

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY  
CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL  
LIBRARY

---

CLASS \_\_\_\_\_

CALL No. 938.005 J.H.S.

D.G.A. 79.

13067



THE JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES  
VOLUME LXXVII (Part I)









Percy Edwards, Chairman

# THE JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES

13067

VOLUME LXXVII (Part I)

1957



938.005

J H. S.

PUBLISHED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE SOCIETY  
FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES

MDCCCLVII

*The Rights of Translation and Reproduction are Reserved*

This number of the JOURNAL has been supervised  
by D. J. Allan, F.B.A., and R. Walzer, F.B.A.,  
in co-operation with the Editors.

**CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL  
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.**

Acc. No. 13067 .....

Date 11.3.1960 .....

Call No. 938.005 .....

J.H.S.

# THE JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES

VOLUME LXXVII (Part II)

1957

PUBLISHED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE SOCIETY  
FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES

MDCCCLVII

*The Rights of Translation and Reproduction are Reserved*

# CONTENTS

	PAGE
HENDERSON, M. I. . . . . Gilbert Murray . . . . .	xv
ANDREWS, A., AND LEWIS, D. M. . . . .	
Note on the Peace of Nikias . . . . .	177
BLACK, R. S. . . . . False Statement in the <i>Sophist</i> . . . . .	181
BOOTH, N. . . . . Zeno's Paradoxes . . . . .	187
CHADWICK, J. . . . . Minoan Linear B: A Reply . . . . .	202
DALE, A. M. . . . . An Interpretation of AR. <i>Vesp.</i> 136-210 and its consequences for the stage of Aristophanes . . . . .	205
DESBOROUGH, V. R. d'A. . . . . A Group of Vases From Amathus . . . . .	212
DIAMANTOPOULOS, A. . . . . The Danaid Tetralogy of Aeschylus . . . . .	220
DOVER, K. J. . . . . The Political Aspect of Aeschylus's <i>Eumenides</i> . . . . .	230
FRENCH, A. . . . . Solon and the Megarian Question . . . . .	238
GASTON, C. . . . . Characterisation in Greek Tragedy . . . . .	247
GOMME, A. W. . . . . Interpretations of Some Poems of Alkaios and Sappho . . . . .	255
HEALY, J. F. . . . . Notes on the Monetary Union Between Mytilene and Phokaia . . . . .	267
KARAGEORGHIS, V. . . . . The Mycenaean 'Window-Crater' in the British Museum . . . . .	269
LEAHY, D. M. . . . . The Spartan Embassy to Lygdamis . . . . .	272
PARRE, H. W., AND DIAREMAN, J. . . . .	
The Struggle for the Tripod and the First Sacred War . . . . .	276
VERMEYLE, C. C. . . . . Herakles Crowning Himself: New Greek Statuary Types and Their Place in Hellenistic and Roman Art . . . . .	283
WRIGHT, G. R. H. . . . . Cyrene: A Survey of Certain Rock-Cut Features to the South of the Sanctuary of Apollo . . . . .	300
 NOTES—	
HAMMOND, N. G. L. . . . . The Battle of Salamis—A Correction . . . . .	311
HAYNES, D. E. L. . . . . Philo of Byzantium and the Colossus of Rhodes . . . . .	311
COLLIER, E. . . . . A Greek Inscription Found in Malta . . . . .	312
MITFORD, F. B., AND NICHOLSON, K. . . . .	
An Inscription From Karpasia in Cyprus . . . . .	313
URE, A. D. . . . . A Boeotian Krater in Trinity College, Cambridge . . . . .	314
WILLIAMS, R. F. . . . . Notes on Some Attic Black-Figure Vases with Ship Representations . . . . .	315
Notices of Books . . . . .	317
Books Received . . . . .	371
Indexes . . . . .	373

# CONTENTS

	PAGE
LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS .. .. .	v
ACKRILL, J. L. .. .. .	1
ALLAN, D. J. .. .. .	7
CALCOTERO, G. .. .. .	12
CHERNOS, H. .. .. .	18
DODIN, E. R. .. .. .	24
FURLEY, D. J. .. .. .	31
GUTHRIE, W. K. C. .. .. .	35
HARRISON, A. R. W. .. .. .	42
HICKEN, WINIFRED F. .. .. .	48
JAEGER, W. .. .. .	54
KNEALE, W. C. .. .. .	62
LANGERBECK, H. .. .. .	67
LELOFS, H. J. DROSSAERT .. .. .	75
MANSION, AUGUSTIN .. .. .	81
MERLAN, P. .. .. .	87
MINIO-PALUELLO, L. .. .. .	93
OWEN, G. E. L. .. .. .	109
REES, D. A. .. .. .	112
SOLMSSEN, F. .. .. .	116
TARRANT, DOROTHY .. .. .	124
TIEDER, W. .. .. .	127
TOD, M. N. .. .. .	132
WALKER, R. .. .. .	142
WEBSTER, T. B. L. .. .. .	149
WILPERT, P. .. .. .	155
Notices of Books .. .. .	163
Indexes .. .. .	174





# LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS

## I

anytown  
anytown  
anytown, Oxford  
an, R. J.  
ckrell, J. L.  
lana, J. W. J.  
lan, D. J.  
Anderson, J. K.  
Appertales, D.  
aker, H. J.  
ckley, H.  
ckley, H. C.  
arbit, E. A.  
Beazley, Sir John D.  
ell, A. Farnworth  
ell, Sir Harold L.  
Berberly, J.  
Bernard, E.  
anahard, B.  
ock, R. S.  
son, C.  
lowman, E.  
owa, Sir Maurice  
ink, C. G.  
son, R. W.  
passing, R.  
son, P. A.  
son, R. W. H.  
son, Mrs L.  
son, P. W. J.  
adler, W. M. III  
arpenter, C. R.  
ernis, H.  
son, C. W.  
mick, R. W.  
Clark, W. D.  
Clayton, C. W.  
Clifford, Miss A. P.  
Cooper, T. Fenimore, Jr.  
Conford, V.  
Cowan, A. H.  
Craig, Mrs. B. D.  
Davies, W. H.  
Davies, W. R.  
eddie, E. R.  
ewer, K. J.  
Kovring, P. R.  
maly, R. H.  
quins, R.  
win, A. C.  
Ferguson, J.  
letcher, G. B. A.  
letcher, W. B.  
Guter, M. B.  
Frankel, R.  
ood, P. R.  
Gajendragadkar, K. V.  
Gatty, R. J.  
Gidley, A. R.  
Gillies, M. M.  
Givonne, A. W.  
Givona, H.  
Gould, C. P.  
Graham, A. R.  
Gow, A. S. F.

Graham, R. B.  
Gregory, D. B.  
Griffith, G. T.  
Gumbert, J. P.  
Gunter, Sir Walter  
Hewlands, R.  
Hall, R.  
Halden, R. L.  
Hardie, C. G.  
Hards, D. P.  
Harrison, A. R. W.  
Higman, I. E.  
Hill, F. R.  
Hogarth, Miss M. L.  
Houlder, P. A. F.  
Jenkins, L. W.  
Jervise, F. H.  
Joseph, T. E.  
Jones, D. M.  
Kent, J. H.  
Kemp, W. C.  
Levinson, R. B.  
Livingstone, Sir Richard  
Lloyd, A. C.  
Lockwood, J. F.  
Low, D. M.  
Lower, J.  
Lydall, A. W. F.  
Mass, P.  
Mabson, J. D.  
McDonald, A. H.  
Mahe, H. D. A.  
McFey, A. J.  
Mackworth-Young, G.  
Madigan, W. G.  
Malcoun, W. F.  
Mallowan, M. E. L.  
Manton, G. R.  
Mandall, Mrs. M.  
Martin, Sir John  
Meurig Davies, P. L. B.  
Milio-Palumbo, L.  
Michael, Miss D. K.  
Moritz, L. A.  
Mullane, H. K.  
Mure, G. R. G.  
Murray, Gilbert  
Myers, R. A. B.  
Nairn, J. A.  
Noble, J. V.  
Noel, A. D.  
Norman, A. E.  
Neworthy, Sir Richard  
Parker, Miss L.  
Phillips, F. D.  
Pickel, F. D.  
Plains, M.  
Potters, A. J. D.  
Pott, L. A.  
Préaux, Mlle. Claire  
Prichard, W. K.  
Rees, D. R.  
Rees, D. A.

Rich, C. G.  
Richardson, L. J. D.  
Richer, Mrs. C. M. C.  
Richardson-Hall, R.  
Robertson, D. S.  
Robertson, J. H.  
Rosen, K. A.  
Roth, Mrs. E. J.  
de Rothschild, A.  
Sackin, G.  
Sandwich, F. H.  
Saydla, G. P.  
Seahard, H. H.  
Seales, R.  
Shotton, B. B.  
Sheto, L. R.  
Sinclair, T. A.  
Singer, P.  
Skemp, J. B.  
Stern, J. H.  
Smith, A. H.  
Stanford, J. W.  
Sturges, P. K.  
Sydney-Pinner, S.

Tarrant, Miss D.  
Taylor, F. A.  
Tchikova, A.  
Thelmer, W.  
Thomas, Mrs. G.  
Thompson, Mrs. M.  
Thompson, J. C. J.  
Tol, M. N.  
Trenkner, H.  
Trotter, A.  
Trotter, A. D.  
Turner, E. G.  
Untermyer, M.  
Vazquez, B.  
Vinton, G.

Wallack, E. W.  
Walsh, W. H.  
Walker, R.  
Wardman, A. E.  
Wasserman, A.  
Webster, P. P.  
Welton, Mrs. A. M.  
Werner, L. B. I.  
Westlake, H. D.  
White, A. S.  
Willard, J. D.  
Wilmington-Lippman, R. P.  
Woodbury, L. E.  
Young, D. C. C.

## II

### INSTITUTIONS

Oxford:  
All Souls College  
Ashmolean Museum  
Department of Classical  
Archaeology  
Balliol College Library  
Bodleian Library  
Christ Church Library

Oxford:  
Clarendon Press  
Corpus Christi College  
Craven University Fund  
Jocelyn Copyright Trustees  
Lady Margaret Hall  
Oriel College Library  
Oriel College

Cambridge:  
Emmanuel College  
Girton College Library  
Jesus College  
King's College Library  
Pembroke

London:  
Bedford College Library  
Royal Holloway College  
University College  
Latin and Greek Department  
(Philosophy Department)  
Westfield College Library

Bangor and North Wales  
Branch (Classical Association)  
Bristol University Library  
Hall University  
Leicester University College  
Manchester, John Rylands  
Library  
Reading University  
St. Andrews University Library  
Southampton University  
Swansea University College  
Library  
University College of North  
Staffordshire

Ottawa:  
British Columbia University  
Library  
Brooklyn, New York: Insti-  
tute of Arts and Sciences  
Heidelberg University, Philo-  
sophy Seminar  
Indiana University Library of  
Research  
Japan: Gakusha Books Co.,  
Osaka  
Louvain, Tijdschrift voor  
Philosophie  
Maastricht University,  
Archaeologisch Seminar  
Rhodesia University College  
Rome: American Academy  
Rome: Pontifical Institute  
Biblical  
Smith College Library,  
U.S.A.  
Toronto: Pontifical Institute  
of Medieval Studies  
Vassar College Library,  
U.S.A.  
Watersand University  
Library, Johannesburg



# LIST OF NEW MEMBERS

Elected during the session 1956-57

## MEMBERS

- Bloch, Herbert, 324 *Plummet Street*, Belmont 78, Massachusetts, U.S.A.  
 Brice-Smith, Rolfe, *Moss Cottage*, Elstead, Godalming, Surrey.  
 Brooks, Edward, Jr., 235 *Exeter Place*, St. Paul 4, Minnesota, U.S.A.  
 Brown, Benjamin W., P.O. Box 25, *Shamrock*, Iowa, U.S.A.  
 Cook, Mrs. E. M., 4 *Edgarcombe Road*, Bristol 6 (on behalf of *Smyrna Museum, Turkey*).  
 Cornford, Mrs. Jean, 111 *Torquay Road*, Paignton, S. Devon.  
 Dennis-Jones, Harold, 14 *Templin Mews*, London, W.9.  
 Doyle, Edwin J., Box 1967, *Tale Station*, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.  
 Du Maurier, Miss Daphne, *Membilly, Par*, Cornwall.  
 Dunbar, Miss Nan V., 10, *Eldon Gardens*, Bishopbriggs, Glasgow.  
 Evans, Prof. J. D., *Institute of Archaeology*, Regent's Park, London, N.W.1.  
 Featey, N. R., 46, *Girton Road*, London, S.E.26.  
 Field, Sgt. Lde. D., *Flat 6, Central Parade*, Orpington, Kent.  
 Glogg, Miss Daphne, 9 *Barn Crescent*, Stammar, Middx.  
 Gunningham, M. R. F., 11 *Fawcett Court*, Fawcett Street, London, S.W.10.  
 Healy, Dr. John F., *Dept. of Classics, The University*, Manchester 13.  
 Holbrook, Mrs. M. J., 3505 S.W. *Baxton Avenue*, Portland 1, Oregon, U.S.A.  
 Hooker, J. T., 46 *Berry Avenue*, Watford, Herts.  
 Jenkins, M. G., 12 *Shirley Road*, Roath Park, Cardiff, Wales.  
 Jones, J. R., *Classics Dept.*, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, W.A.  
 Kirwan, Christopher A., *Charterhouse*, Godalming, Surrey.  
 Kwapong, A. A., *University College*, Accrington, Ghana, W. Africa.  
 Lash, Christopher J. A., 29 *Rosary Gardens*, S.W.7.  
 Lewis, Richard B., 19 *Aldford House*, Park Street, W.1.  
 Lunn, J. E., 97 *Great Eastern Highway*, Ruessdale, Western Australia.  
 MacDonald, Miss Heather, 36 *Milford Gardens*, Edgware, Middx.  
 Macnaughten, R. D., 10 *Common Lane*, Eton College, Windsor, Berks.  
 McKeechie, William P., *Ampleforth College*, York.  
 Munton, A. D., 17 *State Street*, New York 4, N.Y., U.S.A.  
 Mather, Northage J. de V., *Frederick House*, Cornholme, Todmorden, Lancs.  
 Meehan, Miss Cicely, 101 *Marnes Road*, S.W.11.  
 Meinen, Miss Helen J., 416 *Gardner Building*, Toledo 4, Ohio, U.S.A.  
 Minney, R. P., *Lansford House*, Manningtree, Essex.  
 Moyner, Kenneth N., 1 *Lisburn*, Lower Warberry Road, Tiquary, Devon.  
 Neville, H. Richmond, Jr., c/o 711 3rd Avenue, New York 17, U.S.A.  
 Pencreath, Rev. A. G. C. C., *College House*, Cheltenham, Glouc.  
 Perlzweig, Miss Judith, *American School of Classical Studies*, Athens.  
 Peters, Miss Joan, *Wyvern Cottage*, Midon Street, Westcott, Dorking, Surrey.  
 Pope, M. W. M., *Dept. of Classics*, University of Cape Town.  
 Popkuan, Mervyn R., c/o the *Secretariat*, Nicosia, Cyprus.  
 Radice, Mrs. Betty, 2 *Hornsey Lane*, Highgate, N.6.  
 Rayner, Rodenck M. S., c/o *Karnak S.A.L.*, Rue Allenby, Beirut, Lebanon.  
 Rich, Miss Audrey N. M., *University College*, Cardiff, Wales.  
 Robinson, David B., 22 *Lytham Road*, Manchester 19.  
 Rockwell, Kiffin A., 908 W. *Nevada*, Urbana, Illinois, U.S.A.  
 Roth, Mrs. Ellen C., 37 *Cirrus Road*, Maudsley, N.W.8.  
 Serling, Irving D., 179 *South Salina Street*, Syracuse 4, N.Y., U.S.A.  
 Shuttleworth, Henry L. H., *The Red House*, Garsinslith, near Sudbury, Suffolk.  
 Smith, D. Hurdall, *Halesbury and Imperial Service College*, Hatfield.  
 Smith, Wesley D., 15 *University Place*, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.  
 Stathatos, Mrs. Christine, 51 *Patriarchou Ioachim*, Athens, Greece.  
 Swann, Reginald L., *Teachers' College of Connecticut*, 1615 Stanley Street, New Britain, Connecticut, U.S.A.  
 Thomas, J. D., *Dept. of Classics*, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth.  
 Wilman, Brig. J. H., 1 *Oldfield Crescent*, Cheltenham, Glas.  
 Warren, Miss Jennifer A. W., Flat 2, 34 *Empress's Gate*, S.W.7.  
 Warry, John G., 46 *Madara Park*, Tenbridge Wells, Kent.  
 Webster, E. J. Aburn, 57 *High Road*, Woodford Green, Essex.  
 Wiencke, Matthew I., 30/40 *Bedford Place*, W.C.1.

## STUDENT ASSOCIATES

- Aitchison, Miss Jean, *Girton College*, Cambridge.  
 Amit, M., *University College*, London.  
 Blumenthal, H. J., *Trinity College*, Cambridge.

## STUDENT ASSOCIATES—*contd.*

Bridge, B. E., *Koble College, Oxford.*  
 Briscoe, J., *Corpus Christi College, Oxford.*  
 Burford, Alison, *Newnham College, Cambridge.*  
 Burton, Peter W., *Koble College, Oxford.*  
 Coulson, Michael A., *Trinity College, Oxford.*  
 Creer, Miss Ann P., *Somerville College, Oxford.*  
 Davidson, I. D., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Denman, I., *University College, London.*  
 Fairhurst, Miss Eileen C., *Bedford College, London.*  
 Finelli, N. S., *Christ Church, Oxford.*  
 Fisher, J. J., *Hertford College, Oxford.*  
 Foss, Miss Diana, *Hughes Hall, Cambridge.*  
 Foster, M. A., *University College, London.*  
 Goughling, Marreck L., *Magdalen College, Oxford.*  
 Green, J. R., *University College, London.*  
 Jackson, M. A., *Merton College, Oxford.*  
 Jocelyn, Henry D., *St. John's College, Cambridge.*  
 Ladlay, Miss Jean, *Birkbeck College, London.*  
 Lehrer, J. E., *Balliol College, Oxford.*  
 McNelly, Miss Mary, *Somerville College, Oxford.*  
 MacPherson, E. C. E., *Jesus College, Oxford.*  
 Marshall, N. J., *University College, London.*  
 Martinian, W. P., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Mochange, Elizabeth, *Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.*  
 Morrida, R. E. S., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Napier, D., *Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.*  
 Prior, R., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Roberts, Christopher W., *Magdalen College, Oxford.*  
 Rowlands, Adrian, *Jesus College, Oxford.*  
 Simmons, Max C., *St. Hugh's College, Oxford.*  
 Stafford, P. M. O., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Strubbing, Patrick J., *Hammer-smith School of Building and Arts and Crafts, London.*  
 Terry, D. W., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Valacs, Mrs. Helen, *St. Hugh's College, Oxford.*  
 Waterhouse, D. H., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 White, R. M. E., *King's College, Cambridge.*  
 Wilding, Arthur S., *University College of North Wales, Bangor.*  
 Wilson, Christopher, *The Queen's College, Oxford.*  
 Winbury, M. R., *University College, Oxford.*  
 Witherill, Miss Linda A., *Institute of Archaeology, London.*  
 Wotton, M. L. R., *University of Bristol.*

## SUBSCRIBING LIBRARIES

LONDON, *The Headmistress, South Hampstead High School, N.W.3.*  
 WIMBORNE, Dorset, *Gosford School.*  
 AUSTRIA, Graz, *Institut für Geschichte des Altertums und Altertumskunde, Universität Graz.*  
 GIERLANDT, *Bibliothek der Abtei Eßtal, 136 Abtei Eßtal/Obb.*  
     *Göttingen, Abt. für Alt. Geschichte des Instituts für Altertumskunde.*  
 PHILIPPINES, Manila, *Graduate School Library, Ateneo de Manila, P.O. Box 154.*  
 TURKEY, Izmir, *Müzesi Müdürlüğü (per Mrs. E. M. Cook).*  
 U.S.A., Missouri, *University of Kansas City Library.*  
 U.S.A., New Jersey, *Ross Memorial Library, Drew University, Madison.*  
 U.S.A., New York, *Brooklyn Public Library.*

## GILBERT MURRAY

GILBERT MURRAY, President of the Hellenic Society 1945-1947, was born at Sydney on January 2, 1866, and died at Yatscombe on May 20, 1957. His ashes are in Westminster Abbey.

Murray's grandfather fought at Waterloo; his father was President of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales. They were Irishmen. Of the children Murray writes: "We tended to be again the Government . . . 'Pity is a rebel passion,' and we were . . . passionately on the side of those likely to be oppressed." At Southey's school, in the bush near Nattai, Murray's first fight was with a bully. 'I began Greek there, and my first word was *νοῦσα* (of course they pronounced it as if it was a word of praise for a cat).' He left at the age of eleven for England and Merchant Taylors'. At Oxford (St. John's) his tutors included Arthur Sidgwick and Samuel Alexander, his undergraduate friends Charles Gore and H. A. L. Fisher. He won all the classic events, ending with a Fellowship of New College (1888) and the Derby (1889); he made 40 in the Freshmen's match (1885; he had already, with his elder brother Hubert, entertained the victorious Australians to dinner after the Oval Test Match in 1882); he also moved at the Union 'a motion of my own choice . . . a warning of the great danger that threatened all Europe from the militarist powers of Germany and Russia and an appeal to the free nations to unite. . . . After a year at New College he succeeded Jebb in the Chair of Greek at Glasgow.

'Middle-aged responsibility came before its time': Glasgow, Murray said, had robbed him of his youth, yet he never loved another job so much. It taught him to keep order and perfect a skill of lecturing for students who might occasionally be rough, but who insisted on being well taught. Not all of them were rough; among his pupils were John Buchan, H. N. Brailsford, and Janet Spens, who, if she was not the first to rouse his interest in the education of women, undermined his conviction of their intellectual inferiority. He had already been attracted, even dazzled, by the beauty, the friendships, and the vehement idealisms which he found at Castle Howard: Glasgow gave him the income—collected by himself in cash from the students—to propose to Lady Mary, 'consilium paritipati.' Ten years of work, 'impossibly hard,' ended in a breakdown. In 1899 a doctor pronounced him 'permanently incapable of discharging his duties.' He resigned, and retired to Barford, near Churt, on a special Fellowship from New College.

Instead of dying as expected, Murray edited Euripides (1901, 1904, and 1910). By modern professional standards he was not a methodical editor, and he would sometimes (as in his translations) wish a far-fetched meaning upon some MS reading which, not always for the right reasons, he chose to preserve. His assets were mental acuteness, sheer knowledge of Greek, and a strong resistance to what was poetically nonsensical. He never lost the strenuous enjoyment of reconstructing a text; the chief pleasure of his old age was his work with Paul Maas on the revision (1955) of his 1937 Aeschylus. When he edited Euripides he had already published some of his translations of Greek plays. More came out while he formed his long friendships with Bernard Shaw, the Granville Barkers, and actresses from Mrs. Patrick Campbell downwards. He was a born actor (especially in comedy, but his rendering of *Chorophoros* 1021 ff. was magnificent), and his stage sense was brilliant, if not infallibly true to the original dramatist's. His translations have been more commonly judged by such pieces as that which he misquoted 'Could I take me to some tavern for my hiding' than by (e.g.) the splendid narrative of his *Persae* 384 ff. They delighted Shaw and many poets; letters of thanks came from unknown soldiers and trekkers in jungles; his *Trojan Women* was played by the Women's Peace Party of Chicago in 1915 to keep America out of a war which he approved (his *Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey* appeared in that year). At Barford, the Boer War touched off his first public denunciation of nationalist mythology ('National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious,' *JFE* 1900—*Essays and Addresses*, 1921, 160 ff.). This was the angry young man of Shaw's *Major Barbara*, in 'the lifelong struggle of a benevolent temperament and a high conscience against impulses of inhuman ridicule and fierce impatience.'

\* This, with some other passages quoted below, is taken from papers still unpublished.



In 1908 Murray went to the Oxford Chair of Bywater, who had scribbled 'Insolent puppy' against the first words of Murray's preface to his *Literature of Ancient Greece* (1897; republished 1936). Murray had written to Sidgwick in 1894: 'I think a prophet is a good deal needed in Oxford to teach that there are really life and poetry . . . in ancient literature. Bywater knows that this is so, but I doubt if he can make anyone else know it.' England was then at war with the Philistine. To crab Murray's technical erudition is to credit him with more than he desired or deserved. He deeply admired German scholarship, and confessed the difference: he was an amateur and an *animateur*. His Greek verse and prose compositions attest his supremacy in an English tradition of *τέχνη*, but only his secretaries know how incompatible with professional learning was his self-imposed obligation of response—*instant, apt, and sensible*—to the most preposterous calls upon his time. Meanwhile, his impact on the lecture-room can still be imagined from *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (1907), written in the prose of a speaking voice which later became famous on the air, carrying Homer straight to his hearers: 'κεῖτο μέγας πυγῶντι . . . the mighty limbs flung mightily, and the riding of war forgotten.' But Murray was not limited by 'public-schooligan classics.' He was led to translate Sallustius in his *Four Stages of Greek Religion* (1912; *Five Stages* in 1925). In all periods he showed his perception of what his successor at Oxford has called 'the Greeks and the Irrational.' His own 'rationalism' was based on an estimate of human nature which was more Platonic than Pelagian: he recognized and distrusted 'the powers beneath reason which can deceive the brain and unnerve the hand.' His 'liberalism,' whether in party politics or in abolishing compulsory Greek, was simply his prescription of the treatment usually to be advised.

There is not space to speak of the absorbing work for peace which to him was a Hellenist's natural duty. As to his person, most readers of this *Journal* have seen or heard Gilbert Murray. They will give different answers to the question, What made the man greater than his various works? His mind, though always able to modulate and mature, had a coherence which was only reinforced by its blind spots (Shakespeare, music, Roman history). He knew 'that strange mixed passion, known to all artists, which consists, at its higher end, in the pure love of beautiful or noble creation, and, at its lower end, in conscious strain for the admiration of an audience' (*The Greek Epic*, 217). The unity of his life may be found, perhaps, in a continual awareness of danger—danger to Greek studies or to civilized humanity—and in the unfailing response of a fighter.

M. I. H.

TO  
SIR DAVID ROSS  
April 15, 1957





My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F. M. Cornford (in *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato's *Parmenides*, *Classical Philology*, 1942).<sup>1</sup> First it may be useful to give a very brief and unargued outline of the passage. Plato seeks to prove that concepts are related in certain definite ways, that there is a *συντακτὴ εἰδῶν* (251d-252e). Next (253) he assigns to philosophy the task of discovering what these relations are: the philosopher must try to get a clear view of the whole range of concepts and of how they are interconnected, whether in genus-species pyramids or in other ways. Plato now gives a sample of such philosophising. Choosing some concepts highly relevant to problems already broached in the *Sophist* he first (254-5) establishes that they are all different one from the other, and then (255e-258) elicits the relationships in which they stand to one another. The attempt to discover and state these relationships throws light on the puzzling notions *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* and enables Plato to set aside with contempt certain puzzles and paradoxes propounded by superficial thinkers (259). He refers finally (259e) to the absolute necessity there is for concepts to be in definite relations to one another if there is to be discourse at all: *διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συντακτὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν*. So the section ends with a reassertion of the point with which it began (251d-252e): that there is and must be a *συντακτὴ εἰδῶν*.

The question I wish to discuss is this. Is it true to say that one of Plato's achievements in this passage is 'the discovery of the copula' or 'the recognition of the ambiguity of *ἐστίν*' as used on the one hand in statements of identity and on the other hand in attributive statements? The question is whether Plato made a philosophical advance which we might describe in such phrases as those just quoted, but no great stress is to be laid on these particular phrases. Thus it is no doubt odd to say that Plato (or anyone else) *discovered* the copula. But did he draw attention to it? Did he expound or expose the various roles of the verb *ἐστίν*? Many of his predecessors and contemporaries reached bizarre conclusions by confusing different uses of the word; did Plato respond by elucidating these different uses? These are the real questions. Again, it would be a pedantic misunderstanding to deny that Plato recognised the ambiguity of *ἐστίν* merely on the ground that he used no word meaning 'ambiguity', or on the ground that he nowhere says 'the word *ἐστίν* sometimes means . . . and sometimes means . . .'. If he in fact glosses or explains or analyses the meaning of a word in one way in some contexts and in another way in others, and if this occurs in a serious philosophical exposition, then it may well be right to credit him with 'recognising an ambiguity'. I mention these trivial points only to indicate, by contrast, what the substantial question at issue is.

It is generally agreed (e.g. Cornford, p. 296) that Plato marks off the existential use of *ἐστίν* from at least some other use. How he does this can be seen from his remark about *κίνησις* at 258a1: *ἐστὶ δὲ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος*. This *διὰ* does not introduce a *proof* that *κίνησις ἐστίν*: this was already agreed without question before and used to establish a connection between *κίνησις* and *τὸ ὄν* (254d10). Nor, obviously, does it introduce the *cause* why *κίνησις ἐστίν*: it does not refer to some event or state which resulted in the further state described by '*κίνησις ἐστίν*'. The words introduced by *διὰ* give an expansion or *analysis* of *ἐστίν* as this word is used in *κίνησις ἐστίν*, i.e. as used existentially. *μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος* is the philosopher's equivalent of the existential *ἐστίν*; but, as will be seen, it is not his analysis of *ἐστίν* in its other uses. So the existential meaning is marked off.

The philosopher's formulation (*κίνησις μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος*) both elucidates the sense of *ἐστίν* in *κίνησις ἐστίν*, and also makes clear—what is not clear in the compressed colloquial formulation—the structure of the fact being stated; makes clear that a certain connection is being asserted between two concepts. The philosopher's formulation contains not only the names of two concepts but also a word indicating their coherence, *μετέχει*, which is not itself the name of an *εἶδος* but signifies the connection between the named *εἶδη*.

There remain two other meanings of *ἐστίν*, as copula and as identity-sign. The assimilation of these had led to a denial of the possibility of any true non-tautological statements. What is needed in order to deprive this paradox of its power is a clear demonstration of how the two uses of *ἐστίν* differ. By 'demonstration' I do not mean 'proof' but 'exhibition' or 'display'. The

<sup>1</sup> I shall refer to these two works by page numbers, without repeating their titles.

<sup>2</sup> The use of this term may seem provocative. But whether or not the *εἶδη* and *γένη* of the *Sophist* are some-

thing more than 'mere' concepts, a good deal of interpretation of 251-259 can satisfactorily proceed on the assumption that they are at least concepts.

way to sterilise a paradox is to expose and lay bare the confusion from which it arises. One can draw attention to the two different uses of *ἐστιν*, point out how they are related, perhaps provide alternative modes of expression so as to remove even the slightest temptation to confuse the two.

Consider how Plato deals, in 256a10-b4, with the pair of statements *κίνησις ἐστι ταύτόν*, *κίνησις οὐκ ἐστι ταύτόν*. These look like contradictories yet we want to assert both. We need not really be worried (*οὐδ' ἀνυπερβάλλον*); for we are not in both statements speaking *ἀπολύτως*. Analysis of the statements (introduced again by *διὰ*) will show exactly what is being asserted in each and enable us to see that there is no contradiction between them when properly understood. The first statement means *κίνησις μετέχει ταύτου*. The second means *κίνησις μετέχει ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν*.

The essential points in Plato's analysis of the two statements are these: (1) where *ἐστιν* is being used as copula it gets replaced in the philosopher's version by *μετέχει*; (2) the philosopher's version of *οὐκ ἐστιν*, when the *ἐστιν* is not the copula but the identity-sign, is (not *οὐ μετέχει*, but) *μετέχει ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς*. . . . By his reformulation of the two statements Plato shows up the difference between the *ἐστιν* which serves merely to connect two named concepts (copula) and the *ἐστιν* (or *οὐκ ἐστιν*) which expresses the concept of Identity (or Difference) and at the same time indicates that something falls under the concept of Identity (or Difference).

With Plato's procedure here one may compare a passage in Frege's paper *Über Begriff und Gegenstand*.<sup>2</sup> One can just as well assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is green or is a mammal. But, Frege points out, one must distinguish two different usages of 'is'. In the last two examples it serves as a copula, as a mere verbal sign of predication. (In this sense the German word *ist* can sometimes be replaced by the more personal suffix: cf. *das Blatt ist grün* and *das Blatt grünt*.<sup>3</sup>) We are here saying that something falls under a concept, and the grammatical predicate stands for this concept. In the first three examples, on the other hand, 'is' is used like the "equals" sign in arithmetic, to express an equation. . . . In the sentence "the morning star is Venus" 'is' is obviously not the mere copula; its content is an essential part of the predicate, so that the word "Venus" does not constitute the whole of the predicate. One might say instead: "the morning star is no other than Venus"; what was previously implicit in the single word "is" is here set forth in four separate words, and in "is no other than" the word "is" now really is the mere copula. What is predicated here is thus not Venus but *no other than Venus*. These words stand for a concept.

Frege explains the copula by talking of something's falling under a concept; Plato uses for this the term *μετέχει*. Frege expands the 'is' of identity into 'is no other than . . .', in which phrase the 'is' is simply the copula ('falls under the concept . . .') and 'no other than . . .' stands for a concept. Plato expands the *ἐστιν* of identity into *μετέχει ταύτου* . . . (and *οὐκ ἐστιν* into *μετέχει ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς* . . .) where *μετέχει* does the copula's job ('falls under') and *ταύτου* (or *ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς*) names a concept. In offering the analyses that he does it seems to me that Plato, no less clearly than Frege, is engaged in distinguishing and elucidating senses of 'is'.

The claim that one of the things Plato does in *Sophist* 251-9 is to distinguish between the copula and the identity sign would seem to be supported by the following consideration: that this distinction is just what is required to immunise us against the paradoxes of the *διδυμοί* (251b), and Plato does suppose that his discussion puts these gentlemen in their place. Robinson, however, denies that this consideration has any force (p. 174): 'Plato certainly thought of his Communion as refuting the "late learners"'. But it does not follow that he thought the manner of refutation was to show that they confused attribution with identity. Nor is there anything in the text to show that he thought this.<sup>4</sup> Robinson is certainly right to say that it does not follow. Still we are surely entitled—or, rather, obliged—to make some reasonable suggestion as to how exactly Plato did suppose himself to have 'refuted' the late learners. If the above interpretation of 256a10-b10 is sound, that passage exposes the error of the late learners, who construed every 'is' as an identity-sign; and it would be natural to infer that Plato himself regarded the distinction drawn in that passage (and elsewhere) as the decisive counter-move against the late learners. Moreover, if no other reasonable suggestion can be made as to how exactly Plato thought he had disposed of the late learners and their paradox, this fact will be an argument in favour of the interpretation of 256a-b which finds in it an important point which is directly relevant to, and destructive of, the paradox.

Now it might be suggested that it is by his proof that there is Communion among *εἶδη* (251d-252e) that Plato refutes the view that only identical statements are possible; that it is here, and not in later talk about *ὅν* and *μή ὅν*, that he supposes himself to be refuting the late learners. But

<sup>1</sup> I quote Mr. Geach's translation, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, pp. 43-4.

<sup>2</sup> One is reminded of Aristotle, *Physics* 185b29; cf. *ὅτι τὸν ἄλφιον μεταφυσικῶς, ὅτι ὁ ἀπομακρυνόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλλοῦ ἀνελκόμενος, οὐδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν ἀλλὰ σπασίτης*.



what are the arguments by which he proves there is Communion? The first (251e7-252b7) is this: if there were no Communion then philosophers and 'physicists' in propounding their various views would in fact be 'saying nothing' (*λέγοντες ἄν οὐδέν*). It is simply assumed that this apodosis is false and that Empedocles and the rest were talking sense. But, of course, this assumption is exactly what the late learners, maintaining their paradox, will deny; and an argument based on it is obviously no good against them. Plato's second argument for Communion (252b8-d1) is that the theory that there is no Communion cannot be stated without implying its own falsity. As applied to the late learners the argument would be: you say only identity-statements can be true; but this statement—"only identity-statements can be true"—is not an identity-statement; so on your own theory your theory is false. Now this argument is certainly formidable and might easily put a late learner to silence; he could hardly be expected to distinguish between first- and second-order statements. Yet as a refutation of the thesis itself it is surely superficial and unsatisfactory. For the thesis was put forward not only by elderly jokers but also by serious thinkers who felt themselves obliged to maintain it for what seemed to them compelling theoretical reasons. Robinson writes as follows (p. 175): "To such more responsible thinkers it is folly to say: 'But you obviously can say 'man is good'; and if you could not, all discourse whatever would be impossible, including the paradox that you cannot say 'man is good'.'" For these thinkers already know that you can say that "man is good", and that the supposition that you cannot immediately destroys all thought and speech. Their trouble is that, nevertheless, they seem to see a good reason for denying that you can say that "man is good". What they want is to be shown the fallacy in the argument which troubles them. They know it must be a fallacy; but they want to see what it is. Now for such thinkers Plato's exposition of his doctrine of Communion is no help whatever. For he merely points to the fact that we *must* be able to say "man is good", because otherwise no thought or communication would be possible. He does not even notice any argument to the contrary, much less show us where they are wrong.

I agree with Robinson that, for the reason he gives, Plato's proof of Communion cannot be said to dispose satisfactorily of the paradoxical thesis (even though the second argument in the proof is valid against the thesis); for nothing is done to expose the error or confusion which led quite serious persons to embrace the paradox. Surely this passage (251d-252e) cannot be the whole of what Plato has to say in rebuttal of the late learners and their paradox. Surely he somewhere exposes the underlying error, the rotten foundations on which the paradox was built. And he does this, I suggest, for instance in the passage previously discussed, by clearly distinguishing two different uses of *ἐόντι*, as copula and as identity-sign, and by showing how the two uses are related.

Let us turn now to Cornford. He says that the copula 'has no place anywhere in Plato's scheme of the relations of Forms' (p. 279). The relation between Forms that combine—"blending"—is a symmetrical relation; so it cannot be the same as the relation of subject to predicate in an attributive statement, i.e. the relation indicated by the copula (pp. 256-7, 266).

First a very general point. The relation 'being connected with' or 'being associated with' is a symmetrical relation. But there are, of course, many different ways in which things or persons may be associated or connected; and many of these ways involve non-symmetrical relationships. One may say of a group of people, members of one family, that they are all connected. But if one wishes to say *how* they are connected each with the other, one must employ such expressions as 'father of', 'niece of', which do not stand for symmetrical relationships. Now it is agreed by Cornford that the philosopher's task, according to Plato, is to 'discern clearly the hierarchy of Forms . . . and make out its articulate structure' (pp. 263-4). Every statement the philosopher makes in performing this task may be expected to assert some connection or association between Forms. And 'association' is indeed a symmetrical relation. But surely the philosopher could not possibly achieve his purpose without specifying the *kind* of association there is in each case. And he could not do this without bringing in some non-symmetrical relations. Consider the following small extract from a possible 'map of the Forms':



The structure exhibited here must be described by the philosopher; and to do this he *must* advert to a non-symmetrical relationship. In the above diagram the words 'Virtue' and 'Justice' are not merely close together; one is *under* the other. Similarly, Virtue and Justice are not merely connected; they are connected in a particular way: Justice is a *species* of Virtue.

I have discussed these arguments, in another connection, in a short paper in the *Bulletin of the Institute of*

*Classical Studies of the University of London*, No. 2, 1955 pp. 31-35.

Non-symmetrical relations must then be invoked if the complex structure of the 'world of Forms' is to be described; nor is this something Plato could easily have overlooked. Certainly the analogy he draws with letters and musical notes (253a-b) does not support the idea that the dialectician would, according to him, be satisfied with asserting *symmetrical* relations between εἶδη. If we are to say whether 'f' and 'g' fit together, with the aid of 'i', to make an English word we must obviously specify the *order* in which the letters are to be taken: 'gif' is not a word, 'fig' is. The scale of C major is not just such-and-such notes, but these notes in a certain order. Whatever terminology one uses to state the facts about spelling or scales or Forms, some non-symmetrical relation must come in. But if Cornford's view were right and every philosopher's statement told of a symmetrical 'blending' of Forms, the philosopher would never be able to express irreducibly non-symmetrical truths, such as that Justice is a species of Virtue. So we may suspect that Cornford's view is not right.

To this it will be objected that the *Sophist*, though it implies that the philosopher will have to study relations between genera and species, does not itself explore such relations; so a proper interpretation of the *Sophist* should leave them aside and concentrate on how Plato proceeds in exhibiting the relations which he does in fact consider. Let us then look at some of the statements of Communion which Plato makes.

Firstly, 'Motion exists' (I retain Cornford's translation; 'Change' would be better). Cornford says (p. 256): 'Motion exists' means that the Form Motion blends with the Form Existence; and (p. 279) 'Motion blends with Existence' is taken as equivalent to 'Motion exists'. He also says (p. 278): 'The relation intended (sc. by "blending") is not the meaning of the "copula"...; for we can equally say "Existence blends with Motion"'. Taken together these remarks lead to absurdity. For if 'Motion blends with Existence' means 'Motion exists', then 'Existence blends with Motion' must mean 'Existence moves'. And then, if 'Motion blends with Existence' is equivalent to 'Existence blends with Motion', 'Motion exists' must be equivalent to 'Existence moves'. Plato obviously did not intend this. The trouble lies in Cornford's insistence on the 'blending' metaphor, which suggests a symmetrical relation, to the exclusion of others which do not. What 'Motion exists' is equivalent to is not 'Motion blends with Existence' ('blending' being symmetrical), but 'Motion shares in, partakes of Existence' ('partaking of' being non-symmetrical). Cornford's remarks lead to absurdity because he will not let into his exposition any non-symmetrical expression like 'partakes of' (even though Plato's exposition bristles with this metaphor).

Secondly, 'Motion is different from Rest'. Now this is indeed equivalent to 'Rest is different from Motion'. But before drawing any inference concerning 'Communion' we must put the statement into its 'analysed' form, into dialectician's terminology. We get: 'Motion communicates with Difference from Rest'. The question is whether 'communicates with' in this formulation can be taken to stand for a symmetrical relation. But if it is so taken we must be prepared to say that 'Motion communicates with Difference from Rest' is equivalent to 'Difference from Rest communicates with Motion': for the 'Communion' asserted in the first statement is evidently between Motion on the one hand and Difference from Rest on the other. But then, since 'Motion communicates with Difference from Rest' is the technical way of saying that Motion is different from Rest, we must suppose that 'Difference from Rest communicates with Motion' is the technical way of saying that Difference from Rest moves. So we shall find ourselves claiming that 'Motion is different from Rest' means the same as 'Difference from Rest moves'. As before, the absurdity results from taking 'communicates with' as standing for a symmetrical relation. If 'Motion communicates with Difference from Rest' means that Motion is different from Rest (as it clearly does), then 'communicates with' must here stand not for 'blending' but for a non-symmetrical relation ('partaking of' 'falling under').

These considerations, it may be said, are still very general and involve too much extrapolation and 'interpretation'. I am not sure how much weight to attach to this criticism. For one must suppose that Plato had something reasonable and consistent in his mind when writing the very last piece of exposition in *Sophist* 251-9; and if Cornford's account leads, on reflection, to grave difficulties or absurdities this is a sound *prima facie* argument against it. (Even if in the end Cornford's account were to be accepted it would be desirable that the defects in Plato's discussion—as interpreted by Cornford—should be candidly exposed.) However, it is certainly necessary to turn to a closer examination of Plato's actual terminology.

Plato uses a great variety of terms in speaking of relations among εἶδη. While some of them (e.g. *συμμεσθύνειν*) seem naturally to stand for the rather indeterminate symmetrical relation 'being connected with', there are others, like *μετέχειν* which we expect to be standing for some more determinate, non-symmetrical relation. Cornford denies that this expectation is fulfilled and says that Plato does not distinguish 'partaking' from the mutual relation called 'blending' or 'combining' (pp. 296-7). He does not support this by a detailed study of all the relevant passages. His explicit argument that 'participation' as between Forms is a symmetrical relation (like 'blending'; hence



nothing to do with the copula) rests on the one passage 255d, in which Existence is said to *partake* of both τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ and τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο. Cornford writes (p. 256): 'So the generic Form partakes of (blends with) the specific Form no less than the specific partakes of the generic.' And in his footnote on 255d4, he says: 'Note that Existence, which includes both these Forms (sc. τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ and τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο), is said to *partake* of both. This is one of the places which show that "partaking" is symmetrical in the case of Forms.' I do not know which are the other places Cornford here alludes to; yet the reference to 255d is by itself a very inadequate justification of Cornford's sweeping remarks about 'participation', and of his insistence on symmetrical 'blending' as the one and only relation holding between Forms.

Professor Karl Dürr, in his paper *Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik*,<sup>6</sup> assigned precise and distinct meanings to various terms used by Plato in *Sophist* 251-9, but did not attempt anything like a full justification. More useful for us is the following observation by Sir David Ross:<sup>7</sup> 'Plato uses κοινωνία, κοινωνεῖν, ἐπικοινωνεῖν, ἐπικοινωνία, προσκοινωνεῖν in two different constructions—with the genitive (250b9, 252a2, b9, 254c5, 256b2, 260e2) and with the dative (251d9, e8, 252d3, 253a8, 254b8, c1, 257a9, 260e5). In the former usage the verbs mean "share in"; in the latter they mean "combine with" or "communicate with". I do not think Ross should have added that 'though Plato uses the two different constructions, he does not seem to attach any importance to the difference between them'. For Plato does not use the two constructions indiscriminately or interchangeably. A comparison between the two groups of passages yields a clear result (I leave out of account 250b9 and 260e2 and e5, which are not in the main section on κοινωνία γενῶν). κοινωνεῖν followed by the genitive (e.g. θάτερον) is used where the fact being asserted is that some εἶδος is (copula) such-and-such (e.g. different from . . .); that is, it is used to express the fact that one concept falls under another. The dative construction, on the other hand, occurs in highly general remarks about the connectedness of εἶδη, where no definite fact as to any particular pair of εἶδη is being stated. Surely this confirms—what ordinary Greek usage would suggest—that Plato consciously uses κοινωνεῖν in two different ways. Sometimes it stands for the general symmetrical notion of 'connectedness', sometimes it stands for a determinate non-symmetrical notion, 'sharing in'.

There are thirteen occurrences of the verb μετέχειν or noun μέθεξις in *Sophist* 251-9. One of these is at 255d4, in the passage used by Cornford in his argument quoted above. But in all the other twelve cases it is clear that the truth expressed by 'A-ness μετέχει B-ness' is that A-ness is (copula) B, and never that B-ness is (copula) A. For instance, τὸ δὲ μετέχει θάτερον . . . formulates the fact that Existence is different from . . .; it does not serve equally to express the fact that Difference exists,—that is expressed by τὸ ἕτερον μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος. The way Plato uses μετέχειν in all these cases makes it very hard to believe that he intended by it a symmetrical relation.

It is worth attending specially to the passage officially devoted to the statement of certain relations among the five chosen γένη, 255e8-257a11. Here the objective is to state definite truths in careful, philosophical terminology; not merely to allude to the fact that there are connections among γένη, but to say precisely what some of them are. Now in this passage Cornford's favourite metaphor occurs once (256b9), in a purely general reference to the connectedness of concepts (εἴπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὸ μὲν ἀλλήλοις εἶδεναι μελύνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή). And κοινωνία with the dative occurs once (257a9), in an equally unspecific context (εἴπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τῶν γενῶν φύσις). The other terms used are as follows. κοινωνία with the genitive occurs once (256b2) and is used to state the definite relation holding between two named εἶδη (κίνησις and θάτερον); the fact stated is that Motion is different from . . ., not that Difference moves. μεταλαμβάνειν occurs once (256b5) in a passage whose interpretation is controversial. But the significance of the verb is clear. If it were true to say κίνησις μεταλαμβάνει στάσιως then one could rightly say κίνησις ἐστὶ στάσιμος. μετέχειν (or μέθεξις) occurs five times (256a1, a7, b1, d9, e3), in each case expressing the relation between two named εἶδη the first of which falls under the second. Thus all the real work of the section 255e8-257a11, all the exposition of actual connections between particular εἶδη, is done by the terms μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, and κοινωνεῖν (with genitive), that is, by the non-symmetrical metaphor 'partaking of' which Cornford is so determined to exclude. And the role of 'partakes of' in Plato's terminology is clear: 'partakes of' followed by an abstract noun, the name of a concept, is equivalent to the ordinary language expression consisting of 'is' (copula) followed by the adjective corresponding to that abstract noun.

This examination of Plato's use of some terms, though far from exhaustive, is, I think, sufficient to discredit Cornford's claim that the 'blending' metaphor is the one safe clue to Plato's meaning, and to establish that μετέχειν and its variants, μεταλαμβάνειν and κοινωνεῖν (with genitive), are not used by Plato as mere alternatives for μελύνεσθαι. It may be admitted that in 255d, the passage

<sup>6</sup> In *Monism-Helicism*, 1945, especially pp. 171-5.

<sup>7</sup> In *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 111, n. 6.

Cornford exploits, *metéxein* is used in an exceptional way; but one passage cannot be allowed to outweigh a dozen others.\*

To sum up: I have tried to argue firstly, that the verb *metéxein*, with its variants, has a role in Plato's philosophical language corresponding to the role of the copula in ordinary language; and secondly, that by his analysis of various statements Plato brings out—and means to bring out—the difference between the copula (*metéxei . . .*), the identity-sign (*metéxei taútōi . . .*) and the existential *estin* (*metéxei toū oudenos*).

J. L. ACKRILL.

*Brasenose College, Oxford.*

\* This is rather a cavalier dismissal of the passage on which Cornford relies so heavily. But it is not possible in the space available to attempt a full study of the perplexing argument of 253c10-e1, and without such a study no statement as to the exact force of *metéxein* in

253d4 is worth much. My own conviction is that even in this passage *metéxein* does not stand for the symmetrical relation 'blending'; but it is certainly not used in quite the same way as in the other places where it occurs in 251-9.

## MAGNA MORALIA AND NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

In what relation the *Magna Moralia* stands to the genuine works of Aristotle, and to what phase of Peripatetic doctrine it belongs, are questions which have been discussed with a fair measure of agreement by living scholars. Jaeger<sup>1</sup> described the revolution within the Peripatos which, within two generations, led Dicaearchus to reject the ideal of the contemplative life, making human happiness depend on moral virtue and the life of action. Walzer<sup>2</sup> showed beyond reasonable doubt that the M.M. was influenced by Theophrastus's terminology and statement of problems, and was led to infer that the writer, in his treatment of *phronesis* and *sophia*, had formed an uneasy compromise between the views of Theophrastus and Dicaearchus (p. 191). Brink<sup>3</sup> proved from the terminology and style of the treatise, and in a more general way from the structure of its argument, that the author was expounding, probably at an interval of several generations, a received doctrine which he failed to think out properly for himself. Building upon their results, Dirlmeier<sup>4</sup> boldly tried to fix the absolute date of the work within half a century. He argued that it must have been in existence before the first century B.C., since it was used as an authoritative text by the Peripatetic writer from whom Arius Didymus took his compendium of Peripatetic ethical doctrine. On the other hand, a *terminus post quem* can be obtained from 120423, where we read that 'some persons either equate happiness and pleasure, or regard pleasure as essential to happiness; others, unwilling to reckon pleasure as a good, nevertheless add absence of pain (*sc.* to *ἀπηνί*) in their definition of happiness'. Who then were these others? Cicero provides the answer: *Diodorus, eius [Crispini] auditor, adiungit ad honestatem incuitatem doloris* (*de Finibus* V 5, 14, cf. *Tusc. Disp.* V 30, 85). Now this Diodorus lived in the second half of the second century B.C., and the M.M. must be nearly contemporary with him. In confirmation of this, Dirlmeier showed that the writer uses without comment terms which are unquestionably of Stoic origin, such as *προθετικὸς*, *ἐμπειρητικὸς*, *κατὰ φύσιν*, *ἀποκατάστασις*, which are coinages not of the earliest Stoicism but of Chrysippus or his followers. Both Walzer and Dirlmeier have called attention to the fact that the writer shows himself to be wholly without understanding of Aristotle's theology, and actually becomes polemical, refusing to contemplate a God who contemplates himself (1212637-13010).<sup>5</sup>

Dirlmeier's demonstration leads to a date considerably later than that assumed by Jaeger and Walzer, but would appear to me to be conclusive. It is only when he characterises the M.M. as a compendium of Peripatetic doctrine that he seems to me to go wrong. The writer's object is to hold up against Stoic intellectualism, and its alleged progenitor Socrates, the view that moral virtue is a disposition of the irrational part of our nature. Agreeing with the founders of his school that this disposition is rightly regarded as a mean, he nevertheless boldly recasts the doctrine of the mean, insists that only moral virtue is entitled to the name *ἀρετή*,<sup>6</sup> and takes *ἀρετή* rather than *εὐδαιμονία* as his fundamental conception. It is, then, a selective version of Peripatetic ethics that he offers—perhaps one which is designed to make converts from Stoicism—and the choice is not due to inadvertence or misunderstanding.

To lay the foundation for this estimate of the M.M. would require an extensive and detailed discussion for which this is not the proper place. I propose here to consider two passages, the singular character of which seems to have escaped the notice of all those concerned—not unnaturally, since the editors have obscured the meaning by substituting emendations for the reading of the manuscripts. (1) In 1185b14-1187a3 there is a series of literal quotations from the Nicomachean version which the writer, if his words are allowed to bear their normal sense, announces as such. (2) He inserts into the discussion of pleasure a passage (1205a7-25) in which he tries, in the manner of a commentator, to smooth over an inconsistency in Aristotle's doctrine.

<sup>1</sup> *Ursprung u. Kreislauf des philosophischen Lehrenideals* (Berlin, 1928), included as Appendix in English trans. of Aristotle, 2nd edition.

<sup>2</sup> *Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik* (Berlin, 1929).

<sup>3</sup> *Stil und Form des pseudaristotelischen Magna Moralia* (Ohlau, 1933).

<sup>4</sup> *Zeit der Grossen Ethik: Rheinisches Museum*, 80 (1935), pp. 214-23.

<sup>5</sup> His own view to some extent appears when he raises the question: is good fortune due to the care of God for man? (1207a6-17). He rejects this suggestion not because there is no divine providence (on this point he speaks with conventional piety) but because such external good fortune bears no relation to human deserts.

<sup>6</sup> This is in effect, if not always in words, the doctrine

of the treatise, and is seen in such passages as 1185b5-12 and 1206b17-29. The expression *ἀνομιαν ἀρετῆς* nowhere occurs and *ἀρετή* is constantly used without qualification for what Aristotle would term moral virtue. There is an apparent exception in the passage corresponding to N.E. Book VI, where the writer admits that *ἀσπείρα* is a virtue and seeks to demonstrate that *σοφία* must therefore also be one. But here §8 is merely admitting *ἀσπείρα* alongside the moral virtues, not restoring it to the commanding place it has in Aristotle's scheme. He does not regard it as actively producing *σοφία* for the individual or as furthering the contemplative life in the state, or as looking to any higher end and thereby determining the mean. For its definition see 1197a13.



(1) It is necessary to compare three texts: the Nicomachean version, the M.M., and the summary by Arius Didymus preserved in Stobaeus. At this point the general foundation for the definition of virtue as a mean is being laid.

## E.N. 1104a1-19

πρώτον αὖτ' ἐνδεῖς καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθεῖρασθαι· δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίας χρησθαι—ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ἡλικίας ὁρίσκειν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβαλλόντως γυναικῶσι καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλεον καὶ ὀλίγον γυναικῶσι φθείρει τὴν ἡλικίαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ σκίζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.

## M.M. 1185b14-23

ὅτι δὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδὲν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν. δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίας χρησθαι. εὐθείως γὰρ ἐπὶ γυναικῶσι ὁδοὶ αἱ τῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ γυναικῶν φθείρεται ἡ ἰσχύς, ὀλίγων τε ὀσπύσας. ἐπὶ τε ποτῶς καὶ σιτίων ἀσπύσας, πολλῶν τε γὰρ δὴ γυναικῶν φθείρεται ἡ ἡλικία, ὀλίγων τε ὠσπύσας, συμμετρῶν δὲ γυναικῶν σώζεται ἡ ἰσχύς καὶ ἡ ἡλικία. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖσι τοῖς συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.

Didymus apud Stobaeum II 7, ed. Wachsmuth, 137, 24 ff.

τούτους δὲ φασιν ἐπ' ἐνδεῖς καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθεῖρασθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὴν εὐδείξειν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν μαρτυρίαις χρῶνται, βουλόμενοι τῶν ἀφανῶν τὴν ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν παρέχουσαν πίστιν. . . . παραπλησίως αὖτ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.

For the words τῶν ἠθικῶν in M.M., Spengel, in view of the Stobaeus passage, conjectured τῶν αἰσθητικῶν. Susemihl, in the Teubner edition, prints ἠθικῶν without a capital letter, but regards it as unsonant, and in his critical note proposes αἰσθητικῶν. Chandler proposes ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν (i.e. 'apart from moral instances') and Mr. St. G. Stock, the Oxford translator, mentions this with approval. The reading ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν he translates 'it can be seen from moral instances'.

I think there have been two reasons for this suspicion of the text. It is supposed that the author has been tamely following either the Eudemian or the Nicomachean text from the outset, and would not at this stage announce that he proposes to do so. And it has been thought incredible that one work in the Aristotelian corpus could thus appeal to the authority of another. The first ground, however, is a weak one, since the writer might with good reason claim that his approach to the subject thus far had been original. Here I will refer to Brink, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-94, for an excellent analysis of the way in which the relation between ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία is inverted in the M.M.

And there is an excellent reason for reading the words in the sense 'from the *Ethics*'—namely, that the next words are a citation from the *Ethics*, and introduce a whole series of citations. What is more, the maxim now quoted with approval is one to which the writer has already had occasion to refer (1183a26): ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλευμένον τι δεκτικῶν τοῖς μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρησθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοσηρῶν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, and in this negative application of the maxim he can again appeal to Aristotle, who says (*Physics*, Book 2, 193a4): τὸ δὲ δεκτικῶν τὰ φανερά καὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ διαμέτρου κρῖναι ἐστὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὸ γινώσκων.

The principle in question was already almost proverbial, and Aristotle would hardly have claimed to be its discoverer. It is reported that δόξαι τῶν ἀσχηρῶν τὸ φανερόν was an aphorism of Anaxagoras, which was commended by Democritus. A later man of science who approved of it was Diocles of Carystus (*Dox. Graec.* 14.1217). The Epicurean Canonice laid down a similar rule for the investigation of facts beyond our close observation.<sup>2</sup>

The Hippocratic *περὶ διαίτης* contains a passage which may be the origin of Aristotle's statement of the rule. The writer says (I, xi): οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὸ ἀφανὲς σκίπτουσιν οὐκ ἐπιστάται. He proceeds to name divination as an art which 'learns the obscure from the manifest and the manifest from the obscure'. But it is the attempt to do the latter which Aristotle, in the *Physics* passage quoted above, declares to be a sign of want of education. The *περὶ διαίτης* may be contemporary with Aristotle: Jaeger (*Diocles u. Carystos* 170-2, *Paideia*, Vol. III, pp. 33-40) has given grounds for dating it not in the fifth but in the fourth century. Another occurrence of the rule is in [Isocr.] *Ad Demonicum* c. 34: 'In your deliberation use the past as a pattern for the future: τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ ταχίστην ἔχει τὴν διαίτησιν.'

<sup>1</sup> H. Miller, *ὅτι τῶν ἀσχηρῶν τὸ φανερόν*, *Hermes* 63 (1932).

<sup>2</sup> C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicureans*, 257-67.

Proceeding now with our parallel passages, we come to the following statements of the view that virtue has to do with pleasures and pains:

E.N. 1104b8-12

περί ἡδονῆς γὰρ καὶ λύπης ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διό δεῖ ἡχῆσαι πῶς ἐκ τούτων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν. . .

M.M. 1185b32-36

ἔτι οὐ μόνον τοῖς ταυτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφαρτίζειν οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπη καὶ ἡδονή· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. ὅπως τε οὐκ ἐστὶν λαβεῖν ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς· ἐστὶν οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης.

The words διὰ μὲν . . . ἀπεχόμεθα are again quoted at 1189b30-32, during a discussion of voluntary action.

Arius Didymus (Stobaeus, ed. Wachsmuth, 138, 21)

οὐ μόνον δὲ ταύτοις ἀφαρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν ἡμεῖς, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν καλῶν· οὐκ εἶναι δὲ λαβεῖν οὐτ' ἀρετὴν οὐτε κακίαν ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς· τὴν οὖν ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὑπάρχειν.

Here once more the significance of the writer's announcement that he proposed to borrow 'from the *Ethics*' is seen. The Aristotelian text is not, as elsewhere, paraphrased; its key-phrases are reproduced, and eked out with words of explanation. Even during this process the writer is able to make an inconspicuous, but important, alteration. Since he admits no virtues of the intellect, he can omit the qualifying word 'moral'; and in this he is followed by the authority upon whom Didymus depended.

If the following passages, which cannot here be given in *extenso*, are placed side by side in the same manner, it will be seen without difficulty that sentences from the Nicomachean version are similarly imbedded in the text of the M.M.:

E.N. 1103a17 ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ . . . 23 ὅπως δὲ ἐπισθελῇ.

M.M. 1185b38 ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ . . . 1186a8 τῶν ταυτοῦτων.

1105b19 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . —28 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα.

1186a8 μετὰ ταῦτων ταῦτων . . . 22 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ὅμοια.

1109a1 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται . . . 29 διόπερ τὰ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν.

1186b5 ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ . . . 87a4 διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον.

After this, with the words ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἴρηται, the normal treatment of the sources is resumed, and the writer gives, in his own words, the substance of a passage from the *Eudemian Ethics*.

In spite of such verbal echoes, the theory of the mean is here being greatly simplified in accordance with the primacy now assigned to moral virtue. For Aristotle moral virtue is a state of choice, and thereby includes an intellectual element; and the mean, being variable, cannot be found without the assistance of the φρόνιμος, who judges it with reference to a standard. These points are included in his actual definition of moral virtue. In the M.M., however, there is no reference here either to choice and φρόνησις, or to the contrast between an objective mean and one relative to human perception; the writer is content with the statement: 'since, then, virtue is a mean of the emotions, and these either are, or are bound up with, pleasures and pains, we have here another proof that pleasure and pain are its province' (1186a32-35). The words which he repeats from Aristotle, διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι . . . σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον, refer not to the difficulty of ascertaining the mean, but to that of observing it.

Further, in the Aristotelian theory the moral virtues are concerned with both emotions and actions. For the writer of M.M. they are simply moderate dispositions in respect of the emotions. Among the moral virtues the one chiefly affected by this is liberality. It is regarded as a mean in the sentiment of generosity, not in the actions of giving and spending; and Aristotle's assumption that it is concerned with earning and receiving, as well as with giving and expenditure, is criticised. It is no more a part of the character of the liberal man, as such, to acquire wealth than it is part of the brave man's character to be able to manufacture arms (1192a13-20).

I hope it may now be taken as established that the passage extending from M.M. 1185b14 to 1187a4 is, as it professes to be, one of citation from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. And surely this would alone have been a sufficient proof that the M.M. is not a work of Aristotle. He might say in,

for example, the *Politics*, that a point had been made clear in the *Ethics*; but he could not refer without explanation to the *Ethics* in another of his own ethical writings.

(2) My second passage, Book II, 1203a5-25, exhibits the character of the M.M. in a new light. The context is as follows. The arguments of those who say that pleasure is not a good have been set out, five theses being mentioned. (i) Pleasure is a process, and on that account is imperfect; (ii) there are some bad pleasures; (iii) the good is not common, but pleasure is common to men irrespective of character and to men and animals; (iv) the good is excellent (*καρίστητον*), but pleasure cannot be so; and (v) pleasure is a hindrance to the performance of good actions.

After he has finished his answer to the first thesis and before he takes up the second, the writer inserts this passage: (I give the first two sentences in Greek, followed by a suggested translation.)

1203a5: ὥστε εἰ διότι μὲν γένεσις ἢ ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἀγαθὴν ἔδοκει εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδενίᾳ ἡδονὴ γένεσις, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ ἡδονή. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο οὐ πᾶσα, φησὶν, ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὴ. συνίδει δ' ἂν τις καὶ ὑπὲρ ταύτης αὐτίως... φησὶν codd., φασιν Bonitz, Susemihl.

Thus if their reason for thinking pleasure not good was that it is a process, and if no pleasure at all is a process, pleasure can well be good. (He says, however, later that not *all* pleasure is good. We may proceed as follows in order to gain a general view of this matter. Since we hold that "the good" is found in all the categories, substance, relation, quantity, time and the rest, one part of the conclusion is already plain. All activity of a good subject is accompanied by some pleasure; therefore, as there is good in all the categories, pleasure must be good (in all of them)—so that all pleasure should be good. But from the same reasoning it is clear that there are pleasures of different kinds. For the categories in which it is situated are different. The case of the sciences, grammar, etc., is not similar. If Lamprus has knowledge of grammar, his state in respect of such knowledge will be similar to that of anyone else who has it. There is no specific difference between the grammatical knowledge of Lamprus and that of Neleus. But with pleasure this is not so. The pleasures of intoxication and of intercourse are two different experiences. From this it may well be thought that pleasures differ in kind.)

This passage is a familiar one, for it was here that Wilamowitz, in his article in *Hermes* 63 (1928), pp. 103 ff., restored to the text the name Neleus, instead of the meaningless Neus printed by Bekker and Susemihl. Neleus of Scepsis, son of Coriscus, was the nephew and heir of Theophrastus. But the meaning and purpose of the paragraph have not, I think, been sufficiently examined. The reason for this is that all recent editors have read *φησὶν* at 1203a7, apparently thinking that it was easier to regard this paragraph as part of the reply to the antihedonists. But their second thesis is obviously taken up for the first time at 1203a26, 'But another of their reasons for supposing that pleasure is not a good was that there are some bad pleasures.' No one would seem to have succeeded in showing how what follows could be understood as another reply to the same opponents, or what is the point, in that case, of bringing in the distinction of categories. And the passage has no counterpart in the Aristotelian text (E.N. VII, ch. 11-13, esp. 1153b4-13) which is the original of this discussion. Thus there are strong reasons for leaving the text as it is in the MSS., and for holding this to be an insertion by the writer.

If then we retain *φησὶν*, who is the subject understood? A use of *φησὶν* in parenthesis, 'someone may say', serving to state an objection, is highly characteristic of the M.M.; cf. Bonitz, *Index Arist.* s.v. *Personae*, 590a. (Bonitz suggests, however, that in several passages, of which this is one, the word should be changed to *φασιν*.) A well-known example occurs at 1198b11: 'But, it will be said, *φρονίμος* supervises everything and gives orders like one in authority. But perhaps her function is like that of a steward in a household.' The subject of *φροί* is an objector; the second 'but' introduces a reply, and, in fact, as has long been recognised, one which Theophrastus gave.<sup>9</sup> In some contexts it is evidently 'the argument', rather than an unspecified person, which is the subject (1212b38, 1213a1 and 6), but this is hardly a different use.

But there is a different use of *φροί* which is, for obvious reasons, typical of all commentators and writers of paraphrases, namely 'our author says'. This, I suggest, is plainly what is required in the present instance. The writer of M.M. is not interested in the fact that an unspecified person declares that some pleasure is bad, but in the fact that Aristotle, who has just said that pleasure 'may well be good', subsequently does so. He, and no one else, is the subject of *φροί*. It is true enough that Aristotle in answering those who utterly deny the goodness of pleasure seems somewhat to overstate his case, and to leave no room for a distinction between natural and unnatural pleasure, such as his final view requires. It is with the resulting difficulty of interpretation that this marginal comment is concerned, and the writer hopes to explain Aristotle's position by recalling the fact that there is good activity, and so, by hypothesis, pleasure, in all the categories, so that there will be pleasures of different ontological worth, each good in its own way. I must confess that it is obscure to me how in detail he thinks that this will work, but it seems clear that this is the

<sup>9</sup> O. Heylbut, Zur Ethik des Theophrastus von Eresos, *Archiv für Gesch. der Philosophie* I (1888), pp. 194 ff.



general character of the passage, and only on this view is it possible to see why an appeal is made to the doctrine of categories. That Aristotle does hold that some pleasures are unnatural or even unreal, needs no proof; this is the theme of N.E., Book X, ch. 5, and if we confine ourselves to Book VII, he defends in ch. 14 the position that although pleasure in general is good, the excess of physical pleasure is not desirable. And there is a genuine difficulty in seeing how any pleasures can be unnatural when, according to him, all pleasure supervenes upon sound or healthy activity.

The impression that the author of M.M. stands at a considerable distance from Aristotle, and does not by any means maintain throughout the pose of speaking in his name, is thus confirmed. The work is best treated as an example of Peripatetic criticism of the master, undertaken during the attempt to reaffirm his principal positions against the followers of Chrysippus. It may be conjectured that the author upon whom Dielymus's summary is based followed M.M. not because he thought it good evidence for the original teaching of the school, but because it represented to him the most 'modern' version of Peripatetic ethics.

D. J. ALLAN.

*University of Edinburgh.*

## GORGIAS AND THE SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE NEAIO SUA SPONTE PECCAT

MORE than a century ago the great German scholar Welcker tried to confirm the tradition that amongst the sophists the real master of Socrates had been Prodicus. Welcker called him his 'forerunner'.<sup>1</sup> In our century this valuation was once exaggerated to the extent of maintaining that the 'principle of Prodicus'—that is, the care for the exact distinction and usage of the meanings of synonyms—had been the starting-point for every sound development in logic, whereas the methodical pattern presupposed by Socrates in his discussions was, on the contrary, a *Prinzip der absoluten Vieldeutigkeit*, a principle of absolute equivocation and ambiguity, and therefore the starting-point for every kind of trouble in that field.<sup>2</sup>

Of course, the connection of Socrates with Prodicus was justified by the fact that both, in their conversations, appeared frequently to be dissatisfied with certain answers or expressions of their interlocutors, and therefore discussed the meanings of certain terms used by them. But the difference between the two approaches was very sharp, as appears from every passage of the Socratic dialogues of Plato, in which Prodicus is introduced to explain the demands of his synonyms in the midst of the debate.<sup>3</sup> He wants everybody to use, for example, the verb *εὐπαίεσθαι* in some cases and the verb *ἡδοναῖν* in some others, following what he thinks to be the right usage, the *ἀρθρὸς διακρίσις*; whereas Socrates does not care what kind of words one may use, but is only interested in what one really expresses by these words, that is, the meaning which he gives to them. Both search for meanings of words: but Prodicus' question is: What *does it* mean?—and Socrates' question is: What *do you* mean?—Prodicus says: *ἀνδρεία* means this, *θρασύτης* means that: so you shall use *ἀνδρεία* in the first case and *θρασύτης* in the second. Socrates asks: What do you mean by *ἀνδρεία*? (*τί λέγεις τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ*). He does not care for correct speaking: he himself likes to speak *εὐκτὶ τοῖς ἐμυροῦσθαι ἀνδραῖς* (as he says in Plato's *Apology*, 17C). He is interested in the real thing, in what is meant, in the human behaviour which has to be chosen and in the human valuation which has to be given. So Prodicus is the forerunner of all those people who try to determine the proper meanings of the words of a language and to put together its vocabulary for the right usage of those words so long as the passage of time does not change their meanings; and also of those people who write treatises on logic or semantics in the belief that the right knowledge of the meanings of a language is the best method for reasoning well. Socrates, on the contrary, is the perennial master of the real way of reasoning well, stressing not so much logic but dialogic, that is, never pretending to know the true meaning of what has been said by others before *ἐξερᾶζεν* them and never pretending to be immediately understood by others without *διδόναι λόγον* to them, in that incessant dialogue which is the moral life of men.

Now this Socratic ideal of the dialogue is strictly connected with the basic principle of his ethics, *nemo sua sponte peccat* (*οὐδὲὶς ἐκὼν ἑξαπαράσκει*). As a matter of fact, only a person who understands that nobody acts in a certain way without preferring it to any other possible way of action of which he is aware, can be interested in finding out the reasons for such a preference, without being certain in advance that they are wrong.<sup>4</sup> Now, this principle is clearly presupposed in the *Helen* and in the *Palamedes* of Gorgias. This sophist, therefore, might well be considered as the forerunner of Socrates with more reason than Prodicus, although none of his interpreters, as far as I know, seems to have suspected such a connection.<sup>5</sup>

Let us view the main argument of the *Encomium on Helen*. After having briefly recalled her origin and beauty, Gorgias begins the treatment of the real subject of his speech, which is not so much a eulogy as an apology, as was remarked by Isocrates.<sup>6</sup> Gorgias wants, as he says, 'to subject

<sup>1</sup> 'Prodicus von Keos, Vorgänger des Sokrates', in *Stam. Mus. Philol.* 1882 and 1883, reprinted with additions in *Abhandl. Naturgesch.* II (Bonn, 1885), 393-341. Socrates himself says in Plato's *Men.* 96D, that Prodicus had been his teacher. But even if this is not a joke, to study under somebody and to be a disciple of him are not the same thing.

<sup>2</sup> S. Randall, *Die dialektische Satzform Widerpruch*, Copenhagen, 1924; and cf. my criticism, 'Una nuova concezione della logica prearistotelica', in *Giov. ital. d. filol. ital.*, VIII (1927), 209-222.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. the passages quoted in Diehl-Kranz, 5th ed. 24A, 14-16.

<sup>4</sup> May I refer for this to my article 'Socrate' in *Nouvelles Antiquités*, November 1955, 291-308, and to 'Logo e Dialogo', Milan, 1950.

<sup>5</sup> *Helen* and *Palamedes* are still considered only as 'exercises' by K. Freeman (*The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1949, 350) and as 'jeux d'esprit' by E. Dupréel (*Les Sophistes*, Neuchâtel, 1949, 61), although he has carefully analysed many aspects of Gorgias' ethics. As to the interpretation of Gorgias by M. Unterstriner (*I Sofisti*, Torino, 1949, 114-243), I find it very difficult to understand it, even in the English translation by K. Freeman (*The Sophists*, Oxford, 1954, 92-203).

<sup>6</sup> *Encomium Helenae*, 13-15. That Isocrates' quotation of the *ὑπερβασις ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλένης* really refers to Gorgias and not to another apologist of Helen, is now generally accepted.

her story to critical examination, and so rescue her from ignorant calumny'.<sup>7</sup> His point is that she acted as she did because she was irresistibly compelled to do so. As long as such a compulsion is supposed to have been determined by *Tύχη* or by *Ἀνάγκη* or by the Gods or the violence of a man, there is no question: her innocence is obvious. But now Gorgias maintains that she was irresistibly compelled, and therefore deprived of any *αἰτία*, even if the compulsion was only enacted through *πειθώ*, persuasion: and this despite the fact that *βία* and *πειθώ* were for his contemporaries the precise technical terms used to express the opposition between coercive and non-coercive behaviour, as the distinguishing characters of tyranny and democracy, of slavery and freedom.

This is evidently the main contention which Gorgias has to prove, and so he devotes to it the seven central paragraphs of his speech (8-14: seven precede and seven follow), beginning with the expression of his conviction that although his task may appear difficult, it will be easy for him to fulfil it: *εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογίσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ἰδὲ.*<sup>8</sup> And here immediately follows the famous passage on the power of the *logos*, which has always been considered as the most typical expression of Gorgias' philosophy: *λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν.* . . . This power is not only the emotional force of poetry, *λόγος ἔχων μέτρον*, or the magic wizardry of incantations: it is also the power which we would call the persuasive force of reason:—

(13) 'That Persuasion, when added to speech, can also make any impression it wishes upon the soul, can be shown, firstly, from the arguments of the meteorologists, who by removing one opinion and implanting another cause what is incredible and invisible to appear before the eyes of the mind; secondly, from legal contexts, in which a speech can sway and persuade a crowd, by the skill of its composition, not by the truth of its statements; thirdly, from the philosophical debates, in which quickness of thought is shown easily altering opinion.'<sup>9</sup>

Gorgias expatiates on this subject of the various forms of the influence exerted by *λόγος* and its *πειθώ* upon the soul; but the conclusion is always the same, and it is clearly expressed in §12: *λόγος γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας, ἣν ἐπείσεν, ἠνάγκασεν καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ συνενέσαι τοῖς ποιομένοις.* ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκαῖον αἰστέει, ἢ δὲ πεισθεῖσι ὡς ἀναγκασθεῖσι τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα ἀκούει κακῶς. Persuasion by *λόγος* is equivalent to abduction by force, as nobody can fail to 'consent to what is done' if he 'agrees to what is said'; in other words, nobody can help acting in accordance with the considerations to which he has been brought. In Socratic terms, *οὐδαίς ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνει*, nobody does anything, which may appear wrong from a better point of view, without considering it *ἀγαθόν* from his point of view. And even if this point of view is the visual perception of those objects which induce us to fall in love with them, the situation does not change, as Gorgias says in the last section of his speech: *εἰ γὰρ ἔρως ἦν ὁ πείσας, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεσθαι τὴν τῆς λεγομένης ἀμαρτίας αἰτίαν.* ἂ γὰρ ὁρώμεν, ἔχει φῆσαι οὐχ ἦν ἡμεῖς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἕκαστον ἔτυχε· διὰ δὲ τῆς ὕψους ψυχῇ καὶ τοῖς τρόποις τυπύσθαι (§15). We see the things as they happen to be, not as we want them to be! And what follows seems to anticipate some well-known Socratic analyses of the nature of fear and courage, as dispositions of the soul depending upon its way of seeing things as *δεσνὰ* or *θαρραλέα*, which we find in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Laches*.<sup>10</sup> The general conclusion is repeated in §19: if Eros is a god, gods are irresistible, *εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἀμόρτημα μεμπτόν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον.* There is no need to change here, with Weidner and Immisch, *νομιστέον* into *οἰκτιρτέον*, or to add *εὐξίων ἐλέου* with Reiske: Gorgias has already said, at the end of §7, *δίκαιον οὖν τὴν μὲν οἰκτεῖραι*, expressing the same idea of the *ἔλεος*, 'compassion', deserved by the *κακοὶ* inasmuch as they are *ἡμαρτέει*, which is so common in the Platonic passages concerned with the Socratic principle *κακῶς ἐκὼν οὐδαίς*.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> §2. The quotation is from the summary given by K. Freeman in her *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1952), 191.

<sup>8</sup> The feeling of the difficulty of his task is again expressed by Gorgias some lines farther on, if the beginning of §9 has, as I think, to be read with Immisch *οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογίσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι* (all other readings give a poor sense).

<sup>9</sup> From the summary of K. Freeman (see above, note 7), which is here almost a complete translation.

<sup>10</sup> Compare, for example, what §§16-17 say about the *δύσας* as engendered in the soul by the notion of a 'future danger' with the definition of *δεινὸν* as *μέλλοντα κακὰ καὶ θαρραλέον* as *μέλλοντα ἀγαθὰ* and of the *ἀνδρεία* as *ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ τῶν θαρραλέων* in *Laches* 195B ff.

<sup>11</sup> This principle, which is clearly ascribed to Socrates also by Xenophon and Aristotle, was evidently considered so important by Plato that he never disowned it through

all his life, although he did not follow it in many developments of his philosophy. Cp. e.g. *Apol.* 25D-26A; *Protag.* 333E; *Hipp. Minor* 376B; *Hipp. Major* 296C; *Gorgias* 483A, 306C; *Resp.* 336E, 362C; *Tim.* 86D-E; *Leg.* 734B, 860D. By the way, as in *De unit.* 374A, Socrates quotes this principle as expressed by 'a poet' who said *οὐδαίς ἐκὼν πομπὴν οὐδ' ἔκων μόνον* (which seems to be Epicharmus fr. 7 Diels-Kranz with the last two words so changed from *ἐκὼν ἔκων*), and as in *Protag.* 345E he ironically finds it expressed in Simonides' poem. I wonder whether this sort of play with ancient poets (which is referred to also in Plato's *Apol.*, 22B) may not have been extended by Socrates also to Homer. In this case, *οὐδαίς ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνει* may have been the witty invention of K372 *ἔκων δ' ἡμαρτέει* *ἔρως*. As a matter of fact, some MSS. (quoted by Allen, *ad loc.*) say at this point that some people changed the first *ἐκὼν* to that of A350, reading



Let us now look at the *Palamedes*. The hero defends himself by proving, first, that he could not have carried into effect his supposed treason even if he had wanted to, and, secondly, that he could not have wanted to perform the actions of which he is accused, even if he had had the opportunity of performing them. The first part of the defence, which is by far the shorter of the two, does not concern our problem (as the first part of the *Helen* did not). But the second part is a continuous reassertion of the principle which we know as the basis of Socrates' ethics. Right from the beginning, in §13, Palamedes asks: What motive could I have had? And the reason given for this question is a statement of that principle: οὐδὲς γὰρ βούλεται προῖκα τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνους κινδυνεύειν οὐδὲ τὴν μεγίστην κακότητα εἶναι κάκιστος. The formula οὐδὲς βούλεται προῖκα εἶναι κάκιστος corresponds almost literally to the formula οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός. Only a few lines farther on, the same presupposition is expressed in the following passage: ἀλλ' ὅσους ἐκόντες ἐκόντι παραδύκουσιν, μισθὸν τῆς παραδοσίας ἀντιδιδόντες; ἀλλὰ γε πῦρα πολλῆς μορίας καὶ πιστεῦσαι καὶ δέξασθαι: τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐλευσάτο δουλείαν ἀντὶ βασιλείας, ἀντὶ τοῦ κρατίστου τὸ κάκιστον; (§14). As a matter of fact, the impossibility of 'choosing the worst instead of the best' is a typical point frequently underlined by Socrates in the demonstration of his principle. At the beginning of §16 we read the sentence καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν τιμῆς ἐνεκα τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἀνὴρ ἐνχειρήσειε καὶ μέσως φρόνιμος, which presupposes the idea that a reasonable man cannot do things which he judges harmful to himself. And §18 insists: κακῶς δὲ παθεῖν οὐδὲ εἰς ἐπιθυμῶν πανουργεῖ. And §19: διδόνων γὰρ τοῦτωι ἐνεκα πάντες πάντα πράττοισι, ἢ κέρδος τι μετιόντες ἢ ζημίαν φοβούμενοι. This theme of the κέρδος seems to anticipate the subject of the *Hipparchus*, whose connection with the principle *nemo sua sponte peccat* I think to have proved sufficiently.<sup>12</sup> Finally, in §25 Palamedes says that he cannot be accused at the same time of two opposites, wisdom and madness: the accuser, who does so, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ἐναντιώτατα λέγει (a sentence in which has been found an echo of contemporary discussions about the logical rule which was later to be called the Law of Contradiction). And here follows §26, to which we shall compare a corresponding passage from Plato's *Apology of Socrates*:

*Palam.* 26 Βουλόμεν δ' οὐκ οὐκ παρὰ τὸν νόμον παθεῖν, πιστεῖν τοῖς ἀφ' οὗτοις ἄνδρες, ἐπιζήσαντες ἀνθρώπους ἢ φρονίμους· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνοήτους, κακῶς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθές· εἰ δὲ φρονίμους, οὐδ' ὀφείλου προῖκα τοῖς γε φρονιμώτεροις ἐξαρματίζεσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἁμαρτίαν καὶ μάλλον ἀπειθεῖν κακῶι πρὸ παρὸντος ἀγαθοῦ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ σοφός, οὐκ ἔμμενται· εἰ δ' ἡμέτεροι, οὐ σοφός εἰμι. οὐκοῦν δὲ ἡμιότεροι ὡς εἴρη φευδής.

*Pl. Apol.* 25D Τί ὅρτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοιοῦτον πρὸς ἐμὸν σοφώτερος εἰ τηλεκίτου διπλὸς τηλεκίσεδον, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνώσκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται, δεῖ τοῖς μάλιστα πλεονέχον ἐντύον, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμβαλίας ἦκα, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, εἴην τινι μετ' ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον τὸν σιγῶνται, κινδυνεύοις κακῶι τι λαβεῖν ὅπ' αὐτῶν; . . . Ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοὶ οὐ πείθωμι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου ἀθέτως· ἀλλ' ἢ σὺ διαφθείρεις ἢ, εἰ διαφθείρεις, θάνατον ὥστε σὺ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρω φευδής.

Gorgias' passage, even taken by itself, is completely Socratic in its content: every word might have been said by Socrates in a Platonic dialogue. But even more astonishing than this coincidence between the main principle of the defences of Helen and Palamedes and that of Socrates' ethics, is the similarity of this passage to that from the *Apology* which we have placed side by side with it. They end practically with the same sentence, after two formulations of a dilemma which is also substantially the same, because it refers always to the principle *nemo sua sponte peccat*, according to which nobody can, at the same time, ἁμαρτάνειν and be σοφός or διαφθεῖρειν and do so ἐκὼν.<sup>13</sup> Now, the coincidence between Gorgias' *Apology of Palamedes* and Plato's *Apology of Socrates* is not limited to this passage, but permeates the entire structure of both works. In order not to take too much space with quotations, we only mention, for each subject, the corresponding passages (indicating both works with the initials of their authors, and with an X. Xenophon's *Apology*, when the correspondence extends to it too).

Death is not the real issue: everybody is condemned to die: G.1; P.38C-D; X.27.

Real issue: if ἀποθαιεῖν happens δικαίως or not: G.1; P.34E-35C; X.28.

Death is preferable to νεισχροὺν behaviour or repute: G.35; P.38E-39B.

therefore καὶ βέλτε, οὐδ' ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἡμῶνται θάνατος. They probably wanted to restore the harmony between Socrates and Homer, showing that the *ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις* of Ulysses was not a real ἁμαρτία, otherwise it could not have been *λύειν*!

<sup>12</sup> See my commentary on the *Hipparchus* (Florence, 1938), where I have also tried to show that there are many reasons to believe in its authenticity.

<sup>13</sup> It is also to be remarked that a few lines before

Socrates had asked Meliton: εἰτι οὐκ ὅστις βούλεται ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶντων βλάπτεσθαι μάλλον ἢ οὐδελαισθῆναι: 25D), which corresponds to the μάλλον ἀπειθεῖν ἐκὼν πρὸ παρὸντος: or ἀνυπερβῆναι ὄντως, if one prefers Rademacher's to Diels' conjecture! ἀπαθῶν of Gorgias' passage; whereas the term ἀνυπερβῆναι, corresponding to ὑπερβῆναι and ἀνυπερβῆναι of Gorgias, appears in what immediately follows in Plato's *Apology* (26A).

Judges who may condemn people to death should not decide in one day: G.34-35; P.37A-B.

If you kill me, my fame will cause you to be blamed: G.36; P.38C.

I could not go elsewhere as an exile: my hosts would become suspicious, and it would be a *blōs* *oû* *βιωτός*,<sup>14</sup> in Greece as well as *ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις*: G.20; P.37C-E; cp. *Crito* 53B-54A.

Not only am I not guilty, but I am your *εὐεργέτης*: G.30; P.36C (the best proof of my innocence is my entire life: G.28-29; X.3).

I will not use lamentations and prayers, in order to move you to pity; I will only *διδάσκειν τὸ ἀληθές*: G.33; P.34C-35C, cp. 38D-E; X.4; 9.

Interruption of the *ἀπολογία* by a *διαλέγεσθαι* with the accuser: G.22; P.24B ff.; X.19 ff.

Now we can understand why in the enumeration of the most important sophists made by Socrates in Plato's *Apology* (19E) Gorgias comes first, before Prodicus, and why the first hero put to death by an unjust sentence, whom Socrates thinks he may meet in Hades, is Palamedes (41B). Not only must he have heard Gorgias presuppose in his discussions the same principle upon which he was to base his ethics;<sup>15</sup> he must also have clearly remembered Gorgias' *Apology of Palamedes* when he pronounced before his judges his own apology, of which we certainly have the best document in Plato's work. After all, this information is definitely given to us by Xenophon, who presents Socrates himself as recalling Gorgias' *Apology* in his *Apology* (26): *παρουσιάζεται δ' ἐν μὲ καὶ Πυθαγόρης ὁ πυθαγόρειος ἐμὸν τελευτήσας· ἐν γὰρ καὶ νῦν πολὺ καλλίων ἤμους παρέχεται Ὀδυσσεύς τοῦ ἐδίκως ἀποκταίνοντος αὐτόν*. Josef Morri<sup>16</sup> has well argued that this passage cannot be an allusion to Euripides' *Palamedes* (fr. 588 Nauck), and that *ἤμους* and *ἡμῶν* may refer also to prose works: as a matter of fact, Gorgias himself (fr. 5b Diels-Krauz) seems to call his encomia *ἤμους*. Moreover, Morri (who had strongly underlined the coincidence between Gorgias' *Palamedes* and Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates* as to the point that everybody is already condemned by nature to die, without noting, however, the far more numerous coincidences, in this and in other points, with the Platonic *Apology*), quotes Xen. *Mem.* IV, 2, 93: *Τὰ δὲ Πυθαγόρου οὐκ ἀσκήσας πάθῃ; ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ πάντες ἡμῶν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύς ἀπώλυνται*. In connection with this interpretation, according to which Odysseus had accused Palamedes because he was envious of his *σοφία*, Morri refers to Gorgias' *Palamedes* (23: *σοφίαν μὲν κατηγορεῖς*) in order to show that the situation here is the same, and that therefore this is the work quoted by Socrates in Xenophon.

This may be true or false, but in any case Xenophon was particularly influenced by Gorgias, and certain aspects of this influence may confirm what we have seen concerning the relation between the sophist and Socrates. Nestle, who has carefully studied the sophistic heritage in Xenophon,<sup>17</sup> recognises for instance Gorgias in the *διδάσκαλος τῶν παιδῶν* about whom Cyrus is told by his father in *Inst. Cyn.* I, 6, 31. *Ἡ δὲ δίδασκεν τοὺς παῖδας τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . μὴ φεῖσθαι καὶ φεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐξαιπῶν καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν, καὶ μὴ διαβᾶλλειν καὶ διαβῶλλειν, καὶ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. Διόριζε δὲ τούτων ἡ τε πρὸς τοὺς φίλους πινητέον καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἐχθροὺς. Καὶ ἐν δὲ ταῦτα ἐδίδασκεν ὡς καὶ τοὺς φίλους δίκαιον εἴη ἐξαπατᾶν ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν φίλων ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ*. Now, if this *διδάσκαλος* is really Gorgias,<sup>18</sup> it is also easy to see that his doctrines are very similar to certain *loci communes* of the ethics of Socrates, who liked to show, in his criticism of the traditional *ἀρεταί*, how what is good from the point of view of a single *ἀρετή* in certain cases is not good in other cases; for example, that which is good with reference to friends may not be so as regards enemies, and so on.<sup>19</sup> On the other side, Nestle agrees with Hertlein and Ritter, who see a symbolic representation of both the destiny and the fundamental moral principle of Socrates

<sup>14</sup> Gorgias' *ἀβιωτός βίος* (20) and *βίος οὐ βιωτός* (21) literally correspond to Plato's *βίος οὐ βιωτός*, which appears just a little farther in his *Apology* (38A). It is to be remarked that such expressions, according to the 'Word-index' of Krauz in Diels' *Fragmenta*, are used only here in all the pre-Socratic period (*ἀβίος* in Antiphon has just the opposite meaning). I cannot, therefore, understand why Untermyer, in his commentary on this passage (J. *Sofist*: *testimonia et fragmenta*, II, Florence, 1949, 123-4), says that Gorgias' *ἀβιωτός βίος* is an 'espressione impropria', quoting Empedocles fr. 2, 3 as reading *βίος ἀβίος*. This is only a conjecture of Scaliger, the text given by Sextus is *ζωῆς βίος*.

<sup>15</sup> And possibly also discusses topics which became at the same time well-known points of departure for Socratic discussions: for example, the relation between *διδασκαλία* and *ἀγωγή* (*Palamedes*, 31, and cf. *Crito*, 49Bff.) or the idea

that one has to help friends and injure enemies (*Pal.*, 18).

<sup>16</sup> 'Des Gorgias Palamedes und Xenophons Apologie', in *Homos*, LXI (1926), 367-70.

<sup>17</sup> W. Nestle, 'Xenophon und die Sophistik', in *Philologus*, XCIV (1939-40), 31-50. On the influence of Gorgias upon Xenophon see also H. Schacht, *De Xenophanti studiis rhetoricis*, Berl. Diss. 1890, and K. Münscher, in *Philologus*, Suppl. Band 13, 1920, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Nestle sees in Gorgias' philosophy the common source of what is said in this passage, in *Alcibiades* 3, and in Plato, *Resp.*, 331E ff.

<sup>19</sup> Every criticism by Socrates of the single traditional *ἀρεταί* in the early Platonic dialogues might be quoted as an example for this: e.g. the discussion of the *σοφροσύνη* in *Charmides*: *σοφροσύνη* is not equivalent to walking in a slow and dignified manner, because in certain cases it is more *σῶφρον* to hurry, and so on).



in the portrait of the man of whom Tigranes tells Cyrus that his father sentenced him to death because he thought that he was corrupting him, whereas the man was, in fact, so καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, that he advised the son not to be angry with the father for this: οὐ γὰρ κακοποιῶ ἐνὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀγαθῶν ὁποῖον δὲ ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξαπατῶνται, πάντα ἀκούοντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ τοιῶν (Inst. Cyri, III, 1, 38). And so we see that in the main educational work of Xenophon, it is Socrates and Gorgias who seem to be present, as masters of the youth, worthy to be idealised together; Gorgias maintaining points familiar also to Socrates, and Socrates reasserting his *nemo un sponte peccat*.

Anyway, be it as it may with Xenophon, the presence of the aforementioned principle in Gorgias' *Helena* and *Palamedes* is evident, we believe, after our analyses of their contents. G. Bux<sup>20</sup> was right in remarking that the 'logical' structure of both those discourses has nothing to do with the ideas of Teisias and Corax. Neither defence presupposes any likely reconstruction of facts individually connected with the personal situation of Helen or of Palamedes—as, for instance, all other defences of Helen in Greek literature do, including the very inept one of Isocrates.<sup>21</sup> They are based only on general arguments, which could be employed by any other person accused of adultery or treason. But it is no use to say that this type of argumentation is an *apagogischer Schlussbeweis*, whose presence in both defences as well as in the *Ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* reveals all of them to be only exercises in Eleatic dialectic.<sup>22</sup> What is important is the real content of this *Beweis*: and this, we have seen, is nothing else than the sum of the considerations, upon which the *nemo un sponte peccat* of Socrates is based.

The date of Gorgias' discourses is not certain, but no one has thought that they might have been written after 410 B.C.<sup>23</sup> As it is also quite unlikely that they were composed by the very old Gorgias after the death of Socrates, there is no reason to change the ancient view that the *Defence of Palamedes* influenced Socrates' own defence as well as its descriptions by Plato and Xenophon, and not vice versa. At the same time, the idea of the irresistible power of λόγος and πειθώ, so brilliantly outlined in the *Helena*, coincided with the οὐδὲν ἐκὼν κακός of Socrates, but also confronted him with the most important problem of moral conduct. In fact, Gorgias, envisaging the *nemo un sponte peccat* in its most elementary form, might fall into a sort of moral indifference. Everybody could act only according to his persuasions: so everybody could dominate the others if he was able to persuade them!<sup>24</sup> Against this new tyranny of the *logos*, which was both threatening the independence and directing the behaviour of the *ψυχή* in her most intimate realm (by the way, even this idea of the soul as the seat of consciousness and moral conduct, in which Burnet and Taylor saw the most important element of Socrates' philosophy, has been found present in Gorgias' discourses), Socrates had to find a remedy. And this was not a repudiation of the *nemo un sponte peccat*, but the discipline of the πειθώ by the διδῶν. Everybody acted according to his private reasons, but everybody had to διδόναι λόγον of these reasons and to ἀκτεῖν λόγους of the reasons of the others, in order that the better ones could exercise their better πειθώ. So the μέγιστον ἀγαθόν was for Socrates the ἐξέταξις through the διδῶν, both in this life and in any other possible life<sup>25</sup>; and the κατὰ ὅραξ διδόμεσθαι was the only civic discipline necessary in order to check the μακρολογία of the rhetors and their possibly bad πειθώ.<sup>26</sup> But this was not enough for Plato, who was not

<sup>20</sup> 'Gorgias und Parmenides', in *Hermes*, 1911, 203-407. Certain coincidences between *Palamedes* and Plato's *Apology* had also been noticed by H. Gompertz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, Leipzig, 1912, 9-11; in his defence of the authenticity of Gorgias' discourses.

<sup>21</sup> The history of the defences of Helen has been studied by M. S. Khalaf, 'Absolutio Helenae', in *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo*, 1950, 81-98, which unfortunately I was unable to trace. The fact that Gorgias' discourses do not consider any individual circumstances of Helen's and Palamedes' actions, but generally prove every adultery or treason to be either impossible or unimportant, had been stressed also by H. Gompertz, *Soph. und Rhet.*, 11. But, considering such demonstrations simply as absurdities, he saw in them only the proof that Gorgias' discourses were mere jokes.

<sup>22</sup> Through a similar reduction of the real arguments to their external structural pattern H. Gompertz, *Soph. u. Rhet.*, 11, had already arrived at the conclusion that the *Ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* was a pure display of rhetorical ability, not less than *Helena* and *Palamedes*. I believe that I have proved, on the contrary, that also the *Ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* is neither a joke nor an exercise, but a highly ironical *reductio ad absurdum* of the Eleatic philosophy (especially of Zeno); see the chapter on Gorgias in my *Stoa and Eleatism*, Rome, 1951, 157-220.

<sup>23</sup> *Helena* is placed by Preuss (*Die Griech. Helene*, Leipzig, 1911) between the *Protrita* and the *Helena* of Euripides, in 414 B.C., and by Pohltz (*Nachr. d. Göt. Ges. d. Wiss.*, 1920, 166) before the *Timaeus* (see also K. Freeman, *Pro-Soc. Philos.*, 343). The *Palamedes* is dated before 411 by E. Maas (in *Hermes*, XXII, 1887, 379).

<sup>24</sup> In Plato's *Gorgias* 452D-E Socrates asks Gorgias what he thinks to be the μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, and how he can give it to men: he answers that it is the πειθώ καὶ λόγος, because it causes the ὅραξις ἐκαστοῦ, making everybody else a δούλος. The same idea (see ὁ τοῦ ταύτην νόμιον ἀνέστης ὅραξις ὅραξις—πάντα ἐκὼν ὄντας; ὁ δὲ δὲ ὅραξις καὶ λόγος) of the fact that πειθώ is attributed to Gorgias in *Philos.*, 38A B. So πειθώ, which was the essential instrument of any democratic opposition to a tyrannical *logos*, becomes the instrument of a new sort of tyranny *logos* καὶ πειθώ, until it is checked by δικαιοσύνη.

<sup>25</sup> Plato, *Hel.*, 38A, 41B and 41C, for the interpretation of these passages, my article 'Socrates' quoted above, note 4.

<sup>26</sup> This explains also the fundamental value of the opposition between the sophist's *apologos* and the Socratic *eros logos* declaration in Plato's *Protagoras*. According to Deussen, 'Sophistik', 80-1, Gorgias 449B-C might be considered as a proof that the word *apologos* *apologos* was at that time alien to Gorgias than to Protagoras. This could be another sign of his particular

only a teacher but a politician as well, and did not possess the quiet Socratic patience to wait for the slow results of the *diálogos*. The reason why we find the manifesto of his new position in a dialogue entitled *Gorgias* is probably that he could not discuss the faith in *παιδεία* and *οὐδείς ἐκείνους* *καὶ* *διαλόγος* of his master Socrates without beginning by a discussion of the faith in *παιδεία* and *οὐδείς ἐκείνους* of the master of Socrates himself.

GUIDO CALOGERO.

*University of Rome.*

proximity to Socrates. In any case, the only one who had not understood anything at all was poor Prodicus. Confronted with the choice between *μικρολογία* and

*βραχυλογία*, he just recommended a moderate length! (*μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ ῥημάτων ἔδει ὅτι λόγους τέχνη· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων ἀλλὰ μετρίων*; *Phaedrus*, 267B).

In a recent article written by Mr. G. E. L. Owen to prove that contrary to the general current opinion the composition of the *Timaeus* must have antedated that of the *Parmenides* and its dialectical successors,<sup>1</sup> it is contended that when the *Timaeus* was written the analysis of negation given in the *Sophist* could not yet have been worked out. 'For', Mr. Owen writes, 'the tenet on which the whole new account of negation is based, namely that τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐστὶν ὄντως μὴ ὂν (*Soph.* 254D1), is contradicted unreservedly by *Timaeus*' assertion that it is illegitimate to say τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐστὶν μὴ ὂν (38B2-3); and thereby the *Timaeus* at once ranks itself with the *Republic* and *Euthydemus*.<sup>2</sup> After brushing aside Cornford's attempt to reconcile this passage of the *Timaeus* with the *Sophist*,<sup>3</sup> Mr. Owen concludes his treatment of it with the words: 'So the *Timaeus* does not tally with even a fragment of the argument in the *Sophist*. That argument is successful against exactly the Eleatic error which, for lack of the later challenge to Father Parmenides, persists in the *Timaeus*.'

An examination of the other arguments put forward by Mr. Owen in support of his thesis concerning the relative chronology of the *Timaeus* I reserve for another place.<sup>4</sup> Here I propose to consider only the meaning of this one passage and whether it really does imply that the *Timaeus* must have been written before Plato had conceived the doctrine enunciated in the *Sophist*. It is a question not now raised for the first time. More than half a century ago Otto Apelt asserted that this passage of the *Timaeus* is enough to prove that work earlier than the *Sophist*.<sup>5</sup> His assertion did not go unchallenged;<sup>6</sup> and Apelt himself appears to have lost his original confidence in it, for in his later writings on the relative chronology of the two dialogues he did not again refer to it.<sup>7</sup>

The statement of *Timaeus* 38B as Mr. Owen represents it does certainly appear to contradict the tenet of the *Sophist* that he quotes; and yet, if a few relevant passages in other dialogues are called to mind, one must suspect that this apparent contradiction does not necessarily imply the chronological sequence that he so confidently infers from it. The argument in the *Sophist* to establish the existence of τὸ μὴ ὂν is undertaken in order to prove the possibility of ψευδὴς δόξα or ψευδὴς λόγος, the sophist having denied this possibility on the ground that ψευδὴς δόξα would be τὸ μὴ ὂντα δοξάζειν and that τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐτε διαρρέχεται τινα οὐτα λέγειν: οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' αὖτις τὸ μὴ ὂν μετέχειν.<sup>8</sup> Now, in the *Theaetetus* (188D-189B) the suggestion that ψευδὴς δόξα is τὸ μὴ ὂντα περὶ ὅτιον ὁδοῦν δοξάζειν is abandoned by Socrates on the ground that ὁ μὴ ὂντα δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει — ὁ μὴ ὂντα δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν δοξάζει: οὐκ ἄρα εἰς τὸν τε τὸ μὴ ὂντα δοξάζειν οὐτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὐτε ἀπὸ αὐτῶν.<sup>9</sup> According to Mr. Owen's way of arguing, this ought to prove that Plato when he wrote the *Theaetetus* had not yet thought of the solution recorded in the *Sophist*, namely that τὸ μὴ ὂν in this context means not 'non-existence' but *ἄτερον* and that consequently, as a true statement asserts τὸ ὂντα ὡς ἐστίν, one does make a false statement by asserting of a subject τὸ μὴ ὂντα, since this is simply to assert of it ὂντα which are different from the ὂντα that pertain to it.<sup>10</sup> Yet a few pages earlier in the *Theaetetus* itself among the 'common terms that apply to everything' and which it was agreed the soul comprehends by itself without mediation of any bodily faculty there were explicitly

<sup>1</sup> *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. (II = XLVII) (1953), pp. 79-97; referred to hereafter simply as 'Owen'.

<sup>2</sup> Owen, p. 81.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 98, n. 3: 'The non-existent' means (as in ordinary speech) the absolutely unattainable, of which, as the *Sophist* shows, nothing whatever can be truly asserted.'

<sup>4</sup> For one of these I have already had occasion to refer in *J.P.P.* LXXV (1954), pp. 129-30. Thus far I have seen commentaries upon Owen's article by Profs. J. O. Skemp (*Plato's Statesman* [1952], pp. 237-9), G. C. Field (who very generously sent me the text of his unpublished communication unpublished in *Proc. of the Classical Association*, I, 1 (1953), p. 72), and Gregory Vlastos (*Philosophical Review*, LXXII [1954], pp. 334, 335, 336, and 337-338, 340); but in none of these is there any reference to Owen's use of *Timaeus* 38B2-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Mon. Mus.*, I, (1893), p. 429, n. 2, reprinted in his *Platonische Aufsätze* (1912), p. 260, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. G. Freudenthal, *Platon: II Sophist e l'Uomo Politico* (1911), pp. 94-5. Among other interpretations which 'reconcile' the passage of the *Timaeus* with the doctrine of the *Sophist*, cf. especially F. Susemihl, *Die Genetische Entwicklung des plat. Philosophie*, II, 1 (1860), p. 376;

E. Halévy, *La Théorie Platonicienne des Sciences* (1896), pp. 433-3 and 268-70; N. Hartmann, *Platos Logik des Seins* (1909), p. 134, n. 1; P. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre* (1921), p. 364.

<sup>7</sup> It is not mentioned in his edition of the *Sophist* (1897) where the relative chronology of that dialogue is discussed (pp. 37-41), and nothing is said of it in his later translations of the *Timaeus* (either in the Introduction [p. 20], where the *Timaeus* is declared to be earlier than the *Sophist*, or in the note on 38B [n. 73 on p. 161]) and the *Sophist* (p. 13), where that dialogue is dated c. 364 B.C. In the Introduction to his translation of the *Parmenides* (p. 13) Apelt states that both *Timaeus* 38B and the doctrine of τὸ μὴ ὂν in the *Sophist* are equally results of the same Platonic error, the conception of the copula as 'Daseins-ansdruck'; but it is not suggested that one of the two must be later than the other.

<sup>8</sup> *Sophist* 261D1-3, cf. 254D6-254B9.

<sup>9</sup> Earlier in the dialogue this tenet was ascribed to Protagoras in the defence that Socrates is made to pronounce for him (*Theaetetus*, 167A7-B: οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὂντα διαρρέχον δοξαῖν).

<sup>10</sup> *Sophist* 263H and 263D.



included οὐσία καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι and τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ ἄτερον;<sup>11</sup> and in the *Parmenides*, which according to Mr. Owen antedates the *Theaetetus*,<sup>12</sup> Plato makes use of the formula of the *Sophist* for the function of ἄτερον<sup>13</sup> and distinguishes between the sense in which τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ὅτι οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας and so cannot be named or spoken of<sup>14</sup> and that in which τὸ μὴ ὄντα τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι because τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι implies that εἶναι μὴ ὄν as well as μὴ εἶναι ὄν must be predicable of τὸ μὴ ὄν.<sup>15</sup> What is more, the conclusion concerning true and false statement in which the argument of the *Sophist* culminates and which presumably Plato had not yet thought of when in *Theaetetus* 188D-189B he made Socrates abandon the suggestion there proposed is casually formulated at the very beginning of the *Cratylus*. There<sup>16</sup> Hermogenes without hesitation agrees to Socrates' suggestion that a λόγος is true if it states τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν and false if it states τὰ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν and that it is therefore possible λόγῳ λέγειν τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ μὴ; in short τὰ μὴ ὄντα in this context means τὰ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.<sup>17</sup> Without mentioning this Mr. Owen for other reasons does suggest, to be sure, that the *Cratylus* belongs in the 'critical group' of dialogues that follows the *Parmenides*; but such meagre arguments as he gives for this arrangement are not cogent,<sup>18</sup> and it is not clear whether in any case he would be willing to make the *Theaetetus* antedate the *Cratylus*. Even to do so, however, would not suffice to explain *Theaetetus* 188D-189B, for the formula of the *Cratylus* appears in the *Euthydemus* too, the dialogue that Mr. Owen couples with the *Republic*, saying that the *Timaeus* at once ranks itself with them by the assertion in *Timaeus* 38B2-3. To Euthydemus' argument that no one speaks τὰ μὴ ὄντα and that therefore Dionysiodorus in speaking speaks τὰληθῆ τε καὶ ὄντα Ctesippus retorts ἄλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινα λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὡς γὰρ ἔχει.<sup>19</sup> This is equivalent to the definition of ψευδὲς λόγος given in the *Cratylus*,<sup>20</sup> and as it is there identified with λέγειν τὰ μὴ ὄντα so here Ctesippus substitutes it for his earlier statement, ὁ ταῦτα λέγων . . . οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει,<sup>21</sup> upon which Euthydemus had seized to argue that no one speaks τὰ μὴ ὄντα.<sup>22</sup> When Plato composed the *Euthydemus*, then, he must have recognised as a fallacy the argument that it is impossible λέγειν τὰ μὴ ὄντα because τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστι and must have held that in τὰ μὴ ὄντα λέγειν the words τὰ μὴ ὄντα mean τὰ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, unless one is prepared to believe that the *Theaetetus* antedates the *Euthydemus* as well as the *Cratylus*,<sup>24</sup> one must look for the explanation of *Theaetetus* 188D-189B not in the relative chronology of that dialogue but in the meaning and function of the passage in its context;<sup>25</sup> and the same holds true with all the more force of *Timaeus* 38B2-3, for

<sup>11</sup> *Theaetetus* 185C-11; cf. D. Peiper, *Die Erkenntnistheorie Platos* (1874), pp. 383 f.

<sup>12</sup> Owen, pp. 82, 87, 94. Even among scholars who hold the 'orthodox opinion' that the *Timaeus* is later than the *Sophist* which is closely preceded in order of composition by the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides* there has been lively debate as to whether the *Theaetetus* is earlier or later than the *Parmenides*; cf. e.g. A. Diès, *Parménide*, pp. XII-XIII and *Theétète*, pp. 120-3; L. Stefanini, *Platon*, I, pp. LXXVIII-LXXXI and II, p. 133, n. 4; Sir David Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, pp. 6-9.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Parmenides* 143B3-7 and *Sophist* 255E4-6.

<sup>14</sup> *Parmenides* 163C2-164B4 (cf. 163C6-D1 and 164B1-2).

<sup>15</sup> *Parmenides* 162A6-B4. The question of the text in 162A8-B1 does not affect the crucial point made here, i.e. τὸ μὴ ὄν (scil. μετέχει) . . . οὐδαμῇ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν (162B1-2). It may be said, however, that despite Diès in his edition and Calogero (*Studi sull' Eleatismo*, p. 244, n. 1) the text which Burnet adopted from Shorey (*A.J.P.*, XII [1891], pp. 349-53) is surely right, for τὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν in A8 is guaranteed both by τὸ μὴ εἶναι in B1 and by τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχει μὴ εἶναι in A5-6 and this in turn requires τὸ μὴ εἶναι (μὴ) ὄν in B1-2 (cf. Shorey's reference to *Anal. Prior.* 31B36 ff., *op. cit.* p. 353).

<sup>16</sup> *Cratylus* 385B.

<sup>17</sup> When later *Cratylus* in turn denies the possibility of false statement on the ground that whatever one says one says τὸ ὄν (429D), Socrates ironically remarks that this doctrine is too subtle for him and then elicits from *Cratylus* the grudging admission (430D-431C) that there can be false assertion consisting in the ascription to things of ὀνόματα, ῥήματα, and their combinations, λόγος, that are dissimilar or inappropriate to them (n.b. 430D7-7, 431B2-C1 and the similarity between the latter passage and *Sophist* 263D1-3).

<sup>18</sup> Of Owen's statements concerning the relative chronology of the *Cratylus* (pp. 80, n. 3 [sch. fn.]; 82, n. 3; 84, n. 3 [sch. fn.]; 85, n. 6) only the last is of any impor-

tance; and that, as I have shown elsewhere (*A.J.P.*, loc. cit., note 4 *supra*), depends upon a misinterpretation of *Timaeus* 49C-50B.

<sup>19</sup> *Euthydemus* 284C7-B.

<sup>20</sup> As was recognised by M. J. Rouh, *Platonis Euthydemus et Gorgias* (1783), p. 326.

<sup>21</sup> *Euthydemus* 284B1-2.

<sup>22</sup> When Dionysiodorus takes up the argument of Euthydemus again (*Euthydemus* 285A II.), Socrates, attributing it to the circle of Protagoras and still more ancient persons (cf. *Theaetetus* 167A7-B, *Cratylus* 429D2-3), says that he has always wondered at this self-refuting doctrine (285C, cf. 287E-288A).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. P. Friedländer, *Platon*, II, p. 188. Without citing the passages of the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus*, R. G. Bury in 1895 (*Journal of Philology*, XXIII, pp. 196-7) had maintained that the doctrine of the *Sophist* concerning μὴ ὄν as ὄν is 'fundamental for Platonism from first to last'.

<sup>24</sup> This chronology too has been proposed, of course. So, for example, E. Heidegger (*Sokrates und Plato* [1896], pp. 318-20, 330, 333, 342) argued for the order *Theaetetus*, *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Euthydemus* and P. Natrup (*Platos Ideenlehre* [1921], pp. 119 and 122-3) contended that both the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus* were written as appendices to the *Theaetetus*, though both believed the *Timaeus* to be a much later composition than any of these.

<sup>25</sup> The same is true of *Republic* 478B6-C1. The argument there is so similar to that of *Theaetetus* 189A-B that according to Owen's method of interpretation the *Theaetetus* ought to be ranked with the *Republic* and both made to antedate the *Euthydemus*. Yet, since *Republic* 477A3-4 and 478D7 show that the μὴ ὄν of 478B6-C1 is τὸ εἰδέναι μὴ ὄν, it is possible to interpret this passage as asserting only what is asserted in *Sophist* 237E and 238C8-10 and as being perfectly compatible therefore with the later logical analysis of false statement in that dialogue; and that *Theaetetus* 188D-189B is to be explained by a similar interpretation rather than by the relative

it is even less likely that the *Timaeus* antedates the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus* than that the *Theaetetus* does so.<sup>24</sup>

Even the immediate context of *Timaeus* 38B2-3 is not considered by Mr. Owen. Moreover, his paraphrase of 38B2-3 itself is incorrect, for *Timaeus* does not there assert that 'it is illegitimate to say τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι μὴ ὄν'. What he does say (38AB-B3) is that we make such statements as τὸ γεγενημένον εἶναι γεγενημένον, τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι γιγνόμενον, τὸ γενησόμενον εἶναι γενησόμενον, τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν εἶναι, none of which is an 'exact' or 'precise' expression ('οὐκ ἀκριβὲς λέγομεν').<sup>25</sup> This is not at all the same thing as to assert that these expressions are illegitimate; against such a misleading confusion one should be put on guard not only by the language itself<sup>26</sup> and by remembering that Plato elsewhere disparages the concern with scrupulous precision of expression in ordinary circumstances<sup>27</sup> but also by the very next sentence in this passage (38B3-5), which declares that this is not the proper occasion for a precise account of these expressions. This sentence has been taken by some to be a specific reference to an earlier discussion and by others to be a promise of such a discussion to come;<sup>28</sup> it is neither the one nor the other, but it does clearly imply that Plato has more to say than he thinks appropriate to this context concerning the possible meanings of these imprecise expressions.

It is of ordinary Greek usage that he is here speaking when he says that the expressions in question are employed imprecisely.<sup>29</sup> When in the *Sophist* he undertakes to prove that one can with impunity say of τὸ μὴ ὄν that it is really μὴ ὄν (254D1-2), he does so by giving the expression a precise and unequivocal meaning, by explaining that μὴ ὄν in this context means not ἐναντίον τι τοῦ ὄντος but ἕτερον μόνον (257B3-4); and whenever he uses the expression there he is careful to call attention to this qualification. Mr. Owen, to be sure, gives the contrary impression, saying that 'this formula (scil. τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι μὴ ὄν) is echoed insistently and always without the reservation which would be required on Cornford's interpretation' and citing in support of this *Sophist* 258C2-3 and *Politicus* 284B8 and 286B10.<sup>30</sup> The two passages in the *Politicus*, however, do not state the 'formula' at all but simply refer to the argument in the *Sophist* with the words καθάπερ ἐν τῇ σοφιστῇ προσηραγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν and τὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ περί τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐσίας (scil. μακρολογίαν). In *Sophist* 258C2-3 the 'formula' appears but not without the careful reservation, first in 258B2-3 (that μὴ ὄν (cf. B6) as here used signifies not ἐναντίον δέκαίνω (scil. τῷ ὄντι) ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου and again in the sentence in question itself (258C2-3) that τὸ μὴ ὄν is μὴ ὄν in the same sense that has just been defined for τὸ μὴ μέγα and τὸ μὴ καλόν.<sup>31</sup> At the conclusion of the passage Plato defines τὸ εἶδος τοῦ μὴ ὄντος as ἡ θατέρου φύσις, of which τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μέριον ἀντιτιθέμενον is τὸ μὴ ὄν (258D5-E3), insists once more that he is not speaking of μὴ ὄν in the sense of τοσοῦτον τοῦ ὄντος (258E6-7), and re-emphasises the argument that, in the sense in which he has here been speaking of it, it must be possible for τὸ μὴ ὄν to be μὴ ὄν just because it is ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος (259A2-B1). The only other passage in which the 'formula' occurs at all and the only one in which it might be said to occur without this qualification is that in which the whole discussion is introduced (254D1-2). It is just because the meaning of the expression in the *Sophist* is precisely defined that as it is used there

chronology of the dialogue is all the more probable because of the preceding passage, 185C-E (see note 11 *supra*), and the following one, 189C1-4 (cf. David Peiper, *op. cit.* *Index* 11 *supra*), p. 70.

<sup>24</sup> The *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, and *Theaetetus* belong to the large group of writings in which Plato paid no particular attention to the occurrence of hiatus, while the *Timaeus* belongs to the smaller group, consisting of the *Ion*, *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*, in which its occurrence is systematically avoided, and this is the best 'objective' evidence that all of the writings in this latter group are later than any of those in the former. I must reserve for another place discussion of Owen's attempt to circumvent this evidence as well as of the merits and shortcomings of the statistics of vocabulary, which he rejects, and of the statistics of prose-rhythm that he adopts.

<sup>25</sup> For this use of *ἀκριβής* see especially *Republic* 340D3-341A2, 341B5-6, 341C1-2, 342B6-7, 345B3 and Proclus, *In Timaeum* 239D 111, p. 25, 247; Diels: . . . ἀκριβοτέρως μέλλω δὲ ἀκριβεστερα ἀποφασίσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν.

<sup>26</sup> Not even for Aristotle is a statement illegitimate because it is not *ἀκριβής* (*Rhetoric* 1369B1-2; *Eth. Nic.* 1094B1-12 and 1104A1-10); cf. also Theophrastus, *Hut. Plant.* I. ii, 5.

<sup>27</sup> *Theaetetus* 184C1-3 (cf. *Memorabilia* II, 993A10-12) and *Politicus* 284B1; cf. *Theaetetus* 199A2-9, *Ion* 534A, and *Euthydemus* 277E-278C, this last an example of Plato's

attitude towards the so-called *ἀκριβολογία* of Prodicus (for which cf. L. Radermacher, *Antonia Scriptores*, pp. 67-8, nos. 6-10).

<sup>28</sup> Cornford (*Plato's Cosmology*, p. 68, n. 4) took it to be a reference back to the *Sophist*. Leisner (*Littrachische Studien*, II, p. 360) insisted that it promises a later discussion, which in fact occurs in *Parmenides* 131E-137B, from which it follows that the *Timaeus* antedates the *Parmenides*. Pfeiderer (*Sokrates und Plato*, p. 548) maintained that on the contrary it is a backward reference to the *Parmenides* (cf. Süsswold, *Genetische Entwicklung der Plat. Philosophie*, II, 2, p. 376). The 'reference' appears to have been a matter of debate among the ancient commentators also (cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 233E-F [111, p. 38, 39 ff., Diels]).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ἀπορίαν* in 37E3 which governs τὰ εἰδητὰ in 38AB and 38B3; cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 233D 111, p. 47, 28 B. [Diels]: τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν ἑλλήνων διήλυξε, καὶ οὐκ ἀνίσταται τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀπορίων.

<sup>30</sup> Owen, p. 89 and p. 89, n. 5. For Cornford's interpretation see note 1 *supra*.

<sup>31</sup> *οἷον* At καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν . . . μὴ ὄν. Boeckh's addition of *ἐπὶ μέρους* and *ἐπὶ καθόλου* in 258C1-2 is highly improbable, and Cornford was right in rejecting it (*Plato's Cosmology*, p. 102, n. 2); but perhaps instead of construing as Cornford does one should take καὶ before τὸ μὴ μέγα in C1 as introducing a new clause depending upon *ἀπορίαν* ὄν.



it is exempt from the criticism of *Timaeus* 38B1-3; but this does not invalidate the assertion made in the *Timaeus*, and there is no reason then why, if it is still valid, Plato could not have made it after he had established the precise formula of the *Sophist*. Aristotle provides an instructive parallel to this situation. In *Physics* 187A5-6 he says that there is nothing to prevent τὸ μὴ ὄν from being—not ἀπλῶς but—μὴ ὄν τι and in *Metaphysics* 1003B5-10 that, since by reference to οὐσία even negations of it are said to be, ἀδὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φησιν; but then in *Metaphysics* 1030A23-26 he asserts that it is a mere verbalism (λογικαῖς) to say 'as some do' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν. It would be absurd to suppose that this third passage must represent either an earlier or a later stage of Aristotle's thought concerning τὸ μὴ ὄν than the other two, although its relation to them is analogous to that in which the statement in the *Timaeus* stands to the tenet of the *Sophist*.

The assertion made in the *Timaeus* is true, and its truth is in no wise impaired by the argument of the *Sophist*. To say simply τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν εἶναι is to speak imprecisely, for besides the meaning vindicated for the expression in the *Sophist*, τὸ μὴ ὄν is not Being, i.e. is what is other than Being, there are other ways in which it could and perhaps more probably would be interpreted, e.g.:

(1) 'Non-Being is non-existent.' Whatever the correct reading of *De M.X.G.* 979A37-B1 may be, this is the sense in which the author there uses ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν to refute Gorgias, i.e. 'because Non-Being (or 'that which is not') is non-existent'.<sup>16</sup> It is probably the sense on which depends the sophistical argument reported by Asclepius also.<sup>17</sup>

(2) 'Non-Being is non-Being.' In this sense the copula makes the statement the tautology that Aristotle calls a mere verbalism.

(3) 'Non-Being is (exists as) non-Being.'<sup>18</sup> Gorgias in his argument passed from the tautology of (2) to this meaning in order to conclude οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πρὸς ἄλλα.<sup>19</sup> To which the Anonymus replies (979B4-6): εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν, οὐδ' οὕτως ὁμοίως εἴη ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι ὅτι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἔτι.

(4) 'What is not, if it is not, exists.' This meaning is exemplified in the argument of *Parmenides* 162A-B; cf. 162B1-3: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν . . . οὐαίας τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν (scil. μετέχει), εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐ τοιότως μὴ ἔσται.

The other expressions listed in *Timaeus* 38B are similarly imprecise, for the predicates εἶναι, γεγονός, εἶναι γινώμενον, and εἶναι γενησόμενον can be understood in three different ways:

(1) They may be taken as periphrastic forms of the perfect, present, and future tenses;<sup>20</sup> and, so understood, the three expressions would mean simply τὸ γεγυγός γέγονε, τὸ γινώμενον γίγνεται, τὸ γενησόμενον γενήσεται. The first and third of these are themselves imprecise, for the first may indicate process concluded either at the present moment or at any moment in the past and the third may indicate either the future conclusion of process or its future continuation.<sup>21</sup>

(2) The participles may be understood, however, in a genuinely adjectival sense, in which case the meaning is that the subject has the attribute or characteristic expressed by the participle. The distinction between this sense and the preceding one is exemplified by the remark in *Euthyphro* 10C: . . . εἰ τι γίγνεται . . . οὐκ ὅτι γινώμενον ἐστὶ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται γινώμενον ἔσται.

<sup>16</sup> It is improbable that this is meant to refer to Plato's *Sophist*, as most modern commentators suppose it is. In the *Sophist* (258C9) τὸ μὴ ὄν is expressly said to be ἐκπῆλον τῶν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις λόγος δὲ, whereas the true, referred to here, as Pseudo-Alexander points out (*Metaph.* p. 473, 17-19), do not according to Aristotle say that τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐκπῆλον καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν. Asclepius (*Metaph.* p. 305, 30-31) takes the reference to be to the sophists. τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅτι μὴ ὄν was used by Gorgias (*Aristotle*, *De M.X.G.* 979A26; cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII, 67); and Aristotle may have in mind such arguments as his, in fact the same kind of expressions as those to which Plato refers in *Timaeus* 38B.

<sup>17</sup> Or 'that which is not' or even 'the false' (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1017A31-32, 1020A35, 1031A34-B2).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. G. Calogero, *Studi sul Platonismo*, p. 174 but also the note of Loveday and Foster in the Oxford Translation, Vol. VI ad loc.

<sup>19</sup> *Metaph.* p. 305, 31-32: τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστὶ ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶν; εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν, πᾶσι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ἐστὶ (τὸ) μὴ ὄν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν (τὸ) μὴ ὄν, οἱ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν καθόλου ποιοῦσιν, ὅτι πᾶσι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. Hayduck saw that the last proposition requires the exclusion of the second (τὸ), but the alternative is an argument only if the former (τὸ) also is excluded: 'if it exists, it is obviously absurd to say that it is non-existent'. For μὴ ὄν used predicatively in this

sense, cf. Plutarch, *Adv. Coloten* 115B (p. 190, 28 [Pohlenz]).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Porphyry *apud* Simplicium, *Phys.* p. 135, 1-2: . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγειν εἶναι, οὕτως μέντοι εἶναι ὡς μὴ ὄν.

<sup>21</sup> *De M.X.G.* 979A25-28 (on which see Calogero, *op. cit.* [note 36 supra], p. 161). Cf. Sextus, *Adv. Math.* VII, 67, p. 204, 10-11 [Bekker]: ὃ δὲ ἐστὶ (scil. τὸ μὴ ὄν) μὴ ὄν· εἴτι ἐστὶν and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1302A4-5: οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ὄν.

<sup>22</sup> These periphrastic forms of the perfect and present tenses are common; cf. e.g. for γέγονε: ὅτι = γέγονε *Philolaus* 33C6, *Symposium* 204D2 and for γινώμενον ἐστὶ = γινώμεται *Politica* 301D8, *Letter* Bacc7-8. The periphrasis with the future participle is less common, but it occurs along with the periphrastic present and aorist in *Letter* 888E2-6 (cf. E. B. England, *The Letters of Plato*, II, p. 432 ad loc. and Agazzi's translation, *Platonica* (1927), p. 402). Cf. also Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis* 1080D (p. 114, 16-17 [Pohlenz]) where γεγυγός ἐστι = γεγυγός and γενησόμενον ἐστι = μέλλει.

<sup>23</sup> In *Parmenides* 141D-E Plato avoids the former ambiguity by distinguishing between εἶναι γέγονε and εἶναι γέγονε and the latter by coining γενησόμενον which he distinguishes from γενησεται; cf. Proclus, *In Parmenidem*, col. 1237, 23-24 (Cousin) and A. Moulin, *Rev. de Philologie*, XLVIII (1924), pp. 43-4.





Now, Plato himself in the *Timaeus* habitually uses of the phenomenal world the kind of expressions that he here says are imprecise, e.g. γεγονός, γεγονός ἔστιν καὶ ἔρ' ἔσται, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ὁντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.<sup>52</sup> Even immediately after having stated that such expressions are imprecise, he declares that the phenomenal world ἔστιν . . . τὸν ἀπῶτα χρόνον γεγυώς τε καὶ ὄν καὶ ἐσόμενος.<sup>53</sup> His use of such an expression at this very point must certainly have been deliberate: it underscores the statement (38B3-5) that this is not the proper occasion for a precise account of these expressions; it suggests that use of the normal idiom, imprecise though it is, is justified if only one is aware of its imprecision; and it invites the reader to consider for himself the nature of the imprecision in the expressions just listed.

The phenomenal world is γεγονός, γιγνόμενον, and γερνόμενον all together in that at every moment, past, present, and future, it has been, is, and will be in process of becoming; but it is not γεγονός or γερνόμενον in the sense of ever having completed that process in the past or being about to complete it or of existing now as an end-product of becoming or as that which in the future will begin the process,<sup>54</sup> nor is it, moreover, γιγνόμενον in the sense of really existing while in process of becoming.<sup>55</sup> So it is μὴ ὄν in that it does not have real existence; but it is not μὴ ὄν in the sense of being non-existent, for it is as like its model as it can be and being a likeness of that eternal existence, which it is not itself, by coming to be in space it clings somehow to existence.<sup>56</sup> Nor is it μὴ ὄν in the sense in which τὸ μὴ ὄν of the *Sophist* is, for the latter is an idea 'different from that of Being' but ἐνσπίθμων τὸν πολλὸν ὄντων εἶδος ἢ no less than is αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν,<sup>57</sup> so that its mode of being is the eternity of the ideal model; and therefore it in turn is not μὴ ὄν in the sense in which the phenomenal world is, while both alike are not μὴ ὄν since neither is non-existent.

So the assertion in *Timaeus* 38B2-3 is perfectly compatible with the tenet of the *Sophist*. Whether Plato was thinking of that tenet when he set down this assertion is another question, a question to which there can be no answer and the answer to which is in any case irrelevant to the understanding of the passage, since what it says is equally correct and equally intelligible whether it includes a reference to the *Sophist* or does not. *Timaeus* 38A8-B5 is not meant to propose a reformed linguistic usage, the adoption of which Plato came to see is ruled out by logical absurdities.<sup>58</sup> It is rather Plato's own recognition of the fact that the Greek idioms in which he expresses the nature of the phenomenal world, which is γεγός and so does not really exist while it is yet not non-existent, are of necessity imprecise. It is a specific example of the general warning that *Timaeus* was made to give against expecting in his discourse πᾶντι πάντως αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς ὁμιλοῦμεν λόγους καὶ ἀληθεύμενους,<sup>59</sup> and in this respect it resembles the passage in which he apologises for the order of his discourse by citing the casual and random character that manifests itself in human speech.<sup>60</sup> Thus, fully motivated and fully intelligible in its own context, it provides no evidence at all to support the hypothesis that it must have been written before the tenet of the *Sophist* had been formulated.

HAROLD CHERNISS.

*The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.*

<sup>52</sup> 38B7, 38B5-6, 38C8-9 γέγονεν . . . πορομένης ὄν.

<sup>53</sup> 31B3; for γεγονός cf. 29A5, 37C7.

<sup>54</sup> 38B3-5 (cf. 27D6 f., 38C1, 32A6). Cf. Diogenes Laertius, III, 84: τὸ γὰρ ἀσθενὲς καὶ ὁ ἀσθενὲς καὶ μὴ ὄν . . . ὁμοίᾳ δὲ τὸ γεγονός ὁμοίᾳ εἶναι, μὴ ἰσχυρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀληθεύμενους; Proclus, *In Parmenistum*, col. 999, 27-28 (ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τὸν ὄν, μὴ ὄν) γιγνόμενον γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὅπως ἂν ὁδοῦται θεῖ, *In Timaeum*, I, p. 263, 25 f. . . μὴ ὄν ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενον ἔστι τὸ ὄν).

<sup>55</sup> 38C2-3. For the subject of the claim and its construction, concerning which Cornford is right against Fredegarli and Taylor, cf. besides Proclus, *In Timaeum*, III, p. 50, 29-31 and p. 51, 7-8 Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 1155, 13-14 and *De Caelo*, p. 105, 25.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum*, I, p. 282, 1-9; I, pp. 290, 94-291, 12; III, pp. 50, 34-35, 12.

<sup>57</sup> See note 49 *supra*.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 32C2-3. So in a sense γεγονός as well as real being and space exists (32D3): it is not non-existent even though it is not ὄντως ὄν. Cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum*, I, p. 277, 29-30 (ὅτι γὰρ περὶ τὸν τὸν αὐτὸν πᾶντος εἶδη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν).

<sup>59</sup> *Sophist* 258C3, cf. 258B1-2. A. L. Peck has contended that τὸ μὴ ὄν of *Timaeus* and τὸ ὄν and τὸν ὄν are not meant to be taken seriously as ideas, in fact that the *Sophist* is meant to prove that they are not genuine ideas (*Class. Quarterly*, N.S. II = XLVI [1952], pp. 34-56 [cf. pp. 52-53] and N.S. III = XLVII [1953], pp. 16-8). His argument, which seems to me to be entirely mistaken, cannot be examined here. Since, however, he takes the *Timaeus* to be a later work than the *Sophist* and an exposition of Plato's genuine doctrine, it is enough to point out that the ideas of *idea*, *τὸν ὄν*, and *τὸν ὄν* appear in *Timaeus* 35A and 37A-B (cf. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, pp. 409-11).

<sup>60</sup> As Owen appears to think (p. 83, n. 1). He does not say when 'Plato came to see' that the adoption of the supposed reform 'is ruled out by logical absurdities', but the text would require us to conclude that it was in the interval between finishing *Timaeus* 38A8-B5 and writing 38C2-3.

<sup>61</sup> *Timaeus* 29C5-6.

<sup>62</sup> *Timaeus* 34C2-3.



## NOTES ON SOME MANUSCRIPTS OF PLATO

'CRITICAL work on the text of Plato, which in the second half of the nineteenth century had taken an all too easy but mistaken path, had to make a fresh start in the last years before the war (of 1914-18) and is still in its beginnings.' Thus Pasquali in 1934; and as regards the text of the first seven tetralogies the subsequent twenty years have not produced any marked progress—certainly nothing comparable in precision and thoroughness to the work of Sir David Ross and other contemporary scholars on the text of Aristotle. This has been due in part, I suspect, to the prevalent impression that Burnet's text is, if not final, at any rate firmly based on trustworthy and sufficient foundations.<sup>1</sup> And this impression has in turn been encouraged by the paucity of fresh collations: I think I am right in saying that to this day only two manuscripts of this part of Plato's work, B and T, have been accurately collated in their entirety. In this situation it seems worth while to publish the following notes, which are based on fresh collations made in preparation for an edition of the *Gorgias*. I am well aware of the danger of founding any general judgement of a manuscript upon a study of one part of it; but I hope that scholars interested in the text of other dialogues may be induced to check and revise my provisional conclusions.

### I

#### VINDOBONENSIS F

This manuscript, Vind. supp. phil. gr. 39, was known as far back as 1830, when Schneider collated it for his edition of the *Republic* and christened it F. Schneider noticed how frequently its readings agreed with quotations in Stobaeus and Eusebius; but it was Burnet who first established its importance (a) by listing instances of its agreement, both in true and in false readings, with the indirect tradition, and (b) by listing errors peculiar to F which are of unmistakably uncial origin. His conclusion, that F was independently derived from an uncial exemplar which represented an ancient tradition of the text distinct from that preserved in our older mediaeval manuscripts, was later elaborated and confirmed by Deneke,<sup>2</sup> and can be accepted as certain. If further confirmation is wanted, it is supplied by the papyrus fragments of the *Gorgias*, most of which were unknown to Burnet and Deneke. Thus at 486d6, where B T W have εἰ εἰσέρθῃ ὅτι and F has ἥδη εἰ εἰσέρθῃ ὅτι ᾗ, P.S.I. 1200 has ἥδη εἰ εἰσέρθῃ ὅτιᾗ. Again, at 522d8, where B T W have ῥαδίως ἴδωι ὅτι με, both F and P.S.I. 119 have ἴδωι ἂν με ῥαδίως, and so, apparently, had the Found I papyrus, to judge from what is left of it. The F tradition thus goes back at least as far as the second century A.D., to which all these papyri belong.) F accordingly holds a unique position among the manuscripts of Plato, and it is correspondingly desirable to learn all we can about it.

#### 1. The Král-Burnet collation of F.

Burnet did not collate F himself; his information about its readings was supplied to him by Josef Král, except for the *Republic*, where he had Schneider's collation. His report has generally been accepted without question by subsequent editors. But the results of a fresh collation, which I have made from good photographs, are decidedly disconcerting. They show that in the *Gorgias* at least his report is not only very incomplete—as was inevitable, owing to the restricted amount of apparatus criticus allowable in an Oxford Classical Text—but in many places quite false. In particular, he attributes to F a large number of 'good' readings which are not in fact to be found there. According to Burnet's apparatus F has at 450c4 οὐτοι: at 459c8 πρὸς λόγον: at 471c1 τοῦ Ηερδίου: at 472c5 πάντως: at 477d2 ἐστὶ καὶ: at 479c7 εἰ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ: at 480a4 ἐδικήσαι: at 486a1 διατρέπει: at 509c3 τοῦ μή: at 514a3 φῶμεν: at 515c1 πολῖται without article: at 516d9 Μαπαθῶν without preposition: at 522c7 ἂν. All these readings are plausible, and some necessary; all of them were already known, either as modern conjectures or from inferior manuscript sources, before F was examined; all of them had been adopted in Schanz's edition of 1880; but unless my photographs lie, not one of them can be found in F—its reading in all these places is identical with that of B T W, save at 509c3 where it has τὸ μή. How did these alarming errors arise? They cannot be the result of mere carelessness, though Král was in fact a careless collator; on the other hand

<sup>1</sup> *Storia della Tradizione e Critica del Testo* 217.

<sup>2</sup> On the MSS. of the *Lysis* and *Sparsa* much light has been thrown by L. A. Pont, *The Vatican Plato and its Relations* (1934); and in his *Étude* edition of the *Lysis* (Paris i and ii, 1931) des Places has set a new standard of precision in presenting the manuscript evidence.

<sup>3</sup> Though a long list of Burnet's errors in reporting W in the *Phaedo* was published by Klotz and Mino-Paluello in *CQ* 43 (1949), 100.

<sup>4</sup> *CR* 16 (1902), 198 ff.; 17 (1903), 12 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *De Platone* . . . *F numera* (dis. Göttingen, 1922).

there can be no question of impugning either his good faith or Burnet's. It looks rather as if Burnet had misinterpreted Král's silence in these places as meaning that F agreed with Schanz, whereas it really meant that F agreed with B T W. But whatever their origin, these mis-statements seriously impair the foundation of Burnet's text (and those of Coisvet and Theiler) in this dialogue. Nor are they the only ones. Král has sometimes confused the hand of the scribe (F) with that of the corrector (f, see below), e.g. at 482d5, where Burnet would surely have adopted *καταγέλας* had he known it to be the reading of F as in fact it is (*καταγέλας* f with B T W). Further, Král (or less probably Burnet) has omitted to record a number of readings in F which have a *prima facie* claim to consideration, such as *ἐόν γε ἄρα* for *δὲν γὰρ ἄρα* (a collocation which Wilamowitz doubted) at 469d3; the addition of *εἰ*, after *πορίζεσθαι* at 493e7 (which appears also in Iamblichus' citation); and *συμβουλεύσιν* for *συμβουλεύειν* at 520e4 (confirming a conjecture of Coisvet). I do not know whether Burnet's report of F is equally faulty in other dialogues; but it is clear that it ought to be carefully checked everywhere.

## 2. The corrector of F.

The original text of F had numerous lacunae, which the scribe recognised as such, since he left blank spaces (their origin is discussed in note I. 4 below). These lacunae have been filled by another hand, which with Burnet I shall call f (in the Budé editions it is called F<sup>2</sup>). This hand has also supplied the scribe's other omissions, corrected many of his casual blunders, and written numerous variants between the lines or in the margin. It has sometimes been supposed that its readings, or some of them, may have been drawn from F's exemplar and should therefore be taken seriously—so most recently Professor Theiler, in the valuable *appendix critica* to his text of the *Gorgias*.<sup>6</sup> But f has been even more incompletely and incorrectly reported than has F; and a more accurate collation removes all ground for this supposition.

(a) f is able to supply words which in F's uncial source had been obliterated by mechanical injury (see below, note I. 4).

(b) f corrects F to agree with the main tradition even in places where the original reading of F is manifestly right, and may therefore be presumed to have stood in F's exemplar: e.g. *Gorg.* 492b2 *δοὺς* F *recte*, *θεοῖς* B T P f (Burnet's *apparatus* is wrong, and has misled Theiler); 492d7 *ἀμύθεν* [sic] F, *ἀμύθεν* Bekker *recte*, *ἀλλοθεν* B T W f (Burnet's *apparatus* is again wrong); 493b1 *ἀνοήτων* F Iamb. Stob. *recte*, *ἀνοήτων* B T W f; 500b4 f interpolates *κατὰ* (not *περὶ*) *τὸ σῶμα* with T W.

(c) Where the readings introduced by f diverge from the main tradition, they nearly always agree—as Theiler has himself pointed out—with Florentinus 85. 6 (Stallbaum's Laur. 6); in the few cases where they do not, they have the appearance of worthless conjectures. Evidence of the close connection between f and Flor. 85. 6 will be quoted below, in note II, where it will be shown that Flor. 85. 6 has nothing to do with F but represents a recension of the T text.

(d) The one good reading in the *Gorgias* for which f seems to be our sole authority is *τίος* for *τις*, written by f in the margin at 462d11; and this exception is more apparent than real, for Flor. 85. 6 has the meaningless conflation *τις τίος*, evidently representing *τις* with *τίος* suprascript.

I conclude that f has no independent importance, at least in the *Gorgias*.

## 3. The relationship of Florentinus x to F.

Is F the sole independent witness to the tradition which it represents? Burnet thought so.<sup>7</sup> But the claims of Florentinus x (Laur. 85. 7), a manuscript identical in contents with F but considerably later (it was written in 1420), have several times been put forward—tentatively by James Adam, who realised the shakiness of the evidence, more confidently by Immisch and Theiler.<sup>8</sup> And on the basis of the information hitherto available about F and x the claim was an entirely reasonable one. Unfortunately, full collation of F in the *Gorgias*, combined with a fresh inspection of crucial passages in x, shows that the appearance of independence in fact illusory: it arose merely from the mistakes of Král (or the omissions of Burnet) in collating F and the still more numerous mistakes of Stallbaum in collating x. Readings hitherto thought peculiar to F, like *δαῖν* at 449e7, *τέχνης ἐπαυτήμων* at 449c9, *καὶ λέγειν* at 449e6, *φύσει* at 452e5, are in fact found also in x. Conversely, readings like *πὺν διαρωπῶν* at 447c6, *σὸ κρίνει* at 452c4, *σὸ γὰρ* at 505b7, which appeared to distinguish x from F, now prove to be in F also. In the instance quoted by Theiler to show the independence of x, 451a7, the interlinear variants added by f were misreported by Král: they are in fact identical with the variants written by the first hand in the margin of x. In a few cases readings foreign to F have been introduced into x by a second hand, e.g. *δὴ* for *τοῦτον* at 454b5; but that seems to be all. On the other hand, there is strong positive evidence that x is derived from F. Thus at 448a18 F has a half-erased *σε* which could easily be read as *γε*: above

<sup>6</sup> Published in the series *Editiones Helveticae* (Francke, Bern, n.d.).

<sup>7</sup> See the articles referred to in note 4.

<sup>8</sup> Adam, CR 16 (1902), 215; Immisch, *Philologische Studien zu Platon* II, 84, n. 1; Theiler, *op. cit.* 138.



it f has written σοι (the reading of BTW): x has γε σοι. Again, at 449b7 F has ἀποθέσθαι, above which f has written *va* (i.e. ἀποθέσθαι, the reading of Flor. 85. 6): x has ἀναποθέσθαι. In the same line F has φησιν, above which f has written μέμνη: x has the nonsense word μεμνη, corrected by the second hand to μέμνη. We must regretfully conclude, with Schanz and Burnet, that x is a copy of F, made after the latter had been corrected by f.

#### 4. The exemplar of F.

Full collation of F tends strongly to confirm Denekes's view that it is a direct or almost direct transcript from an uncial manuscript. Not only does it abound, as Burnet pointed out, in uncial errors foreign to the main tradition, but it is also characterised, to an extent which could not be guessed from Burnet's *apparatus*, by faulty word-division, false accents, wildly erratic punctuation, and false distribution between speakers. These features suggest an exemplar in which words were not divided, accents few or non-existent, punctuation scanty, change of speakers perhaps marked only by a marginal paragraphos—in other words, an uncial exemplar.

The date of F is significant in this connection. Burnet and others have assigned it to the fourteenth century; but Dr. Paul Maas, who kindly inspected a photograph for me, thinks the thirteenth more likely, and there is some evidence suggesting that characteristic readings of F were known to Thomas Magister,<sup>9</sup> who was Secretary to Andronicus II at some date between 1282 and 1328. Now it is known that the late thirteenth century was a time when Byzantine scholars were discovering and transcribing old uncial manuscripts which had escaped attention during the earlier revival of learning in the ninth and tenth centuries.<sup>10</sup> To this renewed transcription we owe *inter alia* the Ambrosian tradition of Theocritus and of Pindar's *Olympians*. And it seems likely that we owe to it also the F tradition of Plato. For (a) the profusion of uncial errors in F suggests transliteration from a script which had become unfamiliar, as uncials had in the thirteenth century<sup>11</sup>; (b) had the F tradition been made available at an earlier date we might expect to find some trace of its influence in our older mediæval manuscripts.

What was the uncial exemplar like? A little detective work on F may perhaps help us to make a speculative guess. As mentioned above, F has numerous lacunae, where words were omitted and a space left blank for them by the scribe. Many if not all of these lacunae are demonstrably due to mechanical injuries to the exemplar, probably wormholes. For their distribution is not a random one: they recur, either singly or in groups of two or three, at regular intervals of about 22 ( $\pm 2$ ) lines (approximately 1,200 letters), sometimes forming short runs or series; and lacunae which belong to the same series usually correspond roughly in size. Thus, for example, at *Gorg.* 498e7 a lacuna of 16 letters and one of 5 letters are followed after 23 lines by a lacuna of 12 letters and one of 5 (497d6); then after 24 lines by another lacuna of 12 letters (498e7); then after 21 lines by a lacuna of 14 letters (499b2); then after 20 lines by a lacuna of 10 letters (499e8). Or, again, starting at 508b6 we find a run of lacunae, consisting respectively of 20, 19, 19 and 11 letters, which are separated by intervals of 22, 22 and 20 lines. I have not examined other dialogues in f; but I learn from Mr. R. S. Bluck, who has collated F for the *Meno*, that similar runs of lacunae occur there: e.g. beginning at 93b4 lacunae of 9 to 21 letters recur at intervals of 24, 49, 23, 23, 22, 43 and 23 lines (on two pages the injury evidently occurred between two lines, so that no part of the text was lost). It seems certain that these lacunae correspond to damaged patches in the exemplar, and that the intervals between them represent pages<sup>12</sup> of the exemplar.

We thus know the approximate number of letters per page of the exemplar. We can likewise make a plausible guess at the number of letters per line. For at *Gorg.* 506c1 F omits, without marking a lacuna and without the excuse of homoeoteleuton, a run of 38 letters beginning in the middle of a word and ending in the middle of another word (*ης, οὐκ ἀγνοήσωμαι οὐ ὡς περ οὐ μοι, ἀλλὰ μέγ*). It seems highly probable that this represents a line of the exemplar. This particular omission was not reported by Burnet; but my inference from it agrees pretty well with A. C. Clark's inference from a study of all the unexplained omissions in F which Burnet does report—he thought they pointed to a line of about 35  $\pm$  3 letters in one of the manuscripts through which F descends.<sup>13</sup> If we assume 38 as the average number of letters per line of the exemplar, and divide 1,200 by 38, the quotient, 31.5, may be taken to represent something near the average number of lines per page.

<sup>9</sup> In his *Eloge Focum Atticum* Thomas condemns the form *ἀποθέσθαι* at *Gorg.* 449b7 and *εὐγενής* at 487b1, both of which are found in F; he also omits *πῃ* with F at 311a1. But it is no doubt possible that he found the text so quoted in the indirect tradition on which he drew.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. A. Dain, *Les manuscrits* 133 f.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. J. Irwin, *History of texts of Pindar* 107, on the

difficulties experienced by these late transcribers in transliterating uncials.

<sup>12</sup> Pages, not columns. Had the exemplar been written in two columns, as F itself is, the standard series of intervals between lacunae would have been 22-60-22 and not 22-22-22.

<sup>13</sup> *The Dates of Manuscripts*, 414 ff.

These calculations confirm the opinion that the exemplar was an uncial codex. A line of 38 letters is rather too short for an early minuscule book, rather too long for a papyrus roll (which is in any case excluded by the distribution of the lacunae). But Mr. Roberts has noticed that the dimensions I have calculated would suit very well the type of cheap papyrus codex which was manufactured in quantity in and after the third century A.D.—‘the omnibus volumes of a poverty-stricken age’, as he has called them.<sup>14</sup> The guess is attractive. For such an origin would not only explain the frequent agreement of F with papyri and citations of Roman Imperial date; it would also fit Stuart Jones’s conclusion that the F tradition ‘represents the “commercial” texts which circulated amongst the reading public, rather than the more scholarly editions’.<sup>15</sup> F in fact tends to vulgarise the text<sup>16</sup> by eliminating Attic idioms like *θαυμασιος εως* (*Gorg.* 471a9) and *φλανεσις εχων* (490c4), and Attic forms like *τορωσι* (458e1) and *εδωικαδες* (483a7); by introducing vulgar forms like *αποκτινυει* (469a9); and by interpolating unwanted ‘explanatory’ words like *φθοιρ* at 477e2. These features are just what we should expect to find if Mr. Roberts’s guess is right.

## II

## A BYZANTINE RECENSION OF THE T TEXT

The past hundred years have seen a progressive increase in the number of recognised primary authorities for the text of the first six tetralogies. Cobet (and at one time Schanz) admitted only B; but first T, then W and P, then F, had their independence vindicated. To these the Budé editors have added Y (not, I think, with equal justification in all dialogues).<sup>17</sup> Have we reached the end of the process? No one is in a position to say so; and Wilamowitz<sup>18</sup> was certainly right in stressing the need for a critical valuation of those witnesses whom Burnet too often lumped together as ‘scribae recentiores’. The present note is concerned with one group of such witnesses to whom Professor Thielert<sup>19</sup> has called attention.

Among the numerous progeny of T, Schanz<sup>20</sup> distinguished a group of three manuscripts characterised by common omissions in the *Gorgias*. These are Laurentianus 85.6 (which was called b by its collator Stalbaum but will here be called Flor to avoid confusion with the correcting hands in the Clarkianus), and two late Parisini collated by Bekker, 2110 (V) and 1815 (Bekker’s I, here called J with Schanz). Flor contains tetralogies I–VII (the seventh in a jumbled order) together with *Clit.*, *Tim.* and the beginning of *Rep.*; its date is not later than 1355,<sup>21</sup> and probably not very much earlier. V consists of two distinct manuscripts which were bound together in the reign of Henri II. The first contains the *Axiarchus* only; the second, in a different hand and with an independent numeration of quaternions, contains the *Gorgias* and some works of Lucian. The second part belonged to the fifteenth-century humanist Francisco Filelfo, and may well have been written for him.<sup>22</sup> J contains *Gorg.*, *Crat.* and *Parm.* only, and is attributed by Omont to the sixteenth century.

Schanz discerned no particular merit in these manuscripts; but Thielert points out that in the *Gorgias* they have in common a number of good or at any rate plausible readings which are not found in B T W or in the original text of F, and concludes that they derive these from a distinct ancient recension. He has also noticed (as already mentioned in note I. 2 above) that some of these readings were introduced into F by the second hand f. Had he pursued his researches further, however, he would have discovered that for many of the readings in question Flor V J f are not the only, or the oldest, extant sources.

<sup>14</sup> C. H. Roberts, ‘The Codex’, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 1934, 195. Examples of third-century papyrus codices of Attic authors having similar dimensions are P. Rylands 349 (Xenophon) with an average of 30 letters to a line and 32 to 35 lines to a page, and P. Oxy. 459 (Demosthenes) with about 42 letters to a line and 32 to 34 lines to a page.

<sup>15</sup> CR 16 (1902), 301. Immsch had already spoken in similar terms of F, *op. cit.* II, 15.

<sup>16</sup> Deuze put forward the opposite contention, that in the *Gorgias* (though not elsewhere) the F tradition shows traces of having been revised by an Aristotelian. But he produced as evidence only two words, one of which, *εὐζέει*, at 471c2, turns out not to be in F, while the other, *ἀποκτινύει* for *ἀποκτείνει* at 318b6, has no claim to be called an Atticism.

<sup>17</sup> Y is a ‘Mischcodex’ whose contents are drawn from various sources, and as Alline observed (*Histoire du texte de Platon* 233), its value varies widely in different dialogues. In the *Gorgias*, and also in the *Alcibiades* (for which Mr. Black has kindly shown me the results of his collation), I doubt its claim to primary status. In both dialogues Y appears

to me to descend from W through a MS. which was corrected in places from F; in this mixture Y adds a good many false guesses, as well as accidental corruptions of all sorts. In the *Alcibiades* it seems to contribute nothing; in the *Gorgias* very little, and nothing that exceeds the range of *conjectura*.

<sup>18</sup> *Platon* II, 334. Ritter had made the same point in a review of Burnet’s text, *Bursian’s Jahresbericht* 161 (1913), 64 f.

<sup>19</sup> *op. cit.*, 134 f.

<sup>20</sup> *Über d. Platoncodex in Venedig*, 68 f.

<sup>21</sup> Flor has on the flyleaf a note referring to events of that year which was almost certainly made at the time of their occurrence; it is not in the scribe’s hand. Immsch, overlooking this, assigned the MS. to the fifteenth century; Rostagno made it late thirteenth.

<sup>22</sup> I am indebted for these particulars to my pupil Father H. D. Saffrey, O.P., who kindly examined V for me. The fact that Immsch and Post have considered V as a primary authority for the *Aristarchus* has thus no bearing on its value in the *Gorgias*.



In the first place, on collating the *Gorgias* in the Malatestianus (M), which for close on five centuries<sup>27</sup> has lain almost<sup>28</sup> unregarded in the library of the Malatestas in the little town of Cesena, I found in it a large number of the readings characteristic of Theiler's group. It is probably older than any of the group—Dr. Maas assigns it tentatively to the thirteenth century, Rostagno said twelfth—and I was at first inclined to regard it as their source. Its contents are tetralogies I–VII, *Spuria*, *Clit.*, *Tim.*, *Crit.*, *Alcibi.*, *Rep.*, in that order. But secondly, Schanz<sup>29</sup> long ago gave reasons for thinking that in tetralogies I–VII both M and Flor derive from Parisinus 1808 (Bekker's B, which I shall call Par since the symbol B is now appropriated to the Clarkianus), and through it from T. Initially I was disposed to discount his arguments, as Theiler appears to have done, since such a pedigree seemed to offer no explanation of the distinctive readings of these manuscripts. But a fresh examination of the text of the *Gorgias* in the three manuscripts has confirmed Schanz's view, at least as regards this dialogue, and has shown the source of the novelties common to M and Flor to be the hand of a corrector in Par. [The converse hypothesis, that M or Flor is the source of the corrections in Par, is excluded (a) by the fact that M Flor reproduce characteristic errors of the first hand in Par, e.g. 326b8 ἀλατος B T W F recte, ἀδύματος Par (corr.s.). Par:] M Flor; (b) by places like 310a8, where the scribe of Par omitted the word αὐτόν and restored it in the margin with the result that it is misplaced in M.]

Par contains tetralogies I–VII followed (as in M) by the *Spuria*, and is assigned by Omont to the thirteenth century. Before correction, its text was nearly everywhere identical in the smallest detail<sup>30</sup> with that of T; since, however, in one or two places it corrects an error of T,<sup>31</sup> we may suppose with Schanz that it descends from T through an intermediary which had been occasionally corrected from B or W. In its original state Par offered virtually<sup>32</sup> no readings of interest which are not in one or other of the older manuscripts. But it has been corrected by at least two hands other than the scribe's. The earliest of these, Par<sup>2</sup>, is responsible for all the novelties common to M and Flor. A subsequent hand (or hands), Par<sup>3</sup>, has added interlinear variants which often reappear in V, but never in M or Flor. Par<sup>3</sup> has also in some places restored, with the sign *yp.*, the original reading of T Par erased by Par<sup>2</sup>.

The primary question, then, is whether Par<sup>2</sup> derived his readings from Theiler's 'ancient recension' or from his own powers of divination. But this is not the whole of the problem: there is a complication. For in addition to the novelties of Par<sup>2</sup>, Flor presents others that are absent from Par and M (they usually reappear in V). We have to ask ourselves a similar question about these readings. And we have to ask it yet again about certain readings peculiar to V or (in one case) VJ.<sup>33</sup> To enable my readers to form an opinion, I list below the most plausible of the readings belonging to these three groups,<sup>34</sup> noting those which are adopted by Bekker, Burnet or Theiler.

i. *Novelties introduced into the tradition by the first corrector of Parisinus 1808 (Par<sup>2</sup>).*

- 452a1 ἀν' ἑστ' αὐτίκα add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V ( Bekker: om. B T W F (εἰ post δὲ: add. F)  
 452b2 γ' ἂν Par<sup>2</sup> (ut vid.) M Flor V Bekker: τῶν B T W F  
 454c7 τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιθεν add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V Bekker Theiler: om. B T W F  
 456d2 ἐμυθεῖ τις Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V ( Bekker: ἐμυθεν B T W F  
 458d8 καὶ ταῦτο αὐτὸν αὐτόν add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V ( Bekker: om. B T W F  
 458e1 ταῦτοιαι Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor Bekker Burnet Theiler: ταῦτοιαι(ν) B T W: ταῦτοις F  
 460d2 κακῶς post πικρῶς add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V et revera f: om. B T W F

<sup>27</sup> M belonged to Dr. Giovanni Marco da Rimini, who left it at his death to the library of the Franciscan convent at Cesena, which formed the nucleus of the Biblioteca Malatestiana.

<sup>28</sup> Lewis Campbell described M in *J. Phil.* 12 (1882), 195–200, and collated it for his edition of the *Republic*; but so far as I know it has not been collated for any other dialogue. For tetralogies I–VII and *Spuria* collation would probably in fact be labour wasted, but its remaining contents should be examined.

<sup>29</sup> *Platonica*, 50 ff. and 103. Post has since shown that M derives from Par in the *Spuria* also (*Valican Plato*, 54 f.). It seems to be a direct copy, while Flor is an indirect derivative. Parisinus 1808 (Bekker's C) appears to have, as Schanz thought, the same origin, but I have not personally examined it.

<sup>30</sup> e.g. 401b8 ἔδω [sic] T Par M Flor, Schanz, *Platonica*, 37 ff., cited instances where Par omits a complete line of T, and others where Par is corrupted through misunderstanding T's correction.

<sup>31</sup> Notably at 307c8, 417b7 ταῦτα T: ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἡ B W F

Par 10xy. Stob. Here T's false order could not have been corrected by conjecture.

<sup>32</sup> The sole exception which I have noticed is at 323d7, where Par and its derivatives have *ῥῶν* *per* with Plutarch (*ῥῶν* B T W F).

<sup>33</sup> M has a few small and obvious corrections which I cannot trace in Par as it now stands and which Stallbaum has not noted in Flor: *ἡμῶν* *ἡμῶν* at 454b8 (also in E and V); *ἡμῶν* for *ἡμῶν* at 456b6 (also in J); *ἡμῶν* for *ἡμῶν* at 466d7 (also in E, V and V); *ἡμῶν* for *ἡμῶν* at 514c2. Its only independent contribution would seem to be *αὐτόν* (which is not in V) for *αὐτόν* at 450c4. It is a hybrid MS.: its text has been systematically contaminated from elsewhere at 172d, and perhaps sporadically elsewhere. On I see above, p. 25.

<sup>34</sup> The collation of Par, M and F is my own, and I have personally checked some though not all of the readings cited from Stallbaum's collation of Flor and Bekker's of V. For the unimportant J, I am entirely dependent on Bekker.

- 461c1 δ post τοῦτο add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V f Bekker Burnet Theiler: om. B T W F  
 465b3 οὐσα post τε add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V f cum Aristidis libro E Bekker Theiler: om. B T W F  
 497c4 τοὺς ἀφρονες Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V J f Bekker: ἀφρονες B T W F  
 503d2 ἔχεις εἰπεῖν post γεγονέναι add. Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V J et revera f Bekker: om. B T W F  
 505c3 αὐτό Par<sup>2</sup> M (primitus) Flor V (primitus) Theiler: αὐτός B T W F  
 511c3 ἀποβιβάζουσα Par<sup>2</sup> M V J f Bekker Burnet Theiler: ἀποβιβάζας B T W: om. F  
 517d4 ἀλλὰ ὦν Par M Flor V J f (etiam rec. p) Bekker Burnet Theiler: ἀλλων ὦν B T W F

2. *Novelties which appear first in Laurentianus 85. 6 (Flor).*

- 457b5 κῆρα Flor V Bekker Burnet Theiler: κατὰ B T W F Par (καὶ Par<sup>2</sup> in mg.)  
 457c1 δικαία Flor V (etiam Y) Bekker Theiler: δικαίων B T W F Par et suprascr. m. pr. Flor  
 462d1 τάνος τίς Flor V J: τίνος f Bekker Theiler: τίς B T W F Par  
 503a2 τοῦτο Flor V J cum Aristide Bekker Burnet Theiler: τοῦτο δ B T W F Par  
 505c8 καταλύμεν Flor V J et revera f Theiler: καταλύομεν B T W F Par  
 506c1 ἐξελέγχετο Flor J f Bekker: ἐξελέγχετο B T W F Par  
 512c7 τῷ σουτοῦ post αὐτός add. Flor V Bekker: om. B T W F Par  
 519d4 ὦ Flor V J f Bekker Burnet: ὁ B T W Par: ἀλλ' F

3. *Novelties apparently peculiar to V or V J.*

- 469c8 τοῦ λόγου suprascr. V cum Olympiodoro: τῷ λόγῳ V cett.  
 474c7 τὰ om. V  
 476d5 ὁμολογημένων V: ὁμολογουμένων cett.  
 483d1 αὐ V Bekker Theiler: ὦ Y: αὐτό cett.  
 486a8 ἀπαγάγοι V Bekker Theiler: ἀπάγοι cett.  
 490a5 ῥήματα V Bekker: ῥήματι cett.  
 491d4 τί ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους om. V Bekker  
 517e8 τό om. V J Bekker Burnet Theiler: τε F: τό cett.  
 524c8 τε post καταγότα add. V Bekker: om. cett.: ἢ ante καταγότα add. Eus.  
 524e1 οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς εὐρύτης παρὰ τὸν αἰκλόν post 'παδάμασθαι' add. V: om. cett.

It will be seen that Bekker, the exponent of an uninhibited eclecticism, accepted without demur nearly all these novelties; and that even Burnet, sceptical as he was about the value of 'apographa' and conservative as is his general treatment of the text, felt himself constrained to adopt four readings from the first group, three from the second, and one from the third. It will be seen also that Aristides once confirms Flor and once (perhaps, Par<sup>2</sup>; and that V has in one place the seeming support of Olympiodorus (but here the possibility of contamination cannot be ruled out). On the other hand:

(i) It appears that the later the manuscript, the greater its wealth of good readings: Flor has more good readings than Par<sup>2</sup>, and V surpasses them both. This is contrary to the normal behaviour of manuscripts.

(ii) It is relevant to recall that Par<sup>2</sup> and Flor date, so far as can be judged, from the age of Manuel Moschopoulos, Thomas Magister and Triclinius—that is, from the age of deliberate and systematic textual emendation<sup>12</sup>—and that V has all the appearance of an 'edition' of the *Gorgias* compiled by a Renaissance scholar.<sup>13</sup>

(iii) Most of the readings I have listed can fairly be described as 'normalisations' of a more or less abnormal (in some cases manifestly corrupt) text, and are such as might occur to any tolerably scholarly reader.

(iv) These 'good' readings are accompanied by others which are quite plainly false emendations dictated by ignorance of idiom or misconception of Plato's meaning. Such are, to quote only a few:

- 450c5 διότι for οὐχ ὅτι, Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V f;  
 456b8 insertion before ἱατροῦ of ῥήτορα ἢ, Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V f;  
 511c1 εἰς—εὐεργεσίας marked for deletion in Par, relegated to the margin in M, omitted by Flor V, and τῶν inserted before σοῖσασιν by Par<sup>2</sup> M Flor V.


<sup>12</sup> Cf. Paul Maas, *Bz. Zeitschr.* 1935, 299 ff., 1936, 27 ff., and *Laconica* 25 (1953), 441 f.; also A. Turgis, 'The Sophocles Recension of Manuel Moschopoulos', *T.A.P.A.* 1949, who shows that the Byzantine recensions of Sophocles reach well back into the thirteenth century. A. T. H. Soudback has recently observed, 'there is a danger of underestimating the powers of the late Byzantine scholars, and in, through unnecessarily crediting them with access to unknown traditions, of according

unwarranted honour to their conjectures' (CR 68, 1954, 251).

<sup>13</sup> While the main basis of V appears to be Flor, it has readings apparently derived from F (e.g. ὅτι, ὅν, ὅς at 481d6), and others characteristic of the Y group (e.g. ἐν στήθεσιν καὶ ἰσχυρῶς at 508c5). Theiler himself expresses uncertainty 'conjecturae debentur bonae lectionis unius codicis V'.

If these things derive from Theiler's 'ancient recension', must we not view all its gifts with suspicion?

I conclude—most reluctantly, for I have spent much time on these manuscripts—that while Theiler has done a service in calling attention to them, and while the hypothesis of an independent ancient source cannot be excluded, it is safest to accord their readings no higher status than that of simple conjectures. A tentative stemma is given below.





## EMPEDOCLES AND THE CLEPSYDRA

EMPEDOCLES' simile of the clepsydra (DK<sup>4</sup> 31B100) is a crucial document for historians of ancient science. It has been much discussed, and often quoted in evidence, in spite of formidable differences of opinion about its significance. 'Empedocles undertook an experimental investigation of the air we breathe' (B. Farrington). 'The star example of a physical "experiment" in the natural philosophers, the clepsydra, was not an experiment at all, in the proper sense of the word' (G. Vlastos). 'All Empedocles did was to draw the explicit inference: "the vessel cannot be simply empty: the air in it cannot be nothing at all"'. He did not invent the clepsydra in a laboratory' (F. M. Cornford). The simile 'ha tutto il carattere di una esperienza scientifica' (A. Traglia). Now whether the fragment describes an experiment or not, it is certainly a simile, and the first step must be to understand the force of the simile. It is possible, in my view, that the differences of opinion about the fragment spring from various misunderstandings of the simile; and I propose in this article to offer an explanation of its details which I think is new and which may enable us to form a clearer picture of its place in the history of science.

Early attempts to elucidate the passage were marred by two recurrent mistakes. The first mistake was made by Aristotle: in introducing the quotation from Empedocles in *De Respiratione* 7, Aristotle uses the words 'καὶ περὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν μικτῆρον ἀναπνοῆς λέγων οἴεται καὶ περὶ τῆς κυρίας λέγειν ἀναπνοῆς'. Both before and after the quotation he complains that Empedocles failed to make the distinction between breathing through the nostrils, which is just one of at least two kinds of breathing, and breathing through the windpipe, which in Aristotle's view is *καρία ἀναπνοή*. Now there is nothing in the quotation, properly understood, to show that Empedocles was speaking only of nostril-breathing. Diels and Burnet therefore concluded that Aristotle misunderstood the phrase 'ἀνὸν ἔσχατα τέθηκα' in line 4; he thought *ἀνὸν* was the genitive plural of *ῥίς* ('nostril'), though Empedocles meant it for the genitive plural of *ῥῶς* (skin). Since Aristotle says *nothing* about breathing through the skin in this chapter and Empedocles certainly meant to speak of breathing through the skin, Diels and Burnet must be right.<sup>1</sup> The second mistake was about the clepsydra (line 9). For a long time it was thought to be a water-clock. Many details which were obscure on this hypothesis became clear when Professor Last proved (in *Classical Quarterly*, 18, 1924, 169-73) that Empedocles was talking about a device for lifting and perhaps measuring liquids, which did not work in quite the same way as the water-clock.<sup>2</sup>

It is certain, then, that fr. 100 offers a theory of breathing which includes the notion of breathing through pores in the skin, and explains the theory by using the example of a familiar kind of water-lifter. We must now examine the details of the simile with the help of the following analysis:

Section		Lines
A.	Introduction—this is the way all things breathe in and out.	1
B.	'In all [animals] there are tubes of flesh, empty of blood, stretched all over the surface of the body, and over their openings the outermost surface of the skin is pierced through with close-packed holes, so that the blood is hidden but a free passage is cut through for the air by these holes.'	1-5
C.	When the blood rushes away ( <i>ἀναίξῃ</i> ) from them, the air rushes in ( <i>καταίσσεται</i> ) with a mad gush . . .	6-7
D.	. . . and when the blood runs back ( <i>ἀναβήσκει</i> ), the air breathes out.	8
E.	It is like what happens when a girl plays with a clepsydra.	8-9
F.	When she closes the vent at the top and dips the clepsydra into the water, no water enters; it is prevented by 'the weight of air falling on the many holes' of the strainer at the bottom . . .	10-13

<sup>1</sup> I have set out this argument in full in view of a curious attempt by Antonio Traglia in his recent book *Studi sulla Lingua di Empedocle* (Bari, 1922, p. 25 ff.) to save Aristotle from this mistake. All is simple. Traglia maintains, if we realise that the crucial sentence is to be translated: 'Affirmare che . . . v. p. Empedocle pensa di parlare anche della respirazione nasale e della respirazione vera e propria.' A glance at the text of Aristotle will show that this is a misunderstanding of the topography of DK: Aristotle does not quote v. 4 here.

<sup>2</sup> See the illustration in Professor Last's article, or to W. K. C. Guthrie, *Aristotle on the Heavens* (Loeb C.L.).

p. 228. The clepsydra was a hollow vessel, covered at the top except for a narrow vent or tube which could be plugged with the thumb: the bottom was perforated to form a strainer. It was used for transferring liquids from one vessel to another. What Empedocles describes is the normal use of the clepsydra, except that normally it would be dipped into the liquid with the vent unplugged.

<sup>3</sup> My analysis of the simile (lines 8-21) follows that of O. Regenbogen, 'Eine Forschungsmethode antiker Naturwissenschaft', *Quell. u. Stud. z. Gesch. d. Mathematik*, B. I, pp. 180 ff.

## Section

## Lines

- G. . . . until she unblocks the compressed [air-]stream; then, as the air leaves, the due quantity of water enters. 14-15
- H. In the same way, when there is water in the clepsydra and the vent at the top (πρόθυρον . . . ἥδε πόρος) is closed by the hand, air pressure from the outside, exerted upwards on the strainer at the bottom, holds in the water . . . 16-19
- I. . . . until she lets go with her hand; then in turn, the opposite happens—as air enters [through the vent at the top] the due amount of water flows out. 20-21
- K. In the same way, when the blood in the body 'rushes back again to the inmost part' (παλινοπορεύειν ἀπὸ τῆς μυχρόνδε), a stream of air enters . . . 22-24
- L. . . . and when it runs back again (ἀνασπέρσκει) an equal stream [of air] breathes out again. 25

At first sight, it seems obvious that in the simile water corresponds to blood, and air to air; and many commentators have explained it in that way. The breathing-in process is described by Empedocles (C and K) as the withdrawal of blood and entrance of air; this must correspond to the withdrawal of water from the clepsydra and entrance of air. But there is only one stage of the operations when this takes place, and that is section I, in which air enters through the vent at the top and water pours out through the strainer at the bottom. Similarly the breathing-out process (D and L) must correspond to the entrance of water into the clepsydra (G).

This hypothesis leads to a number of paradoxes. The withdrawal of blood to the inside of the body must correspond to the flow of water out of the clepsydra. The retention of water in the clepsydra by air pressure (H) corresponds to nothing in the breathing process. The entrance of air into the body through the pores must correspond to the entrance of air into the clepsydra through the vent at the top, and the strainer at the bottom has no counterpart in the body. In fact, on this hypothesis the clepsydra seems merely confusing. A half-full wine-skin, squeezed until the wine just reaches the mouth and then released, would provide a much apter illustration.

Faced with these paradoxes, some scholars have fallen back on the alternative hypothesis, that water in the clepsydra corresponds to air in the body, and air in the clepsydra to blood in the body. Now, the entrance of water as the air withdraws (G) corresponds to breathing-in (C and K), and the departure of water as air re-enters (I) corresponds to breathing-out (D and L).

This hypothesis avoids the paradoxes of the former one, but involves others just as formidable. It seems extraordinarily unlikely, in the first place, that Empedocles would choose to make air play opposite parts in the two halves of the simile: to do this simply asks for misunderstanding. Moreover, on this hypothesis, as on the former one, there seems to be no point in that feature of the clepsydra's behaviour which must particularly have been thought odd—namely, the queer behaviour of the water when the vent is blocked (F and H). Indeed, the situation of the clepsydra in H suggests a quite impossible parallel—air breathed in through the pores and then held in by the pressure of blood from the outside.

In all these attempts to understand the simile, since Aristotle's mistake was first pointed out, there is one major absurdity which seems hardly to have been noticed. Whatever may be the truth about one's skin, one breathes through the nose and mouth, and there is no imaginable reason why Empedocles should have denied this. No explanation of his meaning is acceptable unless it takes account of this fact. Yet scholars have either ignored it or else assumed, weakly, that the nose and mouth are simply two pores among many.

Moreover, no explanation ought to be accepted unless it can show why Empedocles chose the clepsydra as his illustrative model, and why having chosen it he stressed particularly its odd behaviour when the top vent is plugged (F and H).

If I am right so far, the odd feature of Empedocles' theory is that he thought breathing takes place not only through the nose and mouth but also through pores in the skin; and the odd features of the clepsydra's behaviour all spring from the fact that it has not one but two openings. The solution is simple and obvious: he meant the top vent of the clepsydra to correspond to the nose and mouth, and the strainer at the bottom to the pores in the skin.

First he describes the pores (B) and then states their function in breathing: when the blood drains away from them (to the interior of the body), air takes its place (C), and when the blood returns to them, the air comes out (into the atmosphere) (D). This part of the theory depends on the notion that neither blood nor air can be (much) compressed; so we are entitled to ask where the blood withdraws to when it leaves the pores. Empedocles does not say; but he does say what happens to the water in the clepsydra—it takes the place of air which leaves through the top vent (G). It needs only a very simple interpretation of the simile to see that the blood withdrawing

<sup>1</sup> In line 18, taking 'ἥδε' as *epexetice* and reading 'ἐπὶ τῇ' and in line 19 reading 'ἐξ ἡμῶν', with Regenbogen.



from the pores is supposed to take the place of air breathed out through the nose and mouth. Correspondingly, just as the air enters the clepsydra at the top vent when the water leaves space for it (I), so air enters through the nose and mouth when the blood moves from the interior of the body towards the pores. Empedocles' theory was that breathing in through the nose was simultaneous with breathing out through the pores, and *vice versa*, and that this was made possible by a sort of oscillation of the blood.

The choice of the clepsydra is now easily explained: he needed a model with two air vents and liquid oscillating, as it were, between them. The strainer in the clepsydra, corresponding to the pores, is probably a lucky coincidence. But of course the analogy is still not wholly exact. Section I of the simile seems to suggest blood streaming from the pores as one breathes in through the nose. It may be thought that this objection is as great as those brought against the other hypotheses, but I think it can be explained. Empedocles wanted to suggest that as one breathes in through the nose the blood falls away *towards* the surface of the skin; the nearest he could get to this was to show that the water moves not merely towards the strainer but right through it. Without a glass container and some sort of pump he could do no better.

This imperfection in the model helps to explain why he draws attention particularly to the odd behaviour of the water in the clepsydra. As we breathe out through the nose, the blood leaves the surface of the body and air enters. He could not find a model in which air followed the liquid inside; but he *could* show that there is air pressure on the surface so that the air *would* follow if it could. In section H you cannot see the air surprisingly holding the water in the clepsydra, but you can deduce that it must be there; similarly you cannot feel the air pressing on your skin but you can infer, from the model, that it must be there. Section F, which describes the other aspect of the clepsydra's odd behaviour, seems to explain why you cannot breathe with your nose and mouth gagged, even though the skin has pores. The water cannot enter the clepsydra, because the air cannot escape through the vent; similarly the blood cannot leave the surface of the body to make room for air, because the air cannot escape through the nose and mouth.

The model does not explain the causation of breathing, but that is not surprising. It is not clear what Empedocles believed to be the motive power that causes respiration—perhaps he thought the blood moves *naturally*, as Aristotle seems to suggest (173b6 τοῦ αἵματος πεφυκότος κινεῖσθαι ἀπὸ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν). Whether natural motion or internal heat is the cause, it is hardly likely that he would find a domestic utensil which would illustrate the cause as well.

It will be objected that if Empedocles wanted to make the nose and mouth correspond to the upper vent of the clepsydra he could have said so. Is it quite certain that he said nothing about it? The appropriate place seems to be sections K and L of the fragment, which on the orthodox interpretation merely repeat the sense of C and D. In line 24 the accepted reading is αἰθέρος εἰθὺς ῥέδμα κατέρχεται οἰσμάτι θύον. 'αἰθέρος' is the reading of M and the first hand of Z; the reading of LSNP and Michael is 'ἕρεπον'. It is tempting to suggest that Empedocles wrote 'τοῦτορεπον', meaning 'the other stream' (i.e. the stream of air coming through the nose and mouth). Line 29, ὅππότε μὲν πάλιν ὀπισθεν ἀπαίξαι μυχόδε, would then have to mean 'when the blood rushes away in the other direction as far as the innermost part' (i.e. the blood drains away from the chest, leaving space for the air to enter, as far as the innermost part; the blood in fact moves outwards towards the pores). In favour of this view one can argue (1) that it makes the description of breathing in through the nose and mouth follow immediately after the corresponding section of the simile (I); (2) that 'παλινὸρεπον' ('back in the other direction') now refers back to line 6, which describes the movement of blood from the pores to the interior; this gives it a better sense than the orthodox interpretation, in which it makes a rather irrelevant reference to the repetition of the whole process; and (3) that although at first sight 'μυχόδε' seems to mean 'away from the skin to the interior', it could just as well mean 'away from the chest (or windpipe or whatever) to the interior'; in each case it is the space left free by the withdrawing blood that is in question, rather than the mass of the blood itself.

If this last idea is not accepted—and I do not wish to insist on it—then we are still faced with the objection that Empedocles said nothing about breathing through the nose and mouth. I can only answer that he must have known about it (what else does ἀναπνεῖν normally mean?) and we are forced to guess what he meant. My guess seems to me to have more to be said for it than any other.

The theory of respiration which I attribute to Empedocles is very nearly that which Plato describes in the *Timaeus* (79a3–e9). Plato says explicitly that the heat of 'the inner parts about the blood and the veins' causes the movement of the air, and he believes that the air circulates outside the body, because there is no void, by a series of pushes, so that air expelled from the mouth pushes more air round to fill up through the pores the place it has vacated in the body. Whether

<sup>1</sup> Such a repetition is of course a usual feature of early Greek style; but it is hardly a necessary one.

either of these ideas was held by Empedocles I do not know. Plato certainly seems to differ from Empedocles in saying nothing about movements of the blood. Otherwise their theories are virtually the same.<sup>6</sup>

There is nothing surprising in this—indeed it may be regarded as a confirmation of my suggestion. Plato drew largely from the work of Philistion, the Sicilian doctor from the same school as Empedocles; and Philistion's belief in respiration through the pores is known (see Anonymus Londinensis XX, 24). Nor is there anything surprising in Aristotle's failure to see the similarity between Plato's theory, which he criticised in *De Respiratione* 5, and Empedocles', which he criticised for quite different reasons in *De Respiratione* 7. His mistaken idea that Empedocles was talking about nostrils instead of pores prevented him from understanding the passage.

Empedocles' theory of breathing is not, perhaps, of great importance, though my suggestion, if it is accepted, will at least have the merit of saving him from charges of perverseness which he has had to bear. His theory is still wrong, but it is no longer silly.

It is more important to decide whether this business with the clepsydra is properly described as an experiment or not. The purpose of the clepsydra in the fragment is to illustrate the fact that air entering the body cannot occupy an already occupied space but must have somewhere to go, and that space is provided for it by movements of the blood. When Professor Farrington writes (*Greek Science*, I, p. 55): 'His great contribution to knowledge was his experimental demonstration of the corporeality of the viewless air', he has some justification, but many qualifications are necessary. There is no evidence that Empedocles wished to establish any such generalisation as that air is corporeal. We must realise that discovery and belief are quite different from demonstration and proof; there is first the vague assumption, then the demonstration of particular cases, and finally the proof of a generalised proposition in precise terms. It is probable that Empedocles inherited a notion that air is something rather than nothing; he wished to use this notion in the context of a theory of respiration, but apparently decided that its particular application—the suggestion that blood and breath are about equally substantial and incompressible—was an obstacle to belief in his theory. He therefore used an illustration from ordinary experience.

This is the most that can be said for the thesis that Empedocles established the corporeality of air by experiment. The whole business lacks certain essential features of the experimental method—the attempt to control the conditions exactly and to find answers to precise questions, and the readiness to let conclusions wait upon results. Above all, we must remember that Empedocles does not conclude 'Air is therefore corporeal' but 'This is how we breathe'. The clepsydra is much more like a persuasive analogy than an experiment.

D. J. FURLEY.

*University College, London.*

<sup>6</sup> 'The region of the chest and lung, in the act of discharging the breath outwards, is filled again by the air surrounding the body, as it is driven round and makes its way inwards through the porous flesh. Again, when

the air is turned back and is moving outwards through the body, it thrusts round the respiration inwards by way of the passage of mouth and nostrils.' (*Timaeus* 79c, Cornford's translation.)

## ARISTOTLE AS A HISTORIAN OF PHILOSOPHY: SOME PRELIMINARIES

THE work of Cherniss on Aristotle's criticism of the Presocratics may be compared with that of Jaeger on the development of Aristotle's own thought as contained in his *Aristoteles* of 1923. Jaeger modestly described that epoch-making work as a *Grundlegung* or foundation for the history of the philosopher's development, and as such it has been of value not only for itself but in the stimulus it has given to further study, in the course of which the balance of its conclusions has been to some extent altered. Cherniss's own study is of the same pioneer kind, and if I confess to a feeling that it goes rather too far, the comparison with the now classic work of Jaeger will, I hope, make clear my general admiration and appreciation of the fact that it is a permanent contribution with which all future scholarship will have to reckon.

I cannot at this stage even begin to discuss in detail the mass of erudition on which Cherniss's case is built up. Nevertheless, the very widespread acceptance of his strictures on Aristotle's historical sense suggest that anyone to whom they seem extreme should lose no time in giving voice to his misgivings, even in general terms, before they become irrevocably canonical. This thought has been prompted by the recent monograph of Mr. J. B. McDiarmid, *Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes*,<sup>1</sup> at the beginning of which we read simply that 'the question of Aristotle's bias has been dealt with exhaustively by H. Cherniss', whose views then become, without further remark, the starting-point of the younger scholar's own inquiry into the reliability of Theophrastus. Since in what follows I may speak critically of McDiarmid on several points, let me say that his main thesis, the dependence of Theophrastus on Aristotle in much of his *φυσικῶν δόξων* and the consequent danger of regarding him as a separate authority for Presocratic thought, seems true enough. The derivation of Theophrastus's judgments from those of his master was already beginning to be recognised with fruitful results,<sup>2</sup> and the time was ripe for a general review of the evidence. Here we are concerned with Aristotle himself. The length to which acceptance of Cherniss's criticism as 'exhaustive' may lead is seen in the section on Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, where we read (p. 104) that Theophrastus probably had the writings of Diogenes available, but 'Diogenes's writings are at any rate no protection against the influence of Aristotle'. Now for anyone to whom, as to ourselves, the writings of Diogenes are *not* available, that seems an assertion of unparalleled boldness, matched only by the statement on p. 121, concerning a Peripatetic interpretation of Parmenides's Way of Opinion, that 'there is nothing in Parmenides's poem to justify this interpretation'. If Mr. McDiarmid had written what is all that any of us has a right to say—i.e. 'there is nothing in the extant fragments of Parmenides's poem . . . '—we should have been properly reminded of how miserably scanty the surviving fragments of the Way of Opinion are. That he does not do so is due to his antecedent conviction, based on Cherniss, of Aristotle's 'complete disregard' for anything that Parmenides said.

Cherniss's views are summarised by McDiarmid at the beginning of his study as follows (p. 86):

'Aristotle is not interested in historical facts as such at all. He is constructing his own system of philosophy, and his predecessors are of interest to him only insofar as they furnish material to this end. He believes that his system is final and conclusive and that, therefore, all earlier thinkers have been groping towards it and can be stated in its terms. Holding this belief, he does not hesitate to modify or distort not only the detailed views but also the fundamental attitudes of his predecessors or to make articulate the implications that doctrines may have for him but could not have had for their authors.'

Cherniss himself says:<sup>3</sup>

'Aristotle as a philosopher is, of course, entirely justified in inquiring what answer any of the Presocratic systems could give to the problem of causality as he had formulated it; but to suppose that such an inquiry is historical, that is, to suppose that any of these systems was elaborated with a view to the problem as formulated by Aristotle, is likely to lead to mis-

<sup>1</sup> *Harvard Classical Studies*, vol. 12 (1953), pp. 85-136.

<sup>2</sup> As by Kirk in his *Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments* (1954). Cf. e.g. p. 319: 'The theory of an *ἐκπνοή* in Heraclitus was perhaps directly derived by Theophrastus (like most of his historical judgments) from Aristotle.' (Italics mine.)

<sup>3</sup> 'Characteristics and Effects of Presocratic Philosophy', *Journal of the Hist. of Ideas*, xii (1951), p. 320. This

article contains a most valuable and lucid summary of some of the results of his book on *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore 1935), and in making what at present can be no more than some *prolegomena* to a commentary on his views, I hope it is legitimate to refer to its statements rather than to the detailed analysis in the major work.



interpretation of these systems and certainly involves the misrepresentation of the motives and intentions of their authors.<sup>1</sup>

Now if Aristotle's interpretation of the Presocratics is entirely unhistorical, it is scarcely worth while our continuing to study them. Through Theophrastus he influenced the whole doxographical tradition, and as Cherniss remarks, not only do we possess no single complete work of any Presocratic thinker, but such fragments as we have are a selection determined by the interpretations and formulations of Presocratic philosophy in the post-Socratic philosophers for their own philosophical purposes, chiefly by Aristotle. 'If', asks McDiarmid with reference to Anaximander (p. 101), 'Aristotle has misinterpreted both the nature of the Infinite and the nature and functions of its constituent parts, and if Theophrastus has merely repeated his misinterpretation, what positive historical value have their accounts?' He tries to answer his own question, but the only reasonable answer would be that we should have no possible means of knowing. If Aristotle and Theophrastus were capable of distortion to this degree, our independent sources are quite insufficient for an assessment of it. We should be in the position of the (doubtless apocryphal) theologians who having proved the Pauline Epistles one by one to be spurious, found themselves left with no criterion by which to recognise a genuine epistle if they met one.

Those who dismiss Aristotle's statements about his predecessors as unhistorical should at least be aware of what they are doing. They probably agree that Aristotle's was one of the greatest intellects of all time. They probably agree that he founded formal logic, grasped the principles of scientific method in an even more systematic way than Plato had done, and applied these principles to zoology with such success that his achievement in this sphere can even now excite the admiration of an expert and considering the limited facilities of his age was nothing short of prodigious. They know that he was greatly interested in the historical study of political constitutions, and so aware of the need to have a solid basis of fact underlying any edifice of political theory that he promoted and supervised a series of separate studies of the constitutions of the Greek states, some of which he wrote himself. Moreover, he composed several monographs devoted to separate Presocratic philosophers or schools (and some of us would give much for a sight of his work on the Pythagoreans), in addition—and perhaps preparatory—to the discussion of them in his own philosophical works. I have not yet mentioned his more strictly philosophical greatness, the intellectual force with which he attempts the perhaps impossible task of mediating between Platonism and the scientific outlook, between the conflicting demands of *λογικῶς* and *φυσικῶς* *ζητεῖν*. But I think it would be agreed that no philosopher has shown himself more determined to reduce to a minimum the distorting effects of temperament and prejudice from which not even the most rational of human beings can be entirely free.

After the test of over two thousand years, there is something faintly ridiculous about defending one of the world's greatest philosophers as being on the whole clear-headed and methodical, sane and cautious. Yet it is evidently not superfluous, for we are now asked to believe that whereas on other topics he generally displays these qualities in the highest degree, as soon as he comes to assess his predecessors in the philosophical tradition he is so blinded by the problems and pre-suppositions of his own thought that he loses all common sense and even any idea of the proper way to handle evidence. Nor is the implication of dishonesty absent. ('His silence about intelligence falsifies Diogenes's doctrine, but his motive is clear', McDiarmid, p. 105.)

Book A of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, says Cherniss (o.c., p. 320), 'interprets all previous philosophy as a groping for his own doctrine of fourfold causality and is, in fact, intended to be a dialectical argument in support of that doctrine'. But we do not need Professor Cherniss to point this out. Aristotle tells us it himself, and indeed repeats it more than once, so alive is he to the danger of our forgetting it. In the *Physics*, he says (*Metaph.* A, ch. 3), I have dealt adequately with the subject of the four causes. Nevertheless it will be a useful check on the rightness and sufficiency of this classification of the modes of causation if we run through what earlier philosophers have had to say on the subject. Either we shall find that they adduce some different type of cause, or if we do not, it will give us more confidence in our own results.<sup>2</sup>

This respect for the work of earlier thinkers is shown in his writings on other subjects too. The point of view is well brought out in *Metaph.* 8, 993b11-19:

'We should in justice be grateful not only to those whose opinions it is possible to share, but also to those whose accounts are more superficial. These too made their contribution, by developing before us the habit of thought. Without Timotheus, we should lack much lyric poetry; but without Phrynis, there would have been no Timotheus. The same holds good among those who expressed themselves on the truth. From some of them we have accepted certain views, whereas others were responsible for the existence of these some.'

<sup>1</sup> For a repetition of his intentions see ch. 5, 986a13: καὶ παρὰ τούτων τίνας εἶναι τούτων τὰ ἀρχαῖα, καὶ πῶς αὐτὰ οὐ δι' αἴτιας ἐπεξηγῆσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἴσους δοῦναι ἀλλήλους αὐτὰς ἐξηγῆσθαι ἐκείνων ἀληθείας.

τῇ ἔξῃ προήχθησαν ἡμῶν expresses a proper and historical attitude to earlier thought, and there is no doubt that it was Aristotle's. To treat one's predecessors like this, instead of (like many scientists and philosophers) dismissing them out of hand as immature, ill-informed or otherwise out of date, is a mark of intellectual maturity. It is not a premise which encourages the conclusion that he will go on to cook their results in order to make them square with his own. He is indeed less likely to do this than the man who conceals, or is unconscious of, his own real intention. The application of this kind of test in addition to his own reasoning shows a stronger historical sense than most original philosophers possess.

In addition to the four causes, another conception fundamental to Aristotle's philosophy is that of natural and violent motion. Each of the elements has for him its natural place in the universe and it is its nature to move towards that place and, once arrived there, to remain still. He therefore divides all movement into natural and enforced. Cherniss (*ACP* 196-209) complains that here too he criticises his predecessors only from the standpoint of his own theory. He refers particularly to the discussion of the shape and position of the earth in *De caelo*, ii. 13. Yet at the conclusion of this discussion Aristotle says (294b30):

'But our quarrel with the men who talk like that about motion does not concern particular points, but an undivided whole'. (i.e. the behaviour of a particular element, earth, must not be considered in isolation, but only as a part of the cosmos with its universal laws.) 'I mean that we must decide from the very beginning whether bodies have a natural motion or not, or whether, not having a natural motion, they have an enforced one. And since our decisions on these points have already been made' (this refers to discussion in chapters 2-4) 'so far as our available powers allowed, we must use them as data.'

The reader could not ask for a clearer warning from the philosopher himself that he is proceeding on certain assumptions of his own, of which he is fully conscious; and in the words κατὰ τὴν τῶν οὐρανῶν δόξαν we have a becoming admission that his results may not be final.

There is, of course, much plausibility in the argument that because he was already convinced of the validity of his own scheme of causation he could not but distort his predecessors to fit it, thus 'thoroughly concealing and misrepresenting' their thought (Cherniss, *JHI*, 1951, p. 320), but at the same time we must remember the mote and the beam. We are all to some extent at the mercy of our own philosophical presuppositions, and Aristotle had at least the advantages over us that he was an Ionian Greek like the men of whom he was writing and that he was judging them on fuller evidence than we are. He sometimes says of one or other of them that if one seizes what we must suppose him to have meant, instead of judging by the inadequate language at his disposal, one will see that he was trying to say this or that (e.g. of Empedocles at *Metaph.* A 985a4, of Anaxagoras, 989a30). This practice of his can easily be held up to derision as an obvious case of distorting what the philosopher actually said in order to make it fit what Aristotle thinks he ought to have said. But can any of us hope to do better? The arrogance, if such it be, of assuming that one knows what a man wanted to say better than he did himself, is an arrogance from which none of us is free. It was Whitehead who wrote: 'Everything of importance has been said before by someone who did not discover it', and this statement represents Aristotle's attitude very fairly.

It may be replied that today our aim in studying the Presocratics is purely historical, to find out the truth about them, whereas Aristotle's was the substantiation of his own philosophical views. But in the first place, this again is to underrate the quality of Aristotle's mind as it appears clearly enough in other parts of his works. He did not feel about his philosophical views as an evangelist does about his religion. His interest was in the truth, and he was more capable than most of discarding irrational presuppositions in its pursuit. 'Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas' is *hien truut*; 'Amica veritas sed magis amicum quattuor esse genera causarum' is, for a man of Aristotle's stature, nonsense.

Further, is it such an advantage that in studying the Presocratics we have only historical considerations in mind? Aristotle at least knew that he was investigating a particular question, namely, how far they anticipated his fourfold scheme of causation (or, it may be, his conception of the nature of motion or the *psyche*). Indeed the full consciousness and frankness with which he sets about the task is an excellent guarantee that he will not unduly distort their views. The modern interpreter, just because he is not thinking of his own philosophical presuppositions, is much more likely to be influenced by them unconsciously; and it is absurd to say that because we are not philosophers we have no philosophical presuppositions. It is the philosopher who, because his view of things is framed consciously, is best able to free himself from the preconceptions of his time. The rest of us are more likely to apply them without realising it.

Here is an example from a scholarly modern discussion of a Presocratic philosopher, Mr. J. E. Raven's article on Anaxagoras in the *Classical Quarterly* for 1954. The instance is all the more



telling because the writer conforms to the highest standards of scholarship.<sup>3</sup> On p. 133 he writes:

'Whereas every single one of the Presocratics was striving after an incorporeal principle . . . one and all they ended in failure';

and on the next page he adds: 'Anaxagoras . . . in the last resort failed too.' Here we look back, from the standpoint of an age to which the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal is familiar, to an age before such a distinction was known, and we say that the men of that age were 'striving' to reach that distinction. Were they? That is a difficult question to answer, but no blame attaches to Mr. Raven for putting it in that way, since we can only study these philosophers in the light of our own conceptions, nor would the study be of much value if we did not. But let us at least grant Aristotle a similar freedom without accusing him of distorting his sources any more than we are. He looked at them in the light of his own view of reality, and like the modern scholar (only with much more evidence at his disposal) saw them as 'striving' to reach the same view.

In Cherniss's criticism much less than full weight is given to Aristotle's extreme conscientiousness in reporting the views of others. His statements about Empedocles and Anaxagoras in *Metaph. A*, already mentioned, are often taken as an instance of his 'reading into' their words what they did not say. If we would justly assess his trustworthiness, it is even more important that he himself is careful to let us know when he ceases to quote the 'stammering utterance' and puts his own interpretation on it. Criticising his interpretation of Anaxagoras at 989a30, McDiarmid writes: 'As Aristotle admits, he is not stating Anaxagoras's doctrine but giving it a logical development that Anaxagoras had neglected.' He does not seem to see what an enormous debt we owe to the historical sense of the man who so long before the age of scholarship takes the trouble to warn us explicitly<sup>4</sup> when he departs from the text of his author and goes on to his own interpretation. It justifies a certain confidence when we approach the interpretation itself.

In this connection may be cited what, if too much respect were not due to its author, one might be tempted to call the *reductio ad absurdum* of Professor Cherniss's view. Thales, Aristotle tells us (*Metaph. A* 983b20), said that the ἀρχή, or source of all things, was water, and for this reason he also said that the earth rests upon water. A little later (983a2). Aristotle's historical conscience leads him to put the original statement more cautiously: Thales, he repeats, is said to have declared himself thus about the first cause. He is, however, sufficiently satisfied on the point himself to regard Thales as the first figure in the Ionian philosophical tradition which ascribed the ultimate origin of all things to a single principle, this principle being, as Aristotle saw it, a material one. Thales was ὁ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ἀρχηγός. This will not do for Professor Cherniss.

'What we know', he writes (*JMH*, 1951, p. 321), 'of Aristotle's general method of interpreting his predecessors, however, and the specific purpose of his dialectical history in this book arouses the suspicion that Thales was not led from the general doctrine that all things come to be from water to draw the conclusion that the earth rests upon water, but conversely from the tradition which ascribed to Thales the notion that the earth rests upon water Aristotle inferred that he had made water the origin of everything.'

I would draw particular attention to this passage because it is far from my intention to argue that Aristotle was a faultless historian or that we can never be in a position to see his faults. He can certainly be detected in misinterpretation, and sometimes in self-contradiction, on the subject of an earlier philosopher.<sup>5</sup> But to put it at its lowest, he was intellectually mature, and the fault

<sup>3</sup> The appositeness of this parallel was pointed out to me by my daughter, Anne Guthrie, of Somerville College.

<sup>4</sup> ὁπότε οὐ δύναται πῶς οὐ διδύμωσιν . . .

<sup>5</sup> An obvious example is the contradictory senses which he gives to the word *ἄρχη* in the same passage of Empedocles (*St. B*) in *Gen. et Corr.* A314b3 and *Metaph. A* 1014b35. Change and revision of his opinions, and even forgetfulness of what he has said before, are not surprising in writings 'many of which', as Düring has recently reminded us (*A. the Scholar, Ardes*, 1954, p. 66), are 'continually revised series of lectures' and were never prepared by their author for publication. Cherniss's book provides many instances, though he sometimes exaggerates Aristotle's inconsistency, e.g. in his strictures on the general treatment of Empedocles (*ACP*, p. 196 n. 211, pp. 352-3). Aristotle's complaint that 'Empedocles does not allow one to decide whether the Sphæra or the elements were prior' (*Gen. et Corr.* 315a10. Cherniss n. 211) was from his own point of view justified, and does something to mitigate the heinousness of interpreting in different

ways what was to him a self-contradictory system. Some instances offered are not inconsistent at all. This *ACP* 357 says: 'The theory of Anaxagoras may be praised as "modern" when *κόσμος* is interpreted as final cause and yet held to be inferior to that of Empedocles when Aristotle is arguing that a finite number of principles is preferable to an infinite number.' But why should Aristotle not have regarded it as superior in some respects but inferior in others? Again same page: 'Anaximander is at one time just another Ionian monist, yet elsewhere he is linked with Anaxagoras and Empedocles'. The inconsistency here may lie in the nature of Anaximander's somewhat primitive ideas rather than being imposed on them by Aristotle. Whether *ἀδιαφορ*, from which things could be 'separated out', was originally a single substance or a mixture, is a question which he had not faced. 'Uncertainty on Aristotle's part as to what Anaximander really means' (p. 93) is very probable, but it is not the same as the kind of self-contradiction that is attributed to him elsewhere.

must in each case be proved before it can be assumed. Here, on the other hand, we are asked to suspect him of an elementary blunder for which there is not a shred of evidence, solely on the prior assumption that he 'is not interested in historical facts as such at all'.

If Aristotle were capable of playing fast and loose with facts to this extent, it would hardly be worth while to consult such a slipshod author on any subject, whether the previous history of philosophy or anything else; so let us look at the manner of his references to Thales. They should throw an important light on his methods and consequent trustworthiness, since in this case we know him to have been relying on intermediate sources only. If Thales ever wrote anything, it was lost before Aristotle's day.

As already noted, the statement about the first cause is given as what 'is said' about Thales. But can we trust Aristotle to distinguish between what he has found in tradition and what is merely his own conjecture? A further glance at his practice should help us to decide. Having repeated the simple statement, he goes on to suggest a reason which may have influenced Thales in making it. His words are (983b21): 'He said that the ἀρχή is water, getting this idea perhaps from (λαβὼν ἵστος τὰύτην τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἐκ τοῦ) seeing that the nourishment of all things is moist and that heat itself arises out of moisture and lives by it . . . and because the seed of all creatures is of moist nature.' The reason for the statement is clearly distinguished from the statement itself as a conjecture of Aristotle: we are not left wondering. I would add, because though not directly relevant to the present point it has a bearing on Aristotle's general trustworthiness as an interpreter of early thought, that Mr. McDiarmid does no service to the history of philosophy by simply repeating (on p. 93) Burnet's statement that 'arguments of this sort are characteristic of the physiological speculations that accompanied the rise of scientific medicine in the fifth century B.C. At the time of Thales the prevailing interest appears to have been meteorological'. Terms like 'physiological' and 'meteorological', with their suggestion of modern scientific departmentalism, are highly anachronistic. No technical interest in physiology is implied in the simple explanation given by Aristotle, and a general curiosity about the origin and maintenance of life far antedates the rise of scientific thought. As Professor Baldry showed in an important article, 'interest in birth and other phenomena connected with sex is a regular feature of primitive societies long before other aspects of biology are even thought of. . . . There is every reason for supposing that the Greeks were no exception to this rule'.<sup>4</sup>

The statement that the earth rests on water is referred to again in *De caelo* (294a29) as one which 'they say Thales made' (ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θ. τὸν Μυλήσιον). In *De anima* we find an interesting form of words whereby Aristotle lets us know with admirable precision (a) that he has found something in his authorities about Thales, and (b) that he feels justified in drawing a conclusion from it which nevertheless rests on no authority but his own inference:

'It looks, from what is recorded about him, as if Thales too thought of the soul as a kind of motive power, if he said that the loadstone has a soul because it attracts iron.'<sup>5</sup>

Later in the same treatise we have another of Aristotle's conjectures, clearly distinguished as such from the statements which he has found in earlier sources:

'Some say that soul is mingled in the whole, which is perhaps the reason why Thales believed that all things are full of gods.'<sup>6</sup>

The careful wording of these passages is, for its period, remarkable, and provides the valuable information that in sources available to Aristotle the following statements were attributed to Thales: (i) water is the ἀρχή; (ii) the earth rests on water; (iii) the loadstone has a soul because it attracts iron; (iv) all things are full of gods. To doubt this is to abandon all critical standards and stultify any study of the Presocratics. I would go further, and suggest that the caution and sanity exhibited by Aristotle compel us also to pay serious attention to his own conjectures, and I have tried to show that one of these has been much too hastily dismissed.

In considering a so-called fragment, says Professor Cherniss (*JHI*, p. 319 f.), one must take into consideration the whole context in which it has been preserved, 'a context which is sometimes as extensive as a whole book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*'. I would go even further, and say that in judging Aristotle's account of any of his predecessors one must take into consideration his whole philosophical and historical outlook, which can only be understood by a wide and deep reading of his works on a variety of subjects. Mr. McDiarmid, for instance, holds that doubts about the

<sup>4</sup> *Embryological Analogies in Presocratic Cosmogony*, C.Q. xvi (1932), p. 28. B. refers to Aristotle's version of Thales's motive on p. 33.

<sup>5</sup> 415a19: *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ θ. εἶναι τὴν ἀπορρητισμένην*

*κατακτόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπολαμβάνει, εἴπερ τὴν ἄλυσιν εἶναι ψυχὴν ἔχειν ὅτι τὸν σιδηρὸν κατέλ.*

<sup>6</sup> 415a27: *καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δὲ τινες αὐτὴν μετέχουσαν φασιν, ὅτιν ἴσως καὶ θ. ψυχὴ πάντων πόλιν θέναν εἶναι.*



view of matter which Aristotle attributes to the early physicists are made antecedently not unreasonable 'by the fact that he can seriously comment on the material theory of Homer in the same context with those of the physicists' (p. 92). This is a very misleading statement. It is true that Aristotle is remarkably patient with the views of even poets and mythographers (to whom he once stretches out a hand in a sudden flash of sympathetic insight: διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πρὸς ἑσπερ, *Metaph.* A 982b18), owing to his unshakable and attractive conviction that there must be some grain of truth in any sincerely held belief. But there is much in that πρὸς. The lover of myth shares with the philosopher the all-important gift of curiosity, but no more. This is the same critic who could write '*Metaph.* B 1000a18): ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν μυθικῶς σοφισμένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν δι' ἀποδείξεως λεγόντων δεῖ τινεῖν εἶναι, and who reveals himself in the passage of *Metaph.* A which McDiarmid is discussing. There is no question of Aristotle's putting Homer on a level with the Milesian philosophers; otherwise he could not designate Thales with clear-cut emphasis as ὁ τῆς τριαύτης φιλοσοφίας ἀρχηγός. Only after the serious part of his exposition is over does he add that 'there are some who say' that the old θεολόγοι like Homer took this view of nature, then immediately dismissing that as something scarcely susceptible of verification and not worth further thought, he returns to Thales as the earliest thinker relevant to his inquiry. It is sad to be forced into such heavy-handed exegesis of the expressive dryness with which, after the mention of Homer's Oceanos and Tethys, Aristotle continues (983b33): αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαὶ τὰς οὐρὰ καὶ παλιν τετύχηται ὅσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ δόξα, τάς τ' αὖ ἀδηλον εἶη, θαλάσσης μὲντοι λέγεται οὕτως ἀποφύρασθαι. Homer and Thales in the same context!"

To substitute uncritical rejection for sympathetic criticism of Aristotle's account leads, in the absence of any better source of information, to the creation of a purely modern dogmatism in its place. Many examples could be quoted, but space will scarcely permit of more than one. Of the origin of motion in the system of Leucippus and Democritus, Aristotle says in *Metaph.* A (985b19) that they 'like the others, lazily shelved' this question. In *Phys.* (265b24) he refers to them as those who 'make the void the cause of motion'. Mr. McDiarmid notes (p. 126 f.) that Aristotle, and Theophrastus where he is dependent on him, give the impression that the Atomists considered the assertion of the void's existence to be sufficient answer to the Eleatic denial of motion, and continues: 'Clearly it was not, and the atomists can hardly have thought that it was.' By this unsupported assertion he closes the door against any use of Aristotle's hint as an aid to reconstructing the problem as the Atomists saw it. If, instead, we follow that hint, we may discover the ingenious way in which they safeguarded their system from the objections to which those of Empedocles and Anaxagoras were open. Parmenides had finally condemned any system which, like the Milesian or Pythagorean, combined the notions of a one and a many. An original one could never become many, for change and motion were impossible because, among other reasons, true void was an inadmissible concept. Empedocles and Anaxagoras had tried to save the phenomena by abandoning the original unity. Positing an everlasting plurality, and accepting the Parmenidean denials of (a) γένεσις and φθορά and (b) void, they evidently thought they could retain the possibility of locomotion by a kind of reciprocal replacement (the motion which later writers compared to that of a fish through water, *Simpl. Phys.* 651. 26 Diels).

For motion even to start in such a plenum, an external cause seemed necessary. Otherwise it would remain locked in a solid, frozen mass. Thus whereas to blame the Milesians for omitting to provide a motive cause is anachronistic, to demand it in any post-Parmenidean system is right. The need was there and was known to be there. Hence the Love and Strife of Empedocles and the Mind of Anaxagoras. But to an age for which there was still only one type of entity (that which we should call corporeal, though this term could not come into use until its contrary, the incorporeal, had been conceived), the introduction of Mind over the mixture must have seemed suspiciously like the reintroduction of unity, of a one behind the many, by a back door, thus laying Anaxagoras's system wide open once more to criticism of the Eleatic type.

What is difficult for us to realise is the complete novelty of the idea that a true void might exist. Before Parmenides the concept had not been grasped, so that the Pythagoreans could actually identify κενόν and πνεῦμα (*Ac. Phys.* vi. 213b22). Later it had been understood only to be denied as impossible. I suggest, therefore, that the Atomists had consciously faced the problem of the origin of motion and considered that they were providing a new, sufficient, and positive answer by attributing it to the existence of void.<sup>12</sup> The difficulties which had faced the pluralist attempts to rescue phenomena from the grip of Eleatic logic were the difficulties of accounting for a beginning of motion in a mass of matter heterogeneous indeed, but locked together without the smallest chink of empty space between its parts. Substitute for that picture the alternative of an infinite number

<sup>12</sup> It may be, as Ross suggests, that Aristotle's introduction of the ancient *τολμή* here is a reminiscence of Plato's remarks in the *Cratylus* (402d) and *Theaetetus* (152e, 160d, 180c), though Plato is quoting them as fore-

runners of Heraclitus rather than of Thales. In any case, if Plato, as Ross says, is 'jesting', may we not allow Aristotle to have his joke too?

of microscopic atoms let loose, as it were, in infinite empty space, and it is at least as reasonable to ask 'Why should they stay still?' as 'Why should they move?'

Eleatic logic compelled the Atomists to describe the void as  $\tau\acute{o} \mu\eta \delta\upsilon$ ; but this had an advantage of its own.  $\tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon$  being still what we should be inclined to call some form of body, space was something different, a mere blank; it is  $\mu\eta \delta\upsilon$ . Yet, Leucippus insists, in its own way it exists, it is there (Ar. *Metaph.* A. 985b4 ff.), and not only that, but it is what makes motion possible. Thus Leucippus played on Parmenides the kind of trick which Odysseus played on the Cyclops. When asked what started motion, Anaxagoras replies 'Mind', i.e. a positive  $\delta\upsilon$  somehow different in kind from the matter of which the cosmos is composed. Asked the same question, Leucippus replies, first, that motion has been from all time, but secondly, that what makes it possible is  $\tau\acute{o} \mu\eta \delta\upsilon$ . If  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma \mu\epsilon \kappa\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$ , the neighbours cannot expect to catch the murderer.

Aristotle is often astonishingly close to our own point of view. Like Mr. McDiarmid, he thinks the existence of void is no sufficient explanation of the possibility of motion. It is a *sine qua non*, but not the positive cause—e.g. weight—which his own (incidentally erroneous) mechanics demanded. Hence although he records that they gave this answer, it does not in his eyes absolve them from the charge of 'light-mindedness' (*pathulía*) in this respect. But if we use the evidence which he is a good enough historian to give us, we may succeed in overcoming both our own preconceptions and his and getting nearer to the mind of a pre-Platonic thinker. The Atomists came to a stage in the history of thought when the need for a positive cause of motion was bound up with the lack of a true conception of void. The setting free of the atoms, therefore, though to Aristotle it appeared as no more than a *sine qua non*, seemed to them a sufficient explanation, a positive *áíτιον*, of their motion. They combined it with the assertion that motion was from eternity, and considered that no further, more positive, cause was required. In this the physics of Leucippus and Democritus are more nearly in accord with the views of motion current in Europe since Galileo and Descartes than with the imperfect theories of Aristotle. He is certainly open to criticism, but not to immediate dismissal on the grounds that the Atomists could never have thought of the void as a sufficient answer to the Eleatic denial of motion.

The proper treatment of Aristotle's evidence is vital for the whole history of Presocratic thought. Here I have done no more than suggest a few reasons for believing that it calls for further investigation. Professor Cherniss has not so much 'dealt exhaustively' with the subject as opened our minds to new and fruitful possibilities—perhaps a greater service. As an historian Aristotle has serious failings, but he deserves less wholesale condemnation than he is at the moment in danger of receiving. Too hasty rejection of some of his judgments may be of less service than sympathetic criticism. If we wish to see through his mind to those of his predecessors. A small contribution towards this sympathetic understanding will, I hope, be an acceptable tribute to the great Aristotelian in whose honour it is written.<sup>11</sup>

W. K. C. GUTHRIE.

Peterhouse, Cambridge.

<sup>11</sup> One must remember that Melissus had argued directly from the non-existence of void to the impossibility of motion, in contradiction of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. (Fr. 7 sect. 7, Cherniss *JCP* 402.)

<sup>12</sup> I should like to express my thanks to Mr. D. J. Allan for helpful comments and suggestions made while this paper was in draft.



# ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V, AND THE LAW OF ATHENS

THE publication posthumously in 1951 of Professor Joachim's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics<sup>1</sup> has raised again in an acute form the question of Aristotle's use of Athenian law as the basis of his discussion of justice in Book V. We are told that Joachim in his interpretation of this book made much use of an unpublished essay of Professor J. A. Smith. It is particularly unfortunate that it has not been found possible to trace the manuscript of this essay among Professor Smith's papers since there is a good deal that is new and unorthodox in the resulting interpretation. It is also unfortunate that, because Joachim's publication was posthumous, there could be no reciprocity as between his and some other relatively recent and important discussions of the subject, especially those of H. D. P. Lee<sup>2</sup> and of L. Gernet,<sup>3</sup> while these last two, publishing in the same year, were ignorant of each other's work. I have felt drawn to a brief re-examination of the question because I am sceptical of the general lines of Joachim's treatment, rash though it be to differ from both him and J. A. Smith on the interpretation of Aristotle.

The specific question I propose to ask is whether in N.E. V Aristotle is basing himself at all closely on the substantive law of Athens, and my main conclusion is negative. I think that there is a tendency, particularly in Joachim, to read too much law into what Aristotle says, to force his discussion into a juristic mould into which it simply does not fit. Aristotle after all is attempting to describe a *ēxis*,<sup>4</sup> a tendency to feel and act in a certain way; and, close as may be in his thought the connection between the man and the citizen, we perhaps ought not to look for too exact a mirror of the character of the good citizen in the external institutions of the city.

Aristotle begins his account with a distinction between two senses of the terms 'justice' and 'injustice' as commonly employed. Prefacing that a *ēxis* can be recognised (a) from its opposite and (b) from that in which it inheres (*ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων* 1129a17), he proceeds to examine the current uses of the expression *ô dikaos*. This can mean either the lawless man (*ô παράνομος*) or the grasping and unfair man (*ô πλεονέκτης καὶ ἀδίκος*). It follows that justice is either law-abidingness or the absence of graspingness.<sup>5</sup> He goes on to say (1129b11) that since the lawless man is unjust and the law-abiding is just it is clear that all lawful things (*νόμιμα*) are just, since lawful things are those enacted by the law-giver's art (*τὰ ἀριστὰ ἐκ τῆς νομοθετικῆς*) and we say that each of these is just. Further the laws cover the whole of the citizens' conduct (*οἱ νόμοι ἀρκετοῦσι περὶ πάντων*). Consequently 'justice' in this sense is coincident with complete 'virtue' save that it is *πρὸς ἄλλον*.

Has this initial distinction any important juristic significance? Burnet in his note on 1129a30 discounts the significance of the distinction altogether, attributing it to a mere accident of the Greek language. *ἀδικεῖν* was in the language of the courts 'to be guilty' of any offence whatsoever and all Aristotle is doing here is to clear the ground of this—for his purpose irrelevant—sense of the word.<sup>6</sup> Joachim objects with some force that this is going too far. 'The common name ("justice" or "injustice") covers a generic identity: the two kinds of justice (or injustice) have so much in common that both issue in actions advantaging or disadvantaging another' (p. 128). Joachim proceeds on p. 130 to give the distinction a specifically juristic content, following a suggestion of J. A. Smith. The *ô dikaos* of which Aristotle is here thinking includes all those forms of wrongdoing which rendered the agent liable to the public penal law. 'The motive of the offence might be ethically wrong in various ways—e.g. lust, cowardice, temper; but the offender himself is an injury to the community (*τὸ κοινόν*), and not merely to one of its members (*ἓνα τῶν κοινονομένων*)?; i.e. a breach of the law whose object is to promote the common welfare. The procedure at Athens in such cases was by a *γραφὴ* (indictment) or *δίκη δημοσία* (public suit), and the offence was treated as treason to the public weal: the action was for punishment, the penalties were, for example, death, *ἀνδρα* or loss of civil rights (total or partial), a fine, confiscation, or (seldom) imprisonment. The law could be set in motion by any citizen.'

There seem to me two criticisms to be made of this interpretation, one less and the other more

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, A Commentary by the late H. M. Joachim, ed. D. A. Rees (Oxford 1951).

<sup>2</sup> H. D. P. Lee, *The Legal Background of Two Passages in the Nicomachean Ethics*, C.Q. 41 (1937), pp. 129 ff.

<sup>3</sup> L. Gernet, *Stoic Notion du Jugement en Droit Grec*, Arch. d'Hist. Nat. (Paris) 1937, pp. 311 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Neither a *disposition* nor an *empeachment*. If he had been treating the subject under either of these last two heads the case might have been different.

<sup>5</sup> The difficulty of expressing these two distinct mean-

ings in English seems also to have been a difficulty in Greek. Certainly Aristotle has no abstract words for the opposites of *παράνομος* and *πλεονέκτης*. Perhaps this is one reason why he starts from consideration of the 'unjust' rather than the 'just' man.

<sup>6</sup> There is a brief but illuminating discussion of justice and conforming to the law in P. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 211 f.

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1373b18.

serious. The less serious is the introduction of the term *γραφή* into the distinction. The main differentia of the *γραφή* was that it could be initiated by *ὁ βουλόμενος*, whereas a *δίκη* could only be initiated by the wronged individual or his nearest competent relative. There were clearly various motives for throwing open the initiation of proceedings to *ὁ βουλόμενος* in various types of case,<sup>1</sup> but the danger of making the *γραφή* in any sense equivalent to the public penal suit is shown by two complementary facts: *φόνος* could never in Athenian law be redressed by a *γραφή*,<sup>2</sup> while on the other hand in certain circumstances a *γραφή παρανόμων* involved an unsuccessful defendant in no penalty at all.

But the more serious criticism is that if Aristotle really had this distinction in mind he has signally failed to bring it out. To have made a direct reference to this division of actions at law would have been an admirable method of driving home his point. He does in fact refer to such a division in the passage in the *Rhetoric* quoted by Joachim; but here he does not. Moreover such a division cannot be made to correspond with what he says here of the two kinds of justice. For in the first place the differentia he offers of an unjust action in the particular sense is not that it entails a private rather than a public injury, but that the motive of it is a desire to over-reach (*πλεονεξία*). Now whatever value such a distinction may have for the moralist or the psychologist, it is of singularly little use to the lawyer. Of course the whole question of intention may be very important for law and Aristotle says much that is valuable on the subject both later in N.E. V and in the passage of the *Rhetoric* referred to. But it would be ridiculous to attempt to remove an act from the sphere of public to that of private law on the ground that it was done from a desire to over-reach and not from lust, cowardice, revenge or what else you will: as though Agrippina could have pleaded that her adultery with Pallas was merely a private wrong to Claudius because its motive was not passion but policy. And secondly, if we try to take at all seriously the view that wrongs classified under *ὅλη ἀδικία* are for Aristotle specifically those wrongs for which redress was by a *γραφή* or *δίκη δημοσία*, we immediately get into difficulties over the redress of wrongs arising out of *ἀκούσια συναλλήματα*. As Joachim rightly points out on p. 137, though what we call crimes are included under *ἀκούσια συναλλήματα*, there is nothing in Aristotle's classification corresponding to the distinction between crimes and torts. Further, Joachim adds, 'it is interesting to observe that crimes—except those which fall under *ὅλη ἀδικία* or general injustice—are, according to Aristotle (and also according to Athenian legal practice), matters of private law'. (My italics.) But we at once ask by what criterion we are to separate off the crimes which fall under general injustice, and we are forced back again into the wholly unsatisfactory criterion of the motive of the wrongdoer. *κακηγορία*, to take a concrete example, will be redressable by a private suit if it has been prompted by desire for gain, by a public suit if it has been prompted by some other motive, such as mere delight in back-biting.

I suggest, then, that Aristotle is not likely to have been thinking at all of different kinds of action in making this distinction. He is in search of a *ἕξις* and starts his search from two current linguistic usages. He obviously had to get out of the way that current use of the word which equated 'justice' with 'conforming to the law', since he was looking for a specific virtue. This specific virtue he finds in 'fairness', the absence of *πλεονεξία*, which on his view can only be shown in relation to divisible, desirable goods, *μεριστὰ ἀγαθὰ*—he sums them up in 1130b2 under the three heads of *τίμη*, *χρήματα* and *σωτηρία*. These goods have to be distributed and their distribution has to be preserved. Both the initial distribution and the preservation of it are specific functions of the state and it was natural for Aristotle to trace the image of the *ἕξις* in the relevant administrative and judicial institutions of the state. It was there that the specific virtue could objectify itself. Moreover, the way in which Aristotle depicted this as happening enabled him to bring specific justice within the doctrine of the mean, since the more and the less which was the subject of an administrator's award or of a court's assessment of damages or penalty could be represented as the establishment or restoration of a measurable mean between a too much and a too little. I shall return later to the implausibility of his treatment of this subject. In the meantime I simply stress the point that the distinction between universal and particular justice does not tie up with any objective juristic facts and that Aristotle can hardly have asked himself what is the juristic significance of dividing all wrongful acts into those done from *πλεονεξία* on the one hand and the rest on the other.

Turning to Aristotle's account of specific justice, the first question that arises is the significance of its classification into *διαιρητική* and *διορθωτική*.<sup>3</sup> Here again I find it difficult to accept

<sup>1</sup> It is quite probable that the procedure was originated by Solon in an attempt to safeguard his prohibition of enslavement for debt. So long as there were only *δίκαι* a man who was *de facto* a slave would have found it difficult to get his case before a court.

<sup>2</sup> It is true, as Professor Wade-Gery emphasises to me,

that the rules for *φόνος* were entirely exceptional. It remains for me significant that what is for us the public wrong *par excellence* was always the subject of a *δίκη*.

<sup>3</sup> I use these ugly transliterations since translations are apt to beg the question.



Joachim's view, developed on p. 139 f., that what Aristotle has primarily—if not entirely—in mind under *dianemetic* justice is those rights that formed the subject of *διαδικασίαι*. It is true that a *διαδικασία* differs in one important respect from other kinds of suit in having neither plaintiff nor defendant. It is a declaratory action, deciding who has a better right among two or more claimants to an estate or what their shares should be or which of them is liable to some public burden. But, apart from the fact that there is nothing in the text to suggest that Aristotle is thinking in terms of legal actions at all, even if he had been, it is not easy to see what ethical significance this procedural difference could have. The ethical point of the distinction which Aristotle is making is fairly simple; it is that in *dianemetic* justice the parties must not be assumed to be equal, in *diorthotic* they must. Thus in an aristocratic state a non-aristocrat's sense of justice should not be outraged if he gets less than an equal share of office: it should be, if he finds that an aristocrat who commits adultery gets off more lightly than he would have done had he been a non-aristocrat. It would, I think, have been a nice point for Aristotle whether a *διαδικασία* for an inheritance fell properly under *dianemetic* or *diorthotic* justice. I find it a little sophistic when Joachim says on p. 144 that in such a case the fair shares would depend on the relative closeness of kin to the deceased; certainly this answer only applies to cases of intestate succession. On these grounds I would prefer the conventional view that under *dianemetic* justice Aristotle is thinking of those acts of state which were concerned with the distribution of *μεριστὰ ἀγαθὰ*—a class of acts much wider in his day than ours, particularly in view of the numerous new foundations which were occurring. These acts would include even the distribution of *κλήροι* or land lots, as well as occasional distributions of public revenues or of honours. Joachim on p. 138 objects to this view on the ground that the fundamental legislative acts by which the privileges, powers and places were assigned to the constituent members of the community would require *φρόνησις* (practical wisdom), which is an intellectual virtue in its highest form and therefore not relevant to the discussion at this point. But is there not here a confusion between, on the one hand, the determination of what form the state is to take, democratic, monarchic, aristocratic, a determination which will settle on what principles the *μεριστὰ ἀγαθὰ* are to be divided, and on the other hand the actual process of carrying out the distribution? The latter would surely involve the exercise of plain moral virtue both on the part of the distributor and the recipient.

Here again then it is only by doing violence to the straightforward interpretation of what Aristotle says that we can find any jurisdictional pattern in his system. He simply is not asking himself, as a Roman writer might have done, what rights are protected by what actions at law.

Before turning to *diorthotic* justice a few words are necessary on the place of justice in exchange in Aristotle's scheme (1132b31-1133b28). For Burnet there was here no problem. He insisted that *διορθωτικὴ* should be rendered 'directive' and that 'corrective' or *epanorthotic* was a part only of τὸ διορθωτικόν. He could therefore subsume the consideration of the principles of justice in exchange under that of *ἐκὼνα συμβαλλόμενα*, contractual obligations. He recognised that there was the difference that these principles were not enforceable at law whereas breaches of contract were; but still for him the division of particular justice into *dianemetic* and *diorthotic* is exhaustive.

This view is open to two objections. Firstly the distinction between *diorthotic* and *epanorthotic* is a little too subtle to be thus left to the reader to deduce. Secondly we must on this theory assume that justice in exchange is based on arithmetical 'proportion'; that is that the parties to the exchange are regarded as equal: this is one important differentia of *diorthotic* justice. But surely the one point to which we must firmly adhere in considering justice in exchange is that the values of the two parties are *unequal*.<sup>11</sup>

But if justice in exchange is not a part of *diorthotic* justice it is left in a sort of limbo, 'outside the sphere of strictly legal justice, in a sphere not even necessarily co-extensive with the political community (i.e. the sphere of law in its widest sense)' (Joachim, p. 148). Certainly its principles were not enforceable at law, for we are told in 1132b15 that in buying and selling and like activities the law allows over-reaching—*ἀδικεῖν δίδωμεν ὁ νόμος*—and the point is made again in 1133a2-4. It is therefore not comprehended even under general justice, for *ὁ νόμος ἀγορευόντων περὶ δίκαιον*.<sup>12</sup> Aristotle's failure to enlarge on the paradox that dispositions which are necessary for the holding

<sup>11</sup> See especially Joachim, p. 150, who adds 'how exactly the values of the producers are to be determined, and what the ratio between them can mean, he I must confess, in the end unintelligible to me'. Mr. M. I. Faley, in an interesting unpublished paper on *Justice in Exchange*, which he was kind enough to show me, emphasises the point that for Aristotle the fundamental inequality of men is one of the determining principles of exchange. We should not forget that 'the economic man' was an abstraction still in the womb of time in Aristotle's day. And he remains an abstraction: we are

told, for example, that one disadvantage of being raised to the peerage is that the peer pays more for many things than the commoner.

<sup>12</sup> Sir David Ross puts it forcibly: 'there is no moral virtue in commercial justice as described by Aristotle, "justice" here is not a virtue but a sort of "governor" in the economic machine which keeps exchange prices from swinging far from the actual value, for human needs, of the goods exchanged.' W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, 3rd ed. (London 1939), p. 213.

together of the city—τῇ ἀντιποσὲν ἀνάλογον συμμεῖσιν ἡ πόλις 1132b33—are not enforceable by law is perhaps another instance of his comparative indifference to the juristic problems raised by his schematisation.

Leaving aside this outwork of particular justice we may think to find in Aristotle's treatment of diorthotic justice a rather closer correspondence with the facts of the Athenian legal system. H. D. P. Lee and Joachim have given, independently, careful expositions of this correspondence. But even here a closer examination suggests to me some doubts.

First there is the whole question of the assessment of damages or penalties, not treated by Lee but dealt with in some detail by Joachim on pp. 144 ff. The *prose* interpretation of Aristotle's mathematical scheme here is notoriously difficult and I do not pretend to understand it fully. In the main, however, I would agree with Burnet, as against Joachim, that the point Aristotle is here trying to make is that in assessing what a condemned defendant should pay the court may often have to recognise that the wrong he has done is not exactly equivalent to the damage suffered by the plaintiff. In such a case justice is done by transferring from one to the other the arithmetical mean between these two.<sup>13</sup> Joachim, on the other hand, thinks that Aristotle is anticipating here a point he makes in passing later on—1132b29—that in some cases the status of the parties may make a difference to the damages. But not only do I find it difficult to get Joachim's sense out of the phrase at 1132a4; there is the further objection that this interpretation seems to run counter to the requirement that in diorthotic justice the parties are treated as equal. Burnet's view, on the other hand, preserves Aristotle's self-consistency, but at the expense, so at least it seems to me, of his practical good sense. For, to take Burnet's example in his note to 1132a32, if the δίκαιον estimated as κέρδος is 7 and the βλάβος estimated as ζημία is 3, then the μέσον or δίκαιον is 5 and therefore 5 is taken from the condemned defendant and awarded to the plaintiff. But on what principle of justice should a wrong-doer be mulcted of less than the amount of the gain of his wrong-doing because the loss involved for his victim was less than that amount or contrariwise of more when the resultant loss was more? And *mutatis mutandis* why should the amounts received by the victim be varied in this fashion?

In any case whether we agree here with Burnet or with Joachim, can there be any close resemblance between a real judicial process and the calculations described by Aristotle? It is hard to find any trace of such a process in what we know of Athenian practice. In cases that came before the dicasts certainly the normal procedure for fixing either damages or penalties, when these were not fixed by statute, was by the process of τιμᾶσθαι and ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι. In such cases the dicasts had simply to choose between the two assessments and any process remotely resembling that suggested by Aristotle was ruled out. Vinogradoff, it is true, in his *Collected Papers*, vol. II, p. 13, followed by Joachim, p. 146, makes the suggestion that Aristotle is here thinking of procedure before a public arbitrator. 'In cases of damages and personal wrongs the ground for the decision was thoroughly prepared by the preliminary procedure before the arbiters; their valuation must have supplied the frame for the alternative questions to be put to the jurors.' 'This is quite a plausible guess, but a guess none the less. Unfortunately we do not know what happened about the assessment and counter-assessment of damages in cases when an arbitrator's award had been rejected by one or other of the parties and the case referred on appeal to a dicastery.'

Finally, what are we to make of Aristotle's famous dichotomy of what, on one view at least, covers the whole field of diorthotic justice into συνάλλαγμα ἐκούσιον and ἀκούσιον?<sup>14</sup> It may well be that Aristotle was the first to give clear, theoretic formulation to what was to become later a fundamental distinction between obligations arising out of the concurrent wills of the two parties to a transaction and those in which one of the two parties has been passive—contract and tort in English law, *obligationes ex contractu* and *ex delicto* in Roman. His use of the word συνάλλαγμα as the term to cover both kinds of relationship is a little strange and it is perhaps slightly begging the question when Lee writes συνάλλαγμα = *obligatio*.<sup>15</sup> The word should mean the 'transaction' rather than the situation arising out of it, and one would think that the application to it of the epithet ἀκούσιον must have been almost an oxymoron.<sup>16</sup> However that may be, there is no doubt a remarkable parallelism between the voluntary and involuntary transactions listed here by Aristotle and Roman contracts and delicts, a parallelism lucidly and moderately worked out by Lee, *l.c.*<sup>17</sup>

It is, however, a distinct and much more debated question whether Aristotle is basing himself

<sup>13</sup> This seems the best interpretation of 1132a4—ἀλλὰ τὰς τοῦ βλάβος τῆς διαφορῆς μέσιν ὁ νόμος. Ross agrees with Joachim here, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>14</sup> The best MSS. read at 1131a2 ἀδικημάτων for συνάλλαγμα. Mr. D. J. Allan has pointed out to me that, even if this is impossible—and it certainly seems difficult—it may have been influenced by Plato *Laus* IX 861b where Plato says that all lawyers distinguish between voluntary and involuntary wrong-doing.

<sup>15</sup> C.Q. 31 (1937), p. 131, n. 8, following Lapus, *Ant. Recht*, p. 583.

<sup>16</sup> Professor Wade-Gery offers 'involvement' as a translation of συνάλλαγμα. This certainly cases the application to it of ἀκούσιον as an epithet.

<sup>17</sup> I was rather startled at Lee's statement that in ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα 'liability is incurred "involuntarily" in the sense that the citizen who commits, e.g., a theft does not do so in order to incur the liability, but would



at all closely on principles underlying the practice of the Athenian courts in making this distinction. L. Gernet, for example, in his most suggestive article on the notion of the judgment in Athenian law<sup>18</sup> has developed a strong case against such a view. Having dealt briefly with the *διαδικασία* he passes on p. 129 to *δίκαι* in the narrower sense and discusses the classification of these suits into *δίκαι πρὸς τὴν* and *δίκαι κατὰ τὴν*. It has been the commonly accepted view that this distinction corresponded more or less exactly with the distinction between redress for breach of *ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα* and redress for wrongs suffered through *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*.<sup>19</sup> Gernet casts doubts on this. In his view all *δίκαι* are of the delictual type and he supports his view by four arguments. (1) The prepositions *πρὸς* and *κατὰ* have not the force assigned to them, for (a) we have evidence for the formula *κατὰ τὴν* applied to actions arising out of contracts; for example the pseudo-Demosthenic speeches 48 and 56 are so described in their titles. (b) The only specific text quoted to support the distinction, Isaeus xi. 34 (not as Gernet by a slip gives it v. 11) does not in fact do so. On the contrary the speaker is referring under *δίκη πρὸς* to a *διαδικασία* and under *δίκη κατὰ* to an action for breach of contract. (2) There are cases where a *δίκη βλάβης* is used for breach of contract and this is an action essentially delictual. (3) There is no good evidence for any general action dealing with breach of contract as such. The *δίκη συμβολαίων* and *δίκη συμβηκίων παραβίσεως* mentioned by Pollux do not occur in any classical text. The nearest we get to anything of the kind is in Plato, *Lysis* XI 920d, an action *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμολογίας*.<sup>20</sup> (4) Similarly there are normally no particular actions named after the particular contracts which they were designed to protect. The *δίκη ἐγγύης* is the exception which proves the rule; it has a delictual character and was instituted to take the place of an extra-judicial execution.

F. Pringsheim in his important discussion of the Greek law of contract<sup>21</sup> differs on several points from these views of Gernet. His main concern is to show that Greek law does not know consensual contracts, those that derive simply from the consent of the parties. He accepts Gernet's argument (3) that there was no general action dealing with breach of contract. On the other hand he denies that the *δίκη βλάβης* was ever used for breach of contract on the grounds that (1) 'it is not probable in itself that an action based on delict could be used where the breach of contract consisted in mere neglect of duty' (p. 521); (2) 'the *δίκη βλάβης* makes a distinction between simple compensation (in case of unintentional damage: *ἄκων*) and double compensation (in case of intentional damage: *ἐκούσιον*). This distinction can only be applied and is in fact exclusively applied to delicts' (ibid. 1.22). (3) In the few cases where it is claimed that a contractual case is the subject of a *δίκη βλάβης*, the supporting evidence is weak. Pringsheim then proceeds to a long discussion of a particular kind of contract, that of loan, 'the first transaction to be recognised by law of contract' (p. 57). This discussion leads him to conclude on p. 66 'that an enforceable obligation in its full sense arose in Greece only if the loan contract was made in the presence of witnesses (formal element). Their function was to testify to payment of the money by the creditor to the debtor (real element), at the debtor's request assented to by the creditor (consensual element)'. He does not seem to have felt called upon to go into the distinction of suits into *πρὸς τὴν* and *κατὰ τὴν* and has therefore not dealt with the crucial passage in Isaeus xi. 34. On the whole, however, whether we follow Gernet or Pringsheim on the details of Athenian procedure in cases arising out of contracts we shall not find in that procedure any very close counterpart to Aristotle's categorisation of *συναλλάγματα* into *ἐκούσια* and *ἀκούσια*.

To sum up briefly, I would hazard the opinion that Aristotle's treatment of justice in N.E. V shows only a very general, one might perhaps say an academic, interest in the actual legal institutions of the Athens of his day. Obviously so acute and pragmatic a mind as his would sense in the legal world around him some of the general principles and problems which current practice raised. Thus his realisation that in 'transactions', that is in the changing relations between individuals arising out of their activities, there are two ways in which an obligation can be created between two parties according to whether the wills of both or of only one of the parties have been at work in the transaction and that this must have an important bearing on our attitude to the obligation thus created—this realisation is a remarkable feat of generalisation considering the period at which it was made. But Aristotle does not draw from it its practical juristic consequences and by juristic

escape the liability if he could'. I had always supposed that in such cases the involuntariness lay with the victim rather than the perpetrator of the wrong. Lee's sense would, I think, only be possible if *οὐκ ἐκούσιον* was literally equal to *obligatio*.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* above, n. 3.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* e.g., Vinogradoff, *Outline of Historical Jurisprudence* (Oxford 1922), p. 15; *Id.*, quoted by Lee.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. also Gernet's Introduction to the Boule edition of the *Lysis* pp. cxxviii ff. and especially on p. cxxviii 'l'effort de réflexion juridique est évident: ce n'est pas

si souvent qu'on peut l'observer chez les Grecs. A plusieurs reprises, Aristotle a touché à la question: il n'y a rien de comparable chez lui'.

<sup>21</sup> *The Greek Law of Sale* (Winnipeg 1930), pp. 37 ff.

<sup>22</sup> As against Gernet these first two grounds seem to me to involve a *petite jurisprudence*. In his supporting note to (a) P. quotes a number of passages which 'speak of *ἀκούσιον* only'. It is significant that in one of them, N.E. 1135b2, failure to return a deposit wilfully is classed by implication as *πρὸς τὴν*.

standards it remains a flash of insight by a brilliant amateur.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps, however, the word 'academic' is too harsh; for in his failure to develop the juristic implications of his exposition, if failure it is, Aristotle is after all true to the general trend of Greek thought. The point is made admirably by Gernet at the end of the article from which I have quoted. 'Il est remarquable qu'il n'y ait guère eu en Grèce, à proprement parler, une philosophie du droit, mais plutôt, et si constamment, une philosophie de la justice; remarquable aussi que, dans la théorie d'Aristote, la partie la plus substantielle de la justice—au-dessus du "droit correctif" que dessert le jugement des tribunaux—ce soit la "justice distributive", par quoi les "partis" sont non pas reconnus, mais constitués.'<sup>22</sup>

A. R. W. HARRISON.

Merton College, Oxford.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. F. Schultz in his *History of Roman Legal Science* (Oxford 1953), p. 75: 'Aristotle was a student remote from legal practice and its real problems'. M. Hamburger in his *Morals and Law* (Yale 1951) dissents violently on p. 105. It is true that they are both in the passages quoted dealing with Aristotle's treatment of *ἐπιχρεία* which I have not touched. So far as the topics with which

I have dealt go, I can find nothing in Hamburger's book which would lead me to prefer his to Schultz's judgment.

<sup>22</sup> Professor H. T. Wade-Gery and Mr. W. H. Walsh were kind enough to read through this article in typescript. They concurred, I think, with my general conclusion though I am far from wishing to involve them in any responsibility for the deficiencies of its exposition.

## KNOWLEDGE AND FORMS IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

In the last pages of the *Theaetetus*<sup>1</sup> Socrates is made to present four<sup>2</sup> versions of a final attempt to define knowledge, as true opinion accompanied by logos, and to reject them all; yet in earlier dialogues 'ability to give account', λόγος ἔχειν or λόγον διδόναι διύνασθαι, is closely associated with knowledge, not always,<sup>3</sup> or not necessarily,<sup>4</sup> knowledge of Forms, and in the *Republic* it is said to be the essential mark of the dialectician.<sup>5</sup> These facts are exceedingly hard to interpret. In recent years the passage has been read as an indirect defence of the earlier theory of Forms, as the statement of a problem answered in the *Sophist* by a revision of that theory and as a piece of radical self-criticism. No one of these interpretations seems to me without difficulty, and in this article I shall attempt to argue for yet another solution which owes something to all three.

Professor Cornford,<sup>6</sup> pressing the fact that Socrates draws all his illustrations from the world of concrete things,<sup>7</sup> believes that Plato intended by criticism of the different versions to point the way to an old and invulnerable sense of λόγον διδόναι which implies that the proper objects of knowledge are Forms. This is the statement or understanding of grounds for judgments which in the *Menon*<sup>8</sup> is said to turn true opinion into knowledge. A rather similar line has been taken by Professor Cherniss.<sup>9</sup> Professor Stenzel<sup>10</sup> thinks that the earlier theory of Forms is vulnerable to Socrates' criticism of what I call 'the first version', the 'dream', but he believes that all three of the later versions 'recover their meaning' when the problem of definition has been solved in the *Sophist* with the help of the method of diæresis; and so restated they can be shown to apply to particulars as well as to Forms. Mr. R. Robinson<sup>11</sup> argues that in the passage to be discussed, as everywhere else in the dialogue, Forms are left out of account for the very good reason that to limit the objects of knowledge will not help to find out what knowledge is, but he believes that when Socrates relates the version of the 'dream' he makes a direct attack on the view that knowledge implies ability to give account, whatever sense be given to the words, and that his criticism of the last two versions tells against two of the most familiar forms of Socratic definition.

I have not room here to do more than indicate why these interpretations seem to me unsatisfactory. The definitions of knowledge attributed to Plato by Cornford and Stenzel seem in different ways too limited to satisfy Socrates' original demand for a *general* definition, covering a number of different kinds of knowledge, including, or so we are given to expect, both the science of the mathematician and the skill of the craftsman.<sup>12</sup> Cornford supposes that the only objects of knowledge are supra-sensible Forms, while Stenzel limits the relations grasped in an act of knowing to those between genera and species. Cornford's interpretation, if I understand it, gives no explanation at all of the infallibility of knowledge, while Stenzel's answer to this problem<sup>13</sup> supposes that Plato believed that the content of any given species could be deduced by division from the one above it, and ultimately from the highest genus, Being itself, though in the passage of the *Sophist*<sup>14</sup> which Stenzel believes contains an answer to the problem of the *Theaetetus* Plato appears to recognise a symmetrical relationship between Being and Difference,<sup>15</sup> and indeed between others of the 'great kinds', which forbids us to treat them as species and genus. On the other hand Robinson's solution leaves unexplained a difficulty inherent in the passage itself: the puzzling fact that Plato chooses to make Socrates and Theaetetus meet with final defeat when they have failed to defend any of a number of definitions of knowledge not one of which, if allowed to stand, seems capable of covering mathematical science or the skill of the craftsman, or indeed that case of knowledge which Robinson finds specially interesting,<sup>16</sup> the knowledge which in one place Plato admits is possessed by

<sup>1</sup> *Th.* 201C3-201D.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 201C3-201B1; 205D1-E2; 206B3-206B12; 208C1-210A7. Unlike others who have written on this passage, e.g. Cornford and Stenzel, I am proposing to count the 'dream' (201C3-205B1) as a version in its own right, the first of the (expansion) of *Theaetetus* formula (*Th.* 201C3-D1). Of the three senses mentioned later (*Th.* 206C3), the first seems to me to be introduced only to get out of the way an obvious but unhelpful sense of λόγον διδόναι, so that by 'the three main versions' I shall mean the 'dream' and those stated and discussed in 206B3-208B12 and 208C1-210A7.

<sup>3</sup> *Gr.* 485A2 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Men.* 97E6 ff. If ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου is a variant for λόγον διδόναι; *Phd.* 76B2 ff.; *Sym.* 202A3 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Rep.* VI, 510C6 ff.; VII, 331E2 ff., 333B8 ff.; 334B3 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, 1935, p. 141 f.

<sup>7</sup> *Th.* 201E1 f.; 207A2 f.; 208D1-3.

<sup>8</sup> *Men.* loc. cit.

<sup>9</sup> 'The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Forms', *American Journal of Philology*, LVII (1936), pp. 443 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, translated and edited by D. J. Allan (1930), pp. 71 ff.

<sup>11</sup> 'Form and Error in Plato's *Theaetetus*', *Philosophical Review*, LIX (1950), pp. 3 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Th.* 146E7-148B7.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.* pp. 90-3.

<sup>14</sup> *Sph.* 252E6-250E6.

<sup>15</sup> *E.g. ibid.* 257A3-6; 258A7-9.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 5.



eyewitnesses to a crime;<sup>17</sup> and this although it is possible to collect from earlier dialogues<sup>18</sup> other senses of *λόγον διδόναι* which we might have expected Plato to have taken into account.

The view for which I shall argue is that the final discussion may be interpreted as a rearguard engagement in a moment of defeat. The dialogue reflects a genuine state of *ἀπορία*; Plato has no answer to Socrates' question. For while still confident that the most illuminating kind of knowledge is dialectical knowledge of Forms,<sup>19</sup> so that no general account can be satisfactory which does not cover this, he no longer finds it possible to distinguish this kind of knowledge from true opinion. He is, and remains, convinced that dialectical knowledge, perhaps also by analogy the knowledge of the mathematician and of the 'Socratic' craftsman, who can teach the principles of his craft, *implies* ability to give account,<sup>20</sup> which means to him ability to justify a position, whether statement or definition, by reasoned argument;<sup>21</sup> and as long as he thinks in terms of argument, he finds no difficulty in distinguishing knowledge from unjustified, and so fallible, opinion. But he is also convinced, and continues to be convinced,<sup>22</sup> that *in itself* knowledge is direct intuition of reality, and he can find no way of translating the truths discovered by dialectic into descriptions of objects which will enable him to distinguish an act of knowing from one of no less immediate opinion.

He now finds himself baffled by a problem which once seemed to him merely eristic,<sup>23</sup> to explain how it is possible for a man to have an object before his mind without instantly knowing it. This is a problem which he once hoped to solve with the help of the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*,<sup>24</sup> and in the *Republic* it presented no difficulty because the only fallible judgments in which Plato was then interested could be traced back to ambiguous sense impressions and so directly contrasted with knowledge of determinate and unvarying Forms. But in the apparent digression on the possibility of false opinion<sup>25</sup> it has been presented in a new and more deadly form. Error, it seems, is possible at a purely intellectual level,<sup>26</sup> where there is no question of being misled by imperfect recollection of objects once fully known. This problem Plato solves neither elsewhere nor indeed in the *Sophist*,<sup>27</sup> which deals only with the other of the two difficulties raised in the digression, the one about *τὸ μὴ ὄν*.<sup>28</sup> His logic has outrun his metaphysics, and he now has things to say about Forms and relations between Forms which make it virtually impossible for him to describe them, except in general terms, as objects at all. He can continue to call them 'divine', 'eternal' and the like, but he cannot show what is 'seen' when a man is said to have knowledge of individual Forms.

What he can do is to show that this is a *general* problem, and that those who tacitly limit knowledge to the particular are still further from solving it than those who find it necessary to posit Forms. The three main versions examined, which are all attempts to distinguish knowledge of concrete things from true opinion about them, are not merely refuted but refuted by objections which, in their specific form, it seems possible to meet with the help of the theory of Forms. In each case we find a temporary resting-place from our difficulties in the theory, though the last two of Socrates' criticisms could be restated, and it seems to me likely that Plato realised that they could be restated, in forms dangerous to the theory itself, and all that is secured for the theory by the analysis of the 'dream' is sheer immunity from attack but no definition of knowledge.

In the first version<sup>29</sup> it seems to be suggested that whereas true opinion is an unanalysed impression of a complex particular,<sup>30</sup> knowledge implies ability to analyse such a complex into absolutely simple parts. These elements or 'letters' are sensible but can be made the subject of no judgments whatever, not even of the judgments of opinion. They can only be named, for to make any statement about them involves the use of terms like 'is' and 'each' which are applicable to other things and so cannot describe their peculiar nature. But of the 'syllable' formed from these it is possible to give account, for it is of the nature of a 'logos' to be a complex, *συνπλοκή*, of names, and such a logos is the expression of knowledge.

This version Socrates refutes first<sup>31</sup> by inducing Theaetetus to admit that the syllable is either *all* its letters or a single indivisible nature, distinct from the letters, which comes into being when they combine. But if we take the first course, we are guilty of the absurdity of supposing that while each of the letters is unknowable, we still know them all; if we take the second, we find ourselves faced by yet another 'simple' of which no account can be given.

This first criticism has been read in two ways, both of which have been thought to tell against

<sup>17</sup> *Th.* 201A10-C2.

<sup>18</sup> *E.g.* 463A2-6, where *λόγον εἶναι* seems to mean 'to be able to justify a set of actions by an appeal to general principles'.

<sup>19</sup> *Men.* 97E6-98A3, where *ἀπὸ ἀπλῶς λόγων* seems to mean 'to give general grounds for the truth of a statement'.

<sup>20</sup> *Rep.* VII, 534B3-D1, where by *εἶναι λόγον διδόναι* Plato seems to mean not 'ability to define' but 'ability to justify a definition by argument'.

<sup>21</sup> *Cf.* e.g. *Phb.* 58A1 ff.

<sup>22</sup> *Cf.* *Phb.* 92A2-5.

<sup>23</sup> *Cf.* e.g. *Th.* 173C3-D2.

<sup>24</sup> *Cf.* e.g. *Sph.* 254AB ff.

<sup>25</sup> *Men.* 80E1 ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 81A5 ff.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 123C6 ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Th.* 185C9-186B8.

<sup>29</sup> So Cornford suggests, I think rightly. *Op. cit.* p. 145.

<sup>30</sup> *Th.* 203D8-205E7.

<sup>31</sup> *Th.* 187D1-200C5.

<sup>32</sup> *I.e.* *Sph.* 260B10-264B3.

<sup>33</sup> *Th.* 201C8-202C5.



Plato's earlier theories. Robinson<sup>35</sup> is, I believe, alone in thinking that it is an attack on the whole notion that knowledge implies giving account, and tends to show that there may be knowledge of what is *ἀλογον*. The orthodox view is that Socrates refutes only the notion that there may be knowledge of complexes whose elements are simple and so unknowable, but it has been suggested by Stenzel<sup>36</sup> and Ryle<sup>37</sup> that the Forms of the earlier dialogues were simples of just this kind.

Robinson's view seems to me untenable. Plato presents the doctrine of simples in such a way that we expect him to show that it is inadmissible. He uses the device with which in the *Sophist*<sup>38</sup> he attacks the theorists who believe that only statements of sheer identity are logically sound: he describes the simples with the help of words which he later rejects as inapplicable.<sup>39</sup> If we take him seriously, we make nonsense of the whole business of giving things names, which, as Plato assumes in the *Cratylus*,<sup>40</sup> is an act of discrimination, and as soon as we discriminate, we set things in relation to each other and cease to regard them as absolutely simple. It seems to me significant that when in the *Parmenides*<sup>41</sup> the philosopher attempts to separate off such a simple in his first hypothesis *ἐὶ ἐστιν*, he concludes: *οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἰσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα*. Moreover, it does not seem to me true that the argument tends to show that 'if elements are unknowable because they have no logos, everything is unknowable'.<sup>42</sup> Everything is unknowable only if everything is a complex of simples. But the attempt to construct complexes of such simples breaks down. We find ourselves confronted either by a mere aggregate or by an *ἰδέα ἀμείκτος*, itself unrelated to letters, that is by something utterly unlike a syllable. The argument seems rather to imply that if there is to be knowledge of complexes, there must be a sense, necessarily a second sense, in which it is possible to give account of their elements.

The suggestion of Stenzel and Ryle seems to me more plausible. Two quite different issues seem to be raised: (1) are the Forms of the earlier dialogues indivisible? (2) are they intuited *in vacuo* as if unrelated to each other or to anything else? Only if both questions can be answered affirmatively do we seem justified in believing that they were supposed to be simples in the dangerous sense. For Plato takes special pains to show that the *ἰδέα ἀμείκτος* is unknowable not simply because it is indivisible but because it is a single isolated object.<sup>43</sup>

The evidence, such as it is, seems to be all indirect. *Prima facie* the first question might seem to be settled by the fact that the epithet *μονοειδές*, which in other contexts Plato uses to mean 'without parts',<sup>44</sup> and in the *Theaetetus* is treated as a synonym for *ἀμείκτος*,<sup>45</sup> is in the earlier dialogues applied to Forms.<sup>46</sup> But the term is found in contexts to which the notion that Forms are indivisible seems entirely irrelevant. In the *Symposium*<sup>47</sup> it is used in contrast the Form of beauty with what is beautiful in some contexts and ugly in others; and in the *Phaedrus* it is closely associated with the immunity of Forms from change. It seems to mean not 'without parts' but 'uniform', 'invariable', 'without ambiguity', something which comes close in meaning to *εὐκρίτος* and *καθαρόν*,<sup>48</sup> 'without trace of its opposite'. If so, it tells us nothing about the simplicity of Forms in the first sense, though it might tell us something about their simplicity in the second, for nothing would seem more surely to guarantee their uniformity than a complete absence of 'context'.

There is indeed one passage in the *Parmenides* which has been thought to show that Plato once held that there was no communication between Forms.<sup>49</sup> *Parmenides* 129A6-E3. But in this passage Socrates does not suggest that he expects Forms to be incapable of 'mingling' but of 'mingling and separation',<sup>50</sup> and by 'mingling and separation' he seems to mean something very like that swing between opposite characters described in the *Symposium*. He is in no way surprised that particulars should be shown to admit of opposites like one and many, but he would be shocked to find Unity and Plurality behaving in that way.<sup>51</sup>

In the *Sophist*,<sup>52</sup> however, in a passage designed to show how there is communication between just the 'kinds' cited as Forms in the *Parmenides*,<sup>53</sup> Plato suggests that there is a sense in which they do admit of their opposites. Movement is the same as itself and different from any other 'kind',<sup>54</sup> and it is easy to develop the argument to show that Unity is a many in that it admits of predicates like Being and Difference, and Plurality a one in that it is one Form. Such relationships present no difficulty once we have been enabled with the help of the notions of *καθόν* and *τὸ ἕτερον* to distinguish the 'is' of identity from the 'is' of predication, and in the *Philosophy* problems about the unity

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 25.

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 73. "Αμείκτος and μονοειδές are two of the honourable titles of the ideas in earlier days."

<sup>37</sup> *Mind*, XLVIII (1939), p. 319. "Now although Plato does not make the application, substantial Forms were supposed to be just such simple atomistics."

<sup>38</sup> *Sph.* 252d.2 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Gen.* 89B.3 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Robinson *op. cit.* p. 15.

<sup>41</sup> *E.g.* *Rep.* X. 527d.2 ff.

<sup>42</sup> *Sph.* 211B1 and E4; *Phd.* 78D5; 80B2; 83E2

<sup>43</sup> *Th.* 205E2-207A8.

<sup>44</sup> *Parm.* 132A3 ff.

<sup>45</sup> *Th.* 205C4-E4.

<sup>46</sup> *Th.* 205D1 ff.

<sup>47</sup> *Amείκτος*, according to Ast, is used only in later dialogues, unless we are justified in giving an earlier date to the *Timaeus*.

<sup>48</sup> *Sph.* 210E2-211B5.

<sup>49</sup> *Phd.* 78D1-7.

<sup>50</sup> *Cf.* *Sph.* 211B1 ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Cf.* e.g. Robinson, *Classical Philology*, XXXVI (1942), p. 66.

<sup>52</sup> *Parm.* 129E2-3.

<sup>53</sup> *SJA.* 254B7 ff.

<sup>54</sup> *Sph.* 256A10 ff.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* 129A6-B6.

<sup>56</sup> *Parm.* 129D8-E1.

<sup>57</sup> *Phd.* 141B3-6.

and plurality of concrete things are described as 'childish and easy and a serious hindrance to discussion'. It is plausible to suppose that in the *Sophist* Plato corrects an earlier view that Forms are unrelated simples, and shows that the difficulty from which their supposed simplicity was to set them free is unreal.

But it seems unlikely that this is a fair inference from the two passages. For in a dialogue generally thought to be later than the *Sophist*, the *Philebus*, Plato is still prepared to describe Forms as ἀμεικτότατα ἔχοντα,<sup>51</sup> where again, to judge from the context and Socrates' earlier use of the metaphor, he seems to mean 'having unvarying character', 'without trace of an opposite', and so surpassing concrete things in ἀλήθεια, truth to type, as a small quantity of what is pure white surpasses μεμεργμένον πολλοῦ λευκοῦ.<sup>52</sup> It looks as if Plato did not suppose that the 'multiformity' of perceptibles could be explained away and with it the need to posit entities which were μορσεῖν. The confusion between universals and perfect types which made it possible for him to compare Forms with particulars in this way is still evident in the *Sophist*,<sup>53</sup> where he illustrates the point that no Form can stand in a relation of sheer identity with its opposite by saying that Movement does not rest.

The indirect evidence for the indivisibility of Forms seems to me strong. I can find in the earlier dialogues no trace of a distinction between simple and complex Forms, and yet any definition of a Form which named its parts would imply that it was composed of simpler Forms, for although the number and nature of Forms explicitly mentioned are limited, Plato seems sufficiently aware of their universal character to posit in theory a Form for every general term.<sup>54</sup> Stenzel seems to be right in saying that we have no evidence in the earlier dialogues that he divided individual Forms into genus and species,<sup>55</sup> if indeed he ever did. He is in a sense aware of the relation between genus and species when in the *Phaedrus* he points out that ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα carries with it ἡ περὶ τὴν μορφήν; but it looks as if he thought of them as distinct Forms with an interesting relationship. He may be feeling after the notion of a complex Form in the *Politicus*,<sup>56</sup> where he compares the Form of the Statesman to a syllable, but in the *Sophist*<sup>57</sup> he still seems to have the idea that genera and species are interconnected Forms.

On the other hand the indirect evidence seems to tell against the view that in the earlier dialogues Plato believed that single Forms could be intuited in *vacuo*. The only passage which suggests this is the account of beauty in the *Symposium*,<sup>58</sup> which contains a description of an act of knowing as sheer intuition of a single object<sup>59</sup> and makes no reference to reasoning which might have set it in relation to other Forms. But in this respect it is to be contrasted with the accounts of knowledge of Forms in the *Republic*,<sup>60</sup> and they seem to me right who have argued that Diotima is describing contemplation rather than a typical case of knowledge.<sup>61</sup> Not all Forms seem capable of being 'known' in this way, and in the *Phaedrus*<sup>62</sup> we find a similar account of the vision of single Forms, although when Plato wrote this dialogue he had a lively interest in *diæresis*, which seems to imply that some Forms at least are related to each other and known only in their interrelation.

I can find no passage in the *Republic* which carries similar implications. For while Plato often speaks of single Forms as standards of conduct,<sup>63</sup> intuition of which enables us to discriminate intelligently between particular cases, he nowhere describes such intuition as knowledge, though he does of course imply that we have knowledge of Forms intuited as standards.<sup>64</sup> If knowledge is intuition of single Forms, it is hard to see what we are to make of Plato's insistence that dialectic is essentially synoptic, that Forms are fully known only in relation to the Good, and that knowledge of this Form, as of every other, implies ability to give an account.<sup>65</sup> It is unfortunate that Plato tells us so little about this process, and in particular does not explain what he means by saying that the Good is to be abstracted from everything else.<sup>66</sup> It seems unsafe to assume, as Cornford does in his translation, that by 'everything else' Plato means 'all other Forms' so that to distinguish the Good is to set it in relation to all the rest, for he may be thinking primarily of inadequate concepts like health or pleasure, and in the *Symposium* beauty is distinguished from concepts of a similar kind only to be contemplated in itself. But he does suggest that the 'account' is to be defended against criticism by argument,<sup>67</sup> and we should expect it to contain some explanation of the way in which the Good is causally related to truth and knowledge, since such is the conclusion we have to make when we are finally confronted by the Good.<sup>68</sup> We have no reason to believe that Plato had at this time tried to work out any schema of relationships between the terms used in definitions, which in the earlier dialogues reflect in their variety the many senses of the question 'What is X?'<sup>69</sup> but that definition means setting one thing in relation to another it seems impossible to deny.

<sup>51</sup> *Phib.* 50f' 4.

<sup>52</sup> *Sph.* 215A10.

<sup>53</sup> *Op. ut.* pp. 79 ff.

<sup>54</sup> *Plt.* 278f' 3-E10.

<sup>55</sup> *Simp.* 209E5-212A7.

<sup>56</sup> *E.g.* *Rep.* VII, 532A5-B2.

<sup>57</sup> *E.g.* *R. C. Cross, Mind*, LXIII (1954), p. 442.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* 212B1-33B6.

<sup>59</sup> *Cf. e.g. Rep.* 596A5-10.

<sup>60</sup> *Phd.* 103D1 ff.

<sup>61</sup> *Sph.* 253D5 ff.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* 211B7-D1.

<sup>63</sup> *Phib.* 247D3 ff.

<sup>64</sup> *E.g. Rep.* VI, 483C6 ff.; VII, 520C1-6.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* VI, 484C6 ff.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* VII, 334B3 ff.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* VII, 534B8 ff.

<sup>68</sup> *Rep.* VII, 534B8 ff.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* VII, 517C1 ff.

<sup>70</sup> *Cf. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, pp. 53 ff.



It seems to me, then, that so far from being vulnerable to Socrates' criticism of the first version a case might be made for holding that it is just the virtue of the earlier theory of Forms that it provides us with ultimate units of analysis which are comparable with true parts of wholes. For as Plato recognises elsewhere, most clearly perhaps in the *Phaedrus*,<sup>71</sup> it is of the nature of parts of wholes not to be absolutely simple but to possess a character appropriate to each other and to the wholes in which they combine. That Plato intended us to draw such a conclusion from his examination of the first version it is not possible to prove, but Socrates' very uncompromising treatment of the distinction between τὸ ὅλον and τὰ ἀμέρη was surely meant to disturb us, as it did Theaetetus;<sup>72</sup> and in *Parmenides*,<sup>73</sup> in an apparently straight bit of reasoning, he argues for a distinction between 'all' and 'whole' in words which directly recall those of the *Theaetetus*, and in *Theaetetus* 203B2 ff. he makes Theaetetus unconsciously admit that after all it is possible to give some kind of a definition of letters.

Moreover, in his second criticism<sup>74</sup> of the first version Socrates makes a point which invites us to apply the analogy of letters to Forms and in a familiar way. When we learn to read, our crucial task is not to recognise syllables but to recognise our letters without being misled by their arrangement in spoken and written syllables. It seems to be just Plato's contention in the *Republic*<sup>75</sup> that dialectic frees a man from the danger of being misled about justice and beauty by the different contexts in which they are presented in sense experience. He looks beyond the manifold of experience in which beauty is variously associated with actions and bodies and Forms to the single nature by which the concepts drawn from experience are judged. We might express this as ability to recognise letters in spoken or written syllables, except that in the middle books of the *Republic* he will not allow that Forms are really exemplified by particulars, which are therefore not strictly comparable with letters. This seems to have been one of the points on which Plato has changed his mind.<sup>76</sup> He may have returned to the position which seems to be reflected in the Third Book of the *Republic*<sup>77</sup> in which he explicitly compares knowledge of Forms with the recognition of letters and represents particulars by words.

The point seems to be further developed in Socrates' criticism of the second of the three main versions,<sup>78</sup> in which he tries to distinguish between 'knowing' something and merely 'opining' it by suggesting that whereas in opinion we give a rough description by enumerating the obvious but still complex parts of which something consists, in knowledge we 'give account' of it in the sense that we analyse it into parts which are no longer absolutely simple but still incapable of further division. In opinion at the best we spell a word by syllables, in knowledge we give its letters. This version Socrates shows will not do by reminding Theaetetus that there is a stage in learning to read and write when we get a letter right in one word and wrong in another. In such cases we 'give an account of' the word in the way suggested, but no one will allow that we have knowledge. This argument seems to lead directly to the conclusion that knowledge of universals is prior to and implied by knowledge of instances. When we say that, if we are to read and write, we must know our letters, we mean by 'letters' not the sounds we hear or the marks on a particular page but the abstract symbols. Once again it seems to be the virtue of Socrates' analogy that it provides us with means whereby we may show that the dialectician more nearly satisfies the conditions of knowledge than one who tries to identify it with any kind of analysis of particulars. For although to equate Forms with universals is to oversimplify in view of the tacit limitation Plato sets to Forms, there seems to be no evidence that he ever consciously distinguished between them.

Socrates' treatment of the last version,<sup>79</sup> that to give an account is to state the mark whereby a thing may be distinguished from everything else, is rather different. No positive point is made which tells in favour of the theory of Forms, but his specific criticism seems relevant only to particulars. For his argument is that if we are to have no more than true opinion about X, say Theaetetus, we must already have distinguished him from everything else or we shall be thinking not of him but of men in general or at the best of men of a certain physical type. But it is nonsense to suggest that the addition of true opinion about the differentia can turn true opinion into knowledge, and if we say that we must know the differentia, we argue in a circle. There seems to be no way in which we might select from Forms elements of greater or less generality, unless indeed we suppose that they are complexes made up of genera and species. If, as I believe, this passage does contain tacit criticism of the theory of Forms, it is not to be found in the first part of Socrates' criticism.

Examination of the three main versions reveals some of the virtues of the theory of Forms and

<sup>71</sup> *Phdr.* 264C2 ff.

<sup>72</sup> *Thl.* 203A11-B3 and 204E11-13.

<sup>73</sup> *Parm.* 137D7 ff.: οὐκ ἄρα τὰς ἀμέρων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλον τὸ μέρησι πορίον ὅλον· μήτε τὰς ἀμέρων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλον τὸ μέρησι πορίον ὅλον, ἢ ἀμέρων ἐκ τῶν ἀμέρων πορίον ὅλον τὸ μέρησι πορίον.

<sup>74</sup> *Thl.* 206A1-B11.

<sup>75</sup> *Rep.* V, 476A4-7; VII, 519C2-6.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. e.g. *Thl.* 186B11 ff.

<sup>77</sup> *Rep.* III, 402A7 ff.

<sup>78</sup> *Thl.* 207C6-208B9.

<sup>79</sup> *Thl.* 208C6-210B2.

goes some way to suggest that knowledge cannot be explained without their help, but it has provided us with no 'fourth sense' of λόγον διδόναι; we cannot identify knowledge with understanding of 'intelligible Forms and truths about them'.<sup>81</sup> For the analysis of particulars into constituent Forms has been shown by the criticism of the second version to be less than knowledge,<sup>82</sup> and if we try to restate the first version in terms of Forms and nothing but Forms, and suppose that dialectic gives an account of complexes of Forms in universal propositions, we find that Socrates' criticism of the second version tells against this too. It seems perfectly possible for us to relate a Form correctly in one proposition and wrongly in another. We may correctly affirm that Rest and Movement differ from Being while still aware that there are an indefinite number of puzzles about Being to which we have no answer.<sup>83</sup> In the *Politicus*<sup>84</sup> at least Plato seems to recognise this. For he points out, though for quite another purpose, that we may recognise Combination and Separation in the complex notion of Weaving and yet fail to perceive its presence in the more difficult syllable, Statesmanship.

In some sense, then, the object of knowledge seems to be the 'letter' and not the 'syllable', the Form and not the complex of Forms. We have to find a set of relations, other than those which obtain between parts and whole, which are the permanent possession of Forms, and may be used to distinguish them securely in every one of the complexes in which they may be found. But at once we are confronted by the difficulty raised in the last part of Socrates' criticism of the final version.<sup>85</sup> If we are to make no more than true statements about Forms, we must be already thinking of them as distinct natures, and so be already in some sense aware of the relations which distinguish them from other Forms.

Plato does seem to have provided some sort of answer to the problem of 'knowing' such letters in the *Sophist*,<sup>86</sup> but not in a form which can be reconciled with belief that knowledge is direct intuition of objects. For there Plato compares dialectic with the art of the grammarian, who, as Theaetetus earlier recognised,<sup>87</sup> knows his letters in a specially satisfactory way. The dialectician secures himself against the danger of mistaking the same Form for a different one or a different Form for the same one by working out the general rules for the combination of Forms just as the grammarian works out the rules for the combination of letters. But knowledge of such purely potential relationships cannot without absurdity be treated as a form of direct intuition of permanent relations between objects. As long as the philosopher thinks in terms of propositions, he can work out the relations of compatibility and entailment which govern the combination of Forms in general statements or definitions, and enable him to give reasons for accepting or rejecting them; but if he tries to translate rules for combination into descriptions of actual relations between metaphysical objects, he has to meet the difficulty raised in *Parmenides* 131A<sub>4</sub> ff. and others worse. It is not merely that all Forms are shown to 'partake' of Forms like Difference and Being,<sup>88</sup> but that these Forms partake of each other,<sup>89</sup> and on the Stranger's principles Difference itself can be distinguished from other Forms only if we suppose that in some sense it partakes of itself.

Plato's use of such metaphors in the *Sophist*, which seems almost light-hearted after the struggles of the *Parmenides*, would have been inexplicable if the theory of Forms had ever been merely, or even primarily, a metaphysical theory and not a weapon for the clarification of thought. He still finds that he has important things to say with the help of the theory, though he cannot meet his own criticisms, and his failure to justify his earlier view that knowledge is some kind of direct acquaintance with stable and determinate objects is reflected in the way in which in his later dialogues he keeps in the background, when speaking of Forms, the imagery of vision which characterised the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, and explores instead the analogy of γραμματική.<sup>90</sup>

WINIFRED F. HICKEN.

Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford.

<sup>81</sup> Cornford, *op. cit.* p. 162.

<sup>82</sup> *Thi.* 207C<sup>6</sup>-208B<sub>12</sub>.

<sup>83</sup> *Cj. Sph.* 250C<sup>3</sup>-10.

<sup>84</sup> *Phl.* 271A<sup>4</sup>-279B<sub>7</sub>.

<sup>85</sup> *Thi.* 200A<sub>11</sub>-210A<sub>9</sub>.

<sup>86</sup> *Sph.* 252E<sub>1</sub> ff.

<sup>87</sup> *Thi.* 169B<sub>1</sub>-C<sub>3</sub>.

<sup>88</sup> *Cj. Sph.* 253E<sub>3</sub>-6; 256D<sub>11</sub>-E<sub>3</sub>.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* 256D<sub>11</sub>-257A<sub>6</sub>; 258A<sub>7</sub>-9.

<sup>90</sup> E.g. *Sph.* 252E<sub>9</sub> ff.; *Phl.* 277E<sub>2</sub> ff.; *Phib.* 17AB ff.



## ARISTOTLE'S USE OF MEDICINE AS MODEL OF METHOD IN HIS ETHICS

PHILOSOPHY, in general, moves in a sphere of abstraction, and its statements claim to be necessary and of universal validity. The reader therefore expects them to appeal directly to his reason, and he does not normally reflect much on the time and historical conditions that determined what the philosopher took for granted. It is only in this age of historical consciousness that we have come to appreciate these factors more readily, and the great thinkers of the past appear to us more or less closely related to the culture of their age. The writings of Plato and Aristotle in particular are for us an inexhaustible source of information about Greek society and civilisation. This is true also in regard to the relation of Greek philosophy to the science of its time, and this is of special importance for our understanding. That relation can be traced throughout Aristotle's logical, physical, and metaphysical works: but the influence of other sciences and arts is no less evident in his ethics. In this paper I propose to examine the numerous references to medicine that occur in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. They are mostly concerned with the question of the best method of treating this subject. The problem of the right method is always of the utmost importance for Aristotle. The discussion of it begins on the first page of the *Ethics*,<sup>1</sup> where he tries to give a definition of the subject of this course of lectures and attributes it to a philosophical discipline that he calls 'politics'. He does so in agreement with the Platonic tradition. We can trace it back to one of the dialogues of Plato's first period, the *Gorgias*, in which the Platonic Socrates for the first time pronounces his postulate of a new kind of philosophy, the object of which ought to be the care of the human soul (*ψυχῆς ὁπαστάς*).<sup>2</sup> He assigns this supreme task to 'political art', even though it does not fulfil this function at present.<sup>3</sup> He conceives this new Socratic type of philosophy after the model of the art of the physician, whose task is the care of the human body, and he determines its scientific character by deriving from this medical mould the constitutive elements of a true art (*τέχνη*).<sup>4</sup> There are many passages in Plato's works in which he refers to medicine as a typical or exemplaric art. Thus it is evident that the example taken from this discipline in the *Gorgias* was not chosen at random, since it served Plato for the same purpose throughout his life. From the *Gorgias* to the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*, where Plato praises Hippocrates' medical method as the classical model for the dialectical method of the philosopher,<sup>5</sup> this function of the example of the medical art remains the same; we need not mention the many more casual references to it in other dialogues, including Plato's last work, the *Lysis*.<sup>6</sup>

We have to keep these facts in mind in order to understand Aristotle's use of the medical example in his *Ethics*. He too refers to it throughout as the paragon of the right method for this discipline. But there is this difference between his and Plato's use of the medical example: Plato's concept of philosophy is the Socratic one, i.e. λόγος and βίος are inseparable for him, and all philosophy is in the last analysis knowledge of the good, just as medicine is the knowledge of health; but Aristotle distinguishes sharply between theoretical and practical philosophy, and his discipline of ethics or 'politics' is part of the latter.<sup>7</sup> It is still—as with Plato—concerned with the good as its supreme object, but this good is not Plato's 'idea of the good', which is the highest being; rather, it is the 'human good',<sup>8</sup> and 'politics' is no longer the all-inclusive ontological and theoretical knowledge that it had been for Plato in his *Gorgias* and in the *Republic*. A trace of gradual transition from this form of philosophy to the differentiated Aristotelian classification may be found in Xenocrates' division of philosophy into logic, ethics, and physics;<sup>9</sup> but we are here not so much concerned with the process of this development as with the change in Aristotle's use of the example of the medical art that was its consequence. For when Aristotle applies this parallel to his discipline of ethics, which investigates the question of the human good, he puts all the emphasis on the practical character of both and tries to understand their specific nature and method from this point of view. The comparison has lost nothing of its importance for him, but its applicability to the problem of human life and conduct rests on the fact that both the art of the physician and that of the ethical philosopher always deals with individual situations and with practical actions. It is not easy for us to say whether Aristotle returned to Plato's example of the medical art only after he had made his distinction of practical and theoretical philosophy, which must have given it new meaning, or whether the phenomenon of medical method as distinct from the methods of the theoretical sciences

<sup>1</sup> There is a fine discussion of Aristotle's method in his *Ethics* in J. Burnet's *The Ethics of Aristotle*, Introduction, p. xxxi sq., but the present aspect of it is not given special attention there, though on p. xlii it is mentioned and a parallel is quoted from Hippocrates.

See Plat. *Gorg.* 461 sq., 500 sq.

<sup>2</sup> *La.* 517a sq.; see *Paidia* II, 157 sq.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. *Gorg.* 502a-b.

<sup>4</sup> Plat. *Phaedr.* 270c-d.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Plat. *Lysis* 837e-41; cf. *Paidia* III, 12 sq.

<sup>6</sup> Ar. *Metaph.* E1, 1025<sup>10</sup>14 sq.; *Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1091a27.

<sup>7</sup> *La.* I, 1, 1091b7; I, 6, 1091a16, etc.

<sup>8</sup> See Xenocr. *frag.* i Heintze.

helped him to circumscribe and determine his concept of practical philosophy as distinct from theoretical. Rather, the comparison, once it had been established by Plato, seems to have worked both ways, and the frequency with which Aristotle recurs to it in his lectures on ethics in order to illustrate the special character of this science clearly indicates the fruitfulness this comparative reflection must have had for Aristotle himself while he was trying to establish his own new idea of ethical and political philosophy.

In the first chapter of Book I the art of medicine is referred to only among several other practical arts (*τέχναι*) in order to illustrate the existence of a plurality of arts, each pursuing as its object (*τέλος*) a special kind of good; so medicine aims at health, the art of shipbuilding at the construction of vessels, military science at victory, economics at wealth.<sup>10</sup> Among them there exists a relationship of subordination according to the greater or lesser value of the good they produce. But all of them are subordinate to our highest object, which Aristotle, with Plato, calls 'the human good' *par excellence*. From this he infers that this must be the object of that science or art which is highest in rank, politics.<sup>11</sup> The use of the medical example in this passage seems rather casual, and the reader does not yet realise its full importance for the construction of the ethico-political science that Aristotle is undertaking. The emphasis is both on their similarity (they pursue a good as *τέλος*) and on the difference of their object (medicine, a particular good, politics, the universal human good)—which gives them a different rank in the architectonic system of human civilisation. Politics is the sovereign science or art that employs all the others as its tools.

The example of medicine is used a second time in chapter 4. Although Aristotle seemed to go along with Plato at first in postulating a supreme good as the object of his philosophy of human conduct, his way now diverges from that of his master, for he questions (1) the real existence of Plato's 'idea of the good', and (2) its usefulness for human life even if it did exist, since its empty universality makes it inapplicable to the various kinds of real human activity.<sup>12</sup> What we call 'good' exists not as a universal that is the same for all but in as many forms as there are forms of activity.<sup>13</sup> Thus there is not one all-inclusive science of 'the good itself' (Plato) but many different sciences according to the various forms of good they pursue. For example, the right moment (*καιρός*) is different in war and in sickness; accordingly the one has to be recognised by the strategist, the other by the doctor.<sup>14</sup> The fact that Plato calls his idea the 'paradigm' of the phenomenal world does not enhance its practical usefulness.<sup>15</sup> For how is it that all branches of knowledge that aim at some particular good omit the knowledge of this supreme and universal good?<sup>16</sup> He gives several examples of this neglect; the weaver or architect will profit little for his work by knowing 'the good itself' and no one will be a better doctor or general after having contemplated 'the idea itself'.<sup>17</sup> One cannot escape this objection, Aristotle says, by saying that of course the physician is not concerned directly with the idea of 'good itself'—in its full universality—but with 'health itself', i.e. with the essence of health, for he is interested exclusively in human health, or rather in the health of this or that patient, since he has to cure people individually. Here for the first time appears one of the basic motives of Aristotle's comparison of ethics with medicine, and this is precisely the point where he differs from Plato's concept of the *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. Aristotle, it is true, takes the medical example as a weapon from his master's arsenal, but he turns it against Plato's own conclusion: he shows that the example proves the need for a different kind of knowledge that is able to trace the 'good' in the individual case instead of transcending the differences presented in practical experience. It is of course not Aristotle's intention to demonstrate Plato's philosophical motives but rather to inculcate in his students' minds his own new concept of ethical analysis, which sticks close to the phenomena.

All this presupposes the familiarity of his audience with the characteristic aspects of medicine, e.g. the need for individual treatment of each patient, which was indeed one of the achievements of the Hippocratic school. As I have shown elsewhere, the medical art was the only field in which the Greeks of the classical period had arrived at a fairly exact observation and understanding of the processes of nature, while the older sort of study of 'nature as a whole', as carried on by the Pre-Socratic philosophers, had taken the form of general speculation.<sup>18</sup> No wonder then that the methods of medical procedure, like those of mathematics, should become the object of widespread interest even among educated laymen<sup>19</sup> and that Aristotle, the great methodologist and father of logical theory, should have paid so much attention to the methodical aspect of this science, especially since he was himself the son of a physician, Nicomachus of Stagira, and might have followed his father's calling, as was customary among the Greeks, if Nicomachus had not died while Aristotle was still a child. In my book *Diokles von Karystos* I have shown that medicine was one of the sciences most respected and studied in the older Peripatetic school and that it owed much to Aristotle's

<sup>10</sup> *Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1094a8.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* I, 1, 1094a27.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* I, 5, 1097a16.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* I, 4, 1096b32.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* I, 4, 1096a32.

*Ibid.* I, 4, 1097a1.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* I, 4, 1097a3-4.

<sup>16</sup> See *Paidria* III, 17.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* I, 4, 1097a10-11.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.* III, 12.



interest in medical methods. Diocles continued these methodical studies, which were to give the development of medicine a new direction in the Hellenistic period.<sup>20</sup> It is of great importance for our purpose that Diocles' own thought on the methodical problem in medicine shows his direct dependence on Aristotle's lectures on ethics,<sup>21</sup> more accurately speaking, on the Nicomachean version of the *Ethics*, which had by that time reached its final redaction (c. 300 B.C.). The frequent references to medical procedure and method in the *Ethics* must have aroused the special interest of the eminent physician, who, as his terminology and his clear awareness of the logical problems of his science reveal, had gone through the logical training of Aristotle's school. This give and take in the mutual relationship of science and philosophy is a remarkable feature of the intellectual life of his time, which was a period of creative exchange of ideas and was to remain so for several generations, until philosophy became self-contented and dogmatic and the sciences lost that keen philosophical interest in their own methodical and axiomatic foundations of which Plato has given such a wonderful example in his *Theaetetus*, in the portrait of the young philosophical mathematician for whom the dialogue is named.

The example of the medical art often determines Aristotle's statements on the right method not only where he expressly refers to it but also where it is not mentioned at all. This is so, for example, in the famous section in which he deals with the problem of whether it is desirable to introduce mathematical methods into ethics.<sup>22</sup> It is obvious and has long since been said that Aristotle here rejects the demands made by members of Plato's school to whom, as he states in the *Metaphysics*, 'philosophy has become mathematics'.<sup>23</sup> To this despotic rule of one science over all the others he opposes his more democratic concept of a free and many-sided development of all the individual sciences according to the special needs of their subject-matter.<sup>24</sup> One must not demand mathematical exactness where the very nature of the subject excludes it. Conclusions can never be more exact than the premises from which they are derived, and when the premises do not contain necessary and generally valid statements but state only what happens in the majority of cases, one might to be content with typically true conclusions. Aristotle calls this insight into the reciprocal relationship of subject and method the true sign of the philosophically educated person: the scholar's awareness of the methodical potentialities of his subject and its attainable degree of certainty becomes the supreme criterion of his training.<sup>25</sup> In this connection Aristotle refers to mathematics and rhetoric as the two most diametrically opposed types of method and of scientific certainty. In doing so he silently quotes Plato (*Theaetetus* 162E), thereby making him his main witness against the members of the Academy whose demands he is here rejecting. But in Book II, where he refers back to this passage<sup>26</sup> and repeats the statement of Book I that in matters of ethics one ought to be content with a lower degree of accuracy and with a mere outline of that which is typical, it becomes clear that from the start he has been thinking of medicine as the kind of scientific knowledge that comes closest to his concept of an ethical science. For he says:<sup>27</sup> 'The things concerned with action and that which is useful (*τὰ ἀμφέποντα*) have nothing stable in themselves, just as it is in matters of health. If, however, the general statements (*ὁ καθόλου λόγος*) are of this nature, there is even less accuracy in the statements about particular cases, since they fall under no art or precept, but the person who is acting must himself always keep in mind the special circumstances of the moment (*τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν*) and what they require. This is true also of medicine and of the art of navigation.' This example too had often been used by Plato in connection with that of medicine, but both Plato and Aristotle took it from medical literature, where the decisions to be made by the practising physician are compared to those of the captain of a ship on the high sea.<sup>28</sup> Both medicine and navigation are normative sciences, and in applying their methods both have to deal directly with the individual situation that modifies the general *lógos*. These statements of Book II, which introduce Aristotle's theory of virtue, must therefore be combined<sup>29</sup> with his preliminary statement on method in Book I, and it then appears that when he wrote those words about unjustified demands of exactness in such matters he already had the true paradigm of medicine in mind. Indeed, he is following outright the methodical programme of the Hippocratic author *On Ancient Medicine*, who declares in the same way as Aristotle in the *Ethics* that there is no absolute measure, number, or weight, and that there is nothing stable in matters of health, but that all is left to feeling (*αἰσθήσεις*).<sup>30</sup> We need not here go into the difficulties implied in this latter term; they have prompted divergent interpretations. It is sufficient to show that the medical example,

<sup>20</sup> Diocles von Korymbos: *die griechische Medizin und die Schule des Aristoteles* (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1938).

<sup>21</sup> *Op.* cit. 27 sq. and 45-9.

<sup>22</sup> *Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1094b12-27.

<sup>23</sup> *Metaph.* A, 982a-42. Aristotle himself, while still a pupil of Plato, had stressed exactness as ideal of ethical (political) method in his early work, the *Protrepticus*; see my *Aristotle* (English translation), p. 85.

<sup>24</sup> *Eth. Nic.* I, 1, 1094b12.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* I, 1, 1094b19-27.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* II, 2, 1102a3-10.

<sup>27</sup> See *Eth. Nic.* II, 2, 1102a2 *κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν* *καὶ τὰς ἀρχαῖς ἀνταρτοῖς* *ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις ἀναρτοῖται* and compare with I, 1, 1094b12.

<sup>28</sup> Hipp. *De anat. med.* 9; see Diocles, p. 46. Compare the use of *αἰσθήσεις* in *Eth. Nic.* II, 9, 1109b20.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* II, 2, 1102a1-3.

<sup>30</sup> Hipp. *De anat. med.* 9.



far from being a casual analogy, is present to the philosopher's mind throughout. It belongs to the very foundation of his ethical science, at least in the form it has taken in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Once we have recognised this function of the medical pattern, we can easily see how, in the light of it, Aristotle tries to justify almost every important step he takes in his ethical philosophy. Of this we have a good example in chapter 13 of Book I, which, as has been often observed, is really the beginning of the following book. Before he approaches the problem of virtue (*ἀρετή*), as he is going to in Book II, he lays down a fundamental division of the human soul, or indeed of all kinds of soul, in order to pave the way for his basic distinction of intellectual and ethical virtues, which correspond to the two parts of the soul with which ethics is concerned: (1) the rational part that knows and rules, and (2) that part of the irrational soul which is able and willing to obey reason. Aristotle motivates this digression from ethics into the problems of psychology by an example taken from medicine: the eye-doctor, though he is a specialist, must nevertheless know about the entire human body. Indeed, physicians who possess a higher scientific training always study the human organism as a whole. In the same way, the acting statesman, for whom his *Ethics* is meant, must be familiar with psychology to a certain extent.<sup>32</sup> We find here a new aspect of the parallel of *νόστος* and *ιατρὰς* that runs through the whole of the *Ethics*.

But let us return to the central problem of this discipline: the problem of virtue (*ἀρετή*). After stating that there are no general rules and theories for right moral conduct and that one must keep in mind, while acting, the special circumstances of the situation,<sup>33</sup> Aristotle observes that 'all such things' are corrupted by excess or defect, which therefore must be avoided.<sup>34</sup> At this point he formulates his methodical rule of using the manifest (*φανερὰ*) as an example for the invisible (*ἀφανή*); he therefore illustrates what he has said about the bad effect of excess and defect by the example of strength and health, because they are things we can see with our eyes.<sup>35</sup> Strength and health are the 'virtues of the body'; they had already been paralleled with the 'virtues of the soul' by Plato in the *Gorgias*,<sup>36</sup> where he carries out his comparison of the 'political art' with the art of the physician. Again Aristotle follows Plato's fine observation, but he goes into greater detail in order to show exactly how the deteriorating effect is brought about by either an excess or defect of exercise or of food and drink, whereas the right measure in these matters strengthens and preserves a man's health.<sup>37</sup> This medical parallel leads Aristotle to a similar observation with regard to the growth of man's moral qualities: they too are susceptible to the negative effect of excess and defect, but are developed and preserved by what he calls *μεσότης*. Here, as Sir David Ross remarks, we have the germ of the doctrine of the mean.<sup>38</sup> This is indeed evident, but we may add that apparently this germ grows out of Aristotle's awareness of the biological parallels offered by medicine. He stresses this starting-point because he thinks this the best method of demonstrating how Plato's principle of measure is operative both in nature and in the ethical life of man.

It is easy to trace the persistence with which the philosopher carries out this idea in the details of his analysis. What is true with regard to the processes of origin and growth and of corruption from and by the same things, is equally true concerning active operations (*ἐνέργειαι*), which consist in the same things (*scil.* from and by which they have grown).<sup>39</sup> Again he takes as his point of departure τὸ φανερότερον, i.e. the medical analogies, and he expressly says so.<sup>40</sup> Physical strength originates from taking much food and exercise, and on the other hand, the strong man is he who can do this best. The same is true of moral virtue:<sup>41</sup> we become temperate by temperate action (i.e. by abstaining from pleasures), and again, he who is most able to abstain from them is the temperate man. Likewise with courage: it grows by our getting used to despising that which inspires fear, but once the quality of courage has been developed in us, we are more able to despise the fear-inspiring. Hence the great value that Aristotle attributes to education in his ethical philosophy, for it is based on habit and is conceived by him as a process of formation.<sup>42</sup> Its success depends on whether or not a person gets used from his earliest childhood to the right pleasures and pains. This is what Plato in his last work, the *Laws*, had called the right *paideia*.<sup>43</sup> Aristotle's *Ethics* makes the most extensive use of this new approach to the problem, the pedagogical fruitfulness of which cannot easily be overrated.<sup>44</sup> He states that all virtues are concerned with actions and affections (*πάθος*) and thereby with pleasure and pain, since pleasure and pain are the concomitants of every action and affection. From this he derives his own justification of Plato's theory of punishment:<sup>45</sup> Plato had defined punishment as a therapy of the soul. Aristotle takes up this idea by saying that medical therapy too proceeds by applying opposites. Since virtue is a certain relationship to pleasure and pain, its disturbance can be cured only by restoring the right relation. And

<sup>32</sup> *Eth. Nic.* I, 13, 1102a14.

<sup>33</sup> See note 27.

<sup>34</sup> *Ec.* II, 2, 1104a14.

<sup>35</sup> *Plat. Gorg.* 496b, 499d, 504c.

<sup>36</sup> *Eth. Nic.* II, 2, 1104a15-18.

<sup>37</sup> W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 193.

<sup>38</sup> *Ec.* 1102a18.

<sup>39</sup> *Ec.* II, 2, 1104a12.

<sup>40</sup> *Eth. Nic.* II, 2, 1104a27.

<sup>41</sup> *Ec.* 1104a30.

<sup>42</sup> *Ec.* 1104b11.

<sup>43</sup> *Plat. Laws* 653b; *Paideia* III, 207.

<sup>44</sup> *Eth. Nic.* II, 2, 1104b13.

<sup>45</sup> *Ec.* 1104b16.

<sup>46</sup> *Ec.* 1104a33 sq.

his medical attitude is even more obvious in his additional observation that it is not the right therapy, in moral evil, to liberate a man from all affections ( $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ ) and bring about complete  $\alpha\nu\theta\eta\sigma\iota\alpha$ , but to make him avoid pleasure which he ought not to pursue or when or as he ought not.<sup>16</sup> Who does not recognise in this casuistry the model of medical dietetics? The more frequently Aristotle repeats this formula in his *Ethics*, the more clearly we see how consistent he is in his use of this methodical paragon. He does not, however, carry the parallel with the arts to an extreme, but is aware of the limits of its validity. As in the arts, we learn how to act rightly in the ethical sense by acting rightly. We become courageous by acting courageously, and we learn to control ourselves by controlling ourselves; but the difference between the value of the art and the moral action is that in the arts the value lies in the works they produce, whereas the value of the moral action does not consist in the external action or its result but depends on whether the moral agent (1) acts knowingly, (2) chooses the act for its own sake, and (3) acts from a firm and unshakable disposition.<sup>17</sup> These factors, particularly the second and third, are of basic importance for ethical behaviour, whereas mere knowledge has no greater value for it than it has for the sick man who listens with attention to his doctor's advice but does not follow his prescription. The souls of those who enjoy moral philosophy merely for the sake of theory will never be cured, just as the body of the patient who disobeys the doctor will not be restored to health.<sup>18</sup> Medicine here appears as the model of ethics because both are a practical knowledge, and the comparison has special meaning for Aristotle, who never ceases to emphasise that the aim of the philosopher in this field of thought is not knowledge but action.

We are now prepared to attempt a definition of virtue. First we must determine its genus,<sup>19</sup> and this will not be difficult after we have compared the moral virtues with those of the body such as strength, health, etc. These are called a permanent disposition of the body ( $\epsilon\tilde{\eta}\varsigma$ ) in medical terminology, and Aristotle does not hesitate to apply the same word to the ethical phenomenon of virtue, especially since Plato had been the first to see this similarity and to use medical terms like  $\epsilon\tilde{\eta}\varsigma$  or  $\delta\iota\alpha\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  in an ethical sense. Of the three things peculiar to the soul, affections, capacities, and dispositions, 'virtue' in the moral sense of the word can only be classified as a lasting disposition of the soul ( $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \epsilon\tilde{\eta}\varsigma$ ), since it is neither a mere affection nor a mere capacity (this is shown by several characteristics that distinguish these two from a lasting disposition). Aristotle now determines the *differentia specifica*<sup>20</sup> of virtue. The examples that he uses for this purpose are again taken from the experience of the physician and the gymnast, for they are both experts of health. The examples illustrate the concept of a mean ( $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\eta$ ), which is not the exact arithmetical middle between the two ends of a line or between two numbers but a variable mean relative to the nature of the individual ( $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ ). The right food ration for an athlete like Milon differs from that of the average man,<sup>21</sup> as every Greek would know; and the same difference exists, in the case of racing or wrestling, with regard to the right measure of exercise for the professional and for the average person. There is something analogous to this physical mean in moral action, and at this mean virtue must aim ( $\sigma\tau\omicron\chi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ). Note that the same metaphor of aiming at a target ( $\sigma\tau\omicron\chi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ) is used by the Hippocratic writer of the *De veteri medicina* whom we quoted before,<sup>22</sup> in order to describe the right action of the physician in treating an illness: there is no general rule, no absolute measure or number, that tells him exactly what to do in every case or at every moment, but he must aim at that which is fitting for the nature of his patient.

Thus Aristotle defines moral virtue as a lasting disposition of the human will ( $\epsilon\tilde{\eta}\varsigma \pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ ), which consists in a mean relative to us (the acting person) that is determined by  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ . This must be the  $\epsilon\phi\theta\acute{o}\varsigma \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  mentioned already in 1103b31-32 as a commonly accepted point of Academic doctrine. Aristotle will discuss it later in Book VI, where he takes up the problem of the relationship of moral action and the intellect.<sup>23</sup> There he criticises the concept of the  $\epsilon\phi\theta\acute{o}\varsigma \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  as too vague; his own answer to this question is the long discussion of  $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  in Book VI. It must be admitted that the definition of virtue as given in Book II (in the passage interpreted above) contains difficulties that leave it partly obscure. ■ the participle  $\acute{\omega}\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ <sup>24</sup> (to be construed with  $\mu\epsilon\sigma\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\eta$  and to be written with the iota subscript, as Bywater and others give the text, following the interpretation of Aspasius and Alexander, or is it to be referred to the nominative  $\epsilon\tilde{\eta}\varsigma \pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$  and therefore written without the iota subscript, as our best manuscripts do? And must we read with Aspasius and Bywater  $\kappa\alpha\iota \acute{\omega}\varsigma \acute{\omega}\nu \delta \phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma \acute{\omega}\rho\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\iota$  or is the reading correct in our manuscripts that have  $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$  instead of  $\acute{\omega}\delta$ ? Perhaps the passage at the beginning of Book VI where Aristotle refers back to the definition of virtue in Book II is of some help. He says there, in recapitulating his own definition: 'the mean is such as ( $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ ) the right  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  directs', and he who has the  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  'looks upon this mean as upon a target ( $\sigma\kappa\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$ )'. Thus he thinks now too vague; it is as if you had asked what food you ought to take and someone answered: as much as medicine

<sup>16</sup> *Le.* 1104b24.

<sup>17</sup> *Le.* 1105b32-38.

<sup>18</sup> *Le.* II, 3, 1105a17-39.

<sup>19</sup> See *Eth. Nic.* II, 4.

<sup>20</sup> *Eth. Nic.* II, 5.

<sup>21</sup> *Le.* VI, 1, 1138b25.

<sup>22</sup> *Le.* 1106b3.

<sup>23</sup> See note 30.

<sup>24</sup> *Le.* II, 6, 1107a1.



directs and as (*ὡς*) he (says) who possesses this (knowledge). This example corresponds exactly to the words of the definition (*ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος δρίσκειν*), and I prefer this reading to that of Bywater. Moreover, Aristotle's paraphrase proves that in formulating his famous definition of virtue he again had the parallel of medicine in mind. Medicine suffers from the same difficulty as ethics: instead of presenting a rule it can only refer to the *λόγος* of the perfect physician, just as ethical theory must refer to the *λόγος* of the truly *φρόνιμος*.

The medical analogy is of special importance in those parts of the *Ethics* where Aristotle lays the theoretical foundations of this discipline and elaborates on the requirements of its methodical treatment, i.e. in Books I and II, where his theory of ethics as a practical science and of virtue is developed. But references to medicine are frequent throughout the rest of the *Ethics*.<sup>55</sup> Thus medicine is used as an example of a science that, like ethics, is not concerned with mere theory but with things that are subject to change and require counsel and deliberation. Medicine in this respect resembles economics and the art of navigation. We deliberate not about the end of our actions but about the means for its realisation.<sup>56</sup> So the doctor does not deliberate whether he ought to cure his patient or not, but how he can do it; the rhetor does not ask whether he should persuade, but how he can; and so on with the other arts. Aristotle's distinction of *βούλησις* and *βούλευσις* is the basis of his theory of moral action. The will poses the end (*τέλος*), whereas the means to the end are chosen by an act of deliberation. In Book VI the function of prudence (*φρόνησις*) is similarly defined as being concerned not with the end but with the means (*τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*).<sup>57</sup> Plato had extended the meaning of *φρόνησις* far beyond this: for him it includes the knowledge of the idea of the good (i.e. of the end) as well. Aristotle, who in his earlier period still has to choose the means for a moral end. This is done in the famous analysis of *σοφία* and *φρόνησις* in *Ethics* VI.<sup>58</sup> The parallel with medicine occurs in it again, as we should expect. The object of *σοφία* is one and the same always, whereas *φρόνησις* has to distinguish what is good for every being, just as medicine is not the same for all beings.<sup>59</sup> They also have in common the fact that they are concerned not only with the *καθόλου* but with the *κατ' ἑκαστον* as well.<sup>60</sup> Aristotle makes clear what he means by *φρόνησις* through the example of medical dietetics. It is not enough (for the physician) to know that light meat is easy to digest and healthful if he does not know what meat is light and therefore cannot effect health for his patient; only he who knows that fowl is light will do so.<sup>61</sup> We are here reminded of the Greek medical literature on regimen, which was abundant at Aristotle's time, especially of the second book *Περὶ διαίτης* wrongly preserved under the name of Hippocrates, with its long lists of light and heavy meats and its emphasis on the light meat of chickens and other birds.<sup>62</sup> Aristotle continues to refer to the example of medicine throughout his discussion of *φρόνησις*, where he tries to distinguish its nature from that of *σοφία*.<sup>63</sup> Whoever wants to understand this fundamental concept of his ethics does well to make full use of this analogy.

After the scattered passages (which I here omit) in Books VII-IX, where the example of medicine and health is used for various purposes, it appears once more in the last chapter of Book X, in which the philosopher requires the help of the lawgiver to make his ethical principles work in education and in social life. He asks for laws that are to supplement education and custom as a sort of education for the adult population, an education that will cover the whole of human life and that will use compulsion when necessary.<sup>64</sup> For the law acts as a kind of prudence and reason combined with power<sup>65</sup> that is able to impose itself if not obeyed willingly. This prudence exists in various forms of human life: in the family it is the authority of the father, whereas in the city it takes the form of law.<sup>67</sup> Such laws exist in only a few Greek states such as Sparta—Aristotle seems to hint here at the discussion of the need for a revival of the Areopagus in its earlier form, as the censor of *mores*,<sup>68</sup> in fourth-century Athens—but public care for these things seems to him far the best solution of the problem.<sup>69</sup> Next he touches upon the question of whether education for the many or for single individuals is preferable. He compares the advantages of the latter with those

<sup>55</sup> It is necessary to take into consideration not only the passages in which the words *ἰατρικός*, *ἰατρούς*, *ἰατρία* occur, but also those which speak of *ὑγίεια*, *ὑγιανεύειν*, *ἀρρατύνειν*, *εὐδοκίαν*, etc.

<sup>56</sup> *Eth. Nic.* III, 3, 1112a30 sq. 1112b17 sq.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* VI, 13, 1144a27.

<sup>58</sup> See my *Aristotle* (English translation), p. 83 sq.

<sup>59</sup> *Eth. Nic.* VI, 7 and VI, 13.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* VI, 7, 1141a22a.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* VI, 7, 1141b14.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* 1141b18-21.

<sup>63</sup> Hipp. *De victu* II, c. 46 sq., especially c. 50 on the meat of birds.

<sup>64</sup> See *Eth. Nic.* VI, 13, 1143b23 and 31; 1144b10; 1145a7.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* X, 9, 1180a1 sq.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* 1180a18 and 31.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* 1180b3 sq.

<sup>68</sup> On Sparta see 1180a25. Aristotle holds the Areopagus in high esteem; in this he follows Isocrates' *Antagagistis* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*; see *Paideia* III, 112 sq. (Isocrates) and 17a (Xenophon). Under the rule of Demetrius of Phaleron (317-307) the supervisory competence of this high court was partly restored. This was one of the features of the political programme of the Peripatetic school.

<sup>69</sup> *Eth. Nic.* X, 9, 1180a29.



of the medical treatment of the individual.<sup>70</sup> In general, keeping quiet and abstaining from food is good for patients who suffer from fever, but in an individual case this may not be so; and the gymnast, who in ancient Greece always appears along with the doctor as an authority on diet, does not prescribe the same exercise for all. Individual care therefore permits greater accuracy, but nevertheless the doctor or the gymnast and everyone else who possesses a general knowledge of what is best for all or for a special group of persons might be best at taking care of the individual case.<sup>71</sup> It is true that a man who has no such general knowledge may be able to take care of a single person if he has discovered by experience the effect that everything has on that person, just as they sometimes say that a man is his own best doctor, although he would not be able to help others.<sup>72</sup> Still, if one wants to acquire the art (*technē yendofai*) and theoretical insight he *must* have general knowledge. The same is perhaps true with regard to education, of which we are speaking here: whether one has to educate one or many, he must try to become 'able to give laws', for this requires knowledge, exactly as it does in the case of medicine and the other arts that take care of people and need prudence for this purpose.<sup>73</sup> Aristotle then discusses the problem of how one can acquire this knowledge, and he points out the difference between the professional teachers of political theory, the sophists, who have no political experience themselves, and the teaching of medicine or painting, which is done by the physician and the painter.<sup>74</sup> The sophists believe in the study of books and in the collection of historical material,<sup>75</sup> but in reality experience is indispensable for judging whether the laws, which are the product of the political art, are good or bad. One cannot become a great physician by reading books, even though the books give not only general theory but also try to introduce the student to the practical art of therapy, distinguishing the various dispositions of the patient's body.<sup>76</sup> But these things are really useful only for those who have experience, whereas for the inexperienced they remain useless. Aristotle then expresses his hope that in this sense his own large collection of political constitutions may be of assistance to the expert, and with this he ends his lectures on ethics.

Thus the example of medicine is used not only as a model of method for the theoretical analysis of ethics but equally for its practical application in human life and education. Medicine was the prototype that combined both aspects, and it was precisely this combination that made it the perfect model for the ethical philosopher.

It is not my intention to give a complete list of all the passages in which medicine, health, or the physician are mentioned, nor do I wish to extend my inquiry to the two other ethical treatises preserved under Aristotle's name. Close examination of them confirms the result of recent research, which has placed the *Magna Moralia* in the following generation of the Peripatetic school, whereas the *Eudemian Ethics* is a genuine work of Aristotle and belongs to an earlier period of his life. A keen interest in the methodical issue is lacking in the *Magna Moralia*, and with it the emphasis on the methodical analogies offered by medicine. The spirit of penetrating philosophical inquiry that makes the *Nicomachean Ethics* such fascinating reading has vanished, and there is little understanding of Aristotle's original motives. Problems have become facts, and the whole has shrunk to a textbook for students. But the *Eudemian Ethics*, though incomplete and less polished than the redaction of Nicomachus in style and argument, contains the living breath of Aristotle's thought. References to medical discipline and its method are frequent in it, often occurring in passages that correspond to those in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but they also occur in places where there is no mention of it in the later work. From this it may be inferred that the medical parallel was used by Aristotle from the beginning of his independent thought on ethical problems. He thereby carried Plato's use of it farther, but turned it in a new direction.

The consistent comparison of ethics with medicine obviously was not, for Aristotle, a mere piece of learned pedantry. Every word he utters about questions of method has its philosophic meaning. Apparently he thought it necessary again and again to illustrate the nature and peculiarity of 'politics' or ethics as a science. As a special branch of philosophy distinct from theoretical speculation, it needed a careful description and justification of its aim and methods. The fact that other members of Plato's Academy had felt it necessary to apply mathematics to the problem of the good—a development that Aristotle sharply rejects<sup>77</sup>—seems to be sufficient proof that his own view of these things could not at all be taken for granted at the time when he delivered his lectures on the 'philosophy of things human', as he calls<sup>78</sup> the unity of ethics and politics. The distinction of theoretical and practical philosophy implies a difference of philosophical rank. Theoretical philosophy is supreme because it is concerned with things eternal. We do not 'deliberate' about the stars, but we do deliberate about good and bad in our moral actions. Unless we assume Plato's eternal ideas as the object of ethics, it does not seem to be able to maintain the

<sup>70</sup> *L.c.* 1180b7 sq.

<sup>71</sup> *L.c.* 1180b11 sq.

<sup>72</sup> *L.c.* 1180b16.

<sup>73</sup> *L.c.* 1180b23-26.

<sup>74</sup> *L.c.* 1180b28-1181a1.

<sup>75</sup> *L.c.* 1181a13 sq.

<sup>76</sup> See *supra*, p. 56.

<sup>77</sup> *L.c.* 1181b2-6.

<sup>78</sup> *L.c.* 1181b13.

rank of a science (*ἐπιστήμη*), since it must concern itself exclusively with that which is subject to change (*τὰ ἀδεχόμενα ἄλλως εἶναι*). This is indeed what Aristotle keeps repeating. It may seem a truism to us, but for him, as a pupil of Plato, there lies the greatest problem. Aristotle would not recognise as valid our modern objection that it is indeed a science, but only in so far as it is theory; for what he wants to demonstrate is that, besides pure theory, there is another kind of knowledge that aims at action (or production) and that reveals what a man 'knows' only by action (or production). The science of ethics differs from physics or mathematics not only by its aim of practical application but also by the different nature of its knowledge. The medical analogy is meant to show that such a knowledge also exists in other fields of human activity. Thus the abandoning of Plato's theory of ideas does not mean that we are giving up the scientific approach to the ethical problem. Ethics is not a theoretical science, but it is nevertheless a science, within its limits, like medicine. Its *φρόνησις* is not like the mere *θεωρία* of the *νοῦς*, as it appeared in Plato: rather, it resembles the doctor's art, which is a *τέχνη στοχαστική*, but still it is based on *λόγος*. On the other hand, what distinguishes the insight of the *φρόνιμος* from that of the physician is that he is able to deliberate well about that which is good and wholesome for himself, not with regard to a special part such as health or strength, but with regard to that which is conducive to 'the good life' in general.<sup>79</sup>

WERNER JAEGER.

*Harvard University.*

*J. Phil. Stud.* VI, 5, 1140223.

## ARISTOTLE AND THE *CONSEQUENTIA MIRABILIS*

In a passage of his *Protrepticus* mentioned by several ancient authors Aristotle wrote: *ἐὶ μὲν φιλοσοφῆτέον φιλοσοφῆτέον, καὶ ἐὶ μὴ φιλοσοφῆτέον φιλοσοφῆτέον πάντως ἄρα φιλοσοφῆτέον* (V. Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, 51. Cf. R. Walzer, *Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta*, p. 22; W. D. Ross, *Select Fragments of Aristotle*, p. 27). That is to say, 'If we ought to philosophise, then we ought to philosophise; and if we ought not to philosophise, then we ought to philosophise (i.e. in order to justify this view); in any case, therefore, we ought to philosophise'. So far as I know, this is the first appearance in philosophical literature of a pattern of argument that became popular among the Jesuits of the seventeenth century under the name of the *consequentia mirabilis* and inspired Saccheri's work *Euclides ab Omni Nervo Funicatus*, in which theorems of non-Euclidean geometry were proved for the first time. The later history has been told by G. Vailati (in his article on Saccheri's *Logica Demonstrativa*, 'Di un' opera dimenticata del P. Gerolamo Saccheri', reprinted in his *Scritti*, 1911, pp. 477-84), G. B. Halsted (in the preface to his 1920 edition of Saccheri's *Euclides*), and J. Łukasiewicz (in his 'Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalküls', *Comptes Rendus des séances de la société des sciences et des lettres de Varsovie*, Classe III, Vol. xxiii, 1930, p. 67). In this note I wish to consider only the early history of the argument and in particular a curious criticism of it which appears in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*.

Let us begin with the pattern of a simple constructive dilemma:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If P then R} \\ \text{If Q then R} \\ \text{But either P or Q} \\ \therefore \text{R} \end{array} \right\} \text{(i)}$$

Here all the premisses may be extra-logical truths, but by substituting 'not-P' for 'Q' we get a special case in which the third premiss is a logical truism and therefore redundant:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If P then R} \\ \text{If not-P then R} \\ \text{But either P or not-P} \\ \therefore \text{R} \end{array} \right\} \text{(ii)}$$

This special case has some importance as being a constructive counterpart of the *reductio ad absurdum*:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If S then T} \\ \text{If S then not-T} \\ \text{But not both T and not-T} \\ \therefore \text{not-S} \end{array} \right\} \text{(iii)}$$

By substituting 'P' for 'R' in (ii) we obtain:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If P then P} \\ \text{If not-P then P} \\ \text{But either P or not-P} \\ \therefore \text{P} \end{array} \right\} \text{(iv)}$$

Here not only the third premiss, but also the first, is a logical truism, so that we may, if we choose, reduce the whole to the simple schema:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If not-P then P} \\ \therefore \text{P} \end{array} \right\} \text{(v)}$$

Naturally a premiss of the form 'If not-P then P' cannot be established by observation and induction, but when the proposition that-P is of a suitable kind such a hypothetical statement may be established by logical considerations, i.e. we may be able to show that the proposition that-P is derivable from the proposition that-not-P in accordance with valid principles of entailment. When we can do this we are entitled to assert the proposition that-P as an absolutely necessary truth. In short, any proposition which is entailed even by its own negation must be true, since nothing can tell against it. Saccheri, indeed, went on to say that it was the peculiar characteristic of all *præter necessities* that they could be established in this way alone (*Euclides ab Omni Nervo Funicatus*, p. 99).



By putting 'S' for 'T' in (iii) and then dropping logical truisms which are redundant as premisses we can obtain a destructive schema corresponding to (v), namely,

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If S then not-S} \\ \therefore \text{not-S} \end{array} \right\} \text{(vi)}$$

This may be summarised in the formula 'Any proposition which entails its own negation must be false'. An attempt to use it occurs in Plato's *Theaetetus* 171A, where Socrates argues that the pronouncement of Protagoras on truth must be false because it involves its own contradictory.

Reasoning in accordance with the *consequentia mirabilis* is used by Euclid in his *Elements*, ix. 12, to prove the theorem that if as many numbers as we please beginning from a unit be in continued proportion, by however many prime numbers the last is measured, the next to the unit will also be measured by the same. In modern terminology this means that if  $p$  is any prime number and  $a$  any natural number such that  $p$  is a factor of  $a^n$  then  $p$  is a factor also of  $a$ . In order to demonstrate it we suppose first that  $p$  is not a factor of  $a$ , which is as much as to say that  $p$  and  $a$  are mutually prime. Then, since *ex hypothesi*  $p$  is a factor of  $a^n$ ,  $a$ , it follows in accordance with an earlier theorem that  $p$  is a factor of  $a^{n-1}$ . But by repetition of the same process we can show that  $p$  must be a factor of  $a^{n-2}$ ,  $a^{n-3}$ , etc., and so finally of  $a$  itself. According to (v) this is sufficient to establish the desired conclusion; but Euclid treats the argument up to date as though it were merely a *reductio ad absurdum* of the suggestion that  $p$  and  $a$  are mutually prime, and therefore goes on to infer that  $p$  and  $a$  have a common factor, which must be  $p$  itself. His addition amounts in effect to a validation of the *consequentia mirabilis* by means of the *reductio ad absurdum* and the law of double negation, i.e. we have something of the form:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{If not-P then P} \\ \text{If not-P then not-P} \\ \text{But not both P and not-P} \\ \therefore \text{not-not-P} \\ \therefore \text{P} \end{array} \right\} \text{(vii)}$$

Since, as its name implies, the *consequentia mirabilis* is not a pattern of reasoning that men feel inclined to take as basic, some derivation is in order, and it is merely a matter of taste whether we favour this of Euclid or that given above.

The popularity of the *consequentia* among Jesuits was due to the note which Clavius (a member of the Society of Jesus and author of the Gregorian calendar) wrote on ix. 12 in his edition of Euclid's *Elements*. For this reason Łukasiewicz (*Aristotle's Syllogistic*, p. 80) has used the name 'Principle of Clavius' for a conditionalisation of our schema (v), i.e. for the thesis:

$$\text{If (if not-P then P) then P} \quad \text{(viii)}$$

But, as Łukasiewicz himself has pointed out, Clavius was not the first to recognise explicitly the merits of this kind of argument. In antiquity already the unreduced schema (iv) was used by Stoic logicians. We do not know how they derived it from the indemonstrables of Chrysippus, but their formulation of it has been preserved by Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus Mathematicos*, viii. 292):  $\epsilon\lambda\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu, \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu \cdot \epsilon\lambda\ \alpha\upsilon\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu, \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu \cdot \eta\tau\omicron\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu\ \eta\ \alpha\upsilon\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu \cdot \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu\ \alpha\pi\alpha$ . Here  $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\nu$ , 'the first', is to be understood as a propositional variable in accordance with general Stoic custom.

Like Aristotle, the Stoics used argumentation of this kind as a weapon against scepticism, e.g. to confute those who said there was no proof (Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes*, ii. 186; *Adversus Mathematicos*, viii. 281 and 466), and it may be that through St. Augustine's *Si fallor sum* (*De Civitate Dei*, xi. 26) they inspired Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*. It is important, however, to notice that none of these attempts to refute scepticism is a genuine application of the *consequentia mirabilis*. Anyone who, like the late Professor Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, says  $\alpha\iota\ \phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\phi\omicron\upsilon\eta\tau\epsilon\acute{o}\nu$  lays himself open to a charge of inconsistency, since he has already begun to philosophise in enunciating his principle; but we are not entitled on that account to say  $\epsilon\lambda\ \mu\eta\ \phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\phi\omicron\upsilon\eta\tau\epsilon\acute{o}\nu, \phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\phi\omicron\upsilon\eta\tau\epsilon\acute{o}\nu$ . The most we can properly assert is 'If anyone says there should be no philosophising, then there must inevitably be some philosophising, namely, that which he has just begun', and this is not in the form of a premiss for the *consequentia mirabilis*. Similarly anyone who says *Non sum* refutes himself in a very striking fashion, since the occurrence of his assertion is the best of evidence against its truth; but *Non sum* is not a self-contradiction nor *Sum* an absolutely necessary truth, and the first does not entail the second.

Since Aristotle did not try to work out what we now call propositional logic, we cannot expect to find any systematic account of the *consequentia mirabilis* in his logical treatises; but there are some chapters at the beginning of the second book of his *Prior Analytics* where he discusses general questions about entailment such as medieval logicians included in their tracts on *consequentiae*, and in one of

these he seems to deny the possibility of any valid argument according to the pattern of the *consequentia mirabilis*. The relevant passage (*Analytica Priora*, ii. 4, 57a36-57b17) is as follows: Φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ἂν μὲν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδὲς, ἀνάγκη, ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ψευδὴ εἶναι ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓνα, ὅταν δ' ἀληθὲς, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀληθὲς εἶναι οὔτε τί οὔτε πᾶντα, ἀλλ' ἔστι μηδεὶς ὅντος ἀληθοῦς τῶν ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ τὸ συμπέρασμα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἀληθὲς οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. αὐτῶν δ' ὅτι ὅταν διὸν ἔχῃ οὕτω πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε θατέρου ὅντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι θάτερον, τούτου μὴ ὄντος μὲν οὐδὲ θάτερον ἔσται, ὅντος δ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι θάτερον. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ αὐτό. λέγεται δ' οἷον τοῦ Α ὄντος λευκοῦ τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ τοῦ Α τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὅταν γὰρ τοιοῦτ' ὅντας λευκοῦ, τοῦ Α, τοδὶ ἀνάγκη μέγα εἶναι, τὸ Β, μεγάλου δὲ τοῦ Β ὄντος τὸ Γ μὴ λευκόν, ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὸ Α λευκόν, τὸ Γ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν. καὶ ὅταν διὸ ὅντων θατέρου ὄντος ἀνάγκη θάτερον εἶναι, τούτου μὴ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ πρῶτον μὴ εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ Β μὴ ὄντος μεγάλου τὸ Α οὐκ οἷον τε λευκόν εἶναι. τοῦ Α μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ εἰ ἀνάγκη τὸ Β μέγα εἶναι, συμβαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦ Β μεγάλου μὴ ὄντος αὐτό τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα. τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστι μέγα, τὸ Α οὐκ ἔσται λευκόν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὄντος τοιούτου λευκοῦ τὸ Β ἔσται μέγα, συμβαίνει, εἰ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστι μέγα, εἶναι μέγα, ὡς διὰ τριῶν.

Using Ross's summary as our basis (*Commentary on the Analytics*, p. 434), we may translate this as follows: 'It is clear then that if the conclusion is false one or other of the premisses must be false, whereas if the conclusion is true neither both premisses nor even one need be true; even when neither of the premisses is true, the conclusion may be true, but its truth is not necessitated by the premisses. The reason is that when two things are so related that if one exists the other must, then if the second does not exist neither will the first, but if the second exists the first need not; on the other hand, the existence of one thing cannot be necessitated both by the existence and by the non-existence of another, e.g. B's being large both by A's being white and by its not being white. For when if A is white B must be large, and if B is large C cannot be white, then if A is white C cannot be white. If then A's not being white necessitated B's being large, B's not being large would necessitate B's being large; which is impossible. For if B is not large, A will necessarily not be white; and so if A's not being white entails B's being large, it follows that if B is not large it is large, just as with three terms.'

In the first part of the first complete sentence (i.e. before the first semi-colon of the translation) we have two assertions about the relations of the premisses and the conclusion of a valid syllogism in respect of truth or falsity, and these are justified in the first half of the second complete sentence by two remarks about entailment, namely, that it allows for contraposition but does not admit simple conversion. Aristotle writes here of entailment by a single proposition, but an earlier passage on contraposition (*An. Priora*, ii. 2, 53b11-25), which is remarkable in Aristotle's work for its use of propositional variables, makes clear that he is thinking of the two premisses of a syllogism taken together (*διὰ προτάσεις συλλεγθεῖσαι*). In the second half of the first complete sentence we have an assertion that a true conclusion does not follow from false premisses *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, and in the second half of the second complete sentence we have an attempt to justify this by the thesis that a proposition and its contradictory cannot both entail the same consequence. Such at least is the interpretation of the passage given in antiquity by John Philoponus. I accept it because I can offer nothing better, but I must confess that I cannot understand the relevance of the third thesis introduced by Aristotle for purposes of justification.

In an earlier passage (*An. Priora*, ii. 2, 53b7-10) Aristotle says: *ἐξ ἀληθῶν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς συλλογίσασθαι, ἐκ ψευδῶν δ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς, πλην οὐ διότι ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦ γὰρ διότι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ ψευδῶν συλλογισμὸς· δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις λεχθήσεται*. That is to say, 'True premisses cannot yield a false conclusion, but false premisses may yield a true conclusion, though only the fact without the reason; for the reason cannot be given by syllogistic argument from false premisses; why this is so will be explained in what follows'. Obviously the passage which interests us is intended as a fulfilment of this promise; and when Aristotle says that a conclusion entailed by false premisses may be true but cannot be so *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, he means presumably that its truth is not guaranteed and explained by the falsity of the premisses as the truth of a conclusion from true premisses would be guaranteed and explained by their truth. But if this is the correct interpretation of his assertion, there is no need of subtle argument to prove the point. For to say that a syllogism is valid is just to say that if its premisses are true its conclusion must be true by virtue of the form of the whole; and to say of a valid syllogism that it gives a real reason or genuine ground for its conclusion is just to say that its premisses are in fact true. It seems, however, that Aristotle is not satisfied with this simple explanation but hopes to justify his remark by a consideration about entailment something like those he has just produced to justify his two earlier assertions. If so, he is misled by a false analogy: for the inability of a syllogism with false premisses to provide any guarantee for the truth of its conclusion is certainly not due to any limitation of the possibilities of entailment such as he goes on to maintain.

What Aristotle says at this point is not enough to reveal his thought clearly, and I cannot suggest any plausible expansion, but he seems to assume that if a true conclusion followed *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*



from false premisses these latter would have to be contradictory to the premisses of some other syllogism which gave the real ground of the conclusion. In fact a true conclusion may follow from false premisses that are not related in this way to any true premisses yielding the same conclusion. Thus the true conclusion 'Every man is mortal' can be derived syllogistically from the false premisses 'Every amoeba is mortal' and 'Every man is an amoeba'. But if Aristotle did not make the assumption I have just mentioned he could scarcely have thought that his thesis was relevant in any way to the assertion it was supposed to justify. It is true that the thesis is formulated with reference to entailment or necessitation as a relation between single propositions, but like his earlier remarks about entailment it must be intended to apply to syllogisms, since otherwise the whole argument would be pointless.

Now it is interesting to notice that for a reason quite different from any discussed by Aristotle it is impossible that there should be two valid syllogisms with the same conclusion but so related that the premisses of the first taken together are contradictory to the premisses of the second taken together. To take the premisses of a syllogism together is to treat them as items in a conjunction, and the contradictory of a conjunction is the disjunction of the negatives of the propositions originally conjoined, not another conjunction. Nor is it possible that there should be two valid syllogisms with the same conclusion but so related that they have one premiss in common while the other two are contradictories. For if the common premiss were negative, one of the syllogisms would contain two negative premisses; and if the common premiss were affirmative, one syllogism would have two affirmative premisses while the other had one premiss affirmative and one negative, with the result that they could not both have the same conclusion. Nor again is it possible that there should be two valid syllogisms with the same conclusion but so related that each premiss of one is the contradictory of a premiss of the other. For there are only two cases to be considered, that in which the premisses of one syllogism would be of the form AO while those of the other were of the form OA and that in which the premisses of one syllogism would be of the form EI while those of the other were of the form IE. In either case the conclusion would be negative, and this requires that the major term should be distributed in the major premiss; but it could not be distributed in both syllogisms of the first case, since there one major premiss would be of the form A while the other was of the form O (with the same disposition of terms), nor yet in both syllogisms of the second case, since there one major premiss would be of the form I. On the other hand, it is possible that there should be two valid syllogisms with the same conclusion but so related that one premiss of the first is the contradictory of one premiss of the second and the other premiss of the first the contrary of the other premiss of the second. *Quaro* and *Haroco* are moods of the second figure in which we can construct syllogisms satisfying this condition, and so also are *Canestras* and *Festino*; but it can be shown that there are no other such pairs of moods in any figure.

We cannot tell whether Aristotle had any of these theorems of syllogistic in mind when he formulated his thesis that a proposition and its contradictory cannot both entail the same consequence. For there is no reference to syllogisms in the ingenious attempt to prove it which occupies the rest of the passage I have quoted. But this last portion is very interesting for its own sake, since it is here that Aristotle produces his criticism of the type of entailment statement used in the *consequentia mirabilis*. Using propositional variables instead of Aristotle's examples and writing 'P/Q' as an abbreviation for 'the proposition that-P entails the proposition that-Q' or 'given that P it is necessary that Q', we may reconstruct the argument as follows:

- (1) If P/Q and Q/R, then P/R.
- (2) If P/Q, then not-Q/not-P.
- (3) If P/Q and not-P/Q, then not-Q/not-P and not-P/Q.  
From (2) by conjunction of 'not-P/Q' with antecedent and consequent alike.
- (4) If not-Q/not-P and not-P/Q, then not-Q/Q.  
From (1) by substitution of 'not-Q' for 'P', 'not-P' for 'Q', and 'Q' for 'R'.
- (5) It is not the case that not-Q/Q.
- (6) It is not the case that both not-Q/not-P and not-P/Q.  
From (4) and (5) by *modus tollendo tollens*.
- (7) It is not the case that both P/Q and not-P/Q.  
From (3) and (6) by *modus tollendo tollens*.

In my formulation of (5), as in all similar expressions of universality, the free variable has for its scope the whole statement in which it occurs. In other words, (5) means that no proposition is entailed by its own contradictory. If Aristotle was right in asserting this, there could never be any valid argument in the pattern of the *consequentia mirabilis*. But some propositions are entailed by their own contradictories, namely, those that are absolutely necessary. For to say that a proposition is absolutely necessary is just to say that it is necessary in relation to everything without exception and so in relation even to its contradictory. If when Aristotle wrote *συμβαίνει εἰς*



ἀνάγκης τοῦ Β μεγάλου μὴ οὐτος αὐτό τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα · τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον, he meant *only* that a thing's being great cannot follow necessarily from its not being great, there would be nothing wrong in his assertion; for the property of being demonstrable by the *consequentia mirabilis* is confined to absolutely necessary truths, which Saccheri called *primae veritates*. But it is clear from the context that Aristotle thought of his example as representing all propositions indifferently, and here he fell into error. It is also not correct to conclude, as he does, that a proposition and its contradictory cannot both entail the same consequence; for if the consequence is itself an absolutely necessary truth, there is nothing at all paradoxical in the situation which he finds absurd.

Did Aristotle ever consider in abstraction the pattern of inference which he had used in his *Protrepticus*? And did he realise when he wrote his *Prior Analytics* that the passage I have quoted involved rejection of that pattern? It is impossible to answer these questions with certainty, but I have the impression that Aristotle had given the matter some thought before he wrote the *Prior Analytics*. Whether or not it is sound, the argument by which he tries to show that a conclusion from false premisses cannot be true ἐξ ἀνάγκης is unnecessarily elaborate for its purpose, and it is presented by means of examples that have nothing to do with syllogistic theory. These oddities suggest to me that it may have been conceived independently and worked in here, where it is not strictly relevant, because it was recalled to Aristotle's mind by his immediately preceding reflections on properties of the entailment relation. If Aristotle ever reflected in general on arguments in which a proposition and its contradictory are both said to entail the same consequence, the occasion may perhaps have been some examination of Megarian views. For the Megarians, being followers of the Eleatic tradition, were especially interested in the *reductio ad absurdum*, and the entailment assertions which Aristotle refuses to admit are just those required for justification of the hypothetical premisses in schema (ii), which is the constructive counterpart of the *reductio ad absurdum*. We know that the early Stoics paid great respect to the Megarian teaching on logic, and it is at least possible that their interest in schema (iv) was suggested by Megarian arguments.

Such speculation is interesting, but inconclusive and not very profitable. If we want to keep to facts, we must content ourselves with the remark that on this occasion Aristotle wrote more than was needed and fell into error. But perhaps we may draw a moral. His error was due to the fact that in propositional logic he did not ordinarily use variables but relied on examples. Here, as elsewhere, we may be tempted to make over-hasty generalisations, and the only corrective for this is rigour in the formulation and derivation of theses.

WILLIAM KNEALE.

Exeter College, Oxford.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF AMMONIUS SACCAS

### AND THE CONNECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN AND CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS THEREIN\*

THE excellent report by H.-R. Schwyzer in his long article on Plotinus in R.-E. (Bd. XLI (1951), col. 477-81), presents the reader with a picture of the present state of research concerning Ammonius, while giving a critique of previous discussions. A significant feature of the situation is this: simultaneously with the endeavour to obtain a clear picture of Ammonius's doctrine from the reports in Nemesius of Emesa and Hierocles (Photius, Bibl. cod. 214 and 251)—reports whose upper and lower limits are controversial—a new and fruitful attempt has been made to work back to Ammonius as the common source behind numerous concordances between Plotinus and Origen. Following the lead of René Cadiou, who, in his epoch-making work *La jeunesse d'Origène* (Paris, 1935), demonstrated the importance of Ammonius for the development of the theology of Origen, de Jong has given a convenient conspectus of the parallels between Plotinus and Origen (*Plotinus of Ammonius Saccas*, Leiden, 1941). But this gives rise to some problems of general procedure. What justification is there for Schwyzer's assertion (*op. cit.* 480, 65) that 'it is *a priori* improbable that Plotinus would have studied the writings of Origen'? This depends upon the presupposition that Christianity, and in particular its theology, during the years of Plotinus's studies at Alexandria, was of far too slight importance, intensive or extensive, to have had any influence upon a man of the spiritual calibre of Plotinus. This view appears from every point of view unfounded, and most of all in regard to Ammonius's entourage, which (as is well known) numbered among its members not only Origen himself but, a considerable time before that, Heraklas, subsequently Bishop of Alexandria. Plotinus is known to have been deeply interested, while at Alexandria, in the Persian and Indian philosophy: is it to be assumed that he had no knowledge of the *De principiis* of Origen, which is to be dated 'not long after 220'? (Koetschau, *Introd. to De Princ.*, p. xi). Much rather does it seem certain that Plotinus expressly controverts Origen in not a few places. To be sure, the proof of this would require a very detailed comparative exposition of both authors, for which this is not the proper place. With reference to the Ammonius problem, the possibility of a direct relation between Plotinus and Origen—a relation which may be positive as well as polemical—means a certain limitation of the evidence; especially if one bears in mind the further possibility that, where discrepancies occur between Plotinus and Origen, it is not *ipso facto* clear that Plotinus must be the more reliable witness for Ammonius.

In order to guide us on our way in this search for the common source of Plotinus and Origen, and to protect its result against subjective valuations which must inevitably play a great part in the comparison, it is advisable to start by surveying the meagre, and in part apparently contradictory, testimony concerning Ammonius. Now he was certainly not only an independent but also a systematic thinker. A mere transmission of philosophical commonplaces current in his time, with minor variations to suit his own taste, is not to be imputed to him. It seems, therefore, that one may justifiably raise, and ought to raise, the question what bearing each detail of doctrine has upon the whole. And yet one has no right to take advantage of this fact in order to dismiss some inconvenient morsels of tradition as being *a priori* incredible. The question which must be faced is simply this: Is the detail (be it a problem, an expression of doctrine, or a biographical item) a product of the age? and what is its meaning amid the intellectual controversies of that time?

The two central questions which arise from our tradition concerning Ammonius are these: (1) his relation to Christianity; his alleged Christian descent and his strong influence upon Christian pupils; his doctrine, which is, indeed, contested, of a *creatio ex nihilo* through the will of God, etc.; (2) his harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle. Now the problems which come under these two main heads can be shown to arise naturally, or with necessity, from the movement of ideas at the time; and there is one fact which alone renders it highly probable that they stem from Ammonius: the disparate reports, sometimes aimed intentionally at one another, share a certain amount of common ground. I shall attempt in what follows to illustrate this fact, and if I take my example for preference from the Christian theological problems of the time, this is simply an effect of the present state of research. My problem has not, as far as I know, been examined with these questions in view. To speak briefly of the second point, the thesis that Ammonius was the originator of a conscious harmonising of Plato and Aristotle is based upon what we learn from Photius about Hierocles *Περὶ ἀποριῶν* (fifth century A.D.). The validity of the thesis was questioned by A. Elter (*Rhein. Mus.* 65 (1910), 175 ff.). But his arguments are unconvincing, and in any case Hierocles

\* This essay has been abbreviated from a longer German text.

himself was a follower of this harmonising tendency. It is very improbable that the ascription of it to Ammonius arose entirely from a misunderstanding by Photius, and what has to be considered is whether such a tendency seems more appropriate to the early third century or to the fifth; and in the fifth century it would seem remarkably archaic.

It is clear already that no progress in our inquiry will be made without a liberal use of hypotheses. But we must venture forward, and if our hypotheses close up to form a solid ring, we need not surrender to the (equally hypothetical) rejection of the tradition.

#### LIFE OF AMMONIUS

Ammonius was of Christian descent; for this, we must undoubtedly take Porphyry's word (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* VI. 19, 7). Was he an apostate? This is by no means clearly deducible from Porphyry's words, but only that he devoted himself to a philosophical life. Before pronouncing any judgment on Eusebius's denial of the charge (*op. cit.* 9-10), we must carefully consider what exactly is meant by 'being a Christian', at Alexandria in the latter half of the second century. It is perfectly clear, e.g., from W. Bauer's investigations<sup>1</sup> that previous to the episcopate of Demetrius one can hardly speak of an orthodox community at Alexandria. The Basilidians and the Valentinians, not to speak of the Marcionite church, called themselves without hesitation Christians. The sort of Christianity of which Clement of Alexandria was a representative appears from his extant writings, but still more plainly from Photius's report about the *Hypotyposes* (Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 109 = Clement, *Ed. III.* p. 202, 7). One must put to oneself the simple question, what would become of the representatives of these various tendencies, once it had been laid down, under the authoritarian Bishop Demetrius, that agreement to the faith of the Roman community was the standard of Christian orthodoxy, and therefore of membership of the church. In order to answer this question correctly one must bear in mind the further fact that the establishment of a standard of orthodoxy was as much a social as a dogmatic proceeding. Just as, at Rome after Mureion's expulsion, the intellectual class was to an increasing extent sundered from the brotherhood—for the contest was not with specific 'heretical' teachings but with the phenomenon of a Christian theology in general—so the echo of this movement two generations later at Alexandria had to proceed in the same direction: which would mean that the class of cultured Christians drawn from the upper ranks of society (and this surely was relatively greater at Alexandria than at Rome) was steadily eliminated. Whether and to what extent an individual was henceforward to be counted as a Christian, was a question which certainly, even then, could only be answered in each separate case.

But can the hypothesis that Ammonius may perhaps have been one of this circle be reconciled with the tradition associated with his second name Σακκάς? The usual interpretation 'sack-carrier' is found expressed for the first time, as far as I know, in Theodoret, *Graec. Aff. Cyr.* VI. 60: ἐπὶ τούτῳ (sc. Commodus) δὲ Ἀμμώνιος ὁ ἐπὶ κλητὸν Σακκάς, τοὺς σάκκους καταλιπὼν ὡς μετέφερε τοὺς πυραύς, τὸν φιλόσοφον ἡσπασατο βίον. ταύτῃ φησιν εἶναι φασὶν Ὀριγένην τὸν ἡμέτερον, τῷ δὲ Πλωτῖνον ταυτοῦ. Obviously Theodoret did not invent this. What his source was, we do not know. That such a notable biographical detail did not become an edifying romance in the hands of the neo-Platonists, especially of Porphyry, seems suspicious. Now if one starts from the usual meaning of σάκκος, coarse cloth or coarse garment, it is natural to interpret Σακκάς as the appellation of an ascetic philosopher, 'wearer of the σάκκος'. It was in fact surely very unusual for a Platonist to assume the triton of the Cynic. That the school of Ammonius did distinguish itself by a peculiar dress, we see from the letter of Origen in Euseb. VI. 19, 13-14: . . . τὸν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ καθέζομενον Ἀλεξανδρίῳ Ἰρακλῶν, οὕτως εἶρην παρὰ τῷ διδασκάλῳ τῶν φιλοσόφων μαθημάτων (sc. Ammonius) ἤδη πέντε ἔτησιν αὐτῷ προσκαρτερήσαντα πρὶν ἢ ἐμὲ ἀρξάσθαι ἀκοῦειν ἐκείνων τῶν λόγων δι' οὗ καὶ πρότερον κοινῇ ἐπὶ ἡμῶν χρίμενος ἀποδυσίμενος καὶ φιλόσοφον ἀναλαβὼν ὄχημα . . . Elaboration of this hypothesis is not required here. It is enough to refer to the copious data in the article of the Latin *Théaurus* on *cilicium*, a word which in many passages is expressly mentioned as the equivalent of σάκκος.

But when this possibility is granted, the further statements of Eusebius concerning Ammonius, which have been rejected as untrustworthy on wholly *a priori* grounds, appear in quite a new light. Eusebius denies (*op. cit.* 9-10) that Ammonius fell away from Christianity. It is obvious that he knows nothing of his life. But he does allude to theological writings by him. One title only is named: Περὶ τῆς Μωυσέως καὶ Ἰησοῦ συμφωνίας. From Eusebius's method of work it can be inferred that he found this writing in the library at Caesarea. There is no harm in conceding that, in his apologetic zeal, he made the best of his discovery, and inferred blindly (for he was obviously not acquainted with any) the existence of several similar writings. But still we must consider

<sup>1</sup> W. Bauer: *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum*, Tübingen, 1934, pp. 57 ff.



whether he could suppose that it would serve his purpose if he simply ascribed a tractate written by some other Ammonius<sup>2</sup> to the famous head of the Platonic school. That would have been extraordinarily foolish at a time when Porphyry's *Against the Christians* had attained its widest influence, more especially since among the leaders of the Alexandrian church there were personal pupils of Ammonius, notably Heraklas. Eusebius does make mistakes. But he is primarily an archivist, and is not undistinguished as such. The possibility of a mistake by him may perhaps be admitted. It can hardly be proved by pronouncing his statement 'a priori incredible'.

And there is a further point. The title cited by Eusebius characterises this as an anti-Marcionite writing. But it is notable that Eusebius gives no statement of its contents. This provokes the suspicion that the writing, judged in accordance with that orthodoxy which, since Demetrius, had been extended to Alexandria, was one which could not exactly be recommended. That Eusebius should so reject it in any case credible, and is thoroughly in line with his apologia. Again, the remarkable fact that Origen in his letter (Euseb. *op. cit.* 13) is silent as to the name of the διδάσκαλος τῶν φιλοσόφων μαθημάτων may also naturally be attributed to grounds of piety.<sup>3</sup> Origen knows and judges Ammonius simply as a philosopher. If he knew that there was some question about his status as a Christian, or rather, only in that case, his discretion was timely. Mention of the name could only do injury at a time of heated political controversy among the Alexandrian Christians. Does not all this point to the situation of a man who had made himself conspicuous in youth by an anti-Marcionite tract, and therefore obviously was not a member of a gnostic fraternity, but who did not follow in the highway of Alexandrian orthodoxy? There can be no answer to the question whether he was an 'apostate'. It is, of course, psychologically possible that he had so far relaxed his membership of the community that, perhaps at the time of Severus's persecution, he had evaded martyrdom by offering sacrifice. This could very well have been known to Porphyry, but not to Eusebius. Thus the two sides of the tradition are not absolutely irreconcilable.

#### PERIPATETIC INFLUENCE ON CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

This balancing of possibilities which admit of no demonstration would, however, be an idle game, save for the fact that the title of the tract which Eusebius ascribes to Ammonius<sup>4</sup> indicates precisely at what point the evolving Christian theology found itself obliged to borrow the Peripatetic concept of the ἀσχετόν (vide *infra*, p. 72), and take this up into the Platonic ontology which was traditional in the school.

In the Valentinian Heracleon's *Treatise on the Three Natures* we read concerning the philosophers:

'They did not possess the possibility of knowing the cause of existing things because this was not communicated to them. Therefore they introduced other explanations. Some say that things which happen take place according to a Providence; these are those who perceive the regularity and order of motion. Others say that no Providence exists; these are those who take notice both of the irregularity and abnormality of the powers and of evil. Some say that what must happen happens. . . . Others say that what happens comes about according to nature. Others again say that the world is an automatism. But the great majority have turned to the visible elements, without knowing more than these.'

The editor, Quispel, comments: 'Hence the writer (Heracleon?) sees in Greek philosophy only contradiction and demonic inspiration. He esteems at far higher worth the Hebrew Prophets who did not contradict one another and announced the coming of Christ.'

Written in the generation after 145, these declarations are certainly far from being original. But in their polemical employment of an ordinary school tradition they reveal, with as much clarity as a first-rate thinker could do, the point at which any Christian theology that was marked by the Pauline doctrine of predestination must come to grips with ancient philosophy: the problem *περί προνοίας*.

<sup>2</sup> Compare e.g. Schmidt-Städlin, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.* II, p. 1341; Carl Schmidt, *Plotins Stellung zum Gnostizismus* . . . (T. U. Neue Folge V, 4) has proposed the name of a Bishop Ammonius of Thmuis.

<sup>3</sup> As C. Schmidt, *op. cit.* B, n. 1, agrees.

<sup>4</sup> That is, 'On the conduct of Moses and Jesus' a highly probable title for an early work by Ammonius about the chief theological problem of his day. It may be added here that we learn from Porphyry of the titles of two works by the neo-Platonist Origen, namely: *ἐν νόμῳ ἀποστολῆς ὁ ἱεραρχὴς* and *περὶ τῶν ἀσχετόν*. These works must surely have dealt with the subjects of which Hierocles also treated in his *περὶ προνοίας*—the

former would deal with the creation, the latter with destiny. An identification of Origen the neo-Platonist with the Christian Origen has been essayed by R. Cadiou (*op. cit.*), but is controverted by Schwyzler, *op. cit.* col. 380, 42 ff. From the way in which Hierocles brings to the front the name of this Origen, it can be deduced that he (and not, as might be supposed, Plotinus) was the main source of Hierocles's information about the teaching of Ammonius.

Translation taken from *The Jung Codex, Three Studies* by H. C. Puech, G. Quispel, W. C. Van Unnik, tr. and ed. by F. L. Cross, London, 1955. The section quoted is from pp. 59 ff.

Interest in this and kindred problems is not, indeed, in the second century by any means confined to the Christians. It is unnecessary to enumerate the copious writings still extant, in which they are dealt with by academic philosophers. The words of Heraclitus, however, make it quite clear that it is Philosophy in the broadest sense, not the dogmatic teaching of one school or another, that is here being tested by this problem and found wanting on account of its self-contradiction. And this judgment is not passed from a sceptical viewpoint, but from the gnostic's positive claim to possess the *ἀλήθεια*.<sup>6</sup> *Gnosis* reveals itself as the one and only true philosophy, just because it alone has found a solution to the antinomy of philosophy. Valentinus himself in his *Gospel of the Truth*, written about 145,<sup>7</sup> solves the problem by abandoning the Cosmos as the realm of *λόγος* and *αἴτια*.

'The being' which has no root, still immersed in his nothingness, thinks thus of himself: I am as the shadows and spectral appearances of the night. But when the light appears, he comes to recognise that the fear which took hold of him was nothing. Thus men were in ignorance concerning the Father, Him Whom they saw not. When this ignorance inspired them, fear and confusion left them uncertain and hesitant, . . . there were many vain illusions . . . which tormented them, like sleepers who are a prey to nightmares. One flees one knows not where, or one remains at the same spot while endeavouring to go forward, in the pursuit of one knows not whom. . . . Down to the moment when those who have passed through all this wake up: Then they see nothing . . . for all those dreams were nought. Thus they have cast their ignorance far away from them, like the dream which they account as nought.'

This 'waking up' and this 'knowledge' are not, however, available to all men. 'The Pneumatici turn to God, Who is the fulfilment of the All, because they are those "whose names the Father has known from the beginning." . . . Therefore he who knows is a being from above. When he is called, he hears; he answers; he directs himself to Him who calls him and returns to Him; he apprehends how he is called. By possessing *Gnosis*, he carries out the will of Him Who called him and seeks to do what pleases Him . . . he understands as someone who makes himself free and awakes from the drunkenness wherein he lived and returns to himself.'

It will probably be clear that in this passage the religious experience of salvation is being reflectively analysed with the help of the categories of Platonism. The Socratic-Platonic *οὐδὲν ἐκὼς ἀπαρνέσθαι* is plainly taken for granted by Valentinus. The statement, which has often been repeated, that the salvation of the gnostics, because linked up with *φύσις*, was merely a cosmological process, without relation to the moral responsibility of the human being, is merely a polemical simplification. The 'turning', 'hearing', 'making oneself free', 'doing the will of God', are undoubtedly moral actions, and it is as such that they serve as a proof of 'being saved'. But (i) they are confined to those 'who come from above', that is, the Pneumatici, and (ii) their scope is radically limited because the world has been rejected, so that they have no bearing upon a man's behaviour as a social being *within* the world. And accordingly *πρόνοια* is limited to the privileged few, and is identical with their predestination. This predestination is not founded upon the will of God, and is not justified through the moral will of man. It is a given state of affairs, ontological, though not rational. *Μεθεxis* in the divine being (identity is out of the question) is limited to those who spring from the divine being, to the orbit of the divine emanation. The entire physical cosmos, and with it by far the largest number of men, have no *existence* in the strict sense.

The conception that the Christian religion is the one true philosophy, to which the old 'philosophies' are opposed as heresies, is widespread in the second century; and for pagan eclecticism, also, there is but one true philosophy; whereas the re-establishment of chairs at Athens for the four 'classical' philosophies is a very typical product of the restoration-politics of the emperors, and as such is without importance for the intellectual centres of the age, primarily Rome and Alexandria. With one exception, however: the renaissance of the Peripatos did exercise great influence, through its connection with the outstanding personality of Alexander of Aphrodisias. The two treatises composed by him *Περὶ ψυχῆς* and *Περὶ Εἰσαγωγῆς*, especially the latter, put an end to the existence of the *Stoa*, save in so far as this or that feature of its doctrine was absorbed by the new eclectic tradition. But it was above all the precise elaboration of the peripatetic ethical category of the *ἀρεταί* which furnished the anti-gnostic Christian theology with a means of placing the 'one true philosophy' upon a new foundation, thus bringing to an end the stage of confused and epigonal eclecticism.

To illustrate the eclecticism by one instance: Clement of Alexandria says (*Strom.* I. 37, end of chapter): 'By philosophy I intend neither the Stoic nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean, nor the Aristotelian; whatever has been well said by each of these sects (*αἱρέσεων*), whatever is likely to

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *op. cit.* p. 103.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. van Unnik, *op. cit.* p. 103.

<sup>8</sup> The state of *λόγος* is described with imagery taken from *Iliad* XXII, 199-201, as Quispel rightly emphasises.



impart justice accompanied by a reverent knowledge, it is this chosen part (τὸ ἐκλεκτικόν), as a whole, which I term philosophy.' Elsewhere (*Strom.* I. 50, 6) Stoicism is abandoned on account of its materialism, and Epicureanism on account of its disbelief in πρόνοια, thus limiting the choice to Platonic and Peripatetic doctrine.

### PROVIDENCE IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

But now in what way is the belief in Providence systematically defended by this eclectic Christian philosophy? Probably the *locus classicus* on this subject is Maximus Confessor, *De variis diff. locis Dionysii et Gregorii* (= Clem. Alex. *lrg.* VII, p. 224, 11 sq.). The writer describes how some persons expert in pagan wisdom put to the disciples of Pantaeus the question, 'how the Christians consider that God knows all that is (τὰ ὅντα)', the enquirers' own opinion being that He knows the rational by reason and sensibles by sense. But they replied 'that He knows neither the rational by reason, nor the sensible by sense; for one who is situated beyond realities cannot make use of realities for the apprehension of realities; no, it is as effects of His own will (ὡς ἔβη θέληματα) that He knows all realities. And they added a defence of their belief. For if He has made all things by His will . . . and if it is pious and righteous to say that God must know that which He has willed, and if it is by will that He has made each individual that has come into being (ἐκαστον τῶν γενομένων)—therefore it is as acts of His own will that God knows all things.'

No one will wish to deny that here is a specifically Christian ontology and epistemology is being formulated, and with a novel clarity and awareness. There is an evident allusion, on the one hand to Plato, *Republic* VI, 508 d sq., a passage already fundamental for Middle Platonism, and on the other hand to the transcendent God of the Gnostics, who not merely is not known by the world,<sup>9</sup> but does not know of the world. The advance beyond the view prevalent at least since Irenaeus's time among Western opponents of the Gnostics is unmistakable. Irenaeus, closely followed by Tertullian, directed all his attack against the transcendent God. The Demiurge, on the other hand (who to the Gnostics had been no more than a secondary device,<sup>10</sup> whereby they borrowed Plato's cosmology in order to account for the creation of the world), is for these upholders of the doctrine of the Church the God of whom the scriptures, mainly the Old Testament, teach. In their reply to Gnosticism these theologians therefore proceed by an appeal to the Bible, and what they have to oppose to the philosophical axiom *ex nihilo nihil fit*, is the voluntaristic conception of God's activity, derived from the Old Testament. Such a conception of God has, therefore, ever since that time been regarded as typically Judaeo-Christian.

Now, however, with Pantaeus and the catechetical school of Alexandria, the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας common to Plato and the Gnostics takes shape as the will of God. Consequently the wholly transcendent God of the Gnostics can be retained, and the creation of the world transferred to him. The connection with Christian doctrine is effected, not, as with the Western opponents of Gnosticism, through the Old Testament but through the God of the New Testament (especially of Paul and John), who knows only 'his own' and is known only by 'his own'. (This was also the inspiration of the earliest Gnostic theology.) Predestination can be understood in a voluntaristic manner; and in this way can be rescued from the hands of the Gnostics.

It is all-important to ask whether we have here a coherent 'metaphysic of the will', of the Western type. A negative answer will have to be given to this question, on the ground (a) of the structure of the argument itself, and (b) of the manner in which Clement and Origen develop this basic dogma of the Alexandrian catechetical school. The θέλημα θεοῦ is a ground of knowledge. The ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, though it is not denied, is interpreted simply as a personal force. The foundation for the conception of God as personal is, of course, Biblical. Only for its theological explication did it become necessary to draw upon the ethics and psychology of Aristotle and the Peripatos. Here and here alone, in the whole of philosophy subsequent to Socrates, had the problem of βούλησις been seen in its full extent and discussed. The Platonic οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει was subjected to criticism, but Plato's gradation of values was preserved, which is to say that psychological relativism was rejected (*E.N.* I ch. 6 and 7). Hellenistic philosophy failed to adopt the subtle Aristotelian analysis of βούλησις and its varieties, and it is only the schema of the μεσότης which plays some part (not an imposing one) in the later school tradition.

What should be emphasised for our purpose is that the Aristotelian βούλησις-concept is radically distinct from the Latin *voluntas*, coloured as this became by Stoicism. The ethics of Aristotle is neither theonomous (cf. *Eul. Eth.* 1249b14) nor autonomous, but basically eudaemonistic,

<sup>9</sup> Compare Valentinus *op. cit.* 37 and 51. It should be observed that the concept of will is entirely missing from this *Monologus negativus*. But the view of the activity of God—'He who thinks himself', etc.—coincides with Aristotle's.

<sup>10</sup> Compare Van Unnik, *op. cit.* 98. Valentinus's principal work contains no allusion whatever to a demiurge.



that is to say, directed towards the contemplative life and thus towards God. *Auctoritas* and *lex*, and hence *officium* in the Roman sense, are categories which simply cannot be adapted to it. It is an ethics of decision upon one's personal responsibility; one is responsible equally for one's own *ēxis* and for the concrete results of the decision. Just on this account it is strictly limited to the region of human action and behaviour. For man, however, the *τὸ ἐδ' ἡμῶν* is the core of the situation.<sup>17</sup> And it was Alexander who, borrowing the term *ἀρεθούσιον*, which Hellenistic philosophy had coined, demonstrated this in his crushing polemic against the Stoa. For Aristotle, in any case, transference of the concept of *βούλησις* to God could have had no meaning. It can only be meaningful for that sort of theological reflection, for which the personality of God is the primary experience. But to such religious experience it furnishes a basic conception, whereby God's personality can be assured, in opposition to the familiar arguments of the poet-philosophers and critics of the myths. The *pro* and *contra* of the discussions concerning the *vōth* of God could be ignored.

This transference, then, was the special achievement of Pantaeus or his fellow-theologians. Their dependence upon earlier Christian formulations of the Biblical teaching is evident, and Philo, too, must be borne in mind compare, e.g., *De leg. spec.* IV, 187, or *De opif. mundi*, 46). But a distinction<sup>18</sup> is necessary between (i) Philo's occasional, unsystematic use of such an expression as *ἐθέλει* or *βούλησις τοῦ θεοῦ*, or the similar expression in Galen, *de usu partium* XI, 1: *τὸ βουληθέντι τὸν θεὸν κοσμήσει τὴν αἰὶν*, ἢ δ' εὐθὺς κεκόσμηται—which comes from a Jewish or Christian source; and (ii) the deliberate procedure of Pantaeus in specifying the Platonic *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας* as the *θέλημα θεοῦ*, and thus elevating the *θέλημα θεοῦ* to an ontological principle. True, in both these cases the intention is to justify the *creatio ex nihilo*. But in (i) it is the problem of divine omnipotence that is at issue, and the special object of Galen's attack is the Stoic paradoxes, whereas in (ii) the writer is concerned with a deep-lying ontological problem, that of the relation between the divine *οὐσία* and the *οὐσία* of the world. But from a mere assertion of divine omnipotence there was no way of striking at the heart of the Gnostic theology—namely, the dogma that the Pneumatici, and only they, are predestined.

Characteristically, the Alexandrian theology not merely fails to stress the omnipotence of God, but expressly gives it up. It is sufficient to refer to Origen, *De princ.* II, 9, 1 (= p. 164: sqq. 1:

ἐν τῇ ἐπινοουμένῃ ἀρχῇ τοσούτων ἀριθμῶν τῷ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ ὑποστήναι τὸν θεὸν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, ὅσον ἡδύνατο διακρίνειν—πεπερασμένην γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ λεκτέον καὶ μὴ προφίσει εὐφημίας τὴν περιγραφὴν αὐτῆς περιμειρετέον. ἐὼν γὰρ ἡ ἀπειρος ἡ θεία δύναμις, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μηδὲ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖν· τῇ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἀπειρὸν ἀπερίληπτον· πεποιθεὶς τοῖον τοσούτου, ὅσον ἡδύνατο περιδράσθαι καὶ ἔχειν ὑπὸ χεῖρα καὶ συγκρατεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πρόνοιαν· ὥσπερ καὶ τοσούτην αἰὶν κατεσκεύασεν, ὅσην ἡδύνατο διακοσμήσαι. Perhaps this is the acme of ancient Christian Aristotelianism: the creation of the world by the *βούλημα θεοῦ* is not a proof of divine omnipotence, but of the converse: the inference is that the creator as well as the creation is *πεπερασμένος*. True to the Aristotelian doctrine, *βούλημα* is related to the sphere of *πρακτικὴ*, which, as such, cannot be infinite. And this makes it possible to graft on to a Christian theology the Aristotelian picture of a deity who is the object of his own thought. Such a deity is known to the Valentinians also (see above, note 9); but he is *ipso facto* alien to the world, as the realm of the *ἀπειρον*. Creation by a will is known also to the Roman critics of Gnosticism. But they thought that they could rely upon the Stoic concept of divine omnipotence in order to meet the Gnostic problem, whereby the world is irrational, and therefore shadowy. But in Origen's version creation by will, and the separateness, of God, are combined—it is from the 'will' of God, as he interprets it, that the rationality of the world follows. And from this premiss it was possible for the Alexandrians to subvert the Gnostic anthropology, according to which the Pneumatici are beings of a higher nature.

#### AMMONIUS AND ORIGEN

The ambitious project of a radically 'voluntaristic' metaphysics in Origen's *De principiis* can be most clearly understood, if I am not mistaken, by approaching it from the side of Aristotle's

<sup>17</sup> Anticipating my conclusion, I refer to the striking formulation of Hierocles Ammonius (Philostratus 46b32 sq.): *ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ ψυχῶν ἀνταρῶν ἢ ἀνταρῶν; ἀνταρῶν καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἡμῶν*.

<sup>18</sup> This distinction is, I think, not observed in H. A. Wolfson's great work on Philo. W. expounds Philo from the point of view of a Western 'metaphysics of will', considering him to have been its progenitor. But even a direct derivation of 'the' Christian (or, it may be, Jewish) concept of will from the Old Testament appears to me impossible. An assertion like the following, from

E. Frank, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, O.U.P. (1933), p. 174: 'In the Old Testament, however, the idea of a free moral will is indicated for the first time: If God created the world with all its laws, not because this was the best possible world, but because out of His own unfathomable volition He wanted it thus', surely goes back rather to Luther than to the text of Genesis. A date for the emergence of the whole problem seems to me to be given a *minima* Philo. Had the problem been current in Hellenistic Jewish thought, Philo's naïveté over against it would be quite incomprehensible.

*Ethics*. What he does is to elevate to the metaphysical, or, if you prefer, mythological dimension, the Aristotelian notion of the *ēfis*. The core of the system is the dialectical union between responsibility for one's own life, and fixity of the moral habits once acquired. Admittedly the Platonic components of the system, metempsychosis and so forth, are at first sight far more prominent. But they are less essential, and a notable fact is the entire absence of pictures of Hades derived from the Platonic myths; whereas the argument is dominated by the thesis that matter in general, hence the multiplicity of the cosmos, hence its origin as the world of our experience, is a function of will; i.e. both the will of individual spirits or souls, and God's ordering will. The various degrees of immersion in *śh* are, as it were, a materialisation of the *ēfis*. It is not the capacity for knowing, a capacity dependent upon each thing's situation in the scale, which determines the will, but, conversely, the moral *ēfis* determines knowledge; a trait which I would regard as, beyond doubt, genuinely Aristotelian.

Now by a comparative study of Origen's early writings with his later ones from the *De principiis* onwards, such as has been inaugurated by R. Cadiou (see above, p. 57), it becomes quite plain that this ambitious conception did not take shape without some decisive external influence. In view of the concordant testimony of Porphyry, Eusebius, and Origen himself, this can only have been Ammonius. This closes the ring of our hypothetical argument: the doctrine expounded in Hierocles' treatise exactly fills the space between the dogma of the divine will, as maintained by Pantaenus, and Origen's *De principiis*. It is a kind of first sketch of Origen's programme of *πρόνια* and *πυλῶν*. The ordering function of the divine will is explained in still more abstract and scholastic terms than in Origen. The cosmos has been created by divine will as a static system of spirits of various rank (cf. Photius, p. 461b10-31). Consistently with this, metempsychosis is limited to transition into another human form (172b21-24). By his radical application of the principle of *ἀνθρώπων* Origen shattered this. The ground of or motive for this thoroughness is obvious—the absolute denial of any 'natural' distinction among spirits, even between human and non-human.<sup>13</sup> We shall not go astray if we see, in the emphasis by the Gnostics upon the natural distinction among the spirits who occupy the various ranks of being (cf. Orig. *De princ.* 1. 8, 2 = p. 98, 8 sqq.), a last defensive reaction by them in reply to a system such as that of Hierocles and Ammonius. (For this emphasis on the unalterable distinction compare Photius, p. 461b32 sq.). Origen's radical approach has therefore a definite function in the situation of the time. And by it Gnosis as a spiritual force was in fact broken. After his *De principiis* Gnosis of all tendencies declines into unimportant conservative sects. Manes, also, is merely a syncretist, not a theologian.

There is no space here to enter into detail concerning the debt of Hierocles to Ammonius. Let us put together our result. The treatise of Hierocles professes to be a résumé of philosophy in general. Its historical part is so arranged as to culminate in two points (Photius, p. 173a5-40): firstly Plato (book 2), with whom Aristotle is brought into harmony (book 6), after it has been proved that all the ancients either coincide with Plato or are contradicted by him; and secondly Ammonius, who re-established the unity of philosophy. Ammonius comes last and has the position of honour at the end of book 6. The vigorous polemic against the orthodox Platonists and Peripatetics, which precedes this, is plainly his teaching. Book 7 begins with the exposition of Ammonius's own doctrine and ends with a history of neo-Platonism. In books 6 and 7, the name of Ammonius is immediately followed by citation from Plotinus and from the neo-Platonist Origen.

If this arrangement has any purpose, this can only be to justify the claim made by Hierocles to represent in its purity that philosophy which had been re-established by Ammonius (cf. Photius, 461a32-37). No proofs that Hierocles had before him some source, which he could assert to be a direct echo of Ammonius, are available. But his appeal not merely to Plotinus (which is natural) but to Origen the neo-Platonist, is very striking. The latter, according to all the evidence, wrote only two works, whose contents, judging from the titles, coincide with the teaching of Hierocles. Of the second of them, *Ὅτι μόνος ποιητὴς ὁ θεοῦ*, Porphyry expressly reports that it was composed in the time of Gallienus. He places it, indeed, before the commencement of Plotinus's writings, but after the publication of the *οἰκὸς* of Amelius. Since the title flatly contradicts Plotinus's teaching, it is highly probable that its object was to rectify Ammonius against innovations by Plotinus. And this again tallies with the fact that in regard to the subject in dispute Hierocles departs widely from Plotinus. There is therefore much to suggest that in his endeavour to present the teaching of Ammonius in its purity Hierocles attached himself primarily to Origen the neo-Platonist. It is possible (probable, perhaps) that this Origen was regarded in Alexandria (where

<sup>13</sup> But this does not mean that Origen abandons, as Jonas thinks (*Grund und Spätantiker Geist*, Bd. II, 1 = 191-192), the distinction between the creator-spirit, identical with the Trinity, and created spirits. His speculations concerning the imperishability of *śh* even in the eschatological condition of *ἀνθρώπων* show this

as plainly as possible (*De princ.* II, 2). That spirits have a personality which is never lost is as much an axiom for him as it is for Ammonius. Consequently, in complete contrast to Plotinus, he assigns no sort of 'creative' power to the soul. This creative power is a typically Plotinian and a fundamentally anti-Christian conception.



Ammonius would have been better known, through various indirect traditions, than at Rome or Athens) as Ammonius's prize pupil, and as an authority superior even to Plotinus and his school. The confidence of Hierocles in him is therefore well founded, unless strong reasons are produced on the other side. That Hierocles's teaching has a Christian stamp is, however, no counter-reason; it is rather a confirmation of his reliability, for there is no ground for calling in question the reports concerning the Christian descent of Ammonius and his composition of an anti-Marcionite writing. The assertion of Longinus that Ammonius wrote nothing is not a counter-argument, since Longinus himself intends it to be taken *cum grano salis* (cf. Porph. *Vit. Plot.* ed. Henry-Schwyzler, 20. 36 and 40 sqq.). Besides this it is very probable that the book was a production of his youth, which could easily have been quite unknown to the pupils he had in later years. It is probable or at least possible that Eusebius was more correctly informed about this than was Porphyry. But what is decisive is the book's subject-matter. It goes without saying that 'Christian influence' is not a category which the historian can use. The problems of Christian theology at Alexandria in the time of Hierocles are not those of creation by the will of God<sup>14</sup>; they are quite different. Hierocles can have had no conceivable ground for taking over a Christian commonplace, which had long ceased to have topical interest. In the time of Ammonius, on the other hand, this was the central problem in the Church's contest with Gnosis. And Alexandria is its centre. Moreover, the harmonising of Aristotle with Plato begins to have an urgent meaning, as a requisite of the system, when the point of departure is that of the school of Pantaeus. Never before this, never afterwards, was ancient Christian theology to such a degree compelled by the development of its own problems to strive after an ontology of the will. And, within the given philosophical tradition, this could be achieved only by attachment to Aristotle and the ethics of his school. The historical impetus was already furnished by Alexander of Aphrodisias. And he is in fact the only person, later than the classical systems, mentioned by name in Hierocles (172b10, 461b25). Certainly Hierocles (Ammonius) attacks his solution of the problem of *ἐκπύρωσις*, but that does not prove that he did not take over from him his main anthropological position, the unlimited *ἀνθρώπιον* of man.<sup>15</sup> He held it to be Aristotelian (correctly), and consequently, not less correctly in his own view, to be Platonic.

The emergency, which obliged Christian theologians to provide themselves with a *new* philosophical basis, also opened up the possibility of a Christian philosophy, and, to be precise, of a *pure*, i.e. extra-theological philosophy. It is instructive to find that a man like Ammonius took advantage of this, in the then state of church politics at Alexandria. The treatise of Hierocles undoubtedly has some pagan features, loosely attached to it indeed. Whether, considering the double breach of tradition by Origen the neo-Platonist, who was certainly not a Christian, and by Hierocles, anything follows from this about the opinions of Ammonius, I do not venture to decide. In any case the substance of the system, precisely on account of the Aristotelian impress which is so evident, is considerably nearer to Christianity than Plotinus is. Thus it would not be incorrect to characterise the position of Ammonius as that of a secularised Christian philosopher. Plotinus is not free from traits of an anti-Christian resentment. Porphyry is *the* foe of the Christians. The description of the greater part of theology after Origen as 'neo-Platonic' is in part empty, and in part nonsensical, since the neo-Platonic school from Plotinus onwards was in intention anti-Christian. There are detailed connections upon which a decisive judgment could only be pronounced if we knew more of the school of Ammonius at Alexandria in the third century. For the late Latin theologians (Ambrose and above all Augustine), the part played by Plotinus and Porphyry is considerable. Such influence upon the Greek fathers has yet to be demonstrated.<sup>16</sup>

H. LANGERBECK.

*Nad Homburg v. d. Höhe.*

<sup>14</sup> An illustration of this is the way in which Nemesius III. 6a, applies Ammonius's doctrine concerning the *ἕνωσις* of body and soul to the Christological problem of his own day.

<sup>15</sup> For Ammonius's use of Alexander, a key passage is Nemesius III. 58 ~ Alex. *de anima* 14. 23, compare also Plotinus IV. 20, 13 sqq.

<sup>16</sup> This article was already in the press when H. Dörrie's paper *Ammonius der Lehrer Plotins* (Hermes, 1955, pp. 438-77) was published, so that it has not been possible to take account of it. A discussion of its entirely different conclusions would have been a lengthy process.



## ARISTOTLE'S ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΤΩΝ

As regards Aristotle's *Περὶ φυτῶν* ἄβ mentioned in Diog. Laert.'s list (nr. 108), Alexander's statement is decisive: . . . ἔστι περὶ φυτῶν Θεοφράστῳ πραγματεία γεγραμμένη. 'Αριστοτέλους γὰρ οὐ φέρεται,<sup>1</sup> and though Simplicius and others occasionally refer to a *πραγματεία περὶ φυτῶν*<sup>2</sup> there is no indication that they ever saw the book with their own eyes.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle's treatise *On Plants*, therefore, seems to have disappeared at an early date, and since the quotations in Antigonius, Athenaeus and others<sup>4</sup> are concerned with insignificant details, they cannot give any hint as to its contents.

It has often been asked whether there exists any relation between this lost treatise and the two books *Περὶ φυτῶν* which are incorporated into all editions of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (pp. 814-830 Bk.), but the question has never received a definite answer. There are good reasons for this reticence, for though these books were identified more than a century ago as a work of Nicolaus of Damascus, the text is in such a deplorable condition that it seemed to resist every attempt at interpretation. However, since in 1841 E. H. F. Meyer published the Arabic-Latin translation made by Alfred of Sareshel<sup>5</sup> (the exemplar of the clumsy Greek rendering which was already known), the material has considerably increased.

In 1893 Steinschneider's study of medieval Hebrew translations<sup>6</sup> revealed the existence of a Hebrew translation made from the Arabic by Qalonymos ben Qalonymos in 1314. More important was the discovery of a MS. of the Arabic translation by Bouyges in 1923.<sup>7</sup> The Arabic text has twice been published since then.<sup>8</sup> Finally a few scattered fragments of a Syriac translation turned up in the Cambridge MS. Gg. 2.14, together with the translation of Nicolaus' *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας*, and a brief but valuable excerpt of Bk. i in Syriac is found in Bar Hebraeus's *Candelabrum Sanctorum*.<sup>9</sup> There still is no evidence as to the Greek text, and the situation at the present time may be summed up as follows:

S. The fragments of the Syriac translation consist of a series of dislocated sentences from the first book. They are contained in a single leaf of the Cambridge MS. (f. 383), which, moreover, is mutilated. Neither the translator nor the date can be identified.

B. Bar Hebraeus's excerpt was possibly made from the Syriac. Some quotations appear to be literal.

A. The unique MS. of the Arabic translation (made by Ishāq ibn Humayn, c. 900, presumably after the Syriac) is badly preserved and towards the end there is a lacuna of four pages.

H. The Hebrew translation is a word for word rendering of the Arabic. It may be used *cautis in partem*, but its exemplar often had the same mistakes as the Arabic MS.

L. Alfred's Latin translation is very unsatisfactory, but Meyer's text can be improved (some successful emendations have been made by Bussemaker in the Didot edition).

G. The Greek rendering of Alfred's text is negligible.

During the Middle Ages the Latin version was widespread and its popularity is attested by numerous MSS. (c. 150) and several commentaries (e.g. Albertus Magnus). However, it was printed but once by Gregorius de Gregoriis (Venice 1496) and afterwards it was superseded by G. In the sixteenth century this Greek version made a successful entry, but the enthusiasm first created by the 'discovery' of an unknown work by Aristotle was soon disturbed by J. C. Scaliger's vehement criticism.<sup>10</sup> In a tedious dialogue this valiant censor indiscriminately attacked both the bad Greek and the incoherence of the contents, and ever since most conclusions as to the nature of the book have been founded upon its alleged spuriousness. Meyer, for instance, dismissed the possibility that the extant text (of which he knew the versions L and G only<sup>11</sup>) had anything to do with Aristotle's *Π.φ.* Its composition is confused; discussions of important matters are swamped and

<sup>1</sup> Alex. in *De sensu*, p. 166. 11.

<sup>2</sup> The instances are collected by Heitz, *Fragm. Arist.* (In Didot's *Aristoteles* iv, Paris 1838), pp. 112 ff.

Heitz, p. 164a.

<sup>3</sup> Arist. *Fragm.* ed. Rose 267-78.

<sup>4</sup> E. H. F. Meyer, *Nicolaus Damascenus De plantis libri duo Aristotelis saepe adscripti*. Leipzig 1841.

<sup>5</sup> M. Steinschneider, *Die Hebräischen Uebers. d. A. A., etc.*, pp. 140-1.

<sup>6</sup> M. Bouyges, S. J., *Sur la de Plantis d'Aristote-Nicolas d'après d'un manuscrit arabe de Constantinople* in: *Mélanges de l'École St. Joseph*, Beyrouth ix, 2 (1929), pp. 71-89.

<sup>7</sup> A. J. Arberry, *An early Arabic translation from the Greek*,

Cairo 1933-4; A. Badawi, *Aristotelis De anima &c. (Islamica 16)*, Cahirae 1934.

<sup>8</sup> Ed. J. Balout in *Patrol. Orient.* xxiv fasc. 5, Paris 1933, pp. 320-5. See also *Patr. Or.* xxii fasc. 4, Paris 1930, p. 502. Other works by Bar Hebraeus which are as yet unpublished may contain more references.

<sup>9</sup> J. C. Scaliger, *In libros de Plantis Aristotelis inscriptas commentarii*. Genev. Crispin. 1566; the book has often been reprinted.

<sup>10</sup> Meyer's edition of L (see n. 5), based upon three MSS. only, is insufficient: his emendations are often misleading and his notes are somewhat sketchy, but his preface is interesting, especially because he had profited greatly by the expert advice of the Orientalist Gustav Flügel.

obliterated by perplexing excursions on alien topics, and several statements are at variance with each other. Therefore, he argued, Nicolaus's work cannot be a commentary on or abbreviation of an Aristotelian treatise, but it ought to be considered as a rash compilation from various sources: instances from Aristotle or Theophrastus, combined with excerpts from an unknown collection of *phacita* on plants by Presocratic authors, etc. Zeller<sup>12</sup> decided that the work was 'entschieden unaristotelisch', but he believed it to be 'ein überarbeitender Auszug' from Nicolaus's book. Maurice Croiset was even disinclined to accept the authorship of Nicolaus,<sup>13</sup> while, on the other hand, his brother Alfred went so far as to assert: 'Bien que le traité des Plantes, sous sa forme actuelle, n'ait pas été écrit par Aristote, il n'est pas douteux qu'on y retrouve sa pensée.'<sup>14</sup>

Recently published material has made a new approach possible. For in the first place the major part of the Arabic translation is now available. Arberry and Badawi (see n. 8) have corrected the faulty text of the MS. with the help of L and the Greek parallels quoted in Meyer's notes. But Meyer's collection can easily be enlarged and a collation of H, S and B is still needed.

The most important clue to the understanding of the whole work, viz. its title, has been neglected by HL. It is found in A:

*The Book of Aristotle on Plants—a commentary of Nicolaus—translation of Ishāq ibn Hunayn with corrections by Thābit ibn Qurra.*

This title is nearly *verbatim* quoted by Hāggī Khalifa,<sup>15</sup> and the entry in his bibliography served as one of the starting-points for Meyer's identification.<sup>16</sup>

Though the only extant copy of the Syriac translation of Nicolaus's *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους φαισσοφίας*<sup>17</sup> is incomplete, and the MS. is in a mutilated condition, it gives a valuable insight into Nicolaus's habits. The copy is written by a scribe who has carelessly abbreviated the extended text. Some parts appear to be fairly well preserved, e.g. the first half of Bk. i (on *Physics*), the first and, presumably, the last page of Bk. ii (on *Metaph.*; the rest of the book is lost), and above all Bk. vi (on *Meteor.* i-iii), but more often the scribe has contented himself with copying sometimes a few chapters, and sometimes unconnected sentences, and even they are often truncated. Nevertheless most of the fragments show the same kind of treatment of the Aristotelian text: the argument is condensed, the construction of the sentences has been changed and some terms are replaced by others. In Greek only one example of this kind of interpretation has been preserved: Simplicius (*de Caelo*, p. 399.2 ff.) quotes a passage from Nicolaus's *Compendium* which shows him at his best: a difficult text of Aristotle has been abridged, simplified and interpreted at the same time. But this may be an exceptional case, for the Syriac translation is there to prove that the text has often been so much curtailed that Aristotle's meaning is inadequately rendered. Moreover, Nicolaus appears not to have aimed at completion; his *compendia* consist of *capita selecta*, and he hardly gives any outlines of lengthy discussions, but usually contents himself with a superficial survey of their conclusions.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, Nicolaus strictly adheres to the doctrines of the Peripatetic school and he is not influenced by Stoic or neo-Platonic tenets. In fact, his *compendia* are in many respects reminiscent of the oldest extant fragment of a Peripatetic commentary on *De Gen. et Corr.* which has been inserted into Ocellus Lucanus,<sup>19</sup> and there is even some reason to suppose that this much-disputed fragment may have been due to him.<sup>20</sup>

If, therefore, the *Book on Plants* is what its Arabic title claims it to be—a commentary of Nicolaus on an Aristotelian treatise—the lidgety character of its text cannot be used as damaging evidence, for this appears to be due to Nicolaus's shallow method of compiling. The analogy with the *Compendium* is still closer, for there is another marked feature of Nicolaus's method: his habit of adducing parallel or kindred passages from every possible part of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, or even from other Peripatetic authors (in the first place from Theophrastus). In the first book of the *Compendium* (on *Physics*), for instance, the opening chapter of the *Phys.* (i. 1) *περὶ ἀρχῶν* is combined with *Metaph.* I 1,<sup>21</sup> and in other cases several passages are put together.

Most remarkable is Nicolaus's *Compendium* of *Meteor.* iv (= Bk. vii). It has little in common with the Aristotelian book, for it starts with some excerpts on stones and metals from *Meteor.* iii

<sup>12</sup> *Gesch. d. Gr. Philos.* ii. 22, p. 381, n. 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Hist. d. L. Litt. Gr.* 4. (Paris 1890), p. 101 f.

<sup>14</sup> *Hist. d. L. Litt. Gr.* 19. (Paris 1893), p. 719. See for other judgments Bouyges loc. cit. (cf. n. 7), pp. 71 ff.

<sup>15</sup> *Lexicon Bibliographicum*, ed. G. Flügel, Vol. v. London 1890, p. 162, n. 10784.

<sup>16</sup> See Meyer *op. cit.* p. xii.

<sup>17</sup> MS., Cambridge-Syriac Gg. 2. 13.

<sup>18</sup> This shallowness may have been the reason why even the industrious Simplicius does not mention his *Compendium* anywhere else.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. R. Harder, *Ocellus Lucanus, N. Ph. A.* 1, Berlin 1926: text p. 15, 23-19.23. On pp. 97-111 Harder discusses its merits and its obvious shortcomings.

<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately the relevant chapters in the Syriac Nicolaus are nearly lost, but the *exiguus remanens* corresponds with the Ocellus fragment.

<sup>21</sup> Several chapters of *Metaph.* A are scattered over Nicolaus *Phys.* and *Metaph.* and Averroes has censured him for this procedure. See Averroes *Tafsir mā ba'd al-falṣṣat*, ed. Bouyges, pp. 475.3 ff.



(6.378a15 ff.) and continues with a mixture of instances concerning stones and metals drawn from Aristotle and Theophrastus. In the *Book on Plants* the second half of Bk. i (from ch. 3 on) has been composed in a similar way. It starts with Aristotelian and Theophrastean passages on parts of plants, and continues with a confusing compilation of the first books of Theophrastus's *H.P.*<sup>22</sup> A translation of the *initium* of this chapter (*De Pl.* i. 3) follows here:<sup>23</sup>

60(a) *Some trees contain gum, such as resin, almond-gum, myrrh, frankincense and gum-arabic.*  
(b) *And some trees have fibres,<sup>24</sup> veins, core,<sup>25</sup> wood, bark and marrow within.<sup>26</sup>* (c) *And some trees have several barks, (d) and in some their fruit is under their pellicles.<sup>27</sup>*

61(a) *Some parts of the tree are simple, (b) such as the moisture found in it, and the fibres<sup>28</sup> and veins.* (c) *Some parts are composed out of these things, (d) such as the other parts of trees, viz. the branches, the twigs and the like.*

62(a) *All these things are not found in all plants, (b) but some have these parts and others not.* (c) *Plants have other parts as well, (d) such as roots, stems,<sup>29</sup> leaves, branches and twigs, (e) and flowers, buds, tendrils(?)<sup>30</sup> and the rind<sup>31</sup> which encloses the fruit.*

63(a) *Just as in animals there are members <dis>similar<sup>32</sup> in parts, so it is also with plants.* (b) *Every single <composite><sup>33</sup> part of plants corresponds with every single member of animals,* (c) *since the bark of plants corresponds to the skin of animals, (d) the root of plants to the mouth<sup>34</sup> of animals (e) and their fibres<sup>35</sup> to the muscles of animals.* (f) *And so it is with their other parts as well.<sup>36</sup>*

64(a) *Each of these parts is divided in one way into similar parts, and it may <also><sup>37</sup> be divided into dissimilar parts.* [(b) *Ironwood and a flinted in one way into particles of earth only, and in another way into water and earth.*] (c) *And flesh is divided so that its particles are flesh, and it is divided otherwise into elements [or roots<sup>38</sup>].* (d) *A hand cannot be divided into other hands, nor the root into other roots, nor a leaf into leaves, (e) but in the root and the leaf there is a composition.*

65(a) *As to fruits some are composed of few parts, others of many, such as the olive, (b) because the olive has four layers: its skin, its flesh, its stone and its seed.<sup>39</sup>* (c) *And some fruits have three layers.*

66(a) *All seeds are provided with two pellicles. (b) And the parts of plants are those we have mentioned.*

A full discussion of this text must be reserved for a future edition, and I must restrict myself to a few notes. The §§60, 62 and 63 (printed in italics) are clearly of Theophrastean origin. 60(a) corresponds to the enumeration of gums in *H.P.* ix. 1. 2: gum, resin; 3: almond-gum; 4: myrrh, frankincense. Gum-arabic see 10. 60(b). In *H.P.* i. 1. 2 we find *fibres, veins, wood, bark, flesh and core* (μήτρα). *And marrow within*: τρίτον ἀπὸ τοῦ φλοιῷ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς ὅσσοις μυελός. 60(c) cf. *H.P.* i. 5. 2 καὶ τῶν μὲν πολυλόπων. 60(d) is not clear.

62(a)-(b) cf. *H.P.* i. 1. 10. The examples are found in i. 1. 11: *root, stem, branch, twig, leaf, flower*. As to *buds*, cf. i. 2. 1 βρόβον (*calyx*, Hort); *tendril*: ἄξ (see n. 29). The *rind which encloses the fruit* may be a circumscription of the περικάρπιον. 63 is a scanty compilation of *H.P.* i. 10. 10-11. 1.

The other sections presumably contain fragments of a chapter on the parts of plants in Aristotle's *P.A.* The ἀπλά of 61(a) are opposed to the σύνθετα in 61(c) in the same way as in *H.A.* i. 1. 386a5-7 and *P.A.* ii. 1. 647a1-2 (ἀπλά καὶ ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ ὁμοιομερῆ). §61(b): In the case of plants Aristotle's division may have been similar to that in *P.A.* ii. In the case of animals he mentions *blood, fibres (= fibrine),lard, suet, marrow, brain, flesh and bones*. In plants *moisture* would be analogous to blood, while the other 'parts' of moist nature are wanting. *Flesh and bones* are replaced by *fibres and veins*. Of the σύνθετα in 61(d) *branches and twigs* were also quoted in 62(d). The repetition would be awkward, unless we assume that the two sentences were derived from different sources.

The observations quoted in §63 are so typical for Aristotle's conception of the analogy between parts of animals and those of plants,<sup>40</sup> that their Aristotelian origin is well-nigh self-evident. Moreover, a discussion of this subject is promised in *De Longae.* 6. 467b4, where the analogy of μέζα-στόμα (63d) is mentioned.

<sup>22</sup> The roughness of the translation is aggravated by numerous corruptions, esp. in transcribed Greek words.

<sup>23</sup> I quote the sections according to my own numbering.

<sup>24</sup> See S. Lind. *AHL*.

<sup>25</sup> SH, et ceterum L, om. A. <sup>26</sup> medallum L, flesh *AHL*.

<sup>27</sup> . . . ] inside the rind of their fruits under their skin (?) S, pellicle inter ceterum et lignum L.

<sup>28</sup> fibres S (= κινδύς), twigs *AHL*.

<sup>29</sup> calumbulites *AHL* (= Fluss Meyer, p. 64).

<sup>30</sup> S, bark *AHL*.

<sup>31</sup> My conjecture: homonymous members is nonsense.

<sup>32</sup> L, om. *AHL*

<sup>33</sup> HL, flesh A.

<sup>34</sup> B (p. 321) adds: *stems, branches, twigs ~ arms and legs; leaves, flowers, buds ~ hairs and feathers; fruits ~ the young of animals; rind ~ membrane or eggskin.* <sup>35</sup> LH, om. A.

<sup>36</sup> and root A, no doubt a gloss. It adds: *and it is no more divided into another division.*

<sup>37</sup> S: the fourth is the shell outside which the seeds is, and the seed is the fifth inside those.

<sup>38</sup> See, in general, K. Strömberg *Theophrastus, Studien z. Botanischen Begriffsbildung*, Göteborg 1937, p. 28, etc. W. K. Krack in *Abhandl. S. II* x (1932), pp. 251-62. Theophrastus was usually very reticent in this matter. See Strömberg, p. 51; Krack, p. 258 f.





36(c)–38: When the interpolation is removed the fragment of Empedocles has: 'Plants show a combination of the male and female, for of all kinds of plants the male is that which is hard and rigid, and the female is weak and full of fruits.' The only possible interpretation appears to be that Empedocles assumed the pistil (*hard and rigid*) and the ovary (*weak and full of fruits*) to be analogous to the genitals of animals.<sup>40</sup> This means that he misunderstood the function of the stamina, and thought a single organ to be the combination of two different ones. The important thing, however, is that he was the first to hint at bisexuality in plants.<sup>41</sup>

It would be unfair to make Nicolaus responsible for the perplexing interpolations which have made his work unreadable. Here, too, a comparison with the Syriac translation of the *Compendium* is illuminating, for that text is likewise frequently interspersed with similar interpolations. In the first part of the Cambridge MS. they are indicated with the word *nūthorō* (= *scholium*); later on they are encircled with a tiny line, but in the final part every indication is wanting. Therefore it is obvious that some Syriac scholar has provided the text of the translation with copious glosses and notes quoted from material which happened to be at hand.<sup>42</sup> Presumably these scholia were much condensed<sup>43</sup> and difficult to read, so that they marred the understanding of the text in which they were eventually incorporated. The Syriac fragment of the book on plants (S) clearly shows that the interpolations which I have indicated above were already there. This suggests that the Arabic version must have been made from the Syriac. Its abstruse character seems mainly due to the zeal of some ignoramus who spoiled the coherence of the Syriac text with a vain display of second-hand knowledge, so that even a competent scholar like Ishāq ibn Ḥumayn must often have been at a loss to grasp the meaning of the exemplar he used. The lack of understanding on the part of the scribes did the rest.

In the Cambridge MS. the book on plants follows the excerpts of the *Libri de Animalibus*,<sup>44</sup> and it is reasonable to suppose that it originally belonged to the series of excerpts contained in the *Compendium*. If this be true, it means that Nicolaus knew a copy of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in which the treatise *Περὶ φυτόν* was still extant,<sup>45</sup> and that his book on plants was no separate book at all. On this assumption the fact that Nicolaus's work is never mentioned in Greek literature (which, at least, has provided us with many titles of Nicolaus's philosophical works) finds an easy explanation: it was part of a book which was not read. On the other hand, this particular section of the *Compendium* may have been separately translated by Ishāq because no other information on Aristotle's *Περὶ φυτόν* was available in his time.

For a reason which will appear presently, the first sentence of Nicolaus's book is interesting. It runs as follows:

- i. (a) Life exists in animals and in plants, (b) but the life of animals is evident and manifest, and the life of plants is hidden and obscure.

The synonyms *evident and manifest, hidden and obscure* are no doubt due to the Arabic translator, according to a well-known habit, and the Greek may have had single terms. Meyer (p. 47) failed to find an exact parallel in Aristotle. He compares *H.A.* viii. 1 (which has recently been claimed for Theophrastus) and *P.A.* iv. 5. 681a12: 'Nature passes in a continuous gradation from lifeless things to animals, and on the way there are living things, which are not actually animals, with the result that the difference seems infinitesimal' (tr. Peck). We may infer that Aristotle may well have contrasted animal life, which is at once obvious, because animals can move, with the motionless way of living of plants.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that Aristotle did not always assume that life is fundamentally the same in animals and plants. In *Top.* vi. 10 he attacks the sophist Dionysius for having given a definition applying to both kinds of life: the lives of plants and of animals. Aristotle argues, are homonymous and a general definition can only be given of synonyms (148a29) ἡ ζῷον αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα μὲν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἑτέρα δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει. But elsewhere, e.g. *E.N.* i. 9. 1097b33, we read that 'the mere act of living is not peculiar to men, but appears to be shared even by plants', though 'the latter's vital activity' is confined to nutrition and growth (tr. Rackham). See *De An.* ii. 1. 412a13: 'Of natural bodies some possess life and some not: where by life we mean the power of self-nourishment and of independent growth and decay' (tr. Hicks:

<sup>40</sup> Empedocles was, as far as I know, the first to discover the principle of homology, cf. 36c.

<sup>41</sup> This hypothesis needed twenty centuries to be formulated again (Nehemiah Grew in 1667).

<sup>42</sup> Nearly all the *scholia* to *Metaph.* are derived from a Syriac version of Olympiodorus. I have not yet discovered the source of all the others, but a few quotations from Syriac authors in a curtailed form make it clear that the scholiast was Oriental, and that the notes were not translated from the Greek exemplar.

<sup>43</sup> This may be seen from instances quoted from texts which are still extant. Parts of a kind of scrapbook, such as the Scholiaz may have used, are preserved in the Paris MS. B.N. Syr. 246.

<sup>44</sup> The *initium* of the *St.* on *Pl.* in Syriac is lost, so that neither title nor book number are available.

<sup>45</sup> Nicolaus must have had remarkable resources, for he has also drawn attention to Theophrastus's *Metaph.* which was unknown even to Hermippus and Andronikos.

ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίωσιν). This is explained in 413a22 ff.: the term *life* is used in various senses (πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου), but plants share in it.

In this connection a passage in Plotinus is important. In his treatise *On Happiness* (*Enn.* i. 4) he frequently returns to the problem whether animals and plants share in happiness. The problem is also touched upon in *De Pl.* (Anaxagoras). In the following passage several instances quoted above are combined: (Bréhier I, p. 72.18) πολλαχῶς τοῦτον τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης (*De An.* 413a22) καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχούσης κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἐφεξῆς (*P.A.* iv. 3 ~ *H.A.* viii. 1), καὶ ὁμωνύμως τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου—ἄλλως μὲν τοῦ φυτοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου (Ἰσρ., vi. 10)—καὶ τρανότητι καὶ ἀμυδρότητι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχόντων (*De Pl.* i. 16)—ἀνάλογον δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ, κτλ. Aristotle had probably not used the rare words *τρανότης* and *ἀμυδρότης*, which may be a transposition of Plotinus into a more refined language (*cf.* vi. 3, Bréhier VI. 1, p. 133.21 ὡς ζωῆς ἥ μὲν τις ἀμυδρά, ἥ δ' ἐμυγεστέρα), but since the rest of the sentence contains obvious reminiscences of the most important Aristotelian statements on *life*, it seems likely that the last one was also taken from the same author, viz. from his *Περὶ φυτῶν*. This seems to imply that Plotinus had still access to that treatise, or to Nicolaus's commentary.

In this brief study I have tried to give a few interpretations of a treatise which has often been considered to be the least satisfactory of the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Though we have to cope with distorted Oriental sources, not to mention their crabbed Western renderings, there still are, in my opinion, possibilities of discovering various fragments of Aristotle's *Περὶ φυτῶν*, a book which has always been counted among the lost works of the Stagirite, though parts of it may have always been there.

H. J. DROSSAART LULOFS.

Emmen (D), Holland.

■ No doubt = ζῆσθαι as opposed to *man*.



## LE TEXTE D'ARISTOTE *PHYSIQUE* H, 1-3 DANS LES VERSIONS ARABO-LATINES

DANS un travail déjà ancien<sup>1</sup> nous avons attiré l'attention sur l'intérêt que présentait pour l'histoire de la constitution du texte de la *Physique* d'Aristote la traduction arabo-latine de ce traité attribuée à Michel Scot ou à son école, et jointe, dans les éditions du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, comme dans les mss., à la version latine du Commentaire d'Averroès. En conclusion de cette étude nous avons appuyé—peut-être un peu trop—sur la parenté du texte dont dérive la version arabo-latine avec celui du cod. E, le meilleur des mss. de Bekker. Sir David Ross, à qui ces pages sont offertes en hommage, a repris les données fournies par notre travail, mais a été amené par une étude plus minutieuse des leçons en présence, à modifier ou à redresser nos conclusions.<sup>2</sup> Il juge que le texte auquel remonte la version se trouve à peu près à mi-chemin entre celui de E et celui du groupe des autres mss. principaux de la *Physique*.

Notre travail antérieur ne portait que sur les quatre premiers livres de la *Physique*. Nous voudrions entreprendre ici un travail analogue sur une base à la fois plus étroite et plus large. Nous nous limiterons tout d'abord aux trois premiers chapitres du texte secondaire du livre VII de la *Physique*. Mais au lieu d'en examiner une seule version arabo-latine, nous en rapprocherons les deux versions médiévales faites sur l'arabe, lesquelles remontent respectivement au XII<sup>e</sup> et au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle : dans la mesure où elles convergent elles pourront nous renseigner ainsi en même temps sur certaines caractéristiques du texte arabe dont elles dépendent et par là sur la teneur du texte grec dont dérive en dernière analyse ce texte arabe.

On sait que dans le livre VII de la *Physique*, les trois premiers chapitres se présentent sous une double forme, dont l'existence dès l'antiquité nous est attestée par Simplicius et qu'on distingue sous les dénominations de texte principal et de texte secondaire. C'est ce dernier que, par la force des choses, nous avons dû prendre comme terme de comparaison avec la version arabo-latine, vu que c'est lui qui se trouve à la base de cette version, à l'état absolument pur d'ailleurs, comme nous avons pu le constater. Ce texte secondaire présente, d'autre part, l'avantage d'avoir été de beaucoup le plus répandu des deux : on le retrouve dans la très grosse majorité des mss. grecs et en particulier dans la plupart des mss. importants qui ont servi de base à Bekker et à Ross pour leurs éditions de la *Physique*, savoir EFK de Bekker-Ross et J de Ross (H ne donne le texte secondaire que jusqu'à 244b19 et I jusqu'à 245b24). On ne s'étonnera pas, dans ces conditions, que ce soit ce même texte secondaire qui a été traduit dans les versions latines médiévales faites sur le grec (traduction de Jacques de Venise au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, dite *translatio vetus*, et révision de Guillaume de Moerbeke vers 1260, dite *nova translatio*).

Un mot sur les versions arabo-latines : la première est due à Gérard de Crémone (†1187)<sup>3</sup> et n'est conservée que dans cinq mss. qui en donnent le texte complet ou à peu près complet. Je possède une copie du texte et une collation de ces cinq mss. faite en vue de l'édition du traité dans l'*Aristoteles Latinus*<sup>4</sup> ; j'ai pu disposer, de plus, de la copie nouvelle faite du meilleur des mss. (Aoste, Bibl. Seminarii, Ar. Lat. n° 1269) par M. l'abbé Mogenet, qui a bien voulu se charger de l'édition.

L'autre version arabo-latine accompagne celle du grand commentaire d'Averroès sur la *Physique*, l'une et l'autre version étant attribuées généralement à Michel Scot et datant ainsi du premier tiers du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle.<sup>5</sup> On en trouve le texte dans les nombreuses éditions d'Averroès du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.<sup>6</sup> De plus, j'ai utilisé une copie du VII<sup>e</sup> livre de la *Physique* faite sur le ms. Paris B.N. lat. 16, 141, qui en donne les deux traductions arabo-latines à côté de celle de Jacques de Venise. Malheureusement ce ms. (sigle P) présente pour la version de Michel Scot un texte fort médiocre, plus mauvais que celui des éditions ; d'autre part, il est toujours à craindre que dans celles-ci le texte ait été amélioré parfois de façon arbitraire. Quand il s'agit d'additions ou d'omissions au

<sup>1</sup> Étude critique sur le texte de la *Physique* d'Aristote (L I-IV). L'utilisation de la version arabo-latine jointe au Commentaire d'Averroès, dans *Rev. de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire anciennes*, n° XLVII, 1923, pp. 3-41.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristotle's Physics. A revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, by W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1936), Introduction, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup> Voir *Aristoteles Latinus. Codices* de G. Lacombe, A. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, Act. Franceschini. Paris (Paris, 1939). Præfatio, n° 151, p. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Ces mss. sont les suivants : Aoste, Bibl. Seminarii, une miniature (*Aristoteles Latinus*, 1269), s. XIII inconnu, Murcuzum lat. C. VI, 37 (*Ar. Lat.* 1598), s. XIV ; Parisus B.N. lat. 16, 141 (*Ar. Lat.* 573), s. XIII ; *Vindobonensis Bibl.*

*Nat.* 234 (*Ar. Lat.* 96), s. XIII ; *Vindobonensis Bibl. Nat.* 2413 (*Ar. Lat.* 105), s. XIII. Les leçons propres à certains de ces mss. ne seront pas citées dans la suite de ce travail ; pour la partie qui nous intéresse, les variantes qu'ils présentent entre eux se traduisent immédiatement comme des fautes ou des erreurs dues aux copistes du texte latin.

<sup>5</sup> Voir *Ar. Latinus. Codices*. Pars prior, Præfatio, n° 105, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> J'ai employé les éditions suivantes : Lugduni, apud Jacobum Grynæum, 1542 ; Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1550 (vol. 4) ; Venetiis, apud Cominum de Tridino, Manu-ferrati, 1560 (vol. 3).

regard du texte grec courant, la version de Gérard de Crémone de même que le Commentaire d'Averroès, peut servir de contrôle dans une certaine mesure.

De plus, nous avons pu collationner partiellement le texte de P avec les bons mss. suivants: *Vaticana lat.* 2076, s.XIII (*Ar. Lat.* 1836), *Vat. lat.* 2077, s.XIII<sup>ex</sup> et XIV<sup>in</sup>. (*Ar. Lat.* 1837), jusqu'à 242 a 32, ainsi que *Paris B.N. lat.* 14. 385, s.XIII<sup>ex</sup> (*Ar. Lat.* 634), *Paris B.N. lat.* 17. 453, s.XIII, savoir de 1243 (*Ar. Lat.* 654), ms. de toute première valeur, *Paris B.N. lat.* 16. 159, s.XIII (*Ar. Lat.* 603), jusqu'à 242 a 9.

L'utilisation de ces divers moyens de contrôle a permis de constater qu'un usage prudent et critique du texte des éditions fournissait en général des données suffisamment sûres pour le but que nous nous proposons.

On sait, d'autre part, en quelles étroites limites un rapprochement entre un texte grec et une version latine dérivée de l'arabe peut être fructueux. La traduction de l'original à travers l'intermédiaire d'une langue sémitique: l'arabe, et probablement de deux: le syriaque dont dérive l'arabe, fait disparaître bon nombre de nuances du grec, bouleverse bien souvent la construction de la phrase. De la sorte, sauf dans certains cas exceptionnels, on ne peut guère accorder de valeur aux particules de liaison qui figurent dans le texte latin pour déterminer quelles conjonctions elles présupposent dans le grec. Il n'y a guère que les substantifs, les adjectifs et les verbes, présentant un sens bien net, qui donneront lieu à des comparaisons significatives. Plus significatives encore seront les omissions et additions de quelque étendue, d'autant que, dans le cas présent, la concordance des deux versions arabo-latines permettra de constater qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un accident fortuit et tardif dans la transmission des textes, et que, dans le cas d'additions, il ne s'agit pas de gloses ou d'interpolations provenant du Commentaire d'Averroès.<sup>7</sup>

Une étude rapide des deux versions parallèles fait apparaître, en outre, que celle de Gérard de Crémone, plus verbeuse et d'apparence moins littérale que celle de Michel Scot, use de tournures et de périphrases qui seraient supposer au premier abord un texte différent de celui que nous lisons, alors qu'il s'agit de purs procédés de traduction, commandés, à ce qu'il semble, par la difficulté de rendre en syriaque ou en arabe la pensée exprimée dans l'original. Tels sont: l'emploi répété de la construction: *non est . . . nisi . . .* pour rendre une simple affirmation qu'on retrouve dans la proposition subordonnée amenée par *nisi*. Encore: *quod est quia*, répondant à un *γὰρ* ou à un *ἐπεὶ* du grec.

D'autres tournures sont peut-être encore plus déroutantes, mais on se rend plus facilement compte qu'elles trahissent seulement l'effort, peut-être maladroit, du traducteur arabe mis en peine d'exprimer en sa langue la pensée exprimée dans le grec, quand on constate que Gérard de Crémone est rejoint par Michel Scot. Ainsi dès les premières lignes du livre (241b28) on s'aperçoit que *ὅψ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι* est rendu dans les deux versions par une formule négative, qui n'en est d'ailleurs pas l'équivalent exact au point de vue de la pensée: *non mouetur ab aliquo*. Et cela continue ainsi dans la suite avec des ajustements plus ou moins heureux.<sup>8</sup>

Tout cela est à négliger dans notre étude qui porte uniquement sur la traduction du texte. De même les erreurs de traduction qu'on peut relever par-ci par-là dans nos versions arabo-latines, quand on s'aperçoit que ces erreurs proviennent d'une mauvaise intelligence du texte grec traditionnel et non d'une lecture différente de ce texte.

Ceci dit, nous pouvons procéder à notre examen des particularités des versions arabo-latines qui ont quelque intérêt pour l'histoire du texte. Dans nos notations à ce sujet, nous emploierons les sigles courants EFHIJK pour désigner les mss. grecs utilisés par Bekker-Ross; G désignera la version de Gérard de Crémone; M celle de Michel Scot.

A relever d'abord que le texte arabe utilisé par les deux traducteurs n'est pas exactement le même.

Omissions dans M vis-à-vis de G:

241b31: ΔΕΖ] Δ om EM.

242a3: οὐκ Spengel Ross αὐτοῦ E τοῦ FHIJK illa res illud G om M.

242b33: αὐτὸ omper G om M.

243a23-24: οὐ δ' ἐστὶ ἀλλὰ κινεῖσθαι τετραγῶν κινεῖται eius autem quod ab alio mouetur motus secundum quatuor est motus G, om M.

243a24: ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός immo per uiam accidenus G om M.

243b27: καὶ οὗτοι τῶν συμμάτων ἢ ἐκπρινοῦν ἢ ληπτικαὶ εἶσι et que sunt expulsio ex corporibus aut tractina G om M.

243b28: γὰρ quod est quia G om M.

243b29: καὶ πᾶσα—καὶ διακρίσις om KM habet G.

<sup>7</sup> On place, en effet, la rédaction du Grand Commentaire d'Averroès sur la *Physique* vers la fin de sa carrière en 1186, tandis que la date du décès de Gérard de Crémone est 1187.

<sup>8</sup> On a l'inverse: expression négative rendue par un terme positif, en 243b24: *μὴ κινεῖσθαι* cum sit singularis G cum singulariter est M. Le mot *κινεῖσθαι* semble avoir été pris au sens d' «attrait».

244b17: φάφος ἀφασία et uox et priuatio uocis G om M.

244b18-20: ὁμοίως δὲ—ποιότητος om E; M, habet G.

245b17-18: ἀπὸ μέσου τοῦ τε κινουμένου καὶ τοῦ κινουμένου EFJK inter mouens et quod mouetur G om IM.

245b20: καθ' αὐτὰ per se G om M.

245b27: τῆς πυραμίδος pyramidis G om M (P ed. 1542; les edd. 1550 et 1560 ont: *idoli*, mais ce mot est repris de 245b26 où il rend τοῦ ἀνδριάντος; Averroès ne l'a pas lu).

247b27: καὶ κατόπισιν et figitur G om M.

247b30: τίς quedam G om M.

De bien moins grande importance est le cas unique d'une omission semblable en G:

248b26: καὶ et M om G.

En deux passages Aristote énonce deux fois à la suite la même idée ou deux idées très voisines. Dans le premier 243a23-24 (voir ci-dessus) G traduit les deux rédactions parallèles, M omet la première et traduit la seconde (L24: αἱ γὰρ ὅφ' ἐτέρου κινήσεις τέτταρες εἰσιν). Dans le second passage, 246b25, G et M ne retiennent respectivement qu'une des deux formulations:

οὔτε γένεσις εἶναι E; non sunt generatio G om M; οὔτε γένεσις αὐτῶν om G non habent generationem M.

Quelques autres cas sont moins nets:

243a3: τὸ . . . κινεῖν quod mouet G motum M (lu par Averroès qui juge qu'il y a lieu de corriger en *moter*).

246b23: διαθέσθαι . . . τινες τοῦ βελτίστου πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον due dispositiones laudabilioris per comparisonem ad meliores dispositiones G dispositiones animalium in respectu nobilissimi animalium M (le *due* de G peut être de la paraphrase; mais la mention des animaux en M suppose un texte différent de celui lu par G).

Dans les deux passages suivants l'ordre des termes mis en relation les uns avec les autres par Aristote est renversé, ce qui modifie au moins le sens de l'original, sans pour cela le contredire nécessairement:

242b24-26: εἰ τὸ κινούμενον πρῶτον . . . τίς κινεῖται si illud quod mouetur . . . sit contingens quod mouet G si motor primo . . . contingetur cum moto M edd (. . . motum . . . cum moto P; mais Averroès a bien lu le texte des edd.). Glissement dans le sens: les rapports du premier mu à son moteur deviennent ceux du premier moteur à ce qui est mu par lui.

244a27: τὸ ἀλλοιοθῆν ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀλλοιοῦμενον alterans ultimum et alteratum primum G postremum alteratum et primum alterans M (ici le sens est assez gravement entamé).

Les différences qu'on vient de noter suffisent à montrer que les textes arabes lus respectivement par G et M ne coïncident pas exactement; il n'en ressort pas que ces deux textes n'appartiennent pas à une même recension et ne seraient pas fort étroitement apparentés, de telle sorte qu'ils pourraient remonter en dernière forme à une même forme du texte grec. Tout ce que nous aurons à ajouter encore dans notre comparaison des deux versions tend, en effet, à rapprocher M de G que ce soit pour constater leur accord commun ou leur désaccord commun avec les divers représentants connus de la tradition grecque.

D'abord deux cas où c'est simplement la traduction arabe qui paraît avoir ajouté des précisions absentes du grec:

246b22: πρὸς τὸ περιέχον per comparisonem ad aerem continentem G in respectu aeris continentis M.

246b24: περὶ τὴν φύσιν secundum rem naturalem puram G quae est naturalis pura M.

Additions proprement dites au texte grec, communes à GM:

241b27: ἐφ' οὗ τὸ AB: ipsum per se sitque illud super quod est AB G: per se et sit AB M.

242b28: τὸ (om E) μὲν μέγεθος magnitudo una G una magnitudo M.

247a28: «ἐν» ajouté par Spengel, Ross; in GM.

248a28: ἐπ' ἄλλων: propter res alias sicut doctrinam et quae sunt eius similia G aliis rebus ut a disciplina et a similibus M.

De même quelques omissions en GM au regard du texte grec commun aux mss. utilisés:

241b30: αὐτοῦ κινουμένου.

242a10: πρῶτον.

244a24: ἀμα καί.

246b24: τὸ σφῆζον καί.

247a23: ἦ.

247b22: γὰρ.

247b29-30: παραχῆς.

À ces passages nous pouvons en joindre un certain nombre d'autres où apparaît en GM un désaccord avec le texte grec courant, sans qu'on puisse dire toujours avec certitude que l'origine s'en trouve dans des leçons du grec différentes de celles de nos mss.:



242a19: *πρόεισιν* est GM (*cf.* L21: *πρόεισιν* procedit GM).

242b23: ἀνάγκη oportet ut 'a' aut (*distographie*: a = ā = aut) G *necessarie* est vt 'a' M *cod.* P (*lege*: ā = aut; 'a' *om. edd.*). Texte principal (242b60): ἀνάγκη ἤ.

244a28: τὸ . . . ποιδὺν spissum G densum M (*proviert d'une leçon πυκνόν*).

245a18: οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει et GM.

Notons enfin deux passages où les versions d'accord avec les mss. grecs appuient ceux-ci contre les corrections des éditeurs:

242a23: δὲ Ross γὰρ *cod.*: ergo G quoniam M.

242a26: τοῦ Γ καὶ τὸ Γ τοῦ Δ Spengel Ross τὸ Γ καὶ τοῦ Γ τὸ Δ *cod.* mouetur a et quando remouetur u G; a mouetur et quando c mouetur u mouetur M.

Et, sans y accorder beaucoup d'importance, relevons aussi les quelques cas où l'ordre dans lequel deux termes opposés ou coordonnés entre eux se trouve inversé en GM:

243a24-25: δισὶ ἐλξίς: tractio et pulsio G attractio et expulsio M (*cf.* texte principal 243a17: ἐλ. αἰ.).

244b23: ἡ γλυκαινόμενα ἢ πικραίνόμενα aut amarificantur aut dulcescunt G aut amara facta aut dulcesfacta M.

245a26-28: τὸ αὐξανόμενον . . . καὶ τὸ αἰξόν . . . τὸ τ' αἰξανόμενον καὶ τὸ αἰξόν in augente et (*in add M*) augmentatū . . . augens et augmentatū GM.

245b22-23: ἀποβολαῖς . . . ἀληψίων receptionibus . . . dimissionibus G vesti . . . denudat M.

Les cas recensés jusqu'ici suffisent sans doute à faire ressortir la parenté existant entre G et M. Plus intéressants pour l'histoire du texte sont les passages où GM ont une leçon propre à un ou deux ou à un groupe de nos mss., s'opposant ainsi à la leçon des autres.

Accord de GM avec E (ou E<sup>1</sup>) seul ou avec E et un ou deux autres mss.:

241b20: ἄλλο -τὸ κινεῖν EFGM, *om.* HIJK.

242a1: τὸ κινούμενον διαίρετόν E quod mouetur cum sit diuisibile G tantum cum sit diuisibile M διαίρετόν *om.* FHIJK.

242a18-19: ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸ—ὅφ' ἑτέρων FHIJK *om.* EGM.

242b1: ἀιθηρῷ γεομένῃ FHIJK γεομένην *om.* EGM.

242b6 7: ἐκ τοῦ λευκοῦ εἰς τὸ μέλαν FHIJK Ross ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λευκοῦ (*ἢ add E*) εἰς τὸ μέλαν E1 ex albedine una eadem ad nigredinem unam eandem G de una albedine in eandem nigredinem M.

242b17: τῇ τοῦ B: FHIJK *om.* EGM *sic* Ross.

242b25: κατὰ τόπον καὶ FHIJK *om.* EGM *sic* Ross.

244a20-21: ἡ δ' ἐλξίς ἀπ' ἄλλων πρὸς αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο. ἐστὶ ἡ σύνωσις καὶ ἡ διώσις FHIJK Ross ἡ δ' ἐλξίς ἥδη διώσις E et tractio est intentio una et est tractus G et attractio est una intencio et est tractio M (tractio P attractio *ed.* 1542 tiratio *edd.* 1550, 1560).—A l'origine de ces traductions il y a dû y avoir un texte très voisin de E, mais où ἥδη a pu être précédé ou remplacé, du moins en partie, par ἐν.

244b26-27: διὰ σώματος πασχούτης τι τῆς αἰσθητικῆς E-FHIJK *edd.* *om.* E<sup>1</sup> GM.

245a26: ἀπαίτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀβύχων καὶ τῶν ἀραισθητικῶν FHIJK *om.* EGM.

245b20: ὅσα FJK Ross ἢ ὅσα I aut que G et illorum quae M.

245b20: λέγεται πάσχειν FJK πάσχει E Ross suscipiant . . . impressionem G recipiunt passionem M.

245b24: τὸ σχῆμα *delt.*: *om.* EFJK GM *sic* Ross.

246a2: τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν EFJGM τὸ θερμ. κ.τ. ἔργ. K.

246a23: καὶ (ante τὸ γεγονὸς) FJK *om.* EGM.

247b27: ἡρεμῶν καὶ Ross *om.* FJK Bekker ἡρεμῶν καὶ E quiescit et G quiescit M.

248a26: ἐρίειν FJK *edd.* κοινωνεῖν E communicat G communicare M.

Cette énumération de passages marquant l'accord de GM avec E est sans doute impressionnante et significative; elle le devient encore davantage quand on considère les cas beaucoup moins nombreux d'accord de GM avec un ou plusieurs des autres mss. contre E ou E<sup>1</sup>.

Écartons le cas un peu particulier de 242a27: καὶ τοῦ B> καὶ τοῦ Γ Ross καὶ τοῦ B *ed.* Ald., *om.* *edd.*: et motus u: G; et u: M. καὶ τοῦ Γ EFHIJK *om.* GM.

Les cas suivants sont beaucoup plus nets:

242b33: ποτε FHIJK *edd.* in aliqua horarum G in aliqua hora M τότε E.

243a8-9: τόπον—τό alter.: FHIJGM *om.* E (*ex homoiotet.*).

247b25: αὐταῖ Ross αὐτὰ E αἱ αὐταῖ FHIJK unius eiusdem speciei G eiusdem modi M.

244a17: εἴτε E1 εἴπερ FHIJK si GM.

244b24: ἀλλοιοῦσθαι φερεται *add.* Fmg ante ὁμοῖως (*cf.* texte principal 244b8): alterantur G alterata sunt M (*peuvent être de simples suppléments d'un traducteur à la phrase elliptique du grec*).

246a24: δ' FJK et G autem M *om.* E.

246b26: ἀλλοίωσις—ὁλως FJK GM *om.* E<sup>1</sup> (*ex homoiotet.*) *add.* E<sup>2</sup> mg.

246b27: οὐδὲ δὴ E<sup>2</sup> mg, FH neque . . . etiam G neque etiam M αἱ F. οὐ γὰρ δὴ K.

Il suffit de parcourir attentivement la liste qui précède pour se rendre compte que les cas de désaccord entre GM et E n'ont guère d'importance: ils semblent provenir d'accidents divers, le plus souvent propres au ms. E plutôt qu'à la tradition qu'il représente, sinon des difficultés d'une version séparée du grec original par une ou deux langues sémitiques. On remarquera que le groupe GM ne trahit aucune parenté bien prononcée avec l'important ms. K<sup>9</sup> qui représente une tradition indépendante de E, d'une part et du groupe FHIJ d'autre part.<sup>10</sup> Même chose, dans les cas où G et M divergent et où l'un d'eux est en accord avec certains représentants de la tradition grecque, et l'autre éventuellement avec d'autres témoins de cette tradition (voir ci-dessus les passages où l'on a noté ces divergences entre G et M). Rappelons seulement les deux cas suivants, bien caractéristiques:

242a3: accord FHIJKG, contre E et contre M.

245b17-18: accord EFJKG contre IM.

Il y a quelques rares passages où la parenté du texte de chacune de nos deux versions n'a pu être établie faute de renseignements suffisamment sûrs et étendus:

244a19: ἀρισμῆναι E edd. ἀρισμῶν FJ: εἰρημῆναι HIJ<sup>9</sup>K determinauimus G declarauimus M.—La leçon de G répond certainement à celle de E (dont celle de FJ<sup>9</sup> est une corruption): mais, vu l'emploi que M fait du verbe *declarare* pour rendre des expressions assez diverses du grec, il n'est guère possible de dire si sa version rejoint ici E ou HIJ<sup>9</sup>K.

245b28 χαλκῶν FJK eueum G cupreum M edd. χαλκῶν EI cuprum cod. P (M).—Le commentaire d'Averroès (com. 15) appuie la leçon des éditions de M, mais si celle de P était mieux attestée par le reste de la tradition manuscrite, elle pourrait remonter au texte grec (d'ailleurs mauvais) représenté par EI.

Avant de tirer une conclusion des données fournies ci-dessus, il convient de revenir un instant sur certaines caractéristiques des versions arabo-latines d'Aristotele. On a noté dès le début combien elles sont peu littérales et dans quelle large mesure elles s'écartent par endroits du texte original grec dans la construction des phrases. Mais on y relève, en outre, des particularités qui pourraient faire croire à des variantes dans le grec dont elles dérivent, alors qu'il n'en est rien.

On trouve d'abord quelques passages où l'une des versions ou toutes les deux présentent une traduction double du même mot. Pour G l'examen des mss. montre qu'elles sont antérieures au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et semblent donc remonter au traducteur lui-même; pour M un examen plus approfondi des mss. s'imposerait avant qu'on puisse affirmer la même chose. Mais en cas d'accord entre G et M la double traduction semble plutôt le fait du traducteur arabe (ou syriaque). Voici les principaux passages intéressants à cet égard:

248a26: ἀποθῶναι τέλος quod finitur et completur G eum completur et perficitur M (voir ci-après II, 27 et 28, où M se sépare de G).

247a29: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστημον: gnarus enim sciens G sciens enim et cognoscens M (P, edd. 1542, 1560; mais l'éd. 1556 donne: *cognoscens enim*, formule citée ainsi par Averroès dans le commentaire).

A côté de ces deux cas d'accord entre G et M, en voici six autres où la double traduction est propre à G:

242a3: τοῦθ' FHIJK illa res illud G *am* M.

243a21: ἑῷ αὐτοῦ a se ipso scilicet per se G ex se M.

243b26: ἡ ἐκπνευσις καὶ ἡ ἐκπνευσις: inspiratio et emissio spiritus et anelitus G anelitus et expiratio M (L'*anelitus* de G semble bien faire double emploi avec l'expression précédente, tandis qu'en M il devrait traduire *ἐκπνευσις*).

246a27: τὴν κεραμίδα sit separatio uel distinctio G facere tegulas M.

246a28: κεραμιδουμένης quando . . . sit discretio uel distinctio G cum . . . fuerint tegulae M.

247b20: ἐκ τῆς . . . ἐμπειρίας quia probamus et experimus G per experientiam M.

Terminons par quelques cas où le latin s'écarte assez fort du grec, sans qu'il soit toujours également clair que l'écart provient d'une paraphrase plus ou moins maladroite ou d'une lecture aléatoire du grec:

243a4: ἅμα . . . ἅμα: ex loco a quo motum est . . . locum G est (ci *add* edd) locus ex loco eius quod mouetur . . . locum M.—En égard au sens, on a simplement ici une paraphrase un peu verbeuse.

249b26: εἰς ταῦτα EF Ross εἰς ταύτας HIJK ad hos duos G ad hec duo M.—L'original renvoie bien, en effet, à deux cas différents; mais on ne voit pas à quel substantif masculin renvoie *hos duos* de G.

243b28-29: τὸ μὲν . . . συγκαταστὶς τὸ δὲ διάκρισις illud est aggregatio et hoc est disaggregatio G est illud (illud est *add*) segregare hoc est (hic autem est *add*) congregare M.—G a interverti les pronoms, ce qui modifie le sens; M intervertit à la fois pronoms et verbes et rejoint ainsi le sens de l'original.

<sup>9</sup> Même co 246 a 21 (ordre des termes) K s'oppose seul à EFJGM.

<sup>10</sup> W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics*, Introduction, pp. 111 et 115.

244b22: *αδόμεν* patiuntur G agant MP patiuntur Medd. La leçon aberrante de P devrait être vérifiée; le commentaire imprimé d'Averroès reproduit l'autre.

247a20: *ἀλλοπὴ* separatio G distat M. La traduction courante de *ἀλλοπὴ* = *enruptio* se trouve ailleurs dans les deux versions, p.ex. VI, 10, 246b29; d'autre part, la leçon de *παραπλοπὴ* au lieu de *κατὰ ἀλλοπὴ*, n'entre pas en ligne de compte, car les versions traduisent *κατὰ*.

247b22: *αἰσθῆ* sensum G sentire M.

247b22: *ἐνέπνευα* actus G intelligere M.

L'examen des deux dernières séries de passages qu'on vient de citer, permet de voir de façon plus concrète en quelles limites, parfois fort étroites, il y a moyen d'utiliser le texte de nos versions pour contrôler, appuyer ou corriger celui de nos mss. grecs. Mais cette utilisation demeure, malgré tout, possible et même très fructueuse en de nombreux cas.

On peut constater tout d'abord que le texte grec qui a servi de base aux traductions en syriaque et en arabe et qui doit être antérieur à nos mss. grecs les plus anciens, est substantiellement identique à celui de ces derniers, tout en présentant vis-à-vis de lui un certain nombre de variantes. Il en résulte que les quelques corrections que les éditeurs ont eu devoir apporter par conjecture au texte des mss. ne sont pas confirmées par le texte plus ancien dont dérivent les versions (sauf l'exception de 247a28: «*ἐν*», où l'autorité des versions est plutôt faible).

Il y a pour le reste en GM quelques additions vis-à-vis du grec courant, qui seraient à examiner de manière plus approfondie pour en déceler l'origine (gloses postérieures ou état du texte grec à un stade antérieur à celui de nos mss.). Les quelques leçons qui en GM sont en désaccord avec ce texte grec courant ont une importance moindre: la variante *πυκνόν* révélée par GM pour 244a28 est une leçon fautive; les autres cas offrent encore moins d'intérêt.

Nos versions ont sans aucun doute le plus d'importance là où GM (ou parfois G ou M seuls) apportent un appui à des leçons propres à certains de nos mss. grecs. Les rapprochements qu'on a relevés entre GM et E ou E<sup>1</sup> ne montrent pas seulement qu'il existe une parenté très nette entre le ms. de base des versions arabes et le cod. E, en ces trois chapitres de la *Physique*, mais qu'ils nous fournissent, de plus, pour de multiples passages un moyen de contrôle, permettant de distinguer les fautes et leçons individuelles de E des leçons qui appartiennent vraisemblablement à la tradition dont *ms.* manuscrit est le représentant. On n'a pas constaté, d'autre part, des relations analogues avec le ms. K ou le groupe des mss. FHIJ.

Notre analyse, quelques réduits qu'en soient les résultats, se résume ainsi en un premier essai en vue de remonter à un état du texte à une époque antérieure à celle des mss. grecs du IX-X<sup>e</sup> siècle (E, J...). Essai bien incomplet, car il devrait, pour apporter des résultats plus consistants, être complété par une étude du texte que lisaient les commentateurs des IV-VI<sup>e</sup> siècles. Or on sait qu'eux-mêmes fournissent des indications bien incomplètes, elles aussi. Les maigres extraits qu'on possède du commentaire de Philopon se rapportent pour H, 2 et 3 au texte principal et ne contiennent quant au reste presque pas d'indications sur la teneur du texte commenté. Simplicius veut expliquer à la fois les deux formes du texte, mais s'en tient aussi de façon courante au texte secondaire en H, 1, au texte principal en H, 2, 3. De plus, on sait le peu d'autorité qu'ont les lemmes d'Aristote fournis par les mss. où ils peuvent avoir été empruntés à un texte de la *Physique* tardif et indépendant du commentaire. Quant à Thémistius, comme le note déjà Simplicius (p. 1036, 13-17 et 1051, 9-13 Diels), il ne commence sa paraphrase, par ailleurs fort brève, qu'après le premier paragraphe du chapitre 2 (243a11 ou 21) et ne s'astreint pas à suivre l'ordre de l'exposé d'Aristote. Malgré cela, il reste là un travail à faire, qui livrerait sans doute quelques résultats.

Louvain.

AUGUSTIN MANSION.



## METAPHYSIK: NAME UND GEGENSTAND\*

Das bekannte Problem, von wem der Name Metaphysik eigentlich stamme und ob derselbe denn mehr als ganz äußerliche Bedeutung (nämlich die Angabe der Reihenfolge der Ausgabe der Aristotelischen Schriften) habe, wurde innerhalb der letzten Jahre überaus gründlich diskutiert. Das Problem, das hier behandelt werden soll, ist ihm verwandt. Wie immer man Name und dessen Entstehung erklärt, so bleibt doch sehr bemerkenswert, daß die Metaphysik, wie ihr Name besagt, in irgendeinem Sinne auf die Physik folgt. Denn es scheint doch, daß es im Sinne einer Reihe von Stellen bei Aristoteles läge, dieselbe nicht auf die Physik, sondern auf die Mathematik folgen zu lassen, so daß sie nicht Metaphysik, sondern Metamathematik heißen sollte. Wenn wir uns also für den Namen Metaphysik interessieren, so geschieht es in dem Sinne: Warum Metaphysik und nicht Metamathematik?

An den Stellen, an denen Aristoteles das Wesen der Ersten Philosophie bestimmt, behandelt er immer wieder zwei Wissenschaften, die den Anspruch erheben könnten, Erste Philosophie zu sein. Es sind dies Physik und Mathematik. Und Aristoteles gibt diesen beiden das Recht zu, als Teile der Weisheit zu gelten, weist dagegen deren Anspruch Erste Philosophie zu sein, ab. Als Endergebnis der Diskussion finden wir die Formel, daß es drei Philosophien (oder wie wir auch sagen könnten, Sophien) gibt, Physik, Mathematik und Erste Philosophie.

Nun ist diese Reihenfolge nach der Darstellung des Aristoteles nicht zufällig. Vielmehr drückt sich in derselben so etwas wie ein kontinuierlicher Aufstieg aus. Die Gegenstände der Physik sind körperlich und veränderlich und die Anwesenheit auch nur einer dieser beiden Qualitäten in ihnen würde daher den Anspruch der Physik Erste Philosophie zu sein vernichten. Die Gegenstände der Mathematik sind dagegen unveränderlich und wenigstens in gewissem Sinne, unkörperlich. Aber das ist es eben: sie sind unkörperlich nur in gewissem Sinne, nämlich die Mathematik betrachtet sie in Abstraktion von den Körpern, denen sie innewohnen. Daher können auch mathematische Gegenstände nicht als solche der Ersten Philosophie in Betracht kommen. Nur die Gegenstände der Ersten Philosophie sind im vollen Sinne unkörperlich und unveränderlich.

Es fällt auf, daß, von gewissen Voraussetzungen der Aristotelischen Philosophie aus, gegen diesen Aufstieg Einwände erhoben werden könnten. Gegenstände der Mathematik existieren nicht in demselben Sinne, in dem Gegenstände der Physik und der Ersten Philosophie existieren. Vielmehr existieren sie eben nur als Objekte der Abstraktion. Und auf diesen unsubstantiellen Charakter der mathematischen Gegenstände wird ja von Aristoteles immer wieder hingewiesen—immer wieder mit der Implikation, daß dieselben daher nicht Gegenstände der Ersten Philosophie sein können. Noch Theophrast wiederholt: mathematische Gegenstände sind *ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐδετέρου ἔχον φύσιν* (Theophr. *Met.* I, 3; 4a; p. 4, 4 Ross and Fohest). Aber dann wird es fraglich, wieso

\* Dieser Aufsatz wurde geschrieben, während der Verfasser 1935 Preisträger der John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation war.

Dieser Aufsatz knüpft an folgende Arbeiten des Verfassers an: *Aristotle's Unmoved Movers*, *Traditio* 4 (1946), 1-30; *Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas's Summa*, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14 (1953), 284-91; *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, *The Hague*, 1953. Auf die dort zitierten Stellen und gemachten Literaturangaben sei ausdrücklich verwiesen. Ergänzend: J. Tricot, *Aristote, La Métaphysique*, 2 Bde, Paris 1953, p. 171 Anm. 1 und p. 333 Anm. 1; M. Wundt, *Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Stuttgart, 1953, 41-58.

W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Aristotelischen Metaphysik*, Berlin, 1912; P. Moraux, *Les listes antérieures des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain, 1951; H. Reiner, *Die Entstehung und ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Namens Metaphysik*, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 8 (1954), 210-37; idem, *Die Entstehung der Lehre vom biblisch-theologischen Ursprung des Namens Metaphysik*, *ibid.* 9 (1955), 77-91; idem, *Druckfehlerberichtigung*, *ibid.* 117; idem, *Der Metaphysik-Konzentrat des Johannes Philoponos*, *Hermes* 82 (1954), 486-9. Eine neue Erklärung finden wir bei P. Thüchsen, *Die relative Chronologie der erhaltenen Schriften des Aristoteles nach den hiesigen Selbstzitierten*, *Philologus* 97 (1948), 229-63.

Wo immer dieses Aufstiegsproblem behandelt wird, kommt auch die Lesart von *Met.* E 1, 1026a14 zur

Frage. Nach den Hss. werden die Gegenstände der Physik als *ἀγώματα* bezeichnet, während der Sinn *γνώματα* zu verlangen scheint (vgl. *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, S. 37, 65 f.). Nun ist vor kurzem das *ἀγώματα* von V. Décarie, *La physique porte-t-elle sur des "non-séparés"?*, *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 46 (1953), 366-8, verteidigt worden. Décarie glaubt dies tun zu können, indem er *ἀγώματα* mit 'materiell', d.h. nicht von der Materie abgetrennt, interpretiert. Er übersieht, weil er nur einen Satz überliest, daß er damit Aristoteles sagen läßt: 'Die Gegenstände der Physik eignen sich nicht zu Gegenständen der Ersten Philosophie, denn die genannten Gegenstände der Physik sind zum materiell, aber nicht unbewegt.'

Vielleicht sollte auch noch bemerkt werden, daß sich Décarie nicht ganz mit Recht auf D. R. Cousin, 'A Note on the Text of Metaphysics', *Metaph.* 49 (1930), 495-6 und auf P. Goldke (siehe jetzt: *Die Entstehung der Aristotelischen Prinzipientheorie*, Tübingen, 1954, S. 22) als Verteidiger der Lesart *ἀγώματα* beruft. Denn beide verteidigen zwar die Lesart, aber in anderem Sinne als dies Décarie tut: sie halten den Ausdruck für fehlerhaft, schreiben aber diesen Fehler dem Aristoteles selbst zu. Um diesen Preis läßt sich die Lesart natürlich halten (wie ja auch ich, den Décarie nur für den gegenwärtigen Standpunkt zitiert, a.a.O. 57 zugegeben habe). Décarie behauptet aber, daß die Lesart guten Sinn ergibt.

Mathematik überhaupt noch als Zwischenglied behandelt werden könnte. Daher ist es denn auch nicht verwunderlich, daß es bei Aristoteles Stellen gibt, an denen er in der Tat die Erste Philosophie auf die Physik folgen läßt (E 6, 1026a18); andere, wo Mathematik vergessen zu sein scheint (Z 11, 1037a14-16; cf. *De part. anim.* I 1, 641a34-36); andere, an denen Astronomie an Stelle der Mathematik getreten zu sein scheint (*Met.* A 1, 1069a30; cf. *Phys.* II 7, 198a29). In anderen Worten, den Intentionen und dem Wortlaut des Aristoteles ließe sich die Behauptung entnehmen, daß Mathematik zwischen Physik und Erster Philosophie nichts zu suchen habe.

Nun drückt der Name Metaphysik genau diese prekäre Stellung der Mathematik aus. Wer immer den Namen geprägt hat, hat damit einen der Aristotelischen Philosophie inhärenten Zug vortrefflich ausgedrückt. Auch wenn der Name von einem Herausgeber der Aristotelischen Schriften stammt, der damit 'nur' habe bezeichnen wollen, daß die sich auf die Erste Philosophie beziehenden Schriften unmittelbar auf solche, die sich auf die Physik beziehen folgen (oder folgen sollten), so hat dieser Herausgeber offenbar gemeint, daß dies der Sache entspricht und daß es keine 'Sophie' gibt, die zwischen Physik und Erste Philosophie treten könnte. Stammt der Name endlich nur von einem Leser, der damit ausdrücken wollte, daß er die Aristotelischen Schriften so angeordnet fand, so hat dieser Leser nur ausgedrückt, was in jener Anordnung schweigend angezeigt war. In allen Fällen drückt also der Name Metaphysik die philosophische Lage aus, in der Mathematik aus ihrer Zwischenstellung verdrängt wurde. Und es läßt sich gewiss nicht sagen, daß diese Verdrängung dem Geist der Aristotelischen Philosophie zuwider ist.

Nun ist diese Entmachtung der Mathematik klarerweise das Resultat der Interpretation der Seinsweise der mathematischen Gegenstände. Sie existieren nur als Gegenstände der Abstraktion. Wenn dem aber so ist, so erscheint es als recht zweifelhaft, daß eine Wissenschaft, als deren Gegenstand das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  bezeichnet wird, in den Augen des Aristoteles als Erste Philosophie hätte gelten können, wenn ihm das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  auch nur einen Gegenstand der Abstraktion bedeutet hätte. Wie kann denn die Erste Wissenschaft zu ihrem Gegenstand ein Abstraktum haben, wenn doch in demselben Atemzug erklärt wird, daß Mathematisches nicht Gegenstand der Ersten Wissenschaft sein kann, gerade weil dasselbe nur Gegenstand der Abstraktion ist? Und dazu noch ein Abstraktum, dessen Abstraktheit sogar noch höher wäre als die der mathematischen Gegenstände? Gibt es auch nur eine Zeile bei Aristoteles, in der er erklären würde, warum dasselbe Merkmal, das Mathematisches disqualifiziert als Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie angesehen zu werden, am  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  auftreten darf, ohne es ebenfalls zu disqualifizieren? Und ist es denkbar, daß eine solche Zeile fehlen konnte, wenn das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  wie auch Mathematisches für Aristoteles nur ein Abstraktum gewesen wäre? Ist es denkbar, daß der der gesagt hat 'Mathematisches kann nicht Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie sein, weil es nur eine Abstraktion ist' fortgesetzt haben sollte 'Aber das am meisten Abstrakte, das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$ , ist Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie'?

Damit haben wir auf dem Umweg über die Erörterung des Namens die Frage nach dem Gegenstand der Aristotelischen Metaphysik erreicht. Und es ist der Name selbst, der uns erinnern sollte, daß wenn die Erste Philosophie Metaphysik und nicht Metamathematik heißt, die Interpretation des  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  als eines Abstraktums (etwa: was wir als allen Dingen Gemeinsames von denselben abziehen) so gut wie unmöglich ist.

Was kann dann aber  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  bedeuten? In *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (Anm. 1) wurde behauptet, daß es das Sein im eminenten Sinn bezeichnet—das Seiende das eben nur ist und daher im vollen Sinne das Seiende ist. Und, so wurde ebendort behauptet, indem Aristoteles den Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie in dieser Weise bestimmt hat, kann er als Wegbereiter des Neuplatonismus angesehen werden. Das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  sollte als göttlich Seiendes verstanden werden.

Gegen diese Interpretation hat vor kurzem Mansion Einspruch erhoben.<sup>1</sup> Erstens zeige die Art und Weise, in der Aristoteles die Phrase (mit  $\eta$ ) gebraucht klarerweise, daß er damit immer nur einen Aspekt eines im vorhergehenden Teil der Phrase bereits bezeichneten Gegenstandes meint, d.h. lediglich die Art und Weise in der wir einen Gegenstand ansehen, nicht aber eine Qualität, die etwa das Ding konstituiert.

/Wenn, sogar wenn es sich zeigen ließe, daß Aristoteles unter dem  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  das Seiende im eminenten Sinn verstanden hat, bewiese dies doch nicht, daß er im historischen Sinne als Vorläufer des Neuplatonismus angesehen werden konnte. Denn dazu würde gehören, daß er im vor-neuplatonischen Altertum so verstanden wurde—davon könne aber keine Rede sein. Vielmehr habe das Altertum das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  als universalen Abstraktionsbegriff verstanden.

Um Mansions Einwände auf kürzeste zu widerlegen eignet sich keine Stelle besser als *Met.* K 7, 1064a28-1064b3. Ein zusätzlicher Grund gerade diese Stelle heranzuziehen liegt in der Tatsache, daß auf dieselbe in *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* nur kurz verwiesen wurde. Dies war

<sup>1</sup> A. Mansion, *Het Aristotelisme in het historisch perspectief*, Brüssel, 1954 (*Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten*

van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 16, 1954, nr. 3), besonders S. 33-40.



dadurch veranlaßt, daß dieselbe vor kurzem von Muskens behandelt worden war und zwar in einem Sinne, der den 'neoplatonischen' Charakter des  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  völlig bestätigt.<sup>1</sup> Nun erwähnt zwar Mansion die Interpretation von Muskens, aber er läßt derselben doch kaum volle Gerechtigkeit widerfahren. Die folgenden Ausführungen können daher auch als eine Verteidigung von Muskens angesehen werden.

Es gibt eine Wissenschaft, so fängt unser Text an,<sup>2</sup> τοῦ ὄντος  $\eta\ \delta\upsilon$  καὶ χωριστόν—also eine Wissenschaft des Seienden als solchen und als abgetrennten.

Ist diese Wissenschaft mit der Physik identisch?

Nein—Physik beschäftigt sich mit Veränderlichem.

(In dieser Antwort ist eingeschlossen, daß das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  unveränderlich sein muß.)

Und Mathematik beschäftigt sich wohl mit Unveränderlichem, aber nicht mit Getrenntem.

(In dieser Antwort ist eingeschlossen, daß die Wissenschaft vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  auch nicht mit der Mathematik identisch ist. Und es wird ausdrücklich gesagt, daß dies deswegen der Fall ist, weil die Gegenstände der Mathematik nicht χωριστά sind, während eben der Gegenstand jener Wissenschaft das χωριστόν ist. Wie kann man den nicht-abstraktiven Charakter des  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  mit noch klareren Worten ausdrücken? Würde etwa jemand den Versuch machen, χωριστόν in Zeile 29—siehe Anm. 6—als 'als selbständig bestehend betrachtet' aufzufassen, so müßten ja auch mathematische Gegenstände in diesem Sinne als χωριστά bezeichnet werden! Indessen geschieht das Umgekehrte: es wird von mathematischen Gegenständen in Zeile 33 verneint, daß sie χωριστά seien, während das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  in Zeile 29 als ein χωριστόν bezeichnet wird. In den wenigen Zeilen von K 2, 1060a2–1060b30 wird der Ausdruck χωριστά für die Seinsweise der Gegenstände der Ersten Philosophie nicht weniger als sechs Mal verwendet; und wie Mathematisches allgemeinen in 1064a33 als οὐ χωριστόν bezeichnet wird, so werden besonders die geometrischen Gegenstände in K 2, 1060b14–17 als ἀχώριστα charakterisiert. All dies macht es doch wohl imperativ, die Juxtaposition von  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  und χωριστόν völlig ernst zu nehmen.)

Es gibt also eine Wissenschaft, die von den beiden genannten verschieden ist und sich auf das χωριστόν καὶ ἀκίνητον (oder nach einem Teil der Hss.: auf das χωριστόν und das κίνητον) bezieht—wenn es nämlich eine χωριστή καὶ ἀκίνητος οὐσία gibt, was jedoch unmittelbar bewiesen werden wird. Und wenn es eine derartige οὐσία gibt, so ist diese wohl Sitz des Göttlichen und die oberste und eigentliche ἀρχή.

So gibt es denn also drei Zweige der 'Theorie', Physik, Mathematik und Theologie.

Auch hier ist also mit aller Deutlichkeit gesagt: die Wissenschaft vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  καὶ χωριστόν ist weder mit Physik noch mit Mathematik identisch; vielmehr ist sie identisch mit (nicht etwa: ein Teil von) Theologie.

Wie könnte das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  mit noch größerer Deutlichkeit als göttlich bezeichnet werden?

Als zusätzliches Problem erörtert K (1064b6–14) auch noch, ob die Wissenschaft vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  eine καθόλου Wissenschaft ist. Und die Antwort lautet: Jawohl—denn diese Wissenschaft (d.h. die Wissenschaft vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$ ) geht auf eine οὐσία χωριστή καὶ ἀκίνητος die den οὐσίαι der Physik vorausgeht und weil sie dies tut—τῷ προτέρῳ εἶναι—auch καθόλου ist. Es ist also keine Rede davon, daß καθόλου hier Begriffsuniversalität bedeuten könnte. Es ist vielmehr das Erste in der Reihe der drei οὐσίαι. Die einfachste Erläuterung des καθόλου in diesem Sinne gibt ein Beispiel im Aristotelischen Sinn. Wenn die geometrischen Figuren in einer Reihe von zunehmender Komplexität angeordnet werden, so ist das Dreieck die erste (einfachste) Figur und daher wäre

<sup>1</sup> G. L. Muskens, De ente qua eus metaphysicae aristotelicae obiecto, *Minneapolis*. Tertia series, vol. 3 (1947), 130–40.

<sup>2</sup> [1064a28] ἔστιν ὅτι ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη  
29 τοῦ ὄντος  $\eta\ \delta\upsilon$  καὶ χωριστόν, ἀκίνητον πρότερον ποτε  
τῷ ὄντι

30 καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν θεωρεῖν εἶναι ταύτης ἢ πολλὰς ἐτέρων ἢ  
31 μὴν αὖθις φυσικῇ περὶ τὰ κινήματα ἔχοντι ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτοῖς  
32 εἶναι, ἢ δὲ μαθηματικῇ θεωρητικῇ μὴ καὶ περὶ μέτρα καὶ  
33 μέτρον, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστὰ περὶ τὸ χωριστόν ὅρα ὅτι καὶ ἀκί-  
34 κητον ἐτέρα ταύτων ἀμεινότερον τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστὶ καὶ  
ἐτερε

35 ἐπάρχει καὶ οὐκ αὐτῇ. λέγουσιν δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος,  
36 ὅτι περὶ χωριστῆς οὐσίας, καὶ εἴτις ἐστὶ καὶ ταύτης  
αὐτῆς.

37 καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσιν, δευτέρῳ ὅντι εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὄντι, καὶ αὐτῇ  
b) δι' αὐτῆς φυσικῇ καὶ μαθηματικῇ ἁπλῶς. δὲ τὸν ταύτων δὲ τῶν  
2 γένος τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστὶ φυσικῇ,  
μαθηματικῇ,

3 θεωρητικῇ.

<sup>3</sup> Es ist an sich bemerkenswert, daß diese Stelle von Schwegler, Bonitz und Ross so gut wie gar nicht kommentiert wird. Es ist weiter bemerkenswert, daß sich immer wieder Übersetzungen finden, die χωριστόν mit dem zweideutigen 'separabilis', 'trennbar' usw. wiedergeben (so findet sich das 'separabilis' in der *reiss antiqua* und der *reiss moderna*: S. Thomas Aquinatis . . . *Opera* . . ., New York, 1949 [Wiederabdruck der Parma-Ausgabe von 1852–1879], Bd. 20, S. 600) und auch in der Bessarionischen Übersetzung; das 'trennbar' bei Schwegler und Gohlke), während natürlich andere Übersetzer das unzweideutige 'getrennt' usw. bringen (so z.B. Ravaisson, Tricot, Trendelenburg, Rolfes, Ross, Trendelenburg, Kutschera). Am interessantesten in die Übersetzung von Bonitz: 'selbständig trennbar'. Bonitz ist sich offenbar der Wichtigkeit des Ausdrucks bewußt und versucht die Schwierigkeit zu umgehen. Aber umsonst: denn was immer χωριστόν heißt, die mathematischen Gegenstände werden doch als οὐ χωριστὴ bezeichnet. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, Oxford, 1948, 211 f. = *Aristoteles* Berlin 1953, S. 219 f.



das Studium des Dreiecks das *allgemeinste* Figurenstudium. Nicht aber ist etwa das Dreieck nur ein von allen Figuren durch Abstraktion gewonnener Begriff.

Ohne jede Zweideutigkeit identifiziert also Met. K 7 das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  mit der  $\sigma\delta\omega\iota\alpha\ \chi\omega\mu\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\acute{\nu}\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$ , dem Gegenstand der Theologie.<sup>9</sup>

Mansion ist sich bewußt, daß der Wortlaut von K gegen ihn spricht. Er tadelt denselben daher als unklar. Weiter bemerkt er, daß eben diese Unklarheit ein Argument gegen die Echtheit von K sein mag.<sup>10</sup>

Mansion bemerkt nicht, daß die Unechtheit von K, wenn bewiesen, ja auch gegen ihn sprechen würde. Denn dann wäre K einfach das klassische Zeugnis, daß das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  schon im Altertum und lange vor Plato in der Tat als eminent Seiendes interpretiert wurde.

Aber die Unechtheit von K kann gewiß nicht als bewiesen gelten. Wir wären dann nicht in der Lage, es als ein Zeugnis der antiken Aristoteles-Interpretation anzuführen, aber dafür wäre doch offenbar, daß Aristoteles selbst keine Bedrücken trug, das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  (als Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie) als ein  $\chi\omega\mu\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\nu$ , d.h. nicht nur als Abstraktionsgegenstand Existierendes, zu bezeichnen, während er in demselben Gedankenzug das Mathematische, genau weil es kein  $\chi\omega\mu\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\nu$  sei, nicht als Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie ansehen wollte.

Wenn nun K von Aristoteles selbst ist, dann ist es entweder vor oder nach den entsprechenden Stellen von I' und E entstanden. Für unsere Zwecke ist die Frage der Reihenfolge nicht sehr bedeutend, weil wir uns ja hier nicht mit dem Problem der Aristotelischen Entwicklung beschäftigen. In der Phase seiner Philosophie, in der er den Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie als  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  bezeichnet hat, war sich Aristoteles nicht bewußt, daß von gewissen Voraussetzungen seiner Philosophie dies unzulässig ist, weil  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  nur ein Abstraktum bezeichnen könne, also derselben Kritik ausgesetzt ist, wie die Gegenstände der Mathematik.

Laßt sich aber der Beweis erbringen, daß im vorneuplatonischen Altertum das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  als Abstraktum verstanden wurde? Im Gegensatz zu Mansion sollte, so scheint es, diese Frage mit einem Nein beantwortet werden. Mansion selbst betont, daß ja Asclepius das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  als das eigentlich Seiende interpretiert hat.<sup>11</sup> Dies ist auch ganz richtig (z.B. 225, 15, 21, 34; 227, 18, 35; 230, 4 Hayduck).<sup>12</sup> Doch ist Mansion von der Interpretation des Asclepius nicht beeindruckt; sie sei sehr spät und außerdem offenbar das Resultat eines philosophischen Vorurteils (der neuplatonischen Tendenz, Plato und Aristoteles zu harmonisieren). Zum Repräsentanten der 'authentischen' Interpretation wählt Mansion Alexander von Aphrodisias.

Nun verdient vielleicht sogar Asclepius größere Beachtung, als ihm von Mansion geschenkt wird. Asclepius kann doch kaum als selbständiger Innovator angesehen werden; und bei der bekannten Abhängigkeit seines Kommentars von Ammonios Hermion ist es durchaus möglich, daß er auch seine Interpretation des  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  von diesem hat. Von Ammonios Hermion hinwiederum hat Mansion selbst vor kurzem gesagt, daß er als Repräsentant einer längeren Tradition anzusehen ist (in der Tat gehört er in die Linie Syrianus-Hermias).<sup>13</sup> Und Syrianus selbst war sehr weit davon entfernt, Aristoteles und Plato zu harmonisieren; ein großer Teil seines Metaphysikkomentars ist ja einer Verteidigung Platos gegen die Angriffe des Aristoteles gewidmet. Richtig ist, daß Syrianus immer wieder vom Aristoteles *male informatus* an Aristoteles *notius informatum* appelliert; d.h. er ist sich, genau wie moderne Aristoteles-Interpreten, durchaus der Tatsache bewußt, daß die Schriften des Aristoteles in vielen Punkten 'platonisch' sind.

Doch sehen wir von einer Verteidigung des Asclepius ab. Wie steht es mit dem Zeugnis Alexanders?

Fangen wir mit einer Sentenzlinie an. Met. A kennt den Terminus  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  überhaupt nicht; zusammen mit Met. A spricht es von der Ersten Philosophie als der Wissenschaft vom Göttlichen.

<sup>9</sup> A.A.O., S. 37, Anm. 41: Buitendien verwekt de vermeende koppeling van den twee (zelf.  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  mit  $\chi\omega\mu\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\nu$ ) toevoegende een gewettigden argument; de wijzel, die sindeling bestaat, wat betreft de Aristotelische behoud van het hoek K, wordt hierdoor nog versterkt.

<sup>10</sup> Fr. Mansion, die sich der Ansicht von A. Mansion anschließt, geht mit Met. K noch schärfer ins Gericht. Sie tadelt das Buch als hüllend konfus, und die Identifikation des  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  mit der höchsten Substanz blingt ihr nach einem Schüler, der die Lehre von der Semantologie nicht verstanden habe und nun die technischen Formeln desselben in falscher Weise anwende (S. Mansion, 'Les Apories de la Métaphysique', in *Revue d'Athènes*, 1955, 171-79, bes. Anm. 15, 50 und 67).

<sup>11</sup> Daß K früher ist, ist bekanntlich die Position von Jaeger, Arnim und Ross. Das Umgekehrte wird z.B. von Gähde (s. Anm. 9) und Wundt (s. Anm. 1) behauptet.

<sup>12</sup> A.A.O., S. 36, Anm. 30.

<sup>13</sup> Vielleicht sollte bei dieser Gelegenheit bemerkt werden: wenn Asclepius das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  noch als  $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\acute{\nu}\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$  bezeichnet, so folgt er Aristoteles selbst, der in E 1, 1025b 10 dasselbe tut indem er sagt: die anderen von der Ersten Philosophie verschiedenen Wissenschaften sprechen nicht  $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$  darüber  $\sigma\delta\omega\iota\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$ . Zur Erklärung dieser Met. M 9, 1077b16f. ist klar, sagt Aristoteles hier, daß Mathematisches entweder überhaupt nicht existiert,  $\eta$  *ganz* nur sein offenbar nur als Gegenstand der Abstraktion. *καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄλλοις ἔστιν.* Hier wird das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  dann nur abstraktionsweise Existierendes entgegengesetzt und es ist daher nicht unwahrscheinlich, daß das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  so, wie es, wie in E 1, auf das  $\delta\epsilon\ \eta\ \theta\epsilon$  bezogen wird, ausdrücklich solches bezeichnet, das nicht nur abstraktionsweise existiert.

<sup>14</sup> *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*, Louvain 1946, S. 8, Anm. 3. Vgl. K. Praechter in *Geil. phil. Anz.* 163 (1903) 518-30, bes. 523 ff.

Es ist daher umso bemerkenswerter, daß Alexander von Aphrodisias in seinem Kommentar zu Met. A das Thema dieses Buches folgendermaßen angibt: 'In diesem Buch aber spricht er über die Prinzipien dessen was ist, insofern es ist, das sind die Prinzipien der höchsten Substanz, deren Existenz höchste Wahrheit ist.'

In aller Ruhe und in einem Zusammenhang, der wahrlich eine solche Identifikation nicht nahelegt, identifiziert also Alexander das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  mit der höchsten Substanz.

Wahr ist, daß Freudenthal, dem der des Arabischen Unkundige die Kenntnis dieser Stelle verdankt, an derselben Anstoß nimmt und sie folgendermaßen ergänzt: 'In diesem Buche aber spricht er über die Prinzipien dessen was ist, insofern es ist, das sind die Prinzipien der höchsten Substanz (und über die erste Substanz), deren Existenz höchste Wahrheit ist.' Diese Ergänzung begründet Freudenthal folgendermaßen: 'Die Worte "und über die erste Substanz" fehlen . . . müssen aber notwendig ergänzt werden; denn unter der Substanz "deren Existenz höchste Wahrheit ist" . . . kann nur die göttliche Substanz verstanden sein (vgl. Alex. metaph. 101, 21 [= p. 138, 19–21 Hayduck]), von Prinzipien derselben aber darf nicht gesprochen werden (vgl. Alex. quest. I 1, 13, 24 f. [= p. 4, 4 Bruns]; comm. in metaph. 193, 13 [= p. 236, 12–13 Hayduck]; Arist. Met. a [2.] 994a 1 f. [16.] 1071b16.23. 1072a15).'<sup>13</sup>

Natürlich ist Freudenthals Ergänzung sehr bedenklich. Seine subtile Unterscheidung zwischen höchster Substanz (die also irgendwie nicht das Göttliche bezeichnen soll) und erster Substanz (die das Göttliche bezeichnet) scheitert daran, daß in Met. A von der höchsten Substanz in dem Sinne, in dem Freudenthal das Wort versteht, überhaupt nicht die Rede ist. Indem Alexander behauptet, Met. A spreche vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$ , scheint er es dem Göttlichen gleichzusetzen. Und dieser Eindruck verstärkt sich, wenn wir die Einleitung zu seinem Kommentar zu Met. F im Lichte der Freudenthalschen Stelle lesen. Indem er den Inhalt der Bücher A und B referiert, sagt Alexander hier (p. 237, 3–5 Hayduck; vgl. die Alternativrezension, p. 171, ad 5 Hayduck), daß Aristoteles sich in denselben vorgenommen habe, von der Ersten Philosophie, d.h. vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  zu sprechen. Nun ist ja weder in A noch in B vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  die Rede; in A ist Erste Philosophie klarerweise die Wissenschaft vom Göttlichen. Also nähert auch hier Alexander den Begriff des  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  dem Göttlichen an; sicherlich spricht er hier niemals vom  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  als einem Universalbegriff. Wohl aber gebraucht er für die Gegenstände der Ersten Philosophie den Ausdruck τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα. Weiterhin sagt Alexander: ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς, ἥ αἱ ἀκρόταται τε καὶ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ εἰσιν, ἦν ζητοῦμεν, τὸ ὅν ἢ ὅτι εἶναι (p. 240, 24–25 Hayduck). Und dies klingt ja auch nicht danach, daß er das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  als Universalbegriff aufgefaßt hat. Hätte er es denn in einem solchen Falle als φύσις, deren ἀρχαί gesucht werden (p. 239, 13 Hayduck), bezeichnet?

So ist also bei Alexander nicht so leicht eine Stelle zu finden, die es rechtfertigen würde, ihn als Zeugen der antiken Tradition, die das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  als Universalbegriff interpretiert habe, anzuführen. Mansion führt keine solche *verbatim* an; es wäre interessant zu wissen, welche ihm eigentlich vorgeschwebt hat.

Was ist also Alexanders Auffassung des  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$ ? Das Seiende gehört ihm zu den Gegenständen, die—wie das Gute, die Zahlen, die Figuren—zu einander im Verhältnis des Früher—Später stehen (siehe über diese Lehre des Verfassers 'Aristotle's Unmoved Movers', S. 11 f.), wobei also ein erstes Glied—in unserem Falle 'das Seiende'—vorhanden ist, daß in abgeschwächter Form in allen 'späteren' Gliedern auftritt und dabei gleichzeitig Ursache dessen ist, daß diese späteren Glieder sind was sie sind und daher nach dem Ersten benannt werden (in unserem Falle: alle seienden Dinge sind seiend, weil in ihnen das Erste Seiende vorhanden ist und sie werden daher seiend im Hinblick auf dieses Erste Seiende genannt; natürlich sind sie nicht in gleicher Weise und im gleichen Grade seiend wie das Erste Seiende selbst). Die Prädzierung, die sich für alle späteren Glieder einer derartigen Reihe ergibt, nennt Alexander im Anschluß an Aristoteles Prädzierung ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν (siehe z.B. 241, 5–9; 243, 32–244, 3 Hayduck). In diesem Sinne bezieht sich die Metaphysik auf das *καθόλου* ὄν, i.e. das  $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$  καὶ τὰ ἅλλα ὄντα. Und sie ist *πρώτη* und *καθόλου* zugleich, weil auf dem Gebiete der ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα das *πρώτον* καὶ *καθόλου* ein solches τῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτὸ εἶναι αἰτίον τοῦ εἶναι ist (244, 19–20; 246, 10–12). Hier sieht man mit besonderer Deutlichkeit daß *καθόλου* nach Alexander in diesem Zusammenhang nicht einen Allgemeinbegriff bezeichnet, sondern den Sinn 'überall ursächlich anwesend' hat. Zugleich setzt Alexander immer wieder voraus, daß es Seinsgrade gibt—eine Lehre, die mit jeder abstraktiven Interpretation des Seinsbegriffes kaum kompatibel ist. So heißt es auch, daß Metaphysik *περὶ τοῦ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτου τῶν ὄντων* ist (266, 4–5); und diese Lehre wird mit besonderer Deutlichkeit im Kommentar zu Met. B. 993b24 (147 f. Hayduck) entwickelt. Wieder wird ein Mehr und Weniger an Sein angenommen:

διὰ τὰ αἰδίου μάλιστα ὄντα . . . εἰ δὲ τὰ αἰδίου μάλιστα ὄντα εἴη μᾶλλον ὄντα τὰ τοῦτοις αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῶν . . . διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὰ τοῖτοις ἐκείνα ταῦτων μᾶλλον ὄντα καὶ μάλιστα ὄντα (p. 147, 11–14).

<sup>13</sup> G. Freudenthal, Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles, *Abh. der k. Ak. der Wiss. zu Berlin*, . . . 1884, Berlin, 1885, S. 68 mit Anm. 4.

Weiter: καὶ τὰ τῶν ὄντων δὴ μάλιστα αἷτα, ὅσα καὶ αὐτά, ὅσα μᾶλλον ἐκείνων τῶν αἷτα αὐτῶν εἶναι, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον (p. 147, 27–148, 1).

Und im Fortgang (ad 993b28) wird von Stufen der Teilnahme am Sein gesprochen: ὡς γὰρ ἕκαστον ἔχει τε καὶ μετέχει τοῦ εἶναι, αὐτῶ καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (p. 149, 8–10 Hayduck).

All das kulminiert in dem Satz: ἀμφοτέρως δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ (erste Philosophie) γίνεται πρώτη· ἡ τε γὰρ περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀντων θεωροῦσα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων θεωρεῖ, οἷς ἐκ τούτων ἡρτῆται τὸ εἶναι, ἡ τε κοινῶς περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν θεωροῦσα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὄν τῶν ἀφ' ἑνὸς τε καὶ πρὸς ἑν λεγομένων, μέγιστα ὄν περὶ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως θεωροῖται, πρὸς ἣν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα περὶ ὧν ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον ἀναφέρεται, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει (266, 8–14 Hayduck).

Also ganz deutlich: das ὄν ἢ ὄν ist das Seiende von dem alles andere Seiende sein Sein hat. Das Beispiel, wodurch Alexander dies illustriert, ist Feuer. Feuer ist das Wärmste und daher allen anderen Dingen Ursache ihrer Wärme. Und wie es niemandem einfallen wird, Feuer ein begrifflich Allgemeines zu nennen, so sollte man nicht behaupten, daß Alexander unter dem ὄν ἢ ὄν einen Allgemeinbegriff versteht.

Vielleicht darf in diesem Zusammenhang noch auf Theophrast hingewiesen werden. Dieser erwähnt am Anfang seiner Metaphysik (I 1, S. 3 Ross und Fobes) solche (τινες), die die θεωρία τῶν πρώτων auf Intelligibles beschränken, während sie sinnliches aus derselben ausschließen. Wer sind die τινες? Wenn Theophrast damit Aristoteles gemeint hat, so ist es ja in der Tat bemerkenswert, daß das ὄν ἢ ὄν als Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie von ihm überhaupt nicht erwähnt wird. Dies kann aus zwei Gründen geschehen sein. Entweder kennt Theophrast zur Zeit da er seine sog. Metaphysik verfaßt hat, die Aristotelische Bestimmung des Gegenstandes derselben als ὄν ἢ ὄν überhaupt nicht; dann wissen wir eben nicht, wie er dasselbe interpretiert hat. Oder er kennt diese Bestimmung, interpretiert aber das ὄν ἢ ὄν als ein Intelligibles, also nicht als einen Allgemeinbegriff (der ja dem Intelligiblen und dem Sinnlichen zukäme). Und diese Interpretation ist entweder richtig, oder eine Fehlinterpretation.<sup>14</sup> Was immer von den Zweien zutrifft, in keinem Falle könnte Mansion die Tradition für sich in Anspruch nehmen.

So sprechen also der Name Metaphysik selbst, eine unbefangene Interpretation von Met. K und Alexander von Aphrodisias gegen Mansion. Vielleicht tut dies sogar Theophrast; für ihn spricht er sicherlich nicht.<sup>15</sup>

PHILIP MERLAN.

*Scripta College und Claremont Graduate School.*

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. G. Verbeke, *La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste. Revue philosophique de Louvain* 74 (1967), 368–82, bes. S. 373 f. Verbeke nimmt an, daß sich Theophrast vielleicht auf Aristoteles bezieht: in diesem Falle gäbe seine Auffassung zu ernstem Verbesserung Anlaß. Wahrscheinlich habe Aristoteles in einer bestimmten Phase seines Philosophierens Metaphysik auf das Intelligible beschränkt; aber in der Metaphysik tue er es nicht. Und in diesem Zusammenhang lehnt Verbeke, unter Berufung auf Mansion, meine Interpretation des ὄν ἢ ὄν ab. Es ist natürlich immer bedenklich, in einer so wichtigen Frage von der Aristoteles-Interpre-

tation des Theophrast (wenn eine solche hier vorliegt) abzuweichen, während es Vertrauen erweckt, hierin mit ihm übereinzustimmen. In *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* habe ich auf Theophrast nur im allgemeinen verwiesen (S. 181).

<sup>15</sup> Wieder stimmen meine Ergebnisse mit denen von Owens überein (vgl. *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, S. 181, Anm. 1). Dies ist immer bemerkenswerter, als unsere Fragestellung und unsere Belege nur zum Teil identisch sind. Siehe J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, Toronto, 1951, S. 239–41; 286 f.; 299.



# A LATIN COMMENTARY (? TRANSLATED BY BOETHIUS) ON THE PRIOR ANALYTICS, AND ITS GREEK SOURCES

CON. Florence Bibl. Nazion. Centr. Conv. Suppr. J.VI.34—formerly in Niccolò Niccoli's and St. Mark's libraries—written in a beautiful French hand of c. A.D. 1150–1200—contains the second edition of Boethius's translation of *Pr. An.* Many scholia, written on the margins and between the lines by the same calligraphic hand which wrote the Aristotelian text or by a hand very similar to and contemporary with it, accompany the translation in this MS. They are mainly concentrated in about one-half of the work, viz. in book i.23–30 (40b–46a) and book ii (52a–70b); quite a few accompany i.1,3–6,30–45 (124a, 27b–28a, 46a–50a); almost none is to be found in 1.10–14,17–22 (30b7–33b25, 37a25–40b10). Arrangement and writing suggest that the scribe intended to give the reader Aristotle's text together with what was available to him of an authoritative commentary.

The scholia range, in nature and extent, from short glosses on single words or phrases and short summaries of sections of Aristotle's work to detailed explanations and doctrinal developments of important or difficult passages. Here and there carefully drawn diagrams illustrate logical rules and geometrical examples. The following scholia are mainly chosen from book i; others, from both books, will be given farther on.

24a10–11 [*Πρώτον εἰπεῖν περὶ τί καὶ τίνας ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρότης, ὅτι περὶ ἀποδείξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικῆς* = Primum dicere circa quid et de quo est intentio, quoniam circa demonstrationem et de disciplina demonstrativa]. Consuetudinem quam habet in magnis suis negotiis servat in hoc Aristoteles, scilicet praedicere utilitatem quae sit nobis ex eo quod propositum est ostendere. Ait ergo circa quid est intentio, idest circa demonstrationem, et cuius gratia, idest demonstrativae disciplinae: nam ad hoc demonstrationem ostendit per verba, ut demonstrativa disciplina constituatur nobis in anima. Haec enim est harum differentia: quoniam demonstrativa disciplina in mente est ut potentia, demonstratio autem in prolatione secundum actum subsistit; et sunt haec quodam modo sibi invicem causa: nam et demonstratio, per magistros, disciplinae, et disciplina, per potentiam, demonstrationis est causa; unde utraque utriusque et causa est et effectus.

24a11–12 [*εἰτα διορίσῃ τί ἐστὶν πρότασις καὶ τί ὅρος* = deinde determinare quid est propositio et quid terminus]. Potest quaeri cur praeposuit termino propositionem, nam prior est natura terminus quam propositio. Sed in hoc non illud prius, quod natura est, servavit Aristoteles, sed illud [MS illius] quod ad doctrinam posterioris pertinet: nam ad ostendendum quid terminus 'in quem' inquit 'resolvitur propositio'.

25a1–2 [*Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάσα πρότασις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδεχέσθαι ὑπάρχειν* = Quoniam autem omnis propositio est aut inesse aut necesse aut necessario inesse aut contingenter inesse]. Huius triplicis divisionis prima quidem pars non est modi significativa, reliquae autem, praeter inesse, modus significant. Unde simpliciter inesse non versatur circa determinatam quandam materiam, ut Alexander vult, in accidentibus in subiecto actu existentibus, dicens hoc propositionis significatio(nem) constare: nam in omni materia sine necessario et contingente quolibet inesse prolatum simpliciter dicitur inesse, sive necessaria sit sive contingens materia. Necessariae autem et contingentes tum sunt propositiones cum additur modus, non potestate sed actu, ut 'necesse esse, contingit esse'. Dicitur autem necessarium tripliciter, vel cum non dicitur quid de aliquo (ut 'necesse est solem esse', nam qui sic enuntiat unum dicit tantum), vel cum aliquid de aliquo dicitur (ut 'necesse est Socratem

<sup>1</sup> The MS. was ascribed to the fifteenth century by the author of the hand-written catalogue in the library, and in the fourteenth by E. Franceschini (in G. Lacourbe, etc., *Aristoteles Latinus—Codices* II, Cambridge 1955, p. 967): they were wide of the mark; the writing clearly belongs to the second half of the twelfth century; the decorated initials—as Dr. O. Mächt kindly informed me—place it in France.—About two hundred and seventy medieval MSS. contain *Pr. An.* in Latin, usually together with the rest of the *Organon*. Less than half—including the oldest, of the twelfth century—have been examined. With one exception they present two distinctly different texts, rarely in almost pure form, otherwise with various degrees of contamination. An analysis of the two texts has led to the conclusion that, with all probability, they

represent two stages of Boethius's translation. The first more imperfect edition is preserved uncontaminated only in Theodoric's encyclopaedia (see below, p. 102, n. 19); the second, corrected, edition is preserved almost uncontaminated in Codl. Florence Nazion. Centr. Conv. Suppr. J. VI. 34. Paris Nat. lat. 5990, Vatic. lat. 2978; the most frequent contaminated text contains the second edition so far as 36b23, the first from 36b26 to the end; Codl. Glasgow Hunter U. 6.10, London Br. Mus. Arund. 383 and Paris Nat. lat. 15,595 contain much of the first edition also before 36b26. Codl. Padua Anton. XVIII. 107 contains book i and three short sections of book ii according to a common contaminated form, and the rest of book ii in a different, otherwise unknown, translation.

spirare'), vel cum accidens dicitur necessario inesse (ut 'necesse est Socratem sedere dum sedet'). Eisdem autem modis dicitur ei inesse simpliciter. Contingens vero praeter dictos modos dicitur cum id, quod non est, contingenter dicimus esse (ut contingenter [MS contingeret] omnem hominem esse album et nullum).

2533 [καὶ ἐκαστὴν πρόδηλον = secundum quaque allocationem]. Idest in unoquoque modo, vel simpliciter vel contingenter vel necesse inesse significantium [? significativum].

25326 [διὰ τίον καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς = per quae et quando et quomodo]. 'Per quae' idest per tres terminos; 'quando' idest cum maiori extremitati subiaceret medium et de minore praedicatur, vel cum de utraque praedicatur, vel cum utrique subiaceret; 'quomodo' idest vel universaliter vel particulariter vel affirmative vel negative.

25335 [ἄλλω = alio]. Scilicet tantum.

27337 [μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ = neutro omni]. Idest utrique non omni.

28113 [παρρωτέρου = longius]. Et hic 'longius' natura est intelligendum; nam qui acrius subiicitur propinquior est medio eo qui semper praedicatur.

2822-23 [ἔστι δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου καὶ τοῦ ἐκθέσθαι τὰς τῆς ἀποδείξεως = Est autem et per impossibile et expositione facere demonstrationem]. Tripliciter dicitur fieri ostensionem syllogismorum: per conversionem, per impossibile, per expositionem. Expositionem autem dicit positionem termini, qui pars sit communis termini. Per ipsam enim ostensio quaedam fit, quoniam inest extremitas extremitati; ut, si sit syllogismus 'omnis homo animal—omnis homo animatus—quoddam igitur animatum animal', si hoc dubitetur, ponetur pars hominis, ut 'Socrates', ad ostensionem. Nam huic inerit animal, quia omni homini, ergo et animatum ipsi animali, idest Socrati, quoniam omni homini. Et haec quaedam naturalis ostensio videtur esse syllogismorum.

29119-225 [Ἰσθὺν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἀνακρίσει τοῖς σχήματι . . . φανερόν αὖτ' ὅτι πάντες ἀναχθίσκονται εἰς τοὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι καθόλου συλλογισμούς = Palam autem et quoniam in omnibus figuris . . . manifestum ergo quoniam omnes reducuntur in primae figurae universales syllogismos]. Quid proprium est unicuique figurarum hucusque digessit. Nunc vero quid omnibus simul sit proprium exponit. Ait ergo esse proprium omnium universalem ex affirmativa et negativa ratam conclusionem, si universaliter ponatur negativa; et non ex omnibus negativis vel particularibus ratam facere conclusionem; sed neque ex omnibus affirmativis quando non fit syllogismus, idest quando in prima non est maior universalis, vel cum in tertia utraque fiunt particulares.

3029 [ἐκότερον = utrumque]. 'Utrumque' non est sumendum in duobus terminis eiusdem figurae, sed alterum in secunda, alterum in tertia. In secunda, ut si fiat syllogismus ita: 'Omnis homo animal ex necessitate—non omne corpus animal ex necessitate—non est igitur omne corpus homo ex necessitate'; hoc si dubitetur, exponetur pars corporis cui animal non inest, ut 'lapis'; et in hoc fiet syllogismus (nam quia non omne corpus animal, aliqua parte corporis segregatur, ut lapide; huic ergo nulli inerit animal, et fiet conclusio 'nullus igitur lapis homo ex necessitate, sed lapis quoddam corpus ex necessitate').

3122 [ἐναντίος = contrarius]. Idest cum maior fuerit inesse significans, minor autem contingens.

3123-24 [Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ἐπάρχει = Necesse est igitur A alicui C inesse]. Hoc cum sequitur ex hac positione terminorum, ut pro ea quae est 'non contingit A nulli C' accipitur 'necesse est A alicui C inesse'; sic enim erit syllogismus in tertia figura: 'A alicui C ex necessitate—B omni C inest—A igitur alicui B inest'. Quoniam autem vera 'non contingit nulli' simul vera est 'necesse alicui', palam ex eo quod oppositae sunt eadem [MS opposita sunt eadem]. Nam universali affirmationi quae est 'contingit nulli' secundum quantitatem et qualitatem opposita est 'non contingit nulli', secundum qualitatem vero et quantitatem et modum 'necesse alicui'; quae oppositio in his quae secundum modos fiunt propositionibus maxima dicitur. Vera ergo negatio quae est 'non contingit nulli' continet in se affirmationem suae affirmationi vehementer oppositam. Quoniam autem, vera 'contingit nulli', vera est 'contingit omni' in contingente materia, est autem ei secundum contradictionem quidem opposita 'non contingit omni', secundum quantitatem vero et qualitatem et modum 'necesse est non omni', necesse est, vera ea quae est 'non contingit nulli', veram esse 'necesse non omni'; ergo 'non contingit nulli' continet in se principaliter quidem 'necesse alicui' eo quod universali affirmativae vehementer opposita est, secundum accidens vero 'necesse non omni' eo quod vehementer haec opposita ei quae 'contingit nulli'. Similiter 'non contingit omni' duas easdem in se continet, unam principaliter, alteram secundum accidens, quod patet ex subiecta descriptione.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Vera' in this instance, and twice farther on in this section, = ablative (for ἀνθρώπος ὁμοῦ, πῶς, τῆς πρῆσις).

<sup>2</sup> The 'descriptio' (ἀνθρώπου) is a quite elaborate figure, corresponding only in part to that found in Pseudo-Anaximander 32.32-35.



40b25 [*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* = ex hypothesis]. Hypotheticorum syllogismorum quinque sunt modi, quorum quidem duo sunt secundum copulationem, quae constat ex antecedente et consequente: primus cuius vis est, posito antecedente, poni consequens, secundus in destructione consequentis vim habet. Tertius autem hypotheticorum est, in hypothetica propositione quae negat, repugnantia simul esse non posse posito altero; ut 'non est homo et equus—atqui est homo vel equus'. Quartus vero et quintus modus in disiunctionibus sunt: quartus, posita altera parte, quintus interemptia; habent autem contrariam vim duobus prioribus; nam primus, antecedente posito, ponit consequens; secundus destruit antecedens destructo consequente; quartus vero, posito altero, destruit alterum; quintus, destructo altero, ponit reliquum; tertius vero modus, alterutro posito, destruit alterum.—Horum autem secundo et quinto indiget per impossibile syllogismus; nam omnis per impossibile per duos hypotheticos terminatur et unum categoricum. Et primus impossibilis quintus est hypotheticorum, secundus impossibilis hypotheticorum est secundus. Quoniam ergo omnis per impossibile syllogismus indiget hypotheticis, hypotheticus autem non omnis indiget eo qui per impossibile, propter hoc inquit pariem esse hypotheticorum cum qui per impossibile; ut, volens geometer ostendere quoniam diameter inaequalis est costae, utitur per impossibile syllogismo, a quinto hypotheticorum incipiens sic: 'Diameter costae vel aequalis est vel inaequalis—sed non est aequalis'; ostendit autem hoc per secundum hypotheticorum: 'Si diameter costae aequalis est, idem numerus erit par et impar—sed hoc impossibile.' Eam autem hypotheseos quae fert 'si diameter costae aequalis est, idem numerus esset par et impar' per categoricum syllogismum ostendit.

43b19 [*ὁ δὲ τρόπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπιβλέψεως* = modus autem inspectionis idem]. Hic Theophrastus conatur redarguere per totum hypotheticos syllogismos, inquit non indigere huiusmodi via. Dicit autem per totum hypotheticos qui et propositiones omnes et conclusionem habent hypotheticam, quique videlicet secundum tres figuras sunt (ut 'si est homo, animal est—nō animal est, substantia est—igitur si homo est substantia est'). Hi ergo, quia nullam habent categoricam propositionem, non probantur categorico syllogismo; neque enim hypothetica propositio categorici syllogismi conclusio fit. Sed Alexander et plurimus chorus philosophorum nec syllogismos huiusmodi contendunt; nil enim nisi consequentiam eos aiunt ostendere.

64b17-18 [*δεῖ δὲ κατανοεῖν ὅτι οὐτὸν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία συμπέρασθαι ἐξ ἐνὸς συλλογισμοῦ* = Oportet autem considerare quoniam sic quidem non est contraria concludere ex uno syllogismo]. Viam ostendit in hoc Aristoteles utilem quomodo est sumere appositum conclusionem in eadem propositione, et dicit quoniam in uno quidem syllogismo non est huiusmodi conclusionem colligere nisi in maiore propositione opposita sumantur, ut 'omne animal album et non album', per compositum autem syllogismum competentius hoc fieri, quemadmodum sophistae faciunt. Quomodo autem per compositum hoc fit prosequitur exemplo. Est autem compositus syllogismus talis: 'omnis disciplina opinio—omnis medicina disciplina—nulla medicina opinio—omnis ergo medicina disciplina et non disciplina'.

64b33 [*τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς* : petere quod ex principio]. Id est petere quod ex principio est non est vel omnino non syllogizare vel per ignotiora aut similiter ignota vel per posteriora quod prius est syllogizare, sed conaequaeva species illorum est; genus autem omnium, non demonstrare propositum.

A comparison between the Latin scholia and the preserved Greek commentaries,<sup>1</sup> viz. those by Alexander and Philoponus on book I, Ammonius on I.1, and Pseudo-Philoponus on book II (*CAG* II.1, xiii.2, iv.6) has given the following results: (a) a large proportion of the explanations contained in the scholia to book I correspond to those found in the three Greek commentaries; (b) a few passages in book I correspond literally to passages in Alexander, a few more to passages in Philoponus; (c) many details and, almost everywhere, the form in which the explanations are set out in the Latin scholia to book I are different from those of Alexander's, Philoponus's and Ammonius's commentaries; (d) a large proportion of the Latin scholia to book II are literal translations or very close adaptations of passages of Pseudo-Philoponus's commentary; (e) a certain number of scholia to book II, although evidently translated from, or based on, a Greek original, do not find any equivalent in Pseudo-Philoponus. The following examples will illustrate these conclusions.

<sup>1</sup> The pseudo-Thomistian paraphrase of book I, 9-45, probably by Sophonias (*CAG* xiii.3), appears to be a poor conflation of Alexander and Philoponus; the anonymous fragments published in the volumes mentioned above do not offer sufficient elements for comparison. No close relationship exists between our scholia

and those in Syriac by George the Bishop of the Arabs (eighth century), published by Vahlens (*Rev. d'Études Orientales*, 1942, pp. 47-64, and 1943, pp. 229-38). It might also be profitable to examine in this connection the Arabic commentaries.



(a) *Examples of similarities between the Latin scholia and the Greek commentators in book 1.*

2410: Consuetudinem quam habet in magnis suis negotiis servat in hoc Aristoteles, scilicet praedicere utilitatem quae sit nobis ex eo quod propositum est ostendere. Cf. Alexander Aphrod. (8.3-11 Wallies): "Ὁν δὲ πρὸς διδασκαλίαν χρησιμώτατον τὸ δεῖν τῶν ῥηθηγομένων τὴν ἰκοπὴν καὶ τὴν πρόθεσιν λέγειν . . . τοῦτο δὲ οὕτως ὡς χρησίμους εἶναι τὰς αὐτὰς πραγματείας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἰώθε ποιεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; and cf. Ammonius (12.3-6 Wallies): Τὸν ἰκοπὴν ἐνταῦθα προαναφώνει· εἰώθεν δὲ πολλάκις τοῦτο ποιεῖν . . .

2410: Haec enim est harum [scil. demonstrationis et demonstrativae disciplinae] differentia: quoniam demonstrativa disciplina in mente est ut potentia, demonstratio autem in prolatione secundum actum subsistit. Cf. Philoponus (9.30-32 Wallies): διαφέρει δὲ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀπόδειξις τῇ τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἐξεν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ ἀπόδειξιν ἐνέργειαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης προεῖναι.

24213: Potest quaeri cur praeposuit termino propositionem [nam prior est natura terminus quam propositio]; sed in hoc non illud prius quod natura est servavit Aristoteles, sed illud quod ad doctrinam posterioris pertinet; nam ad ostendendum quid terminus. 'in quem' inquit 'resolvitur propositio'. Cf. Alex. (14. 27-28): διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον περὶ προτάσεως τὸν λόγον ἐποιήσατο, ὥτι ἐκ τῆς προτάσεως καὶ τῇ τῶν ὅρων ἀπόδοσιν ἐμελλε ποιεῖσθαι; also Amm. (14.5-22): ζητεῖται δὲ καὶ ἡ τάξις, διὰ τί πρῶτον εἶπεν τὴν πρότασιν, εἶτα τὸν ὅρον . . . ἐστὶ δὲ ἄλλη αἰτία πιθανώτερα καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθής, ἢ καὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ [Philop., ut videtur] δοκεῖ, ἀπὸ τῆς προτάσεως σαφηνίζειν τὸν ὅρον, τῷ κατὰ ἀνέλευσιν τρόπῳ διδασκαλίας πεχημένους . . . λέγει γὰρ ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις; and Philop. (10.31-2, 11.7-11): ὁρίων δὲ ζητῆσαι τί ὅποτε μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου ἤρξατο . . . ἡ δὲ ἀληθεύτερα ἐπὶ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν αὕτη· δεῖ τὰ πρὸς διδασκαλίαν τινῶν παραλημβανόμενα γνωριμώτερα εἶναι ἐκείνων ὧν παρελήφθησαν εἰς διδασκαλίαν· ἐπειδὴ τούτων μέλλει ἐν τῷ δριμυτῷ τοῦ ὅρου παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πρότασιν λέγων ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, διὰ τοῦτο πρότερον περὶ αὐτῆς διδάσκει.

25126: 'Quando' idest cum maiori extremitati subiacet medium et de minore praedicatur, vel cum de utraque praedicatur, vel cum utriusque subiacet. Cf. Philop. (65.1-4): ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὁ μέσος ὅρος τῷ μὲν ὑπόκειται τῶν ἄκρων, τοῦ δὲ κατηγορεῖται, γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὅταν ὁ μέσος ὅρος ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων κατηγορεῖται· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅταν ὁ μέσος ὅρος ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ἄκροις ὑπόκειται.

3214: . . . contingens aut . . . natura fit—et dicitur quod saepius—, aut voluntate nostra, — et dicitur quod aequaliter—, aut casu—et dicitur quod rarius—; utrumque hic Aristoteles, quod aequaliter et quod rarius fit, uno nomine comprehendit, idest 'infinito'. Cf. Philop. (151.27-152.4): φησὶν ὁρισμένον μὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πάλυ, περὶ δὲ ἢ τε φύσιν καὶ ἢ τέχνη καταγίνεται . . . ὁρίστον δὲ φησι τὸ τε ἐπ' ἰσῆς καὶ τὸ ἐπ' ἑλαττον, τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἰσῆς περὶ δὲ ἢ προαίρεσις ἔχει . . . ἐπ' ἑλαττον δὲ περὶ δὲ ἢ τύχη.

40625: Hypotheticorum syllogismorum quinque sunt modi . . . (see the whole scholium above, p. 95). Cf. Philop. (244. 3-247. 19): περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν οὕτως εἵπουμεν. τῶν τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κατασκευάζοντων ὑποθετικῶν οἱ μὲν ἀκολουθίαν κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ δὲ διάζευξιν . . . ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι διτάμεθα καὶ τὸν τέταρτον καὶ τὸν πέμπτον τρόπου ἐξ ἀναφαιτικῆς συμπελοκῆς ποιῆσαι· λέγω γὰρ οὕτως, ὅτι ἡ διάμετρος τῇ πλευρᾷ οὐχὶ καὶ σύμμετρος καὶ ἀσύμμετρος . . . Ἐπεὶ δὲ φησι καὶ τοὺς διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμούς μέρος εἶναι τῶν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ὠμεν πῶς καὶ τοῦτο φησι . . . Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκ δύο ὑποθετικῶν ἐστὶ, μέρος εἶναι αὐτῶν φησι τοὺς διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου.

44638: Hic duas scripturas exponit Alexander, quarum altera est quam luc ponit, et habet talenti, quia 'palam est' inquit 'ex praedictis quae oportet sumere eadem' erit et hoc palam 'quae sunt in his diversa vel contraria'. Altera scriptura est sic: 'non quae diversa vel contraria', ut sit continuatio hanc: 'palam nobis ex praedictis qualia in descriptis in unoquoque problemate oportet sumere eadem; non enim sumendum quae diversa vel contraria'; hanc autem scripturam meliorem, et convenire sequentibus. Cf. Alex. (313.18-314.6): Διῃται τὸ εἰρημένον διὰ τῆς λέξεως τῆς 'δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅποια ταῦτά ληπτέον κατὰ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν καὶ ὅποια ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία' ὡς ἴσων εἰρησθῆναι. τῷ 'δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τίτι χρειαίται παρέχεται τὰ τε ταῦτά ἐκ τῶν ἐκλεγόμενων ληφθέντα, καθ' ὃν ὑδηγούμεθα τρόπον, καὶ εἰ ἐξ αὐτῶν λαμβάνοιτο τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἢ τὰ ἀντικείμενα . . . Ἡ δὲ λέξις εἰδεῖται ἔχει· λέπειν γὰρ δοκεῖ τῷ 'καὶ ὅποια ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία' τὸ μὴ εἶναι μέντοι τῶν τούτων ἐκλογὴν χρησίμους προηγουμένως πρὸς τὴν εὑρεσιν τῶν προτάσεων . . . Αἰτῇ γὰρ ἡ λέξις μενύει ὅτι τοιοῦτον λέπει τῇ προειρημένῃ λέξει τῇ 'δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅποια ταῦτά ληπτέον κατὰ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν καὶ ὅποια ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία', το μὴ εἶναι μέντοι τῶν τούτων ἐκλογὴν χρησίμους. καὶ εἴη ὡς οὕτως τὸ κατὰλλεον σώζουσα· δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὅποια ταῦτά ληπτέον κατὰ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν, καὶ οὐχ ὅποια ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία. Also Philop. (1293.1-21): 'Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ποῦ ταῦτά ληπτέον κατὰ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν καὶ ποῦ ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία'. διωφορῶν φησι φέρεσθαι τὴν γραφὴν τοῦ ῥητοῦ ὅ 'ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦτο· εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῶν βιβλίων' καὶ οὐχ ὅποια ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία'. εἰ μὲν οὖν φέροιτο 'καὶ ποῦ ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία', αὐτὸς ἐξηγήσειον . . . Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἐτέρη γραφὴ

προσφευστέρα εἶναι τῷ προκειμένῳ θεωρήματι καὶ τῇ ἐπαγομένῃ λέξει, λέγω δὲ ὅτι καὶ οὐχ ὅποια ἕτερα ἢ ἐναντία.

45b18: Hic Theophrastus conatur redarguere . . . (see the whole scholium above, p. 95). (cf. Philop. [302.6-15]: ἀπορεῖ δὲ ἐν ταύτοις ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος περὶ τῶν λεγόμενων περὶ τῷ Θεοφράστῳ δι' ὅλων ὑποθετικῶν· οὐ γὰρ δέονται οὗτοι κατηγορητικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ὥστε οὐδέν χρῆσιμεῖται πρὸς τούτους ἡ παραδεδομένη μέθοδος. δι' ὅλων δὲ ὑποθετικοῦς ἐκάλει ὁ Θεοφράστος τοὺς καὶ τὰς προτάσεις καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνοντες, οἷον . . . ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ Θεοφράστος ὅτι δύνανται καὶ οὗτοι ὑπὸ τὰ τρία σχήματα ἀνάγεσθαι. And cf. Alex. [326.8-26]: δόξουν γὰρ οἱ οἱ ὅλων ὑποθετικοὶ οὕς Θεοφράστος 'κατὰ ἀπαλογίαν' λέγει, οἷσι εἰσιν οἱ διὰ τριῶν λεγόμενοι . . . ἢ αὐτὰ συλλογισμοὶ κυρίως καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐκείνοι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον ταῦτο ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμοί· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι δεικνύουσιν . . .

(b) Examples of passages literally translated from Greek texts in book I.<sup>5</sup>

27b20: Indefinitum vocat alicui non inesse eo quod non habeat definitam significationem, sed potest sumi pro particulari affirmativa ei pro universali negativa. Quoniam ergo, inquit, indefinita est significatio, si sumatur aequipollens universali negativae [MS negationi], palam quoniam non fiet syllogismus.

34a25: omnino possibile antecedit necessario ei consequens possibile esse.

35b28: Si sint, inquit, utraque propositiones affirmativae, vel maior contingens negativa secundum definitionem contingentis est conclusio, si autem maior negativa necessaria, non iam secundum definitionem contingentis est conclusio, sed eius quod concurrat ei quod inesse significat.

45b18: . . . ut 'si est homo, animal est—si animal est, substantia est—igitur si homo est, substantia est'. (This example probably comes from Theophrastus himself.)

45b29: Quoniam in his quae inesse significant propositionibus usus est sermone, quaecumque, inquit, dicta sunt de his quae insunt, haec et de necessariis et de contingentibus dicimus. Sic enim oportet electiones facere eorum et considerationes in unaquaque propositione, addito quid necessario et quid contingenter. Tantum enim vult distabit a contingente quod inesse significat quod prius sit secundum ordinem quod inest, eo quod hoc quidem accidit iam, illud vero futurum sit. Nam sic ex his quae dicta sunt<sup>6</sup> colligimus, ex necessariis enim [leg. quidem?] propositionibus necessariam, ex contingentibus autem contingentem.

43b1 (or 44p35): the 'pons asinorum', which was known to, perhaps invented by, Alexander (301.6-302.16) and fully introduced into the commentary by Philoponus.<sup>7</sup> The

Philop. 98.26-30: Ἀδιόριστον καλεῖ τὰ τινὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὁρισμένην τὴν σημασίαν, ἀλλὰ δύναισθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς μερικῆς καταφατικῆς λαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς. ἐπεὶ οὖν, φησὶν, ἀδιόριστος ἡ σημασία, ἐὰν ληφθῇ, ἢ ἰσοδυναμοῦσα τῇ καθόλου ἀποφατικῇ δηλὸν ὅτι ἀσυλλόγιστος ἐστίν.

Philop. 170.21-22: πάντως τοῦ ἡγουμένου δυνατοῦ ὅσως ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπόμενον δυνατὸν εἶναι.

Philop. 194.2-5: φησὶν . . . ἐὰν μὲν ὥσιν ἀμφοτέραι καταφατικαὶ ἢ ἡ μείζων ἐνδεχομένη ἀποφατικῇ, τοῦ κατὰ τὸν διαρισμὸν ἐνδεχομένου ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὅταν δὲ ἡ μείζων ἀποφατικῇ ἀναγκαία, οὐκέτι τοῦ κατὰ τὸν διαρισμὸν ἐνδεχομένου ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀλλὰ τοῦ συντρέχοντος τῷ ὑπάρχοντι.

Alex. 326.24-25: οἷον 'εἰ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστίν, ζῶν ἐστίν—εἰ ζῶν ἐστίν, οὐσία ἐστίν—εἰ ἀρα ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστίν, οὐσία ἐστίν'.

Philop. 304.11-19: Ἐπειδὴ ὡς ἐπὶ ὑπαρχουσῶν προτάσεων ἐγύμνασε τὸν λόγον, ὅσα, φησὶν, εἰρηται περὶ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν, ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων λέγειν ἔχομεν. Οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ τὰς τε ἐκλογὰς αὐτῶν ποιῆσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιβλέψεις καθ' ἑκάστην πρόβλημα, ἐπισημασιωμένους τί μὲν ἀναγκαίως ὑπάρχει, τί δὲ ἐνδεχομένως. Τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διείσχει τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ ὑπάρχειν τῷ πρότερον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν τάξιν τὸ ὑπάρχον, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐκβεβηκέναι τὸ δὲ μέλλειν. οὕτω γὰρ ταῦτων ἐκλεγομένων συνάξομεν ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων προτάσεων ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἐνδεχομένον.

<sup>5</sup> Other scholia in book I literally translated from passages extant in Philoponus's commentary are the following (pages and lines of Philop.): 194.29-32, 241.25-29, 287.27-30, 304.11-19, 221-33, 305.12-18, 33-24, 306.25-28.

<sup>6</sup> The translator took ταῦτα ὡς λεγόμενα, and interpreted as *he takes them as given*.

<sup>7</sup> The figure summarizing some rules for the discovery of the middle term of a syllogism, which came to be called the 'pons asinorum', is said by Prantl to appear

for the first time in the works of Petrus Tatarus (end of the fifteenth century); a similar figure he had found in Averroes' 'middle commentary' and thought it to be this philosopher's discovery (*Genl. d. Logik in Arabien*, Leipzig 1855-70, II, pp. 384-3, IV, pp. 205-6). But 'Tatarus's' figure appears already in Philoponus's commentaries (p. 274), and is described and referred to by Alexander of Aphrodisias, although it is not printed with the commentary: συνηρῶς δὲ γάρ τι τῶν λεγόμενων συνηρῶς καὶ τὸ διήγημα ὅλον καὶ



figure itself is reproduced exactly as in the Greek model; the symbolic letters from A to H correspond to the Greek letters from Α to Θ used by Alexander and Philoponus; the examples and the syllogistic rules are translated literally, e.g.:

Quae sequuntur bonum: proficiens, eligendum, expetibile, conveniens, concupiscibile, quod ad finem conducit, expediens.

Quae extranea sunt bono: imperfectum, fugiendum, nocivum, inexpediens, malum, damnosum.

Inconstans quoniam sit in secunda figura ex duabus affirmativis; inconstans ex duabus negativis.

Philop. 274: τὰ ἐπόμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὡφέλιμον, αἰρετόν, διωκτόν, οἰκείον, ἐφετόν, λυσιτελές, συμφέρον.

τὰ ἀλλότρια τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄτελές, φευκτόν, βλαβερόν, κακόν, ζημιώδες, ἀλυσιτελές.

ἡσυχάζουσιν διὰ τὸ ἐν β' σχήματι ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν συνίγειν ἡσυχάζουσιν ἐκ δύο καθόλου ἀποφατικῶν.

(c) *Examples of differences between the Latin scholia and the Greek commentators in book i.*

The differences consisting in independence of diction, style, arrangement, have already been exemplified in section (a). Here a few examples will be given of comments found in the Latin scholia alone.<sup>3</sup>

24a10-11: Sunt haec [demonstratio et disciplina demonstrativa] quodammodo sibi invicem causa; nam et demonstratio, per magistros, disciplinae, et disciplina, per potentiam, demonstrationis est causa.

24a26: Quoniam omne compositum ex materia et forma, syllogismus autem compositus, ergo ex materia constat propositionibus, forma autem modificatione in omnibus figuris. Aut ergo quoniam materia, idest propositionibus, distat demonstrativus a dialectico, forma vero, idest modis et figuris, non distabit syllogismus syllogismo secundum quamlibet materiam.

40b17: Hucusque indubitabile sumpsit quoniam, si A de B et B de C sumantur, aut A de B et C, aut A et B de C, fiunt tres figurae et earum syllogismi. Nunc autem de demonstratione probat quoniam sic necesse est esse, et non aliter contingit fieri categoricos. Quoniam ergo sic necesse, ex eo quod omnis affirmativus vel negativus; quoniam vero alter non contingit, quod neque ex paucioribus propositionibus neque ex pluribus neque ex totidem aliter.

42b24: Eadem res, scilicet anima, cum circa superiora et per se vera et aeterna perscrutatur, dicitur mens; cum autem circa universales positiones, dicitur opinio; cum vero circa singularia, sensus vel fantasia vocatur. Nihil autem horum syllogizat; mens quidem ut melior syllogismo, opinio autem et sensus et fantasia ut priora. Cum ergo syllogizat, anima intellectus nominatur; sed, si ex superioribus quidem et per se veris, demonstrativum facit syllogismum, si vero ex inferioribus, sophisticum, si autem ex his quae secundum opinionem et positionem sunt, dialecticum (quandoque) quidem verum, quandoque autem falsum, eo quod et opinio quandoque falsa est, quandoque vera.

(d) *Examples of literal correspondence between Latin scholia in book ii and Pseudo-Philoponus.<sup>4</sup>*

52b37: Intentio secundum Alexandrum quidem dicere quae restant a primo libro, idest quoniam ex falsis est verum syllogizare et ex veris verum; secundum certiores autem expositores, talia: quia in anteriore libro speciem syllogismorum dixit; in hoc autem materiam (species autem erat conclusio, materia vero propositiones).—Quia de materia syllogismorum continet hic liber,

Pseudo-Philop. 387.6-11, 388.3-5: Σκοπὸς . . . κατὰ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρον . . . εἶπε τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ πρώτου λόγου . . . ὅτι ἐκ ψευδῶν ἀληθὲς συνάγεται καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ἀληθῶν ἀληθὲς. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντας . . . οὗτος ἔπειδ' εἰ τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ τὸ εἶδος τῶν συλλογισμῶν εἶπεν, ἐν τοῦτ' εἶπε τὴν ὅλην (εἶδος δὲ ἦν τὸ υπερέρασμα, ὅλη δὲ αἱ προτάσεις).—Ἐπειδ' περὶ τῆς ὅλης τῶν συλλογισμῶν μέλλει λέγειν, χρησιμαίνει ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν

τῶν συλλογισμῶν. πῶς τε καὶ ἐκ τίνος γίνονται. It appears in some Greek manuscripts of Pr. An., and in at least a hundred Latin MSS. In the thirteenth century a paraphrasing verse had been composed on the symbolic letters: Pat'm l'oGenti Del'ere HeBere GraDendo Galla valent, sed non conant HeBere Falser HicC'.

<sup>3</sup> Among the other 'independent' scholia are a considerable number of figures illustrating the various kinds of syllogisms.

<sup>4</sup> Other passages of Pseudo-Philoponus translated into Latin are the following: 387.18-21, 389.17-19, 390.17, 21-22, 391.15-18, 392.20-22, 393.25-394.2, 394.21-27, 395.7-8, 397.2-3, 398.10-399.1, 400.4-9,

400.25-401.3, 401.20-30, 402.27-403.23, 403.33-404.7, 404.23-24, 405.11-15, 405.21-406.11, 406.12-13, 406.29-407.3, 407.28-408.30, 408.33-34, 409.15-21, 413-25, 413.18-20, 413.26-414.7, 414.18-26, 414.20-25, 415.3-5, 416.28-25, 417.22-28, 418.20-31, 419.4-7, 10-19, 419.22-420.3, 420.15-18, 420.31-421.2, 421.25-26, 422.5-12, 9-11, 14-16, 20-21, 22-24, 426.7-9, 428.32-33, 431.12-23, 432.22-24, 432.29-433.11, 434.17-24, 434.26-435.1, 435.1-8, 20-22, 436.3-7, 14-22, 437.3-4, 438.18-20, 439.15-16, 441.2-442.27, 446.12-447.1, 447.10-13, 16-18, 449.5-8, 449.11-13, 450.2-3, 6-12, 451.15-18, 453.36-454.11, 455.3-9, 12-16, 456.1-8, 460.18-22, 463.10, 476.5-6, 476.23-477.5, 480.6-13, 481.9-13.



utilis est nobis ad topicum negotium, sicut et prior ad demonstrativum.

53b4: Vult ostendere hic quomodo ex propositionibus colliguntur conclusiones. Nam, cum propositiones sunt ambae verae, vera est conclusio; cum ambae falsae, quandoque vera quandoque falsa; si autem maior sit vera, minor autem falsa, vera fit conclusio. Dicit ergo quoniam ex falsis utrisque est colligere conclusiones veras.

53b26: Ex falsis propositionibus syllogismus in prima figura vel ex utrisque falsis fit, vel altera sola, ex utrisque autem falsis vel totis falsis utrisque, et fiunt duae conjugationes affirmativae et negativae, vel utrisque in aliquo falsis . . .<sup>10</sup>

69a31: Quaesiverunt quidam si possibile circulum quadrangularem; sumebant autem 'quadrangularem' primum terminum, 'rectam lineam' secundum, 'circulum' tertium. Quoniam ergo recta linea quadrangulatur, palam; obscurum est autem si circulus recta linea fiat, quae est minor propositio; et hoc conatur ostendere per lunares figuras. Quoniam ergo per unum tempus monstrare, reductio est.

69b38: Instantiae vel e contrario, ut 'quoniam omne gaudium bonum'; dico quoniam falsum (neque enim omnis tristitia malum); vel ex simili, ut in his quae sunt secundum proportionem; ut 'quam rationem habet signum ad lineam, hanc habet linea ad superficiem'; ergo ex simili sic, 'quoniam linea superficiei pars'; dico quoniam non; neque enim lineae signum pars; ex secundum opinionem, ut 'quoniam anima mortalis'; nam veteres sapientes hanc immortalē opinati sunt.

τοπικὴν πραγματείαν τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἰς τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν.

Pseudo-Philop. 391.25-392.4: Βουλῆται δεῖξαι ἐντεῦθεν . . . πῶς ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων συναγόνται τὰ συμπεράσματα. καὶ γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις . . . εἰ ἄμφω ἀληθεῖς, ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα· εἰ δ' ἄμφω ψευδείς, ποτὲ ἀληθές, ποτὲ ψευδές. . . εἰ δὲ ἡ μείζων ἀληθὴς ἡ δὲ ἐλάττω ψευδής, ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα. Λέγει οὖν ὅτι ἐκ ψευδῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἔστι συλλογισαῖν καὶ ἀληθὴ συμπεράσματα.

Pseudo-Philop. 393.13-22: . . . ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συλλογισμὸν . . . ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι ἡ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ψευδῶν ἢ τῆς ἑτέρας μόνης. καὶ . . . ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ψευδῶν ἢ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων ὅλων ψευδῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ γίνονται δύο συζητήσεις, καταφατικαὶ καὶ ἀποφατικαί, ἡ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων ἐπὶ τοῖς ψευδῶν αὐτῶν. . .<sup>11</sup>

Pseudo-Philop. 476.28-477.5: Ἐξήγησάν τινες εἰ δυνατόμεθα κύκλον τετραγωνίσαι . . . ἐλάβανον δὲ οὕτως τετραγωνίσασθαι πρῶτον ὄρον, εὐθύγραμμον δεύτερον, κύκλον τρίτον, ὅτι μὲν τὸ εὐθύγραμμον τετραγωνίζεται, δῆλον· ἄφανές δὲ ἔστιν εἰ ὁ κύκλος εὐθυγραμματίζεται, ὅπερ ἔστιν ἡ ἐλάττω πρότασις· καὶ τοῦτο πειρῶνται δεικνύειν διὰ τῶν μηνυειδῶν σχημάτων . . . ἐπειδὴ οὖν δι' ἑνὸς πειρῶνται δεικνύειν, ἀπαγωγὴ ἔστιν.

Pseudo-Philop. 480.6-13: Αἱ ἐνστάσεις ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἶον ὅτι πᾶσα χαρὰ καλόν· λέγω ὅτι ψεῦδος (οὔτε γὰρ πᾶσα λύπη κακόν)· . . ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον πρὸς τὴν γραμμὴν τοῦτον . . . ἔχει γραμμὴ πρὸς ἐπιφάνειαν· ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μὲν οὖν οὕτως, ὅτι ἡ γραμμὴ τῆς ἐπιφανείας μέρος· λέγω ὅτι ψευδές· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ σημεῖον τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος· ἡ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ δόξαν, οἶον ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ θνητὴ· . . οἱ γὰρ παλαιοὶ φιλόσοφοι δοξάζουσιν αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον.

(e) *Examples of Latin scholia to book ii without any equivalent in Pseudo-Philoponus's commentary.*<sup>12</sup>

53a25: Ostendo quoniam sunt plures conclusiones in universalibus syllogismis et in prima et in secunda figura, et quomodo, dicit in particularibus non consequi necessitatem eorum quae sub minore extremitate sunt, ut, si A omni B, ■ autem alicui C, si autem sumamus D partem C, huic non inerit A propter syllogismum, eo quod syllogismis accidit per D, particularem habet maiorem in prima figura . . .

64b17: Viam ostendit in hoc Aristoteles utilem, quomodo est sumere oppositum conclusionis in eadem propositione, et dicit quoniam in uno quidem syllogismo non est huiusmodi conclusionem colligere nisi in maiore propositione opposita sumantur, ut 'omne animal album et non album', per compositum autem syllogismum competentius hoc fieri, quemadmodum sophistae faciunt. Quomodo autem per compositum hoc fit, prosequitur exemplo; est autem compositus syllogismus talis: 'omnis disciplina opinio, omnis medicina disciplina, nulla medicina opinio, omnis ergo medicina disciplina et non disciplina'.

67b3: Hoc refertur ad id quod superius dictum est, quoniam nil prohibet scientem quoniam omnis mula sterilis et quoniam haec mula, putare eam in utero <habere>; 'sed non' inquit 'in eo quod agit' hoc agit, hoc est non, secundum hoc quod coaptat hanc propositionem sub universalem, possibile est putare quoniam concepit haec. Habent quidam libri 'et in eo

<sup>10</sup> The Latin text confirms Wallies' conjecture *propter* for *consequens* of the Greek MSS., but confirms these against him, giving *καταφατικαὶ καὶ ἀποφατικαί*, and not the singular.

<sup>11</sup> A large number of scholia to book ii.16-27 have no equivalent in Pseudo-Philoponus.

quod agit' ut sit sensus 'oportet sensibilia sensibus cognoscere universali et propria scientia, et in eo quod coaptamus ea su . . . (?) universalia'.

57b12: Intentio fuit in hoc Aristotelis monstrare quomodo coniungit secundum opinionis fallaciam idem esse et non esse opinione sequente et non. Ostenso ergo id contingere contradictione maioris propositionis sequente, assumptis mediis et non subalternis, similiter autem nulla contradictione sequente. Cuiusmodi ita exempla posuit, ne quis putaret quoniam in diversis et non in eodem hoc contingeret, sic fidei circa opinionem, ut contrarietas sequatur; contingit etiam sic, ut non sequatur contrarietas; nam bonum, in eo quod bonum putet malum, contraria opinatur et inconueniens sequitur, si vero secundum ea quae ei accidunt, nil sequatur inconueniens. Quoniam autem sequitur contradictio si quis putet malo bonum idem, per duos syllogismos temptandum; nam si bonum omni et nulli malo, malum autem omni bono, fient duo syllogismi contrarias conclusiones colligentes, quibus conversis sequitur contradictio maiorum propositionum. Horum autem duorum syllogismorum affirmativam quam ponit Aristoteles, negativam vero ut totum praeteriit (?). Secundum accidentia autem possibile inquit multipliciter putare bonum esse esse malum nulla contradictione sequente, eo quod fallacia circa minorem sit propositionem. Hoc autem quomodo possibile, perspicendum inquit melius circa ethicam disciplinam, hoc est quod melius contingit.

59a22: Reductio est quam cum habemus non sumus scientes, propinquius autem sumus scientiae quam non habentes. Fit autem huiusmodi argumentatio secundum dubium minoris propositionis; hoc autem dupliciter: vel cum simpliciter est dubia minor propositio similiter conclusioni, vel cum paucissimis mediis indiget ad probationem. Si autem dubia magis sit, conclusione vel pluribus mediis indigeat ut nota fiat, non reductio, neque cum nullo indiget.

With one exception,<sup>12</sup> all the scholia are, clearly or possibly, translated or only slightly adapted from the Greek: the examples given above of scholia which are independent of preserved Greek commentaries provide evidence enough that, behind the Latin dictions, there is a Greek original which they reproduce. It may be suggested that the whole body of Latin scholia consists of an almost literal translation of a body, or part of a body, of Greek scholia accompanying the text of *An. Pr.*: it is less likely that a Latin translator should have himself chosen bits of Greek commentaries or scholia from different manuscripts. The fact that a large proportion of the scholia to book ii are translated from the pseudo-Philoponus, and a certain similarity in style and nature between these scholia and many of those to book i, might suggest that the main body of the Greek collection of scholia underlying the Latin text consisted of excerpts of the complete pseudo-Philoponian commentary (of which book i is lost in Greek). On the other hand, this corpus was obviously not derived exclusively from one commentary only: there are a few cases of two scholia repeating in a different form the same, or nearly the same things, e.g. those on ἀναγωγή quoted below, p. 101, and:

43820: In priore sectione species syllogismorum, idest conclusiones elucidavit; in hac autem quomodo ipsas species parati simus invenire ostendit . . . quaerit de quibus omnino possimus syllogizare.

De generatione syllogismorum exposuit Aristoteles; nunc autem viam facile inveniendi syllogisticas propositiones elucidat, et potentiam qua ipsi syllogismos facere possimus.

Again, there is no reason to imply that all the scholia to book ii which have no equivalent in pseudo-Philoponus derive from a more complete text of the latter than that preserved in Greek MSS.

There is in the scholia no apparent clue to suggest names for the authors of the commentaries which have been drawn upon for the selection. The literal parallels with some passages from Philoponus or even Alexander are not sufficient in themselves to suggest that some at least of the scholia were taken from their works: the habit which Greek commentators—and particularly, as it seems, Philoponus—had of repeating literally passages from previous authors, when they agreed with their views, makes it impossible to identify one particular author by a few coincidences: one is only allowed, in these cases, to speak of a common tradition or school. Philoponus's commentary is based on Ammonius's teaching, and Ammonius might have repeated Proclus or provided his pupils with Proclus's material. In one case at least a passage, which is not found in the preserved Greek commentaries, seems to go definitely back to Proclus, but not to an author before him: it is the passage on the degrees of knowledge, quoted above, p. 98.<sup>13</sup> There is evidence to suggest that Proclus commented upon *Pr. An. Pr.* and his commentary has been lost, or at least has not come down under his name. An investigation, which we shall not attempt here, might show if the pseudo-Philoponian commentary and some of the Latin scholia contain other Proclian elements of the same kind.

<sup>12</sup> See below, p. 101.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. E. Zeller, *Die Philos. d. Gr.* iii. 2, p. 374.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Prantl, *op. cit.* i, p. 642.



Who translated the scholia into Latin? Since no name appears in the Florentine MS., we must fall back on internal evidence and on rather doubtful external arguments. All of these seem to suggest Boethius as being the scholar who translated and possibly elaborated—in a small measure—the Greek body of scholia. The most decisive argument seems to be that based on the language and method of the translation. All the characteristics which have been found to distinguish Boethius's translations from those of other translators of philosophical works, recur in the scholia which can be compared in detail with the Greek original: this is particularly true of the consistent way in which Boethius translated words which occur very frequently (*μὲν, δέ, δὲ, οὐν, γὰρ, ὡστε, διό, ἐπεὶ, ὅτι, ὁλόν, φανερόν, etc.*). There are also some significant parallels between the language of Boethius's translation of *Pr. An.* with that of the scholia (e.g. 'colligere' or 'sylogizare' for *συλλογίζεσθαι*; the addition of 'significare' in phrases such as *τὸ ὑπάρχον* = quod inesse significat, Philop. 304.16; cf. 194.6, and, in Aristotle's text, 24220; the omission of *ὄντος, οὐσης* in genitive absolute phrases). It may also be significant that the second edition of Boethius's translation seems to incorporate the result of some knowledge acquired in the course of translating the scholia; for instance:

24210: *Πρῶτον εἰπεῖν περὶ τί καὶ τίνος ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις*: Boethius had translated, in the first instance, 'Primum dicere circa quid et cuius est consideratio', implying that *τίνος* was a genitive independent of *περὶ*, and that *σκέψις* did not refer to the aim of the inquiry in hand; he had thus rightly and quite clearly rendered Aristotle's meaning. But this could not agree with the comment to this passage which we find in the first scholion: 'ait circa quid est intentio, idest circa demonstrationem, et cuius gratia, id est demonstrativae disciplinae'. The revised translation ('Primum dicere circa quid et de quo est intentio') is a compromise between the interpretation which seemed to be implied by the scholion and the Greek text; Boethius, when revising, took the genitive as dependent on the *περὶ*, so that he could come one step nearer to the 'cuius gratia'.

69220: *ἀπαγωγὴ* had been translated by Boethius, etymologically, by 'deductio'; the two scholia 'reductio dicitur eo quod reducat nos a conclusione in demonstrationem dubiae propositionis' (= Pseudo-Philop. 476.5-6) and 'reductio est quam cum habemus non sumus scientes, propinquius autem sumus . . .' (see the whole scholion above, p. 100) revealed the inappropriateness of 'deductio' and suggested the more appropriate 'reductio', which appears in the second edition.

The scholium to 49b1 (*εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν* = esse voluptatem quod bonum) is evidently written by the Latin translator of *Pr. An.*, and not reproduced from the Greek:

'Quod' inconvenienter additum est 'bono', sed non potuit aptius per aliud significari articulus cuius loco positum est.—Between the lines the translator again explained the *τὸ ἀγαθόν* by 'hoc universale bonum'.

Boethius seems to mention a commentary on *Pr. An.* written by himself.<sup>16</sup> It may be doubted whether he would have referred to this group of scholia as to his own commentary. On the other hand, detailed studies by Bidez and Shiel<sup>17</sup> have led them to suggest that Boethius, when writing his commentaries on the *Categorías* and on the *De interpretatione*, was just expanding and putting into literary form a body of scholia, mainly but not exclusively coming from one commentary, a body of scholia very much resembling the one which appears on the margins of *Pr. An.* in our manuscript. It has also been shown that nothing that is contained in those three Boethian commentaries need come from post-Proclian commentaries: the same possibly applies to our scholia. It might be suggested that, in the Latin scholia to *Pr. An.*, we have the raw material which Boethius had taken and translated from the margins of a Greek MS., and which he was going to expand into a continuous commentary.

*Pr. An.* was first made known to Latin readers in the fourth century by Vettius Agorius Praetextatus who translated or adapted Themistius's now lost exposition.<sup>18</sup> Agorius's work seems to have been in Boethius's hands, but is not known to have survived: in no way could it be identified with our text. There is no evidence that *Pr. An.* was known in the Latin West after Boethius

<sup>16</sup> Cf. our 'Jacobus Venetianus Greus' in *Traditio* viii, pp. 265-304.

<sup>17</sup> 'Est etiam alia expositio, sed in Analytica nostris iam dictis est' (*De Syll. Cat.* ii. PL 64, col. 82b1: ☐ in the same work, few pages farther on (col. 83d1), he uses the future: 'si qua vero desint, in Analytica nostris calculatis exprimeamus'. Did he ever complete such a commentary? Or was he partly repeating the words of a Greek model, partly thinking of ☐ future work?

<sup>18</sup> J. Bidez, 'Boèce et Porphyre', in *Revue Belge de Philologie* 2 d'Histoire, ii, pp. 189-201. Some sections of Bidez's unpublished work on Porphyry's fragments have been drawn upon by J. Shiel in his thesis on Boethius's commentaries on Aristotle (typewritten; a copy is in the Bodleian Library).

<sup>19</sup> Boeth. *In librum septem, secunda editio*, pp. 3-5 (Meiser).



until the times of Abailard (c. A.D. 1120), who knew directly or indirectly two short passages from it, and Theodoric of Chartres, who included the first edition of Boethius's translation<sup>14</sup> in his encyclopaedia of the seven arts. Only one name could be suggested of a scholar, active before the end of the twelfth century, who might have been interested in, and capable of, translating commentaries on *Pr. An.* from Greek into Latin: that of James of Venice. But his method and language as a translator are definitely and clearly different from those of the Latin scholia: it is in fact on the basis of the sharp contrast between the languages of Boethius and James that it has been possible to assign to the latter the 'vulgate' of *Post. An.*, and to the former the 'vulgate' of *Pr. An.*, *Top.* and *El.*<sup>15</sup>

The Florentine MS. is quite unique among all the Latin manuscripts of *Pr. An.* It is the only one, out of about two hundred and seventy, that contains—and contained—only the *Pr. An.*; out of a hundred and twenty so far examined, it is the one which seems to contain the second, and very rare, edition of Boethius's translation in its purest form, and the only one which contains the 'corpus' of Greek scholia translated into Latin;<sup>16</sup> the paleographical characteristics—big letters throughout, even for the scholia, spaciousness, very careful transcription—suggest that we are in the presence of a library copy of an important text of the past.

The attribution to Boethius remains hypothetical; but the linguistic argument in its favour, if expounded in detail, might prove very strong; our other arguments strengthen it. No argument against this attribution has so far suggested itself.

L. MINIO-PALUELLO.

Oxford.

<sup>14</sup> See our 'Note sull'Aristotele latino medievale VIII' in *Riv. di Filol. Neo-Scol.*, 1953, pp. 217-18.—Theodoric's *Epitratichon* is preserved in microfilm in several libraries, including the Bodleian; the MS. was destroyed by fire in 1943.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the article quoted above, p. 101, n. 15.

<sup>16</sup> Only scanty fragments from the scholia are also pre-

served in two or three of the many other manuscripts inspected. The only important exception is the figure of the 'pons asinorum', which exists in most MSS.; but it is likely that Boethius had included it in the text of Aristotle itself, as it appears in Greek copies of *Pr. An.*, independently of any commentary or scholia.

## A PROOF IN THE ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ

In his lost essay *περί ἰδεῶν* Aristotle retailed and rebutted a number of Academic arguments for the existence of Ideas. Several of these, together with Aristotle's objections to them, are preserved in Alexander's commentary on A 9 of the *Metaphysics*. The first object of the following discussion is to show the sense and the provenance of one, the most complex and puzzling, of these surviving arguments. For several reasons it seems to deserve more consideration than it has yet had.<sup>1</sup> 1. Its length and technicality make it singularly fitted to illustrate the sort of material on which Aristotle drew in his critique. 2. Moreover, Alexander reports it by way of amplifying Aristotle's comment that, of the more precise arguments on Ideas, οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τὴν ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὐ φησὶν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος (*Met.* 99b15-17 = 1079a11-13); and the condensed and allusive form of this remark and its immediate neighbours in the *Metaphysics* can be taken to show that here Aristotle is epitomising parts of his *περί ἰδεῶν* that are independently known to us only through his commentator. We shall not understand the objection if we misidentify its target; and another purpose of this discussion is to show that the objection is not the disingenuous muddle that one recent writer labours to make it. 3. But Alexander's report of the argument is a nest of problems, and the same recent writer brands it as almost incredibly careless. To this extent, the success of our explanation will be a vindication of the commentator. But on all the heads of this discussion I am well aware that much more remains to be said.

### THE PROOF

In the authoritative text of Alexander<sup>2</sup> (which, with a minor emendation of Hayduck's,<sup>3</sup> Sir David Ross prints on pp. 124-5 of his *Fragmenta Selecta Aristotelis*) the specimen argument that produces ἰδέας τῶν πρὸς τὴν is given as follows.

I. When the same predicate is asserted of several things not homonymously (μὴ ὁμωνύμως) but so as to indicate a single character, it is true of them *either* (a) because they are strictly (κρίτως) what the predicate signifies, e.g. when we call both Socrates and Plato 'a man'; or (b) because they are likenesses of things that are really so, e.g. when we predicate 'man' of men in pictures (for what we are indicating in them is the likenesses of men, and so we signify an identical character in each); or (c) because one of them is the model and the rest are likenesses, e.g. if we were to call both Socrates and the likenesses of Socrates 'men'.

II. Now when we predicate 'absolutely equal' (τὸ ἴσον αὐτό) of things in this world,<sup>4</sup> we use the predicate homonymously. For (a) the same definition (λόγος) does not fit them all; (b) nor are we referring to things that are really equal, since the dimensions of sensible things are fluctuating continuously and indeterminate. (c) Nor yet does the definition of 'equal' apply without qualification (ἀκρυβῶς) to anything in this world.

III. But neither (can such things be called equal) in the sense that one is model and another is likeness, for none of them has more claim than another to be either model or likeness.

IV. And even if we allow that the likeness is not homonymous with the model, the conclusion is always the same—that the equal things in this world are equal *quo* likenesses of what is strictly and really equal.

V. If this is so, there is something absolutely and strictly equal (ἐστὶ τὴν ἀόριστον καὶ κρίτως) by relation to which things in this world, as being likenesses of it, become and are called equal. And this is an Idea. (Alexander, *Met.* 92. 11-83. 16 Hayduck.)

I shall refer to this report of the argument in the *περί ἰδεῶν* as P. Its gist, if not its detail, seems clear. What is allegedly proved, for the specimen predicate 'equal', is a doctrine familiar

<sup>1</sup> It has been discussed by Robin (who first assigned it to the *περί ἰδεῶν*), *Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, 19-21, 604-5, 607; Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, 299-39, esp. n. 137, and Wilpert, *Zwei aristotelische Fälschungen*, 41-4, each of whom knew only Robin's discussion; and Suzanne Mansion, 'La critique de la théorie des Idées dans le *peri ideon* d'Aristote', *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, xlvii (1949), 101-3, esp. n. 42. I shall refer to these writings by the author's name.

<sup>2</sup> The A of Benitz and later edd. The version of the commentary in I. and F. excerpted in Hayduck's apparatus is later in origin (Hayduck, *Alexander in Met. Commentaria*, pref. viii-b. and ix, n. 2). It modifies the

text of our passage in a clumsy attempt to evade the difficulties discussed *infra*, pp. 124-6. (But notice that, where A uses Socrates and Plato as examples, LF at first uses Callias and Theaetetus, reverting then to those in A.) On Robin's attempt (Lc.) to assign LF equal authority with AM see Wilpert, n. 38, Cherniss, n. 137.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 107, n. 26 *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> 'We' not of course the Platonists, who make no such error, but generally the unwary or unconverted to whom the argument is addressed. The objector envisaged at *Phaedo* 73b6-7, and Hippias (*Stipp. Met.* 288a and 289d), see no objection to using αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον and αὐτὸ τὸ κείνον of sensible things.

from several Platonic dialogues: things in this world can carry the predicate only derivatively, by virtue of resembling a Paradigm that carries it in its own right. The comparison with the *Phaedo* 73c-75d is especially obvious. Both arguments assume that 'αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον' describes something, and prove that what it describes is no physical thing. But already one characteristic of the author of our argument is clear. As we shall see, he is substantially faithful to his sources in Plato: but he takes pains to sharpen the logical issues they involve. As it stands in P, his proof depends on what must be intended as an exhaustive analysis of the ways in which a predicate can be used without ambiguity.<sup>5</sup> Now it is Alexander's report of this analysis that has perplexed his readers. For it seems plausible to say that the author of the proof cannot have regarded the sort of predication illustrated in I(c) as non-homonymous, in the sense initially given to that expression in I, and on the other hand that he cannot have regarded that which is illustrated in I(b) as non-homonymous in the sense of that expression required in II; so that the description of these sorts of predication as non-homonymous must be a confusion in P. To lay these doubts is to take a long step towards understanding the argument and establishing the reliability of P.

### CRITERIA OF SYNONYMY IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO

The difficulty in I(c) seems both logical and historical. We may say 'That is a man' without ambiguity when pointing to each of two flesh-and-blood men. Or (in a very different case) we may say it when pointing to each of two pictures, and what we say has the same sense of both pictures: in that respect we are still speaking unambiguously. But we are inclined to add that now we are not using the predicate in the same sense as in the first case: otherwise we should be mistaking paint and canvas for flesh and blood. Moreover this is Aristotle's view, and his examples suggest that he has our argument in mind.<sup>6</sup> Yet, as it stands, I(c) says just the opposite. The analysis seems to have distinguished cases (a) and (b) in order to assert with all emphasis that a combination of them in (c) imports no ambiguity at all.

The later version of the scholium (*supra*, n. 2) takes a short way with the difficulty, reclassifying I(c) as a case of homonymy. Robin (n. 1) tried to wrest this sense from the original text; Wülpert (*l.c.*) rejected the attempt but regretted the anomaly. Yet the problem is fictitious. The logical issue can only be touched on here. The fact is that, although the difference between I(a) and I(b) predication does show an ambiguity of an important type, this is not the sort of ambiguity that can be exhibited by the methods of Aristotle and the Academy.<sup>7</sup> It no more proves that the predicate-word has two paraphrasable meanings than the fact that I can point to a portrait and say 'That is Socrates' proves that Socrates had an ambiguous name. This is true, but it is doubtful whether it is the point that our author is making. For the wording of I(b) suggests that in its derivative use the predicate is to be paraphrased otherwise than in its primary use (i.e. in terms of 'likeness'), though this difference of paraphrase does not constitute an ambiguity. Similarly we shall find (*infra*, 109-110) that the argument of II can be construed as allowing, with one proviso, that a predicate can be used unambiguously of several things even when the λόγος of that predicate differs in the different cases; the proviso is that the different λόγοι shall have a common factor. (In the cases distinguished in I this factor is the primary definition of 'man', and in II it is the definition αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον αὐτῷ.) If this interpretation is correct our specimen of Academic argument contains an obvious parallel to Aristotle's admission of a class of πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν λεγόμενα which are in a sense synonymous (*Met.* 1003a33-1003b15, cf. *Eth. Eud.* 1236a15-20, and n. 37 *infra*).

But Aristotelian parallels are irrelevant to showing the reliability of P. What matters is that the analysis in I would misrepresent its Platonic sources if I(c) were not a type of unequivocal predication. This is implied by the reference in *Republic* 596-7 to a bed in a picture, a wooden bed and the Paradigm Bed as τὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖται (even when, as in P.I, only one of these is 'really' what the predicate signifies); and more generally it is implied by such dicta as that nothing can be just

<sup>5</sup> μὴ ἀπορρίπτειν in the Aristotelian version but not, as we shall see, using Aristotelian criteria. Some will detect the influence of Speusippus in P.I, noticing that in it the vehicles of homonymy and its opposite seem to be not things but words, and that this is held to be characteristic of Speusippus by contrast with Aristotle (Hambroch, *Logische Regeln der plat. Schule*, 27-9, followed by other scholars including Lang, *Speusippus*, 25-6. Hambroch contrasts Aristotle, *Cat.* 1a1 12, with Boethius's account of Speusippus in *Simplicius*, *Cat.* 38.19). Quite apart from doubt about this tradition represented by Boethius, it is clear that Aristotle's usage is far from being as rigid as Hambroch supposes (see e.g. *An. Post.* 99a7, 12,

*Phy.* II 238b12-21. H. neglects such passages in detecting a book of Speusippus behind *Topics* I 151. Moreover in P. III the ἀποδείγματα are things, not words. All that we can say is that P reflects a general academic usage.

<sup>6</sup> *De Part. An.* 640b35-641a23, *De An.* 412b20-22, and on the traditional interpretation *Cat.* 1a1-6. Cf. Porphyry, *Cat.* 6b23-24, followed by later commentators, and see earlier Chrysippus fr. 143 (von Arnim). But ἴσον, the predicate cited, is ambiguous in a more ordinary sense: LS<sup>5</sup> s.v. II).

<sup>7</sup> For a connected discussion I can refer now to P. T. Geach in *Philosophical Review*, LXV (1956), 74.



or holy or beautiful if the corresponding Form is not so.<sup>8</sup> These utterances have no sense unless the predicate applies without difference of meaning to model and likeness alike;<sup>9</sup> and they are integral to the doctrine that things in this world resemble the Forms. The author of our proof found the latter doctrine in his chief source (*Phaedo* 73c-4c) and remarked that it is illustrated there by the relation between Simmias and Simmias γεγραμμένος (73e), and in paragraph I he tried to do no more than put his original into precise logical shape. We recall Jaeger's suggestion that Aristotle did this very service to Plato in the *Eudemus*. But we had better defer any conjectures on the authorship of our proof.

τὸ ἴσον αὐτὸ AND τὸ ἴσον

A second puzzle turns on the three occurrences in P of the key-word 'homonymous'. P.I distinguishes three possible cases in which a predicate can be used *μὴ ἀμυδίμως*, which is shown by paraphrase to mean 'not ambiguously'. But P.II then seems to contend that the predicate 'equal' is used *ἀμυδίμως* of things in this world, although the explicit conclusion of P as well as the evidence of the dialogues on which P is based prove that such predication would be subsumed under I(b). Lastly, P.IV puts the case that the likenesses carry the predicate *non-homonymously* with their model, which squares with I but seems incompatible with II. In fact P.II seems the misfit; and again the later version in LF takes the short way, replacing the *ἀμυδίμως* of II with *συνωνυμίως* οὐ κρύβως δέ so as to bring the predication in question clearly under I(b). Robin's version of the argument (*l.c.*), which covertly reduces it to a *petitio principii* and contradicts the provisions of I, has been criticised by Cherniss (*l.c.*). Mlle Mansion (n. 42) has seized the important fact that P.II is concerned not with τὸ ἴσον but with τὸ ἴσον αὐτὸ, but I have not understood her claim that the argument is a *reductio ad absurdum* and I do not agree that IV is an interpolation. Wilpert has not considered the problem.

Cherniss has propounded a singular solution (n. 137). He holds that *ἀμυδίμως* cannot be used in the same sense throughout P; and accordingly he claims that in II it is introduced without warning in a *Platonic* sense, such that the Platonic *ἀμυδίμως* is compatible with the 'Aristotelian' *μὴ ἀμυδίμως* in I (which he at once denounces as a 'careless summary' by Alexander of his source). The Platonic sense is identified as 'having the common name and nature derivatively'. So far, the effect is exactly that of the verbal change in LF. But he is then faced with the *μὴ ἀμυδίμως* in IV. On his interpretation this cannot contradict the other occurrences of the expression, yet he cannot plausibly let himself say that it is a return to the 'Aristotelian' sense 'in the midst of the argument'. Consequently he has to provide a different Platonic sense, equally unadvertised by Alexander, whereby *μὴ ἀμυδίμως* in IV signifies that 'the image is not of the same class as the model'; and this in order that the use of *ἀμυδίμως* in the first 'Platonic' sense shall be compatible with the use of *μὴ ἀμυδίμως* in the second 'Platonic' sense and both of these compatible with that of *μὴ ἀμυδίμως* in the original 'Aristotelian' sense. In face of this it is easy to sympathise with his suspicion that the *μὴ* in the third occurrence must be an interpolation.

On the canons of this interpretation I have something more to say, but not until we have reviewed the problem. A closer reading of the text seems sufficient to dissolve it. For what is maintained in II is that τὸ ἴσον αὐτὸ would be predicated homonymously of things in this world; and τὸ ἴσον αὐτὸ is expanded in V into αὐτόισιν καὶ κρύβως (cf. κρύβως ἴσον, cf. IV: κρύβως καὶ ἀκρίτως ἴσον). Thus the question broached by II is just whether *ἴσον* can be used κρύβως of things in this world, i.e. as a case of the non-derivative predication illustrated in I(a); and the answer is that, except by a sheer ambiguity, it cannot be so used.<sup>10</sup> But this conclusion is perfectly compatible with the conclusion in IV and V that *ἴσον* without this qualification can be predicated

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. the instances cited by Vlastos, *Philosophical Review*, LXIII (1954), 337-8. But Vlastos obscures the point by saying 'any Form can be predicated of itself... F-ness is itself F'. The very fact that Plato could assume without question that αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος is big (e.g. *Phaedo* 100c5, cf. *Parmenides* 130a7-b1 and 131d), whereas in English such an assumption about *bigness* makes no sense, should give us qualms at rendering the title of the Form conventionally in such contexts by an abstract noun (Vlastos' 'F-ness'). V's formula misleads him into assimilating the two regressions in *Parmenides* 132-3. If the first can (but with reservations) be construed as confusing bigness with what is big, the second requires only that the Form should have the character it represents. If the first leaves a choice between two possible functions of a Form, the second reduces one of these to absurdity.

<sup>9</sup> This is unaffected by the fact that the Forms are standards. 'That is a yard long' has a different use when

we are speaking of the standard yardstick and when we are speaking of other things (Geach, *l.c.*), but this does not entail that 'yard' has two meanings. Aristotle commonly treats the Forms as *analogous* with their images (cf. *de Lin. Inter.* 688a1-10, cf. δ' οὐκ ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ σωματίων). The objection considered in *Physics* II 2, that *συνώνυμα* need not be *ὁμώνυμα*, may well stem from the attempt to safeguard this thesis from the 'Third Man'.

<sup>10</sup> Instead of asking in set terms whether 'equal' can, without ambiguity, be predicated *strictly* of such things, II seems to introduce the compound predicate 'strictly equal' and ask whether this can, without ambiguity, be predicated of such things. This comes to the same thing: in fact the distinction is too hard-edged for the Greek, but it helped to reduce the author of LF into the absurd notion that the compound predicate *ἀκρίτως* could properly be used, in a derivative sense, of earthly things.

unambiguously of a group including physical things, i.e. that physical things can be called equal by the *derivative* sort of predication shown in I(b). The arguments in II are designed solely to prove that, if 'equal' keeps its proper sense, nothing in this world can be called *strictly* equal.<sup>11</sup> III proves the corollary, that no group of things on earth can be called equal even as a case of mixed, I(c) predication (which would entail that something in the group *was* *κρίτως* *ἴσον*). What is not even considered in II and III is whether physical things can be called equal wholly derivatively, as in I(b).

Now IV is concessive in form,<sup>12</sup> and what it concedes is just this third possibility. (Its form does not of course mean that it is surrendering any part of the argument. It is concessive because it forestalls an objection: the objection that the talk of ambiguity in II is misleading and may be taken to apply to *ἴσον*, not *τὸ ἴσον αὐτό*.) And, in fact, I(b) predication is the only possibility still open to us if we are to keep any unity of sense in our everyday ascriptions of equality. But copies entail models, and this conclusion requires that *τὸ ἴσον* is predicated *κρίτως* of something *not* in this world, of which this world's instances of equality are likenesses.

But, finally, IV is only a concessive parenthesis, and it implies (*ἀεὶ ἐνεταί*) that the same result would follow from II and III alone. So it does: for II maintains that when we talk of what is *κρίτως ἴσον*, what we are referring to (unless the expression is being used ambiguously) cannot be anything in this world. It follows that, unless we call everyday things equal in some sense unconnected with the first, they must be so called derivatively. And since this conclusion is explicitly drawn in V, II, III and V form a complete argument.

So the form of P is clear and its use of the terminology introduced at the start is, as we might expect, consistent. But it is worth noticing two other considerations which are jointly fatal to Cherniss's account. The gross carelessness of which he accuses Alexander is out of character; he has not remarked that, when the commentator does introduce *ἀμύνητος* in the non-Aristotelian sense, he takes pains to explain the ambiguity.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, apart from all particular questions of interpretation (but see nn. 15, 19), the evidence adduced by Cherniss for the existence of his 'Platonic' senses of *ἀμύνητος*<sup>14</sup> has no tendency to prove his point; and the reason for this is worth emphasis. Plato does use *ἀμύνητος* fairly frequently. It seems clear (but he does not use it in the technical Aristotelian sense of 'equivocal'. Sometimes (as at *Tim.* 32a, *Parm.* 133d, *Phdo.* 78e) it is applied to cases of what Aristotle would doubtless call synonymy. But it does not for a moment follow that the expression meant for Plato what is meant by Aristotle's *ἀμύνητος*, any more than it follows that because 'soldier' can be applied to all bombardiers, 'soldier' means 'bombardier'. Elsewhere the same word is used of things that plainly do not have the same *λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*.<sup>15</sup> This should entail for Cherniss that Plato's use of the word was ruinously ambiguous, but of course it was not. As Plato uses it, what it means, its correct translation, is 'having the same name'; and the argument never requires more than this of it (cf., for instance, the versions of Cornford). The mistake recurs in Cherniss's further comment that 'for Plato *ἀμύνητος* when used of the relationship of particulars and ideas meant not merely "synonymous" in Aristotle's sense. The particular is *ἀμύνητος τῷ εἶδει*, not vice versa, because it has its name and nature *derivatively* from the idea'. Yet elsewhere the word is used of an ancestor from whom the name is derived<sup>16</sup> and elsewhere again where there is no derivation either way.<sup>17</sup> Nor does Plato reserve any special meaning for the metaphysical contexts Cherniss has in mind.<sup>18</sup> The fact is that when he thinks it necessary to say that particulars are like the Form in nature as well as name he says so explicitly (*ἀμύνητον ὁμοίον τε*, *Tim.* 32a5) and when he wants to say that they derive their names from the Forms he says that too (*Phdo.* 102b, 103b, *Parm.* 130c<sup>19</sup>). The second 'Platonic sense' of the word rests on the same basis.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>11</sup> It may be said (I owe the objection to Mr. B. J. Furley) that the argument in II(a) is designed to rule out I(b) predication as well as I(c), since even I(b) would presumably require an identical *λόγος* in the various subjects. But in that case the conclusion of II would contradict V, as well as being a thesis foreign to Plato and never attacked by Aristotle; moreover the difference of *λόγος* does not entail ambiguity since, as we shall see, they all have a common factor (p. 109 *infra*).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Alexander, *Met.* 86.11-12 Hayduck.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander, *Met.* 54.11-15, 77.12-19. Cf. ps.-Alex. *Met.* 500.12-35, 786.15.

<sup>14</sup> Cherniss, II, 102, citing Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* 522a-3.

<sup>15</sup> *Isos* 757b, cf. *Phil.* 57b, which Cherniss (i.e.) mis-translates as saying that 'the different mathematics, if *ἀμύνητος*, are a single *τέχνη*' when the point is that although they are *ἀμύνητος* it would be wrong to infer that they are one *τέχνη* (57d8-8).

<sup>16</sup> *Republic* 330b, *Parmenides* 126c.

<sup>17</sup> *Protagoras* 311b, cf. II, 19 *infra*.

<sup>18</sup> That Aristotle, who certainly knew that particulars were 'called after the Ideas' (*Met.* 987b8-9), did not recognise a sense of *ἀμύνητος* in these contexts such that 'the particular is *ἀμύνητος τῷ εἶδει* and not vice versa' must be proved for Cherniss by *Met.* A 990b6, which reports that the Form is *ἀμύνητος* with its particulars; here Cherniss is ready to find 'Plato's sense of the word' (II, 102).

<sup>19</sup> Not however *Parm.* 133c-d, which Cherniss has misread (I.c.): it is not the Ideas that are referred to as *ἡ ἑνὶς περὶ ἑκάστης εἰς ἑκάστην ὁμοιοῦν ἀμύνητος* but the 'likenesses-or-what-you-may-call-them' in this world. Since the particulars are nevertheless said to be *ἀμύνητος* to the Forms, this sentence alone, if he still takes it so seriously, explodes his thesis.

<sup>20</sup> And a misreading of the text cited, *Phil.* 57b: cf. II, 15 *infra*.



But why labour this point? Because the thesis in question seems a particularly clear application of one general principle of interpretation, and this principle underlies a well-known theory of the 'unity' (in the sense rather of fixity) of Plato's thought, to which Professor Cherniss is the distinguished heir. It is often observed that arguments for this theory assume that an expression in one context must carry a special sense determined by its application in quite another setting.<sup>20</sup> And no doubt some of the things to be said in this paper do not square well with that doctrine.

καὶ αὐτὸ AND πρὸς τὴ

So far, P keeps our confidence. It remains to discuss it as a digest of Platonic argument and a target of Aristotle's criticism.

On the face of it, P distinguishes two sorts of predicate: those such as 'man', which can be predicated *nupros* of things in this world [I(a)], and those such as 'equal', which even when they are used unequivocally of such things can be predicated of them only derivatively (II-V). To all appearance it seeks to provide forms for predicates of the second class by contrasting them with those of the first; and we shall see this impression confirmed by other evidence and by the detail of the argument. This distinction Cherniss tacitly suppresses in his précis of P,<sup>21</sup> and he is accordingly able to find 'no reason to suppose that the argument . . . was not also meant to establish the existence of Ideas in the case of all common predicates'.<sup>22</sup> He suggests no reason for this rewriting, unless it is (what is in any case no justification) that the similar argument in *Phaedo* 74-75 is said to apply to all things οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τὸ αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι (75c-d). But to assume that this includes all predicates whatever is to beg the same question. The predicates actually cited there as examples—ἴσον, μείζον, ἐλάττω, καλόν, ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον, ὅποιον—are all of the restricted type to which the argument of P applies; in the relevant respect they are all, as we shall see, the logical congeners of 'equal' and not of 'man'.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the same distinction, which is essential to the argument of P and its sources, is the basis of Aristotle's criticism of these arguments. That criticism gives the rest of our discussion its starting-point and conclusion.

It has come to be agreed that Aristotle's objection to the arguments which 'produce Ideas of relatives' (*Met.* A 9, 990b16-17, cf. p. 103 *supra*) is not of the same form as those preceding it in its context. He is not arguing that such proofs as that reported in P can be used to establish Ideas that were explicitly rejected by the Platonists. He is saying that their conclusions contradict a logical principle accepted by the Academy; and the commentary of Alexander enables us, I think, to identify the principle in question. (But Sir David Ross is one scholar who would not agree with this identification (*Aristotle's Metaphysics, ad loc.*), and in this he is followed by Wilpert.) Namely, Aristotle in this and the following sentence of his critique is turning against the Platonists their own dichotomy of καὶ αὐτὸ and πρὸς τὴ;<sup>24</sup> a dichotomy inherited from Plato and evidently regarded as not only exclusive but exhaustive, since the school of Xenocrates maintained it against the needless elaboration of Aristotle's own categories.<sup>25</sup> Aristotle is objecting that such a proof as P sets up a 'non-relative class of relatives', a καὶ αὐτὸ γένος τῶν πρὸς τὴ, and that 'we say' that there is no such class.

The first thing to remark is the wide sense carried by the Academic πρὸς τὴ when measured by more familiar Aristotelian standards. This seems to have eluded Alexander: hence, perhaps, his reference to P as proving ἰδέας καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴ where Aristotle says only ἰδέας τῶν πρὸς τὴ.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>20</sup> I can refer now to Vlastos, *op. cit.* 337, n. 31; cf. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (2nd edn.), 2-3.

<sup>21</sup> Cherniss, p. 230. To do this he omits the illustrations of the three types of predication in P.1. Yet (a) without the illustrations the analysis is merely formal and without explanatory force; (b) that the predicate cited in the first paragraph of Alexander's source was not *ἴσον* and was not a 'relative' term is implied by Alexander's remark that at any rate the proof goes on to deal with *ἴσον*, which is relative (89.23-3); and (c) in any case the illustration from portraits cannot be excised since it comes from the Platonic source (*supra*, p. 105). This in addition to the considerations adduced in the following pages.

<sup>22</sup> Cherniss, n. 180.

<sup>23</sup> Similarly those given to illustrate similar formulae at *Phaedo* 74d, *Rep.* 475a-d. The one passage in which Plato seems unequivocally to require a Form for every predicate (*Rep.* 395a) cannot be ingeniously cited by any critic wedded to the 'unity of Plato's thought' since (even if *Parasparas* 190 is brushed aside) taken literally it contradicts *Politeia* 262a-30 and incidentally leaves Aristotle's criticism of the *Pr. Int.* middle argu-

ment valid for every negatively defined predicate (*Met.* 990b13; cf. Alexander and Ross *ad loc.*). Readers other than those στανῶνται τοῖς ἰδέαι are likely to find the comment of D. J. Allan in *Mind* LV (1945), 270-1, sound and to the point.

<sup>24</sup> Alexander, *Met.* 83.24-26, 86.13-20. The relevance of this dichotomy was pointed out by D. G. Ritchie against Henry Jackson; cf. J. Watson, *Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato*, 32.

<sup>25</sup> *Sophist* 235c-d, *Philobus* 51c, cf. *Republic* 438b-d, *Parmenides* (68b-c, *Theaetetus* (160b). Xenocrates, fr. 12 (Heintz) = Simplicius, *Gal.* 63.21-4. I am not concerned here with the development and supplementation of this dichotomy in the early Academy, which has been the subject of recent studies. The subsequent conflation of the Platonic 'categories' with the Aristotelian, e.g. in Albinus (*Vitt. Albinus*, 62-7), may derive from Aristotle himself (*E.N.* 1096a19-21).

<sup>26</sup> Alexander, *Met.* 83.17, 22, 85.7. But the text of 85.11 (ὁ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὴ κατασκευάζει ἰδέαι ἴσους) should not be amended, for this comes from the *vepl ἰδέαι* and not from Alexander.



he seems to have seen that the proof applies, not certainly to all predicates, but to many that fall outside the Aristotelian category. (He reassures himself with the reflection, and the *you* seems to prove it his own, that 'anyhow the example used in the proof is relative'—*sc.* in the orthodox sense: *Met.* B3. 23-4.) In any case he is betrayed by his surprise when in the next sentence of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle argues from the priority of ἀριθμός to the priority not of τὸ πρὸς τι but of τὸ πρὸς τι (990b19-21). Here Alexander reports what is certainly the correct explanation (πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τινὸς ἐστίν, *Met.* 86. 5-6; cf. Aristotle, *Met.* 1092b19, and *Cat.* 6a36-37; τὰ πρὸς τι λεγόμενα *are, inter alia, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἀπὸ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγουται*. We know that τὸ ἀριθμὸν οὗτος εἶναι was an Academic premiss; Alexander, *Met.* 78. 16). But not content with this, he attempts to interpret the anomaly away (86. 11-13): an attempt at once refuted by the amplification of the argument in *Metaphysics* M 1079a15-17, which makes it wholly clear that Aristotle does intend here to subsume number under τὸ πρὸς τι as a general class contrasted with τὸ κατ' αὐτό.

Nor are the sources of such a classification in Plato far to seek. In *Republic* VII 523a-525a numbers are classed with such characteristics as *light and heavy, large and small*, on the score that our senses can never discover any of them κατ' αὐτό, in isolation (525d10): in perceptible things they are inseparable from their opposites.<sup>12</sup> For, as Socrates argues in the *Parmenides* (129c-d), what is one of something is any number of something else—one man is many members. We may say, for convenience, that 'one' as we ordinarily apply it to things is an *incomplete* predicate and that, accordingly as we complete it in this way or that, it will be true or false of the thing to which it is applied. Now the same is true, or Plato talks as if it is true, of all those predicates which in the *Republic* and earlier works supply him with his stock examples of Ideas; and conspicuously so of the logical-mathematical and moral-aesthetic predicates for which the young Socrates unhesitatingly postulates Forms in *Parmenides* 130b-d. In this world what is large or equal, beautiful or good, right or pious, is so in some respect or relation and will always show a contradictory face in some other.<sup>13</sup> As large is mixed with small (*Rep.* 524c), so just and unjust, good and bad, in having commerce with bodies and actions<sup>14</sup> have commerce with each other (*Rep.* 476a4-7<sup>15</sup>); and in an earlier context Plato argues that such seeming contradictions are to be resolved by specifying those different respects or relations in which the antagonistic descriptions hold good (436b-7a). Notice how various such specifications will be: some of Plato's predicates are concealed comparatives ('large') or can be forced into this mould ('beautiful' in the *Hippias Major* 288b-9c), some are more overtly relational ('equal'<sup>16</sup>), some are neither ('one'): we have to ask what X is larger *than*, what it is a certain number *of*, what it is equal *to*.<sup>17</sup> Later, in the *Philebus* (51c), Plato is ready to say that even of physical things some can be κατὰ κατ' αὐτά and not merely κατὰ πρὸς τι, but (although what is said of pleasure at *Rep.* 584d seems a first move towards this) there is no such admission in the *Republic*.

Notice, too, that Plato's treatment of these incomplete predicates makes no essential use of the idea of physical mutability, often though that idea recurs in the characterising of the Forms. Here, it is with the compresence and not the succession of opposites that he is expressly concerned.<sup>18</sup>

With these predicates Plato contrasts others of which 'finger' is an example. A finger can be

<sup>12</sup> *Parm.* Wilpert, 109, who cannot think that Alexander would allow himself such an interjection. But see Mansion, n. 79, Cherniss, 301-2.

<sup>13</sup> *Republic*, in a sense that includes any *prima facie* incompatibilities (e.g. different numbers).

<sup>14</sup> With *Republic* 479a-1s cf. 331c and 338d-e and Shorey, *Republic*, vol. I, 230, n. 8.

<sup>15</sup> 'actions' but Plato seems to have in mind types of action *etc.* in that note, cf. *Stoic Logic* 3.2-12. The *Symposium* 180c-1a makes the necessary distinction but here, as elsewhere, seems a step beyond the *Republic*.

<sup>16</sup> The debate on this passage has doubtless lived too long, but the natural sense is surely that given above. The *opposition* of the opposites with each other is a characteristic of those 'manifestations' in the physical world which seem to make a plurality of the Forms; this is the only sort of pluralisation in question in the passage (cf. 476b, 479a-b), and any attempt to read back the *concordia res discordat* of the *Sophist* into this text simply fits the argument needlessly. Plato is talking in terms of pairs of opposites—the unity of a Form is proved by contrasting it with its opposite, and the same λόγος is said to hold good of the rest (476a—but the corresponding pluralisation that is marked by the reconciling in one object of such a pair of opposites has nothing to do with the *Sophist*. Good and bad cannot 'communicate' in the *Sophist* sense (*Soph.* 252b). Cf. rather the *ἁπλῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλα* of *The*

102d7 and, with due reserve, *apud ἀρχαίους* *ἐντροπὴς* xv.

<sup>17</sup> Yet, as many have said, for Plato at this time equality and other relations are attributes of the individual. (It is worth recalling that *ἴσος* could be used to mean 'of middle size' and in this use is not overtly relational.) Geach's conviction (*op. cit.*, 76) that Plato must have thought of any case of equality, including the Forms, as a pair of related terms cannot be justified by the bare *αὐτὸ καὶ ἴσα* of *Phaedo* 74pt. Geach writes that the Form 'has to consist of two equals, or there wouldn't be equality at all'; Aristotle in the *apud Met.*, discussing the same line of thought in Plato, said 'What is equal must be equal to something, so the *αὐτόμαχος* must be equal to a *second αὐτόμαχος*' (Alexander, *Met.* 83.26-8), and whatever we think of Aristotle's methods of polemic this would have been absurd if Geach were right. See *infra*, 110.

<sup>18</sup> The argument of *Phaedo* 74b-c is probably better construed on these lines, taking the τὸ ἴσος . . . 26 δ' οὐ of 74b5-9 (despite the then misleading dative in 74c1) as *nominative* and governed by *ἴσος*. Thus at any rate *αὐτόμαχος* is to be the sense that the argument in *P* makes of its chief source (*lyria*, 109). Otherwise it turns directly an *equality* to different observers (cf. *Symp.* 212a3-5).

<sup>19</sup> *Apud*, *Republic* 324c2, 325a2, 329x1 and 45, *ind.* 479bb, 496d 670a, cf. *Phaedo* 74bb with *Parm.* 129b6 and *Phaedo* 102b-c.

seen καθ' αὐτό: sight never reports it to be at the same time not a finger (*Rep.* 523d). This predicate, then, breeds no contradictions that have to be resolved by specifying πρὸς τι. And the same is evidently true of 'man', and of 'fire' and 'mud': all those predicates for which the young Socrates is unready to admit Forms.<sup>35</sup> That something is a finger is a matter on which sight is competent to pronounce (523b, 524d), and it is characteristic of the sorts of thing to which Socrates refuses Ideas that they are just what we see them to be (*Parm.* 130d). The *Phaedrus* reapplies the distinction (263a: cf. *Alcibiades I.* 111-12) when it argues that men disagree not on the use of 'iron' or 'stone' but on that of 'good' or 'right'—or, we can add, on that of 'one' or 'similar'; for Zeno's logical puzzles, like the moral antinomies of his successors, were built on such incomplete predicates, and the *Parmenides* of itself would suffice to show that these two classes of problem lie at the root of Plato's earlier theorising. If we hope to resolve such disagreements by reference to some unexceptionable standard, we shall find that the world which contains unambiguous samples of fire and fingers contains no comparable cases of goodness or similarity or equality καθ' αὐτό. If we persist, our unambiguous Paradigm must be located elsewhere, in αὐτὸς τόπος.

Plainly, the exclusion of Forms of such non-relative predicates as 'man' is not characteristic of later dialogues nor even of the last book of the *Republic*. A greater preoccupation with mutability (as in the *Timaeus*) would naturally suggest that in a further sense all predicates are incomplete in their earthly applications, for all apply at one time and not at another. This point is already expressly made in a dialogue marked by that preoccupation, the *Symposium* (210c-211a), and the principle which could suggest it is already enunciated in the *Republic* (435b). So doubtless the argument of P, which ignores this extension of the theory, isolates one strand in Plato's thinking which in his earlier work at least he took small care and had small motive to distinguish sharply or to reconcile with others. The same is true of other arguments collected in the *περί ἰδεῶν*. But what seems beyond serious question is that the earlier accounts of Forms are dominated by a preoccupation with incomplete predicates, in the narrower sense given to that expression.

Man, fire and water seem to have remained stock Academic instances of τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγόμενα by contrast with τὰ πρὸς ἑτέρου or τὰ πρὸς τι,<sup>36</sup> and there is small doubt that the broad distinction sketched above between complete and incomplete predicates in Plato lay at the source of the Academic dichotomy as well as of some major arguments for Ideas. The so-called *Divisiones Aristoteleae* preserved by Diogenes Laertius define τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγόμενα as ὅσα ἐν τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ μὴδεὶς προαδίδται and τὰ πρὸς τι λεγόμενα accordingly as ὅσα προαδίδται τινος ἐρμηνείας (67 Mutschmann). Now it seems plain that the same distinction underlies the argument of P. For this explanation of τὰ πρὸς τι recalls the argument of Π(ε) that the definition of 'equal' does not apply without further specification, ἀκριβέως,<sup>37</sup> to anything in this world. To explain why one thing is called equal (and here again we have to note that equality is treated as an attribute of the individual thing) is to specify another with whose dimensions those of the first tally. And Π(α) seems only the other face of this coin, for different cases of equality will require the λόγος to be completed in different ways.<sup>38</sup> (Π(β) seems to add the rider that, since the dimensions of sensible things are constantly fluctuating, even to say 'having the same size as A' is to use a description without fixed meaning.) But even in Alexander's possibly condensed version it is clear that Π(α) and Π(ε) are not duplicates and that their sequence is important. For the point of Π(α) is that the specification of various correlates can be no part of the meaning of 'equal' if it is not merely ambiguous, and the point of Π(ε) is that when the common core of meaning is pared of these accretions it no longer characterises anything in this world.

Such arguments apply only to predicates which in their everyday uses are, in the Academic sense, relative. They follow Plato in deducing the existence of Ideas from the perplexing behaviour of 'equal' (or *mutatis mutandis* of 'beautiful' or 'good') when this is measured against such perplexing expressions as 'man'. To this Π(β) alone might seem an exception, for it can be read to imply (what it certainly does not say) that phenomenal things are continually changing in all

<sup>35</sup> *Parmenides* 130c-d. Parmenides' explanation of Socrates' choice, that he rejects Ideas of *ποταῖα*, is applied only to mud, hair and dirt (130e5). In any case it is a diagnosis of motive and not a characterisation of the reasons that Socrates could have offered.

<sup>36</sup> Hermodorus apud Simplic. *Phys.* 247.30 ff., Diogenes Laertius III 108, Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. X. 263.

<sup>37</sup> ἀκριβέως, opposed to κατὰ προαδίδται: cf. *An. Post.* 87a9-7, *Met.* 98a23-8 and 1078a9-13, *E.N.* 1138a11.

<sup>38</sup> Or the sense may be that different cases involve specifying different measurements; but this would leave the senses of λόγος in Π(α) and Π(ε) unconnected. And Π(ε) may mean just that nothing is equal without being unequal too. But, besides robbing Aristotle's reply of its immediate point (*infra*, 110), these interpretations

neglect a parallel of thought and language in the *Eudemian Ethics*. In the discussion of three types of friendship in *E.E.* VII. 2 it is said that one λόγος does not fit all the cases (1238a25), but the λόγος of friendship in the primary sense (φίλος) is an element in the λόγος of the rest (1238a 20-22 'the rest' are here of course species and not, as in P, individuals). For whereas friendship in the strict sense is to choose and love a thing because it is good and pleasant ἀπλῶς, friendship in its derivative sense is to do this because it is good πρὸς τι or pleasant τινι. In other words a definition that fits primary friendship without qualification (ἀπλῶς = ἀκριβέως in P. Π(ε)) needs to be completed to give the λόγος of the derivative cases. So in P: the similarity of language is very striking.



respects and so not *supra* the subjects of any predicates. But such an interpretation would be the death of P. It would contradict P.I, and it would leave the detail of P.II inexplicable, since the special arguments of II(a) and II(c) would be at once redundant—logically outbidden. Further, it would leave Aristotle's identification of such arguments as producing 'Ideas of relatives' unaccountable. For it seems to be true of all the proofs to which he refers in this context that they produce such Ideas, *inter alia*,<sup>39</sup> so that he can only mean to characterise a further class of argument concerned directly with τὰ πρὸς τι.

### A NON-RELATIVE CLASS OF RELATIVES

The author of our proof is substantially faithful to the class of Platonic arguments he represents, but here again he is anxious to sharpen a logical issue. What the dialogues describe as an appeal to an intelligible Paradigm is seen, in practice, to be the application of a correct definition (e.g. *Euthyphro* 6e). It is in terms of definitions that P is framed. To say that nothing on earth affords an unexceptionable Paradigm of equality is re-phrased as saying that to nothing on earth can the definition of 'equal' be applied, pared of irrelevant accretions. Now this re-phrasing brings out, more clearly than Plato's words, the crucial point at which Aristotle directs his objection—and any success in explaining his reply must stand in favour of our interpretation of the argument. Where a Paradigm is required for a predicate that is incomplete in its ordinary use it must indeed be (as the argument of P faithfully shows) a Standard Case, exhibiting rather than being the character it represents. But more: it seems that the Form, and the Form alone, must carry its predicate *καθ' αὐτό* in the sense given by the dichotomy. *αὐτὸ τὸ ὅμοιον* is indeed equal, but how can we without absurdity ask to what it is equal? It cannot be equal to everything or to nothing (both would engender paradoxes), and it cannot be equal to some things but not others (which would re-import just the compresence of opposites that the Form was invented to avoid: *Parm.* 129b-130a). The incompleteness which so embarrassingly characterises 'equal' in its ordinary applications cannot, it seems, characterise it when it designates the Form. This is the natural sense of Socrates' warning that the 'equal' he is to discuss is not 'stick equal to stick or stone equal to stone but just equal' (*Phdo.* 74a), and it is the main point of the argument in P that unless 'equal' is merely ambiguous the core of meaning common to all its uses must apply to something *δεσβῶν* or, as Aristotle puts it in the *Metaphysics*, *καθ' αὐτό*. One aim of the second part of the *Parmenides*, I take it, is to find absurdities in a similar treatment of 'our'. It is the extreme case of Greek mistreatment of 'relative' terms in the attempt to assimilate them to simple adjectives.<sup>40</sup>

This is the point on which Aristotle fastens, and his rejoinder is not the simple deception that Cherniss reads into it.<sup>41</sup> It is developed in more than one place. In the *Metaphysics* he is content to observe that such arguments construct a 'non-relative class of relatives', i.e. a class of non-relative instances of relatives. They require that any essentially incomplete predicate shall in *one* application behave as though it were complete—yet the Academy's use of the familiar dichotomy recognises no such exceptions (see the *Sophist* 255c-d). Alexander reports what is in effect the same objection: nothing can be equal that is not equal to something; but this entails that τὸ αὐτόμοιον is equal to another αὐτόμοιον, and thus the Form is duplicated (*Met.* 83. 26-8). But even without this corroboration we could be sure of Aristotle's sense. In chapter 31 of the *de sophisticis elenchis* he says: 'We must not allow that predications of relative terms (τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων) mean anything when taken out of relation (καθ' αὐτὰς), e.g. that "double" means something apart from "double of half" merely because it is a distinguishable element in that phrase. . . . We may say that by itself "double" means nothing at all; or, if anything, certainly not what it means in context'—and this rebuts the treatment of 'equal' in P and its sources as applying synonymously to earthly things and to the Form. If 'equal' does not behave as tractably as 'man' in this world, that does not entail that there is another world in which it does: the use of 'equal' is irreducibly different from that of 'man'.

The consequence attacked by Aristotle is, I think, implied by the Platonic arguments on which the proof in P relies. But did Plato clearly contemplate the consequence in framing the arguments? That is surely doubtful. It would be easy to overlook it in the case of an asymmetrical relation such as *double-of-half*, where the absurdity of having to give the Form a twin in order to supply it with its appropriate correlate does not arise. And Plato's very use of *καθ' αὐτό*, by contrast with the Academic usage that grew out of it, shows the weakness; for in characterising a case of X as *καθ' αὐτό* he evidently means rather to exclude the opposite of X than to exclude the relativity which gives entry to an opposite (*Parm.* 128c and 129d, *Rep.* 524d: notice that the solution of

<sup>39</sup> *Met.* 990b11-17. The proofs αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ πᾶσι and αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνὶ τῇ φύσει διὰ τοῦτο they are logically unrestricted in scope. For the λόγος ἐκ τῶν θεωρημάτων see Alexander, *Met.* 79.13-15.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, 76, n. 1, and for a later parallel R. M. Martin, *Phil. and Phen. Research*, XIV, 211.

<sup>41</sup> Cherniss, 279-85.



contradictions by specifying πρὸς τὴν and κατὰ τὴν is broached in quite a different context of the *Republic*). Nor is the latter exclusion the only means to the former, for where the Idea is overtly or covertly a comparative it can as well be represented as *superlatively* X, X in comparison with everything; so that here the predicate would retain its 'relative' character even when used of the Idea. Between these alternatives the treatment of αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν in *Symposium* 210c-211a seems to be ambiguous. But 'equal' and 'one' are not so amenable: their purity is not preserved by making them, in strict analogy, equal to or one of everything. The proof in P does not seem to be mistaken about the implications of its source.

Yet it brings out those implications with a new clarity, and in doing so it plays very neatly into Aristotle's hands. This fact, and the obvious concern of its author with logical reformulations, suggest that here ■ least we should be incautious in treating our records of the περὶ ἰδεῶν as a source of fresh information on Academic arguments about the Ideas. It looks as though Aristotle may be responsible for the representative proof that he produces for refutation. This is not indeed wholly plausible, for by characterising such proofs as ἀκριβέστεροι (*Met.* 990b15) Aristotle presumably means to commend his opponents and not himself for the logical care with which the proof is developed. And the argument of P is not a mere (even *disingenuous*) *réchauffé* of extant Platonic arguments, but a new structure of argument in its own right. But is this reason enough to dismiss the suspicion?

G. E. L. OWEN.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

## BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY

Among the topics this paper will discuss, the leading one is that of the moral psychology of the *Law*; it will not, however, attempt a general study of this, but will confine itself to the question whether that work presupposes any particular division of the soul into parts. The problem seems to have been on the whole neglected by scholars. Apelt in his *Platon-Index*<sup>1</sup> says briefly that the soul is there treated as tripartite, which is certainly not true without qualification. Neither England's commentary nor Ritter's affords much help. The latter does, indeed, touch on the question in Volume II of his *Platon*<sup>2</sup>; he there states that the *Law* treats the soul as tripartite, and supports this by referring to I. 644C and IX. 864B, but neither passage proves his point, the second actually suggesting that it requires some modification, as will be argued below. The best treatment known to me is the discussion of the second of these passages by L. Gernet in his translation (with commentary) of Book IX,<sup>3</sup> but it requires some expansion and supplementation.

It will be well to begin by recapitulating briefly the main points in the moral psychology of the *Republic*.<sup>4</sup> The soul is there divided into three parts or (better) elements, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive, and this division has two aspects: (a) an analysis is thus provided which can be used in the interpretation and appraisal of all action whatever, the soul being in the right state and the agent's actions right in consequence when the rational element controls the appetitive through the agency of the spirited; (b) at the same time each of the three elements represents a drive towards one of three goals, the rational towards knowledge, the spirited towards honour and public distinction, and the appetitive towards pleasure (interpreted as bodily pleasure), or towards material gain as a means to the attainment of pleasure. Secondly, each of these three drives may predominate in any individual soul (though it is commonest for the last to do so, and least common for the first), and the three are therefore to be correlated with three ways of life, that of the thinker, that of the soldier or man in public life, and that of the merchant or other person engaged in a money-making enterprise, and further these ways of life are specially characteristic of different races.<sup>5</sup> Thirdly, the three elements in the soul and the three types of character are correlated by Plato with the three classes in his ideal state, the rulers, the auxiliaries and the artisans.<sup>6</sup> Fourthly, the distinction of three elements in the soul is made the basis for interpreting the four virtues, wisdom being the virtue of the rational element and courage of the spirited (ideally under the control of the rational), while justice consists in the maintenance of the proper relation between the three elements, the rational controlling the appetitive through the agency of the spirited, and temperance in the willing acquiescence of the appetites in the rule of reason.<sup>7</sup> On the larger canvas of state organisation, the three classes will have as their specially characteristic virtues wisdom, courage and temperance respectively,<sup>8</sup> while the state as a whole will be just if the correct relation between the three classes is maintained and the reason of the rulers preserves its control with the help of the auxiliaries.<sup>9</sup> Fifthly, the tripartition of the soul is applied in Book IX to the discussion of pleasure, pleasures being graded as higher or lower according to the element in the soul which enjoys them; indeed, Plato argues that the pleasures of the rational element are not simply superior to those of the other two but more real as well.<sup>10</sup> Finally, Book X suggests at least that the rational element is the real self, that it alone is immortal, and that the other two exist merely in virtue of our temporary attachment to a body.<sup>11</sup>

The theory that the soul is tripartite occurs also in the *Phaedrus*. Here, however, the setting is a myth, and rigid exactitude of doctrine is not to be expected. The soul is likened to a team consisting of a charioteer and two horses which he is attempting to drive; in the case of the gods the charioteer and the two horses are all of noble breed, but the same is not true in other species, and in that of mankind one horse is of noble breed and the other of ignoble, so that the charioteer has difficulty in driving.<sup>12</sup> The charioteer is clearly reason. In saying that in the case of the gods both horses are of noble breed, Plato is indicating the unity and harmony that reign in the divine soul; in fact, he seems to suggest a little later that the soul of the gods is intellect through and through—a suggestion which seems to render inappropriate the introduction of the horses into the picture at all (just as it might be urged that in the phrase we have used above 'unity', taken strictly,

<sup>1</sup> s.v. 'Seeletheorie' P. 351.

<sup>2</sup> Paris, 1917. See pp. 102-6 n. 70.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. esp. IX. 115 B ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Rep.* 135E, 476A.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* e.g. 136E-141A.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 441C ff., 443C ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 429C ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 433A, etc.

<sup>9</sup> 526D ff.

<sup>10</sup> 611B-612A. One might add that the imperfect type of state and character depicted in Books VIII-IX can be interpreted in terms of the relations of the three parts of the soul.

<sup>11</sup> *Phdr.* 246A-B.

is incompatible with 'harmony').<sup>13</sup> Of the composition of the human soul sufficient indication can be obtained from what is said later in the myth. One horse is good, the other bad;<sup>14</sup> the good is a lover of honour conjoined with modesty and temperance,<sup>15</sup> needing no whip, but controlled sufficiently by the word of command and by reason;<sup>16</sup> its fellow, on the other hand, is the companion of insolence and wantonness, deaf, and amenable only to whip and spur.<sup>17</sup> It is plain that the three constituents of the myth are the parts of the soul figuring in the *Republic*.

In the relevant portion of the *Timaeus*, after various metaphysical preliminaries, Plato goes on to speak of the accession of sensation, and of desire, pleasure and pain and the various emotions, when immortal souls are implanted in bodies.<sup>18</sup> Once again the second and third elements in the soul make their appearance when reason has received bodily attachments, and when the soul is subject, through sensation, to violent intrusions from the physical world, the *Timaeus* being careful to distinguish what is mortal in the soul from what is immortal.<sup>19</sup> The *Timaeus* differs from the *Republic* in that the parts of the soul are now located in organs of the body. A. E. Taylor seems to have thought that Plato believed them to be so located when he wrote the *Republic*,<sup>20</sup> and this is certainly possible (it had, as a matter of fact, been suggested as a possibility by Wilamowitz);<sup>21</sup> but the evidence is inconclusive. In the *Timaeus*, however, the rational element is explicitly located in the brain, the spirited in the heart and the appetitive in the abdomen,<sup>22</sup> while the faculty of divination is assigned to the liver.<sup>23</sup>

There are two further points to be noted about the *Timaeus*. The former arises from a brief passage on which no great weight can be laid. 64A-65B provides a discussion of pleasure on physiological lines which contrasts sharply with that of *Republic* IX, and is much closer to the more extended treatment of the *Philebus*. It is like the *Philebus* in not explicitly correlating pleasures with the three parts of the soul in the manner of the *Republic*, though it is difficult to build anything on this since the passage is so brief and since 65A does speak of the 'mortal part' of the soul as that experiencing the pleasures there discussed,<sup>24</sup> while not specifying that part any further; the pleasures of smell are, indeed, a little hard to fit into the tripartition.<sup>25</sup> There is equally little to be inferred from the second point. This is that the *Timaeus* opens with a brief outline of a discussion on the ideal state which the participants are supposed to have held on the previous day,<sup>26</sup> and in this the main features of the political institutions of the *Republic* are recapitulated (the purely ethical and metaphysical discussions and the higher education being left aside), but nowhere is it stated that the number of classes in the state is to be three, the only distinction made being that between those whose business it is to rule and guard the state and, on the other hand, the farmers and artisans.<sup>27</sup> However, one can build nothing directly on this (though we may be reminded of it by what we shall find later in the *Laws*), in view of the cursoriness of the outline and the fact that in the *Republic* itself Plato is able to proceed some considerable distance without dividing the guardians into rulers proper and auxiliaries. The nearest approach to a mention of the tripartition of the soul in the political sketch in the *Timaeus* is the demand at 18A that the nature of the guardians shall be both 'spirited' and 'philosophical'.<sup>28</sup>

Plato nowhere explicitly abandons the tripartition of the soul, but in the later dialogues it falls into the background, and it is difficult to say that in any of them, the *Timaeus* apart (if it be counted as late), it is unambiguously presupposed.<sup>29</sup> Writing in dialogue form, Plato does not set out an ordered system but deals with problems as and when they occur in the course of the discussion, without feeling any need to repeat himself by going once again over the ground covered in earlier dialogues. But in the present instance there seems to be more to it than this, for the rational element tended naturally to stand apart from the other two as that which alone was immortal and divine, not owing its existence to any corporeal attachments. This is illustrated both by *Republic* X and by the *Timaeus*, the latter of which (as has been mentioned already) speaks of a mortal form of soul, contrasting it with the divine.<sup>30</sup> A division of the soul into two elements is, as a matter of fact, ascribed to Plato in *Magna Moralia* I. 1182a23 ff., where the division into three is not mentioned, the contrast intended being that with the theory (ascribed to Socrates) of the soul as an indivisible

<sup>13</sup> *Phdr.* 247D.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* 253D. cf. 246B.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* D-E.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 259E.

<sup>18</sup> *Ti.* 42A-B.

<sup>19</sup> *Cf.* *Ti.* 65A, 64C-D, 70A, 71D.

<sup>20</sup> *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (1928), p. 406.

<sup>21</sup> *Platon*, vol. I, p. 393 (ed. 1922).

<sup>22</sup> 44D-45B, 69D-71A.

<sup>23</sup> 71A-72C.

<sup>24</sup> *Cf.* 42A-B.

<sup>25</sup> 65A. But the pleasures of smell are also mentioned in *Rep.* IX. 583B.

<sup>26</sup> 17C-19B.

<sup>27</sup> τὸ τὸν γεωργὸν (sc. γέροντα) οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸν τεχνίτην, 17C.

<sup>28</sup> οἱ μὲν θυραῖοι, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι.

<sup>29</sup> There seems to me to be great force in Mr. G. E. L. Owen's arguments for placing the date of the *Timaeus* not long after that of the *Republic* ('The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues' *Cl. Qu.*, N.S., vol. iii (1953), pp. 79-95). Perhaps the *Phaedrus* was written about the same time, though this too is a matter of controversy.

<sup>30</sup> *Ti.* 65A, 69C-D, 72D. Burnet (*The Ethics of Aristotle* (1900), p. 63 n.) questions the relevance of these passages and of *Phr.* 309C (discussed below) to the bipartition of the soul into a rational element and an irrational, but he presents no good reasons for his view.



unity: μετὰ τούτων δὲ (sc. after Pythagoras and Socrates) Πλάτων διέλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχειν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον ὁρᾶν, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἐκάστῳ (ῥηκίστῳ) ἀρετὰς προσήκουσας. The expressions τὸ λόγον ἔχειν and τὸ ἄλογον are nowhere used in the dialogues in the sense required, but one may compare the manner in which the doxographical tradition represents Plato. Aëtius reports as follows: Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον διμερῆ τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς καὶ ἀκριβὲς τριμερῆ τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸ θυμικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, Aët. *Plac.* IV. 1. 1. One may compare the way in which the same idea is expressed by Theodoret, who was shown by Diels to be dependent on Aëtius: Πυθαγόρας μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων τριμερῆ τούτην (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) εἰρήκασι καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς εἶναι λογικόν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, διχῇ δὲ [μετὰ πάλιν] τὸ ἄλογον ἔτεμον· καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ θυμικόν εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν, Theodoret, *Cur. Graec. Aff.* V. 19 (cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* [Berlin, 1879], pp. 389-90). Such a bipartition was certainly familiar in the discussions of the Academy: it will be argued later that it provided the psychological basis of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and it is alluded to in the *De Anima*.<sup>29</sup>

Further, if there were to be two elements postulated, a rational and an irrational, instead of three, it was natural that the two selected should be the first and the third. It can be plausibly argued, as some years ago by Cornford and Hackforth,<sup>30</sup> that the spirited element was always in an ambiguous position, or even that the main justification for its inclusion lay in the political structure of the ideal state. If one examines it not as the pursuit of honour and distinction in particular but as an element involved in action in general, it may be thought of as strength of will or of character (normally co-operating with reason), or as self-respect (perhaps not widely different), while on the other hand it seems difficult to dissociate the notion entirely from that of anger, conceived purely as an emotion. In the *Republic* its function seems to be primarily executive, that of putting into effect the pronouncements of reason, so that, as the rulers control the artisans through the instrumentality of the auxiliaries, so reason rules the appetites by means of the spirited element. But, if once it were conceded that reason could be effective of itself in ruling the appetites, this function of the spirited element would disappear, while θυμός as spirit or anger would fall without difficulty into the ranks of the appetites and desires.

There is in fact evidence of a tendency in Plato in this direction. That evidence is negative for the most part, but merits investigation nevertheless. The *Politicus*, discussing the way in which the ideal legislator will rule his subjects, states that he will maintain the right relation—the metaphor actually used is taken from weaving—between that part of the soul which has existed eternally and that which is 'of animate kind'.<sup>31</sup> We are inevitably reminded of the *Timaeus*. There is little of relevance in the *Philebus*, but perhaps one may tentatively draw some indications from its ethical argument, which is based on a consideration of the two claimants put forward for the title of the good for man, knowledge and pleasure. The life of knowledge alone, devoid of pleasure, may, it is conceded, satisfy a god, but it is not one which a man can desire,<sup>32</sup> while the choice of pleasure without knowledge is even less acceptable.<sup>33</sup> For man the good life must unite both.<sup>34</sup> There will inevitably be some hazard in the attempt to infer a moral psychology from these data, but it is clear that divine existence is thought to be pure intellect, as in the *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*;<sup>35</sup> in man, on the other hand, a distinction between a rational and an irrational and appetitive soul seems to be involved—a purely intellectual being would not, on this view, experience pleasure, and the gods are such—and, though there is nothing to preclude any third element, there is nothing to necessitate one. In particular, the list of goods at the end of the dialogue contains nothing which could be the special goal of a spirited element, such as is conceived in the *Republic*.<sup>36</sup> This by itself is not much to build on, particularly as the picture of the ideal life for the individual is constructed on the same lines as that in the *Republic*, where even in the ideal state the philosophers undertake to rule merely because they are conscious of a moral constraint to do so, while in such states as actually exist it is the part of a wise man to avoid the political arena as far as possible: his aim, and theirs, will be, as in the *Philebus*, knowledge accompanied by the appropriate pleasure. There is, however, a further characteristic of the *Philebus* to be mentioned, namely that, in fact, though it discusses pleasure at length, distinguishes different types of pleasure and (like the *Republic*) differentiates true pleasures from false, it nowhere classifies pleasures in accordance with a tripartition or any other similar analysis of the soul. It may well be argued that all that this proves is that Plato did not here need any such analysis; whether anything more is involved is difficult to say, and it is impossible to be dogmatic, though perhaps an examination of the *Laws* will give some little help.

<sup>29</sup> *De An.* ii. 432a23-6.

<sup>30</sup> F. M. Cornford, 'Psychology and Social Structure in the *Republic* of Plato' (*J. L. G.* vi (1932), pp. 246-65); R. Hackforth, 'The Motivation of Man in Plato's *Republic*' (*J. L. G.* vii (1933), pp. 283-72).

<sup>31</sup> Ἠρώτων μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τὸ δαιμόνιον ἢ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν μένος θεῶν ἀνταρξάμενον δαίμων ἢ.

(μετακτὴ ἐπιστήμη), μετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖον τὸ ἐκτελεστικὸν αὐτῶν αἰετὶς ἀσφραγισμένη, 399C.

<sup>32</sup> *Phil.* 21D-22C, 60E.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* 21A-1D, 21D, 23A, 60D-E.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* 22A ff., 61B.

<sup>35</sup> *Phil.* 22B-C; cf. *Acad. I*, N X. 1177b26-1178a2.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Rep.* IX. 581C-583A, with IV. 435E-436A.

Here our primary evidence is provided by IX. 863B-C, where Plato, discussing the nature of criminal responsibility, enumerates three sources of wrong action, 'spirit' (*θυμός*), pleasure and ignorance. The crucial words on the subject of *θυμός* are as follows: ἐν μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶρε τι πάθος εἶρε τι μέρος ὧν ὁ θυμός, δόσκει καὶ δόσμενον κτήμα ἐμπεφυκός, ἄλογόν τε βίη πολλὰ ἀναρπᾷ.<sup>39</sup> Plato is careful to distinguish spirit from pleasure (or, rather, from the impulse towards pleasure), but what he says about it is studiously vague. The classification of the sources of wrong action is reminiscent of the tripartition of the soul in *Republic* IV, where, though it is stated that in the conflict of reason with the appetites the spirited element normally sides with reason, it is not denied that this may fail to occur;<sup>40</sup> on the other hand in the *Republic*, by contrast, the reader is left in no doubt that spirit is a part of the soul on its own account.

The other relevant passages occur largely, though not entirely, in Book I, which sets out the psychological preliminaries. The phrase 'to be master of oneself' (τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὐτόν, *κρατεῖν αὐτοῦ*) is discussed at 626E in terms which presuppose a division of the soul (Plato had not abandoned that), as does also what Plato says a little later, when advancing the ideal of harmony in the state.<sup>41</sup> These conceptions set the key for the whole of the rest of Book I, as when the four virtues are introduced at 630A-B.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, while in the *Republic* these are set out as bound up with, and dependent on, the tripartite nature of the soul, nothing is said of that here. What we find in the *Laws*—at least in the early books—is that the virtues to receive the greatest attention as virtues are courage and temperance,<sup>43</sup> and between these an elaborate parallelism is maintained, courage being the virtue appropriate in the face of pain, temperance that appropriate in the face of pleasure.<sup>44</sup> In both cases the virtue consists in self-command, and moral education in the steps taken to inculcate it, while the educational ideal laid down at the beginning of Book II is similarly that the child shall feel pleasure and pain at the right things.<sup>45</sup>

To touch on a few isolated passages later in the work, the same themes of pleasure, pain and self-control recur at III. 689A-E, and those of pleasure, pain and right thinking at 696C.<sup>46</sup> VII. 840B-C, where Plato stresses the regulation of desire for pleasure in the sexual sphere, is of no great importance for us. More significant is IX. 863E-864A, shortly after the passage on *θυμός* quoted above, where Plato, discussing criminal responsibility, gives definitions of justice and injustice which it is instructive to compare with those in *Republic* IV: 'Wrong (*ἀδικία*) is the name I give to the domination of the soul by passion, fear, pleasure or pain, envy or cupidity, alike in all cases, whether damage is the consequence or not. But where there is a conviction that a course is best—wherever a society or private individuals may take that best to lie (v.l.)—where that conviction prevails in the soul and governs a man's conduct, even if unfortunate consequences should arise, all that is done from such a principle, and all obedience of individuals to it, must be pronounced right (*δίκαιον*) and for the highest good of human life, though detriment thus caused is popularly taken to be involuntary wrong (*ἀκούσιον ἀδικίαν εἶναι*).'<sup>47</sup> As in the *Republic*, though here applied only to the individual soul and not to the state, we have what may be termed an 'internal' definition of justice. Finally we may note that a little later, at IX. 870, the sources of wrong-doing are listed as three in number, desire for money, ambition (*φιλοτιμία*) and fear of detection.

All these passages can be interpreted on the assumption that the tripartite soul is, however hesitantly, presupposed throughout. But nevertheless Plato studiously avoids mentioning it, and this is remarkable in so long a work paying so much attention to moral psychology, even though it might be objected that Plato is more concerned with detailed legislation here than he was in the *Republic*—after all, he also manages to say not a little about theology. But there is more to it than this: the *Laws* operates on the basis of the familiar set of four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, which were expounded in the *Republic* as resting on the character of the soul as tripartite, but this same set is found also in Aristotle's *Protreptics*,<sup>48</sup> which analyses the soul not into three elements but into two, a rational and an irrational, and elsewhere in Aristotle also.<sup>49</sup> To presuppose four 'cardinal' virtues does not necessarily involve presupposing three parts of the soul, even if the soul be divided into parts and if further this division be taken to be the basis of the dis-

<sup>39</sup> *θυμός* is classed by Aristotle as a *πάθος* at *De An.* I. 423a16-17 and *E.N.* VII. 1147b14-16. The threefold classification of appetite, spirit and thought occurs at *E.E.* II. 1223a25-1224a7 (cf. also *ibid.* 1223b25 and *E.N.* III. 1111b10 ff.).

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *σοφία μέλλουσα αἰεὶ ταῖς τοῦ θυμοῦ δόξαι: ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰρήνῃ τὴν αἰετὴν καὶ ἀνταρξίαν τοῦ θυμοῦ.* *Rep.* IV. 430E; *ἡ ἡμετέρα τοῦτο ἐστὶν τοῦ θυμοῦ δόξα: ἐπικρατεῖν ἢ τοῦ λογισμοῦ φάνηται ὅτι οὐδὲ ποτὶς ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ.* *ibid.* 430E-441A.

<sup>41</sup> 627D ff., esp. 628D-E and 630A-D. Cf. *ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς ἀλλήλων ἐπὶ ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς ἑμῶς αἰσθάνεται σφαιρῶν.* 626E.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. 631C-D, 647E-D.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. esp. 633E.

<sup>44</sup> 633E-634A, 696D-E, 647C-648E, and cf. also the juxtaposition of pleasure, pain and desire at 631E.

<sup>45</sup> 659A-C.

<sup>46</sup> *τὴν τὰς ὁλοκῆς καὶ ἀπολαύσεως κατὰ μέτρον συμφέροντος τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ἄνθρωποις καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν.*

<sup>47</sup> A. E. Taylor's translation. Similar views have been adopted in recent centuries, as by Kant and T. H. Green (cf. also Rousseau).

<sup>48</sup> Fr. 5, p. 23.13-20 Ross = Fr. 5a, p. 29.20-23 Walzer.

<sup>49</sup> *Pol.* VII. 1329b33-36, 1334a22-26, *E.E.* III. devotes special attention to courage and temperance.



tion between the virtues. If the alternative bipartition be employed, contrasted with the rational part of the soul there will be an irrational, characterised by the capacity for feeling pleasure and pain; temperance and courage will be shown in the control of pleasure and pain by reason, while wisdom, as previously, will be the specific virtue of the rational element and justice will be shown in the maintenance of a total balance. IX. 863B-C, quoted above, suggests a certain hesitation in Plato's mind, and it has been seen that there were tendencies in other dialogues pointing in that direction. The *Lysis* does, in fact, suggest a bipartition of the soul more naturally than a tripartition, as is confirmed by IX. 863E-864A (also quoted above): reason is simply contrasted with the emotions, and the absence of the rigid scheme of the *Republic* means that the treatment is freer and more empirical. Again, when the sources of wrong-doing are given as desire for money, ambition and fear of detection,<sup>40</sup> we have a list that could indeed be brought within the old three-fold framework, since fear of detection amounts to a desire for freedom from pain, the opposite of pleasure, but Plato does not make any such point explicitly, and his treatment is no longer forced in the same way. A further point which is perhaps of some significance in so long a work is that, as in the *Philebus*, though so much is said about pleasure, Plato does not grade pleasures in accordance with any division of the soul into parts; but then, he is no longer concerned, as he was in *Republic* IX, to vindicate the primacy of the pleasures of the intellect.

It is difficult to be sure how far it is relevant here to refer to the ideal state of the *Lysis*, which differs from that of the *Republic* in certain respects in which the latter is closely connected with the tripartition of the soul. To this it may be objected that Plato has not really abandoned his earlier ideal state, but is only putting forward his new political scheme as something second-best. However, examination of the most directly relevant passage of the *Lysis*<sup>41</sup> shows no more than that Plato still regarded his early communism as ideal, and this does not mean that he was still committed to the *Republic* as a whole, even on its political and institutional side, while the new religion of the *Lysis* is certainly brought forward with the utmost seriousness. We find in the *Lysis* a greater complexity of social structure. The old third class, that of the artisans, is now placed outside the ranks of the citizens altogether;<sup>42</sup> the citizens of the *Lysis* correspond to the two upper classes of the *Republic*, and among them the established order is slightly less authoritarian, elements of both monarchy and democracy (if these are the proper terms) being found, though the former predominates.<sup>43</sup> The primary distinction is that of rulers and ruled, but how far this is to be connected with the tentative shift in the direction of a bipartite soul is difficult to say.

It remains to ask what further evidence there is to support the thesis I have been suggesting. The *Epinomis* (whatever its author may be) provides very little, but what it says may be worth noting. The motion of the stars is, it holds, like all other motion, due to a soul attached somehow to the body and governing it;<sup>44</sup> the perfectly circular movements of the stars are evidence not of the lack of an indwelling soul but of its perfection.<sup>45</sup> Moving according to reason, in the course which deliberation pronounces to be the best and with a perfectly orderly motion, they are contrasted with men and with other 'earthly' creatures whose movements are characterised by disorder, though man is indeed able to contemplate the heavenly bodies and the order in which they move.<sup>46</sup>

It is difficult to be sure of the psychological theory of movement and action which underlies this classification, if indeed a very precise one underlies it at all. The tripartition of the human soul is nowhere mentioned, but it is certainly possible that it is envisaged, and if so it will be helpful to compare the passage of the *Timaeus* in which it is said that a rational element exists not only in the human soul but in those of the lower animals also, though more seriously distorted than in that of man.<sup>47</sup> In that case, the contrast envisaged between the activity of divine beings, that of men and that of the lower animals, will be one between different types of being all of which possess reason; but while in the first type reason is hindered by no disturbing elements, in the second appetite and spirit provide a certain degree of disturbance and in the third a greater. The nature of the star-souls—their connection with bodies composed of aether—will mean also that corporeal attachment as such will not bring upon the soul the disturbance of appetite: that happens only in the case of 'earthly' creatures.<sup>48</sup>

All this is possible, but, as in the case of the *Lysis*, it is possible, and even tempting, if we look at the *Epinomis* without reference to the *Timaeus*, to see here not a tripartition but a bipartition into a rational element and an irrational. If so, the star-souls will be purely rational, their movement being for that reason perfectly orderly, while the souls of the lower animals will be completely

<sup>40</sup> *Lg.* IX. 857c.

<sup>41</sup> VII. 846D.

<sup>42</sup> III. 920A-E, 653D-E, IV. 742B-E.

<sup>43</sup> *Epin.* 981C-985B; esp. 983D-E.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 982A-E.

<sup>45</sup> This seems to be the implication of τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐν ἀταξίᾳ κινουμένων ἀφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀρᾷ τοῦ πᾶσι.

<sup>46</sup> V. 739.

ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀρᾷ τοῦ πᾶσι καὶ ἀφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀρᾷ τοῦ πᾶσι καὶ ἀφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀρᾷ τοῦ πᾶσι, taken with the emphatic injunction that man must study astronomy if he would be perfect.

<sup>47</sup> *Tim.* 91D-92D, 92E-93C.

<sup>48</sup> Contrast the *Phaedo*, but the theory of aether is later than that dialogue.



irrational (or should we say 'non-rational'?) and their movements will exhibit disorder throughout. The human soul, on the other hand, will contain both a rational element and an irrational; its movements will in the ordinary course of things be disorderly, but it will be capable of virtue and, above all, of the contemplation of the divine.<sup>59</sup> Against this interpretation one can allege (for what they are worth) the passages of the *Timaeus* referred to above. In its favour two facts can be adduced: first that, apart from a few passages, Aristotle seems to deny intelligence to animals while allowing them both imagination and appetite, and that there is perhaps in the *Epinomis* a tendency in this direction;<sup>60</sup> secondly, the known prevalence (of which we shall have shortly to speak) of such a bipartition in the circles in which the *Epinomis* was composed.

It is clear that not much can be built on the above. What is much more important is that a bipartition of the soul is explicitly put forward in the *Protreptics* of Aristotle, which seems to belong to the late fifties.<sup>61</sup> The relevant portion argues that the soul and its goods are to be preferred to the body and its goods, and a distinction is further made within the soul of a rational element and an irrational; and as the soul is superior to the body and rules over that, so the rational element within the soul is superior to the irrational and rules over that.<sup>62</sup> The simile is found also in the *Politics*.<sup>63</sup> The argument for the absolute superiority of the rational element is clinched by the assertion, repeated later in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that this is the real self.<sup>64</sup>

The *Protreptics* follows the Academic tradition of distinguishing four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, the primacy belonging to wisdom (*σοφία*), the virtue of the part which is highest and is alone immortal. But the bipartition of the soul is found here in uneasy collocation with the theory of the four virtues, since there is now no reason why their number should be limited to four. Aristotle's subsequent evolution shows a gradual change: in the *Eudemian Ethics*, though specially detailed attention is bestowed on courage and temperance, many other virtues are discussed also, with no suggestion that they are purely derivative (while justice and the intellectual virtues now receive separate treatment), while in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, though they are still dealt with first, they scarcely receive special prominence. The treatment of the moral virtues has no longer an *a priori* basis but an empirical.

It remains to examine the passage on the bipartition of the soul in *Nicomachean Ethics*, I. 19, especially 1102a26-28,<sup>65</sup> and also *De Anima* III. 430a24-26.<sup>66</sup> The interpretation of the former is bound up with that of the phrase of *ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, which, with others which are similar, occurs several times in the treatises of Aristotle, and has been the subject of much controversy in the course of the last century. Bernays held that it referred consistently to Aristotle's lost dialogues—in other words, to his published works as distinct from his lectures, which were intended only for his pupils.<sup>67</sup> *E.N.* I. 1102a26-28 he took to refer to the *Eudemus*.<sup>68</sup> This interpretation of such terms as *ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* was, however, criticised by Diels, who was followed by Susenmühl. Diels doubted if any single consistent meaning was to be given to these phrases running through all the passages where they occurred, but held that, if such were to be given, it would have to be 'discourses external to Aristotle's school'.<sup>69</sup> But Bernays' interpretation found a supporter in Jaeger, who approached the problem afresh in his attempt to trace the course of Aristotle's development, and found no difficulty in the idea that Aristotle should, in his later years, have sometimes referred to earlier works of his own in which views were put forward with which he was no longer completely in accord; nor was he compelled to hold with Bernays that differences in doctrine were always due to the dramatic setting (though that may sometimes be the case).<sup>70</sup>

Diels may perhaps have been right to the extent that one should not expect the phrases under discussion to bear the same meaning in every passage where they occur. They may not be in the

<sup>59</sup> *ἔργα*, 977B-978B, 979C-D.

<sup>60</sup> *De An.* II. 414b16-19, III. 429a4-6, *Met.* A. 980a27-28ab5. But Bonitz's *Index s.o.* *ἄνθρωπος* gives several passages where that word is used of animals. *De An.* II. 421a20-3 speaks of man as *φρονιμώτατος τῶν ζῴων*.

<sup>61</sup> The *Protreptics* seems to have been written shortly after the *Eudemus*, which was written in or shortly after 354 (cf. P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des Œuvres d'Aristote*, 1951), pp. 3-4-5, with the references there given; A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. 4 (1949), p. 168, n.21.

<sup>62</sup> *ψυχὴ μὲν ἀνθρώπου βέλτερον ἡνικιστοτερος γὰρ, ψυχὴ δὲ τῶ ἀλόγου ἔχει καὶ ἡμιαναν ἔστι γὰρ τινος τὸν ὁ κελδεῖ καὶ κελδεῖ, καὶ δὲ τὸ ἢ μὴ δὲ τὸ φῶς πρῶτον, fr. b, p. 25, II. 6-8 Ross (fr. 6 Walzer) (from Simplicius, ch. 7). Jaeger (*Aristotle*, E.T., p. 63) claims to be the first to attribute this chapter of *Psychologia* to the *Protreptics*; see, however, L. Bywater, 'On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle' (*J. Phil.* 41 (1894), pp. 35-59), esp. 37-8.*

<sup>63</sup> I. 1253a24-b24, esp. b1-9.

<sup>64</sup> *Loc. cit.* II. 11-12 Ross. Cf. *E.N.* IX. 1160b28-1160c3, X. 1177b31-1178a2.

<sup>65</sup> *Ἀρχαὶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἀνα, καὶ χρηστοὶ αὐτοῖς ὅτι μὲν ἀλόγου αὐτῆς ἐστὶν τὸ ἢ ἀλόγου ἔχει.*

<sup>66</sup> *πρῶτον γὰρ τινος ἐστὶν φῶς πρῶτον (sc. ἀνθρώπου τῆς ψυχῆς), καὶ ὁ μόνος ὁ τινος ἀλόγου ἡνικιστοτερος, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ὃ δὲ τὸ ἀλόγου ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀλόγου.*

<sup>67</sup> J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1863), p. 11. For Bernays' view of the dialogues in general, see pp. 45, 127-8.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 63-4.

<sup>69</sup> H. Diels, 'Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles' (*Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1883), pp. 477-94, esp. p. 492; *Aristotle, Politics*, I-V (i.e. I-III, VI, VII), ed. F. Susenmühl and R. D. Hicks (1894), pp. 361-3.

<sup>70</sup> Jaeger, *Aristotle* (E.T.), pp. 246 ff.

proper sense technical terms: they may only seem to be such when they have first been isolated and tabulated by scholars. But it is at least certain that in several passages Bernays' interpretation can be seen to be correct if Jaeger's arguments are kept in mind, and this creates a presumption in its favour elsewhere also.

Heinze and Burnet, however, maintained that 1102a26-28 referred to Xenocrates.<sup>71</sup> Now it is perfectly possible that Xenocrates did hold the view in question, but there is little or no evidence on which to work, and even if he did it is unlikely that the reference here is to him. Heinze and Burnet were influenced by Diels, and also (probably) by the fact that there are several passages where, presumably for personal reasons, Aristotle criticises views of Xenocrates without mentioning his name<sup>72</sup> (the only work where he does so being the early *Topica*<sup>73</sup>), while there seems to be no other thinker to whom he consistently alludes in this veiled and anonymous manner. But comparison of 1102a26-28 with the passage from the *Protrepticus* referred to above, taken in conjunction with what Jaeger has said about the term *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, can leave no real doubt that it is to the *Protrepticus* that Aristotle is alluding; the other interpretation may have been helped by the fact that there is no good reason for supposing, as did Bernays,<sup>74</sup> that the allusion is to the *Eudemus*, though it is certainly possible that that dialogue dealt with these topics. That the *Protrepticus* was in Aristotle's mind is made still more certain by the fact that an earlier passage in *Nicomachean Ethics* I alludes to the *Protrepticus* under the term τὸ ἐγκύκλιον,<sup>75</sup> while the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Politics* do so under the term οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.<sup>76</sup> Nuyens, in his *L'Évolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote*, does indeed state that 1102a26-28 refers to the *Protrepticus*, but he mentions no particular fragment and gives no supporting reasons.<sup>77</sup>

As for Xenocrates, we learn from Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of his works that he wrote on topics of moral psychology, but of what he said nothing is known directly.<sup>78</sup> Heinze reconstructed psychological and eschatological theories from Plutarch, *De Facie in Orbe Lunae*, and attributed them to him, but these attempts fall to the ground.<sup>79</sup> More to the point, but nevertheless puzzling, is a passage in a Neoplatonic commentary on the *Phaedo* found in conjunction with part of that of Olympiodorus. According to this, Xenocrates and Speusippus regarded the soul as immortal μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας. In this they are compared with Iamblichus and Plutarch, and contrasted with various other philosophers, and an examination of the other cases confirms that the use of μέχρι is inclusive, i.e. that the meaning is that Xenocrates and Speusippus held that there were in the soul both a rational element and an irrational, and that both were immortal.<sup>80</sup> But unfortunately this does not settle the issue definitely in favour of attributing a bipartition of the soul to Xenocrates and Speusippus; the language would also be compatible with their having held that there were more irrational elements in the soul than one, and the doxographical tradition (as has been seen) makes it clear that the two lower divisions of the soul were regarded frequently as subdivisions of the irrational, to be contrasted with the rational.

Of *De An.* III, 432a24-26 all that needs to be said or that can be said definitely is that, like *E.N.* I, 1102a26-28, it confirms that the bipartition of the soul was familiar in the early Academy. In part Aristotle would be criticising his own earlier self, but we may take it that it was not himself alone that he had in mind. Similar confirmation comes from *Magna Moralia* I, 1182a23 ff.<sup>81</sup>

D. A. REES.

Jesus College, Oxford.

<sup>71</sup> R. Heinze, *Xenocrates* (1892), pp. 121-3; J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (1908), note ad loc., and pp. 63-4.

<sup>72</sup> *Met. E.* 1028b27; *Met. M* and *N* (frequently); *De An.* I, pp. 27, 301b32-301b34.

<sup>73</sup> *Top.* II, 112a37, VI, 112a6, VII, 112a7, 207.

<sup>74</sup> *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, pp. 63-9.

<sup>75</sup> *E.N.* I, 1025b32-1026a2 (cf. καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἥδιον μετὰ οὐκ αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἀποδείκνυσθαι τὰς αἰσθητὰς τῆς καθόλου ἐκ παραδείξεως τῶν ἡδονῶν, *Protr.* fr. 9, p. 38 ad fin.-p. 39, l. 1 Rom.).

<sup>76</sup> *E.E.* II, 1218b32-34, *Pol.* VII, 1323a21-7.

<sup>77</sup> P. 191, n. 133.

<sup>78</sup> *D.L.* IV, 11-14. The list includes a *Περὶ ψυχῆς* in two books, and several works on ethics, among them a *Περὶ ταπεινῶν*.

<sup>79</sup> Heinze, *Xenocrates*, pp. 123-47. One of R. M. Jones, 'Pseudo-Plutarch and Solar Eschatology' (*Class. Phil.*, xxvii, 1932), pp. 113-25; W. Hamilton, 'The Myth of

Plutarch's *De Facie* (949F-945D)' (*Class. Quart.*, xxviii, 1934), pp. 24-30).

<sup>80</sup> οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως ἔχον τὴν ἐμψύχου φύσιν, καὶ Bernays) ἔχουσ ἀσώφιστον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀδύνατον τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἡδονῶν καὶ ἀποδείξεως καὶ ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντες καὶ ἀδύνατον, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰαμβλίου καὶ Πλουτάρχου. οἱ δὲ μέχρι μέρους τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πλάτων καὶ Περικλῆς καὶ οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα, φησὶν γὰρ τὴν ἄλγεα, ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων. οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἄλλης φύσεως φησὶν γὰρ τὴν μερῶς εἰς τὴν φύσιν, Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Περικλῆος. In *Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria*, ed. W. Norvin (1913), p. 124, ll. 13-20; Xenocrates, fr. 75 Heinze, (J. Speusippus, fr. 35, ed. P. Lang, *In Speusippi Academicarum Scriptis, acaudum Fragmentis*, 1911). The Plutarch is Plutarch of Athens, a Neoplatonic philosopher of the first half of the fifth century.

<sup>81</sup> See above, p. 113f.



## THE VITAL HEAT, THE INBORN PNEUMA AND THE AETHER

A SHORT section of Aristotle's *de generatione animalium*<sup>1</sup> embodies his final answer to the question how the faculties of soul are transmitted from parent to offspring. Aristotle here speaks in a tone which is dogmatic as well as enthusiastic; he is able to announce a new discovery. There is, he sets forth, in the *sperma* a peculiar substance (*σῶμα*) which has some connection with soul and differs in quality as the souls themselves differ in worth. This substance is identical with two of the entities mentioned in our title and 'analogous' to the third.

Πᾶσις μὲν αὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θεϊότερον τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὥς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσει. πάντων μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ποιεῖ γόνιμα εἶναι τὰ σπέρματα, τὸ καλούμενον θερμόν. τοῦτο δ' αὖ πῦρ οὐδὲ τοιαύτη δύναμις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφρώδει πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀνάλογον οὕσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρον στοιχείῳ.

The sentences which follow state that fire has no generative or procreative power, yet such a power must be present in the Sun and in the *θερμόν*, the vital heat of living beings. Clearly, then, this *θερμόν* cannot be identical with the fire.<sup>2</sup>

Nowhere else in the body of his preserved work does Aristotle establish this close connection between the vital heat, the *pneuma*, and the element of the stars, the so-called aether. These three concepts differ as much in their origin and past history as in their function and place within Aristotle's own physical or biological system.<sup>3</sup> A brief sketch of them—skipping by necessity many significant episodes in the history of each—will suffice to make this clear.

What needs here to be said about the 'element of the stars' is indeed not much. It was Aristotle himself who added this element to the canonic four of the Empedoclean and Platonic tradition. The dialogue *On Philosophy* and the First Book *On the Heaven* secured it its place. It is divine, un-aging, and unchanging, and yet a material element. Like the other elements it has its specific 'natural motion', to wit the circular, which makes it possible for Aristotle to explain by a physical 'hypothesis' the celestial motions for which Plato had resorted to the World-Soul. The place of this element is the entire heavenly region, extending from the First Heaven to the moon; below this, in the regions occupied by the four other elements, it is never to be found.<sup>4</sup>

For the concept of vital heat we may—somewhat arbitrarily—take our starting-point in Parmenides.<sup>5</sup> His correlation of dead with the cold, alive with the warm, may not have been primarily intended as a contribution to physiology, yet the physiological significance of this thought was perceived by his successors; witness Empedocles, who taught that 'sleep comes about when the heat of the blood is cooled in the proper degree, death when it becomes altogether cold'.<sup>6</sup> This doctrine points forward to Aristotle, who modified it to the effect that sleep is a temporary overpowering of the inner heat by other factors in the body, death its final extinction (on the interaction of hot and cold he propounds doctrines more subtle than his precursors).<sup>7</sup> Between Empedocles and Aristotle we encounter the concept occasionally in the Hippocratics, one of whom, the author of *περὶ σαρκῶν*, indulges his speculative vein to the extent of making this *θερμόν* a cosmic principle and investing it with attributes of divinity.<sup>8</sup> However, if we look for antecedents of Aristotle's theories, the most important are probably to be found in the *Timaeus*. Here Plato shows in some detail how in respiration the *θερμόν* in us is cooled by the air which enters from outside, and he relies on the cutting power of the fire, which is here identical with the 'hot', to explain the process of digestion.<sup>9</sup> In Aristotle the *θερμόν* is connected with the same functions. Its role in digestion is set forth in *De partibus animalium* (where 'cooking' takes the place of Plato's 'cutting'). Respiration is again the cooling of our inner heat, and the *De iuventute*, which covers this subject, gives us in fact a little biographical sketch of the vital heat, detailing its phases from its first appearance in the *genesis* of a living being to its final withering in death.<sup>10</sup> Yet the *θερμόν* is also the 'seal' of the nutritive soul, and as nutrition and reproduction are closely linked in Aristotle's scheme we may here record that he correlates the greater or lesser degree of internal heat in various animal classes

<sup>1</sup> *de gen. anim.* II. 3.736b30-737a1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 737a1-2.

<sup>3</sup> See now Sir David Ross, *Aristotle Parva Naturalia* 40-3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *de phil.* 26 ff., 29 (Walzer); *de caelo* I, 2 f. and *parva*; *Met.* I.2.340b5 ff. E. Bignone (*l'Aristot.* *Peribio* I, 227 ff.) thinks that in *περὶ ἀεροςστοχίας* the 'aether' formed the substance of the human soul.

<sup>5</sup> *Vossius*, 28A26b, 26 (cf. Heraclitus' conception of soul as fire, *esp.* 22B36).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 31A85.

<sup>7</sup> *de somno* 3 (*esp.* 457b6 ff.); *de ins.* 24; cf. *ibid.* 4 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *de corp.* 2 ff., 6; *de nat. hom.* 12 (*de cord.* 6). The *de meta* (which is now considered late) even knows *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θερμόν* (2.60.62).

<sup>9</sup> *Tim.* 78b-79e (note 79d2 ff.). On *Tim.* 79c see my paper *Stud. H.* 27 (1956), 344 ff.

<sup>10</sup> See *esp.* *de part. an.* II, 3. 650a3 ff. (cf. *de an.* II, 4. 416b28 ff. and *Ross op. cit.* 41 and n. 2); *de ins. parva*, *esp.* 4 ff., 19, 21, 24.



with their capacity of producing offspring in varying degrees of perfection. Only animals that possess a great deal of heat can produce living young, whereas the others lay eggs, produce larvae, and so forth.<sup>11</sup>

Very different is the history of the third concept, the *pneuma*; yet, though it has received considerably more attention than the *θερμότης*, some crucial points are still in doubt.<sup>12</sup> While in its role as vital and animating force it may strike us as a rival of the *θερμότης*, it has yet, naturally enough, no concern with nutrition. Rather, being from the beginning a somewhat more 'spiritual' principle, it tends to associate with what Aristotle would regard as 'higher' functions. We need not here go back to Anaximenes or trace connections between him and Diogenes of Apollonia. When we come to Diogenes himself and his school—represented, I take it, by the author of *περὶ τερψῆς νοῦσων*—we find the mobile air in our body recognised as the agent of our sensations and as the central animating force which accounts, among other things, for the movement of our limbs.<sup>13</sup> Aristotle too needs the *pneuma* to explain the movement of animals and with him, too, it is the physical agent of some sensations (smell and audition in particular). Yet for him it is an 'inborn' (*σύμφυτον*) *pneuma*. In spite of this—and in spite also of the fact that the details of his doctrines are not particularly close to Diogenes—some scholars have thought of Diogenes as *πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου* and *πρώτος εἰρηγὴς* of the *pneuma* doctrine,<sup>14</sup> making allowance for some intermediate stages before it reached Aristotle. There is a further similarity which may be of special interest to us: Diogenes defined the substance of the *sperma* as foam (*ἀφρός*); and so does Aristotle in a section previous to ours of the *de generatione animalium*.<sup>15</sup> It is indeed possible that Aristotle came to appreciate Diogenes' position on a number of these subjects; yet whether this is all that need or can be said about the origin of his *pneuma* is another question. In a paper which appeared in 1913<sup>16</sup> Jaeger put forward strong reasons for thinking that Aristotle had received his *pneuma* concept along with other and related doctrines from the Sicilian school of physicians—men like Philistion and Diocles, who were working in the tradition of Empedocles. It may be argued that in the meantime Jaeger has himself removed the strongest pillar on which his theory originally rested; for if Diocles, as Jaeger has since shown,<sup>17</sup> was actually a pupil and younger associate of Aristotle, his views concerning the functions of the *pneuma* are no longer good evidence for the 'Sicilian' tradition. Even so, however, we can hardly in our present state of ignorance and uncertainty afford to dismiss the idea of Sicilian influences altogether. If much is obscure, one basic fact should not be lost sight of: from Empedocles onward through the *Timaeus* to Aristotle's biology, air (*ἀήρ* or *μετέωρα*<sup>18</sup>) is one of the four elements of which all living beings are 'compacted'. In this cardinal point the tradition is constant; and if both Plato and Aristotle actually used the air for the composition of very few organs or tissues, it still must be present in the constitution of man and animals; in fact, it must be a part of their nature (*ἐμφυτον, σύμφυτον*).<sup>19</sup>

It will be clear from these sketches that the three concepts which Aristotle in our passage ties together—actually identifying two and almost identifying the third with both of them—are normally distinct and would be more inclined to respect one another's sphere than to mix and coalesce. Special reasons must account for Aristotle's decision to bring them here for once together, yet before we turn to them we may note that our section has also other singularities and peculiarities. Only here does Aristotle teach that every kind of soul is connected with an element 'different from and more divine than' the four sublunary. Only here does he allow the aether—or something like it—a place in his biology and a function in the phenomena and substances *περὶ τὸν μένον τόπον*. Barely two pages before this section he has marshalled all resources for a most painstaking 'chemical' inquiry about the nature of the *sperma*, with the result that it must be a compound of *pneuma* and water; yet *pneuma* as there understood is simply 'air'—hot air, nothing more peculiar or more precious.<sup>20</sup> Again Aristotle nowhere else expresses so firm a conviction that the vital heat cannot be identical with fire; on the contrary, there are passages

\* See *de an.* 11, 473b14 ff. *et al.*, *de gen. anim.* II, 1, 732b28 ff., 733b34 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Besides Jaeger's *notitia* (presently to be cited) see in particular J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elem. Cognition* (Oxford, 1906), 333 ff.; Sir David Ross (see Note 3). For the later history of the concept see e.g. G. Verbeke, *L'Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma* (Paris-Louvain, 1943) and J. H. Wassink, *Tertullian, De anima* (Amsterdam, 1937), 342 ff. See also W. Wierwille, *Museion*, ser. 3, 11 (1943), 107 ff.

<sup>13</sup> For Diogenes see Porphyry, *εἰσαγωγή* c. 84 f.; on the relation to him of 'Hipp', *de morbo sacro*, cf. Harold W. Miller, *T.A.P.A.*, 70 (1943), 103 ff.

<sup>14</sup> See *de an. vultu* 10; *de an.* II, 8, 420a3 ff.; *de gen. anim.* II, 6, 744a2 ff. and (not in context through this passage) *ib.* V, 2, 781a27 ff. For Diogenes as ultimate source cf.

Pohlenz, *Hippokrates* (Berlin 1938), 30 ff., 93 ff.; Emil Lesky, *Ähnd. Monist. Abh.*, 1930, 19, 123 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Porphyry, *εἰσαγωγή*; *de gen. anim.* II, 2, 733b10 ff. (cf. b19; 736a13 with Peck's note on this passage and a19 ff.).

<sup>16</sup> 'The *Pneuma* in the Lyceum', *Formos* 48, 29 ff., esp. 51-7.

<sup>17</sup> *Traktat von Anaximander* (Berlin, 1938); see also *Abh. Pr. Abh.* (phil.-hist. Kl.) 1933/34.

<sup>18</sup> See Plato *Philos.*, 29a10.

<sup>19</sup> This may account, e.g. for the *pneuma* in the organism of non-beautifuls *de an.* 13, 473b10 ff.; *de part. an.* III, 6, 656a22 and in the ear and its *πόρος* (*de an.* II, 8, 420a3-12; cf. III, 1, 425a4; *de part. mem.* II, 10, 656b17; *de gen. anim.* II, 6; 744a2 ff. V, 2, 781a23).

<sup>20</sup> II, 2, 733a30 ff., 58 ff., b32 ff., 736a1 f.

where he seems to have no qualms at all about their identity.<sup>21</sup> If Aristotle always knew this affinity of the vital heat with the aether (or of *pneuma* and aether) he must have been biding his time with extraordinary patience and reticence, waiting for a suitable occasion when he would flash forth this startling doctrine upon the astonished world. Finally, as regards the subject of reproduction, Book I has assured us that the male parent contributes nothing material to the foetus but only *éidos* and *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*.<sup>22</sup> To be sure, this question is reopened in Book II, where the origin of the soul functions in the foetus must be accounted for. It looks as though Aristotle, as long as he deals with the offspring's body, does not need any material contribution on the part of the male parent—here his position is practically the opposite of the 'biological argument' in the *Eumenides* which contemporary readers find so distressing—yet when he comes to discuss the offspring's soul the *sperma* must contribute something material, albeit the finest and noblest material, a *δύναμις* analogous to the aether.

We cannot go into every aspect of these problems. I think, however, we should firmly hold to the view that our section gives us Aristotle's answer to the question how the soul functions come to be present in the foetus. The preceding section has ended in an impasse (even if this is not clearly seen by all interpreters).<sup>23</sup> The assumption there made is that the soul functions should be present 'potentially' in *sperma* and location; yet when this idea is translated into concrete terms none of the various possibilities will work. These functions cannot (a) all be present beforehand in the material supplied by the female, nor can they (b) all develop in this material without the help of the male partner; on the other hand, if they come by way of the *sperma* they can neither (c) be present in it beforehand, nor (d), except for the *roûs*, enter the *sperma* from an outside source. The last sentence of that section puts a brutal end to lingering hopes that they might after all enter in the *sperma*. The *sperma*, it says in conformity with the doctrines of Book I, is '(only) a residue of the nourishment'. Thus it is surely not a suitable vehicle for the soul functions.<sup>24</sup> An agonising predicament. We are past the point where the devices in which Aristotle is generally so resourceful—a more precise definition, the discovery of one more nuance in, say, the concept of potentiality—could save the situation. Only by a fresh start, and if necessary by abandoning some of the premises so far used, can the deadlock be broken; and our section, which opens up new vistas and treats the *sperma* not as residue of nourishment but as including a *physis* comparable to 'the element of the stars', embodies Aristotle's final and satisfactory solution. This solution may well be the result of a long and intense search; that it is his final word is also suggested by the fact that no other section of our Book 'follows up' the ideas here put forward or operates on the level of the new discovery.<sup>25</sup>

If we now look for specific reasons why each of our three concepts figures in this final answer, we should remember that the *sperma* has previously been defined as a compound of water and *pneuma* and that this definition includes the statement τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἐστὶ θερμὸς ἀήρ.<sup>26</sup> From here Aristotle could move on to the conclusion that the *θερμὸν* as well as the *pneuma* is present and active in the seed. Moreover, the *θερμὸν* had in any case a strong claim to being regarded as operative, since it is the agent or instrument of the nutritive soul and reproduction is in Aristotle's scheme a sideline, as it were, of nutrition. It is the 'hot power' in us which by concocting the nourishment produces blood as well as *sperma*; and the same hot power remains active in every later phase of reproduction and embryonic growth.<sup>27</sup> The *pneuma*, on the other hand, is as we know associated with psychic functions like locomotion and some of the sensations; hence it may logically play a part also in the transmission of such functions to the offspring. As the 'chemical' study of the *sperma* points to the same conclusion, Aristotle can feel amply justified in drawing it.

There remains the question why Aristotle here, not content with the *pneuma* as such, has recourse also to a substance in it which he describes as 'analogous' to the celestial element. If physical properties of the *sperma* are relevant, its 'whiteness' (the λευκόν) may be mentioned;<sup>28</sup> yet whatever allowance we make for physical or 'empirical' reasons, the point of principal interest is that the aether here substantiates, and gives concrete form to, the conviction formulated in our first sentence: the *δύναμις* of every soul appears to be connected with a body of a higher order, and 'more divine' than the familiar elements. If there is to be a material vehicle by which the soul functions are

<sup>21</sup> E.g. *de part. anim.* II, 7. 632b7-11; *de ins.* 14. 474b10-13; see also 473a24, 469b11-17.

<sup>22</sup> I, 21. See also 20. 719a10 f. <sup>23</sup> 736b8-29.

<sup>24</sup> The significance of this sentence seems to have been more appreciated by A. Platt (who in the Oxford translation adds the 'only') than by Peck, who in vain seeks Aristotle's alternatives for hints of a solution (on 736b21). On the other hand, Platt's assumption of a *luxuria* at 737a8 and his doubts about 217 ff. are gratuitous (for our section has settled—not only 'more or less settled'—how the soul functions can be *divinely* present). I

accept Aubert-Winmer's corrections in 737a8 f. and 12. It may be necessary to change *ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως* 736b17 to *πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν*.

<sup>25</sup> II, 6. 740a13 f. indicates a different origin of the *pneuma* which differentiates the parts of the foetus.

<sup>26</sup> II, 8. 735a30-b38. See also p. 120. Note 736a1 f. and also 735b34.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *de part. an.* II, 3. 650a2 ff.; *de ins.* 4. 469b11 ff., 14. 474a25 ff. See also above (p. 120) and *de gen. anim.* I, 19.

<sup>28</sup> II, 2. 735a32.



communicated from parent to offspring, none of the common four elements can be regarded as sublime enough. Something *deior* is needed (even though, we may once more remember, the antecedent inquiry into the nature of the *sperm* has found no evidence in it of substances other than water and air). To be sure, Aristotle has often established a connection or co-operation between soul and body; he knows that soul needs physical *dyvwa*. Yet only here, where he is dealing with the transmission of life, does he feel the need to counterbalance this 'materialisation' by postulating for the material itself a divine ingredient. 'In a way all things are full of Soul', Aristotle declares when explaining the process of spontaneous generation in earth and water.<sup>29</sup> If he has Thales' famous dictum in mind the substitution of 'soul' for 'the gods' is certainly significant. Our passage remains the only one where something divine—or 'nearer to the divine' (*θειότερον*)—is found operating in the biological phenomena.

As everybody knows, the place of the divinity is in a very different phase of Aristotle's system. Whatever the relation between the Unmoved Mover and the divine aether—whether they complement one another or represent different stages of Aristotle's search for the divine—both concepts clearly reflect the cosmological approach to the deity and keep the divine principle closely associated with the perfect movements of the Heaven. Both are *κατὰ πόρον* legates of the Platonic World-Soul. With soul, life, and biological processes they have no obvious connection. Nor could one easily imagine that the discovery of a divine ingredient in such a process should suggest to Aristotle a revision of his theological tenets. Yet if for Aristotle himself the discovery has no further significance, historically it is noteworthy as a harbinger of developments in the near future. It was not long before leading philosophers were ready to find a divine presence in the *θερμὸν* as well as in the *πνεῦμα*. In the Stoic system *pneuma* and vital heat no longer need to borrow their divine quality from the aether. Both of them are now substantially connected with the fire (from which Aristotle in our section is so anxious to keep his *θερμὸν* distinct), sharing its divine status, and both are cosmic as well as psychic principles.

There is no reason to suppose that the Stoics learned much about the remarkable 'powers' of either of these principles by studying the 'esoteric' treatises of Aristotle.<sup>30</sup> Interest in these principles was continuous and was kept up by those whose primary concern they were, the medical schools. Diocles of Carystus shares Aristotle's conviction that the *pneuma* is concentrated in the heart; there is evidence that he operated with the concept of the *φαγνὸν πνεῦμα* as well as with that of vital heat.<sup>31</sup> At the other end of the development we find Chrysippus appealing to one medical authority—Praxagoras of Cos—against others in his effort to retain the heart as seat of the vital *pneuma*. The nerves had in the meantime been discovered, and were now considered the carriers of the *pneuma*. As their *ἄρχή* is in the brain, Chrysippus had to defend his views about the *pneuma* against the leading physicians of Alexandria.<sup>32</sup> Surely this was not a fight about 'synonyms', but a philosopher's struggle to adapt a medical concept to his own uses (in the physiology of the senses the uses were not actually very different). As for the Stoic *πῦρ* or *θερμὸν*, the medical tradition about the vital heat need not be more than one component of this concept, and we are hardly in a position to decide whether this scientific 'substratum' or their interest in Heraclitus' fire contributed more to its formation. Some physiological arguments which the Stoics—in particular Cleanthes—used to show *quanta vis motu caloris in omni corpore* have a familiar ring to students of Aristotle's biology. They include the function of the *calor* (n.b. the *θερμὸν*, not in this case the *πῦρ*) in nutrition, in digestion, in the *reliquiae quas natura respuit*, yet they also include life itself as being dependent on this *calor*.<sup>33</sup> One point is new and could not have been made by Aristotle in this form: the hot moves *motu suo*. It is a self-mover. This predicate of the deity which characterised Plato's World-Soul now attaches to the vital heat which Plato too had known but which he had been careful to keep at a safe distance from his soul principle.

When Plato in *Lysis* X condemns the Presocratic systems on the ground that their 'materialistic' principles, being devoid of life, cannot initiate movement and *genesis*, he disqualifies along with the elements also the traditional 'powers' (hot and cold, moist and dry).<sup>34</sup> Nothing so material, so lacking in *νοῦς* and *τέχνη* as the 'hot' could for him be a physical principle. Only Soul can initiate

<sup>29</sup> *III*, II, 762a19-22. Here, too, Aristotle makes use of *πνεῦμα* and *φαγνὸν θερμὸν*; see also 762a16 ff.; yet they appear in a somewhat different combination: note also the difference between 762a24 ff. and 762b32. For quotations of Thales' dictum 'dotted' toward *dyvwa* see also on I, 3, 112b1 Pl. *Legg.* 1011b20; *Epic.* 111d1 ff.

<sup>30</sup> On the relation of *πνεῦμα* and *πῦρ* in early Stoicism see *Problems, The Stoics* (Berlin, 1918), I, 79 f.; also Jaeger, *Hermes* 45, 50, 51.

<sup>31</sup> *Frgs.* 44-49; II, 45 in M. Wellmann, *Die Fragmente d. nath. Ärzte* (Berlin 1901). Cf. Wellmann, *ibid.* 14 ff., 20, 70, 77 ff.

<sup>32</sup> *St. V. F.* II, 897; cf. also II, 879, 883. See Wellmann, *op. cit.* 13, 114. In general cf. J. Moreau, *L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïques* (Paris, 1939), 163 f.

<sup>33</sup> *Cic.* *de nat. deor.* 2, 23 f.; cf. 3, 23. To Aristotle's point that fire is not precreative the Stoics in their way do justice by distinguishing two kinds of fire, one consuming and destructive, the other constructive and precreative (*St. V. F.* I, 120: 504). For the *reliquiae resperruptae* see 787a4 in our section.

<sup>34</sup> *Legg.* 10, 889b.



movement, and the primacy in the physical world must be assigned to her. Yet if 'life' is a criterion for primacy<sup>35</sup> the *θερμότης* would seem to have claims for consideration; as we know, its crucial role in the life process was understood at the time. In the physiology of the *Timaeus* where Plato cannot dispense with the vital heat, he treats it like nutrition and respiration as a necessary condition for the functioning of the organism, yet allows it no determining influence on life and death, or growth and decline. It is never permitted to come near the sphere of *psyche*.<sup>36</sup> We need not hesitate to say that Plato has deliberately reduced its importance. Aristotle too is opposed to the thought of identifying soul and vital heat, yet he does not feel that Soul is contaminated if it has its seat in the *θερμὸν* or uses it as an instrument.<sup>37</sup> In the *de uentibus* he makes the phases of life depend on the changing conditions of the vital heat in us.<sup>38</sup> Finally he even, if only once, grants it a share in the nature and divine quality of his aether. Yet the last step—still a large one—of identifying the *θερμὸν* with the soul and attaching to it attributes of the deity remained to be made by the Stoics. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

With the aether, too, the soul retains or even strengthens its connection. Yet when in Hellenistic texts the aether is spoken of as the home or essence of the soul, our other two concepts are not likely to reappear along with it. In its original form Aristotle's *synthesis* did not survive, and if all three concepts find themselves again together it is in poetry rather than in technical discourse. In one and the same line of *deneid* VI Vergil endows the souls with *aetherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem* (where *aura* = *πνεῦμα*; cf. *spiritus intus alit* earlier in this section).<sup>39</sup> Here we would not look for scientific precision or systematic consistency. As the poet glides easily from souls to *semina*—both significant in our perspective—so he also employs freely one or the other of our concepts as a symbol of man's divine origin. It is in this sense, as links between man and the divine, that all three entities which Aristotle had brought together in his *θεϊότατον* were destined to gain a hold on the religious feeling of the Hellenistic era. As we have said, this Aristotelian conception points to the future, to the thought of the next generations and centuries; whereas the Unmoved Mover, transcendent, remote, and towering in self-sufficient contemplation above the system, would be more visible to distant ages.

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN.

Cornell University.

<sup>35</sup> Legg. 893c7: *μὲν ἄρα με ἔμοιγε; εἰ τίη αὐτὸ προσερχόμεν ὅτε αὐτὰ αὐτὸ κινήσῃ—τίη. πῶς γὰρ αὐ;* The next step is the identification of the self-moving *ἀρχή* with soul).

<sup>36</sup> See above, p. 119 and note 9.

<sup>37</sup> *de part. anim.* II, 7. 652b7 ff.; *de nat.* 4; 6. 470a19 ff.

<sup>38</sup> *de uiv.* 24; cf. 23. 478b3; I; see also 14. 474a25 ff. and again 4. esp. 469b13-20.

<sup>39</sup> *Aen.* 6. 747, 726 (note also 730).

Φαμέν ποί τι εἶναι ἴσον . . . αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον . . . αὐτὰ τὰ  
ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀριστὸ ποι ἐφάκη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀπασότης;

The questions involved in this passage continue to be matter of debate. At this point in the dialogue the Forms are not yet regarded as causes, or as 'in' particulars; they are here introduced as in each case the perfect type, which particulars so named imperfectly resemble. Thus, equal things are described as being 'like' αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. How far can this statement be reconciled with the case of the other Forms, which are presently instanced as on a par with 'the Equal'? 175 c-d, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ δαίου). Further, what is the point and significance of the plural phrase αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα?

(1) αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Plato does not at any point in his argument indicate that he finds any difference in status between αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον and the other perfect types. He refers to it in terms which become familiar in relation to the Forms of being. Thus, 74c, ἐκ τούτων . . . τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου. 74d, ὅταν τις τι ἴδῃ ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τούτου . . . εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδέξαι δέ, κτλ. 75a, ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι ἴσα τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεσπτερώς . . . ἐκείνου τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ ὅ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεσπτερόν ἐστιν. 75b, εὐληφάσθας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν. It is after this passage of exercise, so to speak, in the concept of αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον that he explicitly (75c-d, already quoted) places this Form on a level with αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν and the rest.

Now in every other instance given (75c-d) of a perfect type, it is clear that any single particular called, e.g., καλόν, or any group of particulars called καλά, will stand in this respect in the same relation to any other single καλόν or group of καλά, while being also imperfectly similar to the αὐτὸ καλόν itself. For all καλά, whatever their size or shape or other qualities, resemble the same perfect type of beauty by virtue of a general attribute, the same in all beautiful particulars. But this is obviously not so with all particulars that may be called ἴσα. In the first place there is no such thing as a single ἴσον, as there may be a single καλόν or the like. Further, equality is not a general attribute corresponding to one universal Form; it is a limited relation. It is to be noted that Plato himself illustrates particular equality by referring to single pairs of equals—74a, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλον οὐδὲ λίθον λίθον κτλ. In general terms, say that A and B, of one size, are equal, and C and D, of another size, are equal. Obviously B and C are not equal. That is, A, B, C, D, etc., are not all 'like' the same Equal in the way that all καλά are like the same Beautiful. In fact, the equality which A and B in common 'resemble' does not serve to cover every predication of 'equal'; it denotes a relationship shared by these two, and by other members of their size-group, alone. In the attempt to postulate a Form of Equal which equal particulars resemble, we find ourselves in need of as many such Forms as there are possible pairs or groups of things equal to one another, but not equal to the members of other pairs or groups.

This appears to be the meaning of the obscure statement of Alex. Aphr. Comm. in Ar. Met. 89. 26-30, ἐπὶ δὲ εἰ τὸ ἴσον ἴσα ἴσον, πλείους ἰδέαι τοῦ ἴσου ἢν εἶναι. Robin (*La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres chez Aristote*, p. 193) translates: 'si toute chose égale est égale à une chose égale, on sera obligé d'admettre plusieurs idées de l'Égal'. This, though a literal rendering, does not go far to elucidate the meaning. Translate, perhaps: 'If every equal thing is equal in relation to its equal, there must be a plurality of Ideas of Equal'.

N. R. Murphy (*The Interpretation of Plato's Republic*, p. 111, n. 1) may seem to approach the implications of the passage when he translates 74b, τῷ μὲν ἴσῳ φαίνεται τῷ ὅ οὐ, 'equal to one thing but not to another'. He remarks that 'sticks and stones . . . have contrasted predicates in different relations'; then, overlooking the crux of a single Form of Equal, he adds 'but αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα (in the next clause) not'.

It is thus impossible to correlate intelligibly an αὐτὸ ἴσον with the αὐτὸ καλόν and other Forms here postulated. What Plato is emphasising in the present passage is, of course, merely the imperfect resemblance (divined by ἀνάμνησις) of particulars to the perfect types which exhibit their qualities as they should be. 'Equality' is a telling instance of such approximation, and is so far comparable to Beauty and the rest. But as to speak of 'an equal thing' in the singular is meaningless, so also is 'the Equal' meaningless as a singular term for the type of this quality, which is not a universal but a relation. Plato does not elucidate this distinction between τὸ ἴσον and, e.g., τὸ καλόν, any more than in a later passage of the dialogue (102b-c) he admits or disavows the relative nature of such qualities as μέγεθος and μικρότης, which are there treated as causal

Forms, having been given a passing mention in our present context—75c, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἴσα καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλάττω ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλα πάντα τὰ ταυῦτα. Mr. Hackforth in his new study of the *Phaedo* (p. 144) rightly describes great and small as 'relational Forms, which Plato does not, at all events in the *Phaedo*, distinguish from qualitative'.

(2) αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. The singular αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον has been used (74a) to denote perfect equality as contrasted with that of particular things—οὐ ἕλκον λέγω ἕλκω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθω . . . ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι. These instances are further considered, and it is found that the 'equality' of particular pairs of things is not invariable. Here arises the question of reading. At 74b the recent editors and translators from Burnet onward tend to follow the general tradition in preferring τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ, as against τότε μὲν . . . τότε δ' οὐ. τῷ μὲν . . . τῷ δέ . . . has been understood in relation to φαίνεται, 'appear to one man equal, but not to another'; and this interpretation has been used to explain αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα which immediately follows. Thus Wagner writes αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα, "abstract equality" in the plural, in order to represent it as the affection of several minds, not of one only. Here, again, we are tentatively referred to an ancient and obscure comment—Olympiodorus *ad loc.*, εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀποβλέπων νόας, ὡν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἴσον. This idea of different men's conceptions of 'the Equal' is strangely at variance with the absolute character ascribed by Plato to the Forms, here and elsewhere. It must, further, be urged that the reading τότε μὲν . . . τότε δέ . . . is far more consistent with the next step in the argument, where ἐστὶν ὅτι is emphatic while σοὶ is unemphatic, the natural interpretation referring to different experiences of the same percipient.

Rejecting, then, the interpretation of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα as the conceptions of Equality present to different minds, we return to the question why Plato here uses the plural. Heindorf has surely set us on the right track: 'multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe refertur'. Archer-Hind writes in support: 'the implied comparison compels him [Plato] perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense'. On the comparable phrase αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια at *Parmenides* 129b, which the editors quote, A.-H. remarks that here 'Sokrates is stating the earlier form of the ideal theory' involving 'these unfortunate ideas of relations'.

Plato, then, having started by referring to αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον as a universal Form, recognises that the word connotes plurality, and so reasonably resorts to the use of the plural αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα to denote the ideally perfect pair or group of things equal to one another, while ἰσότης expresses the characteristic which, within their own group, equal particulars share. But at 75a he reverts to the standard expression and writes again τὸ ἴσον—ὁρέγεται πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι ὅλον τὸ ἴσον. Here, in accordance with our analysis, πάντα ταῦτα must mean either (a) all the particulars within a group of equals or (b) all the members of all such groups, but in their relation to fellow-members.

There remains the question whether αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα can or should be interpreted as 'mathematical entities'. Burnet's note has given the lead to comment on these lines. 'αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα: things that are "just equal"'. There is no difficulty about the plural. When Euclid says (*El.* 1) τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἴσα, he is not speaking of sticks or stones, but of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. Cf. αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, *Parm.* 129b1. 'The two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are an instance of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.'

Ross (*Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 22) interprets the phrase as meaning 'perfect particular instances' of the Ideas, and finds here 'the earliest hint of a belief in mathematical entities as something intermediate between Ideas and particulars'. Hackforth (*Phaedo*, p. 69) agrees in calling αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα 'mathematical objects', and quotes Burnet, but adds: 'It is, however, very unlikely that Plato had as yet formulated the doctrine that all mathematical objects are intermediate between Forms and sensibles'.

For Plato's belief in τὰ μαθηματικά as μεταξύ, the relevant passages are *Republic* 510c-d, 526a, 529e.

At 510c-d the hypotheses of the mathematicians are outlined—ὑποθέμενοι τὴν τε περιττόν καὶ τὸ ὄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφά . . . τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρων αὐτῆς, κτλ. Here no mention is made of ἴσον as a mathematical postulate.

At 526a the nature of mathematical units is discussed—εἰ τις ἐροῖτο . . . περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διηλέγεσθαι, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν ὅσον ὁμοῖα ἀξιοῦν ἐστίν. ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παρὶ καὶ οὐδὲ ἀμικρόν διαφέρειν μέρειν τι ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδέν. Here ἰσότης is predicated as a characteristic of all mathematical units; there is no question of τὸ ἴσον or τὰ ἴσα being themselves recognised among the μαθηματικά.

At 529e the visible heavens are being contrasted with 'the mathematical realities of true astronomy' (Adam, *Republic*, vol. II, p. 128)—ἡγήσασθε γὰρ ὅτι ποῦ τις . . . γελοῖον . . . ἐπισκοπεῖν ταῦτα οὐνοῦ, οἷς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αἰτοῖς λεγόμενοι ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς συμμετρίας. The whole passage deals with relative dimensions and motions—cf. 530a, τὴν δὲ νικτὸς πρὸς



ἡμέραν συμμετρίαν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν κτλ.—and *ἴσα* and *διπλάσιον* are cited as instances of such relationship. The only possible reference in this passage to τὰ μαθηματικά, in the sense of 510c-d or 526a, would appear to be in the phrase ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθεῖσι σχήματι, 529d.

Adam quotes (*Republic*, vol. ii, p. 160), the references given by Boultz to the passages in the *Metaphysics* which bear upon Plato's theory of τὰ μαθηματικά. In none of these passages is there any mention of *ἴσον*. The mathematical terms cited by Aristotle are εὐθεῖα and στρογγύλον (*Met.* 998a 2 ff.), μήκος, πλάτος, βάθος (1077a25), ἐπίπεδον, γραμμὴ, στρογγύλη (1076b 1 ff.).

Aristotle himself treats of *ἴσον* correctly as a term of relation. *Cat.* 6.3a26 (section on τὸ πρῶτον), ἴσται δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἴσιστον λέγεσθαι. (The ensuing paragraph gives instances of the proper use of the terms.) *Cat.* 7. 6b22 (section on τὸ πρὸς τε), καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἴσιστον μᾶλλον καὶ ἴστων λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τι ὄν. *Met.* Δ. 1021a11, ταῦτά μὲν γὰρ ὡν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὁμοῖα δ' ὄν ἢ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὄν τὸ ποσὸν ἔσ.

It appears, thus, difficult to find a place for τὰ ἴσα among the 'mathematical entities' to which Plato is said to have given a special grading in his system. His use of the words *ἴσος* and *ἰσότης* is frequent both in their mathematical and in their ethical sense. For the former meaning, which concerns us here, cf. *Gorg.* 308a-b, ἡ ἰσότης ἢ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. At *Phil.* 25a ff. the terms are used to convey aspects of τὸ πέρας—πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτι περὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέτρον. (Bury, *Intr.* p. xi, 'the Equal, the Double and the like determinate mathematical relations'.) The καὶ of *Theaet.* 185c-d do not explicitly include *ἴσον* along with ὁμοιότητα . . . ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν . . . ἁρτίων τε καὶ περιττῶν . . ., but it might well be subsumed under τὰ ἅλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται. αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον (singular or plural), like αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, carrying the pronoun which connotes a self-existent form, can hold its place only in that early phase of the theory which postulates *εἶδος* . . . ἐν ἑκάστῳ . . . περὶ ἑκάστον τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταῦτόν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν (*Rep.* 396a). And in that phase, as we have seen, its claim is baffling and its position precarious.

London.

DOROTHY TARRANT.

## EIN VERGESSENES ARISTOTELESZEUGNIS

Bei dem seit 25 Jahren wogenden Streit um die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Gotteslehre,<sup>1</sup> in den auch mit wohl abwägendem Urteil Sir David Ross (*Aristotle's Physics*, 94 ff.) eingegriffen hat, ist eine Stelle aus Sextus Empiricus hyp. 3, 218 nicht verwertet worden. Um aus dem Schwanken der Theologie in die skeptische *ἐποχή* zu führen, gibt Sextus einen kurzen Katalog der Gottesauffassungen, wobei er wie 'Aetios' Doxogr. 297a13 ff. anlässlich eines ausführlichen Kataloges mit den Atheisten beginnt und folgende Lehrmeinungen aufzählt: 'Αριστοτέλης μὲν ἀσώματος εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν θεόν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Στωικοὶ δὲ πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, Ζενοφάνη δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ. Deutlich ist, wie sich zwei Paare gegenüberstellen. Der aristokratische Gott des Aristoteles, unkörperlich und uns entrückt, und der gemeine, körperliche und auch durch das Hässliche hindurchgehende des Stoikers, weiter der menschenförmige und der in idealer Kugelgestalt gedachte Gott. Die stoische Meinung ist gut wiedergegeben, höchstens dass in διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν ein leiser polemischer Ton mitschwingt; ein frühes Zeugnis bietet Megasthenes, der in seinem Indienbuch für einen Zug der brahmanischen Philosophie die stoische Formulierung übernimmt (bei Strabo 713) ὁ διακίων τὸν κόσμον . . . θεὸς δὲ ὅλον διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ. Der menschengestaltige epikurische Gott ist vielfach bezeugt, z. B. fr. 355 Usener. Σφαῖρα ist gemässer Ausdruck für den xenophaneischen Gott, der οὐτὶ δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος ist (B 23 Diels) und der säkularisiert in Parmenides' Kugel des Seienden erscheint (B 8, 43); Aristoteles fasste die Kugel des Xenophanes als Himmel (A 30).<sup>2</sup> Ἀπαθής (auch A 35 Ende aus Sextus Emp. hyp. 1, 225) mag καλούμενος οὐδὲν von Xenophanes B 26 decken; kaum dass daran zu denken ist, dass für Aristoteles der Himmel ἀπαθής ist, de coel. 284a14, also ἡ τοῦ κυκλικοῦ σώματος σφαῖρα (de coel. 289a30), wie denn ἀπαθής das πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων heisst, de coel. 270b2, oder das πέμπτον σῶμα, wie es Aristoteles vermutlich im Frühdialog de philosophia bezeichnete, ohne ihm einen Elementennamen zu geben,<sup>3</sup> wenn er auch im volkstümlichen Namen 'Äther', den wir praktischerweise verwenden, die Abnung des Richtigen erkannte (de coel. 270b22; Meteor. 339b25 mit der Etymologie ἀεὶ θέον); auch πέμπτη οὐσία ('Quintessenz') kommt vor; πέμπτη τις φύσις, ἐξ ἧς ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἄστρον schon Megasthenes bei Strabo 713, und so ist bei Philostrat vit. Apollonii 3, 34 die indische Lehre vom πέμπτῳ στοιχείῳ genannt, das γένεσις θεῶν ist, passend zu Aristoteles de philos. fr. 21 Walzer, aus Cicero de nat. deor. 2, 42. Ohne weiteres spricht αἰθέρα ἀπαθῆ, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ σῶμα dem Aristoteles zu Artios 336a5, und Ps.-Aristoteles de mundo 392a5 ff. ist zu vergleichen; die Schrift mischt Aristotelisches und Poseidonisches.

Noch nun zum aristotelischen Gott nach Sextus Emp. hyp. 3, 218. Ἀσώματος als Gottprädikat ist nicht nur Interpretation der Doxographie, sondern wirklich für den aristotelischen obersten Gott, das πρῶτον κινεῖν und den höchsten Geist der Metaphysik, bezeugt, de coel. 288b4 ἐπεὶ οὐτὸν τὸ κινεῖμενον (der Himmel) οὐ μεταβάλλει σῶμα ὄν, οὐδ' αὖτὸ τὸ κινεῖν μεταβάλλει ἀσώματος ὄν. Es ist eine Stelle, deren Zusammenhang H. von Arnim Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles 1931, 18 ff. für einen spätern Einschub hält und so auch W. K. C. Guthrie, *Class. Quart.* 27, 1933, 170, der 167 allerdings fein bemerkt, die Aktualisierung eines Unvollkommenen durch ein Vollkommenes sei immer ein Grundgedanke des Aristoteles gewesen. Beide wollen nicht den 'Dyotheismus' einerseits von ätherischem Himmels- und Gestirngott, andererseits von πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον dem ersten Entwurf von de coelo zuerkennen (gegen unehrtragliche Ergänzung Ross, *op. cit.* 98, Cherniss *op. cit.* 584 ff.). Nun aber findet sich der Dyotheismus schon in der Frühchrift de philosophia, im berüchtigten Fragment 26 W. aus Cicero de nat. deor. 1, 33. Als aristotelische Götter werden aufgezählt einerseits 2. mundus, 4. caeli ordo (der Äther des Volksglaubens), andererseits 1. mens, 3. 'praefectus' mundi, der replicatione quidam mundi motum regit atque tuetur (vgl. παδαργονεῖ Plato Gesetze 897b1. Replicatione ist schwer zu erklären; Cherniss 592 denkt mit von Arnim 4 f. an den Bewegter der im Verhältnis zum Fixsternhimmel rückläufigen Planeten. Aber mundi motus muss die Vorwärtsbewegung des Kosmos im Ganzen sein, die im Kreise rückläuft; vgl. Chalcidius 103 tempus . . . progrediens semper et replicabile, wo Plato (Tim. 38a) nur von χρόνος κυκλούμενος spricht. Der Epikureer wirft absichtlich die verschiedenen Götter ineinander, spottet am Schluss darüber,

<sup>1</sup> Literatur bei H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Universe of Plato and the Academy*, 1944, 584; A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II*, 1940, 250. +; L. Alfonsi, *Miscellanea Galbati* I, 1951, 71, 1 (vgl. auch Hermes 81, 1953, 45. 2 und schon Vigli. Christ. 2, 1943, 73 ff.)

<sup>2</sup> Der menschenförmige Gott gegenüber dem jüdischen Gott als ἀνθρώπος περιέμενος bei Hekataios von Abdera Fgr Hist. 264F6, 4 und Poseidonios 87F70, 35.

<sup>3</sup> Richtig beobachtet im Altertum, vgl. Mich. Psellus, de omnif. doct. 131, S. 69 Westerink (= Cramer, Anecd. Par. 1, 333) οὐ γὰρ ἐξαρμύζει τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ (τῆς ὁρεσμῆς) und so Cicero Tusc. 1, 22 quidam enim sacros nominant; 41 quanta illa non nominata magis quam non intellecta. = ἀκτατονήματος μέλλων ἢ διατονήματος; natura; vgl. Arnim, 6. Der von Epikur selber als ἀκτατονήματος bezeichnete vierte Bestandteil der Seelenmischung (fr. 314 f. Usener; vgl. Lucret. 3, 242) ist fernzuhalten.

dass der *ἀσώματος* (*sine corpore, carens corpore*) *mundus semper se movens* sei.—Derselbe Dyotheismus wird von der Doxographie Theophrast zugeteilt, bei Cicero §93 *modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo* (und auch Gestirnen), Clemens von Alexandria *protr.* 66, 5 πῇ μὲν οὐρανόν, πῇ δὲ πνεῦμα (christianisiert für νοῦς) τὸν θεόν ἐπονοεῖ: vorher unklar über Aristoteles: τὸν καλούμετον ἰσχυρόν ψυχῇ εἶναι τοῦ παντός οἰεται . . . τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ψυχὴν· nachher aber τὸν κόσμον θεὸν ἡγοῦμενος . . . τὸν ἰσχυρόν τοῦ θεοῦ θεὸν δογματίζων (denn Aristoteles anerkennt die göttliche *πρόνοια* nur in der obern Region vom Monde aufwärts an)—ähnlich wie Cicero über den Widerspruch spottet, dass der Äther Gott sein soll, nur ein Teil der anderwärts als Gott bezeichneten Welt. Seltsam kann der Ausdruck *ψυχὴ* scheinen, doch vgl. Actius 305a8 'Aριστοτέλης ἐκάστην οἰεται τῶν σφαιρῶν ζῆλον εἶναι αὐθότο: ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, ὃν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστὶν αἰθέριον κυκλωρικῶς, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ λόγος ἀκήνητος. αἰτίαι τῆς κινήσεως· noch näher die Fassung bei Athenagoras 6 (von Diels zitiert), die nur *ἐν σῶμα αἰθέριον* und *eine ψυχὴ* nennt, τὸν τοῦ σώματος λόγον, αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ κυκλωρικῶς, αἰτίαι δὲ τῆς ταύτης κινήσεως.

Der Dyotheismus kam schon in Aristoteles' Fröhschrift vor, und falls Theophrast den Namen *πρώτων σώμα* gebrauchte (nach fr. 21, Doxogr. 493, 8), schloss er sich einer frühern Ausdruckweise des Aristoteles an. Wenn *de coelo* thematisch in der Hauptsache nur den sichtbaren Gott behandelt, so wird deswegen nicht eine alte Gedankenschicht des Aristoteles erreicht; auch die *Endemische Ethik*, ganz dem praktischen Leben hingeneigt, verzichtet auf die Darstellung des *θεωρητικῶς ἀσώματος*, den die *Nikomachische Ethik* später unter Rückgriff auf den *Protreptikos* hineinnimmt.—In *de coelo* wird 260a31 der Äther *θεοτέρα νόσα* genannt, das *σῶμα θεῶν* 260a11. Gern wird auf die volkstümliche Auffassung verwiesen, dass der Sitz der Götter oben ist, 270b5 ff., 270b15, 281a11 f., die letzte Stelle beweist, dass nicht an den ersten bewegenden Gott gedacht ist; erst der Autor *de mundo* nennt als Sitz für die Gotteskraft, *θεῖα ἀνάγκη*, den obersten Himmel, 397b24 ff. und erinnert durch *ἐν ἀκήνητος* 400b11, *ἀκήνητος* ὡς 614 (die Stelle nach Aristoteles *de an. mot.* 702b31 gestaltet), *ἀκήνητος* 631 an das *πρώτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον*. Auch der pythagoreisierende Autor (Agatharchides nach Immisch, Sitzb.-Ber. Heidelb. 1919) bei Photios 499b26 bemerkt *ἐν τῇ ἀπλυνῇ τὸ πρῶτον αἰτίον ἐστὶν* 619 *ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς καὶ αἱ νοητοὶ θεοὶ* (ungefähr die *νοητοὶ δυνάμεις* von Philo *spec. leg.* 1, 46); vgl. [Justin] *cohort.* 6.

Die platonische Himmelsbeseelung, die offenbar in *De philosophia* Geltung hatte, ist auch in *De coelo* nicht ganz verschwunden, 285a29; 292a18 (auch von Simplicius in *de coelo* 378, 12 f. zitiert), und Theophrast verlangt die Himmelseele, *Metaph.* 5b2 und bei Proklos in *Tim.* 2, 122, 11 ff. und 3, 136, 1 Diels. Nur dass die Seele nicht *ἀναγκάζουσα*, nicht *μετὰ βίας* widerstrebend die Elemente stößt (Simplicius 378, 35 ff.; Ross *op. cit.* 98), wird *de coel.* 284a22 ff. dargelegt, in einem Stück, das, wie W. Jaeger, Aristoteles 320 sah, der Jugendschrift nahe steht, in der zwar noch nicht dem Äther von Natur—Natur im Sinn der terrestrischen Physik gebraucht—die kreislaufige Bewegung zugeschrieben wird, aber auch die *βία* (*vis*) abgestritten wird, derart das *πρόνοιας* (*voluntas*) den vermutlich ruhig schwebenden Äther in Bewegung setzt; fr. 21 aus Cicero *de nat. deor.* 2, 44.

Aber nun zum *πῆρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* an der Sextusstelle. Soll man ungesichts des aristotelischen Dyotheismus an den göttlichen Äther denken oder an das sozusagen anschliessende *πρῶτον κινεῖν*—nach dem Ausdruck von Actius 305a2 *τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν εἶδος χωριστὸν ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντός, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον σῶμα*? Für die erste Auffassung könnte Cicero *de rep.* 6, 17 angerufen werden, der die Fixsternsphäre *summus deus ardens et continuus ceteris deos* nennt. M. Messala, cons. 53 v. Chr. also zur Zeit, als Cicero an seinem Staatswerke schrieb, erklärte nach Macrobius Sat. 1, 9, 14 den welterschaffenden Janus (*Ἄϊων* nach Lydus *de mens.* 64, 12 Wutsch) als den Gott, der die auseinanderstrebenden Elemente *copulavit circumdatum caelo*; *quar vis caeli maxima duas vis dispares colligat*. Gott und Himmel scheinen hier dieselbe Aufgabe zu haben.<sup>6</sup> Zu vergleichen ist, was Kaiser Julian or. 4, 139c bemerkt: τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος οὐσία πάντα προσέχει τὰ μέρη καὶ σφίγγει πρὸς αὐτὸ συνέχουσα τὰ φύκια σκεδαστὸν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπαρτίζον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Vor allem aber ist merkwürdig eine Notiz des Hippolyt elenchos 7, 19, 2 ff., der den Ketzler Basileides des Aristotelismus bezichtigen will, ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου μέρος τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τῆς σελήνης ἀπρονόητον (solches bemerkte auch Clemens; vgl. Diog. Laert. 3, 32) . . . τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν σελήνην ἐν πάσῃ . . . πρόνοια . . . τεταγμένον μέχρι τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια, πέμπτη τις αὐτῶν οὐσία, . . . οἶμαι οὐσία τις ὑπερκόσμος.

<sup>6</sup> Theophrast benutzte auch nicht die späteste Fassung der aristotelischen Ethik; vgl. Hermann 69, 1933, 334, 376. Über die theophrastische Definition (*de anima*) der Himmelseele Stobaeus 1, 936, 26 ff. *τελειώτατη* . . . τῆς οὐρανοσφαιρῆς (Äther), ἥν ἐπεδύξαμεν καλεῖται ἄστρον τῆς γῆς. Dagegen polemisiert bei Julian or. 5, 126b 100 ff. zu lesen *σφαιρῶν, γῆς (ἡ) ἀστροσφαίρας* der peripatetische Lehrer Stobaeus Xenarch (von dem Simplicius *de coelo* 378c 29 *πρώτος οὐρανὸς ἀπὸ πᾶσι* bezeugt: Eine Ursache für die natürliche Bewegung des *πρώτου*

*σώματος* sei nicht zu suchen, das verstatte gegen einen Satz gerade Theophrasts; er ist am erhaltenen fr. 9 li 21 und bei Proklos in *Tim.* 2, 140, 7 ff. Zur Himmelsbeseelung vgl. noch Arius Did. *Dox.* 430, 19; [Plutarch] *poet. Hom.* 103; Alexander v. Aphr. *quest.* 1, 25.

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. Glan, *Röm. Recogn.* 8, 14 Aristoteles (sile philo., fr. 27 Ross) *etiam quintum introducit elementum* . . . *ἀκνωτόμαστον* . . . *sine dubio illud indicant quae in unum quatuor elementa coniungunt mundum fuerit.*



Entsprechend gibt es drei Wissenschaften: 1. φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις (περὶ τῶν οὐ προνοίᾳ, διαικουμένων); 2. μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ (περὶ τῶν μετὰ σελήνην); 3. περὶ πέμπτης οὐσίας ἴδιος λόγος, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτῇ θεολογούμενος. Hier ist also eigenartigerweise die theologische πέμπτη οὐσία auf die Oberfläche des Himmels, sein πέρας, beschränkt. Die Theorie ist nicht einfach eine Missgeburt aus dem Gehirn des Hippolyt. Philo de somn. 1. 21 gibt auf die Frage, was der Himmel sei, als Antwort: z.B. πέμπτον κυκλωφορικὸν σῶμα, und er fährt fort: τί δέ; ἡ ἀπλανὴς καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφαῖρα πρὸς τὸ ἀνω βάθος ἔχει ἡ αὐτὴ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιφάνεια βάθους ἐρήμῃ; Zu vergleichen ist auch die Verwendung von ἐπιφάνεια bei Arius Didymus Doxogr. 166, 7 τετάχθην τὰ ἀπλανῆ ἐπὶ μιᾷς ἐπιφανείας: ähnlich Autor de mundo 392a18 τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἐπὶ μιᾷς κινουμένης ἐπιφανείας τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ, während er 396b30 nahe Messala steht: δύναμις τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον δημιουργήσασα καὶ μὴ διαλαβοῦσα (περιλαβοῦσα;) σφαῖρας ἐπιφανείᾳ τίς τε διωνυτωτάτος ἐν αὐτῇ φύσεις ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκάσσει ἁρμολογήσθαι.

Der Dreietagenbau bei Hippolyt lässt sich in gewisser Beziehung auf Aristoteles zurückführen. Dieser nennt die zwei oberen Etagen (Fixstern- bzw. Planetenhimmel) ausdrücklich de coel. 278b11: ähnlich 'Agatharchides' 44:09. Verdächtig ist die Dreistufung bei Philolaos A 16: ὄλυμπος (wo die εὐκλείπεια τῶν στοιχείων!), κόσμος mit den Planeten, οὐρανός unter dem Mond, wo die φιλομεταβολος γίνεται.

Aber es gibt noch eine andere Dreietagenordnung im Umkreis des Aristoteles und vielleicht hilft sie uns weiter. Von unten nach oben: terrestrische Sphäre, Himmelsphäre im ganzen und—vermuten wir—das πέρας. Nach der Stelle Sextus Emp. hyp. 3, 218 ist ja damit am ehesten der gleiche Gott gemeint, der auch δαίμονος heisst, und an einer Parallelstelle Sextus adv. math. 10, 33 finden wir κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς ἦν τὸ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.<sup>1</sup> Freilich in diesem Zusammenhang (32) witzelt der Skeptiker darüber, dass nach Aristoteles τὸ πᾶν ὃν αὐτὸ τε ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ὅπου ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς οὐδὲν ἔχει ἕτερον παρ' αὐτὸν ἐξωθεν, διόπερ αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὢν οὐδέ πῃ γινώσκειται (nachher 35 τὸν οὐρανὸν αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ τόπον εἶναι)—das ist wirklich spätere aristotelische Lehre, Phys. 212b14 ff.—und dass der erste Gott zum τόπος πάντων wird. Wir bemerken nur im Vorbeigehen, dass eine solche Lehre Philo von Alexandria tiefinnig vorgekommen ist, somn. 1, 63 f. ὁ θεὸς καλεῖται τόπος τῷ περιέχειν μὲν τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεσθαι δὲ πρὸς μηδενὸς ἀπλῶς . . . τὸ θεῖον ἵπ' οὐδενὸς περιεχόμενον ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τόπος ἑαυτοῦ: fug. 75; leg. all. 1, 44 (vgl. auch oben Antm. 2), und wir führen auch nicht aus, wie Aristotelesklärer versuchten, das πρῶτον κινεῖν in der äussersten περιφέρεια des Fixsternhimmels unterzubringen—was bis zu einem gewissen Grade die seltsame Ansicht bei Hippolyt erklären könnte—so Alexander von Aphrodisias bei Simplicius in phys. 1354, 79 ff. der dagegen 1355, 15 vielmehr den Himmel in Gott sein lässt, der τὸν ὅλον κόσμον περιέχει. Wir wenden uns lieber einer Stelle bei Aristoteles selber zu, an der Gott als τέλος (πέρας und τέλος gehören nah zusammen, Met. 1022a6 ff.) vorkommt, de coel. 279a23 ff. τὸ τέλος τὸ περιέχον τὴν τῆς ἐκάστου ζωῆς χρήσιν, οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω κατὰ φύσιν, αἰὶν ἐκάστου κέκληται. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ τέλος καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος αἰὼν ἐστίν (vgl. Messala's *Alōn*). Der Abchnitt war schon im Altertum umstritten. Alexander von Aphrodisias (bei Simpl. in de coel. 290, 1 ff., 287, 19 ff.) wollte das Ganze im Sinne von Arnims auf das κυκλωφορικὸν σῶμα, Hauptgegenstand von de coelo, oder auf die Fixsternsphäre zielen lassen und war dadurch gezwungen (287, 30 ff.) ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω σφαῖραν ἡμῶν auf die Bewegung der vier unteren Elemente zu beziehen: dass es sonst περιφορὰν heissen müsste, ist unbedacht, vgl. z.B. 288a15. Simplicius, der das Bedenkliche dieser Auffassung einsieht, will bis 279b2 das πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον erkennen und ist damit genötigt, 279b1 die Lesart κινεῖ statt κινεῖται zu empfehlen. Aber ἀπαστοι κίνηται weist dort auf das Bewegte wie der ähnliche Ausdruck 284a9; 284a11; Phys. 250b13; 250b25 (πρῶτον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον, εἰ μέλλει . . . ἐσεσθαι ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἀπαστος τις καὶ ἰθάνατος κίνησις); Met. 1072a21; Theophrast Met. 5a3; insbesondere ist der Fixsternhimmel gemeint.—Die Neuern machen entweder bei de coel. 279a22 (Guthrie 168, Ross 97) oder bei 279b1 (Cherniss 388, Gigon in der Übersetzung im Artemis-Verlag 1950, 22) den Übergang zum bewegten Himmel. Auch diese Differenz ist bezeichnend. Zwar nimmt Simplicius in de coelo 291, 5 ἀμετάβλητον für das ἀκίνητον in Anspruch, aber er könnte durch 288b1 widerlegt werden. Und doch wird er Recht haben: ἀμετάβλητον nimmt das οὐδεμίᾳ μεταβολῇ von a 19 auf, und zu κινεῖται in dem Satz b34 der mit de an. mot. 700b34 zusammenzustellen ist, fehlt das Objekt, der Himmel, und so ist allein schon in diesem Wort das πρῶτον κινεῖν zum Ausdruck gebracht. Da die These von Cherniss, 279a18-35 als grosse Parenthese zu fassen, nicht befriedigt—die These, die Jaegers Auffassung, das Stück auf die Schrift de philosophia, die ja auch zitiert wird, zurückzuführen, stützen könnte—, wird man versuchen, 279b1 direkt anzuschliessen: nun, wie zu κινεῖται das Objekt fehlte, so fehlt zu κινεῖται das Subjekt ('es gibt entsprechend eine unaufhörliche Bewegung'); vgl. Schwyzer-Debrunner, Griech. Grammatik 2. 239 Nr. 4.

Aion, als überzeitliche, alle zeit-einschliessende (vgl. Phys. 221b2 ff.) Ewigkeit, ewiges Leben

<sup>1</sup> Dass die Seele bei Philo somn. 1, 30 πέρας ἡ εἰδος ist, bei Stobaeus 1, 363, 19 f. nach einigen Peripatetikern

εἰδος τὸ παρὶ τοῖς ποιήματι ἡ ποιητὴς ἀαδὶ δαίμονος, hat nur den Wert einer gewissen Analogie.

gelässt, umhüllt den Himmel—denn ausserhalb des Himmels gibt es keinen zeitmessenden bewegten Körper—, und da Gottes Leistung selber Unsterblichkeit, ewiges Leben ist und um der Leistung, also des ewigen Lebens willen existiert, ist das von ihm abhängige *θεῖον* ewig bewegt (286a9), schliesst alle untergeordnete Bewegungen wie ein *πέρασ* ein (284a4). Die Bewegung des ersten Himmels ist *οὐρανὸς ζωὴ τις*, Phys. 250b14; Theophr. Met. 10a16, und es gilt, dass vom obersten Unsterblichen *καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξήρηται, τοῖς μὲν ἀπριέστεραι, τοῖς δ' ἀμικρῶς, τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὸ ζῆν, de coel.* 279a28; vgl. Met. 1072b14; de an. mot. 700a6; Theophr. Met. 4b15.

Gewiss hat das zeitliche *πᾶντος οὐρανοῦ τέλος*, der *αἰὼν* (de coel. 279a26), und das mehr räumliche *πέρασ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* bei Sextus Emp. hyp. 3, 218 und adv. math. 10, 33 in der Schrift de philosophia Platz gefunden. Auf sie darf auch zurückgeführt werden de coel. 279a18 *οὐτ' ἐν τόπῳ τάκει πέφυκεν οὐτε χρόνῳ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ γηράσκειν οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς οὐδεμίᾳ μεταβολῇ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φεράν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὴν ὑρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ αὐταρκετάτην διατελεῖ τὴν ἀπαντα αἰῶνα*. Die *ὑρίστη ζωὴ* ist die *εὐδαιμονία*, die Gott besitzt. Ganz der *θεωρία* hingegeben ist Gott *αὐτάρκτης* wie der theoretische Mensch, Eth. Nik. 1177a27; b21, ist nicht nur ausserer *πράξις* (= *κίνησις*) befasst, de coel. 292a22 *ἐοικε γὰρ τῷ ἥριστῳ ἔχοντι ἐμάρχεω τὸ εὖ ἀνεν πράξεως*, vgl. Pol. 1325b28. Die Endlosigkeit der *θεωρία* (im Unterschied zur *πράξις*, die einem bestimmten Zweck hingegeben immer wieder ein Ende, ein *πέρασ*, erreicht) findet ihre Abspiegelung in der ewigen Bewegung des dem höchsten theoretischen Gotte nächsten Himmels. Gott ist *ἡμιθεὸς* et *θεῖος* nach de philosophia fr. 26, wo der übermittelnde Epikureer wieder mit der Paradoxie des *ἀκίνητος κινούμενος* Effekt erzielen will. Nach der beseligenden Erfahrung theoretischen Lebens in der Akademie (Protrept. bei Jambl. Protr. 58, 13 ff. Pistelli) hat Aristoteles früh die geistige *ἐνέργεια*, die er nach der Abwendung von der Ideenwelt über die körperliche Welt gesetzt hat, in freudvoller Glückseligkeit leben lassen; *ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ* (Met. 1072b27). Selbstbetrachtung, *νόησις νοήσεως*, wird Gott zugesprochen (1074b34), da es ja keine Ideenobjekte ausserhalb gibt. Die der Materie entblösten *εἰδῶν* der Welt, wie die Metaphysik des Aristoteles sie ergründet (vgl. Met. 983a9), erfüllen den Geist Gottes (wie etwa der Architekt ein Haus ohne Materie in seinen Sinn fasst, Met. 1032b13; 1034a24; de gen. an. 730b14 ff.). Nicht ausgesprochen ist, dass auch alle *ἑνὸς* *εἰδῶν* göttliche Bestimmtheit in der durch den Umlauf der Planetensphären angeregten Weltveränderung erstreben.—Wir betrachten den Dreietagenbau im Kreise des Aristoteles. Schon Plato hat den *ὑπερουράνιος* *κόσμος*, freilich im Mythos des Phaidros 247c, und den Raum der Sternbewegung und den der irdischen *γένεσις*, denen drei Arten von Wissenschaft entsprechen, geschieden. Das wirkt bei seinen Schülern nach. Philipp von Opus in der Epinomis friert hauptsächlich das mittlere Stockwerk der Astronomie die gleich der *θεοφύβεια* ist. Bei Xenokrates gibt es (fr. 3 Heinze) die oberste Stufe des *σοφῶν*, das Idealzahlenreich, und den Bereich des Himmels, in dem *Ζεὺς ὁπάτος*, Vertreter der Mōmis herrscht, der Astrologie zugänglich, und die Welt unter dem Mond, wo die Weltseele, die Göttermutter, Vertreterin der aoristos Dyas regiert (fr. 15. 18). Ähnlich unterscheidet Aristoteles (Met. 1069a30 ff.) nach dem Fall der Ideenlehre die *ἀκίνητος οὐσία* des Geistes—nie konnte die höchste Norm fehlen,\* nie konnte es also im von Arminischen Sinn einen Bau nur aus den zwei untern Stockwerken geben—and die *πῆμπτῃ* *οὐσία αἰδώς* und die *οὐσία φθαρτή*. Die entsprechenden Wissenschaften sind Metaphysik (Theologie), Himmelsphysik (welcher Mathematik hilft) und terrestrische Physik (mit Meteorologie). Die drei aristotelischen Stockwerke finden sich z.B. bei Philo quæst. gen. 4, 8, danach Lydus de mens. 28, 10 ff. Der sog. Onatas bei Stobaeus 1, 49, 2 ff. Wachsm. stellt dem *πρώτος* und *νοητός* *θεός* *περιέχων τὸν σὺμπαντον κόσμον* die wandelnden Götter des Himmels gegenüber.

Verständlich ist, dass der aristotelische Dyotheismus—bei Plato fehlt er, da er die der Seele und dem Geiste vorgeordneten Ideen nicht als Götter bezeichnete—Bedenken erregen konnte, und dass Versuche gemacht wurden, die Geistsubstanz dem göttlichen Himmel oder insbesondere der Fixsternsphäre (so auch nach Arius Did. Dox. 450, 15) zuzuordnen. Ein später Gegner des Aristoteles, der Philosoph Antikos, meint (bei Euseb. praep. ev. 15, 7, 6) maliziös, das *πῆμπτον σῶμα* sei eine Mischung von Platos *οὐσία νοητή* . . . *τε καὶ ἀχρῶματος καὶ ἀσφῆς* (Phaidros 247c) *καὶ ἀπαθῆς* und Platos *θεῖα καὶ ἀφθάρτα* (κατ' εἶδος, Euseb. 15, 8, 2) *(καὶ ἀπαθῆ) σῶματα*. Der erste Peripatetiker, der nach Theophrast und Strato Kenntnis der aristotelischen Schulschriften verrät und auf Okellos (um 100 v. Chr.) gewirkt hat,† Kritolaos (und sein Schüler Diodor), lässt Gott *οὐκ ἐξ αἰθέρος ἀπαθούς* sein (Actios 303b6) und leitet so auch die Seele *ex quinta essentia qua substantia ab* (Tertullian de un. 5; Macrobi in somn. Scip. 1, 14, 20). Nach Stobaeus 1, 366, 25 fassten einige Peripatetiker die Seele als *αἰθέριον σῶμα*; dies ist uns von Herakleides Pontikos fr. 99 Wehrli

\* *Ἐπιμεθεῖς* an der Hippolytstelle, gegen die Gnostiker gewandt (vgl. euchenoi 7, 23, 2) zeigt, dass der dortige Stagenbau nicht ganz unabhängig vom jetzt betrachteten ist. Vgl. auch Vita Aristotelis Marciana 435, 1 *Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ θεολογῶν Ἀριστοτέλους προσέθηκεν τὸ μὴ τὸ πᾶντα ἐνδεσμεῖν εἶναι . . . ἀλλ' εἶναι τὴν καὶ ἐπιμεθεῖαν*.

\* Auch die kreisende Bewegung der Gestirngötter oder des Äthers verrät eben die Wirkung einer geistigen *ἐνέργεια*, Met. 1025b25; 1060a26.

† *Enchiridion* 1926, 590 ff. Bei Okellos 37 Harder auch Andeutung des Äthers unter Bereinigung des Dyotheismus.

überliefert. Der nämlichen Auffassung folgte Antiochos von Askalon, der in seiner akademisch-peripatetischen Einheitsphilosophie auch seine stoischen Sympathien zur Geltung brachte. Sie liegt vor bei Cicero Acad. 1, 26 (*quintum genus e quo astra mentesque*, ähnlich Philo horoz 283; aber anders der alte Zeuge Megasthenes, der den Geist weglässt), 39; de fin. 4, 12, wohl auch 36 (*animus in quodam genere corporis*) und 2, 114. Unbestimmbar ist der Übermittler für Ciceros Tusculanen, wo weniger die Verstofflichung des Geistigen als die Vergeistigung der *quinta natura* vorliegt: 1, 22<sup>11</sup> im Vergleich mit Plato Gesetze 897 a und 66 mit der pathetischen Hervorhebung der Freiheit, Körpergelöstheit des Göttlichen (ähnlich dem, was Plutarch de parte aut facult. animi 3, VII 15, 15 ff. Bernardakis von der Seele bemerkt). Wir sind gehalten, Cherniss 601 f. zu folgen und solche Lehren nicht der Schrift de philosophia zuzuweisen trotz neuer Fürsprache bei Festugière 255 f. (mit geistvoller Begründung) und Alfonsi (vgl. oben Anm. 1).

WILLY THEILER

Universität Bern.

<sup>11</sup> Die folgerade Umschreibung der Seele mit *ἐντελέχεια* passt scheinbar zur ewigen Bewegung der platonischen Weltseele. Theophrast hat nach seiner Anm. 5 wiedergegebenen Definition der Weltseele das Wort *ἐντελέχεια* gerade nicht gebraucht, und auch Aristoteles, der *ἐντελέχεια* nach *ἐντελέχεια* gebildet hat, verwendet in seiner Seelendefinition de an. 412a28, die Theophrast benutzt hat, nur *ἐντελέχεια*. Das bedenkliche *ἐντελέχεια*

kann beim gemeinsamen Vorfahr von Cic. Tusc. 1, 22; Philo somn. 1, 36, der das *animae* betont, und Macrobius in somn. Scip. 1, 14, 19 auf das selbe Missverständnis zurückgeführt werden, das bei Arius Did. Dox. 44b, 20 vorliegt. *ἐντελέχεια* sagt in der Definition der menschlichen Seele Xenarch nach Actius 388b16; vgl. Simplicius in de coelo 380, 16.



## SIDELIGHTS ON GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

WHEN, towards the close of 1897, I, a freshman of St. John's College, Oxford, first met David Ross of Balliol in the room of a common friend, I little dreamed how long and how closely we should be associated in the life and work of another Oxford college and how immeasurably I should be enriched by his example, his help and his friendship. So I welcome wholeheartedly this opportunity of acknowledging, since I cannot repay, my debt by making a contribution, however slight, to the tribute of admiration, affection and good wishes embodied in this volume. Much of his time and ability has been devoted to the study and elucidation of the works of the Greek philosophers, and I offer him, γλαῦκ' εἰς Ἀθήνας, some notes, which lay no claim to completeness, on the light thrown on that study by Greek inscriptions.

We regard the rise and development of philosophy as one of the supreme achievements of the Greeks, which has permanently and profoundly affected Western civilisation. Did the later Greeks share this view? Inscriptions offer some evidence which merits consideration. The author of the Parian Chronicle,<sup>1</sup> who is for us, owing to the mutilation of the stone, anonymous, compiled a chronological table of the outstanding personalities and events in Greek history down to 264-3 B.C. The extant record is fairly complete from 1581-80 to 355-4 B.C. and again from 336-5 to 299-8, and if we examine the period after 1000 B.C. we are struck by the predominance of Greek tyrants and foreign potentates in the sphere of political and military history and of poets (prose authors are ignored) in the realm of culture; Terpander of Lesbos (A34) is the sole representative of music and Callippus, the astronomer (B6), of natural science, while sculptors, painters and architects are passed over in silence. Philosophy appears only in the persons of Socrates, Anaxagoras and Aristotle;<sup>2</sup> a brief reference to two of these, [ἄ]σπερ δὲ κατ' Ἐδρηίδην Σωκράτης τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας, is tacked on as an afterthought to the record (A60) of Euripides' first victory in 442-1 B.C., and the death of 'Socrates the philosopher' at the age of 70 is reported (A66) under the date 400-399,<sup>3</sup> while in a paragraph (B11) relating to events in Asia Minor and Egypt in 321-20 B.C. occurs the phrase καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐτελεύτησεν.<sup>4</sup> A fragment of another chronological table,<sup>5</sup> drawn up in A.D. 15-16, survives in Rome and gives rather more recognition to philosophy; S[olon], Anacharsis, the Seven Sages and Aesop are mentioned in B2, 4 and 5, B7 tells of Pythagoras's capture by Cambyses in Egypt<sup>6</sup> in 524-3, and B10 runs: αὐτ' οὐ Σωκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος [καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιμος καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας] καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων, ἔτη—, where the year is unfortunately lost. Nor is it without significance that the owner of a villa in Colonia Agrippinensis (Köln) in the Imperial period, wishing to adorn it with mosaic portraits of leading representatives of Greek thought and letters, placed Διογένης, the cynic, depicted in his tub, in the centre, with Σωκράτης, [Κλ]εόβουλος, [Χ]αλ[ω]ν, Σοφιστής and two others, possibly Plato and Aristotle, around him.<sup>7</sup>

We may begin our brief survey with that curious blend of religion, mysticism and philosophy which has come down to us under the name of Orphism. Ten Orphic poems, engraved on thin sheets of gold, have been found in graves at Petelia (IG XIV 698) and Thurii (*ibid.* 641-2) in Southern Italy, near Rome, and at Eleutherna in Western Crete (J. Cr. II xii 31, three copies of the same poem). These have been long known and often edited,<sup>8</sup> but recent years have brought to light two further relevant documents. The first is another inscription<sup>9</sup> of the same nature, similar to, yet at a number of points differing from, that of Petelia, discovered, along with human ashes, in an elaborately ornamented bronze urn at Pharsalus in Thessaly; the editor assigns both urn and inscription to about the middle of the fourth century B.C., so that it must rank as the earliest member of the series. The second is an extraordinary alabaster bowl<sup>10</sup> of uncertain provenance,

<sup>1</sup> IG XII (3) 444 and Suppl. p. 110, F. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium* (Berlin, 1904), F.G.H. III. no. 239.

<sup>2</sup> In the mutilated paragraph A79, relating to 355-4 B.C., the letters ΖΟΦΟΖ were read by Selden and may refer to a philosopher; we should expect some reference to Plato, but I know no event in Plato's life dated in that year which would call for notice.

<sup>3</sup> The word here used, ἐτελεύτησεν, is that used throughout the record (except for ἀπέθανε in B19) to denote death, whether natural or violent: there is no suggestion that Socrates died as a martyr.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Jacoby's comment *ad loc.* (F.G.H. III. p. 701).

<sup>5</sup> IG XIV 1097, Jacoby, F.G.H. III. no. 252.

<sup>6</sup> For this incident see Lamblichus, *Vita Pythag.* IV 19.

<sup>7</sup> IG XIV 2567, K. Schefold, *Bildnisse der antiken Dichter*, 154 f., 214.

<sup>8</sup> J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Reli-*

gion, 373 ff. (with a critical appendix by G. Murray, 660 ff.), D. Compagnot, *Lamine de orphique* (Florence, 1910), A. Olivieri, *Lamine d'or orphique* (Bonn, 1915), O. Kern, *Orphicorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922), 103 ff., W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London, 1935), 171 ff., K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 161, and *Ancilla*, 51 (Oxford, 1946, 1948), H. Diehl, *Fragmente der Versukrator* (Berlin, 1951) I 15 ff., nos. 17-20. See also O. Kern, *Orpheus* (Berlin, 1920), K. Ziegler, *RE* XVIII 1200 ff., and M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte d. griech. Religion*, I 642 ff., II 497 ff.

<sup>9</sup> N. M. Verdell, *AE* 1950-1, 98 ff.; cf. J. and L. Robert, *REG* LXV 132 f. (*Bull.* 1952, 79), A. Rionaghi, *Riv. Fil.* LXXX 262.

<sup>10</sup> H. Lamer, *Ph. W. LI* (1931) 653 ff., R. Delbrück and W. Vollgraf, *JHS* LIV 129 ff. Cf. M. P. Nilsson, *op. cit.* II 411 f.

now in Geneva, the interior of which is decorated by sixteen nude figures, male and female, grouped around a central dragon, and the exterior by four Erotes and an inscribed band containing four quotations of unmistakably Orphic character; the bowl, almost certainly authentic, is dated by its editors between the third and the sixth century A.D., and so attests the survival of the Orphic faith to a surprisingly late period.

Of the early philosophers' inscriptions give us some glimpses. Diogenes of Oenoanda<sup>11</sup> prefaces his account of the elements (στοιχεῖα), ἐξ ἀπ[λ]ο[ύ]της μὲν ὑφεστηκότα | [καὶ ὄν]τα ἀφθάρτα, γεννῶν[τα] δὲ τὰ πράγματα (fr. V i 3 ff.), by a summary of the ἐτέρων δόξαι, which deserves quotation: 'Ἡράκλειτος [μὲν] οὖν ὁ Ἐφέσιος πῦρ εἶ[ναι] σ[τοιχεῖον] εἶπεν, Θα[λ]λῆς δ' ὁ Μελήσιος ὕδωρ, [Διογένης δὲ δ'] Ἀπολλωνιάτης καὶ Ἀναξίμενης ἄερα, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δ' ὁ Ἀ[κράγυ]ος [καὶ] πῦρ καὶ αἶρα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, Ἀνα[ξ]αγόρας δ' ὁ Κλαζομένιος τὰς ὁμοιομερείας ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, αἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔλην καὶ θεῖον. Δημόκριτος δὲ ὁ Ἀ[βδηρεῖτης] εἶπε μὲν ἀτόμους φύσεις καλῶς γε ποιῶν πηλ. (fr. V i 10-ii 12). He goes on to arraign the philosophers here named, οὐ φιλο[νέ]ικον πρὸς αὐτοὺς π[ά]θει || χρώμενοι, τὴν δ' ἀλ[λ]ήθειαν σωθῆναι θέλοντες (fr. V iii 3 ff.), beginning with Heraclitus thus: κακῶς, Ἡράκλει[τε], πῦρ εἶναι στοιχεῖον λέ[γεις]. οὔτε γὰρ ἀφθάρτων ἔστιν, εἰπεὶ φθερόμενοι | ὁρῶμεν αὐτό, οὔτε δύναται γεννᾶν τὰ πράγματα (fr. V iii. 9 ff.). Here unfortunately the fragment ends and we lack the refutations of the remaining δόξαι save for a passage pointing out a serious error in Democritus, τίς || ἀτόμους μόνος καὶ ἀλήθειαν εἰπὼν ὑπάρχειν | ἐν τοῖς οὐσι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ | [ν]ομισαὶ ἀπαντα (fr. VI ii 4 ff.).

The name Θαλῆς occurs in a sixth-, or even a seventh-, century dedication of a marble lion, now in the British Museum, which stood beside the Sacred Way leading to the temple of Apollo at Branchidae,<sup>12</sup> but as his father's name is Python he cannot be the celebrated philosopher, who was son of Examyces, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius and from a headless Roman herm inscribed Θαλῆς | Ἐξαμίον | Μελήσιος (IG XIV 1163); another herm, found at Brundisium, bore the legend Θαλῆς Μελήσιος. Ἐργόα, παρὰ ■ ἀτα (ibid. 673). A seated statue from Branchidae bears a boustrophedon dedication of the children of Anaximander, son of Mandromachus,<sup>13</sup> but again the patronymic forbids identification with the philosopher, son of Praxiades. But it has been plausibly suggested<sup>14</sup> that an archaic statue inscribed Ἀναξίμανδρος, unearthed in the Milesian βουλευτήριον, may be dedicated by the philosopher, and the view that a Hellenistic relief in Rome inscribed Ἀναξίμανδρος<sup>15</sup> portrays the Milesian is confirmed by the discovery of a similar relief, now in Budapest, inscribed Εὔδοξος. Of the other philosophers named by Diogenes in the passage quoted above,<sup>16</sup> Empedocles recurs in fr. XXXV ii and Democritus in fr. XXXIII ii, iii, while Anaxagoras appears in the Parian (A60) and the Roman Chronicle (IG XIV 1297 ii 31).

Pythagoras, whose many-sided genius deeply influenced Greek life and thought, is named only once in the extant portion of Diogenes' inscription,<sup>17</sup> but his capture by Cambyses is recorded, as we have seen, in the Roman Chronicle and we find references to some of his followers, as Sex. Cl. Aurelianus of Sinynna Πυθαγόρας, on whom the Delphians conferred πολυτεία (Pouilles, III (1) 203), and to his doctrines, as in the epitaph<sup>18</sup> of an otherwise unknown Pythagoras of Philadelphia in Lydia, which begins

Οὐ γενόμενος Σάμῳς [κ]εῖνος ὁ Πυθαγόρας,  
ἀλλ' ἐφύην σοφίᾳ τὰ τοῦ λαχὼν ὄνομα,  
[τὸν] πόνοιον ἐν κρείττας ἀρετῶν [ἐν βίᾳ].

and is accompanied by the sign Υ, symbolising the two paths between which man must make his choice (J.E.D. XI 129), or in the late epigram<sup>19</sup> in honour of Lactus, probably a Neoplatonist, which ends

εἰ κατὰ Πυθαγόρην ψυχὴ μεταβαίνει εἰς ἄλλον,  
ἐν σοί, Λαῖτε, Πλάτων ζῇ πάλι φαινόμενος.

M. Guarducci recently sought<sup>20</sup> to trace Pythagorean influence in three epigrams of the second

<sup>11</sup> Diogenes Oenoandensis, ed. I. William, Leipzig, 1907.

<sup>12</sup> I see no reference to Diogenes of Oenoanda in G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge, 1954). For a herm at Rome inscribed Ἡράκλειτος | Βλάσιος | Ἐφέσιος see IG XIV 1159; for his date, *ibid.*, 1297 ii. 30; for the legend Ἡράκλειτος Ἐφέσιος on an Ephesian bronze coin issued under Philip I (A.D. 244-9), *BMC Coins: Asia*, 98, H. Dieck, *Fragments*, I, p. 144, Pl. p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> SIG 30, DGE 723, IBM 430.

<sup>14</sup> SIG 36, IBM 931.

<sup>15</sup> SIG 32, cf. C. Fredrich, *Mitteil.*, 1(2) 112, no. 8, W. Darsow, *JdI* LXIX 101 ff.

<sup>16</sup> IG XIV 1291 (where the name is regarded as a sculptor's signature); cf. Heibig, *Führer*, II 175 f.

no. 1408. K. Schefold, *Bildnisse der antiken Dichter*, 156 f.

<sup>17</sup> Diogenes also deals with Xenophanes (fr. XXI), Digenes of Melos, who [ἐν] τῇ τακτῇ | [Εὐδοκίῳ] τῆς δόξης | [ἀποδείξαι] ἀπ[λ]ο[ύ]τος ἴσας μὴ εἶναι θε[ο]ί[ους] (fr. XII i 9 ff.), and Protagoras of Abdera, who τῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀνθρώπων φωνῇ | ἀνθρώπων | δόξαν, ταῖς δὲ λέξεσιν δὲ | ἑτέρας ἀχρησάτο, ὥς | τὸ λέγειν ἰσχυρὸν ἀνθρώπων | ἐκφραζόμενος. ἔφη | σὺ γὰρ μὴ εἰδέναι, εἰ θε[ο]ί | οὐ εἶπεν (fr. XI ii 3 ff.).

<sup>18</sup> Fr. XXXIV Πυθαγόρας οὐ || μόνος καὶ [ἐστίν] . . .

<sup>19</sup> J. Keil and A. van Premerstein, *Bericht über eine Reise in Lydien* (Wien, Denkschr. LIII 2) 34, no. 53; cf. A. Brinkmann, *Rh Mus* LXVI 616 ff.

<sup>20</sup> IG II 3816; cf. J. H. Oliver, *Epigrammata*, Suppl. VIII 257 f., who compares *Anth. Pal.* VII 75.

<sup>21</sup> *Rund Pont de XXIII-IV* 209 ff.



century A.D. found at Ostia, but her interpretation is called in question by A. Vogliano.<sup>22</sup> That Samos continued to pride itself upon being the birthplace of so illustrious a man is shown by a coin of Trajan's reign representing a statue of the philosopher and bearing the legend *Πεθαγόρης Σαμίου*.<sup>23</sup>

Socrates, the first of Athenian philosophers, opened a new chapter in the history of Greek thought. His arresting personality, his patent sincerity, and the novelty of his method and field of investigation, combined with his good fortune in having his teaching, or what purported to be his teaching, expressed by so consummate a literary artist and so devoted a disciple as Plato, secured him a lasting place among the immortals. He appears, as we have seen, in the Parian and the Roman Chronicle and on the Köln mosaic. On a mosaic<sup>24</sup> at Syrian Apamea he is shown presiding over a conclave of six unnamed philosophers, and Hansmann, who dates it between A.D. 350 and 400, regards it as a proof of the popularity of Socrates among the educated Syrian pagans of that time. His memory was also kept alive by portrait-herms bearing his name;<sup>25</sup> one double herm<sup>26</sup> portrays Socrates and Seneca, their names inscribed in Greek and in Latin letters respectively. In Diogenes of Oenoanda he appears in a mutilated fragment, which runs thus: *πυλὸς τῶν φιλοσόφων* | *καὶ μάλιστα αἱ περὶ Σω* | *κράτῃ, τὸ δ[ὲ] φύσις* | *λογεῖν καὶ τὰ* | *μετέω* | *πολυπραγμο* | *περιττόν φασ[ιν εἶναι]* (fr. III). Since the main philosophical schools traced their ancestry to Socrates, *Σωκρατικός* rarely appears as an epithet of a philosopher, because it was not sufficiently distinctive; we have, however, an Attic epigram of the first or second century A.D., which runs

Υἱὸν Ἐπιστή[μης Φυ]ιδριεὶς τε, | Τρωάδος ἄνθος, |  
Σωκρατικῆς σοφίης | ἄστρον ὄρεϊς Σεύκου.<sup>27</sup>

Plato is more frequently mentioned, and it is probably a mere chance that his name does not occur in the extant portions of the Parian and Roman Chronicles, the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda and the Köln mosaic; his statue stood in the 'exedra of poets and sages' at Memphis.<sup>28</sup> The epitaph of Collega Macedo at Pisidian Antioch, dating from the fourth century A.D., speaks of him as *φιλόσοφον καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ αἰρουμένον*?<sup>29</sup> and to this evidence for the widespread and lasting influence of Plato we may add that of the named herms, busts and statuette found in or near Rome,<sup>30</sup> the third-century Eleusinian memorial of the *ἐκρόφαντες* Eunice, which refers to her great-uncle as *σοφίης ἡγήτορι—τῇ τε* (or *τῇ ἐδ[ε]*) *Πλά[τωνος]* | *δρέφατο*—: *Καλλιόχῃ περιωνύμῃ*,<sup>31</sup> and the fourth-century inscription recording the visit of the Athenian sophist Nicagoras, *ὁ δαδούχας τῶν ἀγωνιάτων Ἐλευσίνι μυστηρίων*, to the Egyptian Syringes, *πολλοῖς ὑστερον χρόνοις μετὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, which ends with the prayer *θεῶς ἡμῖν Πλάτων καὶ ἐνταῦθα*<sup>32</sup> suggesting a Plato-cult amounting almost, if not quite, to apotheosis. The metrical epitaph<sup>33</sup> of Aridices of Rhodes refers to the Muses, *τὸν αἰδιδίμον αἱ σε τιθήνοισι* | *χεροὶ Πλουτωνέου* *θρέψαν* *ὅπ' ἀτραπιτοῦς*, and the title *φιλόσοφος Πλατωνικός* is given to C. Julius Sabinus at Athens,<sup>34</sup> to L. Mestrius Autobulus, a descendant of Plutarch, at Chaeronea,<sup>35</sup> to Theon at Smyrna,<sup>36</sup> to Secundinus of Tralles at Ephesus,<sup>37</sup> to Flavius Maecius Secundus? Dionysodorus at Antinoë,<sup>38</sup> and, in a Latin honorary inscription, to Apuleius at his native Madaura in Numidia.<sup>39</sup> Delphi exercised, not unnaturally, a powerful fascination for these devotees of Plato, and some of them received from the Delphians citizenship and other privileges; such were Isidore of Thmouis in the Egyptian Delta,<sup>40</sup> the famous L. Calvenus Taurus of Berytus, friend of Plutarch and teacher of Aulus Gellius and Atticus Herodes, honoured at Delphi about A.D. 163,<sup>41</sup> and Bacchius of Paphos, the first teacher of Marcus Aurelius, Zosimus (also named Sotinus) and Claudius Nicostratus of Athens, and

<sup>22</sup> *Prolegomena*, I 120 f., 155 f. cf. A. Barigazzi, *Konst. Apoc.* VII 97 ff.

<sup>23</sup> H. Diels, *Fragmente* I, p. xii — *BMCoinn: Ionia*, 373 (cf. 381, 390, 392).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. M. A. Hansmann, *Herm. St.* LX 205 ff., thinks that Socrates is represented as teaching a class of six disciples, but C. Picard, *RA* XLII (1933) 190 ff., draws attention to the difficulty of this interpretation.

<sup>25</sup> *IG* XIV 1214-17, A. Hekler, *Greek and Roman Portraits*, 10 ff.

<sup>26</sup> K. Schefold, *Bildnisse der antiken Dichter*, 17 ff., C. Mauch, *Röm. Bildnisse*, R 106, pl. 71.

<sup>27</sup> *IG* II 3793.

<sup>28</sup> C. Wicken, *JdI* XXXII (60 ff.), C. Picard, *GRAT* 1951, 71 ff., esp. 73 f.

<sup>29</sup> *GR* XXXIII 2. See below, p. 139.

<sup>30</sup> *IG* XIV 1192-1200; cf. A. Hekler, *op. cit.* 20 f.

<sup>31</sup> *IG* II 3709, 11 f. (with *temnia*), J. H. Oliver, *Hesperia*, Suppl. VII 251 (with *stemma* facing p. 248).

<sup>32</sup> *OGI* 721. Cf. J. Ballet, *Inscr. gr. et lat. des lambeaux*

*des rois*, 1265; *GRIJ* 1922, 282 ff. (who dates the inscription in A.D. 326), W. Siegmund, *RE* XVII 218, no. 9, O. Schüdel, *Älter*, XXI 361 ff.

<sup>33</sup> F. Hiltel von Gaertringen, *BCH* XXXVI 290 ff.

<sup>34</sup> *IG* II 3803 (post med. 2. II p.).

<sup>35</sup> *IG* VII 3423 = *SEG* 844. For another third-century philosopher in the same family, *Ἰσίδωρος ἀπὸ Πλουτωνέου*, see *IG* VII 3425, where the restoration *ἐπ[ίστη]* is uncertain (cf. *SEG* 844B).

<sup>36</sup> *IGR* IV 1449; cf. Schefold, *op. cit.* (n. 26) 181 (2).

<sup>37</sup> *Ephesos*, IV (3) 288, no. 40.

<sup>38</sup> *IBM* 1076 — *Sammlbuch*, 6012.

<sup>39</sup> *Ann. Ép.* 1919, no. 96; so Apuleius describes himself as *philosophum Platonium Madanensem* (*Libri primi hypomnem.* IV).

<sup>40</sup> *Equites*, III (2) 116, where Isidore is regarded as probably one of the earliest masters of Neoplatonism.

<sup>41</sup> His name appears as *Καλβένος* in the Delphian document (*SEG* 868A), as Calvenus in Aulus Gellius, XVII 10, 3; cf. *PIR* II p. 79, no. 339.



M. Sextius Cornelianus of Mallus, enfranchised a little earlier,<sup>44</sup> while Gaius, son of Xenon and adoptive father of Bacchius, who previously received similar honours,<sup>45</sup> though described simply as φιλόσοφος, was almost certainly also a Platonist. The words Πλατωνικὸς φιλόσοφος are also cut in a *tabula unguata* on a rock at Termessus in Pisidia,<sup>46</sup> but no name accompanies them and their purpose is uncertain. The excavation of the site of the Platonic Academy by P. Z. Aristophron brought to light a tantalising fragment<sup>47</sup> bearing the familiar names Χαρχ[ιδες], | Ἀρίστ[ον], | Ἀξι[oxos], | Κρίτων, in fifth-century script. On a herm, probably of Socrates or Plato, is engraved the concluding prayer from the *Phaedrus*, 279B, C, ὦ φίλε Πάν . . . ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σὺ φέρων<sup>48</sup> and on the shaft of a herm of Plato are two brief quotations<sup>49</sup> from his works, αἰτία θεομέ|νω· θεός | ἀνείπτος (*Republic*, 617E) and ψυχὴ ■ πᾶσι | ἀθάνατος (*Phaedrus*, 245C). In a well-known passage (III 4) Diogenes Laertius asserts that Plato was a nickname given to one whose true name was Aristocles, but J. A. Notopoulos has collected forty-six epigraphical examples of Πλάτων,<sup>50</sup> which show that this was a normal personal name, especially common in Attica.

The encyclopaedic range of Aristotle's studies and teaching may explain, at least in part, why the author of the Parian Chronicle terms him ὁ σοφιστής (B11) rather than ὁ φιλόσοφος. The title φιλόσοφος was probably omitted from the decree<sup>51</sup> of the Delphic Amphictyony which commended Aristotle and Callisthenes for their services in compiling a list of *Πυθιαῖκαι* and ordered its publication. Whether he figured in the Kōin mosaic we cannot say, nor does he seem to have had a place in the exedra of poets and sages at Memphis, but his memory was kept alive at Rome by named portrait-herms,<sup>52</sup> while a headless herm at Athens, not earlier than the time of Hadrian, is inscribed

[Υ]δὼν Νικομ[ά]χου, σοφίη[ς] | ἐπίστορα | πάσης,  
στῇ||σεν Ἀλέξαν[δρος] θεῖον | Ἀριστοτέλ[ην].<sup>53</sup>

Diogenes of Oenoanda states that Aristotle and οἱ τὸν αὐτὸν Ἀρισ[το]τέλει ἐμβαίνον|τες περίπατον οὐδέν | ἐπιστητὸν φασιν εἶναι· | ρεῖν γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ δι' αἰὲτος | τῆς ρεύσεως τὴν ἡμε|τέρω ἐκφεύγειν ἀπὲ|λημψιν (fr. IV 13-118), and proceeds to refute this view. Lycon of Alexandria Troas, who followed Theophrastus and Strato in the headship of the Peripatetic School at Athens, which he held from c. 270 until his death c. 226 B.C., received from the Delphic Amphictyons a series of honours and privileges on the ground of his εὐνοία καὶ φιλοτιμία towards Apollo, his sanctuary and the Amphictyonic κοινόν, but his philosophy is not mentioned.<sup>54</sup> His name recurs at Athens as a donor of 200 dr. to a fund εἰς τὴν σω|τηρίαν τῆς πό|λεως καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς [χώρας]<sup>55</sup> in the archonship of Diomedon,<sup>56</sup> and there the word φιλόσο(φος) is added in place of a demotic or ethnic. Another member of the School, Serenus, was among the many educated Greeks who visited the Egyptian Syringes,<sup>57</sup> while of yet another, the otherwise unknown<sup>58</sup> Epicrates of Heraclea, we have a pleasing picture in a Samian decree<sup>59</sup> of c. 200 B.C., which grants him full citizenship because πλείονα χρόνον | παρεπίδει|δήμηκεν ἡμῶν ἐν τεῖ πόλει | [καὶ διὰ τῆν] αὐτοῦ παιδείας πολλὰ | [τοῦ]ς νέους εὐεργέτηκεν, χαρίζο[μαι] βο|υλόμενος καὶ ἰδίου τοῖς ἐπαυτῶ||σι τῶν συσχολαζόντων ἑαυτῶν καὶ | [κοιν]ῇ τῶν δῆμων, μεταδιδόνς ἀφθόνως || [τῆς] καθ' αὐτὸν παιδείας τοῖς βουλομέ||νοις μετέχειν τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῖς τε[μὴ] δύναμένοις τῶ[ν] δ[η]μοτῶν τελεῖν | [τὴν] ἐκκείμενον ὑφ' αὐτοῦ μυσθόν

<sup>44</sup> SIG 860B; for the date see G. Daux, *Chronologie delphique*, 94, for Nicestratus, K. Praechter, *Hermes*, LVII 461 ff.

<sup>45</sup> SIG 868C; for the date see Daux, *loc. cit.* For Gaius, who may have known Varius, see K. Praechter, *RE* Suppl. III 335 ff., W. Tacite, *Philobolia für P. von der Alstedt*, 70 ff., A. Momigliano, *JRS* XXXVI 226.

<sup>46</sup> TAM III 68a (IGR III 459 combines this with TAM III 744). IG II: 12767a, an Attic epigram probably of the second century A.D., reads in l. 7 -ομα Πλάτωνος, which Kirchner, following Perle, restores as -ομα Πλάτωνος. I am not sure that of the 700 words ending in -ομα collected by Kretschmer-Löcher (*Rückf. Wörterb.*, 36 ff.) *πλάτων* is the only one which will suit the context.

<sup>47</sup> AJA 1934, 137 ff., *JHS* LV 110.

<sup>48</sup> IG XIV 1215.

<sup>49</sup> IG XIV 1196 (the MS. text reads *θεομένω* and omits *θεός*).

<sup>50</sup> *CPH* XXXIV 144; cf. *REG* LXIII 179.

<sup>51</sup> SIG 475; cf. *EGH*, no. 121703, with Jacoby's comment. These honours were subsequently cancelled for political reasons (Aelian, *V.H.* XIV 1).

<sup>52</sup> IG XIV 1137, 1138 and perhaps 1139.

<sup>53</sup> IG II: 4261. IG II: 4262, an Athenian epigram, which used to be read ending *τὴν ἡγήνηται* | *εὐεργετῆ* | *Ἀλεξάνδρου* > *πλεονεξία* *θεῶν* (or *θεοῦ*) and referred

to Aristotle, is now correctly read with *Ἀλεξάνδρου* and *θεῶν*. Of this philosopher and his grateful disciple Theon we know nothing further. Is he perhaps to be identified with the *καθηγητὴς* Ἀλέξανδρον | *Διόνυσος* *Φαυλέα* (IG II: 3793) and/or with the teacher honoured by the herm inscribed *θεῖον* Ἀλεξάνδρον | *τὸν* *δημόν* | *μοι* *ἔλασε* | *μέσσω* *ὁ* | *γρόντος* | *μ' ἔστησε* *τὸν* | *δωδεκακλόν* (IG II: 3819), for whom see Rauhnschick, *Herpetia*, XVIII 99 f.?

<sup>54</sup> *Fouilles*, III (3) 67 (dated by Daux and Saksé 240-30 B.C. = SIG 461 (dated by Fomtow 254-34 B.C.). Cf. W. B. Dinsmore, *Archons of Athens*, 141 f. (who dates it 242-1 B.C.), R. Flacelière, *Les Aioliques à Delphes*, 260, *Illog. Laert.* V 68.

<sup>55</sup> IG II: 791d 29 = SIG 491-70. Cf. Kirchner, *Imag. Inst.* Att. 90.

<sup>56</sup> The date of Diomedon's archonship has been much disputed. Kirchner and Kolbe assigned it to 232-1 B.C., Dinsmore (*Archons of Athens*, 31, 35) to 247-6 and later (*Athenian Archon List*, 21) to 246-5, Pritchett and Merritt (*Chronology of Hellenistic Athens*, xii) to 247-6.

<sup>57</sup> CIG 4012, *Adh.* p. 1213; others include the philosophers Lampson and Philastrius (CIG 4783, 4817).

<sup>58</sup> Unless he is the Epicrates who was an executor of the scholar Strato (Diog. Laert. V 62).

<sup>59</sup> SIG I 368.





light on Plotina and Hadrian, as well as on the organisation of the School<sup>71</sup> and on the control exercised by the Imperial government.

Of other philosophical schools I have little to note. Diogenes the Cynic occupies, as we have seen (above, p. 132), the centre of the Kôlu mosaic, a portrait-herm in Rome bears his name,<sup>72</sup> and two *dicta* of Διογένης ὁ κυνικός φιλόσοφος are written as a school exercise on an Egyptian ostrakon of the fourth or fifth century A.D.<sup>73</sup> A visit to the Theban Syringes and the statue of Μένειος is recorded in a couplet by Ὀδρανίος κυνικός,<sup>74</sup> and a stone inscribed κυνικῶν, found on the north slope of the Acropolis,<sup>75</sup> may belong to a meeting-place of the Cynics in the first or second century A.D. A metrical epitaph from Ali-aga, near Cyzic, commemorates the Pyrrhonian (Πυρρωνιστάς) philosopher and poet Menecles, τὸν ἀτάραχον ἐν βροταῖς θεῖσας ὁδόν,<sup>76</sup> while another, from Suessa Aurunca, describes one who migrated from Macedonia to Italy as

τὸν πάσης ἀρετῆς εἰδήμονα φῶτα | Φίλῳππον,  
πρέσβυν Εἰλαοῦντος ἐμπέραμον σοφίης.<sup>77</sup>

One sage, Ortyx of Parium, δὲ πάντα | λόγοις ὑποτάσσει, claims that he is *nullius addictus iurati in verba magistri*; his curious epitaph begins εἰμὲ μὲν ἐκ | Παρίου Ὀρτυξί|σοφός αὐτο|διδάκτος.<sup>78</sup>

An interesting glimpse of the part played by philosophy in the education of the Athenian youth is afforded by a group of decrees passed by the Council and Demos in honour of the preceding year's class of epheboi, together with the κοσμητῆς and the διδάσκαλοι (or παιδευταί) responsible for their training. Thus we read<sup>79</sup> that the epheboi of 123-2 B.C. were honoured because they duly performed their religious and other duties and devoted themselves to τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου προστεταγμένα μαθήματα, προσεκαρ[έ]λυσαν δὲ καὶ Ζηνοδότῳ σχολ[α]στή|οντι[ς] ἐν τῇ τῷ Πτολεμαίῳ καὶ || ἐν Λυκείῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις [φιλο|σόφοις] πᾶσι[ς] τοῖς τε ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημαίῳ δὲ ὅλον τὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ (ll. 19 f.), and that their κοσμητῆς was praised because προ[ε]νοήθη δὲ καὶ τῆς πυλιδείας αὐτῶ[ν] ἐν ἅπασιν | καὶ σωφροσύνης, τοῖς [φιλο|σόφοις] καὶ τοῖς [π]αρακαλῶν καὶ [σ]χυλῶν ἅπασιν τοῖς - - δι' ὅλον τὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ | ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῇς ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίο[ν] αὐτῶν ἀφελίῳ ἐφρόν[τι]σι τε σχολᾶζων Ζηνοδότῳ - - (ll. 62 ff.). This suggests a comprehensive programme of philosophical lectures, and the Zenodotus here named may well be the pupil of the famous Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, who wrote a metrical epitaph of Zeno.<sup>80</sup> A similar decree<sup>81</sup> of 101 B.C. is less detailed, merely stating that the epheboi ἐγκύλιον δὲ ὅλον τὸ ἐν[ιαυτοῦ] || τοῖς φιλοσόφοις μετὰ πίστες εὐταξίας, and this phrase recurs in decrees<sup>82</sup> of c. 95 B.C. and some years later, while about 80 B.C. it is further shortened<sup>83</sup> to [παρ]εδρεύοντες ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων σχολαῖς. Some extension of the curriculum is later indicated by the phrases ταῖς τε τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ γραμματικῶν [σχολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν λογιῶν αἰεὶ γει]νομέναις ἀκροάσεσιν παρατυγχάνοντες,<sup>84</sup> and παρεδρεύοντες τῶν [φιλο|σόφων καὶ ῥητόρων] καὶ γραμματικῶν σχολαῖς,<sup>85</sup> and π[α]ρεδρεύοντες ταῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ γραμματικῶν σχολαῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰεὶ γινομέναις ἀκροάσεσιν.<sup>86</sup> This evidence, though less detailed than we could wish, proves that for at least a century attendance at courses of philosophical lectures was an important element in the training prescribed by the δῆμος, βουλευμένος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν παλ[α]ίων μεταβαλόντας εἰς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι τῆς πατρίδος διαβ[ο]λήχους.<sup>87</sup> The fascination exercised by philosophy is illustrated by the case of the Pergamene who παραγονόμενος θεωρὸς εἰς τὰ [Παναθηναῖα] | παρεδήμησεν ἐπὶ? π[α]λείῳ, τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν παιδείας ἐχόμενος | ὡς τοῦ πρό πάντων ὑπ[ε]ρί|στατου ἐπιτηδεύματος,<sup>88</sup> and after returning home influenced King Attalus I in favour of the Athenians; the words τῶν Εὐάνδρου σχολαστῶν in l. 13 suggest that he came under the spell of Evander, who succeeded Lacydes as head of the Academic School.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>71</sup> In the Latin letters the School is termed *scila Epicuri* (ll. 4, 9) or *Epicurata* (l. 13), in the Greek, σχολή (l. 36); the phrase *chorus Epicureus* appears in CHL X 2971 = Dessau, ILS 7781.

<sup>72</sup> IG XIV 1140; cf. Scheffold, *Bildnisse der antiken Dichter*, 153. <sup>73</sup> Sammelbuch, 5730.

<sup>74</sup> CG I 387A = Kaibel, *Epigr.* 1017.

<sup>75</sup> IG II 3164.

<sup>76</sup> IGR IV 1740; cf. BCH XII 368 f., no. 17.

<sup>77</sup> IG XIV 881 = IGR I 407.

<sup>78</sup> IGR IV 1761; cf. AM IX 61 f., no. 4.

<sup>79</sup> IG II 1006. Cf. B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XVII 23 ff., no. 11 (adding a new fragment to ll. 38-116), M. T. Mitsos, *AE* 1930-1, 43, no. 24 (adding IG II 2483), F. Jacoby, *JHS* LXIV 66.

<sup>80</sup> Diog. Laert. VII 30, *Anth. Pal.* VII 117.

<sup>81</sup> IG II 1028 = SGI 717, 34 f.

<sup>82</sup> IG II 1029, 31 (dated in 94 B.C. by IG, in 95 by Dinsmoor, *Archives of Athens*, 290, and in 96 by Notopoulos, *Hesperia*, XVIII 6, 11), 1030, 31.

<sup>83</sup> IG II 1039, 47, dated in 80 B.C. by Dinsmoor.

<sup>84</sup> *op. cit.* 290 f., and Notopoulos, *op. cit.* 24 f. Cf. R. Laqueur, *Epigr. Unterz.* 11, Kirchner, *Imag. Inscr. Att.* 112.

<sup>85</sup> IG II 1042, 7 f. (cf. 11 f.), dated in 40 B.C.

<sup>86</sup> IG II 1043, 42 f. (cf. 19 f.), dated in 38 (Kirchner) or 37 (Dinsmoor); cf. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XV 219, Kirchner, *Imag. Inscr. Att.* 116.

<sup>87</sup> IG II 1040, 26 ff., dated in 21 B.C. by Notopoulos, *op. cit.* 12, in 22 B.C. by Dinsmoor, *op. cit.* 296.

<sup>88</sup> IG II 1006, 59 f. In l. 64 the kompetes is praised because συνεχέ|λυσεν τοῖς μαθή|μα|σι|αὐτῶν (cf. 1028, 85).

<sup>89</sup> IG II 2006, 8 ff., dated in 200-197 by Kirchner, in 192 by Dinsmoor, *Athenian Archon List*, 163 ff., and by Fritchett and Meritt, *Chronology of Hellenistic Athens*, xvi, 11. I distinguish π[α]λ[α]ίῳ in l. 9, and should prefer to restore π[α]λ[α]ίῳ or ἐπεδήμησας χρόνῳ π[α]λ[α]ίῳ (cf. SEG I 368, 5, 13).

<sup>90</sup> For the date see Kirchner's comment on IG II 249, Dinsmoor, *Archives of Athens*, 48 f., 235. In IG II 102764 we have the metrical epitaph of Telestes of Phocaea, Evander's colleague, who died in 167-6 B.C.



In advanced education also philosophers took an important part, though their popularity tended to wane as that of sophists and rhetors increased.<sup>91</sup> In the remarkable document discovered at Pergamum in 1934 and edited with a masterly commentary by R. Herzog,<sup>92</sup> comprising an edict issued by Vespasian on December 27, A.D. 74, granting immunity from billeting and taxation, together with other privileges, to *iatroi*, *paideutai* and *iatrodidaskaloi*, followed by a rescript of Domitian denouncing [*avaritiam medicorum atque*] *proceptorum* in instructing slaves [*aug]rude mercedis gratis*, philosophers are not expressly named, while the Edict of Diocletian, which in A.D. 301 prescribed the maximum payments chargeable for all commodities sold and all services rendered, the chapter *de mercedibus operariorum*,<sup>93</sup> while including the item *ρήτορι ἢτοι σοφιστῇ ὑπὲρ ἐκδότου μαθητοῦ μηνιαία* (*δημάρια*) *ον'*, does not specifically mention philosophers. They did, however, play a leading role in some at least of the *Μουσεία*—Academies, or Institutes for Advanced Study—which existed in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.<sup>94</sup> The most famous of these was that at Alexandria, founded by Ptolemy I Soter and favoured by Hadrian; its members, divided into sections or classes, one of which consisted of philosophers, enjoyed the privileges of *ἀτέλεια* and *σιτήσις*. Thus an inscription of Antinone, probably of the third century A.D., honours Dionysodorus, *τῶν ἐν τῶν | Μουσείῳ σπουδ[ε]ων ἀτελῶν | Πλατωνικῶν φιλό[σο]φον*,<sup>95</sup> and a certain Fronto, *τῶν ἐν τῶ | Μουσείῳ [sic] σπειτου[μένων] φιλοσόφων | τῶν Ἀ[λ]εξαν[δ]ρ[ει]α[ν]των*, appears in an inscription of Saryschlar in Lydia.<sup>96</sup> Elsewhere also the phrases *τῶν ἐν τῷ Μουσείῳ | σπειτου[μένων] ἀτελῶν φιλοσόφων*,<sup>97</sup> *τοῦ ἀπὸ Μουσείου [φιλοσό]φου*,<sup>98</sup> and *[φιλοσό]φου ἀπὸ Μουσείου*<sup>99</sup> probably refer to the Alexandrian Academy. But J. H. Oliver has shown<sup>100</sup> that the titles *τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ Μουσίου* [*ν*], borne by Cassianus, also called Synesius, on a third-century base at Athens (IG II<sup>2</sup> 3712), and *τῶν ἀπὸ Μουσείου φιλόσοφων*, given to T. Pompeius Dionysius (IG II<sup>2</sup> 3810), refer to the Athenian *Μουσείον*, the University of Athens organised under Hadrian and Antoninus Pius; 'the philosophers ἀπὸ (τοῦ) Μουσείου are', he claims, 'the incumbents of the philosophical chairs at Athens'. So also J. Keil has proved<sup>101</sup> that an honorary inscription at Ephesus set up about the middle of the second century A.D. by *οἱ περὶ τὸ Μουσείον παιδευτοὶ* and a reference in a grave-inscription to *οἱ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ Μουσείου ἱατροὶ* point to the existence in that city of a *Μουσείον* in which *παιδευτοὶ* and doctors formed two sections; whether philosophers were included in the former class or constituted a separate section we do not know.

The close association of philosophy and medicine is illustrated by numerous examples, literary and epigraphical.<sup>102</sup> Empedocles was noted both as doctor and as philosopher; Socrates' mother Phaenarete was a midwife, a fact which left clear traces in his teaching and his terminology, and Aristotle's father Nicomachus was a Stagirite doctor, who traced his ancestry back to the Messenian healing god Nicomachus, son of Machaon and grandson of Asclepius. Galen of Pergamum underwent a philosophical training before devoting himself to medical study and practice, and maintained throughout his life a keen interest in philosophy; one of his minor works is entitled *Ὅτι ὁ ἀριστος ἱατρὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος*, and another<sup>103</sup> summarises his many contributions to philosophical literature. In Rome lived Ortesinus, *ἀνὴρ ἀριστος, ἱατρὸς δὲ τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐν λόγῳ φιλοσόφος καὶ ἦθει θαυμαστός* (IG XIV 1900), and a portrait-burn commemorated Asclepiades (*ibid.* 1142), the philosopher-doctor of Prusa in Bithynia, who lived and practised in Rome. The Council, People and Gerusia of Rhodiapolis in Lycia conferred outstanding honours on Heraclitus, Rhodiapolite and Rhodian and priest of Asclepius and Hygiea, *πρώτον ἀπ' αἰῶνος ἱατρὸν καὶ συνεγραφέα καὶ ποιητὴ τῶν ἔργων ἱατρικῆς καὶ φιλοσοφίας, | ὃν ἀνεγράψατ ἱατρικῶν ποιημάτων | Ὀμηρον εἰναι*,<sup>104</sup> and an interesting

<sup>91</sup> W. H. Walden, *Universities of Ancient Greece*, 58 ff., A. D. Nock, *Sabbatium*, vol. II, H. von Arnim, *Die*, 4 ff. A philosopher might, however, be at the same time a sophist and orator, as was Lachares, whose 'metrical' epitaph survives in *RE* II 11972, and T. Flavius Glaucias, described as *ποιητὴς καὶ ῥήτορ καὶ φιλόσοφος* (IG II<sup>2</sup> 3704 12; cf. *Hesperia*, Suppl. VIII 240 ff.). 'Suidas' calls Hippias of Elis *αὐριστὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος*, and says that Zollus of Amphipolis *ῥήτορ ἦν καὶ φιλόσοφος, ἔγραψε μέγα τὰ καὶ γυμνασιακά*.

<sup>92</sup> *SBH* 1000, 1935, 967 ff., cf. *RE* VIII (1936) 284 ff., *Glossar*, XIV 707 ff.

<sup>93</sup> R. Grunert op. l. Frank, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V 344 ff., vol. VII 74; cf. J. Blayen, *BEH* LXXVII 655.

<sup>94</sup> E. Müller-Guerra, *RE* XVI 797 ff., F. Polak, *Geschichte d. griech. Vorlesungsverf.*, 121, 205, *SEG* 900, n. 17, *OGI* 714, n. 4, E. Ziebart, *Griech. Vorlesungsverf.*, 69 ff.

<sup>95</sup> *IBM* 1076 = *Sammelbuch*, 6012. A Roman officer who in A.D. 122-3 carved his name on the statue of Metronia is called *τῶν ἐν Μουσείῳ | σπουδαστῶν ἀπὸ [sic] | (IG I 1210 = *Sammelbuch*, 6340)*, but we are not told to which section he belonged.

<sup>96</sup> Keil-von Premerstein, *Bericht über eine zweite Reise in Lydien*, 210 = *IGR* IV 1373.

<sup>97</sup> *IG* XIV 1103 = *OGI* 714 = *HER* I 174 (Rome).

<sup>98</sup> M. Aur. Asclepiades of Alexandria, the philosopher in question, was a distinguished paedriatrist and minor *νοσηρός* τοῦ μεγάλου Σωκράτους (cf. *IG* XIV 1102). The phrase occurs in *Pap. Kt.* 143, 2 ff. of A.D. 38.

<sup>99</sup> *SEG* 900, 53 f. (Panama, A.D. 307-13).

<sup>100</sup> *BEH* IV 303 (Halicarnassus). Cf. *IsMagna* 189, 9 (ἀπὸ Μουσείου), *CIG* 3748, 3 (Ὀμηροῦ ποιητῶν ἐν Μουσείῳ).

<sup>101</sup> *Hesperia*, II 191 ff. Pompeius Dionysius may well be the same as the *ἱστορὸς Πωμπίου* (narrated) named in l. 21 of a papyrus-list (*IG* II 1826) dated c. 210 p. by Kitzinger and assigned to A.D. 222-3 by J. A. Nottopoulos (*Hesperia*, XV III 37 ff., 53). For the University of Athens at this period see J. W. H. Walden, *The Universities of Ancient Greece*, 130 ff.

<sup>102</sup> *IG* VII 125 f.; cf. *Ephesus*, II. no. 63, III, no. 68, IV (1), no. 1, *OGI* XL 11.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. A. D. Nock, *Sabbatium*, xxi f.

<sup>104</sup> *Ἡμεῖς τῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ βιβλίαν*, xi-xvi.

<sup>105</sup> *TAM* II 910 (= *IGR* III 733) 12 ff.

inscription of Pisidian Antioch describes C. Calpurnius Collega Macedo, a Christian *βουλευτής* (*cursalis*) of the fourth century, who died at the early age of thirty, as *ῥήτορα ἐν ταῖς δέκα Ἀθηναίων πρώτοις κλήρον ἔχοντα*?, | *φιλόσοφον τὸ Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ ἀφρονέμενον*?, | *ἀρχίατρον ἐν λύγειν καὶ ἔργοις τὰ Ἱπποκράτους τηλμήσαντα*? (CR XXXIII 2 ff.). Other cases are more doubtful. The city of Sokandra in Lycia honoured Menecrates, *μ[έγαν] ἱατρὸν καὶ φιλόσοφον* (IGR IV 1359), who may be the same as Tiberius Claudius Menecrates, to whom, *ιατρῶι Κλαυδίων καὶ ἰδίας λογικῆς ἐναργοῦς ἱατρικῆς κτίστην ἐν βιβλίῳ ρυσ'* and *τῶι ἑαυτῶν αἰρεσιάρχῃ*, his γνώριμοι erected a *ῥήτορον* at Rome.<sup>107</sup> But the identification is dubious, and even the restoration *φιλόσοφον* is uncertain, as we see by comparing an epitaph of Lydæ in Lycia commemorating Aminias, or Aristobulus, *γεγνόμενον ἱατρὸν τέλειον καὶ φιλόλογον*.<sup>108</sup> The Roman epigram *ἐνθάδε κεῖται ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων* | *Πομπήιος Διοκλῆς τέρματ' ἔχων σοφίης*<sup>109</sup> may refer to a doctor or a philosopher or one who was both, though the obvious echo of *Iliad*, XI 514, *ἱπρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων*, supports the view that he was a doctor. A remarkable philosopher-poet of the time of the Flavians and Trajan, on whom recent epigraphical studies have thrown fresh light,<sup>110</sup> is the Athenian Sarapion, whom his grandson described as [*Σαραπίων*]α *Χαλλεῖδην· πεποιητὴν - -* | *καὶ φιλόσοφον Στωϊκ[όν]* (IG II<sup>2</sup> 3796, 3631) on a monument on which he inscribed Sarapion's poem *de officiis medici moralibus*,<sup>111</sup> which is in the best tradition of the Hippocratic oath. He was a friend of Plutarch, who introduces him into several of his works, especially the *De Pythiae oraculis*, in which he figures prominently and is acclaimed as one who has revived the old custom of expressing philosophic truth in poetic form (402 E, F; cf. 396 F).

Occasionally, or perhaps normally, the Athenian epheboi at the close of their course made a present of books to the 'Library in the Ptolemaion', which they presumably used for their instruction or recreation. It is recorded that the epheboi of 117-16 B.C. dedicated (*βυβλία ἐκαστὸν εἰς τὴν βιβλιοθήκην*) *πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα ὁ Θεοδωρίδης Πειραι[εὶς] εἶπεν*,<sup>112</sup> and that those of 96-5 dedicated *βυβλία εἰς τὴν ἐν Πτολεμαίῳ βιβλιοθήκην ἑκαστὸν κατὰ* | *τὸ ψήφισμα*,<sup>113</sup> and a mutilated passage relating to those of some year c. 44 B.C. seems to refer to a similar gift.<sup>114</sup> It would be interesting to have a list of the books comprised in such a present, and to see what part, if any, philosophical literature took in it, but the decrees in question do not enlighten us beyond indicating that on the last occasion the gift included one or more plays *Εὐριπίδου* and a copy of *τῆς Ὀδύσσειας*, no doubt as duplicates or in replacement of worn or lost copies. We possess, however, a considerable fragment of a book-catalogue<sup>115</sup> of the late second or early first century B.C., which may relate to an ephebic presentation; in it the dramatists (Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, Crates, Diphilus, Menander, etc.) predominate, but the *Εὐκλείδου Διοχάρους* of l. 10 is probably the dialogue of Euclides of Megara which bore this title.<sup>116</sup> Another fragmentary book-list<sup>117</sup> of c. 100 B.C. gives us a glimpse of the contents of a Rhodian library, for which the gymnasiarchs apparently had some responsibility; authors' names are arranged in alphabetical order—[Demetrius (Phalereus)], Hegesias, Theodectes, Theopompus of Chios and a second Theopompus—but the only work which here concerns us is Theopompus's *Καταδρομὴ τῆς Πλάτωνος* διατριβῆς. Very different is the list preserved in a papyrus<sup>118</sup> of the early third century from Memphis; here philo-

<sup>107</sup> IG XIV 1759. Cf. *PIR* Π 218, no. 937, *IGR* I 286, *SIG* 803.

<sup>108</sup> *TAM* II 147 = *IGR* III 534.

<sup>109</sup> IG XIV 1951 = *IGR* I 333. It is uncertain whether the *ῥήτορας* ἢ *ἐπαγόμενοι* of IG XIV 942 (Ostia) was philosopher as well as doctor; I think not.

<sup>110</sup> J. H. Oliver, *Hesperia*, Suppl. VIII 213 ff. (partly superseding his earlier treatment in *Hesperia*, V 91 ff.); cf. R. Flacelière, *REG* LXIV 305 ff.

<sup>111</sup> P. L. Maas and J. H. Oliver, *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, VII 315 ff., Oliver, *op. cit.* 245 f. I doubt Oliver's translation of *ὁὐδ' οὐδ' ἐσ[ο]ποῖται* | *δούλον ἀν[ε]στ[ε]ναι* [*τῆς*] *καὶ ὀφεινῆς καὶ ἀν[ε]στ[ε]ναι* | *σοῦ* [*ἐσ*] [*τῆς*] (ll. 25-7) by 'like a savior god, let him make himself the equal of slaves and of paupers, of the rich and of rulers of men'. Does it not rather mean that the doctor should treat all men alike, regardless of status and of wealth? Another fragment of Sarapion's poetry is preserved in Stobaeus, *Anthol.* III 10. 2 Hense; for his *lemma* see Oliver, *op. cit.*, facing p. 240. In *RE* he is dismissed in two lines.

<sup>112</sup> *Hesperia*, XVI 171, ll. 31 f. - *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1009, 7 f. A fragment containing parts of ll. 52-62 was added in 1946 by Meritt (*Hesperia*, XV 213 f.), who in the following year published (*Hesperia*, XVI 171 ff., no. 67) a large fragment bearing the opening lines of the decree. Cf. A. F. Raubitschek, *AJÄ* XLIX 435, n. 5; M. T. Mitsos, *AE* 1936-7, 41 f., 80, 19.

<sup>113</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1029, 23 f. For the date see Dietsch, *Archaeol. of Athens*, 290, J. A. Nottopoulos, *Hesperia*, XVIII 6, 11.

<sup>114</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1041, 23 f. For the date see Dietsch, *op. cit.*, 292.

<sup>115</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 2363. R. J. Walker's ingenious interpretation (*Parnassus Biceps*, Paris, 1926) is rejected by E. J. Thomas, *CR* XI 215.

<sup>116</sup> 'Suidas' i.e. *Εὐκλείδης, Μεγαρεὺς . . . φιλόσοφος . . . συνέγραψε διαλόγους* 'Αλκιβιάδου, Διοχάρου, Κρίτωνος, κτλ.

<sup>117</sup> A. Maiuri, *Nuova iddige*, no. 11, Jacoby, *F. G. Hist.*, no. 113 T 40, no. 288 T 11, F. Hiller von Gærtringen, *Gnomon*, II 195 f., 365, *RE* Suppl. V 825, G. De Sanctis, *Riv. Fil.* LIV 69 ff. It is uncertain whether the names Dionysius and Democritus in col. II are those of authors or titles. Maiuri also edited *loc. cit.*, no. 4; cf. *Gnomon*, II 195) a decree inviting gifts of books for a library (perhaps that of no. 11) and recording donors' names. Cf. M. Segre, *Riv. Fil.* LXIII 213 ff., LXIV 40.

<sup>118</sup> Mutsch-Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, I (2) 182 ff., no. 125. F. G. Kenyon's examination of the literary fragments discovered at Oxyrhynchus (*JEd* VIII 129 ff.) showed that 'Democritus stands out as clearly among the orators as Thucydides among the historians. The same is true of Plato among the philosophers; and here it is a case of "Eclipse first and the rest nowhere"' (p. 136).



apocryphal works by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Posidonius and others form the great majority in what appears to be a private collection rather than a public library.

Most of the inscriptions naming individual philosophers fall into one of four classes: (1) decrees conferring honours and privileges; (2) honorary inscriptions, often engraved on the bases of statues of the philosophers concerned; (3) epitaphs; and (4) names inscribed on busts or herms indicating the persons portrayed. Of the first, third and fourth classes I have already given some examples, but the second calls for some further remarks. We may distinguish three types: (a) honours paid by states or other public bodies, e.g. to T. Pomponius Dionysius at Athens (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3810), to M. Aurelius Olympiodorus, *τειμηθέντα λογιωτέα ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας εἰς δεκαετίαν* at Troezen (*IG* IV 796), to Flavius Maccius Dionysodorus at Antioch (see p. 138), to Ti. Claudius Paulinus *ἀντι[ταμίαν] τῆς κολωνείας* at Pergamum (*Abh Berl* 1932 (5) 42 no. 2), and to Apuleius at Madaura, below whose statue stood the inscription [*Philosopho*] [*Platonico*] [*Ma*] [*laurenses*] [*cives*] [*ornament*] [*o*] [*suo* d.d. p. [*p.*] (*Ann. Ep.* 1919, 36); (b) honours paid by the recipients' relatives or friends,<sup>119</sup> and (c) expressions of esteem and gratitude felt by pupils to their teachers.<sup>120</sup> Private inscriptions of these last two types frequently include a phrase indicating that the erection of the statue has received the sanction of the state. Among many examples of type (c) I call attention to two, which concern well-known philosophers. In 1949 the American excavators of the Athenian Agora unearthed a previously known, but long lost, plinth of a seated bronze statue inscribed *Καρνεάδην Ἀθηναία Ἀτταλος καὶ Ἀριαράθης Συπαλλήτ[ρι]οι ἀνέθηκαν*,<sup>121</sup> attesting the regard felt for Carneades of Cyrene, now a citizen of Athens, by two of his pupils, Attalus (later Attalus II, King of Pergamum 139–38 B.C.) and his kinsman Ariarathes (later Ariarathes V, King of Cappadocia 162–c. 131 B.C.), both of whom had received Athenian citizenship. Aguin, A. E. Raubitschek has recently shown<sup>122</sup> how much light is thrown by the skilful comparison and restoration of a number of Attic inscriptions, mostly honorary, on the history and family of the *Φαίδρος Λυσιάδου Βερενικίδης* of *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3897–9 (which he dates c. 78 B.C.), head of the Epicurean School and a close friend of Cicero and of T. Pomponius Atticus. His statue was erected by Lucius Saufeius, often mentioned in Cicero's letters to Atticus, who terms him *τὸν ἐαυτοῦ καὶ θγγ[γ]ήν* (3897.6, with a new fragment), and probably also by Atticus himself (3899), while Appius Saufeius, Lucius' brother, dedicated a herm, the basis of which has come to light in the Agora, portraying Phaedrus, *τὸν ἐαυτοῦ καὶ θγγ[γ]ήν*, probably in the Athenian Eleusinion.

Philosophic training might begin at an early age; the phrase *ἀπὸ πρὸς αἰλικίας* occurs in an epigram of Orchomenus (*IG* VII 3226), *ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας* in an honorary decree from Branchidae (*IBM* 925612); and *ἀγὰρ καίτοι νέος* in the epitaph of a Stoic from Patrae buried at Athens (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 10046a), while an inscription of Chaeronea commemorates an *ἐν[ε]λ[η] | φιλόσοφον ἐπὶ [κ]β'* (*IG* VII 3425, if the restorations are correct), and a metrical epitaph from Gythium contains the couplet *Ἀτταλος ἐνθάδε ἐφθ[η]β[α]ς ἔτη ζήσας δεκά[π]ν[ε]τε | καίτοι τὴν Μανσίων γυνὸς ἐπ' ἄκρον σοφίην* (*IG* V (1) 1186.7 f.). Nor was philosophy confined to men; an inscription of Apollonia in Mysia honours *Μά[γ]ν[η]λα[ν] φιλό[σο]φον Μάγ[ν]ου | φιλοσόφον θυγα[τέρα], Μυρία[ν] φιλο[σο]φ[ο]ῦ γυν[αίκα]* (*IGR* IV 125),<sup>123</sup> an epigram from Nicæa in Bithynia commemorating a Christian nun is headed *Ἀττίς φιλοσόφισσα* (*AM* XXXVI 103),<sup>124</sup> and the adjective *φιλόσοφος* is applied to a woman in Pares (*IG* XII (5) 292.6) and, in the superlative degree, to two women honoured at Sparta in Imperial times (*IG* V (1) 598 f.).

Philosophers did not necessarily devote themselves wholly to contemplation and to teaching; many of them played active, some even leading, roles in the life of their communities. We may cite the Emperors Marcus Aurelius and Julian, *τὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας βασιλεύοντα* (*OGI* 520),<sup>125</sup> the statesman Demetrius of Phalerum, the hieromonemon Menecleus of Eretria,<sup>126</sup> M. Aurelius Olympiodorus at Troezen, *τειμηθέντα λογιωτέα εἰς δεκαετίαν* (*IG* IV 796), a [*διὰ*] *βίου ἐυστάτην καὶ ἐπὶ βαλυνείων τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ* at Rome (*IG* XIV 1103 = *OGI* 714), an *ἀντι[ταμίαν] τῆς κολωνείας* at Pergamum (*Abh Berl* 1932 (5) 42 no. 2), *βουλευταὶ* at Antioch (*IBM* 1076 = *Sammelbuch*, 6012) and Pisdian Antioch (*CR* XXXIII 2), and a *πρώτων τοῦ ἔθνους* [s], | *δὲς Γαλατάρχη φιλόδοξον* || καὶ κτίστην

<sup>119</sup> Examples are *IGR* IV 1449 (*τὸν πατέρα*), *IG* VII 3423 (*τὸν πατέρα μητρός σὺνταρον*), *BCH* XXXIII 307 f., nos. 107, 109 (*τὸν φίλον, τὸν ἐαυτοῦ φίλον*). *BSA* XXIX 93, *JHS* XLIV 42, no. 76 (*τὸν ἐαυτοῦ εὐαγέτην*).

<sup>120</sup> Examples are *Epheci*, IV (3) 288, no. 40 (*τὸν ἐαυτοῦ [διδάσκαλον]*), *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3801 (*τὸν διδάσκαλον*), 3819 (*τὸν διδάσκαλον*), 3793 (*τὸν ἐαυτοῦ | καθηγητήν*), 4269 (*σοφίης τὸν ἡγητήν*).

<sup>121</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3781 = *SEG* 686. Cf. B. D. Merritt, *Harvard*, XVII 29, H. A. Thompson, *Harvard*, XIX 318 f.

<sup>122</sup> *Harvard*, XVII 98 ff. The article includes a valuable discussion of the title *καθηγητής*, characteristic

of, and at first restricted to, the Epicurean School.

<sup>123</sup> For philosophy running in families see also *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3702. 9, 10, S. Pelekides, *Ἀπὸ τῆς πατρὸς καὶ τῆς κοινῆς τῆς ἀρχαίας Θεσσαλονίκης*, 33, n. 4.

<sup>124</sup> The feminine *φιλόσοφος* is found in Dessau, *HS* 7783 (*IL* VI 33898 (Rome)).

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Dessau, *HS* 751 *Philosoph[us] magister*, Nibson, *Geschichte der griech. Religion*, II 435 ff.

<sup>126</sup> R. Flacelière, *Les Antioches à Delphes*, 180, 387 f., no. 3. For the date, 274 or 273 B.C., see *op. cit.* 439, G. Daux, *Chronologie archaïque*, 3466. Dismayor, *The Athenian Athenian List*, 57, 60.



καὶ πλουτιστὴν | καὶ πολυστέφανον φιλόσοφον | φιλόπικτρον καὶ | ἄλειπτον πολεμικτὴν at Ancyra (JHS XLIV 42, no. 76).

The rarity of the word φιλόσοφος in Greek epigrams is due to the fact that it is inadmissible in elegiac and hexameter verse;<sup>117</sup> the favourite metres of epigrammatists, though not in iambs or trochaics, as, e.g., in the epitaph *οὐκ ἦν ῥήτωρ μὲν εἰπεῖν, φιλόσοφος δ' ἂν χρὴ νοεῖν*,<sup>118</sup> and *Ἰδὲ κού Πολεΐτου φιλοσόφου, πάντων φίλου*.<sup>119</sup> Epigrams therefore often use σοφός or σοφία in phrases which sometimes leave us in doubt whether philosophy is indicated rather than medicine or some other branch of learning or skill.<sup>120</sup>

The aim of the present article is merely to illustrate some of the ways in which epigraphical discoveries contribute to our knowledge of Greek philosophy and its exponents. I close by calling attention, briefly and in general terms, to three aspects of this contribution.

(1) Inscriptions render a valuable service in enabling us to identify the portraits of a number of philosophers, writers and orators. I content myself with a reference to K. Schefold's remarks on this subject.<sup>121</sup>

(2) Many important events in the lives of philosophers and the history of the philosophical Schools are dated by the names of Athenian eponymous archons. The determination of the archon-list for the Hellenistic and Roman periods depends mainly on epigraphical evidence, and, although complete unanimity has not yet been reached, very remarkable progress has recently been made, thanks especially to discoveries made in the Agora and the researches of American scholars.<sup>122</sup>

(3) It would be interesting to inquire how deeply and in what directions philosophic teaching affected the thought and speech and life of the common people of the Greek and Greco-Roman world. To assess this influence accurately is beyond our power, but much valuable evidence may be gained by a study of the language and thought of the surviving epigrams<sup>123</sup>—not so much the dainty and polished products of the epigrammatists' art collected in the *Anthologia Palatina* as the more spontaneous, if cruder, works of lesser artists preserved on stone, often faulty in metre and grammar and spelling, yet affording an insight into the hearts and minds of those who wrote them and of those for whom they were written, and indicating their attitude to some of the fundamental problems of life and death and God.

MARCUS N. TOD.

Birmingham.

<sup>117</sup> In defiance of metre Aristophanes ends a hexameter with φιλόσοφος *ἑρμῆα* (Ecl. 371), which doubtless evoked a hearty laugh from the audience.

<sup>118</sup> Kaibel, *Epig. Gr.* 106 = IG II<sup>2</sup> 10826.

<sup>119</sup> Kaibel, 391 = IGR IV 528 (Traianopolis).

<sup>120</sup> See, e.g., Kaibel, 103 (= IG XII (9) 954), 104 (= IG II<sup>2</sup> 11140), 372 (IGR IV 806), 845 (= IG II<sup>2</sup> 3790), IG II<sup>2</sup> 4251. V (1) 592, 19, 1186, 3, 8, VII 93, 381. Σοφός is also used occasionally in prose inscriptions, e.g. IG XII (9) 147, 253.

<sup>121</sup> *Die Bildnisse der antiken Dichter, Redner und Denker*, 193.

<sup>122</sup> See especially W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens*

*in the Hellenistic Age* (Harvard U.P., 1931), *The Athenian Archon List in the Light of Recent Discoveries* (Columbia U.P., 1939), W. K. Pritchett and B. D. Merritt, *The Chronology of Hellenistic Athens* (Harvard U.P., 1940), S. Dow, *Hesperia*, III 140 ff., J. A. Notopoulos, *Hesperia*, XVIII 1 ff.

<sup>123</sup> See R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana, 1942), especially ch. II, A. D. Nock, *Sallustius*, xxii ff. The study will be greatly facilitated by the publication of the remaining volumes of P. Friedländer's *Epigrammata* and of W. Peek's *Griechische Versinschriften*; meanwhile G. Kaibel's *Epigrammata Graeca*, published in 1878, has by no means lost all value.

## AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S THEORY OF PROPHECY AND DIVINATION

It is the purpose of this paper to draw the attention of classical scholars to an Arabic theory of prophecy and divination which, though known for a long time in the original text and in modern translation, has quite escaped the notice of those interested in the history of late Greek philosophy and its continuation in mediæval Islam. I mean here by prophecy and divination, like the Arabic author I am going to deal with, all kinds of apparently supernatural knowledge, concerned with the realm of the transcendent as well as with particular events in the future and special happenings in the present time. The possessors of this knowledge are characterised as individuals of a peculiar excitability and a range of imagination which exceeds the normal. Attempts at explaining phenomena of this kind in rational terms were not uncommon in Greek philosophy from Plato's days down to late Neoplatonism. I propose to show that the Arabic theory continues these Greek discussions and to suggest that it represents, at the same time, a facet of Greek thought which has not survived in its original context.

Al-Fārābī (c. A.D. 870-950), a well-known Muslim Neoplatonist and Aristotelian of outstanding importance in the history of Islamic philosophy,<sup>1</sup> deals at some length with prophecy in his work *The Virtues of the People of the Best State*.<sup>2</sup> Since, in accordance with the Greek tradition, he connects divination and prophecy with an innate faculty of the soul itself, and does not describe it as a state of possession by supernatural powers, his explanation of these phenomena is linked up with his analysis of man and his Neoplatonic-Aristotelian metaphysics. Prophecy is auxiliary to the rational faculty and as such an indispensable ingredient in man's perfection; divine inspiration (*wahy*)<sup>3</sup> can be understood as the union of the highest philosophical knowledge with the highest form of prophecy; but the primacy of reason and philosophy is maintained, prophecy being confined to the faculty of imagination, which is given a less humble position than in Aristotle's *De anima*, but still ranked as inferior to philosophy. This evaluation of prophecy comes near to Plato's attitude as expressed in *Tim.* 72a, *Phaedr.* 248d, *Rep.* IX 571c f. and elsewhere (cf., e.g., the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* 414b 2) and may be compared to Aristotle *On philosophy*, fr. 120 Ross; it is a fair guess that Al-Fārābī represents in this respect, as elsewhere, what is ultimately a Hellenistic or Middle Platonic tradition which may have been drawn upon by Porphyry; cf. Al-Fārābī's description of the *theia moira* in the *Phaedrus* in his work *De Platonis Philosophia*, 22 (p. 10 f. Rosenthal-Walzer). But the details in his theory presuppose not only Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De anima*,<sup>4</sup> but also the Neoplatonic metaphysics of emanation in an unusual variation which was, however, accepted by many Arabic philosophers after Al-Fārābī: the First Cause was at the same time the Plotinian One, the eternal creator of an eternal world, and the Aristotelian divine Mind;<sup>5</sup> and the *voûs* *noûs* had become a transcendent entity comparable to the Neoplatonic world-*voûs*. Most remarkable is the theory of imagination adopted by Al-Fārābī; its Greek author had probably taken as his basis Aristotle's view of *phantasia* as modified by the Stoics but, under Neoplatonic influence, given it a new direction.

Soul is for Al-Fārābī—as in the Greek philosophical tradition—the principle of life (hence it

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. R. Walter in *The History of Philosophy: East and West* (London 1953), vol. 2, pp. 156 ff. C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur* I (Leiden 1943), p. 232 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The classical Arabic language has no word for 'virtues' *ṭawāṭif*, and the translators of Greek texts had to face this difficulty. Cf. Sir Hamilton Gibb, *The Evolution of Government in Early Islam, Studia Islamica*, 4, pp. 5-18.

<sup>3</sup> This paper is based on chapters 20-25 and 27 of the work, and more specifically on chapters 24 and 25. The text is available in a not very satisfactory Arabic edition by F. Dieterici (Leiden 1895), in a German translation by the same scholar (*Al-Fārābī, Der Musterstaat*, Leiden 1900) and in a French translation (R. P. Janssen, Youssef Karim et J. Chahale, *Al-Fārābī, Idées des habitants de la cité idéale*, Cairo 1933). References to special passages indicate Dieterici's Arabic text and can be easily verified in his German translation.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2.v., and recently R. Bell, *Introduction to the Qur'an* (Edinburgh 1953), pp. 31 ff., who shows that *wahy* and the actual text of the Koran are to be considered as two different things. Cf. also

L. Massignon in Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris 1950), p. 383. Al-Fārābī fully realised that his philosophical definition of *wahy* is opposed to the way in which it is understood by tradition and speculative theology, cf. his *De divisione scientiarum*, V, p. 108, ll. f. (ed. Chantre Amlu) and L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane* (Paris 1938), p. 104 f.

<sup>5</sup> The work was available to Al-Fārābī in a ninth-century Arabic version by Ishāq, son of Hūmān (cf. *Supplementum Aristotelicum* II, pp. xiv ff. Bruns) and was commented upon by him in a special work of his own (cf. *Iḥā al-Qifl*, p. 279, 22 Lippert). Some lost works by Alexander have been discovered in Arabic versions and published (but not translated into a European language); some more have been recently traced in Istanbul (cf. *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, München 1956, p. 190).

<sup>6</sup> There is some slight late Greek evidence for this theory, as is shown by S. van den Berghe, *Desroches' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, vol. II (London 1953), p. 74; but we can trace a similar conception of the First Cause back to Middle Platonism, cf. Albinus, *Logica* 1 (p. 169, 20 Hermann) = IX 3, p. 33 Lottin and 10.

comprehends a vegetative faculty (*θερρακή δύναμις*) and reaches its perfection in reason and disciplined thinking. It is made up of several faculties or powers (*δυνάμεις*)—‘parts’ of the soul or different ‘souls’ are tacitly rejected—the vegetative faculty, sense-perception, imagination or representation, and reason; with the exception of the first, each of these faculties is associated with an appropriate desire, a *δύναμις ὁρεκτική* vel *ὁρμητική*. Imagination—which interests us in the present context as the seat of prophecy and divination—is, in this section of Al-Fārābī’s work, characterised as preserving the impressions (*τύποι* or *τυπώσεις*) made upon it as a result of the activity of sense-perception and either connecting those images which it preserves with each other or separating them from each other so as to produce either true or false representations of past sense experiences within the soul. These faculties are closely interlocked, so that their distinctly graded order—which corresponds at the same time to their order of generation—can be neither changed nor reversed, each lower faculty being the matter for the one higher in rank, with the exception of the rational faculty, which is the form of all prior forms. The same relationship can be expressed by distinguishing ruling and subordinate powers within the soul and by establishing ruling and subordinate faculties within the province of vegetative life, sense-perception and desire. (The relation between the ruling power of sense-perception—elsewhere known as ‘common sense’—and imagination is defined in a similar way as by [John Philop.] *De an.* p. 307.16 ff.; cf. van den Bergh, *op. cit.*, II, p. 187.)<sup>7</sup>

In the same way Alexander, following Stoic predecessors, had spoken of reason as τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν and can contrast ἡγεμονικόν and ὑπηγετικόν within different faculties of the soul.<sup>8</sup> Thus Al-Fārābī recognises a ruling vegetative power (p. 35, 2 ff.) and a ruling power of perception (πρώτον αἰσθητικόν, cf. Sir David Ross, *Parva Naturalia*, Oxford, 1955, p. 35), identical with common sense (p. 35, 11 ff.), and corresponding subordinate powers.<sup>9</sup> Like Alexander, who in psychology as elsewhere smooths out the apparent discrepancies within the Corpus Aristotelicum, he localises the ruling vegetative power (p. 35, 2 ff. = Alexander, *De an.*, p. 94.18 Bruns), the ruling power of sense-perception (p. 35, 17 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 96, 11 ff.), the imaginative faculty (p. 35, 19 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 97, 11 ff.) and the ruling power of desire (p. 36, 14 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 97, 17) in the heart as primary organ, thereby following Aristotle’s views in the *Parva Naturalia* (cf. Sir David Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 6 f.) and discarding what Aristotle maintains in the *De anima*. Al-Fārābī differs, however, from Alexander—who in one place wants reason to be located in the heart as well (*op. cit.*, p. 98, 24 ff.)—by not locating the highest faculty of the soul in any bodily organ at all and thus, as in other transcendent aspects of his system, rather agreeing with Plotinus (*Enn.* iv, 3.23).<sup>10</sup> By thus selecting Aristotle’s psychology in the systematic form given to it by Alexander, Al-Fārābī has, from the very beginning, some protection against being misled by the narrow rationalism of most Stoics<sup>11</sup> or the late Neoplatonic mysticism and contempt of the priority of reason, keeping the middle way while approaching the difficult problem of prophecy and divination.

This impression is strengthened when we look at Al-Fārābī’s description of the faculty of reason, the highest perfection of which constitutes human happiness. As the divine mind rules the universe, so reason should govern and control the life of man. No human faculty higher than reason can be conceived. The different kinds of reason (νοῦς) which, again, are ordered in terms of matter and form (p. 31 f.) also occur in a series familiar since Alexander of Aphrodisias’ days: the material or passive intellect, νοῦς ὑλικός or παθητικός (Al-Fārābī, p. 44; Alex., *De an.*, p. 81, 22 ff.; 85. 10. *Mont.*, p. 106. 19-107, 20), the intellect in act, κατ’ ἐνέργειαν (Al-Fārābī, p. 57, 24; Alex., *De an.*, p. 86, 4 ff.), and the acquired intellect, νοῦς ἐπίκτητος (Al-Fārābī, p. 58, 3 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 82, 1). The active intellect, νοῦς ποιητικός, is no longer identical with the divine mind (Alex., *De an.*, p. 88 24-91, 6; cf. Albinus, *Isag.*, p. 165, 21 ff.), but is described, as it was by Marinus as reported by Stephanus — [John Philoponus], *De an.*, p. 535, 6, 31 ff., as δαμόνιος τις ἢ ἀγγελικός, as a transcendent immaterial entity placed next to the sphere of the moon and acting as inter-

<sup>7</sup> Δὲ ἐκείνου ἐστὶ φαντασία ἐκείνῃ δυνάμει θερρακὴ δια μέσου αἰσθητικῆς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς εἰσόδου. . . . ἀπορροῖται δὲ εἰδὼς ἐκ τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τοῦτο τῆς λόγου εἰδὼς φανταστικῆς φαντασίας τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ ἡ κοινὴ γὰρ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις ἐστὶ θερρακὴ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς εἰσόδου καὶ μέσης αἰσθητικῆς. . . . λέγουμεν δὲ ἐστὶ ἡ γὰρ φαντασία θερρακὴ ἐστὶ τῆς εἰδὼς δια μέσου αἰσθητικῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ μερική, ἥτις κοινὴ αἰσθητικὴ δια μέσου τῆς μερικῆς αἰσθητικῆς μέσης θερρακὴ ἐστὶ τῆς εἰδὼς. ὁμοίως αὖτε ἐστὶ ἀσφαρὶ φαντασίας καὶ κοινῆς αἰσθητικῆς.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. ‘Nicomachus of Heraclea’, *De nat. hom.*, p. 177, 5: τῶν δὲ ψυχικῶν τὰ μὲν εἰσι ὑποκειμένα τὰ καὶ ὑπερκειμένα, τὰ δὲ ὑπερκειμένα καὶ ὑποκειμένα. W. W. Jaeger, *Nicomachus von Heraclea* (Berlin 1914), p. 21.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also Al-Fārābī, pp. 46, 21 ff.

<sup>10</sup> It may, in this context, be relevant to remember that

a Neoplatonic commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysics E-N could be accepted as the work of Alexander (cf. J. Freudenthal, *Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik*, Berlin 1885, *passim*). Recent research has shown that Proclus could pass for Alexander in Arabic tradition, cf. B. Lewin, *Notes sur un texte de Proclus en traduction arabe*, *Orientalia Suecica* 4, 1953, pp. 195 ff., and S. Finckh, *Une version arabe de trois propositions de Proclus*, *Oriens* 8, 1953, pp. 195 ff. That extracts from a paraphrase of Plotinus (the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*) and a work based on Proclus’ *Elements of Theology* (the *De causis*) were attributed to Aristotle by the Arabs is well known.

<sup>11</sup> Which was accepted by Philo, *De fuga*, §166; *Quint. ter. dial. heret.*, §259. Cf. also H. Leisegang, *Der heilige Geist*, I (Leipzig 1919), p. 146.





other temperaments of the body. This activity of 'representation'—by which a whole class of dreams is explained rationally—may be compared to the activity of reason in so far as it does not reproduce witness itself; reason grasps the essence of witness by thinking it, without itself becoming wet. This applies to representation as well, in so far as it cannot go beyond forming a mental image and does not duplicate the experience obtained by the other faculties of the soul. It is inferior to reason, because it can express itself only through imagined sensibles which can never be as true as abstract concepts; hence it can imagine abstract concepts in the form of sensibles (those of sight or hearing, for example) only. The same can be stated for emotions like desire or anger or fear or shame, which occur in the appetitive faculty; they can be preserved in imagination which in such cases acts as a kind of memory; but they can also be produced within that same faculty, without reference to any real happening, through 'imitation'. Now it was a commonplace among the Greeks that emotions produce certain involuntary bodily reactions, and it is scarcely necessary to give the exact history of this *τόπος* here: I shall simply refer to Posidonius,<sup>19</sup> Plutarch<sup>20</sup> and Plotinus.<sup>21</sup> But if the ultimate aim is to explain prophecy and divination as an activity of *φαντασία*, it is more important to show the creative power of *φαντασία* in the case of the emotions and their influence on the body, as an analogy to its higher activities. Purely imagined emotions resulting from *μίμησις* can produce the same reaction in the body as the real event. Features of sexual intercourse are given as an example.<sup>22</sup> The same applies to all the other emotions but no examples are given. Some can be found in a passage from Porphyry quoted by Proclus, *In Tim.*, p. 395, 24 Diehl<sup>23</sup>: καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ φαντασία πολλά περὶ τὸ σῶμα παθήματα ὑπεργάζεται παρ' αὐτὴν μόνῃ τὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν· ἥσυχνῃ γὰρ τις φαντασθεὶς τὸ αἰσχροὺν καὶ ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐφοβήθη δεινὸν τινα ἔκτοισιν λαβὼν καὶ ψυχρὸν τὸ σῶμα ὑπέφηνε. καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη περὶ τὸ σῶμα, αἰτίων δὲ τούτων τὸ φάντασμα, οὐκ ὡσεὶ καὶ μοχλεῖσθαι χρησάμενον ἀλλὰ τῇ παρῆναι μόνον ἐνεργῆσαν. But in the passage of Proclus—and in the Arabic passage of Avicenna referred to above, n. 22—this kind of argument is used as a stepping-stone to the demonstration of the possibility of miracles. Here, on the contrary, it is used in a rationalistic explanation of a seemingly supernatural phenomenon. Finally, in this section, Al-Fārābī quotes the example of a man who gets up in his sleep and hits another man, or gets up and runs away, driven to such actions by the strength of his imagination produced through 'imitation'. This is again an observation used by Hellenistic philosophers already, though for a different purpose, and preserved, for instance, by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.*, VII, §402 ff.<sup>24</sup> To connect 'imitation' in its artistic and its wider meaning with the discussion of *φαντασία*<sup>25</sup> seems, however, peculiar to the philosophical tradition utilised by Al-Fārābī, and I have not been able to find precise evidence for it in extant Greek texts although it is obviously of Greek origin. Sometimes the claims of *φαντασία* and *μίμησις* can be contrasted with each other, as can be seen from a passage in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, VI 19 (p. 118 Kayser), where Phidias and other Greek artists are discussed: *φαντασίᾳ ταῦτα εἰργάζετο σοφωτέρᾳ μιμήσεως δημιουργίᾳ*.<sup>26</sup> It lies on the whole—since we are now sufficiently prepared to approach Al-Fārābī's description of prophecy as produced by *μίμησις* within the imaginative faculty of the soul—to be stated at this stage of the argument that a few scattered notices about the Platonising Hellenistic and Plotinian theory of art constitute the best parallel to Al-Fārābī's theory of prophecy. It may be sufficient to point to a well-known passage from Cicero's *Orator*, II, 7 ff. (which in its turn is inspired by Plato's *Tim.*, 27d5 ff.): 'nec vero ille artifex (scil. Phidias) cum faceret Iovis formam aut Minervam contemplabatur aliquem: quo similitudinem duceret sed ipse in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam quam intuens in caque delixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat. Ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens cuius ad cogitatum speciem imitando

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch, *De libidine et aegritudine* 6 (*Moralia*, vol. VI, 3, p. 41 Fohlenz): ὃ γὰρ τοῖς ἰσχυροῦσι τοῖς μὲν εἰσὶν φρεσὶν (scil. αὐτοῖς παθόντων), τὰ δὲ συμπεπνυμένα, καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ φρεσὶν περὶ ψυχὴν δὲ εἰσπρακτικά, τὰ δὲ οὐ σώματος, περὶ σώματος δὲ φρεσὶν. Ἀντίπατρος δὲ περὶ σώματος φρεσὶν τρώμενος καὶ ἀσχυροῦς καὶ μεταβολῆς τοῦ εἶδους κατὰ φόβον ἢ λύπην. Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Posidonios* (München 1921), p. 313, n. 1.

<sup>20</sup> *Quaest. Conv.* V 7, 3, p. 581 D: οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι παλαιότερα ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνδυάζοντο. εὐνοῦσαν γὰρ ὑπεροχάζοντο ἐνέμενον· αἰδέοντο δὲ τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς· ἐκτρέποντο καὶ πάλιν ἀφελόμενοι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀντιμαχίας. *Epist.* III 6, 3, l. 16. Henryschwyzer. Cf. also Priscianus Lydus, *Metaphys.*, p. 27, l. ff. Bywater.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. above n. 20 and also 'the philosophers' as quoted by Al-Ghazālī in *Asfar* (ed. *Asfar* of *Asfar*, p. 513, vol. I, p. 314 of the English translation by S. van den Bergh, London 1954), and n. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. H. Krause, *Studia Neoplatonica* (Diss. Leipzig 1904),

p. 19, and W. Theiler, *Posidonios und Augustin*, Königsberg 1933, p. 38.

<sup>23</sup> Γνωρίζω γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ἐπαρχόντων φαντασίᾳ ἡς ἀπὸ ἐπαρχόντων καὶ τεκμηρίων τῆς ἀπαρραχίας τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ἐπαρχεῖν καὶ τεκμηρίως ἐνδραστηρίαι, τοῦ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φαντασίας καὶ ἐπαρχεῖν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο ἀπαρραχίαι· πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαρκαλίσθηται ὡς περὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὅμοις ἡ μὲν ἀπαρκαλίσθηται κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν, ὡς περὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὅμοις ἡ δὲ ἀπαρκαλίσθηται κατὰ τὴν τεκμηρίαν, ὡς περὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὅμοις ἡ δὲ ἀπαρκαλίσθηται κατὰ τὴν τεκμηρίαν. Cf. also E. Rieu, *Le monde antique* (Paris 1924), p. 118.

<sup>24</sup> The section on *φαντασία* in P. Longinus, *De subl.* 13, is interesting in this context and deserves to be considered.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. E. Rieu, *Le monde antique* (Paris 1924), p. 118 and n. 57. Cf. also H. Schwyzler, 'Der bildende Künstler und der Begriff des Künstlerischen in der Antike', *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, 1925, p. 120 f.







back to "common sense" and the faculty of imagination. And since all these processes are continuous, the objects of that kind which the Active Intellect has provided become visible to that man.<sup>11</sup> This experience produces a blissful joy of a unique kind: 'When it happens that the imaginative faculty "imitates" these objects by imagining sensibles of extreme beauty and perfection, then the man who has that sight comes to enjoy overwhelming and wonderful pleasure and sees wonderful things which are in no way whatever to be found among other existing things.'<sup>12</sup> A man who thus in waking life has reached the utmost perfection of his imaginative power can be called a man gifted with prophecy (*nubuwwa*),<sup>13</sup> since he is aware of particulars, present and future, and visualises things divine in symbols of outstanding beauty and perfection. 'This is the highest perfection which "imagination" can reach, and the highest level accessible to man on the strength of this faculty.'<sup>14</sup> Thus prophecy is understood in rational terms and, moreover, as 'auxiliary to the rational faculty'. Philosophy is in a higher place than the different religions and has everywhere the same truth, whereas the religious symbols produced by the imaginative power of sectional prophets vary from land to land. But before I say a few more words about this side of Al-Fārābī's theory I have to deal, however briefly, with the remaining section of the chapter on prophecy.

There are major and minor prophets, and their differences are described in minute detail. Of those prophesying in waking life some may be capable of dealing with particulars only, as they are or in 'imitation', others with the 'imitation' of immaterial and divine things exclusively. If we transpose this to the philosophical level, Al-Fārābī would consider neither the pure philosopher like Plotinus nor the man of action alone as perfect specimens of the human race but only the man who is both;<sup>15</sup> and that this was really his view becomes perfectly clear in later sections of his work.<sup>16</sup> But apart from this there is a whole host of defective representatives of prophecy, and one would like to know whether Al-Fārābī in reproducing this classification was thinking of definite Islamic examples,<sup>17</sup> and which persons or features of Greek life were described in his source, whose loss is really regrettable. Some divine partly in sleep, partly in waking; some imagine all 'these things', but do not visualise them. A lower class, again, divine in sleep and communicate their experience in symbolic verbal expression, in allegories, enigmatic language, etc. The Greek ancestor of Al-Fārābī may have dealt with oracles in this context. Far below these two classes are others; some of them receive particulars and visualise them in waking life but do not receive the intelligibilia; some receive the intelligibilia and visualise them in waking life but do not receive particulars; some receive some things and visualise them to the exclusion of others (p. 52, 19). Some (I omit a few lines) receive only some particulars and these are the majority; there is a difference in quality to be noticed among the representatives of this class as well. With this attempt to arrange the different kinds of divination in a systematic order Al-Fārābī again continues a discussion which had been going on in ancient philosophy for a very long time; we find traces of it in Cicero's *De divinatione*, for example, or in Plutarch's essays about the Delphic Oracle or in Iamblichus' *De mysteriis*; but as far as I can see nothing which corresponds exactly to what we read in Al-Fārābī's work. It may also happen, he adds, that the physical constitution of people changes in certain circumstances so that they thus become capable of receiving some of these things from the Active Intellect, sometimes in waking life and sometimes in sleep; in some this capacity lasts for a longer time, in others it is soon lost. There are, in given circumstances, also reactions of the imagination, based on disturbed bodily states, which one should not mistake for true prophecy: the experiences of these people are not true and their fancies do not correspond to any reality nor do they imitate any real, actual things; they are to be classified as impostors or madmen.<sup>18</sup>

There are then two ways which lead man to metaphysical truth, philosophy and prophecy, there being no doubt about the primacy of reason; what the religious tradition of Islam understood as revelation (*wahy*)<sup>19</sup> is interpreted by Al-Fārābī in the time-honoured fashion of Greek rationalism as established by Plato. It amounts to a complete new valuation of the religious tradition, through an attempt to understand it in rational terms, using Alexander of Aphrodisias' elaboration of Aristotle's *De anima*, the Stoic analysis of *pharaoia* as taken over by the Neoplatonists, and the Neoplatonic metaphysics of emanation in a simplified form. We are informed of similar views about poets and artists in extant Greek texts, but there seems to be no trace of a corresponding theory of prophecy which I make bold to assume must have existed as well, at least in Middle Platonic times. There seems, on the other hand, understandably enough, to be no trace of the Greek theories of poetry and art and of the visual representation of gods in Al-Fārābī's

<sup>11</sup> P. 52, 3 ff. and Plotinus, *Enn.* I 5, 4, l. 15 f. Henry-Schwyzler. Cf. n. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *Nabī*.

<sup>13</sup> P. 52, 11 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. 'New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy', *Classical Quarterly*, 1949, p. 84 and n. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. e.g. cap. 28.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. n. 33 and the well-known pre-Islamic prophets which are recognised: Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *Dāwūd*, *Hūd*, *Ibrāhīm*, *Idrīs*, *Ilyās*, *Isḥāq*, *Isḥāq*, *Ismāʿīl*, *Lūṭ*, *Mūsā*, *Nūḥ*, *Sālih*, *Shuʿaib*, *Sulaimān*, *Yūnus*.

<sup>17</sup> Islām knows, e.g., al-ʿAṣwad, Musallima, Sadrjāh, Tulaita as false prophets; cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. above n. 4.

book—whereas the comprehension of prophecy was of overriding importance for a Muslim philosopher.

Al-Fārābī's theory of prophecy was only in part acceptable to Avicenna (980-1037). Since the perfect man is for Avicenna identical with the prophet, he cannot be satisfied to confine prophecy to imagination alone and to subordinate it to philosophy. And being himself a philosopher and upholding the primacy of reason like Al-Fārābī (though being nearer to Plotinus than he) he is led to identify the highest grade of philosophy with prophecy. He thus revives the Stoic view that the wise man is the *μάντις* and ascribes to the prophet an intellectual acuteness (*ὑψηλότητα*) of the highest order. There is an overflow of that highest knowledge from prophetic reason to imagination, and this prophetic imagination builds up symbols of truth, as Al-Fārābī had maintained. Avicenna's view appears to amount to only a slight shift of emphasis, but one very characteristic of the difference between Al-Fārābī and him. Moreover, since philosophy and Islam are one and the same thing for him and Islam can only be understood in philosophical terms, he describes the prophetic intellect as holy intellect (*'aql qudsī*), thus using an Islamic term which has no counterpart in corresponding Greek texts. This intellect is of higher rank than the acquired intellect.<sup>41</sup> It is not surprising that the religious opposition to Avicenna's theistic philosophy was dissatisfied with this explanation of prophecy. His great critic Al-Ghazzālī (1058-1111), for instance, insists that all the philosophers failed to grasp the true nature of prophecy: it is, for him, something unique, utterly beyond the ken of philosophy and accessible to the immediate experience (*yedon dhauf*) of the mystic only.<sup>42</sup>

R. WALZER.

Oriel College, Oxford.

<sup>41</sup> F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology* (Oxford 1952), pp. 35 ff., 93 ff. S. Van den Bergh, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 313 ff. and notes.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazzālī* (London 1953), pp. 63 ff.

## SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS IN GREEK TRAGEDY

THE justification for including this article in a volume dedicated to Sir David Ross must be that the tragic poets reflect the psychological terminology of educated Athenian society during a period which corresponds almost exactly with the life-time of Socrates and includes the first twenty years or so of Plato's life. Of course the tragic poets wrote in a poetic language strongly influenced by Homer and less strongly by lyric poetry, but they were also influenced by contemporary thinkers, doctors, sophists, and philosophers. The present study<sup>1</sup> is confined to the words *psyche*, *thymos*, *kardia* (and its synonyms), *phreni/phrenes*, *noos*.

It may be useful first to note the range of usage of these words and secondly to point out very briefly the historical development. The range of usages of these words is difficult to define; in fact such definition cannot produce boxes into which instances can be sorted but may usefully mark points on the scale of meaning between which any given instance falls. Of the five words, *kardia* and *phrenes* are names for parts of the body, 'heart' and 'diaphragm';<sup>2</sup> It is perhaps rash to identify *psyche* and *thymos* with the cold/moist and hot/dry components of breath, but certainly in many passages of Homer they have some such physical meaning. *Noos*, however, is a verbal abstract and verbal abstracts in Greek mean not only a process but also the agent or the result of the process; as a process, it means 'appreciating the situation' in the military sense in which appreciate involves also making a plan; as an agent, it means 'the appreciating mind'; as a result, it means 'the plan or thought' which results from the appreciation. By analogy, I suspect, with *noos* the other words also can be used for mental processes and results as well as for agents; *thymos* can already mean 'thought' in Homer, *kardia* 'courage' in Archilochos, and *phrenes* 'intention' in Solon.<sup>3</sup> The full possible range of meaning is: (a) part of the body, (b) psychological agent, (c) psychological process, (d) result of psychological process. But these meanings fade into one another and any particular instance may be difficult to classify precisely.

A physical part or constituent of the body can be a psychological agent in early Greek just as cornland can be the goddess Demeter, navigable water the god Okeanos, or a growing tree a nymph. Another distinction which had not yet been drawn clearly is the distinction between emotional and intellectual activity. Thus *phrenes*, *thymos*, and *kardia* to a large extent overlap in Homer (although *phrenes* is more often used in intellectual contexts than the other two), and *noos* can have an adjective *opānos* to describe Ajax's 'stubborn way of thinking' (*Iliad* 23, 484). *Psyche*, the word with the greatest future, has the least psychological extension in Homer. It is the breath blown out in death, which survives as a shadowy replica of the man. But because its absence means death its presence means life; and Achilles can speak of 'staking *psyche*' (*Iliad* 9, 322). So in the seventh century poets *psyche* is the living soul or life;<sup>4</sup> in the sixth century poets *psyche* can feel emotion.<sup>5</sup> Parallel to this development in poetry we can probably assume that for the Milesians *psyche* was both life, the source of life, and the source of movement. Still probably in the sixth century *psyche* develops in two new directions. One is Pythagoras' transmigration of souls; for his use of *psyche* the slightly younger Xenophanes gives contemporary evidence (B 7); when Pythagoras saw a man beating a puppy, he told him to stop, 'for it is a friend's *psyche*, which I recognised when I heard its voice'. This *psyche* is individual because it is recognisable in a new shape, it feels pain, and has control over the voice. Secondly, Heraclitus distinguished not only reason and passions but also knowledge and sense perception; it is the function of *psyche* to understand the language of the senses (B 107), and the battle with *thymos* (the source of desire) is lost at the price of *psyche* (B 85).

Such very briefly is the pre-history. A new addition to fifth-century thought is the empirical knowledge of the doctor. It is primarily Diogenes of Apollonia and the two doctors influenced by him, the authors of *airs*, etc., and of *Sacred Disease*, who show some influence on tragedy, and their

<sup>1</sup> In its original form this paper was part of a series on the general theme of the 'Relation of language to thought in ancient Greece', and was discussed by my colleagues in University College, London. I should like to express my gratitude for their criticisms and particularly to Mr. D. J. Furley, Mr. E. W. Handley (now published in *Rh. Mus.*), and Professor F. G. Turner for permission to use their papers on psychological terminology in Homer, the lyric poets, and Aristophanes. I am also much indebted to three dissertations, M. Assmann, *Mens et animus*, Amsterdam 1937; E. Harrison, *Development of Thymos from Homer to Plato*, Oxford 1951 (unpublished); R. Meisner, *Mythisches und Rationales in der Psychologie der archaischen Tragödie*, Göttingen 1951.

<sup>2</sup> R. B. Onians, *Origin of European Thought*, 24 f., argues rather for 'lungs'.

<sup>3</sup> It is certainly attractive to suppose with R. B. Onians, *op. cit.*, 108 f., that *psyche* was very early connected with the cerebro-spinal fluid which was believed to be responsible for procreation.

<sup>4</sup> *Od.* 9, 302; Archilochos 60 D; Solon 3, 2 D (this use may be already foreshadowed, *Iliad* 13, 431; *Odysses* 2, 117; but these passages could be otherwise interpreted).

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Hesiod, *Op.* 686-7 (cf. the further development in E. *Anth.* 418).

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Hipponax 42 D; Anakreon 4 D.



work was known in Athens from about 430. Diogenes, according to Aristotle (A 20), equated *psyche* and air, and 'therefore the *psyche* has knowledge and can initiate motion'. The author of *Sacred Disease* (17 ff.) does not use the term *psyche* (perhaps because of its eschatological colour) and denies intelligence to *placenta* and *kardia*; for him the brain is the essential organ, the centre of sensation, feeling, thought, and movement; it interprets what arises from the air and reports to the understanding (*synesis*). In *Airs, etc.*, for the first time perhaps, *soma* and *psyche* are clearly contrasted as body and soul (23): 'uniformity of climate goes with slackness and variation with endurance both of body and of soul'. Moreover, the qualities of courage, etc., are described by the neuter adjective with the definite article (24) 'the brave and the steadfast would not be in the *psyche*'. The use is modelled on the similar use of 'the hot, the cold, the sweet, the bitter' by physicists and doctors, and signifies a material constituent for which another could be substituted. This implies a material *psyche* contrasted with a material *soma* and uniting psychic activities as the *soma* unites bodily activities.

In the tragedians *psyche* may mean (a) life or life soul as in Homer.<sup>7</sup> Evadne in *E. Suppl.* (1024) will not betray Kapanews by her *psyche*, by going on living.<sup>8</sup> Ajax tells his son to 'cherish his young *psyche*' (559), his whole living person; in the same physical sense the infant Orestes wore away his nurse's *psyche* (*Cho.* 749), the adult Orestes, if he fails to obey Apollo, will pay with his own *psyche*—he will be tortured by disease to the end of his life (*Cho.* 276)<sup>9</sup>—and the banqueters in *E. Ion* (1170) filled their *psyche* with good food. *Psyche* may also mean (b) the soul after life as in Homer.<sup>10</sup>

*Psyche* (c) as in the lyric poets can be affected by sorrow, anger, pleasure, joy, love.<sup>11</sup> Four Euripidean passages are interesting here. Hippolytos (1006) claims 'to have *parthenos psyche*' a soul unaffected by sexual attraction, and this is an enduring characteristic. Phaedra's *psyche* is bound to her bed by grief (160) and Medea's nurse (108) wonders what her *psyche* 'deeply feeling, hard to check', will do. In both these passages *psyche* besides feeling emotion stands for the person who feels the emotion; it is not a synonym for Phaedra or Medea but signifies them in their psychological aspect. The contrast between soul and body underlies this use. Similarly, where Pindar (*O.* 1, 58) says simply that Tantalos is astray from happiness, Euripides restricts the verb by an internal accusative and says that the man who has lost his fortune is '*psychically* astray from his former well-being' (*Tro.* 640).<sup>12</sup> In these passages *psyche* means a particular feeling soul. This is emphasised by the grammar in *S. Phil.* 712, where the chorus say of Philoktetes: *ὁ μέλεα ψυχῆ, ὡς μὲν δ' ἀνθρώπου σώματος ἦσθαι*, 'wretched soul, in that he never even had the pleasure of wine'.

Change of grammatical person is also found in *E. Or.* 466: *οἷς, ὃ τάλαρα καρδίᾳ ψυχῇ τ' ἐμῇ, ἀπέδωκε* ἀμωβὴς οὐ καλῆς. Here, however, Orestes is not addressing a feeling soul like Philoktetes but a daring or enduring soul. The traditional Homeric address to the enduring soul (*kardia*, *thymos*), which continues in the second person, is found in *S. Trach.* 1260: *ὦ ψυχῇ σκληρᾷ . . . ἀνέπαυε βοῆν*. *Psyche* (d) as the organ of daring, courage, and endurance perhaps takes its origin from such Homeric phrases as 'staking *psyche*' which implies the possession of these qualities; then Tyrtaeus (9, 18) speaks of 'staking *psyche* and enduring *thymos*'; then *psyche* is equated with and substituted for 'enduring *thymos*', and is commonly so used in tragedy, Pindar, and prose.<sup>13</sup> So Haimon (*S. Ant.* 707) contrasts 'having *psyche*' with 'having a tongue' and 'being wise'.

Iphitos in *E. Suppl.* 1109 says that nothing is pleasanter for an old father than a daughter, 'men's *psychai* are greater but less gentle in endearments'. The great *psychai* of the sons are enduring, daring, etc. The daughters' *psychai* have an intellectual element (e) which thinks out how to please their fathers. This sense is not found in Aeschylus although we have noted it already in Heraclitus. But the guard in *S. Ant.* 227 is addressed by his *psyche*, which places alternatives before him. Odysseus instructs Neoptolemos to deceive the *psyche* of Philoktetes with fictions (55), and Philoktetes describes Odysseus' training of Neoptolemos: 'your evil *psyche* always looking through peepholes taught him'. *Psyche* here is not a feeling or an enduring soul but a soul with a capacity for conceiving or apprehending plans.<sup>14</sup> Odysseus' *psyche* uses intellectual power to gratify a desire. The control of desire is equally possible: 'a wise *psyche* with just thoughts is a better planner than any

<sup>7</sup> (i) *A. Eun.* 112 = *S. OT.* 93 = *E. Or.* 147, cf. *Hdt.* 1, 112, 3; *Thuc.* 3, 39, 1; *Lykias* 22, 20 (origin *Rind* 22, 103).

(ii) *A. Ag.* 965 (to Agamemnon); *E. Ion.* 1134 *Hdt.* 4, 190, cf. *Thuc.* 1, 130, 1; Antiphon 5, 42; Pindar *N.* 1, 47.

<sup>8</sup> So Wacke. The Bude translation 'journes en mes cour je ne t'aurois trahi' finds a possible parallel in *Tro.* 630.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Bacchylides 5, 151.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. *A. Per.* 630, 46, 965 (to the audience); *S. OC.* 108; *E. Or.* 671.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. *A. Pto.* 411; *S. Ant.* 930; *El.* 118; *E. Ak.* 108, etc. Cf. Pindar *P.* 4, 122; *Hdt.* 3, 40, 4. Isocrates, *Hil.* 55.

<sup>12</sup> *S. OT.* 727 *ψυχῇ ἐμῇ* is similar, there of amazement. Cf. also *E. fr.* 1038 N.

<sup>13</sup> E.g. *A. Per.* 442, 46, 1043; *E. Hec.* 580; *HF.* 626; 1366; Pindar, *P.* 1, 48; *N.* 9, 39; *Hdt.* 3, 14, 1; *Thuc.* 2, 40, 3; *Lykias* 20, 24. In Antiphon 5, 93, *Lykias* 24, 3 this meaning is combined with the soul/body antithesis: the enduring soul saves or heals the tired or crippled body.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *S. El.* 903; *E. Andr.* 159; *IT.* 881; *Tro.* 1171; 1193 with *S. Phil.* 1014 particularly *Hdt.* 7, 16, 2. Cf. also *Ar. Nob.* 319. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 138 f. seems to me to underrate these passages which are partly omitted, partly misinterpreted by Burnett in *PBA* 1915-16, 238 f.

sophist' (S. fr. 101F).<sup>15</sup> Alternatively intelligence may be called a constituent of the *psyche*; Orestes knows that Electra's *psyche* possesses *τὸ αὐτόν* (E. Or. 1180). E. Harrison in his above-mentioned dissertation adds the similar use of 'the frightened' in *Bacchae* 1268. This is the terminology of the doctors and implies a *psyche* made up of a number of different constituents, intellectual, moral, and emotional. The right balance of these constituents can be achieved and maintained by philosophy just as the right balance of constituents in the body can be achieved and maintained by medicine.<sup>16</sup> The balance may immediately affect the body: 'when the body has given up, *psyche* saves it, willing to endure because conscious of innocence', writes Antiphon about 415. This planning soul may also be the traditional life-soul so that Antiphon earlier could appeal to a jury 'to deprive the accused of the *psyche* which planned the crime'.<sup>17</sup>

The belief that the living soul survived after death to be rewarded for its virtues or punished for its crimes accounts for a further meaning, (f) the most precious part of the personality, in Pindar's second *Olympian* (68): 'all who persevered . . . to keep their *psyche* from injustice, took Zeus' road to Kronos' palace'. But the meaning is found in Sophocles and Euripides in contexts free of any such eschatological allusion, when for instance Kreon accuses the guard of 'selling his *psyche* for money' (*Ant.* 322) or Theseus tells Hippolytos that he shall 'never master' Theseus' *psyche* (*Hipp.* 1040).<sup>18</sup> The same phrase, however, used by Oedipus (*OC.* 1207) when he has been persuaded to see Polyneikes has the further meaning: dispose of me in life and death. Near this meaning, too, is the curious line in the *Antigone* (317), where the guard asks Kreon whether the news of Polyneikes' burial bites his ears or his *psyche* and explains that the doer angers his *phrenes* and the messenger his ears. *Phrenes* and *psyche* are here equated as the part affected by genuine as distinct from superficial anger; so also when Kreon says 'you shall not buy my *phren*' (1063), the expression is exactly parallel to his earlier 'you have sold your *psyche*' (322).

We have noted several instances where *psyche* means a particular soul, feeling, enduring, or planning and so stands for the person in his psychological aspects, distinguished from his physical aspects or body. But in Sophocles and Euripides *psyche* may also simply mean (g) a person without any further emphasis on the soul as distinct from the body than the implied recognition that the soul controls the body. The blind Oedipus, asking Ismene to sacrifice to the Eumenides for him, says (*OC.* 498): 'one *psyche* performing these rites, if well disposed, is as good as a myriad men'.<sup>19</sup>

Finally (h) *psyche*, like the other words, and presumably by analogy with them, comes to mean a mental process or state. Thus in the *Antigone* (176) Kreon couples it with *phronema* and *gnome* and the three mean 'courage and wisdom and eloquence';<sup>20</sup> whereas Haimon in the parallel passage (708) quoted above, couples *psyche* with the organ *glossa*. Tyndareus asks Orestes (E. Or. 526): 'what *psyche* had you then, when your mother showed you her breast in supplication?' what was your state of mind that you could endure her prayers without being moved by them. This is also found in Lysias.<sup>21</sup>

This meaning is not found in Aeschylus nor does he use *psyche* for the psychological as distinct from the physical side of the personality (the seeming exception (*Sept.* 1034) comes from the false end of the *Septem*). Where *psyche* comes nearest to meaning personality, it is still physical personality, but to some extent, as we shall see, the other words fill its place. *Thymos* once in Aeschylus has its Homeric meaning of life-breath (*Ag.* 1388); in all the tragedians it can mean mind;<sup>22</sup> it can feel fear, joy, elation, love and other emotions;<sup>23</sup> particularly it is the source of courage;<sup>24</sup> it can also mean courage, desire, or anger.<sup>25</sup> The boundary between courage and source of courage, between desire or anger and that which feels desire or anger, is not clearly marked and we may not always be certain which is meant: for instance, when Medea says, *μη δῖτα θυμέ, μη σὺ γ' ἐπύδων τάδε* (1056), Homeric parallels suggest that she is addressing her angry soul, but it is certainly arguable that she is addressing a personified Anger—the Anger which later she calls 'the cause of the greatest human ills' and 'stronger than her reasoning' (1079).<sup>26</sup>

To the latter passage, whether in implied criticism of Socrates or not,<sup>27</sup> intellect expressed in

<sup>15</sup> Cf. S. fr. 472 P; E. fr. 308 N; Isocrates 13, 17.

<sup>16</sup> Democritus B 31; Isocrates 11, 23; 13, 8. Both perhaps dependent on Socrates, but the idea in its simplest form that the words of a friend can cure wounded feelings is found A. PV 380 (cf. G. Thomson *ad loc.*).

<sup>17</sup> Antiphon 5, 93; 4, 27. On the chronology see K. J. Dover, *Op.* 44 (1950), 44 f.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. S. *Ant.* 534; E. *Bacch.* 73 (with Dodds *ad loc.*); Lysias 1, 33.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. S. *Ag.* 1341; *Ant.* 1009; E. *Hec.* 87; *Med.* 247; *Hipp.* 250; *Phoen.* 1297, 1552.

<sup>20</sup> *Phronema* and *psyche* are similarly parallel in E. *Hec.* 926.

<sup>21</sup> E.g. Lysias 6, 23; 32, 12.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. A. PV 706 = S. OT. 975 = Hdt. 1, 84, 4; S. *Ant.* 493; E. *El.* 377.

<sup>23</sup> E.g. A. *Suppl.* 466; PV. 539; S. OT. 914; A. 955; E. *Med.* 8; *Hipp.* 1114. Cf. Antiphon 4, 2; Hdt. 7, 39, 1 (which is a variation on the theme of S. *Ant.* 317 f.).

<sup>24</sup> E.g. E. *It.* 912; HF. 1210. Cf. Hdt. 1, 120, 3; 8, 139, 3; Andocides 3, 31.

<sup>25</sup> Courage: A. *Sept.* 507; S. *El.* 26. Cf. Thuc. 1, 49, 3; desire: S. *El.* 1313; E. *Med.* 910. Cf. Hdt. 1, 1, 4; Parmenides B 1, 1, anger: A. *Suppl.* 448; S. *OC.* 1107; E. *Med.* 1079, etc. Cf. Hdt. 1, 137, 1; Thuc. 2, 11, 7.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. also E. *Med.* 910 (desire or desiring soul), S. *El.* 26 (courage or courageous soul).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 188. B. Snell, *Philologus*, 97 (1938), 134 suggests that these lines caused Socrates to assert that virtue is knowledge. I think E. may allude to Socrates' questioning of acknowledged authorities in *Alc.* 300-1.



*bouleumata* is the victim of her passion, expressed in *thymos*. Such moments of decision had particularly interested Aeschylus also and he used a variety of images to express them. These must be examined together although they contain *kardia* and *phren* as well as *thymos*. In the *Persae* (767) Darius says of one of the Persian kings *φρένες γὰρ αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ἀνεκροπόδουν*. Here *thymos* is a ship steered by *phrenes*, intellect; *thymos* is the feelings. (The nautical metaphor recurs in a contemporary poem of Bacchylides 17, 23 *ὄμον οὐδέτι ῥαῦν ἔσω κυβερνήτης φρεσὶν θυμὸν*, which I take to mean 'the feelings within your breast you no longer control and therefore they are unscrupulous'; the metaphor is weaker and *phrenes* is a part of the body.) The ship may be diverted or propelled by a wind: so in the *Prometheus* (883) is carried off her course by the mad wind of frenzy. In *Cho.* 390<sup>21</sup> the wind is 'bitter *thymos*, wrathful hatred' blowing 'before the prow of the heart'; *kardia* here takes the place of *thymos* in *Persae* 767; *phrenes* in the preceding line seems to be the imagination which foresees vengeance, but the exact reading is uncertain. In the moment of decision in the *Agamemnon*, Agamemnon (187) is first described as 'breathing with the sudden disaster'; as E. Fraenkel says, he let himself be carried in the same direction; then he takes the decision to sacrifice Iphigenia *φρενὸς πόντον δυσσεφῆ τροπαίαν* κτλ. (218). In both passages it is Agamemnon who 'breathes' because Aeschylus stresses his responsibility; in the second his impious desire is *φρενὸς τροπαίαν* because it takes place in the *phren* (i.e. the soul as a whole), just as Antigone is held by gusts of *λαχῆς ἀνέμων* 'soul-winds' (*S. Ant.* 929). The ship is a further elaboration which introduces the possibility of conflict and control into the traditional Homeric idea of courage breathed into a man by a god or wrath which he breathes out.<sup>22</sup>

A racing chariot may be substituted for the ship. When Orestes feels himself going mad in the *Choephori* (1022), he develops the chariot image of Anaëreon: 'you are the charioteer of my *psyche*'. He says: 'I am driving my chariot off the course. I am being overcome and carried away by my *phrenes* beyond control. Fear is ready to sing to my heart, and my heart to dance to the tune of wrath.' *Phrenes* here is diseased intellect, the power of control which has become itself uncontrollable. The imagery then changes from driving to music; fear (of Klytemnestra's Furies) will setenae his heart, and his heart will dance to the tune played by Klytemnestra's Furies (the Wrath of 1025 is expanded in 1034 to 'my mother's wrathful hounds'). This will drive him off the course of sanity. The dance is also, as Thomson says, a heightened synonym for the physical throbbing of the heart; so when Io is carried off her course by the wind of frenzy, she says 'my heart kicks at my breast in fear and my eyes roll'. We must not therefore follow Fraenkel in rejecting entirely the physical interpretation in a very difficult chorus of the *Agamemnon* (988 f.): I observe Agamemnon's return with my eyes; but my *thymos* self-taught sings a Fury's dirge; man's inward parts are not deceived, the heart circling in conclusive motion against the just breast. Observation of Agamemnon's return should give rise to joy; instead it gives rise to fear. This is one conflict; *thymos*, the feelings, reacts in its own way instead of agreeing with the eyes; it sings a Fury's dirge much as Orestes *kardia* listens to the song of Fear. The second conflict is, as it were, superposed on the physical heartbeats, much as Orestes' heart dances to the Furies; the heart feels certain foreboding and therefore its motion is 'conclusive'; it beats against the breast (cf. 10), which being mind (*phrenes*) knows that justice will be done.

I have lingered over these passages because Aeschylus is concerned to express as exactly as possible by imagery and description what happens in these moments of psychological stress. Such stresses have their physical concomitants, quickened breathing and beating heart;<sup>23</sup> therefore he locates them in the chest. The victim feels that he is going off his course. *Thymos* or *kardia* feel the desire or fear or anger like winds or music. *Phrenes*, the hard midriff which can be thought of as withstanding the paining and throbbing, is the mind which only loses control completely in madness.

We can then pass on to other instances of *kardia* and *phrenes*. *Kardia* very commonly feels emotion:<sup>24</sup> in the *Heruba* (1129) Agamemnon tells Polyaëstor to cast 'the barbarous' out of his heart: 'the barbarous' is a constituent of his heart, as 'the intelligent' is a constituent of Electra's *psyche* (*Or.* 1180). Medea, like Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, appeals to her heart when she needs courage.<sup>25</sup> The heart can also see, hear, understand, and even speak; but probably only performs these intellectual operations when emotion is involved;<sup>26</sup> in particular 'to speak from the heart' is to speak the truth undeterred by fear.<sup>27</sup> Like the other words, *kardia* can also mean a mental process or its result: Kreon, when persuaded to bury Polyneikes, says, 'I abandon my cherished

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Lesky, *Sitzb. Ak. Wini. Wini.* 201 (1933), 3, 70 f.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Becker, 'Bild des Weges', *Hermes, Hefenheften*, 4 (1937), 168 ff.

<sup>23</sup> For *kardia* in this psycho-physical sense, cf. also *Ag.* 1121, *Cho.* 1034, *E. Bacch.* 1288. In *prom.* *kardia* is only used of the physical organ and the author of the *Sacred Disease* (17 ff.) denies it intelligence.

<sup>24</sup> E.g. *A. Ag.* 392 (*judges*); *Soph.* 781; *S. Ant.* 1085; *E. Med.* 245, 433.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *S. OT.* 688; *E. Alc.* 897. *HF.* 833 (cf. 626 with *psyche* instead of *kardia*).

<sup>26</sup> *A. Ag.* 170, 977, 990; 1021; *Eum.* 103; *Suppl.* 466; *E. Hipp.* 612.

<sup>27</sup> *E. IA.* 475, fr. 412 N. *U. A. Eum.* 679; *S. fr.* 303 P 'to open the closed gate of the *psyche*' (The distinction between *enre* and *psyche/phren* in *S. Ant.* 317 f. is not unlike this.)



desire (*kardia*), so as to do it' (S. *Ant.* 1105) and Medea says (1042), 'my heart (i.e. my courage) is gone', when she sees her children.<sup>11</sup>

*Phrenes* may simply be the physical midriff.<sup>12</sup> The psycho-physical use in conjunction with *kardia* seems to be confined to Aeschylus (see above). But in Sophocles *phrenes* have a relation to the body: Oedipus has not even grown wits in old age (*OC.* 804). So in Herodotus (3, 134, 3) *phrenes* increases as the body increases and grows old with it as it grows old. A yet more direct connection is shown by his statement about Cambyses: 'If the body is greatly diseased it is natural that the *phrenes* also should be unhealthily' (3, 33). This is the view of the author on the *Sacred Disease*, but he speaks of the brain and denies intelligence to the *phrenes*.

The commonest meaning, mind, need only be illustrated in certain special uses. (a) In a number of passages emotion may disturb, damage, or destroy *phren* without causing complete madness as in the case of Orestes (see above): when Helen saw Paris she was driven out of her wits by his beauty.<sup>13</sup> (b) Various relations between *phren* and the senses are mentioned. The division may merely be between reception by the senses and understanding with a view to contemplation and action: Agamemnon's majesty performed its will through the ears and the *phrenes* of the people.<sup>14</sup> Similarly the eyes may be the outward expression of the *phren*: Ajax' twisted eye and twisted *phrenes* departed from his plan (*Aj.* 447), and Oedipus made his charge against Kreon with level eye and level mind (*OT.* 528). Or the words heard or spoken may be at variance with the feeling or thought which they cause or express. We have already noticed the distinction in the *Antigone* (317 f.) between superficial anger felt in the ears and genuine anger felt in the *phrenes* or *psyche*. A similar contrast underlies Hippolytos' famous line (612): 'my tongue has sworn, but my *phren* is unsworn'. (c) Without this contrast with expressed thought, *phren*, like *kardia*, can be the source of genuine, sincere utterance: 'I will lay bare my *phren* to my husband', and so can have moral epithets—true, good, pious, etc.<sup>15</sup>

*Phren* can feel fear, joy, or anger without thereby losing its intellectual balance, and so perform the same function as *kardia*, etc.<sup>16</sup> The nurse in the *Medea* (103) speaks of the 'wild character and hateful nature of (Medea's) stubborn *phren*' five lines before she speaks of her *psyche*, deeply feeling, hard to check: there is no distinction between the words. *Phrenes* also, like *kardia* and *psyche*, can have constituents expressed by the article and the neuter adjective: 'the scowling and contracted' (*Ak.* 797), 'the irritable and the tyrannical' (*Bacch.* 670), 'the swift and the nimble' (*fr.* 1032 N), 'the proud' (*Suppl.* 217), 'the noble' (*Hipp.* 1390), 'the modest' (*Andr.* 365), 'the loyal' (S. *OC.* 1488). Eros lives *ἐν τῷ κακότητι τῶν φρενῶν* (E. *fr.* 1054).

It is not always easy to distinguish mind from thinking and still harder to distinguish thinking from thought. When Hyllos prays that Deianira may get better *phrenes* than her present *phrenes*, *phrenes* means way of thinking.<sup>17</sup> *Phrenes* can also mean 'right way of thinking': Fraenkel so interprets *τελῆται φρεσὶν τὸ πᾶν* in A. *Ag.* 175. Herodotus uses the phrase: *ἐξέλπισσας τῶν φρενῶν*, 'You have sailed out of right thinking'; the metaphor of the ship survives from Aeschylus.<sup>18</sup> When, however, Teiresias tells Kreon (*Ant.* 1015) that the city is suffering from his *phren*, *phren* means something like 'plan',<sup>19</sup> and in this meaning *phren* can have an adjective: 'unhappy ones, you came to the idea of single combat' *μονομάχου ἐνὶ φρεσὶ* (E. *Phoen.* 1299).

In the meanings 'thinking' and 'right way of thinking' *nous* and *phrenes* are identical;<sup>20</sup> thus Herodotus speaks once of people 'sailing out of their *nous*' (6, 12, 3) and Euripides in the *Bacchae* (269) having said there are no *phrenes* in Pentheus' words continues, he is a bad citizen who has no *nous* ('to have *nous*' in the sense of to think sensibly is common in prose). *Nous* meaning 'way of thinking' can also be juxtaposed with *phrenes* meaning 'mind' (E. *fr.* 212 N), and this is probably the explanation of the difficult *τὸν νοῦν τ' ἀπέλυσεν τῶν φρενῶν* in S. *Ant.* 1090, 'the thinking of his mind'. Further *nous* 'expressed thought' can be contrasted with *nous* 'right thinking': 'this particular sense is senseless' (E. *IA.* 1139).

In the *Antigone* passage 'better *nous* in his *phrenes*' would, according to Teiresias, prevent Kreon pouring out his *thymos*; the contrast between *phren* and *thymos* has already been noted in Aeschylus; here *nous* 'right thinking' is contrasted with *thymos* 'anger'. In the *Oedipus Coloneus* (659) threats are made in anger (*θυμῷ*), but when *nous* gains control of itself, the threats are gone—i.e. when mind controls its own thinking. *Nous* can traditionally feel emotion although such passages are

<sup>11</sup> Cf. E. *Hec.* 1027, *Id.* 1173.

<sup>12</sup> A. *PI.* 361; S. *Trach.* 931.

<sup>13</sup> E. *Tro.* 962. Cf. A. *Cho.* 211; 233; S. *OT.* 727; *Trach.* 538; E. *Hipp.* 283.

<sup>14</sup> A. *Cho.* 35, cf. 431; *Ag.* 1034; *Sept.* 25; S. *Aj.* 16. Cf. also the dialogue in Demetrius B 123 between *phren* and the senses.

<sup>15</sup> E. *Tro.* 662. Cf. S. *OT.* 528 (already quoted); E. *Med.* 661; *Hipp.* 926; 1454; *fr.* 212 N.

<sup>16</sup> E.g. A. *Suppl.* 379; *Pers.* 115; *Ium.* 301; S. *Trach.* 217; *OT.* 153; E. *Hec.* 85; *Phoen.* 1284; *IA.* 1380.

<sup>17</sup> S. *Trach.* 796; cf. E. *Bacch.* 1270.

<sup>18</sup> The normal prose phrase is given by Lyxias *fr.* 90 *απαλίσσας τὸν φρεσίν*. Cf. E. *Bacch.* 269, etc.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. A. *Pr.* 172; *PI.* 34; *Suppl.* 1050; S. *Ant.* 993; E. *Hipp.* 1485. Mr. E. W. Handley pointed out to me that *Isid.* P. 5, 49 is especially like S. *Ant.* 1015.

<sup>20</sup> E.g. A. *PI.* 362; S. *OT.* 1147; E. *Med.* 1022, 1027; E. *Hipp.* 920; *fr.* 254 N.

not very common in tragedy.<sup>15</sup> Two are interesting. 'The young *nous* suffers much when grieved' (*Ant.* 767); here Sophocles expresses the same idea that we have noticed in the *Oedipus Coloneus* (804)—wisdom should increase with age.<sup>16</sup> A different relation between mind and body is the contrast between the slave's body (or name) and his free *nous*.<sup>17</sup> The second passage of particular interest is Hekabe's accusation of Helen in the *Trojan Women* (987). 'My son was surpassingly beautiful. Your *nous* having seen him was made into Kypris. For any folly is Aphrodite in men's views . . . You were driven out of your wits' (*phrenas*: cf. above). *Nous* receives and operates on a visual impression: so the difficult line in the *Helen* (122) where Teucer answers Helen's doubt: 'I saw her with my eyes and *nous* sees' (i.e. recognition follows sensation), and more relevantly in a passage which similarly rates virtue above beauty, 'the criterion is not the eyes but the mind' (*fr.* 909/6 N). Helen, instead of so interpreting her sensation, was driven out of her wits; her *nous* became passion instead of reason, or more subtly 'was made into Kypris': like other weak mortals she claimed that Aphrodite had conquered her.

We have seen that Hippolytos' 'unsworn *phren*' denotes the organ of his private as distinct from his public behaviour. *Nous* already in Homer meant an organ of private or mental as distinct from public or bodily behaviour.<sup>18</sup> So in the *Trachiniae* (272) Iphitos' eye is on one thing but his *nous* is elsewhere, and in the *Ion* (251) Kreousa is in Delphi but her *nous* returns to Athens some eighteen years before.<sup>19</sup> Finally, in Hekabe's prayer in the *Trojan Women* (886), '*nous* of men' is one of the alternative definitions of Zeus; the allusion is probably to Diogenes of Apollonia, whose air is both god and human *noesis*. So in the *Helen* (1014) 'the *nous* of the dead does not continue living but has immortal power (*gnome*): the decision which guides the world, cf. Diogenes B 9), merged in the immortal aither'. In the *Suppliants* (532) the terminology is even nearer Diogenes: 'the *pneuma* to the aither, the body to earth'. *Pneuma* is breath, the air of Diogenes. The epitaph on the fallen at Potridaia (432 B.C.) substitutes *psyche* for *pneuma*: 'aither received their *psychai*, earth their bodies'.<sup>20</sup> *Psyche* is perhaps a slightly easier word for a public monument since the allusion to philosophy is not quite so clear and it would be possible to think of the souls becoming stars, as in Aristophanes's *Peace* (832). In two passages of Sophocles, where there is no allusion to any such doctrine, *nous* is nevertheless used as the equivalent of *psyche* in the sense of particular determining soul: *Phil.* 1208, 'my *nous* is bent on blood now, seeking my father', *El.* 913, 'my mother's *nous* is not wont to do such things nor would she have done it unseen'.

The great overlap of meanings is partly due to the convenience of poetry, partly to the traditional use of the same words for mental functions which were in Plato's time differentiated. They can all mean feelings or mind, but only *psyche*, *thymos*, *kardia* can mean the source of courage and courage as a state of mind; only *phrenes* and *nous* can mean mind as distinct from the senses, or the organ of private as distinct from public behaviour (in the sense defined above), and only they have the secondary meaning 'way of thinking' or 'right way of thinking'. Because *psyche* means life, living soul, and immortal soul (whatever kind of immortality is supposed for it), it can most easily be substituted for the person, particularly when the person is described as feeling, daring, or thinking, when his mental activities are distinguished from his bodily activities or are regarded as the most precious part of his personality; occasionally *phren* and *nous*, as we have seen, come near to these uses of *psyche*. These interesting extensions of *psyche* are post-Aeschylean. With them we have also the new conception of the mind (*psyche*, *kardia*, *phren*) as composed of constituents described by a neuter adjective and the conception of the mind (*nous*) as physically composed of air, which will ultimately rejoin the air-mind of the world. The earlier Aeschylean psychology can truly be called psycho-physical because it is based on the physical *phrenes* restraining beating *kardia* and panting *thymos*, physically registering the emotions which are restrained by reason. This is a satisfactory description of the divided personality at moments of decision and in its description of conflict between *phrenes* and *thymos*, *kardia* foreshadows the Platonic description of the divided soul. The localisation of all psychological functions in the brain made the physical side of this interpretation impossible, and the conflict was transferred in the second half of the fifth century to a *psyche*, which some doctors located in the brain and some thinkers identified with air; it was physical because it was still as always responsible for life; it was material because it was composed of 'the loyal', 'the barbarous', etc. But it was nevertheless essentially the soul in distinction from the body.

T. B. L. WEBSTER.

University College, London.

<sup>15</sup> E.g. *A. Chn.* 742; *PF* 413.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *A. Sep.* 622.

<sup>17</sup> *S. fr.* 930 P; *E. Hel.* 730 (where *E.* uses *phrenes* instead of *nous* in the next line; cf. *fr.* 831 N).

<sup>18</sup> E.g. *Odysseu* 2, 92 (cf. *Hdt.* 3, 100, 3); 1, 347; *Ilad* 15, 80.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. 1370. In *Rev.* 603 *nous* is responsible for

generalisations as distinct from what is needed at the moment. In spite of its Homeric ancestry the freedom of *nous* to range apart from the body was apparently interesting and surprising in the fifth century, cf. *Ar. Ach.* 396 ff.

<sup>20</sup> *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 442 = Kaibel, *Epigr.* 2<sup>a</sup>, 31. *E. fr.* 1018 is sometimes quoted in this connection but means rather 'nous is an uncanny powerful thing like a god'.



## DIE STELLUNG DER SCHRIFT 'ÜBER DIE PHILOSOPHIE' IN DER GEDANKENENTWICKLUNG DES ARISTOTELES

Zu den erregendsten Zeiten der Geistesgeschichte gehören sicher die zwei Jahrzehnte, in denen Aristoteles zunächst in der Schule Platons seine philosophische Anregung empfing, um sich dann von seinem Lehrer und von der platonischen Akademie zu lösen und sein eigenes System dem seines Lehrers gegenüberzustellen.

Die folgenden Jahrhunderte richteten ihren Blick ausschließlich auf die ausgebildeten Systeme dieser beiden großen Denker. Entweder stellte man ihre Ansichten als gegensätzlich einander gegenüber oder man trachtete sie irgendwie miteinander zu vereinigen. Das hatte zur Folge, daß gerade die Jahre, da beide als Lehrer und Schüler sich begegneten, für uns in Dunkel gehüllt sind.

Wir besitzen zwar das literarische Werk Platons, aber wir wissen wenig von seinem mündlichen Unterricht und von dem Lehrbetrieb seiner Schule. Und gerade die Reihenfolge seiner Spätschriften, die eben in die zwei Jahrzehnte fallen, da Aristoteles in der Akademie war, können wir immer noch nicht mit Sicherheit bestimmen. Aristoteles kannte natürlich die Schriften seines Lehrers, aber er war nicht auf sie angewiesen, um zu wissen, welche Ansichten Platon vertrat. Wir wissen auch, daß er selbst die Lehre der Akademie in Schriften vertreten hat, die teilweise im Altertum weit verbreitet und berühmt waren. Wir wissen freilich auch, daß er in anderen seiner Schriften die Lehren Platons bekämpfte und seine gegenteilige Ansicht begründete. Wir haben aber von diesen Schriften nur geringe und unzusammenhängende Bruchstücke. So stehen wir bei der Erforschung dieses Zeitraums, dessen Kenntnis uns doch helfen könnte, sowohl Platon wie Aristoteles besser zu verstehen, vor großen Schwierigkeiten.

Würden wir mit Sicherheit die Reihenfolge der platonischen Spätdialoge festlegen können und würden wir die einzelnen Dialoge wenigstens ungefähr auf bestimmte Jahre datieren können, so hätten wir zugleich ziemlich Klarheit über den Werdegang des jungen Aristoteles. Was wir heute von der Entwicklung der platonischen Lehre wissen, das hat Sir David Ross vor wenigen Jahren übersichtlich dargestellt.<sup>1</sup> Ebenso könnte uns aber eine Kenntnis der aristotelischen Frühschriften viel sagen von den Ansichten, die Platon und die Akademie damals vertraten.

Bei einer so unsicheren Quellenlage ist jeder Forscher in der großen Gefahr, daß er sich ein Bild von der Entwicklung des späteren Platon und des jungen Aristoteles macht und nach diesem Bild dann die Quellen deutet. Ich habe kürzlich darauf aufmerksam gemacht,<sup>2</sup> daß wir uns vielleicht bereits da in dieser Gefahr befinden, wo wir noch auf sicherem Boden zu stehen glauben. Durch die Forschung sind viele antike Berichte zusammengetragen worden, die wir als Zeugnisse der aristotelischen Frühschriften betrachten. Da aber die meisten Nachrichten von Schriftstellern stammen, welche diese Schriften schon nicht mehr kannten, ist immer die Möglichkeit des Irrtums gegeben. Außerdem sind unsere Fragmentensammlungen selbst wieder auf Grund unserer Theorien von der Entwicklung des Aristoteles zustande gekommen. Wenn wir uns jetzt auf diese Sammlungen stützen, um den Inhalt einer Schrift zu bestimmen, sind wir dann nicht in der Gefahr, daß wir nur beweisen, was wir selbst vorausgesetzt haben?

Aber vielleicht sehe ich die Gefahr als zu groß an. Es gibt doch viele Punkte, in denen sich die Forscher einig sind. Von einem solchen Punkte möchte ich hier sprechen.

### I

Unter den Titeln der Frühschriften des Aristoteles fällt einer besonders auf. Die Schrift handelt 'Über die Philosophie'. Und das einzige wörtliche Zitat, das wir aus dieser Schrift besitzen, sagt: *ὥστε εἰ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς αἱ ἰδέαι, μὴ μαθηματικὸς δέ, οὐδεμίαν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνεσις ἔχομεν ἢν τις γὰρ τῶν γε πλείων ἡμῶν σκεῖται ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν;* Aristoteles kritisiert also in einer sehr scharfen Form die Lehre von den Idealzahlen, von der wir allmählich nicht mehr zweifeln können, daß sie Platon selbst in seinen letzten Lebensjahren vertreten hat.

Es erscheint wohlbegründet, wenn W. Jägers aus dem bedeutungsvollen Titel und aus dieser Stelle schließt, daß die Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' das Programm des Aristoteles verkündete, als er sich von der Lehre Platons löste und seine eigene Metaphysik auszubilden begann. Durch

<sup>1</sup> *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford, 1951.

<sup>2</sup> Die aristotelische Schrift 'Über die Philosophie', *Revue d'histoire de philosophie ancienne et*

*medievale offert à A. Maunier*. Louvain, 1955, pp. 99-116.

<sup>1</sup> S. 9 Ross; 11 Walzer; 11 Ross.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristoteles*, pp. 125-70.



Vergleich mit der Metaphysik kann Jäger sogar ziemlich genau die Zeit bestimmen, in der Aristoteles die Schrift verfaßte. Nach dem Tode Platons ging er mit Xenokrates und anderen Freunden aus der Akademie nach Assos in Kleinasien. Hier, so meint Jäger mit guten Gründen, sind die ältesten Teile der Metaphysik entstanden und auch 'Über die Philosophie'.

Wir besitzen außer dem wörtlichen Zitat, das der Berichterstatter aus dem zweiten Buch der Schrift nahm, noch zwei kurze Nachrichten, von denen die eine dem ersten und die andere dem dritten Buch zugewiesen wird.<sup>5</sup> Das gibt uns ziemliche Sicherheit über den Aufbau der Schrift. Im ersten Buch war eine Übersicht über die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Philosophie von ihren ersten Anfängen in Mythen und Weisheitsprüchen gegeben. Im zweiten Buch war die Lehre Platons dargestellt und kritisiert. Im dritten entwickelte Aristoteles seine eigene Ansicht über die Götter und das Weltall. Das ist ein Aufbau, wie wir ihn bei Aristoteles gewohnt sind.

Wir haben also mit dieser Schrift ein recht gutes Mittel in der Hand, um die anderen Probleme der Frühentwicklung des Aristoteles zu lösen. Diese Ansicht bestätigen alle Forscher, die sich seit Jäger mit der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' beschäftigt haben.<sup>6</sup> Sie scheinen den zeitlichen Ansatz, den W. Jäger gewählt hat, für so gut begründet zu halten, daß sie ihn nicht in Frage stellen. Und sie folgen Jäger auch in Aufbau und Bedeutung der Schrift als philosophischem Programm. Auch ich habe keinen Grund gesehen, an diesen drei Punkten (Zeit, Aufbau, Bedeutung der Schrift) zu zweifeln.<sup>7</sup>

In vielen Einzelheiten haben freilich Forscher wie Ross, Bignone, Festugière, Allan, Saffrey die Ergebnisse Jägers ergänzt und unsere Kenntnis erweitert. Aber gerade diese neuen Untersuchungen haben es mir wahrscheinlich gemacht, daß wir auch die Frage nach Daurung, Aufbau und Bedeutung neu stellen müssen.

## II

In einem Aufsatz habe ich kürzlich versucht, die zweite Frage zu beantworten.<sup>8</sup> Ich glaube, man kann zeigen, wie die drei Bücher zusammenhängen. Ein Fragment aus Philoponos, dessen Echtheit Jäger bezweifelt hatte, muß nach den Feststellungen von Bignone und Festugière doch anerkannt werden, und Ross hat deshalb auch dieses wichtige Stück in seine Fragmentensammlung aufgenommen.<sup>9</sup> Leider hatte ich bei Abfassung des Aufsatzes die Forschungen Festugières noch nicht gekannt. Sein Ergebnis hilft das meinige zu stützen. Festugière überzeugt mich davon, daß eine Definition der Weisheit (*σοφία*), wonach dieses Wort von Offenheit (*σάφεια*) kommt, in der aristotelischen Schrift gestanden hat.<sup>10</sup> Das stützt meinen Hinweis, daß wir in dem Philoponosfragment den Aufbau des ersten Buches fassen können. Diese geschichtliche Überschau über die bisherige Entwicklung der Philosophie war als Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes 'Weisheit' gegeben worden, die selbst durch eine Entwicklungstheorie der Kultur gestützt wurde. Aristoteles nimmt im Unterschied von der periodischen Weltvernichtungslehre der Stoa eine periodische Teilvernichtung der Menschheit an. Regionale Überschwemmungen lassen alles Leben bis auf geringe Reste untergehen. Die wenigen Überlebenden retten Reste der alten Kultur, so daß Aristoteles uralte mythische Weisheit als Überreste aus einem früheren Aion deuten kann.

Von solchen Resten abgesehen aber beginnt die kulturelle und geistige Entwicklung der Menschen nach einer solchen Katastrophe von vorne. Weisheit ist den mit der Lebensnotdurft Ringenden bereits die Bestellung der Felder, das Urbarmachen des Bodens. Doch bald erwacht auch ihre künstlerische Gestaltungskraft wieder, und Weisheit ist jetzt die Fähigkeit zu gefälliger Form und künstlerischem Schmuck. Die Ausbildung politischer Gemeinden läßt schließlich die Aufgaben des sozialen Lebens als Weisheit erscheinen. Der im wirtschaftlichen, künstlerischen und sozialen Bereich gesicherte Mensch wird frei für das Wissen um seiner selbst willen. Sein Geist wendet sich der Natur zu und sucht ihr Werden und Vergehen zu begreifen. Es ist die Stufe der vorsokratischen Naturphilosophie, die Aristoteles hier im Auge hat. Endlich aber erhebt sich der Geist über das Vergängliche zur Betrachtung des Unvergänglichen, Ewigen und Sinnlichen und findet in diesem höchsten Gegenstand seine höchste Aufgabe. Das ist nun die höchste und eigentliche Weisheit. Es klingt deutlich durch, daß Aristoteles diese Stufe mit Platon erreicht sieht.

Gemeinsam ist diesen fünf aufeinanderfolgenden Bedeutungen des Begriffes Weisheit, daß sie immer vom Gegenstand her bestimmt wird. Ihr Gegenstand ist der jeweils höchste und erste. Nur was als Erstes und Höchstes betrachtet wird, das ändert sich im Laufe der materiellen und geistigen Entwicklung. In allen ihren Stufen bleibt sich die Weisheit als Wissenschaft vom Ersten gleich. Das aber ist genau die Definition, die Aristoteles in den ältesten Teilen der Metaphysik

<sup>5</sup> Fr. B. Ross, Walter, Ross; fr. 26 Ross, Walter, Ross.

<sup>6</sup> z.B. E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, II, pp. 333-348.

A.-J. Festugière, *La Philosophie d'Aristotele Transmise* II, pp. 218-30.

D. J. Allan, *The Philosophy of Aristotle*, pp. 21-9. H. D. Saffrey, *La Hippi Philosophie d'Aristotele et la théorie Platonicienne des idées*, Leiden, 1953.

<sup>7</sup> Zwei aristotelische Prologdramen über die Ideenlehre, S. 23.

<sup>8</sup> Die aristotelische Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' (cf. n. 2).

<sup>9</sup> Fr. B. Ross.

<sup>10</sup> Philoponos in Nicom. I, 8-10 Hecker; Ascl. in *Arist. Met.* 3, 30-4 Hayduck.

bietet.<sup>11</sup> Auch dort bestimmt er die Wissenschaften noch wie Platon allein vom Objekt her, und das Objekt der ersten Wissenschaft, der Weisheit, ist das Erste. Wir spüren in dem Weisheitsbegriff der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' noch nichts von der späteren Unterscheidung zwischen Material- und Formalobjekt, welche dann dazu führt, die Wissenschaften nach ihrem Formalobjekt voneinander zu scheiden. Wir befinden uns in der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' noch auf dem Boden der Platonischen Wissenschaftseinteilung. Diese Feststellung paßt gut zu Jägers Vermutung, wonach die Schrift gleichzeitig mit dem ersten Buch der Metaphysik anzusetzen sei.

## III

Ja, wir können sogar Gedanken unserer Schrift im ersten Buch der Metaphysik wiederfinden.<sup>12</sup> Die erste Philosophie wird dort als Weisheit bezeichnet und ihr Gegenstand sind die ersten Ursachen und Prinzipien. Dabei erwähnt Aristoteles auch einen Bedeutungswandel des Begriffes Weisheit. Zunächst hat man den für weise und über die anderen hervorragend gehalten, der ein neues Werkzeug entdeckte. Als aber die Fertigkeiten sich mehr und mehr entwickelten, da wurden die Dinge höher geschätzt, welche nicht dem Gebrauch allein dienten, sondern der Belaglichkeit des Lebens. Wer darin geschickt war, hieß jetzt weise. Schließlich aber fanden die Menschen Muße, sich dem zweckfreien Wissen zuzuwenden. Von den fünf Stufen, in denen der Weisheitsbegriff in der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' entwickelt wird, finden sich hier die ersten beiden und die letzte, welche die vierte mitumschließt. Wichtiger aber noch ist der auch hier deutlich spürbare Gedanke eines Bedeutungswandels im Begriff der Weisheit im Laufe der Kulturentwicklung. Und wieder ist das, was den Menschen jeweils als das Höchste erschien, Gegenstand der Weisheit.<sup>13</sup>

Bedenkt man, daß das neunte Kapitel mit seiner Ideenkritik eine für uns fast bis zur Unkenntlichkeit gekürzte Wiedergabe von Gedanken ist, die Aristoteles vorher in einer eigenen Abhandlung 'Über die Ideen' ausführlich dargestellt hatte, so legt sich die Vermutung nahe, daß auch die kurze Erwähnung einer Entwicklung des Weisheitsbegriffs auf eine ausführliche Erörterung des gleichen Gedankens zurückgeht. Dann hätten wir freilich die Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' früher anzusetzen als das erste Buch der Metaphysik.

Doch bleiben wir zunächst noch bei der Definition der Weisheit. Ihre höchste (stufte) Stufe ist mit Platon erreicht. Er hat mit den Ideen und mit dem Aufweis von Gegenständen, die nur im Denken sich fassen lassen (*νοητά*) und aller Veränderlichkeit entzogen sind, der Weisheit endgültig ihren Gegenstand gegeben. Es ist das schlechthin Erste und Höchste. Wir dürfen sicher die Feststellung des Aristoteles nicht im modernen Sinne relativieren. Für uns enthält der Aufweis der historischen Relativität eines Begriffes die Warnung, auch seine gegenwärtige Bedeutung als relativ zu betrachten. Und der Hinweis, daß jeweils andere Gegenstände dem Menschen als die Ersten galten, würde uns vermuten lassen, daß eine spätere Zeit über dem, was wir als Höchstes sehen, ein noch Höheres entdecken wird. Solch absoluter Relativismus liegt dem Denken des Aristoteles fern. Wenn er auch eine geschichtliche Wandlung des Weisheitsbegriffs kennt, so ist ihm doch die durch Platon erreichte Stufe eine endgültige. Jetzt hat die Weisheit ihr eigentliches Objekt gefunden.

Mag uns auch eine Nachricht von einer scharfen Kritik überliefert sein, die Aristoteles an Platon übte, wir dürfen darüber nicht übersehen, daß die Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' von einer großen Hochschätzung der Leistung Platons getragen ist. Übrigens wird diese Einschätzung Platons auch noch in den spätesten Teilen der Metaphysik vorausgesetzt. Immer fragt sich Aristoteles, ob als diese ersten und obersten Prinzipien, die er in seinen bisherigen Untersuchungen erschlossen hat, die unsinnlichen Gegenstände anzusehen seien. Und unter diesem Motto, ob wir in den Ideen und Idealzahlen Platons und seiner Nachfolger die gesuchten ersten Prinzipien vor uns haben, wird dann die Ideenkritik gebracht.<sup>14</sup> Hier zeigt sich noch die Einschätzung Platons, die Aristoteles einst vertreten hatte und die wohl dem Selbstverständnis der Akademie entspricht. Platons Leistung ist die Entdeckung der ersten, unrückführbaren Prinzipien des Seins, die er als übersinnliche, unveränderliche Wesenheiten erkannte. In der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' ist diese Einschätzung Platons noch unangetastet. Die Entwicklung des Weisheitsbegriffs wird bis zu der Stufe geführt, zu der sie Platon erhoben hatte.

## IV

Damit ergibt sich aber der Aufbau der Schrift und das Verständnis ihres Titels. Es geht um die Weisheit, so wie Platon sie nach ihrem Gegenstand bestimmt hatte als 'Wissenschaft von den

<sup>11</sup> Cf. E 1, 1026 a 13; a 29; 11, 1069 a 36; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Introd., pp. lxxvii-lxxix. Jäger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 225-8.

<sup>12</sup> Met. A 1, 981 b 13.

<sup>13</sup> Wahrscheinlich geht auch der Kommentar des

Asclepius zu dieser Stelle auf 'Über die Philosophie' zurück, deren Material er freilich sehr frei ausgestaltet. Cf. Festugière, *loc. cit.*, pp. 587-9.

<sup>14</sup> Met. M 1, 1076 a 8; 9, 1086 a 21.



göttlichen und unveränderlichen Dingen' (*περὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα*). Die drei Bücher sind von einem einheitlichen, klaren Plan durchzogen. Das erste entwickelt den Begriff der Weisheit in seinen geschichtlichen Wandlungen. Sein allgemeiner Inhalt bleibt immer der gleiche. Weisheit geht auf das Erste und Höchste. Freilich die Ansichten, was dieses Erste ist, ändern sich, bis Platon wirklich auf das ontisch Erste stößt. So folgt logischerweise auf diese geschichtliche Übersicht, die nicht eine Philosophiegeschichte im heute üblichen Sinn, sondern eine Kulturgeschichte ist, die Darstellung der platonischen Lehre, und zwar der Lehre vom Ersten, d.h. von den Ideen und Idealzahlen.

Wir haben nur das eine Zeugnis Syrians für eine Kritik der Ideenlehre. Es genügt uns aber, um zu wissen, daß in diesem zweiten Buch die Lehre Platons nicht nur dargestellt, sondern kritisch betrachtet wurde. Aristoteles ist nicht mehr der bedingungslose Anhänger der platonischen Metaphysik.

Aber wir dürfen diese Anzeichen einer Kritik auch nicht überbewerten. Die Inhaltsbestimmung der Weisheit als der Wissenschaft von den göttlichen und ewigen Dingen, die Platon gegeben hatte, bleibt in Kraft. Es wird nur die Frage aufgeworfen, ob die Ideen und Idealzahlen als diese höchsten Objekte zu gelten haben. Es fragt sich vielmehr, ob sie überhaupt selbständige Wesenheiten sind.

In der Schrift 'Über die Ideen' hat Aristoteles die Gedankengänge, mit denen Platon und seine Schule die Notwendigkeit begründete, Ideen und Idealzahlen anzunehmen, eingehend auf ihre Beweiskraft geprüft. Ein Kernpunkt seiner Überlegungen liegt in dem Nachweis, daß Platon die logische Unabhängigkeit des Allgemeinbegriffs von seinen Besonderungen zu einer ontischen Unabhängigkeit des Allgemeinen von dem Individuellen gemacht habe. Er habe das vom Vielen aussagbare Eine (*ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν*) zu einem Einen neben dem Vielen (*ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ*) gemacht und so eine logische Unterscheidung zu einer ontischen Getrenntheit (*χωρισμός*) umgedeutet.<sup>15</sup>

Die Nachrichten aus dem zweiten Buch 'Über die Philosophie' genügen nicht, um zu sagen, in welcher Form die Ideenkritik dort geführt war. Wir können eindeutig feststellen, daß die Schrift 'Über die Ideen' dem A der Metaphysik vorausging.<sup>16</sup> Aber es ist einstweilen unmöglich, aus der Tatsache der Ideenkritik das zeitliche Verhältnis der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' zu der Schrift 'Über die Ideen' und zum ersten Buch der Metaphysik zu bestimmen.

Das dritte Buch der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' entwickelte dann die eigenen Gedanken des Aristoteles über 'die göttlichen und unveränderlichen Dinge'. Was wir hier aus den Nachrichten entnehmen können, das hat Festugière dargestellt. Es ist vor allem der Kosmos selbst und die ewigen Sterne mit ihren unveränderlichen Bahnen, was den Blick des Aristoteles fesselt. Eine Weltfrömmigkeit äußert sich hier, und es ist noch nicht ganz deutlich, wie weit daneben der Gedanke des ersten unbewegten Bewegenden schon anklingt. Jedenfalls ist klar, daß Aristoteles ganz im Begriff der Weisheit bleibt, den Platon festgelegt hatte. So erklärt sich der Titel der Schrift ganz von selbst. Ihr Thema ist die Weisheit, und deren Gegenstand sind die göttlichen und unveränderlichen Substanzen.

Wenn wir so die Schrift als eine Einheit begreifen, die zuerst die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Weisheit schildert, um dann ihre endgültige Gestalt in kritischer Würdigung Platons und in positiver Darstellung zu umreißen, so besagt der Titel nichts anderes als was später die 'Erste Philosophie' besagen will. Es handelt sich um das eigentliche Thema der Philosophie als einer Weisheitslehre, um die göttlichen und ewigen Dinge. Nur vom Inhalt her und nicht von der Form, so scheint es, müssen wir den Titel verstehen. Es wird fraglich, ob wir ihm neben seiner sachlichen Bedeutung, die ihn voll rechtfertigt, noch eine besondere programmatische Absicht beilegen dürfen. Gewiß zeugt die Schrift schon in ihrem Aufbau davon, daß Aristoteles über Platon hinausgekommen ist. Das verbirgt er nicht, und schon die Anfügung des dritten Buches an das platonkritische zweite zeigt es. Aber trotz aller Kritik läßt der Schüler seinem Lehrer die Ehre, das endgültige Thema der Weisheit gefunden zu haben. Nur die Antwort glaubt er verändern und verbessern zu müssen. Wir haben eine eigentümliche Stimmung des Verpflichtetseins und des Abstandnehmens zugleich. Ob man in dieser Stimmung der Schrift die Bedeutung und Absicht eines eigenen Programms zusprechen darf, erscheint mir doch fraglich. Werner Jäger hatte sich doch wohl zu stark von der ersten eindeutig bezugten Nachricht einer Kritik an Platon bestimmen lassen. Inzwischen wissen wir, daß eine sehr viel ausführlichere und gründlichere Auseinandersetzung mit der Ideenlehre in der Schrift 'Über die Ideen' erfolgt war. Dort wird der Abstand zu Platon sehr viel deutlicher als hier, wo die eigene Position in die Ebene eingebaut wird, die Platon bereitet hatte. Die Frage, ob wir der Schrift eine Sonderstellung als philosophisches Programm beimessen dürfen, bedarf jedenfalls einer neuerlichen Überprüfung.

Die zweite Frage nach dem Aufbau der Schrift scheint sich dagegen in Fortführung dessen, was Jäger festgestellt hat, lösen zu lassen. Wir können nun die Folge der drei Bücher aus einem einheitlichen Plan begreifen, der zugleich den auffälligen Titel erklärt.

<sup>15</sup> Vgl. P. Wilpert, *Zwei aristot. Frühschriften*, pp. 52-97.

<sup>16</sup> *loc. cit.* 26.



## V

Am schwierigsten aber dürfte die Frage nach dem zeitlichen Ansatz der Schrift sein. Sehr spät ist sie sicher nicht, das hat bereits Jäger gezeigt. Sie bestimmt aber die Weisheit noch vom Materialobjekt. Die höchste Wissenschaft handelt vom höchsten Gegenstand. Die spätere Bestimmung der Ontologie als der allgemeinsten Betrachtung des Seienden als Seiendem, also vom Formalobjekt her, liegt erst in der Zukunft.

Und sie ist Wissenschaft vom Göttlichen und Ewigen, das gleichzeitig pluralisch als göttliche und ewige Substanzen gefaßt wird. Sicherlich würde ein eingehender Vergleich dieser Auffassung mit den ältesten Zeugnissen der aristotelischen Theologie, etwa dem *1* der Metaphysik, aber auch mit dem *Timaios* Platons<sup>17</sup> sowie mit der *Epinomis*, die sicherlich mehr platonisches Gut enthält, als es ihre Vernachlässigung durch die jüngste Platonforschung vermuten läßt, uns manche Hilfe für die Datierung der Schrift leisten können. Solche Untersuchungen würden jedoch weit über den Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes hinausgehen, der deshalb auch keine Lösungen bieten kann, sondern nur Fragen stellen möchte.

Wie weit dürfen wir aber die Schrift in die Frühzeit des Aristoteles rücken? Auch da kommen wir an eine deutliche Grenze. Es gab wohl sehr wahrscheinlich eine Zeit, in der Aristoteles die Lehren Platons selbst sich zu eigen machte. Wir können uns einen 18jährigen nicht gleich als Kritiker vorstellen. Auch die spätere Platonkritik macht deutlich den Eindruck einer Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen Vergangenheit. Nun konnte es freilich sein, daß Aristoteles erst zu schreiben begann, als er bereits an der Lehre Platons auf Schwierigkeiten gestoßen war. Aber schon die große Zahl von Titeln im Verzeichnis seiner Schriften, die sich an platonische Titel anschließen, macht das wenig wahrscheinlich. Soll man annehmen, daß Aristoteles beharrlich die platonische Hülle benützte, um ihren Inhalt ins Gegenteil zu verkehren? Solch kleinliche Schlaueit wäre seiner wenig würdig, und die stets ehrfurchtsvolle Art, wie er auch als reifer Mann von Platon spricht, gibt uns keinen Grund zu solcher Vermutung. Wir müssen also als sicher annehmen, daß er Schriften im Geiste und in der Lehre Platons geschrieben hat. Solcher Art sind die Schrift 'Über das Gute', die ja nur die Niederschrift der mündlichen Unterweisung Platons sein wollte, und wohl auch der *Eudemos*.

Diese Zeit, in der die platonische Lehre noch das feste Fundament des eigenen Denkens war, ist in der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' vorbei. Unser einziges wörtliches Zitat berichtet von einer Kritik, deren Ton sehr scharf ist. Wir bewegen uns also in einer Übergangszeit, und das paßt zu der allgemeinen Überzeugung, wonach die Schrift in die Jahre von Assos fällt. Unsere Beobachtung, daß sie vielleicht dem ersten Metaphysikbuch vorausliegt, widerspricht dem auch nicht. Und selbst die Feststellung, daß trotz einer Kritik doch noch eine enge Bindung an Platon und seine Wissenschaftseinstellung bestand, fügt sich in diesen Rahmen.

Es gibt aber noch einen Anhaltspunkt. Es ist längst bekannt, daß uns aus der aristotelischen Schrift die erste Fassung des später so oft wiederholten Gottesbeweises aus den Seinstufen überliefert ist. Dieser Gottesbeweis schließt aus der Tatsache, daß alles uns hier in verschiedenen Graden der Vollkommenheit entgegentritt, auf das Vorhandensein eines absolut Vollkommenen. Als Gottesbeweis läßt sich der Gedankengang bei Platon nicht nachweisen, aber er liegt völlig in der Linie seines Denkens. Das relative Verhältnis von groß und größer setzt ein Absolutes, die Größe, voraus. Ebenso ist die relative Gleichheit, die wir an empirischen Gegenständen vorfinden, nur begreiflich als Annäherung an die Gleichheit selbst.

Gewiß läßt sich ein solcher Gedankengang wie dieser Gottesbeweis dann auf andere Systeme übertragen. So ordnet ihn Thomas von Aquin in sein aristotelisches System ein. Aber er kann das nur dank der neuplatonischen Elemente, die auch in seinen Aristotelismus wie in den mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus überhaupt eingegangen sind. Es wäre eine dankbare Aufgabe, diese neuplatonischen Überreste im Aristotelismus des Mittelalters aufzuzeigen. Dabei müßte freilich vorher die Frage geprüft werden, wieviel Aristotelisches in den Neuplatonismus von Anfang an eingegangen ist.

Bei Aristoteles begegnet uns der Gottesbeweis aus den Seinstufen später nicht mehr. Er hat auch in seinem System keinen Platz, weil er dort seine Beweiskraft verloren hat. Der Nachweis, daß es unter den Dingen der Wirklichkeit weniger vollkommene und vollkommener gibt, ist dem Aristoteles auch später nicht fremd. Die Stufenordnung des Seins, die zu den Grundlehren des Neuplatonismus gehört und die vom Materiellen zum Vegetativen, zum Sinnenbegabten und schließlich zum Vernunftbegabten führt, geht ja auf ihn zurück. Während es aber bei Aristoteles durch die Beobachtung der Natur feststeht, daß das Höhere nicht ohne die niedere Stufe sein kann, wohl aber umgekehrt,<sup>18</sup> wird im Neuplatonismus das Höhere die Bedingung des Niederen. Ist

<sup>17</sup> Aristoteles zitiert selbst in *De an.* II, 2, 403 b 19 die Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' neben dem *Timaios* als

Beleg für eine platonische Lehre. Vgl. Saffrey, *l.c.* <sup>18</sup> Cf. Allan, *l.c.*, pp. 26, 75, 93.

bei Aristoteles die höhere Stufe eine Überhöhung, aber keine Aufhebung der niederen, so erklärt sich für den Neuplatonismus die niedere Stufe als Abstieg aus der höheren. Wollte man die beiden ontologischen Überzeugungen scharf gegenüberstellen, so könnte man sagen, daß bei Aristoteles das Niedere die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Höheren ist, während umgekehrt für den Neuplatonismus das Höhere die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Niederen ist.

Wenden wir diese Feststellung auf den Gottesbeweis aus den Seinsstufen an, so kann der spätere Aristoteles unter dem Vorhandenen ein tatsächlich Höchstes und Vollkommenstes feststellen, aber er kann nicht aus Unterschieden der Vollendung auf ein absolut Vollendetes schließen, das Voraussetzung und Bedingung alles relativ Vollendeten wäre. Der Aristoteles der Metaphysik, der Schriften zur Tierkunde und der Schrift 'Über die Seele' hat für einen solchen Gottesbeweis keinen Platz.

Wenn nun Aristoteles früher diesen Gottesbeweis vertreten hatte, ja wie es scheint, ihn selbst ausgebildet hatte, so mußte damals die platonische Überzeugung, daß das Höhere zugleich Seins- und Erkenntnisgrund des Niederen ist, noch lebendige Geltung gehabt haben. Es ist immerhin möglich, daß die Formulierung des Gottesbeweises geraume Zeit vor der Niederschrift von 'Über die Philosophie' erfolgt ist. Dann hätte Aristoteles nicht bemerkt, daß sein Gottesbeweis sich nicht mehr mit seinem in der Ideenkritik erreichten Standpunkt verträgt. Wir hatten dann in diesem Gottesbeweis einen Überrest aus einer schon überwundenen Stufe der eigenen Entwicklung zu sehen.

Wenn wir diese Deutung annehmen, und dem steht nichts im Wege, dann besteht zwischen den Thesen des zweiten und einigen des dritten Buches ein Widerspruch, den Aristoteles selbst nicht bemerkt hatte und der entwicklungspsychologisch zu erklären ist. Es wäre ein Zeichen dafür, daß die bei Aristoteles sonst so auffällende Reflexion über den eigenen Standort auch ihre Grenzen hat. Denn darüber kann doch wohl kaum ein Zweifel bestehen, daß mit einer erkenntnistheoretischen und ontologischen Kritik der Ideenlehre, wie wir sie aus der Schrift 'Über die Ideen' kennen, die Grundlage dieses Gottesbeweises zerstört ist. Aristoteles zeigt ja nicht nur, daß die Annahme eines Allgemeinen über dem Einzelnen nichts für die Erkenntnis dieses Einzelnen leistet, sondern er weist auch nachdrücklich darauf hin, daß es für das Sein des Einzelnen bedeutungslos ist. Für ihn behält das Allgemeine zwar noch einen logischen Vorrang (*phōus próteron*), aber das bedeutet weder eine ontische (*χρονικός*) noch eine erkenntniställige (*πρὸς ἡμᾶς*) Vorrangstellung. Das Sein eines Höheren (*πρότον*) ist nicht mehr Seinsvoraussetzung für seine Darstellung im Einzelnen. Notwendigerweise fällt für Aristoteles zugleich der Begriff des 'An-sich' (*αὐτό*), der die platonische Idee als das Absolute im jeweiligen Bereich ähnlicher Gegenstände bezeichnete. Auf der Gültigkeit dieses 'An-sich' aber beruht die Schlussigkeit unseres Gottesbeweises. Wie die Abschattierungen der Gleichheit bei empirisch gleichen Dingen eine Gleichheit an sich voraussetzen, so haben die Grade der Vollkommenheiten im empirischen Bereich ein Vollkommenes an sich zur Voraussetzung.

Es ist schwer denkbar, daß sich Aristoteles dieser Zusammenhänge nicht bewußt geworden wäre, wenn er den Gottesbeweis im dritten Buch 'Über die Philosophie' nach der Ideenschrift niedergeschrieben hat. Die Annahme scheint mir sehr viel wahrscheinlicher, daß unsere Schrift der ausführlichen Ideenkritik in 'Über die Ideen' vorausliegt.

Unterstützt wird dieser Schluß noch durch die Beobachtung, daß Aristoteles in seinem eigenen Sprachgebrauch noch den Begriff des 'An-sich' verwendet, und zwar einmal bei seinem Verweis auf die Schrift.<sup>19</sup> Das kann aber einfach die Verwendung eines platonischen Sprachgebrauchs zur Darstellung platonischer Lehren sein. Aber in dem Bericht des Philoponus wird die vierte und fünfte Stufe in der Entwicklung des Weisheitsbegriffs dadurch umschrieben, daß die Denker sich den Körpern an sich und dem Göttlichen, Überirdischen und Unveränderlichen an sich zugewandt haben. Die Beifügung ist hier im Bericht des Philoponus völlig unnötig und stammt sicher aus seiner Vorlage, die über Aristokles auf Aristoteles zurückgeht. Und hier handelt es sich nicht mehr um einen Bericht über Platon, sondern um eine Definition der Weisheit, welche das Thema der Schrift ist.<sup>20</sup>

## VI

Damit sind wir geneigt, den zeitlichen Ansatz der Schrift ziemlich weit hinaufzurücken und, wenn wir sie nicht überhaupt in die platonische Periode des Aristoteles verlegen wollen, sie ihr doch anzunähern. Unsere sonstigen Feststellungen könnten das unterstützen.

Doch wir scheinen gerade die Nachricht zu vergessen, die Jäger und die seitherige Forschung zu der Deutung als Programmschrift und zu ihrer Datierung veranlaßt hat. Wir dürfen das Zitat Syriacus, das sich als wörtliche Entlehnung gibt, nicht übergehen. Freilich könnten wir es leicht in einer Weise deuten, daß es sich in unser bisheriges Ergebnis fügen würde.

Wären uns aus dem platonischen Parmenides nur einige Stellen der Ideenkritik bekannt ohne

<sup>19</sup> *αὐτό ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι οὐδὲν* b 19; cf. Saffrey, p. 42, n. 1.

<sup>20</sup> J, 3-7 Heide.



Angabe des Zusammenhangs und der Dialogfigur, der sie in den Mund gelegt werden, so müßten wir annehmen, daß Platon in diesem Dialog seine Ideenlehre aufgegeben hat. So könnte uns Syrian auch eine Äußerung berichten, die zwar von einer kritischen Erörterung der Ideenlehre zeugen würde, gegen die aber dann die Lehre siegreich verteidigt wird. Auf diese Weise wäre jede Schwierigkeit beseitigt. Die Zeugnisse, welche bei vorsichtiger Prüfung zweifellos auf die Schrift bezogen werden müssen, lassen häufig ihren stark platonischen Charakter ahnen. Von einigen der Gründe, die dafür anzuführen sind, wurde oben gesprochen. Deuten wir das Zeugnis Syrians, das als einziges uns Sicherheit darüber gibt, daß in der Schrift überhaupt kritische Äußerungen gegen Platon standen,<sup>11</sup> in der angegebenen Form, so tritt die Schrift neben den platonischen Parmenides als Zeugnis einer in der Akademie selbst geführten Diskussion um die Ideenlehre, aus der eine Neubüberprüfung, aber keine Ablehnung erschlossen werden darf.

Aber die eben angedeutete Interpretation der Syrianstelle scheint mir doch recht wenig wahrscheinlich. Bei unserem mangelhaften Kenntnisstand ist es doch eine reichlich gewaltsame Lösung, das eindeutige Zeugnis einer Platonkritik einem Dialoggegner in den Mund zu legen. Es wäre doch ein wenig erstaunlich, wenn das einzige wörtliche Zeugnis, das auf uns gekommen ist, nicht der Ansicht des Verfassers entspräche.

Müssen wir dann die Widersprüche zwischen einer Ideenkritik und einer noch stark platonischen Haltung, die sogar noch die Überzeugung von der Richtigkeit der Ideenlehre einschließt, bestehen lassen und auf eine Datierung der Schrift verzichten? Mir scheint, daß sich eine Lösung anbietet, welche den Widerspruch in einer sehr viel einleuchtenderen Form zu lösen vermag als der eben besprochene Versuch.

Wir wissen aus den beiden letzten Büchern der Metaphysik, daß es unter den Schülern Platons eine heftige Diskussion um die letzte Form der platonischen Ideenlehre gegeben hat. Obwohl Aristoteles für Hörer spricht, welche die gemeinten Personen kennen und mit die Lehrverschiedenheiten nach sachlichen Gesichtspunkten ordnet, können wir deutlich die Auffassung Platons, des Spensipp und des Xenokrates und anderer, zu denen Eudoxos zu gehören scheint, unterscheiden.<sup>12</sup> Platon identifiziert offenbar Ideen und Zahlen, während er den mathematischen Zahlen eine Zwischenstellung (*μεταξύ*) zwischen den empirischen Dingen und den Idealzahlen einräumt. Diese Dreiteilung verwandelten Spensipp und Xenokrates in eine Zweiteilung, indem der eine die Sonderstellung der Idealzahlen, der andere die der mathematischen Zahlen aufgab. Man spürt aus der Kritik des Aristoteles, daß ihm von diesen drei Theorien, die er stündlich ablehnt, die Platonische immer noch als die bessere erscheint. Jedenfalls aber müssen wir den Beginn dieser Gespräche über den Sinn der Idealzahlen und ihr Verhältnis zu den mathematischen Zahlen schon in die Akademie des greisen Platon verlegen. Eine Kritik an dem Zahlencharakter der Ideen aber ist es, was uns Syrian berichtet. Dürfen wir aus einer Kritik der Idealzahlen schon auf eine Kritik der Ideenlehre und ihrer Grundlagen schließen, nachdem wir wissen, daß die besondere Form der Idealzahlen auch bei denen kontrovers war, die wie Spensipp und Xenokrates die erkenntnistheoretischen und ontologischen Grundlagen der Ideenlehre bewahren wollten? Die von Syrian berichtete Stelle fügt sich zwanglos in das, was wir über den stark platonischen Charakter der Philosophie feststellten, wenn wir sie als das nehmen, was sie dem Wortlaut nach ist: eine Diskussion der Idealzahlenlehre, noch nicht aber eine Diskussion der Grundlagen der Ideenlehre.

Selbstverständlich kann diese Deutung einstweilen nur in der Form einer Vermutung ausgesprochen werden. Sie würde die Schrift in den Rahmen der spätplatonischen Akademie hineinstellen. Aristoteles hatte den platonischen Begriff der Weisheit in einer kulturgeschichtlichen Ableitung begründet, dann in der Kontroverse um die Idealzahlen Stellung bezogen und schließlich eine Kosmologie entwickelt, die platonische Gedanken weiterführt.

Bei unserer mangelnden Kenntnis über die Frühentwicklung des Aristoteles sind wir immer geneigt, Nachrichten über eine Kritik an Platon in der Weise seiner späteren Platonkritik zu verstehen. Dieser kleine Aufsatz zu Ehren eines um die Erforschung dieser Fragen hochverdienten Gelehrten wollte nur die Frage stellen, ob wir darin so sicher sein dürfen.

Ob meine Deutung der Wahrheit näher kommt, das muß sich erst entscheiden, wenn wir noch andere Argumente haben, um die Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' in die Gedankenentwicklung des Aristoteles einzuordnen. Vor allem könnte ein Vergleich der Theologie und Kosmologie mit den ältesten Teilen der Metaphysik, dem Timaios und der Epinomis vielleicht helfen. Sollte meine

<sup>11</sup> Ein zweites Zeugnis über ein Abgehen des Verfassers von der Lehre Platons kommt in der bekannten Cicerostelle *De nat. deor.* I 93 ff. 26 Rome, fr. 26 Walzer, fr. 26 Ross) gesehen werden, die sich ausdrücklich auf das dritte Buch bezieht. Wenn ich auch mit Ross u. Festugiére (*l.c.*, p. 243. n. 1) zur Ablehnung der Konjektur von Manitius neige, so läßt sich doch eine endgültige

Entscheidung über die Lesart des Textes nur aus einer Gesamtinterpretation der kosmologischen Gedanken des dritten Buches und der Auffassung des Epikureers bei Cicero treffen.

<sup>12</sup> (J. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Introduction, pp. lxxi-lxxv).



Vermutung aber nicht ganz falsch sein, dann hätte Aristoteles zunächst mit Speusipp und Xenokrates gewisse Schwierigkeiten in der Idealzahlentheorie besonders hinsichtlich ihrer Stellung zu den mathematischen Objekten gefunden. Ein Zeugnis aus dieser Zeit hätten wir in der Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'. Später wären ihm jedoch die Grundlagen der Ideenlehre vor allem aus erkenntnistheoretischen Erwägungen selbst problematisch geworden. In der Schrift 'Über die Ideen' hat er die Ideenbeweise der Akademie einer eingehenden Prüfung und Würdigung unterzogen. Nun erst hatte er die Grundlagen für seine eigene Ontologie und Metaphysik, deren Entwicklung wir aus den verschiedenen Schichten seiner Lehrschriften ablesen können.

PAUL WILPERT.

*Thomas-Institut, Köln-Lindenthal,*

## NOTICES OF BOOKS

**BRILLANT (M.) and ANDRÉ (R.) [Editors].** *Histoire des religions, III: La religion égyptienne*, by E. DRIOTON; *Les religions pré-helléniques*, by P. DEMARGNE; *Les religions de la Grèce antique*, by L. DES PLACES; *La religion romaine*, by P. FABRE. Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1935. Pp. 443. Fr. 1750.

The arrangement of subjects in this rich volume is a geographical one, and their juxtaposition a little incongruous. What binds them together is that all are written by authorities who are not only sound scholars but men to whom religion is a reality. Each of them, having to cover an indeterminate region in a restricted space, has had to sacrifice profundity to a manageable perspective. The result is in every case a vivid presentation of historical development, supported by a comprehensive bibliography.

M. Drioton's sketch of Egyptian religion as an historical process is based scrupulously on texts. He is careful always to quote contemporary documents without reading into them the applications of a later theology. As former Director of Antiquities in Cairo he has at command a full hoard of archaeological material, which he considers not only historically but also from the standpoint of personal devotion. This is rather rare. If he dwells less than is usual on the king's preeminence in his people's religion, he perhaps considers that this has been sufficiently worked over by others. He is at pains to show that during the greater part of Egyptian history the inaccessibility of daily rites to the people found partial compensation in their participation in processions and mystery plays. He rightly reads into surviving monuments the fervour of an exceptional piety, which was noted by Herodotus. In this connection the author makes considerable use of the books of maxims, which are primarily educational manuals.

In the absence of any general code, M. Drioton attempts to reconstitute the various contradictory sources of Pharaonic beliefs. He dwells on the difficulties of interpretation, noting, for instance, the important fact that the language has few abstract words, and is thus often incapable of exact translation, concrete images being used to describe the transcendence of a religion built not on dogma but (he believes) on cult. He finds a monotheism going back to the Old Empire, which is never thought to contradict the prevailing polytheism, and also a tendency to syncretism visible in the co-existence of the cosmologies of Memphis and Hermopolis. He thinks that the myth of Osiris was dramatic because of a popular origin, and reconstructs it 'with certainty' from Plutarch in spite of the latter's philosophic attitude. But he usefully analyses its elements, while omitting its great part in the rites of the king's succession. He also concentrates on the legendary and historical Osiris without connecting him either with the waters of the Nile or the rotation of the crops. But he shows his worship as emerging intact from all political vicissitudes, so that the earliest Greek travellers took it to be the national religion of Egypt.

M. Delaton's work on after-death beliefs is particularly hard in its distinction between chthonic and solar elements, traced through the Sarcophagus texts and the Book of the Dead, and the tomb-architecture of all periods, from which the dead were never entirely freed, so that Adeuton's rejection of Osiris brought them temporarily back to their graves.

Professor Demargne has nine pages in which to describe prehistoric religion. What with the multiplicity of explicit documents at his disposal, and the meagreness of space allowed, his account seems naturally less conclusive than those of his fellow-contributors, who each cover about 140 pages. Rightly placing Evans's 'Tree and

Pillar Worship' at the head of the first attempts to associate Minoan civilization with religion, and stressing the importance of archaeology in assessing its relations with Egypt and Asia, he nevertheless believes (if less exclusively than Nilsson) that we must chiefly rely on the literary survival of legends and cults of Crete as our principal mode of access, and pays little heed to her art. He sees her religion as polytheistic with subordinate male gods everywhere. Perhaps he insists too much on their ubiquity, using myths seen through Greek eyes, when Cretan art gives such an unmistakable predominance to female divinity. He sees the gods as masked men—but even so they must represent the deity. He thinks the heroisation of the Hagia Triada sarcophagus to be due to Egyptian influence rather than to the coming of the Aeludians, yet he believes that the cult of heroes passed to the Mycenaeans from the Minoan world (in spite of the rarity of Cretan scenes of human action). He ends on a note of expectancy of light from the linear B decipherment.

Even M. des Places is handicapped by having to crowd into some 140 pages the tremendous developments in Greek religion from Homer to the Christian Fathers, and so can only summarise. Yet the contents of these pages are alive, because all religion is alive to him. For his sources he draws chiefly on the poets and philosophers.

He makes the interesting suggestion that the Greeks always tended to encroach upon, or be encroached on by, their gods, the double movement producing both anthropomorphism and the pursuit of perfection. He gives Apollo an Asiatic origin only, in 'the home of the Silybi', though he sees him as the later guardian of religious law and the most Greek of all the gods. He gives him not so much two personalities as two cults.

In the section about Homer, Professor des Places is more concerned with the rites of prayer and sacrifice and burial than with relations between gods and men. Of course he emphasises the fact that the gods are not the basis of Homeric morality, but he does confess that they intervene in all psychological action. Herod's contribution to religion is the idea of justice, human and divine. The author justly dwells on the religious originality of the first Ionian thinkers. Among these he curiously omits all but the bare name of Heraclitus.

He considers that Democritus returned to favour when early Greek rationalism required an antidote, and that his ritual increased in depth and power until it inspired Plato and Aristotle with the idea of assimilation to God as the end of philosophy. Towards Orphism he shares the current sceptical attitude, concluding that none of the classical references presupposes an Orphic religion before 300 B.C.

The author's religious history is bound into unity by the growth of the conception of the soul. So mythology develops into philosophy, and considerable space is allotted to Empedocles. The assimilation to God, as an end both of Greek mysticism and Greek philosophy, oscillates throughout the classical age with the Delphic banner of Pindar's 'Seek not to become a god'.

In the long section dealing with religious philosophy of the decline, M. des Places is particularly at home, and so conveys its reality and extreme importance in the history of the West. In his eyes it became not an opponent but a natural basis of Christian dogma.

Père Fabre's wide and comprehensive survey of Roman religion shows how distant was its first relationship with Greece, and how their early contacts were more literary than religious. While stressing the importance of Etruria he shows the Roman religion as a juxtaposition of various elements rather than a true unity. In comparison with Greek richness of imagination, it betrays its poverty,

dryness and incoherence on the æsthetic plane, but leaves the sentiment of sanctity and dependence on the unseen even more strongly marked. If M. Fabre cannot follow Dumézil all the way, he shows his *modus* as recreating more widely than in the past the perspectives of Roman religion, but he believes them to be not only centres of forces but divinities which, however mysterious and unknown, possess some personal character. Preoccupied from the first with efficiency of action, the Romans were concerned with the functions of their gods rather than their precise definition. The unifying power of Rome perhaps caught the gods of the many peoples of Italy into this fabric. Vesta had a consensual force never possessed by *Flavia* (except, indeed, in *Plutis* heaven). According to Cicero, as Fabre subtly notes in this connection, all prayers began with *Janus* and ended with *Vesta*.

He gives a clear historical exposition of the indigenous deities of the Calendar, showing its inorganic character. There was a hierarchy of priests but not of gods. He stresses also the extreme importance throughout Republican times of that family religion of which so little is known.

He describes clearly the currents of mysticism and philosophy which began to invade this domestic stability with the foreign conquests. He considers that Sautic influence seduced especially the common people, because they were without access to traditional cults, or to the revolution introduced by Augustus. In assessing the value of Stoicism as a completion of the indigenous Roman faith, and the resistance to Christianity of philosophers and peasants alike, and their partial victory, M. Fabre rounds off a remarkable vision of unity.

C. R. LAYY.

PETRAZZONI (R.): *The All-Knowing God. Researches into early Religion and Culture.* Authorised translation by H. J. Rose. London: Methuen, 1936. Pp. xv + 475, with 51 illustrations fac.

In this stimulating and provocative book, Professor Petrazzoni surveys an area which embraces recent primitive cults throughout a large portion of the globe, and the religions of most of the ancient civilisations known to us, in order to consider a single divine figure which he believes to be present in each of them—the all-seeing God who is therefore all-knowing.

He seeks to show that throughout antiquity omniscience was an attribute of particular polytheistic gods (who like *Ullari* were not necessarily supreme) in opposition to Fabre and Schmidt's primeval monotheism, which he alleges to be an abstract, and therefore not a primitive conception; with attributes borrowed from theological speculation. For the primitive thinker, the author is convinced, the ideological complex: Omniscience of the Sky, or Justice of the Sun, is not the result of reasoning on transcendent deity but a concrete anthropomorphism often portrayed with a monstrous multiplicity of heads or eyes. Such omniscience is qualitative because of its visual nature, and its special object is the conduct of man.

This analysis of the primitive mind in general is reinforced by a survey of anthropological research which sweeps over all the continents from Southern Central Africa to the extreme point of South America, and in the course of which the author discovers almost everywhere a male god of the weather, the sky or the sun, who watches man's deeds: 'the omniscient chief god of polytheism'.

I think that he cannot be absolved from seeing these attributes too exclusively. He most justly observes in passing that the interpretable *Romans* which gave Latin names to barbarian divinities, did not grasp the character of deity, which makes every god unique and absolutely original; but in discovering to each religion a being with an almost identical set of characteristics, he seems to lose sight of this nuance, and so produces a certain monotony.

This is particularly noticeable in his treatment of the great prehistoric religions of Egypt and Mesopotamia. After surveying the survivals in many regions of Africa of a weather-god who is also a sky-god, he accepts the theory of a prehistoric sky-cult in Egypt, which was to survive in *Horus* the sky-god whose eyes were the sun and moon, and *Amun* as air in motion, both to be assimilated with *Ra*, and he derives this cult from the Hamites of East Africa. In Egypt, however, he encounters the sky as a goddess, and suggests that as the African giver of rain naturally lost importance in the Nile valley, 'so he gave place to a female sky' in *Nut*, 'identified with *Hathor*'. There are no speculations on the nature of such goddesses, who are unimportant to his thesis, except to bring forth the sun and *Horus*.

This is partly due to his conception of those primary stages of worship postulated in the passage from a hunting to an agricultural economy. He passes over, except for a brief reference in the epilogue, that pastoral society which was of supreme importance to the basic religions of Egypt and Mesopotamia, whose cow-goddess was in both countries the mother of gods and kings, and imagines the Mother-Goddess first in an agricultural environment, where earth is mated to the sky.

The Young Gods of these and neighbouring areas, the divinities of the crops in whose exultance the great kingdoms periodically renewed their life, are omitted from this survey, no doubt because they always remained gods of the dead; but the supreme gods who were also Father and Creator, would be more distinctly seen as the chief subject of the work if considered in relation with these.

For instance, the author rightly emphasises the fact that *Marduk*, in the Babylonian Epic of Creation, replaces the storm-god *Enlil* of the earlier version. His weapon in the cosmic battle is indeed the whirlwind. But *Marduk* retains his personality as a young God. He is called four-eyed at his birth, not because he is all-seeing, but because he is endowed with a double portion of divinity. In no work of art is he double-headed, as Professor Petrazzoni conceives him, and he appears on seals beside a really double-headed figure, the *Jannu*-like *Urmu*, who is merely an attendant of one of the supreme gods.

In fact the exclusive conception of multiplicity of eyes or heads with omniscience is by no means proven. In the iconography of the Hindus the many heads, like the many arms, of certain gods, appear to denote rather the extension of power than concern with the deeds of men. *Shiva*, whom Professor Petrazzoni derives, like others, from the (possibly) three-headed god sealed among animals on *Moksha-dara* seals, is not multiple-headed, and his third eye denotes interior vision. The three-faced carving of *Shiva Mahadeva* at *Elephanta* represents three divine persons of a trinity. *Jannu* himself looks two ways into time and space as a god of passage, and the black-white, east-west godhead of certain American tribes represents, the author says, a prevailing male-female duality. Coming to Northern Europe, he confesses that *Odin's* wisdom is the fruit of the sun of an eye, and is derived from earthly magic: 'the slipping of the darkest and most ghostly of the gods into the position of supreme deity of light and heaven'.

Nor is the supreme god invariably omniscient. The Homeric *Zeus* is not. Nor is the earlier *Yahweh* whose sight may be obscured by clouds. Nevertheless his theory finds wide confirmation.

Among the *Urites* the prayer of *Mawatalli* is noted as a striking record of the sun-god who reads the hearts of men. The political position of the sun-goddess as guardian of treaties does not appear.

The inclusion of the several-headed Thracian Rider as an all-seeing sun-god, the reconstruction of those Thracian other-world cults which seem to have held such significance for early Greece, and the suggestion of their influence on Celtic and Slavonic Europe and possible repercussions on Western Mithraism, are very significant. The author draws an analogy between *Mithras* and *Hermes* (or rather



the Thracian sun-god whom Herodotus calls Hermes) by way of the nocturnal sun as guide of souls.

In Zoroaster's thought the Persian sky-god has lost the naturalistic character noted by Herodotus, but the foundation of his knowledge is, like Varuna's, an act of vision. The Turko-Mongolians and some other tribes of Central Asia, who have enlarged their religious scope with traits drawn from Zoroaster as well as from Northern Buddhism, are thought to have influenced the non-anthropomorphic Chinese conception of Heaven, which is naturalistic and philosophical at once: 'The celestial element in T'ien is never effaced.'

In proceeding eastwards, where a Lord of Beasts is found as well as a sky-god, the author curiously omits Japanese Shinto, with its ancestral sun-goddess. Crossing the Pacific he notes, amid a great wealth of other stone-age material, some of it very beautiful, a primitive monotheism in California 'the classic land of Supreme Beings', where omnipotence is not a constant attribute. He notes the surviving influence of the cosmic dyad of ancient Mexico. Among the American hunting tribes there is sometimes an animal which creates, or helps the Creator. In this connection he quotes Kroeber on the Eskimos of Smith Sound: 'Of the two polar cosmogonic conceptions, the negative one seems to have the older and deeper roots', but because of his theory of an earliest sky-god, he does not try to relate this Lord of Beasts either with his animal-masked worshippers or with a celestial all-knowing supernumerary. His final conclusion is: 'Concretely the monotheistic idea in its completeness belongs to the history of European thought, religious, theological and philosophical, under the inspiration of Christianity and having its roots in the Old Testament.' Whether or not that conclusion is wholly valid, no quick survey can possibly suggest the richness of the material gathered on the way.

The translation is a fine achievement.

G. R. LEVY.

FRÄNKEL (H.). *Weg und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens. Literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Studien.* Ed. F. Tietze. Munich: Beck, 1935. Pp. xx + 316. DM. 24.

This volume collects together twelve articles published in various periodicals over a period of thirty years. A short introduction by the author describes some of the general themes underlying the detailed studies in the separate articles, and we are reminded that many of them served as a basis for the author's *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* published in 1931. In addition there is a bibliography of the author's publications down to 1933, and indexes of passages and words discussed. All the articles are in German, those which were originally published in English being translated, and the opportunity has been taken to introduce some revisions and additions. The contents, with the original dates of publication, are as follows:

1. Die Zeitauffassung in der frühgriechischen Literatur (1931). Unchanged.
2. *ANIMÉNES* als Kennwort für die menschliche Natur (1936). Original in English, slight changes only.
3. Eine Stileigenheit der frühgriechischen Literatur (1924). Slight changes only.
4. Das Bild des Einwanderers (1933). Original in English, slight additions.
5. Der homerische und der kallimachische Hexameter (1926). Completely re-cast.
6. Parmenidestudien (1930). Part III rewritten.
7. Zenon von Elea im Kampf gegen die Idee der Vielheit (1932). Original in English, revised throughout in detail only.
8. Heraklit über Gott und die Entstehungswelt (1938). Original in English, slight changes only.
9. Heraklit über den Begriff der Generationen (1938). Original in English, slight changes only.

10. Eine heraklitische Denkform (1938). Original in English, slight additions.

11. Besprechung eines Buches über Anaxagoras [= *La Philosophie de Anaxagoras*, by D. Cluvelier] (1950). Original in English, later part much expanded.

12. Über philologische Interpretation am Beispiel von Cäsars gallischen Krieg (1933). Unchanged.

A comparison of a number of the articles with the original publications reveals that in the vast majority of cases the changes made are very small, and affect presentation of the argument rather than its substance. In a number of cases, however, such as No. 6, the original publication is not very widely accessible and it is a great convenience to have the present collection available in a single volume. There follow a few detailed comments.

No. 5: An important discussion, newly presented without change of thesis. No. 6: Part III is concerned with the interpretation of the difficult and important fr. 16 of Parmenides, which probably contains an account of what we would call Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge. In his earlier discussion Fränkel took the fragment as covering both sense-perception and knowledge of Being. His interpretation was discussed, among others, by Venturius in his *Parmenides, some Comments on his Poem*, 1922, by Van Fritz in *C.P.* xl (1945) 239, and Vlastos in *T.A.P.A.* lxvii (1946) 67. Fränkel now accepts the readings *Idioter* and *epistē* in line 1 of the fragment and restates his interpretation in the light of these changes. Nos. 8-10: Revision completed before the publication of G. S. Kirk, *Heraklitus, the Cosmic Fragments*, in 1954. No. 11: Not merely a review, but an independent contribution to the study of Anaxagoras. Fränkel claims that Anax. had a more important part to play than is usually recognised in the system of Anaxagoras. Fr. 4 should be read as three separate fragments, of which the first does not imply a plurality of worlds, but only a single postulated world or matter where it might be. This has the advantage of making the fragment accord with the doxographic tradition, but seems ingenious rather than convincing.

G. R. KERFOOT.

THOMSON (G.). *Studies in Ancient Greek Society.* Vol. II, *The First Philosophers.* London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1935. Pp. 367, with 10 maps. 97s. 6d.

The second volume of the author's *Studies in Ancient Greek Society* claims to deal with the growth of slavery and the origin of science. In fact, comparatively little is said about slavery. A systematic study of it is said to be 'a task for collective research', for 'it becomes increasingly clear that such a study will never be undertaken by bourgeois scholars, whose acquiescence in colonial oppression renders them incapable of understanding the degradation either of the slave or still more of the slave-owner' (p. 7). The few pages which the author feels able to devote to the subject, uncollectivised, are not without interest, but do not show what new direction the eventual collective research would take. The other main declared topic is treated at greater length; here Thomson seeks to illustrate the thesis that 'early Greek philosophy expresses the outlook of a class engaged in the exchange of commodities' (p. 338). In this form, the thesis is ludicrous. The author has, nevertheless, some quite interesting things to say (or to quote from the Communist philosophers) on the difference between the primitive outlook and the outlook of men living in a developed social environment. The treatment of individual Pre-socratic thinkers—the Milesians, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Parmenides—is quite inadequate and reveals that the author is unfamiliar with many of the main difficulties of interpretation. Much of the book, however, is concerned with other things than the stated main topics, to which their relevance is not immediately, or sometimes even ultimately, apparent. The second chapter, on tribal

cosmology, repeats parts of previous books by Thomson. The following chapter, on China, is a complete red herring and is surprisingly devoid of information. Chapter IV on near eastern mythology and cosmology, is far more competently done, as is that on Greek theogonies, partly because the author has read Cornford—for whose early book, *From Religion to Philosophy*, great admiration is expressed. The chapter on the calendar contains many facts, but seems to have slipped in by error—although it does lead on to the subject of priest-kings, one of Thomson's favourites. Of Herakleitos it is said that 'he was himself by right of birth a priest-king'. That is why he wrote in a hieratic style' (p. 153). (Thomson thinks that any nonhierarchical style—and Herakleitos' was not particularly so—in hieratic.) It would appear to be relevant here that Herakleitos was so uninterested in being a 'priest-king' (to adopt Thomson's exaggerated interpretation) that he let his younger brother occupy this somewhat derelict office. It is not surprising to find that Thales and Anaximander, too, 'also belonged to an ancient family of priest-kings' (p. 137). This conclusion is stated quite baldly after a series of really startling conjectures by the author. Indeed, what gives the book one of its most peculiar flavours is the manner in which a faint initial possibility is repeatedly made the basis of another and so on, until some monstrously improbable conclusion is reached—a conclusion which is then stated as truth ingenuously, and indeed so stylishly, that one is almost tempted to believe it. All this, if accepted in the right spirit, is certainly not uninteresting, especially since the author's knowledge, while not deep at every point, is undoubtedly wide. In general, though, this book has fewer merits than its predecessor. Since Professor Thomson is evidently determined that it shall have a successor, too, might one hope that this will be far more closely argued, and less repetitious, than what has gone before?

G. S. KIRE.

HERINGTON (C. J.). *Athena Parthenos and Athena Pallas. A Study in the Religion of Periclean Athens*. Manchester: University Press, 1955. Pp. vi + 70, with 1 plan. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Herington asks two questions: why was Phidias commissioned to build the gold and ivory Athena Parthenos? And what did she mean to the Athenian citizens who saw her inaugurated in 438 B.C.? His questions are primarily concerned with religion, or religious feeling—that is to say, religious feeling in Athens in the time of Pericles, and particularly in that especially enlightened circle of Athenians of which he was the centre and the inspiration; but he also records Plutarch's story that one reason for the building was to keep craftsmen employed: I wonder what he thinks all these artists and craftsmen were doing in Athens before 447? Before he tackles his main problem, however, he endeavours to clear away certain difficulties which beset us, two especially—that of the two temples of Athena, the Erechtheion and the Parthenon, and their predecessors, and the purpose of the latter which seems to have had no distinct end of its own. In the course of three very sensibly and clearly written chapters he discusses the problem of the 'Dionysian' temple, which was well worth doing though his solution ('the old temple'—'the temple with the old statue'—the Erechtheion, a not novel, the name *Hekatompedon* ('the east cella of the Parthenon'), a more dubious conclusion: see, e.g., Plummer in *JHS* lxxxi, 1952, 153), and the predecessors of the Parthenon on its present site. In this last he follows Dinsmore unquestioningly, though many of Dinsmore's arguments are weak. He goes further and suggests that from Mycenaean times there had been a shrine with a cult of a maiden-warrior goddess on the Parthenon site, side by side with that of the unmarred, peaceful Polias at the northern site: for this, however, there is no evidence on the site, nor any I believe for an

armed goddess in Mycenaean times; and the only argument Herington can find to support it—the armed Athena on Panathenaic amphorae which 'it is generally agreed', is a continuance of a statue, which may have stood in the (mainly conjectural) 'first' Parthenon of 566 B.C.—is considerably weakened by the fact that the Panathenaia was, despite the Parthenon frieze, connected with the temple with the old statue and the statue near it, not with the Parthenon, as Herington has pointed out, and as well because most of the argument for identifying 'the old temple' with that on the northern site would, if this hypothesis were correct, disappear.

The second part, chs. 5-7, which for the author is the more important, embodying his conclusions, is disappointing. His general conclusion, on the meaning of the Parthenon and its statue to Phidias' contemporaries, is sound enough: the exalting of the goddess, with the best thought in religion of which the Greeks were capable, and therewith of Athens; but surely this has often been said before, from ancient times to the present day, sometimes eloquently, sometimes in cliché? What is the object of such sage remarks as that the sculptures of the Parthenon have more in them than 'story-telling and visual beauty'. . . . They contribute . . . to the expression of the highest in Periclean religion. In the same way a fifth-century tragedy offered something more than an absorbing plot and splendid lyrics? But, besides this, Herington misses a good deal, because, in the naive modern way, he oversimplifies: Aeschylus could exalt Athens and Athens, but he does not exactly leave out Zeus; nor did Phidias, and the reason was not that he could not help himself and the presence of Zeus was due only to the need to put Athena near him. The metopes were not concerned with Athenian, but with Greek myth (they recast, all of them, at Olympia); the battle of Lapiths and centaurs may hint at the war against the Persians, but this too was a Greek, not an Athenian achievement; of course, too, all these stories illustrated the fate of *hētrōs*, but this is not even exclusively Greek, but human (in Greek eyes). In this connection it might have been noticed that Greek representation of the battle of civilisation (themselves) against barbarism (their enemies) was seldom one of victory, but of the struggle. The Athenians looked upon Athena as their special protectress; but that does not mean that for them 'Athena was Athens'—they were not surprised to find that she was worshipped as a principal goddess in many other cities (as *Polias* or *Poleocheia*, e.g. in Thebes, Troizen, Sparta and Chios). Poseidon also is not absent from the Parthenon, any more than he is from the verse of Aristophanes, though Herington gives no hint of this in his quotation of *Knights*, 581 B. Lastly, he seems to think it significant of the Greek attitude towards art, at least an art which represents the gods, that in Euripides' *Iph* (190 ff.) from the women who wonder at the sculpture at Delphi 'we do not hear so much as a *kalos*' meaning ('who is that figure?') and religious feeling were everything. He might, however, have noted Aristophanes (*Peace*, 115-18) and Plato (e.g. *Allegory*, 91D). And when he says that the significance of the Parthenon statue unlike Phidias' Zeus' died with the generation that created it, with the dissolution of the empire, he should have remembered, at least, Demosthenes.

A. W. GUMME.

GOULD JONES. *The Development of Plato's Ethics*. Cambridge: University Press, 1955. Pp. xiii + 241. 25s.

The author's introduction makes clear the scope and purpose of his work. He thinks that too little attention has been given to Plato's ethical development—that study of the *Republic*, in particular, has been too much occupied with other matters, and that concern with the dialectical method of the later dialogues has led to neglect of the *Lysis*. His attempt to redress the balance is embodied in an able and interesting essay.



The arrangement of the book is effective. The first section, which examines Plato's inheritance from Socrates of a 'technique' of individual moral judgment and behaviour, is followed directly by a study of the *Lysis* as exhibiting, at the far end of Plato's developed thought, 'a joint pursuit of the good' systematised by every method of social teaching and enactment. The third part, entitled 'The Growth of a Reality Principle', traces the intervening stages by which Plato was led to revise his early belief in the innate powers of the individual to decide moral issues, and arrived at a 'final mood of resignation' (p. 71) in which the pressure of *daiōn*, physical and moral, is fully recognised.

In the early chapters considerable study is made of the significance, in earlier tradition, of certain words characteristic of the Socratic dialogues. Thus the Homeric meaning of *ἐπιστήμη*, 'know-how to . . .', is stressed to bring out the continuing application at *ἐπιστήμη*, along with *τέχνη*, to ability for action rather than to static awareness of fact. This interest in the bearings of Plato's choice of terms is pursued, indeed, throughout the book and contributes largely to its value. Much stress is laid upon the implications of *ἀπορία*, as carrying to the verge of philosophic validity the belief in an instinctive ability to choose and act aright. It is with the treatment of the *Republic* that Mr. Gould's specialised line of interest becomes most clearly marked, and his application of it most questionable. He very rightly insists that the central purpose of the dialogue is ethical, and the individual, not the state, its main concern. But when he comes to offer an exclusively ethical interpretation of the central parables of the Sun, the Line and the Cave, most readers will find it hard to agree that here the problems of moral behaviour are Plato's own main concern. In this passage the sun, we are told, is a 'symbol' leading to apprehension of the Good; any idea of 'an exact metaphysical status' for the Good is deprecated, and its position as 'the supreme Idea in the moral field' (p. 128, a phrase quoted from Cornford) is alone recognised. The four states of mind indicated by the Line, and again by the Cave and the Sun illustration, are here distinguished as 'moral attitudes'. Thus, *εὐδαιμονία* represents 'a quite unconscious reaction to "moral" problems'; *δύναμις*, 'a morality which co-ordinates actions in the physical world . . . but without reference to any absolute standard'; *διάνοια*, 'an understanding of . . . unrelated moral Forms'; *νόησις*, 'comprehension of the whole of moral reality' (pp. 177-9). This is ingenious and suggestive as a partial interpretation of an infinitely suggestive passage; and the incidental reference to 'ethical *διάνοια*, like mathematics' as limited in scope (p. 179) implies recognition of other aspects of Plato's scheme of dialectical progress. The doubt is how far, at this stage of his thought, Plato himself would have allowed examination of moral problems to be detached from that discipline in abstract thought, and that accompanying approach to 'vision' of ultimate truth, which are here offered as the rightful and necessary training and experience for the highest faculty of the integrated soul.

In the later books of the *Republic* 'disintegration' is found spreading in the moral personality, and recognition of the cramping force of *daiōn* leads us to its full analysis in the *Timaeus*, which our author is inclined to agree with Mr. G. E. L. Owen in placing early among the later dialogues. The growth of 'pessimistic realism' (p. 218) is traced through the *Politicus* and *Philebus*; and thus we arrive at the position already studied in the section devoted to the *Lysis*. Here every kind of social and political support—education, propaganda, restraint—is found necessary to compensate the limitations of the human individual in his struggle with the thwarting forces of 'reality'. This analysis and exposition of the *Lysis* is a particularly valuable part of a book which as a whole makes a noteworthy contribution to Platonic studies.

D. TARRANT,

Lodge (R. C.). *The Philosophy of Plato*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956. Pp. ix + 347. 28s.

This is a strange book in a strange idiom, dominated by the belief—alleged also to be Plato's—on the strength of the *Seventh Letter*—that philosophy 'is not a matter of objective content at all'. Hence Plato's philosophy has to be 'directly experienced like poetry or music', and the interpretation of it is 'an art not a science', the purpose of which is to enable the student to 'merge his personality with Plato's'. Strings of references are provided, but clearly we are forewarned that the control of the exposition by the actual text of the dialogues is by no means rigid; it is more important to 'stimulate' us to 'piece out' with our intuitions the imperfections not only of Plato but of every writer whom we study; for that is how Plato treated his own predecessors. Lodge has been so much impressed by the disagreements between commentators that he seems from the start to despair of finding any objective validity either in his own account or anyone else's. Even the most erudite interpreters of Plato, we are told, usually produce nothing more than a 'full-length self-portrait'. The situation is not really so hopeless as this; and Lodge seems to resign himself to it too easily. At any rate these are ominous words with which he approaches his subject.

The book consists at first sight of a series of four excursions into Plato's treatment of ethics, aesthetics, religion, and education. The different sections, however, do not confine themselves to their ostensible subjects; they overlap considerably; and the discussion of the four themes is very general. Under aesthetics, for example, there is no account of mimesis or of the form of beauty, but a good deal about education and the ideal social life as 'the final art-product'. This illustrates the author's sociological point of view. His favourite word is 'holosocial', and for the most part he is interested in Plato's incorporation of 'non-logical' Hellenic traditions and the demands of human 'nature' into his meditations on the model community, rather than in Plato's critical attitude towards those 'Hellenic traditions and faiths', and in the fundamental principles inspiring that attitude. There is no reason why a sociologist should dissolve Plato's ethics, education, and the rest into a collection of pragmatic considerations, or insist that Plato's treatment of every question is dominated by 'the spirit of model citizenship' and the requirements of the group. But this is what Lodge inclines to do in numerous matters of detail. For example, the lawgiver, whose 'art' Plato praises as rational and, therefore, natural, is represented as the 'political administrator' whose equipment is that of 'a trained scientist'. Similarly *Lysis* 746-7 on standard measures and the numerical division of the citizens is thought to mean that 'there is nothing quite as useful as statistical methods' and to sanction 'the application of mathematics to social problems'. It is no criticism of the statistical procedures of descriptive sociology to point out that they have no connection with the passage in question.

This kind of interpretation is unlikely to bring out clearly the distinctive features of Plato's thought. There can be no objection to Lodge's making what he can of Plato from his own point of view; the surprising thing is that he makes so little of him in spite of an apparently sympathetic attitude. Thus the theory of ideas is admitted to be 'of central importance'; but for Lodge its moral seems to be merely that we should think in general terms (though the modern biologist, he holds, no longer does so) and in particular seek as far as possible for universally applicable solutions to particular problems. The supremacy of the idea of good means for him simply that in each case the solution should be the best conceivable. There is no need to go to Plato to learn such commonplace matter. We have not here one of those resounding differences of interpretation which seem to Lodge to excuse so much subjectivism and relativism. The interpretation may be true so far as it goes; but it does not go very far.



The same criticism applies in general to the standpoint of the Marburg school of interpretation to which Lodge declares his adherence in an appendix, thus belatedly explaining why the theory of ideas receives so little prominence in his exposition, as is natural enough if the 'transcendental ideas' have no 'actuality' and are nothing but 'regulative' concepts of interest only for methodology. It is regrettable that Lodge seems unacquainted with Rosa's *Plato's Theory of Ideas* and his considered verdict on the negative aspects of the Marburg interpretation (p. 286): 'this view will not survive examination'. Among Lodge's authorities the name of Cornford too fails to appear. Cornford has well stated the importance of the theory of ideas even for those who cannot accept it in detail or as expressed by Plato: it involves 'the conviction that the differences between good and evil . . . are absolute not "relative" to the customs or tastes or desires of individual men or social groups' (*The Republic of Plato*, p. 176). Such essential principles ought not to be absent from what purports to be an account of Plato's philosophy; they would have provided a perhaps instructive contrast to an undue preoccupation with the 'group' and its 'conventions'.

Each section contains a chapter on Plato's predecessors. Their views are generally culled from the dialogues, for Plato's 'idea' of historic facts and personages is 'poetic truth' and therefore more 'true' than any historic truth could be. (It is imagined that Aristotle supports this attitude.) Frequently, however, there is a shift of ground; it was not in the dialogues that Lodge found such questionable views as that the Ionians were 'actual scientists' or that Heraclitus is their typical representative and made for 'the universal substratum' and believed in 'a cyclical process of history'. The treatment is not only sketchy but frequently rather careless. 'Scientism' of the factual type known as 'Ionian', including men like Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Xenophanes is perhaps a fair quotation. 'Xenophanes' is no doubt a mistake for someone else, just as 'Thucydides' in a list of 'national heroes' seems to be deputising for Themistocles. There is a curious translation of the well-known line of Solon: 'May I continue to grow old', etc. Some instances of playfulness will not be to every taste: Zeno 'had a lovely time poking good clean fun at' Pythagorean mathematics; and the untractable person whom *Lysis* goes to liquidate are called 'failed Ph.D.'s.

These predecessors include Socrates, who usually stands for Plato's 'idea of Socrates', a 'ghumoxized' version of the original. This Socrates had very positive beliefs, and is represented by Plato as 'knowing more than his fellows'. Indeed, the *Republic* was written for the purpose of 'drawing out the implications' of Socrates' thoughts. But here and there another 'Socrates' crops up, one who was essentially a 'rebel', and whose beliefs, if the implications of his position be drawn out, lead to 'zero'. Lodge does not try to reconcile the two pictures. The difference between *Rep.* as 'Socratic' and *Lysis* as 'Platonic' is much exaggerated. Socrates rejected hedonism, Plato accepts 'the homosexual pleasures'. Socrates was an uncompromising 'pure logician' with his home in the transcendental realm; he was 'trained in the Elvatic school'. Plato was more practical, more disposed to allow for habit and social customs ('biologically patterned reaction-tendencies'). At a later stage the author recognises something of the part assigned to right opinion and habit in *Rep.*; and even adds that Plato (in *Lysis*) shows symptoms of having been 'influenced' by Socrates (of *Rep.*). He does not notice, however, that *Lysis* is just as critical as *Rep.* of the 'institutional myths', or that the 'Socratic' equation of virtue with knowledge, and its corollary that no one errs voluntarily, persist in the later dialogue. The statement that there is 'no paradise for guardians' in *Lysis* contains a *suggestio falsi*: no paradise is provided for them in *Rep.* either.

The chapter on Plato and Modern Philosophy dwells on Plato's lack of contemporary flavour; the historical

point of view is absent from his writings; the advance of science has left him far behind; and his 'small-town stuff' has little relevance to modern large-scale communities. If Lodge be taken literally, he equates 'science' with 'control of the empirical environment'; yet this 'science', so inadequately conceived, has 'won its victory over' poetry, literature, the arts, religion, theology, and philosophy. Contemporary fashions of feeling or behaving are not 'modern philosophy', but it is the former, or rather his gloomy picture of them, which Lodge allows to sit in judgment on Plato. It would be 'quite a mistake to spend much time on Plato's theology' because such matters as the existence of gods, providence, immortality, have 'little, if any, contemporary significance' (whatever that may mean). The *Theaetetus* on the problem of knowledge may be left unread because it does not 'strike a responsive chord in the modern reader's mind'. As to the sphere of 'value', morality and religion have now been 'socialised and mechanised' and 'who would have it otherwise?' In sum, this is a confusing and confused work which it is impossible to recommend.

J. TATE

LOQUIX (R.) *L'être et la forme selon Platon. Essai sur la dialectique platonicienne.* (Museum Lessianum, Section Philosophique No. 99.) Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955. Pp. 227. Fr. fl. 145.

This work was inspired, the author tells us, by E. Gilson's pronouncement (in *L'être et l'essence*) that Plato is an 'essentialist' and indifferent to problems of 'existentiality'. The attempt here made to prove that for Plato the Forms have real existence, from their first appearance to their last. Their first appearance is noted at *Phaedo* 102B, earlier suggestions of the theory, and the influence of earlier thought, being for the most part ignored; the doctrine of *dianoia* imports the belief in perfect and absolute types of being. The variety of Forms postulated in the *Phaedo* receives less attention than does the repeated use of *eidos* and *forma* of *eidos* in describing their nature. The *Symposium* is found to add the concept of a supreme Form as object of knowledge and (from the use of the epithet *telos*) of devotion. The *Republic* postulates a Form of Good, which is here practically identified with the *summum bonum* of the *Symposium*, and, by the analogy of the Sun, provides a proof of the existence of this highest being. The fact of its supremacy mediates dignity to all the other Forms. So far, the author has been following the development of a 'dialectique ascendante', which at the end of *Republic* VI Plato describes and contrasts with the 'dialectique descendante' that is its complement. This latter method is again found prescribed at *Phaedrus* 264D-E, and its development is now traced through the later dialogues. The main problems here are 'participation' and the interrelation of Forms. Detailed study of language in the earlier parts of the *Parmenides* leads to re-emphasis upon their existence. The question 'Of what are these Forms?' is answered in part by the statement (p. 129) that Plato has tended from the first to privileger certains Formes au dépens des autres. Such are the Beautiful, the Good and the Just. Socrates' doubts about Forms of the trivial or disgusting are not further dealt with, nor does Dr. Loquix anywhere face the problem of the real existence of Forms corresponding to sensory or relative predications.

Through the course of the later dialogues the classification of the system of Forms is found to be the main purpose. The *kosmos* of the *Theaetetus* are recognised as means to relationship between sense and intelligence; their bearing on the earlier postulate of Forms of like and unlike, etc., is not considered. References to a certain 'hardening' of Plato's system, and to the use of the term *genos* in reference to Forms (p. 126 et al.), may suggest some misgiving as to Plato's continuing belief in their absolute existence. But in the *Timaeus* the theory comes fully into its own, with emphasis again upon the characteristic terms *de*, *eidos*

and the like. Here, the Forms are *logoi* analogous to the first principles of early thinkers. The *symposiaca* is dismissed as a *deus ex machina* part of the mythical setting of the cosmology. The new element is the *kosmos*, space, providing the means of participation between Forms and things. In *Lysis* X a similar theory is found clothed in theological terms.

There is here much that is valuable and suggestive. But the hypothesis of Plato's consistent belief in the real existence of every one of the Forms postulated in the *Phaedo* or the *Republic* is difficult to entertain in the light of the logical analysis found in the later dialogues. And the problem of 'participation', though repeatedly alluded to, is not really faced by the author with reference either to the *enipnusia* theory of *Phaedo* 100d ff. or to the *anagigmenon* metaphor found earlier in the same work (74b ff.) and recurring throughout the course of the dialogues. The theory here propounded, of a project consistently carried through in amplification of a conception firmly held throughout Plato's philosophic career, fails to recognise adequately either the element of growth and change in his thinking or the poetic and metaphorical elements in its expression.

D. TARRANT.

VANHOUTTE (M.). *La Philosophie Politique de Platon dans les 'Lois'*. Louvain Publications Universitaires, 1934. Pp. ix + 366. Fr.B. 195.

The *Laws* has received more attention in our generation than for a century before, and this interest has gone beyond technical issues. Perhaps interest in it has been aroused by the claims of modern 'totalitarianism' to permeate society; perhaps also despair at the cracking of idealistic constructions has led to a renewed interest in politics considered as the art of the possible in the reconstruction of society. Of course the *Laws* is the easiest of targets for the kind of attack made upon it by Dr N. R. Popper; but the prevailing tendency of continental scholars like M. Vanhoutte is to look for the positive value of the dialogue and to find in it significant advances in Plato's political thought. It is unfortunate that the *Laws* has come to be regarded only as a *deletoioc stoicheion* on the strength of a short passage in Book IX (873c 499). This simply ignores the novelty and importance of the assigning of a new rank to *nomos* as *nomos tou theou* (IV 713a). It is a pity that M. Vanhoutte only skirts round this crucial definition, though he discusses its context fully and shows how law succeeds to the function of the *daimon* in the age of Kronos. However, he atones for this omission in his full treatment of Book X and of 897b in particular. Here soul's right direction of all things when it has 'taken to itself god-like intelligence' is shown to be the ultimate secret of legislation, which has a divine and cosmic function. 'La législation platonicienne présente des dimensions cosmiques.' This careful linking of God the *dyoteros deos* in Book X with the God who is *tertios deos* in Book IV is one of the notable features of M. Vanhoutte's book. Alongside it one may place the constant references to *Politeia*, *Timaios* and *Philebos*—he evidently places *Timaios* relatively 'late'. Some of these parallels may be built rather too much into a system—there is too great faith, perhaps, in Kucharski's work. But when all allowances are made (for instance, for an ever-ready approximation of Kronos in *Lysis* IV to Kronos in *Politeia*), it remains significant that such close attachment to the other later dialogues can be found by penetrating only a little below the surface of the *Laws*. It remains for others to show links between the *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics* and the clear anticipations of the Stoic *lex naturae*.

\* Vanhoutte reads *mia me apokateleuthen tes theou dyoteros deos* (fr. 1095). *dyoteros deos* seems to me a more lively translation (cf. *dyoteros theos* Tim. 37b7) if we accept the *dyoteros* termination from A<sup>1</sup> and O<sup>1</sup>; the MSS. give *tes theou dyoteros deos*.

A work as long as this and bearing this title might have been expected to look forward as well as backward, but M. Vanhoutte is mainly content to interpret Plato by Plato.

It must, however, be confessed that the length and repetitiveness of this book tend to tire the reader much as the dialogue itself does. But it is a book that improves as it goes along. The third section, briefly commented on already, is clearer and more convincing than the second; and this is more convincing than the first, which gropes toward uncertain conclusions from a study of the evidence of the incompleteness of the *Laws* and a consideration of its formal dramatic construction as a dialogue. Vanhoutte notices the radical criticism of G. Müller, but only to dissent from it. He minimises the *deipnosophontes* of Philip of Opus and asserts that there is certain reference to the *Laws* in the *Philip* of Isocrates, published in the autumn of 336. He accepts, however, the testimony of Suidas that it was Philip (and so not an Alexandrian) who divided the *Laws* into twelve books. M. Vanhoutte then attempts to fit the significant number twelve to the dramatic situation, the stages in the walk of the three old gentlemen to the Cave of Zeus. He provides them with a *deipnion* like that of Phaedrus and Socrates and can tell us when they rise from it. This helps him to account for the remark of the Athenian at the end of Book IV that they have been talking since morning and now it is noon. For two pages in which he constantly mis-spells *dyoteros* he argues that noon could refer to an hour before noon and that at the summer solstice this 'hour' would begin at 10.45 a.m. It would be simpler to argue that as they were three old gentlemen they did not make too early a start. After this rather disappointing beginning M. Vanhoutte catalogues the internal inconsistencies of the dialogue and examines the reasons why legislation cannot cover every aspect of life at once: Plato's work therefore had to be tentative, quite apart from its accidental incompleteness at the time of his death. The conflict of rationality with the irrational factors of life is duly recognised in the *Laws*. M. Vanhoutte makes rather heavy weather of this; but it is evident—even to those of us who have not read M. Carnus on *Le Mythe de Sisyphos* and M. Merlan-Ponty on *Sen et non-Sen*—that the *Laws* shows an awareness of political realities found in the *Republic* only in Books VIII and IX, save for the defiant acknowledgment of them in the earlier part of Book VI.

The second part of M. Vanhoutte's work is probably the one that will be of the greatest immediate interest to English-speaking readers. This examines imitative art as described in *Lysis* II and seeks to draw wider inferences, especially to legislation itself as a work of artistic imitation. The distinction between true and false art is related to the contrast of *elementos* and *ekdosmos* and to the distinction in the *Politeia* between the doctor who writes a prescription (the true legislator, nevertheless engaged in a sense on a work of imitation) and the layman who blindly copies such a prescription (the contemporary Greek legislator). All this is suggestive, but one is not so convinced when the model-copy relation is discussed and M. Vanhoutte quotes approvingly a sentence of Schaefer's: 'En un mot, toute réalité n'est le bien-être imitative, d'une autre réalité, et, en ce sens, futile, vaine, illusoire; inversement, toute réalité, sauf le Non-être pur, est modèle d'une autre réalité, et, en ce sens, sérieuse, importante, nécessaire.' It is indeed true that *apodidesthai* has a new sense attached to it at *Politeia* 278c 499, which at least supports the second part of the sentence quoted; but the reviewer does not see how this new use of *apodidesthai* within Dialectic affects the doctrine that all *tychē* is imitation of a *tychēdemon* which is not *in pari materia*. Moreover, the consideration of *offense* and of *injury* (*tois si tois onoma* *on tois onoma*) which are to guide the *epistēmōn* *epistēmōn* *epistēmōn* imply indeed a moral and mathematical aesthetic on the part of the *epistēmōn* himself and a power to transcend sensory imitation; but it is not so clear that they imply a conscious power of this kind in the poet or artist criticised.



One must therefore accept this very interesting discussion with some caution, though with the hope that it will be pursued further.

The book also contains long passages of summarising: these are clear enough, but read like a protracted introduction to a Bude edition. Some of these could have been spared and the more fruitful themes could have been developed—and the book might still have been a hundred pages shorter. Nevertheless it is a real and important contribution to Platonic studies.

J. D. SKEAN.

Black (R. S.). *Plato's Phaedo*. A translation with introduction, notes and appendices. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955. Pp. x + 208. 21s.

The chief value of this useful book naturally lies in the running commentary (oddly unmentioned in the subtitle), together with the notes and appendices. The translation, which (with a few minor deviations, notably at 71d, where Black accepts Lacc's defence of the vulgar) follows Burnet's annotated edition of 1911, is a necessary adjunct, and serves its purpose well, although there are a few slips, e.g. at 401c, 71d3, 80b1, 109a2-4, 111d6-7. Two main innovations are claimed for the interpretation. One is a defence of the final argument for immortality: it turns chiefly upon the point that *psyche* is a contradictory of *physis*, which therefore cannot admit it (as other things do) and so perish, but can only withdraw. This indeed seems obvious; but I cannot find that any other commentator has noted it explicitly. The other consists in a new approach to the passage 99d-101c. Black contends that the *logoi* are not propositions but the Socratic definitions out of which Plato developed his own theory of Forms—the essential difference being that the former are mere concepts whereas the latter are not—and the *mathemata*, just mentioned as such, are provisional notions of *logoi*-users, which (in so far as they are correct) correspond to objective realities. This is quite likely, though the change from *logoi* to *mathemata* is not necessarily significant; it might be due simply to the intervention of *epistēmē* (at 100a-b) Plato is never rigid in his terminology. Still, the view is attractive, and certainly better than forcing a reference to propositional reasoning, which is not even relevant. If the rest of the interpretation is not strikingly original it is sensitive, thoughtful and scrupulous. Black knows his author well and faces difficulties squarely, so that his solutions, even when questionable, nearly always help towards a better comprehension. At the same time he corrects a number of heavy or partial judgments; in particular he reminds us that the Forms are *not* mere universals; their primary purpose is ethical and teleological. All Platonists will read this book with profit.

HELEN TREDENNICK.

Plato. *Phaedo*. Translated with introduction and commentary by R. HACKFORTH. Cambridge: University Press, 1955. Pp. vii + 200. 21s.

Plato's *Phaedrus*. Translated with introduction and commentary by R. HACKFORTH. Cambridge University Press, 1952. Pp. 172. 18s.

In both these welcome contributions to Platonic scholarship Professor Hackforth follows, with small modifications, the pattern familiar to us from Cornford's commentaries on Plato and his own on the *Philbus*. He takes as his text Burnet's text, explaining in valuable footnotes his occasional preference for a different reading, and translates the dialogue section by section with brief summary and commentary. Where questions like the purpose and date of composition of the dialogue lie beyond the introduction, where also he discusses such problems as the authorship of the speech attributed to the *Phaedrus* or Lyais and the interrelation of the arguments for immortality in the *Phaedo*, the author is a short appendix to the latter a translation of some of

Strato's criticisms preserved in the commentary of Olympiodorus. This is a method which suits very well Professor Hackforth's main interests, the development of the arguments, the influences which helped to shape Plato's thought and the interpretation of the dialogues as works of art. Such questions are handled with admirable economy and judgment and a nice appreciation of work done by others.

The main purpose of both dialogues he finds in the development of Socrates' teaching that 'the true tendency of the soul' is the pursuit of philosophy. In the *Phaedo* this is presented as a 'training for death' which leads on directly to the theory of Forms and the attempts to prove the immortality of the soul. His chief problem here is to distinguish the Socratic and the Platonic elements of thought, and he is particularly successful, as it seems to me, in his treatment of the difficult autobiographical passage. In the *Phaedrus*, he believes, Plato vindicates the claim of philosophy by contrasting it with the false claims of contemporary rhetoric, and to this, the main purpose, are subordinated more subtly two others, to make proposals for a reformed rhetoric, which shall serve the ends of philosophy and adopt its methods, and to present one special method, the method of *dialektikē*, exemplified positively and negatively in the contrasted speeches. This attempt to defend the organic unity of the *Phaedrus* is convincingly supported in the detail of the commentary.

Professor Hackforth accepts the ten traditional findings of stylometry in placing the *Phaedo* towards the end of the large group of dialogues which precede the *Republic*, and gives reasons for believing that it may also have preceded the *Symposium*. He suggests tentatively that it was written in the interval—if the implication of the story told by Diogenes Laertius are to be trusted, quite a short interval—between Plato's return from his first visit to the West and the founding of the Academy. He agrees with von Arnim in believing that it can be shown that the *Phaedrus* was written after the *Republic*, but finds no evidence to enable us to place it before or after the other two dialogues of the Middle Group, the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*. He seems to be right in suggesting that Reber's attempts to link the dialogue closely to the *Theaetetus* do not amount to very much. Since, however, if it could be shown that the *Phaedrus* came after these dialogues, this would have momentous consequences for the interpretation of Plato's later thought especially about Forms, we must regret that Professor Hackforth has not attempted a full-scale attack on this question. In any case it would have been interesting to have had some analysis of the problems latent in Plato's treatment of Forms in the *Phaedrus*, where they are at once presented as transcendental objects of contemplation and related as species and genera, and a comparison of Platonic dialectic in the *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Philbus* and indeed in the *Timaeus*. It is unfortunate that Owen's provocative article on the date of the *Timaeus* was published too late to be taken into account (CQ, 1953).

The translation is clear and scholarly and succeeds in representing changes of mood in the dialogues. It is perhaps a pity that Professor Hackforth has retained the convention of translating more or less literally the short exchanges between Socrates and his interlocutors, which rarely sound natural in English. The difficulty of translating the verb *elen* is particularly apparent in the *Phaedo*, where it seems to me that the translation of phrases like *τίς τίς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸν* as 'the reality of this or that', and *ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχή ἐστι διλογεῖται* as 'the soul can question and answer itself' (28d1-2) is that very realisation of whose existence (I think) we give an account when we question and answer each other, might mislead a reader into thinking that dialectic was largely given up to metaphysical speculation. In both passages Plato seems to me to be thinking of Forms as (a) real, (b) the objects of definition. Burnet compares, rightly I think, *Republic* VII 524b3 ff.

Perhaps I may take this opportunity to raise two problems of interpretation. On page 181 of his commen-



laxity on the *Phaedrus*. Professor Hackforth compares the argument for the immortality of the soul in 245c5 ff. with the final argument of the *Phaedrus* and lays stress on the more empirical approach of the former. 'What the *Phaedrus* does is to remodel an argument about the relations of words and concepts into one based on observed fact, the fact namely of *κίνησις*.' But Plato's argument seems to require us to extend the meaning of the word *κίνησις* beyond the range of observed fact. For he suggests (243d6-e2) that if it were possible for an *ἀσπρὴ κίνησις* to pass in and out of being, the universe would not merely stand immovable, but would cease to be subject to change, *οὐκ ἔχοντος οὐδὲ ἔχειν τίς κίνησις ἀσπρὴν περιέχοντα*, including, we should suppose, the kind of change like physical growth and decay which cannot be observed to depend on the operation of mind. He seems to be using the word to cover *ἀλλοίωσις* as well as *κίνησις*, the two kinds of *κίνησις* explicitly distinguished in the *Parmenides* (130b7 ff.) and the *Theaetetus* (181d3 ff.). Is Plato relying on an easy metaphor of the *πῦρ* of kind as has he at the back of his mind some such theory as that elaborated in the *Theaetetus* (156c6 ff.) that temporal change can be reduced to a special kind of imperceptible motion?

The difficulties presented by the accounts of the hypothetical method in the *Phaedrus* do not seem to me to be solved by Professor Hackforth's suggestion (pp. 128 ff.) that in 101d Socrates gives the detail of the process briefly described in 100a, though his comments on the meaning of the plural *τὰ ἀποκρίνεται* seem to me helpful and cogent. He believes that in both passages Socrates describes an attempt to establish the truth of a proposition by deducing it from some more acceptable hypothesis, but in the later passage takes into account the possibility that you may have to rebut some objection that occurs either to yourself or to an interlocutor. If all such objections are successfully rebutted, the propositions of the deduction are 'in agreement with each other', i.e. the inferences stand as valid; otherwise you must reject either one of the dependent propositions or the hypothesis itself.

This view seems to me to contain the following difficulties over and above the notorious difficulty of understanding *ἀποκρίνεται* to mean anything except 'to be consistent with':

(1) One striking feature of the earlier account, the rejection of propositions not in agreement with the hypothesis, seems to be left high and dry. I cannot, on Professor Hackforth's view, be what is meant by 'seeing whether the dependent propositions agree or disagree with each other', for whereas in the earlier passage he takes *μὴ ἀποκρίνεται* to mean 'to be the contradictory of a proposition implied by the hypothesis', in the later passage he understands by *ἀποκρίνεται* 'do not follow from', and we can hardly suppose that in every invalid inference we deduce from propositions the contradictory of the proposition which follows in fact.

(2) It is not clear to me what kind of objections Professor Hackforth has in mind. The rebuttal of objections from inconsistency with received doctrine such as that successfully rebutted by Socrates in 103b1 ff. can have no direct bearing on the validity of the inferences as such, while if the objector simply expresses doubt whether X follows strictly from Y, then Robinson's objection to understanding *ἀποκρίνεται ἢ διαφέρει* in this way seems cogent (Plato's *Earlier Dialogues*, p. 130): Socrates seems to be giving disproportionate attention to the process of checking one's logic. In any case on this view the second passage describes a check on one's processes of inference and not an integral part of the processes themselves.

W. F. HICKES.

STARK (RUDOLF). *Aristotelesstudien. Philologische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der aristotelischen Ethik.* Pp. vii + 337. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1954. (Zetemata: Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 8.) DM. 9.50.

This is a series of studies somewhat loosely strung

together on the theme of the development of Aristotle's ethical ideas. The theme indeed tends to drop out of sight at intervals while certain scholarly problems of rather distant relevance are pursued, with the result that it is difficult to keep a sense of direction throughout the book. This feeling of mild bewilderment is deepened by the unusually formidable number of scholars' names which march in and out of one's ken in the accompanying footnotes. Some of these references seem in fact to have no more than a vaguely adding effect upon one's grip of the main theme, e.g. in a chapter on the *Partes*, which is already but slightly connected, we embark upon a note (p. 43) on the Pythagorean theory of *katharsis* by music, pass through some half-dozen learned names and end up, by way of Ruelle's 1768 version of Twining's 1789 explanation of Aristotle's theory of *katharsis*, with an implied criticism of Gilbert Highet for not mentioning Twining in his *The Classical Tradition*. After all this—and apart from the fact that Highet's book does not set out to be a history of classical scholarship—it is surely the very cessant of 'footnotemanship' to add in brackets that it was reviewed by E. R. Curtius in *Gnomon* 25 (1931), 121 ff.

After this protest it must be said at once that individual sections of the book, disjointed though it is, will be found to be generally clear and cogent. Stark differs from Jaeger's picture of a steady development in Aristotle's thought away from Platonic idealism towards a naive empiricism. He believes that both theory and practice (which are the subject of a special excursus) were given their due weight by Aristotle from first to last, and especially in his 'philosophy of human affairs'. 'The development of Aristotle is not to be represented as a metamorphosis in which the idealist turned into a realist' (p. 94). His Platonic outlook was a *ἔξω* not a *δύστρον*. On the other hand, Stark disputes the version of Allan (The *Philosophy of Aristotle*, p. 2) whereby Aristotle until his 38th year more or less stagnated, as Stark puts it. There is, he thinks, an original and lasting unity in Aristotle's thought, at once Platonic and empirical, which dates right from the days of the *Protreptikos*. He sees behind Plato's *Statesman* especially the combination of 'Seinsethik und Situationsethik' which is the basis of Aristotle's philosophical politics, as first sketched in the *Protreptikos*. From similarities of thought Stark concludes that the last chapter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is virtually a 'fragment' of this earlier work.

There is hardly space here to do more than list some of the topics treated by Stark. In a discussion of Plato's 6th Letter he rightly rejects Jaeger's assertion of the text in favour of his own theory (*Aristotle*, E.T., p. 173 n.), but is oddly unaware of the most convincing explanation of the phrase *καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ*, which he still finds puzzling, given by Post in *Class. Rev.* XLIV, p. 116 (an intentional reminiscence of a fragment of Sophocles). He becomes rather sophistical himself when he tries to maintain that the neighbouring phrase *οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιφύσειν* can mean that Hermias had listened to Plato (as Strabo says he had) without Plato's knowing him.

In a chapter on 'The Good as Measure' Stark contests Jaeger's translation of the *Politicus* fragment (*μικρὸν καὶ μεγάλῳ ἀντιφύσειν καὶ μέτρου ἐκείνου*) as 'The Good is the most exact of all measures' and shows with the support of parallel passages from the *Protreptikos* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* that it must mean rather 'The Good is the most exact measure of all things'. A chapter follows on the ethical effects of tragedy. After a useful distinction between Aristotle's use of *πάθος* and *μύθος* Stark explains *katharsis* as a kind of psychotherapy in which one's *pathē*, whose accumulation might otherwise disturb the soul, are not purged but neutralised, as it were, by the action of pity and fear. In an interpretation of Aristotle's definition of tragedy Stark takes *μυθία* as more or less equivalent to *ἦθος*. A rather far-fetched chapter on Aristotle's valuation of philanthropy leads to an extended consideration of the meaning of *αἵμα* in Democritus, Plato and Aristotle.

The avowed purpose of the book is to settle certain questions of detail which the author considers a necessary preliminary to a new reconstruction of Aristotle's philosophy. It is possible that these discussions would have been better published as a series of articles, but there is at any rate no doubt that they contain much stimulating and useful matter for the Aristotelian. The indigestible nature of the book as a whole is partly redeemed by the excellent indexes, which should make it easy to consult on particular points.

P. R. HALL.

**ARISTOTLE. The Nicomachean Ethics.** Translated and introduced by Sir David Ross (The World's Classics). London: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. xxiv + 284. 3s.

The republication in the World's Classics Edition of Sir David Ross's Oxford Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, which has successfully stood the test of thirty years' critical reading, is very welcome. A few small alterations have been made to the original translation and one would be hard put to it to find many more that need to be made. Of course every student of Aristotle will have his own ideas about the translation of individual words and some will be different from Sir David's. Perhaps 'wisdom' is a better translation for *phronesis* than for *sophia* (for men show wisdom, but not *sophia*, in the practical affairs of life); 'involuntary actions' is not entirely satisfactory for *akousia*; in most contexts 'craft' or 'skill' is less misleading than 'art' as a translation of *techné*. More importantly *ta dé kalla kai ta blabara* . . . *oúdiōs ēsti dianoia* and *oúdiōs ēsti dianoia* (τοῦτο) and *oúdiōs ēsti dianoia* (τοῦτο) things too or 'even good things', in the next sentence, are surely mistranslated. Aristotle's point seems to be not that men's opinions about morality vary but that things that are generally good (or noble or just) are sometimes not good; wealth, for example, which is a 'good thing' has sometimes brought men to ruin.

Sir David has written for this edition a new twenty-page introduction, largely consisting of a précis of the text (excluding Books VIII and IX). Perhaps a critical examination of Aristotle's moral theory would have been more useful. In particular, I was very dissatisfied with Aristotle's psychology of action. Aristotle's statement that every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and his (to the layman) paradoxical account of *akousia* merit fuller discussion. Attention is not drawn to the fundamental confusion of thought about means and ends which leads to the perhaps insoluble ambiguities of Aristotle's account of *phronesis*. The assumption that there are two kinds of *phronesis* provides, I think, too easy a way out of the difficulties of Book VI. There is a danger that the very lucidity of the introduction may lead the reader to think that the Ethics is a straightforwardly uncontroversial work. A more critical discussion of the arguments might help him to understand its enormous influence on later (and, particularly, contemporary) moral philosophy.

But these are minor criticisms. Probably no one has succeeded better than Sir David Ross in conveying in an exact and scholarly translation the flavour of Aristotle's writing, with its unadorned, unemphatic succinctness, its freedom from tricks of rhetoric and 'fine writing'. The reader who knows no Greek will owe little of the original to this excellent translation.

D. MITCHELL.

**Aristoteles Latinus, Pars Posterior: codices descripti** (G. Lacombe, in societatis operis assumptis A. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, Act. Franceschini: supplementis indicibusque instructis L. Minio-Paluello. Cambridge: University Press, 1955. Pp. 607. 84s. net).

What is, I think, required from the reviewer is not so much a criticism of this work as an explanation of its

purpose. The catalogue of all manuscripts containing mediaeval Latin translations of Aristotle and his commentators is preparatory to a critical edition of such translations, which itself will be helpful in any future edition of the works of mediaeval philosophers. Part I of the catalogue, comprising a description of about 1,100 manuscripts, and an introduction in which the known facts concerning the history of the versions were set out and specimen passages given, was printed at Rome in 1939. By the chance of alphabetical order, Great Britain, France and Germany came within this volume. The second volume now before us brings the total of MSS. described to 2,012, and, as including Spain, Italy and the Vatican, is probably the richer in content of the two. Compliments and thanks are due, firstly, to the Cambridge University Press for producing a book uniform in appearance with the first volume, and, secondly, to Dr. Minio-Paluello, by whom it has been prepared for publication. His editorship has been most careful, and every significant piece of information has been recorded. Besides this his skill in research is responsible for much of the new information now made available.

Although this is in form a work of reference, the two volumes have in fact served as a record of progress in a subject which, twenty years ago, was still imperfectly mapped out. Research concerning the date and authorship of the translations and the distinctive style of individual writers has, in spite of all difficulties, made progress between 1939 and 1955. A supplementary bibliography, and specimens of versions which have become known in the intervening years, are important features of this volume.

An editor of these texts needs more information than is customarily given him in the printed catalogues of libraries. The presumed date of the MS. and the first few words of the text are not enough. He needs to know whether the MS. is written by one hand or more, whether it has marginal notes, what is known of its previous history and the country of its origin, and, if it includes several treatises, in what sequence these follow one another. A mixture of Arabic-Latin and Greek-Latin versions may sometimes provide an indication of date. Ample specimen passages are needed, since the idiom of the translators is similar, and one of them sometimes revised the work of another.

Critical editions of the pseudo-Aristotelian *de Mundo* and *de Anima*, and of one version of the *Posterior Analytics*, have now appeared. It is to be hoped that others will not be long delayed. When this is done, some new evidence, important though not perhaps spectacular, will be available for the Greek text of Aristotle. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for instance, Bywater's and Susemihl's attempt to cite the evidence of what they term the 'old version', taking this from printed editions, was premature. They did not realise that it had passed through various stages before William of Moerbeke gave it its final shape, and that one of the translators concerned, Grossicoste, was in the habit of comparing different Greek manuscripts.

D. J. ALLAN.

**PIETTERIA (A. J.). Epicurus and his Gods.** Translated by C. W. Cuthbert. Oxford: Blackwell, 1955. Pp. xiii + 100. 6s. 6d.

Although this book is of greater importance than its modest size would indicate, it would obviously be absurd to discuss it at any great length a work which first appeared in 1946. The translation has been well done, i.e. it does not read too like a translation and infelicities are few (e.g. on p. 62, 'chastised' is hardly the best word when the original is *apoptere*, see p. 75, n. 62). The author has taken the opportunity to make some additions and corrections in the light of what has been published since his treatise was first brought out; hence this is really a second, revised edition. The printing is adequate, except that here and there a Greek accent is misplaced or dropped,



but the type in which the elaborate and very useful notes which follow every chapter are set up is very small and something of a strain on the reader's eyes.

That the account given of Epicurus's life, philosophy and religious attitude is thoroughly well informed and the tone at once scholarly and urbane goes without saying to anyone at all acquainted with Father Festugière's other works. Perhaps more remarkable is the sympathetic understanding of the man and his followers which is shown throughout. It is not everyone who, being himself what might not unfairly be described as a Christian Platonist, can enter so imaginatively into the thought of a materialist. One reason is naturally the excellent understanding the author has of the times in which Epicurus lived and the other currents of opinion, including astral religion, which existed from the fourth century B.C. onwards. I mention the brief description of the effects of the degradation of the city-state (p. 19), the reason given on p. 42 for the wide influence of the Epicurean spirit, the correct evaluation on p. 60 of the 'collection of insults and calumnies that one sect hurled against another', not least the Stoics against the Epicureans, and the excellent comparison and contrast of Scepticism and Epicureanism on pp. 84 ff. The list could easily be lengthened.

It is curious that the old error of making Heracles a Dorian hero reappears on p. vii. I doubt if Euhemerism was so influential in Greece as is made out on p. 11. To say (p. 96) that 'all knew by heart' the *Odyssey Nekyia* is rather an exaggeration, and surely the first of the *Kypria Nekyia* is not to be translated, as on p. 98, by 'blessed and immortal Nature' but by 'the blessed and immortal nature (of the gods)'. But these are small matters.

Not the least praiseworthy feature of the book is the short but useful bibliography at its end.

H. J. ROME.

CASATI (A.). *Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano*. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1953. Pp. 364. L.2,000.

The purpose of Dr. Grilli's book is to trace the development and influence of the idea of the *bios theoretikos* in the Graeco-Roman world from Epicurus and the early Stoics to the beginnings of Christian monasticism. He excludes from his survey (except for incidental mentions) the religious or mystical contemplation of the Platonic tradition; the ideals of the contemplative life which he considers are those less exalted and more widespread ones of withdrawal from active life, and especially from politics, to intellectual pursuits, and from the city to the country in pursuit of an undisturbed peace of mind. He begins with a chapter on Epicureanism, notable for its careful examination of the evidence about Epicurus's attitude to the family. Then follows a long and extremely interesting discussion of the contemplative elements in Stoicism. Grilli lays great stress on the importance of the part played by Pannetius as the propagator of a moderate and balanced ideal of contemplation which did not make a rigorous and universal demand for complete withdrawal from the world of affairs; and in this he may well be right. Perhaps, however, he (with Pohlenz and other respectable scholars) is rather too positive about the content of the *epistola ad Herennium*: I am still, after reading Grilli's very able survey of the evidence, inclined to prefer the agnosticism of van Straaten. Also Grilli (again in good company) seems to me to go rather far in speaking about the influence of Democritus upon Pannetius. There is no need to doubt that Pannetius knew and was impressed by Democritus's remarks about *theoria*; but he seems to have worked out his own doctrine on a Stoic basis with some help from Peripatetic sources (as Grilli shows); indeed it is quite likely that he was a more orthodox Stoic than has generally been supposed (cp. I. G. Kidd's article in C.Q. July-October 1955), and it seems rather misleading to speak of his idea of *theoria* as 'Democritean'.

There follows a chapter on the contemplative conventions and commonplaces of Hellenistic and Roman literature, in which Grilli shows well how much of a mere literary convention the idea of withdrawal from the world had become, with a long and interesting concluding discussion of Seneca, of whom Grilli has an unusually high opinion.

The last section deals with the use made by Christian writers of pagan ideas about the contemplative life and the elements in the Christian revelation which enabled them to make contact with the pagan tradition. This contains much that is valuable and enlightening, as long as one remembers that (as Grilli makes clear) it is not a complete survey of Christian thought about contemplation or the monastic life, but only of those elements in it which have some connection with the pagan contemplative tradition. The real impulse and ideal of Christian monasticism was something very different from the aspiration to a withdrawn and primarily self-regarding *theoria*.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

OLIVER (R. P.). *Niccolo Perotti's Version of the Enchiridion of Epictetus*, edited with an introduction and a list of Perotti's writings. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954. Pp. vii + 166. Price not stated.

Perotti, in his day a poet laureate and an archbishop, is one of the major minor figures of Renaissance scholarship. He lacked the incisive mind of Valla or the attractiveness of Poggio or Pompono. His monumental thesaurus which masqueraded as a commentary on the first book of Martial was soon superseded. His Polybius was eclipsed by Casaubon's, his Epictetus by Politian's. But he is a man of whom more should be known than the paragraph or two he receives in Sandys, and Mr. Oliver has done a service to Renaissance scholarship in translating him. His flowery but judicious introduction contains fresh material for the specialist, and is interestingly readable for the non-specialist; his careful elenchus of Perotti's writings disproves the wilder appraisals of some critics and provides valuable documentation for future studies. Indeed Oliver's scholarship throughout is careful and impressive.

Perotti's translation of the *Enchiridion*, completed in 1450, and presented to Nicholas V, who had commissioned it, in the following year, is here published for the first time. In itself it is competent, though of no outstanding merit. Its importance lies partly in the light it throws on Perotti and the general development of Renaissance scholarship, partly on the information it provides about the text of the *Enchiridion*. It is a little strange that the *Enchiridion*, by far the most familiar part of Epictetus, and one of the most influential philosophical writings of antiquity, has yet to be scientifically edited in modern times. The last independent critical text was Schweighäuser's. The reason is plain—the very large number of MSS. to be collated, of the text, Simplicius's bulky commentary, and the two Christian paraphrases, a mass of material before which even the indefatigable Oldfather blanched, and the doubt whether anything very valuable would emerge from the labour involved. There are at least thirteen MSS. of Perotti's translation, which Oliver has now collated. This publication shows that Perotti had before him a very interesting text, which future editors will have to take into account, and which does not conform precisely with any of the main strands in the MS. tradition. Thus at 6 he has 'boni equi' *hai bonoi dythoi*, plainly right, but against the MSS., which read *frayoi*. At 29 where the text follows closely that of the Discourses, with slight modifications, his evidence is ambivalent. At 29, 2 he seems to have read *tonos* with Nilus and the Discourses against the MSS. At 29, 4 he read *theoria*, with the MSS. against the Discourses; at 29, 5 the neuter *idion* with the MSS. against the Discourses; at 29, 6 *theoria* with one MS. against the remainder (which omit) and





## O

Ocellus Lucanus, 76, 79, 130  
Olympiodorus, 79, 118, 125  
Origen, 67, 71 ff.

## P

Panmenius, 71 f., 73  
Parmenides, 22, 34, 40, 119, 127  
Phallosion, 34, 120  
Philomatus, 127, 143  
Philo, 72, 109 f., 143  
Photius, 67  
Plato, *Apology*, 12 ff.; *Cratylus*, 16, 30; [ ] *Definitions*, 142;  
[ ] *Euthydemus*, 116, 130; *Euthydemus*, 19; *Gorgias* (manu-  
script), 24 ff.; *E.* 24 ff.; *Florentinus*, X, 25; *Byzantine*  
*Reception of T.* 27 ff.; *Malatestianus* M, 28; 34, 126;  
*Hippias*, 109, 108; *Laces*, 40, 37, 106, 114 f., 122,  
127, 131, 143; *Parmenides*, 19, 30, 32, 105 ff., 106,  
110, 112; *Phaedo*, 50 f., 103 f., 107 f., 110; *Phaedrus*, 31 f., 54,  
109, 112, 114, 130, 135, 142, 147; *Philebus*, 31, 106,  
108, 114, 106; *Politeia*, 20, 31, 34, 107, 114, *Republic*,  
49, 51, 71, 104, 106 f., 108 f., 110 ff., 114 f., 115, 125 f.,  
142, 144; *Sophia*, 20 ff., 48 ff., 51, 53, 110, *Symposium*,  
30 f., 109; *Theaetetus*, 18 f., 48 ff., 63; *Timaeus*, 18 ff.,  
106, 113 f., 116, 117 f., 123, 127, 142, 145  
Platonius, middle, 71, 144, 147  
Pleasure, 10  
Plutarch and Hadrian, 136 f.  
Plotinus, 67, 73, 66, 143 f., 145, 147  
Plutarch of Athens, 118, 144  
Pneuma, 119 f.  
Pneumatici, 70, 72  
Pons asinorum, 97  
Porphyry, 21, 38, 68 f., 74, 144 f.  
Ponichonius, 143  
Proclus, 20, 46, 100, 143 ff., 146  
Prodicus, 12  
Prophecy and divination, 142 ff.

Prose-rhythm, 20, 26  
Pythagoras, 132 f.

## Q

Quilonymos b. Quilonymos, 75 ff.

## R

Relatives, 109 ff.  
Respiration, 31 ff.

## S

Saccheri, Gerolamo, 62, 66  
Scaliger, J. C., 75  
Seimice, 31 ff., 54 ff.  
Simplicius, 75 f., 117, 107, 109, 128 f., 144  
Socrates, *passim*, 10, 134  
Speridion, 104, 118, 161  
Stoics, 63, 66, 70 f., 122, 127, 136, 143, 148  
Syrianus, 90, 136 f., 160 ff.

## T

Terminum, 71, 130  
Thales, 39, 122  
Theodoric of Chartres, 162  
Theophrastus, 71, 20, 35 ff., 76 ff., 87, 92, 128 f., 130

## V

Ventus Agorini Praetextus, 101

## W

Whitehead, 37

## X

Xenocrates, 54, 107, 118, 130, 161  
Xenophon, *Apology*, 12 f.; *Memorabilia*, 13; *Isotimias*  
*Crit.*, 15

## II.—INDEX OF GREEK AND LATIN AUTHORS

Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Metaph.* 82, 11-89, 16, 103 ff.;  
83, 26-30, 124 ff.  
Aristotle, *de Caelo* II 13, 294b30; 37; *Eth. Nic.* I 1, 35 f.;  
I 9, 35; I 13, 57, 117; II 2, 1102a1-10, B; II 2,  
1104b8-12, 1; II 6, 1107a1, 38 f.; VI 7 and 13, 39;  
X 9, 39; *fragmenta*, p. 27 Ross (*Protrepticus*), 62 ff.;  
p. 761 Ross (*de Philosophia*), 136 f., 160 ff.; p. 78 Ross  
(*de Philosophia*), 135; p. 84 Ross (*de Philosophia*), 136 f.;  
p. 94 Ross (*de Philosophia*), 127; p. 124 f. Ross (*de Idem*),  
103 ff.; cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Hypotyposis*, 127 ff.;  
*de Generatione Animalium* II 1, 736b30-737a1, 114 ff.;  
[ ] *Magna Moralia* I 5, 1105b14-23, 38 f.; 1105b32, 39, 40;  
II 7, 1103a2-23, 10; *Metaphysics* 21, 991b1-10, 36;  
E 1, 1020b14, 87; K 7, 1061a26-34, 38 ff.; *Physics*  
VII 4-5, 31 ff.; [ ] *de Plantis* I 2, 78; I 3, 77; *Primo*  
*Analytica* II 2, 33b7-23, 14; 4, 33a36, 62 ff.; *de Respiratione*  
7, 31 ff.

Empedocles, 31 B100 (Dicks-Kraus), 31 ff.  
Euclid, *Elements* IX 12, 63; *As.* 1, 125  
Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* VI 16, 68

Gorgias, *Encomium on Helen* 9-19, 13; *Palamedes* 13-26, 14

Heracleon, *Treatise on the Three Natures*, 69 f.  
Heraclitus, *πρὸς ἀπορίας*, cf. Photius  
Hippocrates, *πρὸς ἀνδρας*, I 11, B; II 46 ff., 50; *On*  
*ancient medicine* IX, 36, 38

[Isocrates], *ad Democritum* 34, 8

Origen, *de Principiis* II 9, 72

Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 214 and 251; *Hierocles*, 67 ff., 73  
Plato, *Apology* 43 ff., 15; *Phaedo* 74 A, B, 124 ff.; *Theaetetus*  
201 C8-210 A7, 48 ff., 102 f., 36; *Timaeus* 38 A5-B5,  
18 ff., 70 A5-E1, 39; *Sophist* 254-259, 1 ff.; 254 D1, 18  
Plotinus, *Enn.* I 3, 80

Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* VII 400 ff., 145;  
VIII 292, 63; X 33, 109; *Hypotyposis* III 218, 127 ff.  
Stobaeus, II 71 p. 197, 24 Wachsmuth, B1 p. 138, 21, 2

Theodoret, *Græc. Aff. Cur.* VI 60, 68

Valentinus, *Gospel of Truth*, 70  
Virgil, *Aeneid* VI 747, 123

## III.—INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

ἀδελφός, 42  
 ἀδελφότης, 56  
 ἀδελφότης, 56, 72

ἐξουσία, 117  
 ἐξουσία, 117, 22 (cf. p. 117)

θεοί, 140 ff.

θεός, 140 f., 143 ff.

καὶ ὁ θεός, 107 f.  
 καθόλου, 56 ff.

καὶ ὁ θεός, 107 ff., 70 ff.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 149 ff.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 1

καὶ ὁ θεός, 2 ff., 5, 70  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 11 ff., 22 f., 41, 49  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 144 f.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 50

καὶ ὁ θεός, 149 ff.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 149 f.

καὶ ὁ θεός, 107 ff.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 56 ff.

καὶ ὁ θεός, 16  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 103 ff., 107 ff.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 136  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 133, 135  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 44 f.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 105  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 144 f.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 10  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 134 f.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 140 ff.  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 59, 61  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 58, n. 7  
 καὶ ὁ θεός, 149 ff.

## IV.—BOOKS NOTICED

Ambrascio Lattin, *Pantheism*, 170

Black (R. S.), *Plato's 'Phaedo'*, 170

Brilliant (M.) and (A.), *History of religions*, III, 169

Demargne (P.), *Les religions pré-helléniques*, 163

Des Places (E.), *Les religions de la Grèce antique*, 163

Drouton (E.), *La religion égyptienne*, 163

Émile (P.), *La religion romaine*, 163

Feilich (A. J.), *Epicurus and his Gods* (tr. C. W. Chilton), 172

Frankel (H.), *Weg und Form frühgeschichtlichen Denkens*, 165

Gould (John), *The Development of Plato's Ethics*, 166

Griff (A.), *Il problema della etica contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano*, 173

Hackforth (R.), *Plato: 'Phaedo'*, 170; *Plato: 'Phaedrus'*, 170

Herrington (C. J.), *Athenian Pantheism and Athenian Politics*, 166

Lodge (R. C.), *The Philosophy of Plato*, 167

Lattin (R.), *L'âme et la forme selon Platon*, 168

O'Brien (R. P.), *Niccolo Perotti's Version of the 'Euchiridion' of Epictetus*, 173

Penazoni (R.), *The All-Knowing God* (tr. H. J. Rose), 164

Ross (Sir W. D.), *Aristotle: 'Nicomachean Ethics'*, (translation and introduction), 170


Sark (Rudolf), *Antikelektik*, 171

Thomson (G.), *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, Vol. II, *The First Philosophers*, 165

Vannote (M.), *La Philosophie Politique de Platon dans les 'Lais'*, 164







GILBERT MURRAY

*Photograph by Arthur C. Sappington, M.A. — I.H.S.A.*

## NOTE ON THE PEACE OF NIKIAS

In the early part of the fourth century it was the regular practice for Athenian treaties to specify the authorities who were to swear the oath on either side, and, although the fifth-century material is more scanty, three clear instances suggest that the habit was already established by 425.<sup>1</sup> The notable exception is the Peace of Nikias, and with it the Spartan alliance of 421, in which not the quality but the number is prescribed, seventeen from each city.<sup>2</sup> Kirchhoff suggested<sup>3</sup> that this odd number might be built up, on the Spartan side, from the two kings (who in fact head the list), the five ephors (the eponymous ephor Pleistolas comes third and the next four might be his colleagues; cf. Tod, *GHI* 99), and a board of ten. Kirchhoff refused to speculate about these ten beyond saying that it was a normal number,<sup>4</sup> but this gap in his argument can perhaps be filled from a passage in Diodorus (below) which has received no satisfactory explanation. Normal Athenian practice would not oblige Athens to conform to the Spartan number, and if Kirchhoff is right we should perhaps suppose that Sparta asked for numerical parity. The next question will be, how the Athenians made up their seventeen.

Recently, however, J. H. Oliver has remarked<sup>5</sup> that 'the curious number seventeen became, precisely at Athens, a traditional number for the representation of parties making peace or alliance'. His evidence, apart from his primary speculation that the 51 *ephetai* were three groups of 17, consists of the Peace of Nikias, *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 40, and Plato, *Laws* vi 761c. This last is a doubtful support. Plato begins with five magistrates and adds a group of twelve for more important cases,<sup>6</sup> and the fact that the total is seventeen is probably not significant; at any rate he shows no general fondness for this number. The combination of *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 40 with the Peace of Nikias would be a powerful argument for the Athenian origin of clauses prescribing seventeen, if one could be sure that *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 40 contains such a clause, but we doubt this (n. 2), and if the Peace of Nikias stands alone we prefer Kirchhoff's explanation, which is at least less mysterious. Alternatively, if the number originates with Athens, it is still a question how the Athenians made up their seventeen.

We turn now to Diodorus xii 75, which describes the growth of unrest after the Peace. 75.4 gives the reasons why Athens and Sparta were suspected of a design to enslave the rest of Greece: first the clause which gave them the right to amend the peace in consultation (as Thuc. v 29.2), then *χωρίς δὲ τούτων Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν διὰ ψηφίσματος ἔδωκαν δέκα ἀνδράσιν ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῶν τῇ πόλει συμφερόντων· τὸ παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πεποιηκότων φανερὰν ἀντίβη γενέσθαι τῶν δὲ πόλεων τὴν πλειονείαν*. This second grievance is not in Thucydides, but Ephorus might have genuine information about this period from another source, and his original statement must have made more sense than Diodorus' vague epitome, which does not at all obviously illustrate the *pleioneia* of the two cities. The two boards of ten must have some relation to one another and some specific duty in respect of the peace. The words *χωρίς δὲ τούτων* show that Diodorus has left the subject of amendments. A joint commission to execute the provisions of the peace would make sense in Diodorus' context, but there is no trace of such a commission in Thucydides and his narrative almost excludes the possibility. We suspect that in the original the verb corresponding to *ἔδωκαν* was pluperfect and referred back to the period before the peace was signed: at some stage Athens and Sparta had each appointed a board of ten to conduct the negotiations and Sparta's allies complained that they were not more directly represented.

If this interpretation of Diodorus is correct, both boards of ten should appear in the lists of Thuc. v 19.2 and 24.1. The Spartans should be the last ten, Dathos to Laphilos, but with our limited knowledge of Spartan politics we cannot hope for much light from this side. But an Athenian commission of ten should have one member from each tribe, and it would confirm our guess if we could detect a tribal series in the official order within the Athenian list. The sixth to the fifteenth of the Athenian names may be such a series.<sup>7</sup> The main reason for thinking so lies in five identifications already made by Kirchhoff and others, and these depend on the presumption

<sup>1</sup> *IG* i<sup>2</sup> 87 (*SEG* x 401); *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 40; Thuc. v 47.9.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Thuc. v 18.3 see Gomme *ad loc.* A similar formula has been found in *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 40 (for the text see Wilhelm, *Wiener Studien* xxiv (1912), 416 ff., for further discussion Accame, *La Lega ateniese*, 33-44), where Wilhelm restores ll. 1-2 [τὸν δὲ ἄρμος ἀμνηστῆσαν ἐπὶ καὶ ἀρχαῖς ἀνδράς ἐξ ἐκαστοῦ· καλίστα δὲ κτλ. But the opening phrase and the content of the amendment which begins in l. 3 make it at least doubtful whether the main text in this case was a treaty at all.

<sup>3</sup> Thucydides und sein Urkundenmaterial, 63-4.

VOL. LXXVII

<sup>4</sup> Commissions of three are more common in this period, e.g. Thuc. v 12.1, Xen. *Hell.* iii 2.6; but ten *ἐπιβουλοὶ* were appointed to supervise Agis in 418 (Thuc. v 63.4).

<sup>5</sup> *Classical Weekly* xlv (1951), 203.

<sup>6</sup> The phrasing is sometimes obscure, especially at 760a2 where the text is not quite certain. But cf. 762c2 ἐπεὶ οὖν γὰρ οὐ καταλείψαντες οἱ δίδωκεν, συνελθόντες μετὰ τῶν περὶ βουλευσάμεσθαι κτλ.

<sup>7</sup> This observation by Lewis was the starting-point for our note.



that a man with a known public career in the relevant period is more likely than an unknown. It is true that the list contains one name not attested elsewhere and others for whom there is no obvious identification. But this is due simply to our ignorance, coupled with the fact that the board was not composed of very active politicians: we can produce no alternative to Iskias, but that would not justify us in preferring, e.g., an unknown Hagnon to the founder of Amphipolis.

*Ἰσκίας* (no. 6 on the list). A fairly common name. The nearest in date is *Ἰ. Ἀράβου* *ἐδωρομότης*, secretary of the council 421/0 (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 82, 84); then *Ἰ. Κηφισεύς*, *athlothes* 406/5 (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 305.49), both are from Erechtheis (I). *Ἰ.* or *Πατροκλῆς Ἀττικεύς*, choregos in the late fifth century (Sieph. Byz. *Ἀττικῶν*) for Antiochis (X), is much less likely.

*Πυθόδαμος* (no. 7). A common name: the obvious candidate is *Ἰ. Ἐπιζήλον Ἀλαυεύς* (*PA* 12402 + 12410), hipparch (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 816), chairman of the treasurers of Athena 418/7 (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 268.102), general 414 (Thuc. vi 105.2), choregos (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 770a) for Aigeis (II). This *Ἰ.* with a normal public career is more suitable than *Ἰ. Πολυζήλον Ἀναβλήστως*, the accuser of Protagoras (Diog. Laert. ix 54) and proposer of the constitutional commission of 411 (*Ἀθ. 29.1*), from Antiochis (X); a remote possibility is the phylarch (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 950.180) from Hippothontis (VIII).

*Ἄγριον* (no. 8). This should be the well-known *Ἄ. Νικίου Στρυμονεύς* from Pandionis (III). The name is not rare, but no other *Ἄ.* is attested from this period.

*Ἡρμιππος* (no. 9). Only two are recorded, *Μ. Ἀνάκτος* the comic poet and brother of Hermippos (*PA* 10497) of unknown tribe, and *Μ. Πρασιεύς* whose tombstone (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 1072) bears only these two words. It has been doubted whether the latter was an Athenian or from Prasiai in Laconia (foreigners are not uncommon in these brief inscriptions): if he was Athenian he belonged to Pandionis (III). There is no way of telling if either had a public career, though this is clearly possible for Hermippos' brother.

*Θρασυκλῆς* (no. 10). No candidate from this period other than the mover of *IG* i<sup>2</sup> 82 of 421/0, usually (*PA* 7317) identified with the general of 412/1 (Thuc. viii 15 ff.). The board of 412/1 includes generals certainly from tribes I and IV, probably from II and VII: Θ. could thus represent Akamantis (V) (Beloch<sup>2</sup>, ii. 2, p. 266).

*Θεογόνης* (no. 11). The MSS. have *Θεογόνης* at v 19.2, *Θεαγόνης* at 24.1. *Θεογ.* is common on inscriptions of all centuries from the fifth to the first B.C. (cf. *PA* 6687-6727) and is read by all MSS. of Ar. *Wasps* 1183 and schol., Xen. *Hell.* i 3.13, ii 3.2, Dem. xxvii 38, liv 7, lix 72, 84, and in the fragment of Eupolis' *Demai*, Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.*, p. 206 l. 9 (*Θεογονῆς* l. 5). *Θεαγ.* is relatively rare: *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1750.11 (334-4), 2355 (*Θεαγυίδης*, perhaps third century), 6354 (tombstone, now lost): the archon *Θεαγυίδης* of 468/7 (*Mar. Par.* A57 and elsewhere: once *Θεογ.*, Ps. Plut. *Vit. X Or.* 835a); all MSS. of Ar. *Peace* 928, *Birds* 822, 1127, 1295 with schol. and Suid. In the Roman period *Θεαγ.* is more common though still less frequent than *Θεογ.*: the conspicuous *Θεαγ.* of the fifth century A.D. (Suid. *Θεαγόνης. Ἀθηναῖος ἀρχὼν*) may have influenced the Aristophanes tradition. In Thuc. iv 27.3 G reads *Θεαγ.*, all other MSS. *Θεογ.*: in Xen. *Anab.* vii 4.18a (non-Athenian) *Θεογ.* is *Θεαγ.* in some inferior MSS.: at Ar. *Lys.* 63 the MSS. and Suid. read *Θεαγ.*, schol. R *Θεογ.* Clearly *Θεογ.* is the more likely name for the late fifth century and there is a presumption in its favour where the MSS. of Thucydides vary. Dindorf went further and altered all relevant passages of Aristophanes from α to ο.

The Θ. of *Lys.* 63 is an Acharnian, and the *Θεογ.* of *Wasps* 1183 is identified by schol. *ad loc.*, ὁ Θεογ. οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀχαρνεύς, as if he were a known figure (*Ἰδίωνης Θεογόνου Ἀχαρνεύς*, Tod 125.7 of 376/5, is no doubt his son, as Kirchner suggested, *PA* 7445): the MSS. of *Lys.* 63 and Suid. *Θεαγόνης. ὄνομα κύριον* are no doubt in the wrong. The Θ. of the *Birds* pretended to great wealth (schol. 821: *μεγαλέμπορος τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, περὶ τῆς ἀλαζών, ψευδοπλούτος· ἐκαλεῖται δὲ κατὰς, ὅτι πολλὰ ἐπαγορεύμενος οὐδὲν ἐπέδει. Ἐὐπολῆς ἐν Δήμοις*) and schol. *Peace* 928 describe the same man as ἐκ Παιρώνος (possibly a false inference from *περὶ τῆς* above, the meaning of which is obscure). It is natural to take the reference to Eupolis as a reference to the papyrus fragment of the *Demai* cited above, ll. 5-10 where the beggar Pauson steals a ship from *Θεογ.*,<sup>a</sup> and if this is correct we ought perhaps to read *Θεογ.* in the *Birds*: but schol. *Peace* 928, *Birds* 822 distinguish their Θ. from Theagenes (of Rhegium) the interpreter of Homer (who certainly has the α) but do not mention *Θεογ.* *Ἀχαρνεύς*, whereas the scholiasts who deal with the Acharnian do not distinguish him from Theagenes; so there may have been a distinction in spelling between the Acharnian and the character in the *Birds* when the commentary was compiled from which our scholia descend. Kirchner (*PA* 6703) and others nevertheless identify the Θ. of the *Birds* with the Acharnian (and with the Θ. of Thuc. iv and v), and there are the further links (which may be mere confusion)

<sup>a</sup> Korte, *Hermes* cxviii (1912), 295 n., wondered in passing what Pauson stole if Theogenes' ship were unreal. It might be answered that the theft is not in any case literal and concrete; the real difficulty is to understand what

part Theogenes plays in the argument of the chorus, and though we see no clear answer the difficulty is less if the ship existed.

that the Acharnian is also called *καπρός* (Suid. *Θεογένης*: *ὄνομα κέρων*) and *κομπαστής* (schol. *Lys.* 63, cf. *Birds* 1126-7 with schol.).

We incline to admit the possibility that the *Θ.* of the *Birds* was *Θεός*, possibly *Περαιεύς*. But we would read *Θεός* in Thuc. iv and v, and identify the oath-taker with the *Θ.* of iv 27.3, chosen to go with Kleon in 425 as *κατάσκοπος* to Pylos and thus evidently trusted by the people. It seems natural also to identify him with the Acharnian who was a known public figure of the period from *Wasps* to *Lys.* and thus to allocate him to Oineis (VI). The tribe of the ambassador to Persia in 408 (Xen. *Hell.* i 3.13) is unknown: the *Θ.* of the Thirty belonged, if Loeper is correct, to Hippothontis (VIII).

*Ἀριστοκράτης* (no. 12). The MSS. reading *Ἀριστοκίτης* at v 19.2 may be disregarded, and the obvious candidate is *Ἀ. Σκελλίων*, prominent by 414 (*Birds* 126) and in 411 (Thuc. viii 89.2), indeed much earlier if we may trust Plato *Gorg.* 472a, and choregos (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 772) for Kekropis (VII), usually (*PA* 1904) and no doubt rightly identified with the general *Ἀ.* of 413/2 (Thuc. viii 9.2) and later years. Possible alternatives are *Ἀ. Φαλαργεύς* of Aiantis (IX), hellenotamias 421/0 (*ATL* ii, list 34.5), and *Ἀ. Εὐωνυμίδης* of Erechtheis (I), chairman of hellenotamiai 425/4 (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 302 = Meritt *AFD*, pp. 163.66 ff.): casualty lists of the Ionian War (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 950.86, 951.54) give us two more unknowns.

*Ἰνίδκιος* (no. 13). Unknown, and the name does not occur elsewhere.

*Τυμοκράτης* (no. 14). A common name, but there is no obvious candidate. The father of Aristoteles, general 426/5 (Thuc. iii 105.3), was *Θοραεύς* (Meritt, *AFD*, p. 84.6) and belonged to Antiochis (X); he would be fairly old, if he was still alive, in 421. The tribe of the politician of 406 (Xen. *Hell.* i 7.3) is not known: other unknowns from Antiphon (*Harp.* *Σπάρτιδος*) and *IG* i<sup>2</sup> 950.105.

*Κων* (no. 15). There are at least two public figures with this name in the fifth century. *Ἀέω[ν]* proposer of the Phaselis decree (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 16.4), [*Α*]*έω[ν]* proposer of the treaty with Hermione c. 450 (*SEG* x 15), [*Α*]*έω[ν]* secretary to the hellenotamiai 453/2 (*ATL* ii, list 2.1), may be all one person, of unknown tribe. The general of 412/1 (Thuc. viii 23.1, etc.) can hardly be the same. He disliked the oligarchy *διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου* (73.4), which suggests he had had his full share of office before reaching the generalship, and encourages us to identify him with the general elected after Notion (Xen. *Hell.* i 5.16, cf. *JHS* lxxiii 1953, p. 4).<sup>10</sup> In that case, the tribes available are III, VI, VIII, IX, possibly II (cf. *Θρασύκλῆς* above, and Beloch *Gr. Gesch.* ii<sup>2</sup> 2.266-8): he could belong to Antiochis (X) only if Konon was elected *ἐξ ἀπάντων* in 406, which is possible enough. There is also an unknown [*Α*]*έω[ν]* from Aigeis (II) on an earlier casualty list (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 940.1). But it is worth noting that the general from Antiochis for 439/8 (*ATL* ii D18.46) had a four-letter name. There are not many of them: Dion is a little commoner than *Ἀ.*, but the first Dion in public life is from the early fourth century (Plato *Menex.* 234b, Xen. *Hell.* iv 8.13): the others are relatively rare.<sup>11</sup> We suggest that the general of 439/8 was an earlier *Ἀ.*, distinct from the general of the Ionian War, and that he survived like Hagnon to take part in the negotiations of 421.

This seems a plausible series. The identifications of Prokles (I), Pythodoros (II), Hagnon (III), Theogenes (VI), Aristokrates (VII) have all been made by scholars who were not looking for a tribal sequencer, and where alternatives exist they are in every case less likely. Leon (X) is

<sup>10</sup> [*Θ*]*έω[ν]* or [*Ν*]*έω[ν]* would be possible here.

<sup>11</sup> He and Erasimides were blackballed with Konon at Mytilene in the summer of 406 (Xen. *Hell.* i 6.16), but he did not, like Erasimides, take part in the battle of Arginusai nor does Xenophon mention him again, perhaps, as several commentators have suggested, Erasimides was on the ship which escaped to Hellespont and Athens and Leon on the other which was captured by the Spartans (16.21-2). If so he may have survived to the end of the war and Sauppe (*Gr. Att.* ii 202) may be correct in identifying him with the father of the speaker of *Lysias* x who served many times as general (26) and was murdered by the Thirty (3, 27): there cannot have been many veteran generals in Athens in 404, and this general's elder son was named Pankleon (3). Meyer, *GdS* v 22.24, cautiously approved Sauppe's suggestion and (without argument) identified the general with Leon the Salaminian the notorious victim of the Thirty, to which it has been objected (e.g. Swoboda, *RE* xii 2007) that this Leon was not an Athenian citizen (Kirchner does not admit him to *PA*). The objection will not hold. There were indeed distinguishable Salaminians in Ctesander's time (Polyaen. iv 11.1, Paus. i 35.2), and Leon cer-

tainly lived on Salamis (Plato, *Apol.* 320). But Xenophon's phrases in ii 3.39 suggest a citizen and so does his order (i.e. all the characters of 39-40 are citizens as opposed to the metics of 41), and Andokides i 94, without suggesting any but the normal citizen procedure, said Leon's children might have prosecuted Meletos but for the amnesty. Plato *Ep.* vii 324c<sup>1</sup> 329a definitely *ἐν τῇ πόλει κατέμεινε*. We prefer to accept the identification and suppose that a *Σαλαμίνιος* was one of those by-names common in Athens, drawn from his residence not from his status. See Kahstedt, *Staatsgesch.* 357 n. 3, who compares the case of Meimides (*PA* 10400 and Suid. *Φοῖβ. ἀπὸ Μυροκλήος*).

<sup>12</sup> *Βίαν* is attested early (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 643). *Λυσίας* provides the earliest examples of *Βίαν* (*Harp.* *βίαν*, *ἐκτρέφειν*) and probably *Βίαν* (MS. reading at x 12). The earliest *Βίαν* is Tod 117.4 of 380-5. There are several fourth-century examples of *Βίαν*, and cf. the early comic poet *Χαρμίδης* (*Arist. Poet.* 1438a34). *Βίαν* (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 1641.10), *Βίαν* (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 1745.7), *Βίαν* (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 352.6, 1641.10), *Βίαν* (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 6915) and *Βίαν* (*PA* 4330) all appear before the end of the fourth century. The dubious name *Όρος* (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 1009.78) hardly comes into consideration.

clearly possible, and there is no evidence against Thrasykles (V) or Iolkios (VIII); the tombstone *Myrtidos Hpaotews* cannot in the circumstances weigh heavily against Myrtidos (IV), or Aristoncles' father against Timokrates (IX).

Hagnon and Leon form a pair of age and experience, survivors from the generation of Perikles. Pythodoros, Thrasykles, Aristokrates were younger men, not yet (so far as we know) generals but due to reach that office within ten years. Prokles and Theogenes at least were already public figures, but their affiliations are not known: Theogenes may have been selected in 425 either as Kleon's sympathiser or to represent his opponents. Pythodoros, Hagnon, Aristokrates were certainly men of property. The board as a whole seems to be composed of sound and trustworthy men, not specially committed to war or peace, and not the leading politicians of the time. The active work was no doubt done elsewhere, and mainly by Nikias and Laches (Thuc. v 43.2).

If these are the ten commissioners, what are the other seven and why is the list in this order? The Spartan list follows a natural order and we suppose that the number seventeen was proposed by the Spartans, but there was no evident principle for the Athenians to follow when they completed their seventeen, probably *ad limina iudicis* in the assembly which voted the peace, so the resulting list may well look miscellaneous. Lampon's function will be religious. Istunionikos is unknown (he evidently comes from an athletic family, and if the MSS. have an *iota* too many he may have built the *Isthmionikon βαλανεϊον* mentioned in IG i<sup>2</sup> 94.37 of 418/7) and we suggest that he appears as a colleague of Lampon. Nikias, Laches, Euthydemos are more easily guessed; we expect some generals—not the whole board, since that would exclude part of the ten commissioners and in any case one general or more will have been at Skione—and three were enough for the armistice of 423 (Thuc. iv 114.2). We have no generals' names for 422/1, except Kleon who was dead, but Nikias and Laches are extremely probable, and Euthydemos possible though he is not attested till 418/7 (IG i<sup>2</sup> 902 = Meritt *AFD*, p. 160.9). The ten commissioners follow next.

Lamachos and Demosthenes remain, and their position is the most puzzling feature of the list. It would have been easy to make up the number with two more generals, but these two are separated from the three we identify as generals, and may well have missed election in 422: Lamachos is not heard of otherwise between his loss of ten ships near Herakleia in 424 (Thuc. iv 75) and his Sicilian command of 415, nor Demosthenes between the Boeotian disaster (followed by a minor defeat at Sikyon, iv 101.3-4) of 424 and his command at Epidaurus in 418/7 (v 80.3). We suggest that the order of the list is the order of proposal in the assembly: two rectrs, three generals, the ten commissioners were obvious choices, the presiding officer called for two more names, and someone proposed these two. Neither (though this is not the place for a detailed examination of their careers) is likely to have been an enthusiastic supporter of the peace, but this may itself have been the reason for their appointment: we cannot reconstruct the scene in detail, but we need imagine nothing stranger than the comedy of 425.

A. ANDREWES.  
D. M. LEWIS.

Oxford.



## FALSE STATEMENT IN THE *SOPHIST*

VARIOUS attempts<sup>1</sup> have been made to find a satisfactory alternative to Cornford's explanation of what the *Sophist* has to say about false statement, and in particular to his interpretation of the passage in which the statements 'Theaetetus is sitting' and 'Theaetetus is flying' are discussed. The difficulty with Cornford's view is that he wants to find the explanation of truth and falsity entirely in the 'blending' or incompatibility of Forms, but that in the examples Socrates chooses, while Sitting and Flying may be Forms, Theaetetus cannot be. Hence Cornford has to say, 'It is not meant that Forms are the only elements in all discourse. We can also make statements about individual things. But it is true that every such statement must contain at least one Form'.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, when talking about the εἶδων συμπλοκή at 259c, the Stranger seems clearly to envisage a blending of εἶδη with each other: διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. How can this be reconciled with an 'example' in which only one term stands for a Form?

I do not propose to discuss in detail the various solutions that have been offered, but to set forth my own interpretation of the whole passage. This may be regarded as to some extent a 'blending' of what has been said by Professor Hackforth and Mr. Hamlyn, but a number of points arise which deserve further discussion, and it may perhaps be hoped that such a σύνθεσις as this may prove to be *ὁριανὰ τε καὶ ἀληθὴς λόγος ἀληθής*.

Professor Hackforth has argued<sup>3</sup> that if we compare the use of συμπλοκή at 262c and of the corresponding verb at 262d (συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι), it appears likely that what are 'woven together' at 259c are not Forms at all, but simply parts of speech. The γένη discussed earlier on (254b seq.)—Existence, Motion, Rest, Sameness and Difference—are Forms; but the εἶδη referred to in the expression εἰδῶν συμπλοκή are not, in Hackforth's view, the same sort of thing at all. With much of what Hackforth says on other points in connexion with this problem I agree, as will appear, but I do not believe that we are concerned with Forms only to the limited extent that he would allow, or that the εἰδῶν συμπλοκή has to do with parts of speech. I will begin with this latter point.

The discussion of the μέγιστον γένος arises out of the question raised in the *Parmenides*, whether (and if so, how) a Form can be both one and many. At *Parmenides* 129a Socrates says that there is nothing surprising in the fact that sensible things can partake of opposite characters such as 'like' and 'unlike', or 'one' and 'many', but that he would admire anyone who could show that Likeness itself and Unlikeness, Plurality and Unity, Rest and Motion 'and all the rest' (129c) could have these contrary characters and be combined with or separated from one another; and presently (130c seq.) Parmenides raises the question exactly how a Form that is a unity can come to be present in the many particulars that are instances of it. What is meant here by 'and all the rest'? From 129c-e—that is, from the context—it seems certain that this means 'and all other Forms'.<sup>4</sup> In the *Philebus* the simpler kind of one-many problem is again dismissed (14c seq.), and then Socrates continues (15a): 'But suppose you venture to take as your One such things as Man, Ox, the Beautiful, the Good, then you have the sort of unities that involve you in dispute if you give them your serious attention and submit them to division. . . . How are we to conceive that each of them . . . is, to begin with, most assuredly this single unity, and yet subsequently comes to be in the infinite number of things that come into being?' Here we have a number of other Forms mentioned in connexion with the same problem as was raised in the *Parmenides*, how a Form can be one and yet many, suggested furthermore as possible objects of Division. There is a strong presumption, therefore, that when the *Sophist* yet again dismisses the simpler form of the one-many problem (251a-c), raises the question whether Existence, Motion and Rest can participate in each other or not (Sameness and Difference are brought in later), and suggests that a science of Division is needed to show which γένη accord with which and which are incompatible (253b-d), these γένη are Forms<sup>5</sup>—though whether they are παραδείγματα-Forms such as we find in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* is another matter, into which I shall not go; and, further, that we are concerned with the relations subsisting between *all* Forms, and not merely those that are named. That this is so becomes abundantly clear when at 254c the Stranger says, 'We will not take all the Forms [this

<sup>1</sup> E.g. R. Hackforth in *CQ* xxiix (1943), 56 ff.; R. Robinson in *Phil. Rev.* lix (1950), 3 ff.; A. L. Peck in *CQ* n.s. ii (1952), 32 ff.; J. L. Ackrill in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*, no. 2 (1953), 92 ff.; D. W. Hamlyn in *Phil. Q.* v (1955), 289 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Plato's *Theory of Knowledge*, 300.

<sup>3</sup> *loc. cit.*, 57, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. especially 129c ad init.: καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάρτων ὁμοειδῶς: ἢ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τὰ καὶ εἶδη κτλ.

<sup>5</sup> As Cornford observes (*op. cit.* 261, n. 1), εἶδος and γένος are treated as synonymous in the *Sophist*, cf., e.g., 256d-e; and when at 261b an allusion is made to 253d, where τὸ μὴ ὂν was said to be an εἶδος, we are told that it was found to be a γένος.

time the word is εἶδη] for fear of getting confused in such a multitude, but choose out some of those that are recognised as most (or very) important, and consider . . . how they stand in respect of being capable of combination with one another' (κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δύνημους).

It is also clear that whether or not Plato thought he knew exactly how it was that a Form that was a simple entity could be simultaneously a 'many', he did think that if any Form was to be instantiated in any other Form or in phenomena—in other words, if predication was to be possible and any statement meaningful—that must be so somehow; and that whatever else this might imply, it did presuppose the existence of certain definite relationships between Forms. Like the letters of the alphabet, some Forms cannot be 'fitted together', but others can (253a). If there were no possibility of combination, you could not even say of anything that it 'existed' (252a, c). The Stranger discusses at some length the relations existing between the εἶδη that he has chosen to be his examples, the most important outcome for our purpose being that 'what is not' can mean 'what is different'; more of this anon; and it is at this point that, in deploring the attempt of some people to disallow any combination, he remarks, 'This isolation of everything from everything else means a complete abolition of all discourse; διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν' (259c). The sequence of thought requires that 'everything' here means 'all Forms', and that it is the *συμπλοκή* of Forms with each other that is regarded as making discourse possible. So far we have been concerned with nothing else. Only later, at 261d, does Plato turn to consider the relationship between words. The 'isolation' here deplored must be the same as the refusal to admit that any γένη combine which was considered at 251e–252c, and τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν must be interpreted on the assumption that we are somehow concerned with two or more Forms even when dealing with statements about particular individual persons or things, such as 'Theaetetus is sitting' or 'Theaetetus is flying'. Now Mr. Ackrill believes<sup>6</sup> that the Forms with which we are concerned are not, or at any rate not all, contained in the statement with which we are dealing: he takes Plato's meaning to be that such a sentence as 'Theaetetus is sitting' would be meaningless unless 'sitting' excluded various incompatible predicates. 'Sitting', in fact, is *not*—is different from—standing, running, lying, and so on; and it is only because of the way in which the world of concepts is constructed—in such a way that the use of one term can rule out others—that informative statements can be made. If Mr. Ackrill is right, then we are concerned with the relationship between the existing predicate of a sentence, and other possible predicates with which it is incompatible. But this seems unsatisfactory for several reasons. (i) First, it involves taking the εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν to refer simply to the complicated structure of the world of Forms—the 'web' or 'interwoven complex' that exists—and not, as one might expect, to the ways in which we weave Forms together when we talk. When the verb *συμπλέκειν* is used later (262d) in connexion with words, it is the statement (λόγος) that we make that is said to do the weaving, when it combines a verb with a name. (ii) It is surely odd to say that discourse depends on the fact that Forms are interwoven one with another, if what is meant is that it depends on the fact that some Forms will *not* combine. (iii) It was precisely the possibility of combining terms *within* a sentence (*συνέπρειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις*) that was taken at 252c to indicate that some Forms will combine, and, indeed, was at the root of the serious kind of one-many problem. (iv) At 252c–253a the combination of Kinds was compared to the fitting-together of letters of the alphabet to make a word, and nothing was said about the incompatibility of a constituent letter with others that would not fit. (v) When at 261d *scq.* the weaving-together of parts of speech is compared to the fitting-together of Forms and of letters, it is compatibility with what is in the sentence that is insisted upon, not incompatibility with something else: it is 'words which, when spoken in succession, signify something' (261d–e) that may be said to fit together. It is not the incompatibility of 'stags' with 'roaring' or anything else extraneous that makes 'lions stags' not a statement, but the fact that 'stags' does not fit with 'lions' to make sense. For all these reasons it seems best to take the Stranger's remark at 259c to mean that in any statement we make we are in fact weaving Forms together, either correctly or incorrectly, and that only so is discourse possible. When we say 'Theaetetus is sitting', we are weaving together (whether we realise it or not) the Form Man with the Form Sitting. As Mr. Hamlyn has put it, 'Theaetetus' may be regarded as 'unpacking' into a list of all the Forms of which he partakes.<sup>7</sup> But we need not say, with Mr. Hamlyn, that according to Plato every significant statement is concerned with Forms *alone*, that proper names always refer simply to Forms, and that particulars as such do not enter into knowledge at all.<sup>8</sup> The Stranger presently insists on the reality of the subject of the statements 'Theaetetus is sitting' and 'Theaetetus is flying', and makes it clear that he is referring to the particular person to whom he is talking (263a, c). This need not surprise us, since the *Theaetetus* explicitly ascribes being (*οὐσία*) to objects of perception (185a, c; 186b *seq.*). We can allow that descriptive knowledge may be about particulars—may sometimes be contained, that is, in statements referring to particulars—while at the same time recognising that any such statement, if true, must presuppose a certain relationship between Forms.

<sup>6</sup> *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 293–5.

<sup>8</sup> *loc. cit.*, 292, 301.



The statement that our discourse has come about through the weaving-together of Forms and that discourse would be abolished if there were no combination among Forms does not mean that every sentence that has meaning correctly represents the relationship between the Forms concerned. Sometimes in our statements we weave together Forms that do not in fact combine, and should not be so woven. The point is that if *no* Forms combined, *no* statement would be meaningful, because no statement could possibly be true; if nothing were instantiated in anything else, to say that 'X is y' or 'X exists' would be meaningless; and it is on the belief that there are meaningful statements and that some of them are true that the Stranger bases his conclusion that some Forms combine. He argues, as we have seen, that if there were no such combination, you could not say of anything that it 'existed' (252a, c). But we may take it that only a true statement implies the ability of the Forms concerned to combine. The fact that Motion and Rest combine with Existence is inferred from the fact that they plainly do exist (254d), and the all-pervasive nature of Sameness and Difference is similarly inferred from what is assumed to be true fact (256d-e). 'Theaetetus is sitting' can be true because men are in fact capable of sitting. But a statement can be meaningful even if the Forms concerned in that particular statement do not in fact combine. 'Pigs swim', to take but one example of a false general statement, is a statement that conveys meaning, but the Forms concerned will not combine because pigs cannot swim. Plato probably considered the statement 'Theaetetus is flying' as in the same way necessarily false, because he probably thought it impossible that any man could fly, but he no doubt regarded it as nevertheless meaningful. There would be no point in taking as an example of a false statement one that he himself regarded not as false but as meaningless, especially as it is the Stranger's object to show that τὸ μὴ ὂν in the sense of the false can exist and blend with discourse (λόγος), or in other words that a statement can be false and yet have meaning. In the actual discussion of the statement 'Theaetetus is flying' no mention is made of incompatibility between the Forms concerned, and it would, indeed, be inappropriate that Plato should attempt to explain truth and falsity there in terms of Forms for two reasons: firstly, because the sophists whom he has to convince would probably not accept, even if they understood, the theory of Forms, and secondly because although the Forms concerned must combine if a statement is to be true, the fact that they can combine does not make a contingent statement inevitably true. The fact that Man can combine with Sitting does not mean that it is necessarily true to say at this moment that Theaetetus is sitting: that depends upon circumstances. All we can say is that such a combination is a necessary prerequisite to the truth of any such statement.

'Now,' says the Stranger at 261d, 'remembering what we said about Forms and letters, let us consider words in the same way. . . . Words which, when spoken in succession, signify something, do fit together, while those which mean nothing when they are strung together, do not.' He goes on to point out that a statement must contain an ὄνομα and a ῥήμα (262a seq.), and it is perhaps suggested, though this is not explicitly stated, that any combination of an ὄνομα and a ῥήμα will constitute a meaningful sentence. At 262d the Stranger says that we call the πλέγμα of ὄνομα and ῥήμα a λόγος because it gives information and 'gets you somewhere' (τὴ περὶ οὗ). It is true that he is speaking with special reference to the statement ἀνθρώπου μανθίνει, but that is only given as an example. He seems to mean that any combination of ὄνομα and ῥήμα gives information and is meaningful. If so, we have here what is virtually a definition of a meaningful statement.\* At all events we are not now concerned with Forms. When the Stranger says at 262d that a statement 'gives information . . . it does not merely name something but gets you somewhere by weaving together verbs with names', the repetition of the weaving metaphor, like the reminder of what was said about Forms and letters, is intended simply to indicate that a statement, like reality and like words, is complex in its structure.

It remains for the Stranger to give his demonstration that a meaningful statement can be false. It is first agreed that any statement must be about something, not about nothing, and that it must be of a certain character—that is, be either true or false. The Stranger then takes as examples the statements 'Theaetetus is sitting' and 'Theaetetus is flying', and his respondent declares that these are true and false respectively. The Stranger's following remarks require careful attention.

1. λέγει ■ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστι περὶ σοῦ.

'The true statement states about you the things-that-are as they are.'

2. ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.

'The false one states things other than the things-that-are.'

3. τὸ μὴ ὄντα ὅρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

'So it states the things-that-are-not as things-that-are.'

\* This view receives support from the summing-up at 263d (which I quote below as proposition (g)). Hackforth (*loc. cit.*, 37) speaks of 'obviously meaningless conjunctions of noun and verb', like 'Boots drink' or 'Boots

love', but these expressions do give information, however untrue, and might be said to have a meaning. If a fairy story were written about boots in love, a child would understand what was meant.



We are reminded by (1) of a passage in the *Euthydemus* (283c-284c), where Euthydemus maintains that the man λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ὃν ὁ λόγος ἢ inevitably λέγει ἐν τῶν ὄντων. But ὁ γε τὸ ὄν λέγων καὶ τὰ ὄντα τάλιθ' λέγει (284a), so that falsity is impossible. The fallacy lies in the ambiguity of τὸ ὄν (or τὰ ὄντα), which can refer either (i) to an existing person or thing, or (ii) to truth. Euthydemus' premiss is concerned with (i): he is talking about the subject of a sentence. But in his conclusion τὸ ὄν and τὰ ὄντα are ambiguous: his assertion is valid only if they refer to complex situations or states of affairs which 'are' (exist). Now if it were in this latter sense that τὰ ὄντα was used in (1) here and τῶν ὄντων in (2), the sophist might well object, as Cornford has pointed out,<sup>10</sup> that there is no such thing as a non-existent fact, so that even if τὰ μὴ ὄντα means ἔτερα, he could still deny that Theaetetus-flying is an ὄν. I take it, then, that although the Stranger uses what appears to have been a more or less accepted definition of a true statement,<sup>11</sup> he plans to make τὰ ὄντα refer to what is indicated by the predicate alone (in his example, 'sitting'). This is borne out by (4a).

4a. ὄντων δὲ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ.

'But these things that it states about you, though different from things-that-are, are still things-that-are.'

Professor Hackforth<sup>12</sup> says of this, 'The Greek might be (uncouthly) expanded thus: λέγει δὲ περὶ σοῦ τίνα ἢ ἕτερα ἔστι τῶν περὶ σοῦ ὄντων, the enclitic ἔστι being of course unemphatic (as I take ὄντα to be in the text; and ὄντων emphatic'. He translates, 'Yes, but these things, while different from those that are about you, are said about you'. This seems a most unnatural way to take these words. περὶ σοῦ comes at the end; and ὄντα looks as though it is quite as emphatic as ὄντων, and certainly more emphatic than περὶ σοῦ.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the reality of the subject is adequately emphasised in (6), (7) and (8). What we might expect after the long discussion of Otherness and 'not-being', and what we need in order to be assured that a false statement does not λέγει οὐδέν, is an indication that 'the things-that-are-not' *are* (exist). This, I submit, is what is given to us here. But if this is so, ὄντα here cannot refer to the whole complex situation, 'Theaetetus-flying, which does not in fact exist. It refers to what is denoted by the predicate alone, and the point is that 'flying', though different from 'sitting', is still a thing-that-is. This does not mean that it is here represented as in any sense a Form; we are not told that it is a transcendental entity, or that it is simply a concept; we are not concerned, in this *argumentum ad sophistas*, with Forms. It is simply a 'thing' with which we meet from time to time, as when we see birds flying. It is a thing that exists. We need not suppose that our sophist would deny this. He is not a nihilist: there is no dispute as to the reality of Theaetetus, when the Stranger observes that the statement 'Theaetetus is flying' is about him and not about nothing; and like Euthydemus in the dialogue of that name (283c-284a) he would probably admit that τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ὃν ὁ λόγος ἢ is one of τῶν ὄντων. As a common-sense sort of person, he would not deny that flying exists: he would probably call it a πρᾶγμα, and mean by that something which, at least in non-philosophical parlance, might be said to exist. But if the Stranger wants to say that flying, though different from sitting, is still a real thing, why does he use the plural (ὄντα)? No doubt because of the use of τὰ ὄντα in (1), which appears to represent a popular definition of a true statement.

4b. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἑκάστου εἶναι πού, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

'For we said that with regard to everything there are many things-that-are, and many things-that-are-not.'

The allusion is to 256c, where the Stranger remarks περὶ ἑκάστου ἄρα τῶν εἶδων πολλὸν μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πληθεῖ τὸ μὴ ὄν. This is his conclusion after he has shown that each one of the γένη or Forms is different from Existence and so 'is not', but nevertheless partakes of Existence and so 'is'; and it is in a similar connexion that at 259b he observes that every Form πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἔστι. Our present proposition therefore means—as indeed the present context is itself sufficient to show—'For we said that in the case of each thing there is much that it is, and much that it is not (i.e. is different from)'. As applied to the present statements about Theaetetus, it cannot mean 'there are many things that he is not as well as many that he is, i.e. there are many possible negative determinations as well as many positive, e.g. he is not flying', because 'things-that-are-not' here means things from which *x* is different, and there is no question of Theaetetus' being different from anything else.<sup>14</sup> Nor can the allusion be to the difference between the complex situation

<sup>10</sup> *op. cit.*, 313.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. the description of a true statement at *loc. cit.* 311b as one ὃς ὃν τὸ ὄντα λέγει ὃς ἔστι, and Ctesippus' grudging admission at *loc. cit.* 311c that a false statement τὸ ὄντα μὲν ἔφαμεν τίνα λέγει, οὐ κατεμ' ὡς γε ἔχει.

<sup>12</sup> *loc. cit.*, 31.

<sup>13</sup> That ὄντα here is emphatic was suggested in a paper (to which the present article is much indebted) read by Professor R. C. Cross at a joint meeting of the Northern

Association for Ancient Philosophy and the Scottish Group in September 1955.

<sup>14</sup> Hackforth (*loc. cit.*, 31) writes: 'That which is truly asserted may be positive (*x* is A, B, C) or negative (*x* is not D, E, F). Now D is something said about *c*, but something different from what is about *x*. Hence the false statement *x* is D substitutes one of the negative determinations of *x* for one of the positive.' This is no doubt true, but it is not what the Stranger is saying in the present sentence.

Theaetetus-flying and the complex situation Theaetetus-sitting, because, as has already been remarked *a propos* the *τὸ ὄν* of (1), that would not help the Stranger's argument. By a process of elimination, the allusion must be to the things denoted by the predicates, flying and sitting. Another consideration leads to the same conclusion. The present assertion is given us as the justification of (4a), and if so it is justifying a claim that something (namely, flying) that is-not (in the sense of being different) nevertheless also is. Although flying is-not (is different from) sitting, it nevertheless is (exists): for we said that that which is-not (is different from) many things can nevertheless *be*.

After pointing out (5) that 'Theaetetus is flying' must necessarily be one of the shortest possible sentences (262a-e showed that a sentence must include at least one *ὄνομα* and one *ῥῆμα*), the Stranger goes on:

6. 'And it must be about something (or someone).'

7. 'And if it is not about you, it is anyhow not about anything (or anyone) else.'

8. 'But if it were about nothing (or no one), it wouldn't even be a statement at all; for we showed that it was an impossibility for something that was a statement to be a statement about nothing (or no one).'

That *τινός* in (6) refers only to the subject, and not to the complex situation, is shown by the *αὐτός* in (7) and the *περί σοῦ* in (1), (4a) and (9). The subject, then, is something real. Theaetetus is real. This prepares the way for the final summing-up, which shows that the truth or falsity of a sentence depends upon the juxtaposition of a particular subject with a particular verb.

9. *περί δὲ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάνατος ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὄν ὡς ὄντι, παντάπασιν φαίνεται ἢ τοιαύτη σὺνθεσις, ἢ καὶ ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὅπως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίνεσθαι λόγον ψευδῆς.*

'And when what is different is stated as the same and things-that-are-not as things-that-are about you, this sort of combination, although made up of verbs and names, does definitely seem to be really and truly a false statement.'

What is the force of the participle *γιγνομένη*? Translators generally avoid the issue.<sup>15</sup> It can surely only be concessive, and if so this supports the view that I have already put forward, that 262a *seq.* may be taken as virtually defining a meaningful statement. The point here is then that it is the particular *σύνθεσις* of *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα* that makes the statement 'Theaetetus is flying' untrue, although the statement is meaningful because of its make-up, since it is composed of an *ὄνομα* and a *ῥῆμα*. But we are no doubt intended to remember, also, that it has been admitted that both *ὄνομα* and *ῥῆμα* refer to real things. It is possible, while alluding solely to things that are real, and doing so in a statement that is meaningful, to say *τὸ μὴ ὄν*. (A true statement would not of course necessarily become false if any different predicate were substituted for the existing one, but only if an incompatible one were substituted. But we need not press this point. It is enough for the Stranger's purpose to show that the substitution of a different predicate can make the statement false; for his aim is not so much to define falsity as to show that it is possible to 'say what is not'—and for that all he needs to do is to equate 'what is not' with 'what is different'.<sup>16</sup>)

The expression *λεγόμενα θάνατος ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὄν ὡς ὄντι* reminds us of 253d, where we find that *τὸ κατὰ γένη διαμεμεσθαι καὶ μῆτε ταῦτόν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγέσασθαι μῆτε ἕτερον ὄν ταῦτόν* is the business of the science of dialectic. It is the task of the philosopher (253c). He will think in terms of Forms, and distinguish one from another however slight the difference may be. This will help

<sup>15</sup> E.g. 'Ainsi un assemblage de verbes et de noms, qui, à ton sujet, énoncé, en fait, comme autre, ce qui est tel, et, comme étant, ce qui n'est point, voilà, ce semble, au juste, l'espèce d'assemblage qui constitue réellement et véritablement un discours faux' (Désir). 'So what is stated about you, but so that what is different is stated as the same or what is not as what is—a combination of verbs and names answering to that description finally seems to be really and truly a false statement' (Cornford).

<sup>16</sup> Hamlyn (*loc. cit.* 292) remarks that Plato 'says in 257c that the "nature of difference" is subdivided, and he seems to have in mind here a range of incompatibles; what is to say that A is not B is to say that A is incompatible with B'. The belief that Plato had this in mind here seems to be not uncommon, but it is unlikely to be correct. The sequence of thought is this: The nature of Difference makes all other Kinds different from *αὐτόν*, so that in a sense they 'are not', and in a similar way *τὸ αὐτὸ* itself 'is not' (256d-257a); *τὸ μὴ ὄν* is not then (here) the opposite of *τὸ ὄν*, but only different (from it). Just as *τὸ μὴ μέγα* is not necessarily the opposite of *τὸ μέγα*, but may mean *τὸ μικρόν* or *τὸ ἴσον*—the *μὴ* simply indicates something different (257b-c); *τὸ μὴ καλόν* and *τὸ μὴ μέγα* exist just as much as *τὸ καλόν* and *τὸ μέγα*, for the parts of *ἡ φύσις*

*φύσις* must exist just as much as we have seen that it does, and the setting of such a part in contrast to a part of *τὸ ὄν* does not signify the opposite of *τὸ ὄν*, but only something different from it—this is the *τὸ μὴ ὄν* we have been looking for, and it is a Form (257d-258c); Parmenides has been contradicted: *τὸ μὴ ὄν* is not the opposite of *τὸ ὄν* (258c-e); an opponent must accept or refuse our conclusions that (i) the Kinds blend, (ii) Existence and Difference pervade them all, and (iii) Difference and Existence both are and are not. Now if Plato meant to offer us a range of incompatibles, he has kept his purpose dark. All he insists on is that difference is not the same as non-existence, and the discussion of the 'parts' of the Different is simply a justification or elaboration of the analogy between *τὸ μὴ ὄν* and *τὸ μὴ μέγα* which at the same time helps to lead to the identification of *τὸ μὴ ὄν* with *τὸ ἕτερον*. The only possible ground for supposing that e.g. *τὸ μὴ μέγα* does not embrace all Forms other than *τὸ μέγα* is 257b, where on Hamlyn's hypothesis we should have to take *τὸ ἴσον* to be a grade on the height-scale between tall and short, but that seems unreasonable. In any ordinary sense being equal to something or someone is not incompatible with being tall. *τὸ ἴσον* and *τὸ μέγα* are simply different.

him in his purpose of discovering ποῖα ποῖοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐδέχεται (253b-c), which will *inter alia* show him which predicates can be attached to a given subject in a general statement and which cannot. In practising dialectic, he will be concerned with Forms alone, and therefore only with general propositions. But in making both general and particular statements one must attach a correct predicate to the subject, if the statement is to be true; it is the σύνθεσις that makes the statement true or false; and that is why careful distinctions are necessary (259c-d).

We have here an important attempt to explain the nature of descriptive or stated knowledge. Whether or not Plato still believed in the possibility of a direct, mystical apprehension of Forms, a 'knowledge by acquaintance',<sup>17</sup> he shows in the *Theaetetus* that truth and falsity cannot be explained in terms of the correct or incorrect identification with one another or with things of simple entities of any kind, whether they be sense-impressions, memory-traces, 'pieces' of knowledge or anything else. Here in the *Sophist* he explains them with reference to statements. But in the *Theaetetus* it was also suggested (201d seq.) that if simple entities cannot be 'known' (γινώσκειν) but only named, then a statement composed of names referring to several such entities will itself be a collection of unknowables; or else, if the juxtaposition of these be thought to result in something additional arising, a new unit, then that, as a simple entity, would again be unknowable. In our passage of the *Sophist* Plato avoids this difficulty by showing that stating is not simply a matter of naming: οὐκ ὀνομαζέει μόνον ἀλλὰ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ (262d).<sup>18</sup> Subject and predicate are not entirely discrete. A statement gives information (δηλοῖ περὶ, 262d), stating things *about* someone or something. It expresses, in fact, a *relationship* between a subject and an activity, and is not simply the sum of the words that make it up. But neither, for the same reason, is it a distinct simple entity that arises out of or supervenes upon an aggregation of 'parts'; for a relationship is not a simple entity. Truth and falsity are essentially propositional, and a statement, according to Plato, expresses a relationship.

R. S. BLUCK.

Queen Mary College, University of London.

<sup>17</sup> If το μὲν at 253b-4 is a self-predicational Form, as it appears to be, Plato must still have believed in paradigmatic Forms. Belief in the possibility of a direct mystical apprehension of them would not be inconsistent with the present account of propositional truth, which yields a different kind of knowledge.

<sup>18</sup> Plato does not say that words are not names of

things, and we may notice the *μὲν* here. That he did still think of the words of a sentence as standing for or representing things of some kind is shown by 257c: τῶν ἄλλων τι μὲν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁρομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ὧν' οὐδέχεται τι ἐπιδέχασθαι ἄλλω τῶν ἀποφάντων ὀνόματι.



## ZENO'S PARADOXES

THE incessant labours of British industrialists have sent up a pall of smoke over our larger cities. Sometimes the pall descends and causes fog. So it is also with scholarship; the incessant labours of modern scholars often cause a fog to descend upon our understanding of ancient philosophers. A case in point is Zeno of Elea.<sup>1</sup> The paradoxes of Zeno have aroused much discussion ever since they were first propounded; the long history has been recorded by Florian Cajori (*The History of Zeno's Arguments on Motion*, reprinted from *American Mathematical Monthly*, Vol. 22, 1915). But it was not until quite recent times that men began to doubt the correctness of Aristotle's account of the paradoxes. Towards the end of the nineteenth century a number of French writers<sup>2</sup> built up elaborate reconstructions of Zeno's four arguments on Motion. Refusing to accept the explicit testimony of Aristotle on a number of points, they argued, first, that Zeno must have been more intelligent than Aristotle made him out to be; and secondly, that the arguments, when rightly interpreted and reconstructed, follow a certain pattern. Thus in their praise of Zeno they could not help including an element of denigration of Aristotle.

Zeno's arguments in their reconstructed form appear to have held an irresistible fascination for Earl Russell,<sup>3</sup> who discusses them both in relation to the mathematical infinite and in relation to more general philosophy; his discussions are sometimes bound up with attacks upon Bergson's view of continuity. In *Principles of Mathematics* (1937, p. 348) Russell disclaimed any interest in the historical correctness of Zeno's arguments, saying that he regarded them as 'merely a text for discussion'; he also admitted that he had 'no first-hand authority as to what Zeno really did say or mean'. This did not deter him from making such sweeping statements as the following (p. 347 of the same work): 'In this capricious world, nothing is more capricious than posthumous fame. One of the most notable victims of posterity's lack of judgment is the Eleatic Zeno. Having invented four arguments, all immeasurably subtle and profound, the grossness of subsequent philosophers pronounced him to be a mere ingenious juggler, and his arguments to be one and all sophisms.' In *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1926) Russell seems to have been at more pains to discover the historical correctness of the paradoxes, and he is inclined to accept the French interpretations with one or two changes; but he still has to rely on other authorities.

The matter has not ended here. Mr. H. D. P. Lee, in his book *Zeno of Elea* (C.U.P., 1936), accepts the French reconstructions more or less *in toto*. Sir David Ross (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics*, 1936, Introd., pp. 71-94) accepts the French reconstruction of the fourth paradox, but firmly refuses to depart from Aristotle's 'explicit testimony' on the first two paradoxes. He is inclined to accept the French theory that the four paradoxes are arranged in accordance with a certain pattern.

B. L. van der Waerden, in *Mathematische Annalen*, 1940 (Vol. 117, pp. 141-61), showed clearly that there was little or no evidence to support the theories of Tannery. Even more to the point is G. Calogero, 'Studi sull' Eleatismo', *Pubblicazioni della Scuola di Filosofia della R. Università di Roma*, 1932. But either the news did not percolate through to these islands, or else we have closed our ears to it. For in 1948 we still find Mr. J. E. Raven saying that in the fourth paradox Aristotle 'must have missed the point' (*Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, p. 74).

I regard most of this reconstruction and departure from Aristotle's evidence as a modern aberration. Certainly it is difficult to be sure that Aristotle is an accurate reporter; but there is no real reason for supposing that he is not. Aristotle was writing rather over 100 years later, but I think that Zeno's arguments must have been well known among philosophers during the entire intervening period, and it is not likely that Aristotle could have mis-stated them with impunity. Aristotle provides the only reasonably early evidence of the 'paradoxes' (which he himself calls *logoi*, arguments); ancient commentators, who wrote much later, like Simplicius and Philoponus, add very little.

The main arguments that are used against Aristotle's evidence are (1) the dogmatic pronouncement, that Zeno must have been more intelligent, and (2) the theory that the four arguments together follow a certain pattern. The second point will have to be examined later; the first

<sup>1</sup> Elea, a city in Lucania, was founded by that energetic seafaring people, the Phœaciens. Zeno's 'floruit' was probably about 480 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Tannery, P.: *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène* (2<sup>me</sup> éd. Paris 1930), pp. 255-70; *Rev. Phil.* xx, 1885, pp. 385-410. Brochard, V.: *Rev. de Mét. et Mor.* I, 1893, pp. 209-15, etc. Noël, G.: *Rev. de Mét. et Mor.* I, 1893, pp. 108-25.

<sup>3</sup> Bertrand Russell: *Principles of Mathematics* (1937), pp. 347 ff.; *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1926), pp. 129 ff.; *History of Western Philosophy* (1948), Chapter xxviii; *Monthly*, July 1912, pp. 337-41; and *The Philosophy of Bergson* (Bower & Bower, Cambridge, 1914).

invites more immediate comment. It seems to me that those who try to make Zeno's arguments better than they probably were, are not really doing Zeno a service; they are merely showing a gross lack of imagination in regard to the limitations of Zeno's times. They fail to realise that in these early times, such clear formulations as 'Distance equals Speed multiplied by Time' had not been made. If they could realise that Zeno's examples of Achilles and the Stadium were perhaps the first inklings that man ever had of such simple equations, they would arrive at a far higher estimation of Zeno's true greatness. In order to praise Zeno, there is no need to slur over the evident shallowness of the paradoxes as posed; but there is every need to understand him in relation to his own times.

I shall begin by presenting Aristotle's version of Zeno's arguments about Motion; then I shall discuss various theories which have been held about them.

## I. ZENO'S ARGUMENTS ON MOTION

### A. THE FOUR PARADOXES, AS GIVEN BY ARISTOTLE

The four paradoxes on Motion are given by Aristotle as follows:

#### 1. *Dichotomy* (endless slicing-into-two).

The first paradox of Zeno, according to Aristotle, was that 'motion does not take place because the moving body must get to the midway point before it gets to the end' (*Physics* 239b11-13); i.e. in order to cover any distance, the moving body has first to reach the half-way point; but in order to reach the half-way point, it has first to reach the quarter-way point, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore the moving body has to cover an infinite number of points before it can reach its goal; therefore it never reaches its goal.

#### 2. *Achilles*

The second is the argument of 'Achilles and the Tortoise' (known in Aristotle's time as the 'Achilles'):

'The slowest will never be overtaken in a race by the swiftest; for, as reckoning from any given instant, the pursuer, before he can catch the pursued, must reach the point from which the pursued started at that instant' (*Physics* 239b15-18).

The argument may be paraphrased as follows: Say the tortoise at any given instant is ten yards ahead of Achilles; and say Achilles is ten times the swifter. Then let Achilles move up ten yards to where the tortoise is; the tortoise will move one yard, and will still be one yard ahead. Then let Achilles move up the one yard; the tortoise will move one-tenth of a yard, and so still be one-tenth of a yard ahead. This can go on *ad infinitum*. Therefore Achilles has to pass through an infinite number of positions before he can overtake the tortoise; therefore he never overtakes the tortoise.

#### 3. *Arrow*

Aristotle's account of the third paradox is excessively abbreviated and obscure. The conclusion of the argument was that 'the flying arrow is at rest'; the argument itself was based on a consideration of the individual instants during the arrow's flight, and the general purport of it was that since at each instant during the arrow's flight the arrow must be considered to be motionless, therefore the arrow is motionless (and so at rest) for the whole period of its flight. So much is clear enough; but what is not clear is the exact manner in which Zeno proved that the arrow is motionless at every instant during its flight. The most probable version of the whole argument is as follows:

At every instant during its flight the arrow occupies a space equal to itself.

If it occupies a space equal to itself, it must be motionless.

Therefore the arrow is motionless at every instant during its flight.

Therefore the flying arrow is at rest throughout the entire time of its flight.

But since there is some doubt about this, it is necessary to give the reader some idea of the basic evidence, and of the alternative possibilities. Aristotle's text as it stands does not quite make sense:

'Zeno's argument is fallacious. For if, he says, everything is either at rest or in motion, when it is over-against what is equal to itself, and what is in flight is always in the now, then the flying arrow is motionless. But this is false, for time is not composed of indivisible nows, any more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles' (*Physics* 239b5-9).

The first alternative is to suppose that the argument is as outlined in my opening paragraph. We can get this result either by making two additions to Aristotle's text or else by supposing that Aristotle himself gave an excessively abbreviated account of the argument, and that he really meant to include these additions. Aristotle's text perhaps ought to read:


'For if, he says, everything is either at rest or in motion, but nothing is in motion when it is over-against what is equal to itself; and if what is in flight is always in the now, and what is in the now is over-against what is equal to itself; then the flying arrow is motionless.'

Emendation along these lines is approved by Diels (29A.27) and several other scholars, and it seems quite likely that at any rate the first insertion might have fallen out of the text; a scribe's eye could easily have slipped from the first 'in motion' to the second. The only trouble is that it is difficult to suppose two rather big errors in so short a passage. It seems possible to me that Aristotle gave the barest skeleton of the argument, and that the reason why he stressed the two points ('everything is at rest or in motion', and 'what is in flight is always in the now') was perhaps because these were two points he specially wished to combat. He had argued earlier on in *Physics* VI (the book in which his account of the paradoxes occurs) that neither rest nor motion is possible in the now (254a24 ff.); in the immediate context he is concerned to show that time is not made up of indivisible nows.

The first alternative is supported by Philoponus 817.6, and it seems intrinsically probable. The other alternative is given by Simplicius (1011, 19), who accepted Aristotle's unemended text and explained it as follows: 'The flying arrow is over-against what is equal to itself at each now, and so during the entire time of its flight; that which is over-against what is equal to itself at a now, is not in motion, since nothing is in motion at a now; but what is not in motion is at rest, since everything is either in motion or at rest; therefore the flying arrow is at rest during the entire time of its flight.' Thus according to Simplicius Zeno proved immobility in the instant not by saying that 'nothing is in motion when it occupies a space equal to itself', but by saying that 'nothing is in motion in the now'. But if this were the true form of the argument, then there would be no need to mention the 'space equal to itself'. Zeno could simply have said: 'The flying arrow is always in the now; but anything that is in the now is motionless; therefore the flying arrow is always motionless.' So Simplicius's version seems highly improbable.


#### 4. Stadium (*Physics* 239b33-240a18)

The fourth paradox<sup>4</sup> requires a diagram:



The diagram represents a stadium; AAAA, BBBB, and CCCC represent bodies each containing an equal number of units (*ὑποκείμενα*); AAAA is stationary; BBBB and CCCC are moving past each other from opposite directions at exactly equal speeds; the first two B's, and the first two C's, at the outset, both overlap two A's.

Then let us imagine that the B's and C's move. They will soon reach the position where A's, B's and C's are all opposite each other:



Now, says Zeno, when they have reached this position, the first B has passed all 4 C's, but only 2 A's. But, since the first B has been moving at exactly the same speed past both the A's and the C's, then it should have passed the same number of A's as C's; therefore it should have passed 4 A's. Therefore 4 A's equal 2 A's. Zeno apparently concluded in this way (1) that 'twice the time equals half the time', and (2) that 'twice the number of units equal half the number of units'.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle's text of this argument contains one or two textual difficulties, and there are differences of opinion about some minor details of the arrangement of the A's, B's and C's; but the main sense is not in any doubt.



Since, then, the assumption of motion involves such absurd conclusions, we should say that motion does not occur.

As Aristotle says, the fallacy 'lies in assuming that a moving object takes an equal time in passing another object equal in dimensions to itself, whether that other object is stationary or in motion'.

#### B. INTERPRETATIONS, RECONSTRUCTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS

The main purpose of this section is to refute the rather ungrammatical sentence of Earl Russell's which appears in my introduction: 'Having invented four arguments, all immeasurably subtle and profound, the grossness of subsequent philosophers pronounced him to be a mere ingenious juggler, and his arguments to be one and all sophisms.' Aristotle's criticisms of Zeno are very far from being gross; in fact I believe that Earl Russell could have learnt something from Aristotle. Besides this, Zeno's arguments probably involve far more elementary blunders than modern scholars are willing to realise. In the first three paradoxes, it is quite unlikely that Zeno had 'moralised on the time' to such an extent as scholars think he had; in the fourth paradox, I see no reason at all why Zeno should not have made the elementary mistake which Aristotle attributes to him; finally, I see no reason why we should try to make a pattern out of all four paradoxes together. I shall deal with these three points in turn:

##### 1. *The first three paradoxes*

Aristotle says that the first paradox and the 'Achilles' are essentially the same argument; the only difference is that the first involves halving, whereas the second involves division in accordance with the respective velocities of pursued and pursuer. Both arguments involve the same fundamental assumption that it is not possible to 'pass through infinite things' (touching at them one by one 'in a finite time'). Aristotle refutes this by saying that time is infinitely divisible in precisely the same sense as distance is, and that Zeno's paradox depends on an arbitrary selection of the points of division (*Physics* 239b).

Even if this had been all that Aristotle had said about the problem, Earl Russell would hardly have been justified in attacking the 'grossness of subsequent philosophers'. But Aristotle comes back to the problem in *Physics* 263a. Here he admits that his former answer was not a complete answer to the difficulty underlying Zeno's paradox. 'For', he says, 'if one leaves out of account the length and the question whether it is possible to traverse an infinite number of things in a finite time, and asks the same question about the time itself (for the time itself has an infinite number of divisions), our former answer will no longer be adequate.' (263a18-22.) It is just not true to say that Aristotle had not understood all the implications of the first two paradoxes.

We may now continue in the words of Sir David Ross: 'That is to say, Aristotle recognises the deeper significance of the paradox exactly as modern writers have done. But he still maintains that his own former solution was an adequate *argumentum ad hominem* against Zeno (263a15). And thus it could be only if Zeno made the paradox turn on a contrast between the infinite number of divisions of space to be covered in covering a finite space, and the finitude of a particular portion of time (*ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ* 233a23, 263a16, 19).

If Aristotle had never admitted his earlier refutation to be only adequate *ad hominem*, we might suppose him to have misunderstood Zeno's meaning; but since he draws the distinction I have pointed out and still maintains that his earlier argument was good *ad hominem*, this can only be because he held that the paradox as stated by Zeno took account of the infinite divisibility of space only, and not that of time. And since we have no knowledge of the nature of Zeno's argument independent of what Aristotle tells us, we should accept his testimony on this point.' (*Aristotle's Physics*, Introd. pp. 73-74.)

I am inclined to agree with Ross. Russell's only argument in favour of rejecting Aristotle's testimony runs as follows: 'Unfortunately we only know his arguments through Aristotle, who stated them in order to refute them. Those philosophers in the present day who have had their doctrines stated by opponents will realise that a just or adequate presentation of Zeno's position is hardly to be expected from Aristotle; but by some care in interpretation it seems possible to reconstruct the so-called "sophisms" which have been "refuted" by every tyrant from that day to this.' (*Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1926, p. 173.) Russell in a footnote refers to Aristotle's earlier refutation of Zeno in *Physics* 239; of the later passage at 263a he seems blandly unaware. I think perhaps he has a tendency to divide philosophers into two classes; dogmatic asses like Aristotle, and intelligent sceptics like Zeno.

For all that, it is certainly true that we only hear of Zeno's arguments through Aristotle; and Aristotle may have falsified Zeno. In view of what Sir David Ross says, we cannot possibly suppose that Aristotle falsified Zeno because he misunderstood his argument; but there is one reason why

he might have slightly adjusted Zeno's paradoxes, and that is to do with the context in which he discusses them.

The context of Aristotle's first account of the paradoxes, which occurs in *Physics* vi, is a discussion of 'indivisibles'. Aristotle is concerned to combat the theory that magnitudes are composed of indivisible, minimal units; he believes, rather, that magnitudes are infinitely divisible.<sup>2</sup> Just before his account of the paradoxes, he is concerned to establish the infinite divisibility of time. 'Time', he says, 'is not composed of indivisible nows; and this is where Zeno goes wrong in his third paradox.' There follows Aristotle's very brief account of the third paradox, and then Aristotle, as though reminded by this of all four paradoxes, continues: 'There are four arguments of Zeno's concerning motion which give trouble to those who try to solve them' (it looks as if there had been many abortive efforts before Aristotle). Then he enumerates all four paradoxes in order. It is noteworthy that in this context he criticises all the first three paradoxes on the single ground that time is infinitely divisible. In the first two paradoxes, he says, Zeno has not taken into account the fact that the time is infinitely divisible in precisely the same sense as the distance; in the third paradox, he says, Zeno falsely assumes that time is made up of indivisible nows.

In the later passage, however which occurs in *Physics* viii (263a11 ff.), Aristotle is discussing his distinction between 'actual' and 'potential'. Suddenly he breaks off, as though remembering a loose end left from an earlier discussion, and says in effect: 'Of course this distinction is the real answer to Zeno. What we said before was an adequate refutation of the paradoxes as posed by Zeno, but it was not adequate in relation to the matter itself and to truth. The real answer is that, although lines are infinitely divisible, this does not mean that the infinite division ever actually occurs.'

On the basis of this contextual evidence, we can I think suggest a legitimate alternative to Ross's views of the paradoxes. Ross believes that Zeno actually did (as Aristotle's account suggests he did) make his argument turn on a contrast between the infinite number of divisions of space to be covered in covering a finite space, and the finitude of a particular portion of time. I would like to suggest that possibly Zeno's argument was simpler than this, and that Aristotle may have analysed the argument in this way simply because he wished to show its relevance to his own discussion of infinite divisibility.

Perhaps Zeno's argument was simply to the effect that Achilles always has to keep coming up to the point where the tortoise was; and since this can go on indefinitely, Achilles never overtakes the tortoise. Aristotle then interprets the argument as meaning that, since it takes a small period of time to traverse each of the infinitely numerous divisions of distance, therefore it takes an infinite time to traverse any finite distance. Or perhaps he takes 'never' to mean 'not in a finite time'. So he analyses the argument as being dependent on the assumption that it is impossible to pass through infinite things in a finite time. I think Aristotle would be justified in doing this. If Zeno stated his problem in the simple form I have suggested, it is more than possible that he had never even considered the problem of the time; and if he had not thought about the time, then he had not really thought out the problem in all its depth. But at the same time Zeno's problem, even when stated in the simple form that I have suggested, raises the deeper problem of the infinite division of motion, and if so, I do not think that Aristotle's earlier answer was an adequate answer *ad hominem*, except in so far as Aristotle referred to a point which had probably been ignored by Zeno. I should think that Aristotle's explanation in *Physics* viii, to the effect that his earlier answer was adequate *ad hominem*, was really a salve to his own conscience-stricken realisation that his earlier answer was not quite adequate.

A similar explanation may be offered for the third paradox. The essence of the argument is that at each 'now' the flying arrow is motionless. Aristotle assumes that Zeno's 'now' is an indivisible unit of time. I think that possibly Zeno's 'now' was quite vague; he just had not thought out whether his 'now' was an indivisible small period or a point of time. Aristotle, analysing the argument in the course of his refutation of the theory of 'indivisibles', takes Zeno's argument to imply that time is made up of 'nows' (as indeed it does imply); but he then goes on to reason that, if time is made up of nows, then each 'now' must be the result of a process of dividing down the period of time until at last an indivisible 'now' is reached. If so, then Aristotle's refutation is valid enough; but if Zeno's 'now' was quite vague, it might also imply a null-point of time, and in this case Aristotle's later argument in *Physics* viii would also be needed, if his refutation was to be complete. Once again, it seems to me that Aristotle's answer in *Physics* vi is only a partial answer, and that he may in this context have analysed Zeno's argument in this way so as to make his answer seem complete. A significant point, perhaps, is that in his first account of Zeno's third paradox (before he goes through all four paradoxes), he says it depends on the assumption that time is composed of 'indivisible nows', but when going through all four paradoxes, he says it depends on

<sup>2</sup> Plato apparently had a theory of 'Indivisible Lines'. See A. T. Nicol, 'Indivisible Lines', *C.Q.*, xxx, 1936.



the assumption that time is composed of 'nows' (i.e. he leaves out the 'indivisible'). Possibly this only means that Aristotle was in a hurry, but it may be significant; people sometimes give themselves away when they are in a hurry.<sup>4</sup>

Thus I am prepared to admit that the assumption that 'it is impossible to traverse infinite things in a finite time' may perhaps belong to Aristotle's analysis of the argument, and not to Zeno; but I am not prepared to fly in the face of Aristotle's evidence to such an extent as to say that Zeno in these arguments took account of the infinite divisibility of time. On this point I agree fully with Sir David Ross; and I would add that, at the time when Zeno was at work, it must have been much easier to apply the process of 'slicing-into-two' to a comparatively visible thing like distance, than to apply it to time. Aristotle may in fact have been the first to put infinitely divisible time into anything like a satisfactory relationship with infinitely divisible distance, and in this case Earl Russell's charge of 'grossness' falls to the ground entirely.

In any case, it seems to me that Aristotle's final answer to Zeno is better than any given by Earl Russell. Aristotle says that the fact that a distance is infinitely divisible does not mean to say that it is infinitely divided. The infinite points on a line are only 'potential'; a point is only 'actualised' when something arrives at and leaves it, or when somebody divides the line. Moreover, it is only an 'accidental' characteristic of the line that it is an illimitable number of half-lengths; its essential nature is something different. We should also note that, in Aristotle's view, an act of counting involves an interruption of continuity; for 'one who counts the segments' must 'take the bisecting point twice, once as an end and once as a beginning—I mean if he does not count the continuous line as one, but the separated halves as two'.

Earl Russell, however, in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, seems to support the view that the theory of 'mathematical continuity' may apply to the real, external world. In this theory (if I have understood it correctly), each number is taken to be an infinite aggregate; each line actually is a sum of an infinite number of actual points. This theory seems to have proved useful for the purpose of mathematical analysis; but whether it really applies to the external world is another matter. Earl Russell would get round Zeno's paradoxes by saying that in certain infinite series (series such that there are always more points in between, as in Zeno's dichotomy; 'compact series', as Earl Russell calls them), the terms cannot be considered as 'successive'. Since there are always more points in between, it is not possible to think of successive, discrete points. The answer to Zeno's two paradoxes, then, is that the moving object must not be conceived as reaching each point necessarily (in the manner of a man counting).

This theory involves one or two rather difficult ideas. First, the notion of an actual infinite seems most difficult to me. It seems to me that it is useful for mathematicians to take things 'to a limit', and to speak of things tending 'towards infinity'; but as soon as we start treating infinity as an actuality, we become involved in difficulties. For instance, if all numbers are infinite aggregates, then they should all be exactly equal. Mathematicians get round this difficulty only by saying that, in the case of infinite aggregates, normal rules do not apply; part can be equal to whole. But this is a purely theoretical difficulty; the difficulties of conceiving of the idea in practice are even greater. The infinite positions of an object moving along a line have to be different, in different places—and yet not discrete; this is a strain on the imagination. And how does Earl Russell answer the third paradox? By agreeing with Zeno that at each point the arrow is truly at rest, and by saying that motion merely involves being in different places at different times. But

<sup>4</sup> Another possible explanation is that Aristotle's 'indivisible now' was a vague expression, and did not necessarily imply a minimal period. In *Physics* 219a22 Aristotle applies the term 'indivisible' to his own 'now' which is a limit, and has no magnitude. If this is the correct explanation here, then Aristotle's remarks in *Physics* viii should be taken as applying particularly to the first two paradoxes, though they also help out his answer to the third.

<sup>5</sup> For the theory of mathematical continuity, see R. Dedekind: *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen*, Braunschweig, 1872; *Was und wie wir denken in Zahlen*, Braunschweig, 1888; Georg Cantor: *Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mengenlehre*, Leipzig, 1895; E. W. Hobson: 'On the Infinite and the Infinitesimal in Mathematical Analysis', *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society*, Vol. 35, London, 1903, p. 117.

Not being a trained mathematician, I have had to rely too much on Earl Russell's accounts of mathematical continuity. Further discussion appears in the Aristotelian Society's supplementary Volume 4, *Concepts of Continuity*, 1924; the philosophers of this time evidently

felt that relativity theory and quantum theory ought to be taken into account. There is also a most interesting discussion in *Mind*, 1946, pp. 151-65, written by Andrew Ushenko (who refers to previous articles in *Mind*, pp. 58-73 and 310-11, and *Mind*, 1942, pp. 89-90). Gilbert Ryle in *Dilemmas* (1953) devotes a chapter to Zeno's paradoxes.

Earl Russell seems to have been curiously anxious, at one time or another of his career, to defend the idea of mathematical continuity against philosophies such as that of Bergson. Bergson seems to have had a 'dynamic' view of the external world, and to have thought that mathematics was a construction of the human brain, far too rigid and static to bear any real relation to the dynamic world outside. The physical theory was evidently accompanied by a rather 'fluid' attitude towards social and political matters. In the *Philosophy of Bergson* (1914), Earl Russell was at pains to defend not only mathematical physics (the imposition of order on the physical world), but also justice (the imposition of order on the social world) against Bergsonian fluidity. How like the ancient quarrel between Plato and the Sophists!



as Aristotle says, if an object is at rest, this involves it being in a place for a certain period of time; and at each instant the arrow has no time in which to be at a place, much less to be at rest there. Russell's argument, that if the arrow is not in a place while it is moving, then St. Sebastian would have felt no wounds, is not decisive for his own view; St. Sebastian represents an interruption in the continuity of the arrow's course, and this particular problem could be answered in terms of Aristotle's solution.

Sir David Ross criticises Aristotle's solution as follows (Aristotle's *Physics*, Intrud. pp. 74-5): 'It surely cannot be maintained that a moving particle actualises a point by coming to rest at it. It can come to rest only at a point that is there to be rested at. And when it does not rest but moves continuously, the pre-existence of the points on its course is equally presupposed by its passage through them. Nor again can the process of counting be said to actualise that which it counts.'

I cannot really see that this criticism has any force. Can we not conceive that a point is to be defined, not as a 'point of space', but as something which has no actual existence, except as some kind of limit or division? Aristotle, it seems, had no belief in absolute position. He defines 'position' as the 'limit of the containing body' (*Physics*, 212a5-6), and 'position' is to be considered in relation to other objects, in respect of the 'down' and 'up' and other directions (Aristotle did, however, maintain that the earth's outer surface, and the inner celestial sphere, were fixed relatively to one another, and provided fixed terms of reference; this kind of theory, and Aristotle's too absolute conception of 'up' and 'down', may be attributed partly to the limitations of astronomy in Aristotle's time, and partly to the Platonic cast of Aristotle's mind). Aristotle also regarded the universe as a 'plenum', so that there is always some 'containing body'.

All the same, there may be some underlying truth in what Sir David Ross says. It seems at least an arbitrary proceeding to say that points are 'actualised' in the way that Aristotle says they are. Are points really 'actualised'? To say that they are, is part and parcel of Aristotle's whole theory of potentiality and actualisation. But a Bergsonian philosopher would perhaps assert that points are never 'actualised'; they are never in any circumstances anything more than the imaginary constructs of the human intelligence. If the Bergsonian position is tenable at all, then it seems to me that we must regard Aristotle's theory as being, to say the least of it, an arbitrary theory of his own, which is not necessarily true. We might even go so far as to say that Aristotle, in 'actualising' points, is showing his addiction to that Greek habit of mind which tended to assign ultimate reality to the objects of the intelligence.

Further, although it may be true that, as I have suggested, Aristotle had a certain awareness of the relativity of position, still he continues to talk of 'rest' and 'motion' as though these were absolutes; he does not seem to contemplate the idea that what is at rest in relation to one object, may be moving in relation to another. The principles of Galilean relativity were, probably, not more than vaguely present in his mind; while Einstein's theories were altogether outside his ken.

Besides this, Zeno's problem seems to treat Achilles and the Tortoise with mathematical exactitude, as though they were unchanging points; it is at any rate questionable whether this procedure is justified.

Finally, neither Aristotle nor Earl Russell seem to have had much idea of 'Quantum Theory'; but Earl Russell has since given vent to the following utterances (in 'The Greatness of Einstein', printed in the *Listener*, April 28, 1955): 'Nobody before quantum theory doubted that at any given moment a particle is at some definite place and moving with some definite velocity. This is no longer the case. The more accurately you determine the place of a particle, the less accurate will be its velocity; and the more accurately you determine the velocity, the less accurate will be its position. And the particle itself has become something quite vague, not a nice little billiard ball as it used to be. When you think you have caught it, it produces a convincing alibi as a wave and not a particle. In fact, you know only certain equations of which the interpretation is obscure.' (Russell adds that 'this point of view was distasteful to Einstein, who struggled to remain nearer to classical physics'.)

The question is not yet closed. Physical theory is still in a state of flux and uncertainty. One cannot help wondering whether Aristotle's thoroughly discarded and discredited theory of 'potential' and 'actual' may not some day come into its own again; not perhaps in exactly the same form as Aristotle had it, but still, the same essential theory. After all, it puts a good deal of stress upon the event, the movement; and in that respect it is at one with the most up-to-date physical theory.\*

## 2. The Fourth Paradox

The French scholars supposed that, since in the fourth paradox Zeno used the word *onkoi* to describe the moving A's, B's and C's, and since this same word *onkoi* was later used to describe

\* In one respect, Aristotle's theory is very different; his Potential-Actual distinction is bound up with an exciting teleological theory of nature, in which each thing strives

to realise its own most perfect form. It is interesting to compare Andrew Usenko's discussion in *Ibid.*, 1946, pp. 151-65.

the indivisible atoms of the Atomists, therefore the moving *onkoi* are meant to be indivisible units, and Zeno's argument is directed specifically against the theory that time and distance are composed of indivisible, minimal units. The vexed question of what school of philosophers might have held such a theory at this time, is one I shall leave out of my present discussion; see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics*, pp. 656-7.<sup>9</sup> Let it suffice to say that *onkos* was an everyday word for 'mass', 'body', and might well have been used by Zeno in the unreconstructed argument without carrying any implication of 'minimal unit'.

Cornford gives the reconstruction as follows (Loeb, *Physics*, introductory note *ad loc.*):

'The argument appears to be this: if motion, time and distance consist of indivisible atoms, it will always require an equal time to traverse an equal distance and there can be no differences of velocity, as one atom of time and one atom of distance must always correspond to one atom of motion; for if either corresponded to more than one, it (the atom of time or distance) would be divisible, because one atom of motion would correspond to less than an atom of time or distance; if one atom of motion corresponded to more than one of time or distance, then the atom of motion would be divisible for the same reason (etc.).'

This seems the natural argument for a man who wished to argue against 'indivisibles'; the natural conclusion for him would be Cornford's, that 'the indivisible must be divided'. But this is a far cry from the argument as stated by Aristotle; and Cornford went on to reconstruct it without departing from the conclusion given by Aristotle ('twice the time equals half the time'). To revert to the diagrams given on page 189; let the leading B pass two A's in two minimal periods of time; common sense says that in the same period of time, the leading B passes four C's; but the leading B must take one minimal unit to pass each C, else we should have to divide the indivisible; therefore it takes four units of time to pass all four C's; but we worked out before that it took only two units; therefore four units of time equal two units of time.

This reconstruction still flouts Aristotle's evidence, without good reason. Aristotle makes no mention of minimal units; even the *onkoi* are not said to be indivisible. Further, Aristotle attacks Zeno's argument on the grounds of failure to distinguish between motion relative to a stationary object, and motion relative to a moving object; but if the reconstructed argument were the argument Aristotle had in mind, Aristotle might have been expected to attack Zeno's assumption of minimal units, rather than the resulting fallacy about relative motion. It was, as we have seen, very much to Aristotle's point to attack indivisibles in the whole context of *Physics* VI; it is hardly likely that Aristotle can have been so jealous of a Zenonian anticipation of his own arguments that he suppressed the truth about Zeno.

So whatever the true argument may have been, Aristotle almost certainly thought the argument was simply as he stated it, without reconstruction. Anyone who reconstructs it is flouting Aristotle's evidence, and must produce strong arguments to support his case. The main arguments so far produced are as follows:

- (1) Zeno could not have been such a fool.
- (2) The paradoxes follow a certain pattern.

Both arguments are weak. There is no evidence to support the view that Zeno never made blunders which seem elementary to us now: this is a dogma of modern thinkers, who fail to take into account either the numerous other blunders of the Eleatic philosophers or the limitations of the times. We should think of Parmenides' evident failure to distinguish between the two senses of the verb 'to be'; of Zeno's refusal to admit that one thing may be both like and unlike—like in one relation, unlike in another (Plato, *Parmenides* 127e1-5);<sup>10</sup> and of the limitations of Greek ideas on motion at this time. Nobody had yet formulated the equation, Velocity equals Distance divided by Time. Any previous theorising on time and motion probably related only to the movements of heavenly bodies (especially the sun's course throughout the day and during the year). Some of the theorising was of a primitive nature; the Pythagoreans talked of Void and Time being 'breathed in' from the Unlimited,<sup>11</sup> and the Ionian philosophers talked of the 'ordering of time', and seem to have thought of Time as a kind of Justicer in the heavens, allotting fair shares to Day and Night—or as a child playing draughts.<sup>12</sup>

Zeno was perhaps the first to bring theorising about time and motion into the Stadium. This in itself was a great achievement; it is not to be wondered at if Zeno, in first introducing this kind of theorising, made what appears to us to be an elementary blunder about relative motion. The idea of relative motion is one of those which seem simple enough once you have been told; but at a time when motion had hardly been thought of, it cannot have been at all easy. If Zeno made

<sup>9</sup> See also J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (1948).

<sup>10</sup> The fallacy may also be taken to be a confusion between 'identical' and 'similar'.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Physics* 213b22; Stobaeus *Ed.* t. 18, 1 (Diehl 38B30).

<sup>12</sup> Anaximander and Heraclitus.



this elementary blunder, it was at least a valuable blunder, in that it made Aristotle and others think out the problems of relative motion.

The argument from pattern will be discussed in the next section. In the meantime there are one or two arguments in favour of accepting Aristotle's evidence. First, in the discussion of indivisibles which precedes the account of the paradoxes, Aristotle shows quite clearly that he was fully aware of the kind of argument which appears in the reconstructed paradox; his own arguments against 'indivisibles' are fully as subtle.<sup>12</sup> Aristotle had no real reason for mis-stating the paradox; unless we say that he did it because he specially wanted to raise the problem of relative motion—which seems extremely unlikely. Secondly, if the paradox is reconstructed, it disproves motion only on the assumption of indivisible units. This is all right if we accept also the idea that the paradoxes follow a pattern; but every one of the other paradoxes will stand on its own as an independent argument against motion, and so will this one, provided it is not reconstructed.

### 3. *Is there a Pattern?*

If anyone wishes to dispute Aristotle's evidence on the grounds of an underlying pattern, he ought at least to provide a convincing pattern. On the whole, patterns so far suggested are unconvincing. The clearest is that given by Mr. H. D. P. Lee (*Zeno of Elea*, p. 102):

'The first two arguments, we have seen, assume that space, and probably also time, are continuous and infinitely divisible. The third assumes that time is discontinuous and composed of indivisibles, and has as a natural implication that space also is discontinuous. The fourth assumes that time consists of instants, as does the third, and that space consists of minimal extensions. The four in fact form a quartet of which the first two proceed on the assumption of infinite divisibility, the second two on that of indivisibles (cf. Noel, *Rev. de Mét. et Mor.* i, 1893, pp. 107-8); and the following passage from Brochard (*Études*, pp. 4-5) expresses clearly their mutual relationships. There follows a long quotation from Brochard, who presents us with more criss-cross symmetries than we could find in a Cretan Labyrinth.

Objections to this scheme are, first, that time in the first two paradoxes is almost certainly *not* infinitely divisible; secondly, that space seems *not* to be discontinuous in the third paradox—the moving body at each point 'occupies a space equal to itself', but nothing is said of jumps in between each point or anything like that; thirdly, the fourth paradox assumes minimal units of space and time *if and only if* we accept the French reconstruction—in Aristotle's account there are, admittedly, units of extension, but even these are not said to be minimal or indivisible.

Sir David Ross, who is more sceptical than Mr. Lee about the reconstructions of the first two paradoxes, but still accepts the reconstruction of the fourth, modifies Mr. Lee's scheme as follows (*Aristotle's Physics*, Introd., p. 84):

'Now in the first two paradoxes Zeno is clearly assuming the infinite divisibility of space (though probably not that of time). In the fourth paradox he is, as I have tried to show, working on the assumption that neither space nor time is infinitely divisible, that both are composed of small unitary parts. In the third paradox it is not very clear whether he is working with the notion that time is composed of an infinite number of unextended nows, or that it is composed of a finite number of times. But the latter is the more probable because we shall then have two paradoxes based on the assumption of infinite divisibility, and two based on the assumption of divisibility into a finite number of indivisibles.

'Again, the French writers point out that the first and the third paradoxes deal with one moving body and raise only the problem of absolute motion, while the second and fourth introduce two moving bodies and raise the problem of relative motion (the fourth introducing absolute motion as well).'

The details of this scheme are better attested than those of Mr. Lee's scheme; the trouble is that there is no real scheme left. I would certainly not favour reconstructing the fourth paradox simply so as to make it fit into so untidy a scheme as this.

P. Tannery worked out a dialectical pattern. His idea is that the first two paradoxes suppose infinitely divisible distance, and prove that absurd conclusions follow from this assumption. An adversary then suggests that this argument is false, because the infinite divisibility of time has not been taken into account. So Zeno produces the third paradox, in which (according to Tannery) both time and distance are divided away into null points. This again leads to an absurd conclusion,

<sup>12</sup> E.g. *Physics* 231a24 ff., where Aristotle argues that neither rest nor motion is possible in the now. Motion in the now is impossible, because if A moves faster than B, and B covers a certain distance in the now, then A could accomplish the same distance in less time than a now, so that the supposedly indivisible now would have to be

divided. Rest in the now is impossible, because 'we say a thing is at rest when it has not changed its position, either in respect to its totality, or in respect to its parts, between now and then; but there is no then in now, so there is no being at rest'. (Aristotle gives two other arguments.)



so Zeno produces the reconstructed version of the fourth paradox, in which minimal units of time and space are assumed. This again leads to absurd conclusions.

This scheme is more plausible than either of the other two. But it conflicts with Aristotle's evidence on the fourth paradox, and probably on the third paradox too. If Tannery goes directly against the evidence, he must produce strong arguments for doing so. I have already discussed the fourth paradox; it seems very dogmatic to say that Zeno could not have made the blunder attributed to him by Aristotle. It seems equally dogmatic to say that there must be some scheme underlying all four paradoxes. It is perfectly true that in the arguments on Plurality, Zeno probably used the method of reasoning from alternative hypotheses; but we need not suppose that Zeno applied this method to all his arguments. Some arguments of Zeno's seem to stand on their own, as for example the 'millet-seed' (Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th ed., 29A29) and the argument from place (*ibid.* 29A24). There is no real reason why one or more of these arguments on motion should not be isolated arguments standing on their own. Tannery has not made out any real case for departing from Aristotle's evidence.

It seems to me, therefore, that the most reasonable course is to accept Aristotle's evidence, and to be very sceptical about the pattern theories. The first two paradoxes will stand in their own right as arguments against motion. It should be noted that, in Zeno's arguments on plurality, the 'dichotomy' (Diels 29B3) is held actually to prove infinite divisibility; therefore, in the first two paradoxes, we may take it that infinite divisibility is regarded as proved by the argument, and is not an assumption. The third paradox will, clearly, stand on its own as an argument against motion; and so will the fourth, provided we resist the temptation to reconstruct it.

If there is to be a scheme, we might say that the first two paradoxes raise the difficulty of the infinitely large, whereas the third paradox is concerned either with infinitesimals or with null points. But I doubt if Zeno schematised like this, and in any case the fourth paradox would still stand on its own.

## II. ZENO'S ARGUMENTS ON SUBJECTS OTHER THAN MOTION

My discussion so far has centred almost entirely upon Zeno's arguments against Motion. This was, I think, desirable, not only because erroneous views of these arguments had to be contradicted, but also because they are the best known of Zeno's arguments and should therefore provide the best 'way-in' for readers who are not acquainted with Zeno's thought in general. However, I do not wish to let matters rest there. The other arguments of Zeno are less well known, but they are of no less interest than the arguments on Motion; besides this, it is interesting to view Zeno as a totality, and to ascertain the whole purpose and direction of his arguments. Arguments against Motion were not Zeno's only 'paradoxes'; he also produced (according to one authority)<sup>14</sup> no fewer than forty arguments designed to prove that there cannot possibly be a multiplicity of existing things. To these arguments—generally referred to as Zeno's arguments against Plurality—we must add one argument against Place, one argument against Place and Motion together (which might be considered to be a fifth argument against Motion), and one argument which seems to be directed against the sense of hearing; and there may be many more arguments no longer extant.

The reader will have observed that all these arguments have a common tendency; the tendency to reject the evidence of the senses, and accept reasoning alone as the criterion of truth. Now this attitude of Zeno's was not an isolated phenomenon; Zeno had a great predecessor who was (in Plato's language) the 'father' of the theories which Zeno supported so loyally—Parmenides of Elea. We shall therefore have to consider the theory of Parmenides, and Zeno's relation to it, before we can consider Zeno's arguments themselves.

### A. PARMENIDES AND ZENO

Parmenides founded the so-called 'Eleatic' school of philosophy; his followers were Zeno and Melissus. His philosophy was based on two main ideas: (1) 'What-is-is', and (2) 'What-is-not is not' (or 'there can be no not-being'). This may seem a curious pair of ideas on which to base a philosophy, but the two statements taken together are, in effect, the first crude statement of the Law of Contradiction, and Parmenides can appropriately be called the Father of Logic.

From these two principles Parmenides deduced that 'What-is' must be (1) One and Indivisible, and (2) Motionless and Unchanging. 'What-is' must be one and indivisible; for (a) there can be no qualitative distinctions between one piece of 'Being' and another (since it is all equally 'Being'), and (b) there can be no separation between one piece of 'Being' and the next (since this would involve there being a piece of 'Not-Being' in between, and 'Not-Being' is impossible). So 'Being' (or 'What-is') is one and the same, continuous, indivisible Being all over. Secondly, 'What-is' cannot possibly become, or come to be; the same Greek word, *genesis*, is used both for

<sup>14</sup> Elias, Diels 29A15. Uncertain evidence.

'coming to be' and for 'becoming'. It cannot come-to-be, because it has nothing to come-to-be out of; it could hardly come-to-be out of 'Not-Being'. Moreover, destruction involves something having 'been' in the past, but 'not being' now; while becoming involves something being 'about to be', but 'not being' now; so that both destruction and becoming involve a breach of Parmenides' axiom that there can be no 'Not-Being'. So 'What-is' is unchanged and subsists in the now always; there is no past or future.

There are obvious logical fallacies in these arguments. First, 'Being' seems to be considered as though it were a corporeal substance, not as a predicate of the things that 'are'; the distinction between 'What-is' and 'Being' appears to be blurred. Secondly, there seems to be a confusion between the copulative and existential senses of the word 'to be'; his denial of 'Not-Being' involves him not only in a complete rejection of the non-existent, but also in a refusal to admit the possibility of negative predication. For him, 'Not-Being' is such an impossible idea that we are not even allowed to say 'Socrates is not Parmenides'.<sup>10</sup> This same confusion occurs in regard to the Greek word 'becoming', which can be used both of 'coming to be' absolutely, and of something which 'becomes' something other than what it has been.

Parmenides' conception of 'Being' as a corporeal substance is further revealed by his arguments that it must be (1) spherical, and (2) held within the bonds of Limit. It must be spherical, because there is no reason why it should be bigger in any one direction than in any other. It must be limited, because it must be complete in itself.

The reader may well ask now: What then did Parmenides do with the world of sense? How did he explain away the very evident existence of motion and plurality in the external world? Parmenides evaded the difficulty by distinguishing between the Way of Truth, in which there is only Being, and the Way of Opinion, in which 'Being' appears to mingle with 'Not-Being'. The truth of the Way of Truth lies in its rejection of everything that cannot be conceived by the mind; it is an intellectual truth, concerned with intellectual consistency. The Way of Opinion is a trick played upon men by their senses; their senses tell them that there is an external world in which diversity and motion occur. But since motion and diversity involve a mingling of 'Being' with 'Not-Being', this world of sense is altogether inconceivable to the mind, and it is therefore unreal, a mere fantasy in the minds of men.<sup>11</sup>

It is hardly necessary to stress the close connexion which exists between these arguments and the arguments of Zeno. The point has already been made by Plato in his *Parmenides* (128c). Plato tells us that Zeno had written a book containing arguments against plurality; the character 'Zeno' in Plato's dialogue describes his purpose as follows: 'It is really an attempt to support Parmenides' argument against those who try to ridicule his theory that "One is", saying that, if One is, then many absurd and inconsistent conclusions follow. This book, then, argues against the pluralists, and repays them in their own coin by trying to show that the assumption of plurality involves even more absurd consequences than the assumption that "One is". I wrote it when I was a young man, in a rather argumentative spirit, and I had many doubts whether to publish it or not.'

We need not take Plato's account too literally, but Zeno's arguments against plurality all start with the hypothesis, 'if there are many', and go on to prove that absurd and inconsistent conclusions follow. The regular method of argument is *reductio ad absurdum*. One example is given by Plato (*Parmenides* 127c): 'Socrates asked him to read out again the first hypothesis of the first argument;<sup>12</sup> and when he had done so, asked: "What is it you mean by this, Zeno? If things are a plurality, you say, then they must be both like and unlike, but this is impossible. For it is not possible for the unlike to be like or the like unlike. Is not this what you say?"'

It is not certain how Zeno worked out this argument. Proclus (*on the Parmenides*, ii. 143) says that the argument was to the effect that, if there are many things, they must be like and unlike—unlike, inasmuch as they are not one and the same; like, inasmuch as they agree in not being one and the same. Zeno was perfectly capable of ignoring the difference between 'identical' and 'similar', or 'similar in one respect' and 'similar in another respect'. But I quote this as an example; the bulk of Zeno's extant arguments against plurality are to be found in a rather piecemeal state in the works of late commentators like Philoponus and Simplicius. They are more or less as follows in my next section.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Plato *Sophist* 240c-end. Plato refutes Parmenides by saying that, when we say A is not B, we mean A is other than B; and in this sense, not-being is possible. It has, however, been suggested to me that these arguments of Plato's were directed against Sophists who made capital out of Parmenides' thesis, rather than against Parmenides himself.

<sup>11</sup> Parmenides was perhaps the first to deny the reality of the world of sense, and it is interesting to note that his reason for doing so was, probably, a confusion between

the two senses of 'be'. Plato relegated our awareness of the sensible world to mere opinion, because sensible objects are always changing; they 'are' and 'are not', and never securely 'are'.

<sup>12</sup> This does not sound like dialogue form; Tannery tried to make a dialogue out of Zeno's paradoxes. The suggestion is rather of a number of arguments, one after another, each perhaps containing one or more hypotheses. This proves nothing in regard to the suggested systematizations of the arguments on Motion.



## B. ZENO'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST PLURALITY

A text of the relevant quotations, with an English translation and commentary, appears in Mr. H. D. P. Lee's *Zeno of Elea*. But since Mr. Lee is necessarily restricted by the exigencies of his task as an editor, it may perhaps be of some assistance to the reader if I now make some attempt to give as clear and accurate an account as possible of what seems to have been the general purport of the arguments. The evidence is difficult. Our authorities are late; they may use anachronistic expressions; they may foist ideas on to Zeno which do not belong to him; and they may analyse Zeno's arguments further than he did himself.

The first leg of these arguments is always the hypothesis 'if existing things are many'. This is, on the face of it, a plain, straightforward hypothesis of plurality, and I see no reason for departing from this, the most obvious interpretation. It has, however, been suggested<sup>10</sup> that, for Zeno, this hypothesis must have meant 'if there is a plurality of Pythagorean units'; in which case Zeno's arguments would be directed, not so much against the whole idea of a plurality of existing things, as against the Pythagorean conception of plurality.

This is yet another vain attempt to make Zeno out to have been cleverer than he was. It falls down at two points. First, although it is true that Zeno took his hypothesis to imply 'ones' of which there are many, this is not to be considered as a second premise; it is a logical implication of the original assumption. The original assumption is that 'existing things are many'; it is this theory, and no other, which Zeno means to attack. If we are to re-interpret 'if existing things are many', we should re-interpret it as: 'if what-is is divided into a plurality' (as opposed to Parmenides' theory that what-is is one). The second point is one of general probability; if Zeno in the arguments on motion was concerned to attack the whole idea of motion, is it likely that in the arguments on plurality he has any other target in view than the whole idea of plurality?

The next thing Zeno had to do was to prove that absurdities and contradictions followed from this hypothesis. Accordingly he took hold of the hypothesis and analysed it. No mere examination of sense evidence was good enough for Zeno; he did not proceed to talk about earth, air, fire, and water, as the Ionian philosophers had done. Rather, he analysed the concepts of 'many', and of 'being' in so far as it applies to a plurality. 'Many' must imply 'units' of which there are many: the essential difficulty raised by Zeno in the extant fragments concerns these 'ones'. We read in Simplicius (97.13 or 138.32; Lee 5), quoting Eudemus at this point:

'They say Zeno said that, if any one would give him what the one is, he would have a way of telling of existing things. It seems he found a difficulty because all sensible things are called many both "categorically" and by division, and the point he supposed to be nothing at all; for what does not increase a thing when added to it, nor decrease when subtracted from it, he thought not to be an existing thing at all.'

This passage requires explanation. 'Categorically many' is explained by Philoponus (*Phys.* 49.9 ff., Lee 8): 'Socrates, who you say is a unit contributing to plurality, is not only Socrates, but also pale, philosophic, pot-bellied and snub-nosed. But the same person cannot be one and many, therefore he is not one.' The argument, in this exact form, cannot be Zeno's, for the illustration is clearly post-Zenonian. So here we are already up against a difficulty in the evidence; does this argument really belong to Zeno?

Mr. Lee (*ad loc.*) argues at some length that this is not the authentic Zeno. Very possibly he is right. It is perfectly possible that Eudemus, with his 'it seems', was merely analysing Zeno's arguments from an Aristotelian point of view, in order to lead up to a refutation on the grounds of the different senses in which 'one' and 'being' may be used; for this is the essence of Aristotle's answer to the whole question as given in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere. It is also possible that Philoponus and Simplicius took their information from Eudemus. On the other hand, I would urge that, although Eudemus may have analysed falsely, there are no tremendously cogent reasons for supposing that both he and the general tradition are wrong. One of Zeno's main antinomies was certainly that 'the same things will be both one and many' (see Plato, *Parmenides* 129d-e, and *Phaedrus* 261d), and I see no real reason why he should not have used the contrast between the unity of a man and the plurality of his attributes in order to prove his case.

The second argument mentioned by Eudemus is the argument from division. This argument would be (according to the ancient commentators) to the effect that every one of existing things, if it has magnitude, can always be split up into still smaller parts, and must therefore be both one and many. It is not possible to arrive at any ultimate 'one' which cannot still be divided into a

<sup>10</sup> By J. E. Raven, *Pythagorean and Eleatic* (1948), p. 72. For the anti-Pythagorean interpretation of Zeno's arguments, see P. Tannery, *op. cit.* (see my note 2); F. M. Cornford, *C.Q.* xvi and xvii (1922 and 1923), and *Plato and Parmenides* (1939); J. E. Raven, *op. cit.*; H. D. P. Lee,

*op. cit.* (the last two with considerable modifications). For criticisms of the theory, see G. Calogero and B. L. van der Waerden (works quoted by me in the introduction to my account of the motion arguments), and also W. A. Heidel (*A.J.P.* 61, 1940, pp. 21-39).



'many'. People might suggest the geometrical point; but the point, according to Zeno, has not magnitude and therefore does not exist.<sup>19</sup>

But 'one and many' was not the only antinomy which Zeno based on the argument from division. He also produced antinomies between finitely and infinitely many and between large and small; and a proof that the things-that-are must be infinite-times infinite:

(i) If they are many, the things-that-are must be both finitely many (because there are exactly as many as there are) and infinitely many (by the first proof given below).<sup>20</sup>

(ii) If they are many, the things-that-are must be both large and small, so large as to be infinite in number, so small as to have no magnitude.<sup>21</sup>

(iii) If they are many, the things-that-are must be infinite-times infinite. For the units resulting from infinite division must still (if they are to be real) have magnitude, and must therefore be themselves infinitely divisible.<sup>22</sup>

Two proofs of infinity are given by Simplicius as belonging very definitely to Zeno:

1. '... "If things are many, they will be infinite; for there will always be others between them, and again between these yet others. And so things are infinite." Thus Zeno proved numerical infinity by means of the dichotomy.' (Fr. 3 Diels; incorporated in the first antinomy given above.)

2. 'The infinity of magnitude he showed previously by the same process of reasoning. For, having first shown that "if what-is had not magnitude, it would not exist at all", he proceeds: "But if it is, then each thing must necessarily have some magnitude and thickness, and one part of it must be separate from another. And the same reasoning holds good of that-which-is-beyond; for it too will have magnitude and there will be something beyond it. It is the same to say this once and to say it always; for no such part will be the last, and there will never be one that (? does not involve yet) another one. So, if there is a plurality, things must be both small and large. So small as to have no magnitude, so large as to be infinite." ' (Fr. 1 Diels.)

The first argument seems not to be quite the 'argument from division' mentioned by Eudemos. The units of a plurality—whether they are points or magnitudes—must be separate from one another; and in the intervening space a third unit must be present, which must again be separate from the two outer units—and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is very like the argument from division; if the units concerned are considered to be the successive dividing points in a process of halving, it is exactly the same as the dichotomy, though expressed in a slightly different way.

It will be noted that Zeno argues that each existing thing must be separated from its neighbour. This is necessary, because if two neighbouring things were not separated, then they would be one. Such an argument implies that all the units were of a single homogeneous nature; presumably Zeno thought that, because they were all equally existent, they were all made of the single substance of 'beings'. Such a thought would be of a piece with Parmenides' apparent failure to distinguish between 'existence' and 'that-which-is'. Also, there is no room for empty space in Zeno's thought; whatever separates objects must be something.

In the second argument, there are serious difficulties of interpretation. The statement that 'one part of it must be separate from another' definitely implies the division of each unit into at least two parts.<sup>23</sup> But then our difficulties begin. What is meant by 'that-which-is-beyond'? Presumably the part, which is the 'next' unit in the process of division. But why call it 'that-which-is-beyond'? The easiest assumption seems to be that the expression simply means the 'next' unit in the process of division; beyond any existing unit—which, since it exists, must have magnitude—there must always be some 'further-on' unit which is the 'one separated from the other' in it. But this is by no means certain; other suggestions have been made.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>19</sup> The argument about the point is ascribed to Zeno by Aristotle *Metaph.* 1001b7, and so is presumably genuine enough.

<sup>20</sup> Simplicius 140.27. Very definitely ascribed to Zeno by Simplicius.

<sup>21</sup> Simplicius 140.34. Again, very definitely ascribed to Zeno.

<sup>22</sup> Philoponus 80.23 ff. Ascription to Zeno less definite; Philoponus may be doing some analysis of his own.

<sup>23</sup> I cannot agree with G. Catagero's translation (*op. cit.* p. 99) 'e necessario . . . che si distingua da essa, come da altra, quella che rispetto ad essa e' altra.' We have indeed to demand a 'ricca pregnanza di senso' if this is the sense of the Greek.

<sup>24</sup> That Simplicius took *epolytoros* to imply the next term in the process of 'dichotomy' (or perhaps the prior one?) is proved by the following passage: *on pnythos*

*ēzen ēkastos tōn polythōn kai hekaston tōn apō tōd hekastonōntōn kai ti ekhōn dia tōd ēē' āpōtōs tomyē* (Simplicius 139.16-18). But Simplicius was perfectly capable of misunderstanding an argument. Other suggestions include the ideas that *apo* implies the 'prior' term, and that 'that-which-is-beyond'—the jutting out piece—implies the piece separating the first two units. The word *epolytoros* makes the first suggestion difficult, and if the second explanation were the true one, why should not Zeno say the 'piece in-between'? The suggestion that Zeno is thinking of a series of geometrical points in a line does not convince me; such a rendering seems inconsistent with the actual language used by Zeno in this argument. Possibly his 'one part separated from another' implies the two limits at either end of an extension; but if so, they are (for the purposes of this argument) limits having magnitude.

But we have not come to the end of our difficulties in regard to this argument. What of the final conclusion, 'things must be both small and large'? We have had Zeno's proof of the infinity of magnitude; but what about the 'small': so small as to have no magnitude? How, and where, has Zeno proved this?

The answer to 'where' seems clear enough. Since there is no room between the argument for infinity and the conclusion, presumably Zeno proved the 'smallness' beforehand. Now we hear that Zeno started the argument for infinity by showing that 'if what-is had not magnitude, it would not exist at all'. In other words, Zeno argued from the *existence*, which he postulated in his original hypothesis of plurality (many *existing* things), that each existing thing must have magnitude. Such an argument might, in Zeno, very easily follow on a proof that what-is has no magnitude. This was exactly the mode of reasoning by antinomies which Zeno adopted, and which Plato gaped in his *Parmenides*. Zeno would first argue, probably from the *unity* of each existing thing (unity being implied in the many ones of a plurality), that what-is has not magnitude; he would then cheerfully proceed to argue, from the *existence* of each existing thing, that it must have magnitude; and not merely magnitude, but infinite magnitude.

A clue as to Zeno's method of proving no magnitude is given by Simplicius 139.18. He tells us that Zeno argued that 'it has no magnitude because each one of the many existing things is the same as itself and one'. Evidently Zeno thought that magnitude implied plurality, and was inconsistent with unity; presumably because magnitude implied divisibility into a 'many' and therefore nothing can have magnitude unless it is many. Still, this is not certain. Other methods of arriving at the conclusion of no magnitude are suggested by Simplicius (139.27 ff.) (infinite division implies a division which goes on until nothing is left), and by Philoponus 80.23 ff. (a plurality of existing things implied for Zeno that Being is *per se* divisible); but these may be interpretations rather than exact renderings, for the expression 'same as itself and one' somehow sounds more authentic, and corresponds to the separation of 'one from other' in the argument for infinity. It is, of course, perfectly possible that Zeno proved the same point by several different methods.

As regards Simplicius's 'same as itself and one': Zeno presumably argued on the one hand that the existence of each thing implied that it had magnitude; on the other hand, that if each *one* is really what it is said to be—if it is identical with itself and therefore really 'one'—well then it cannot have magnitude (for magnitude can only belong to that which is 'many'). This argument, as Calogero shrewdly observes,<sup>26</sup> corresponds exactly to the argument that if things are many, they must be both finitely many (exactly as many as they are) and infinitely many.

When we have examined the arguments given by the ancient commentators, we are bound to experience an uneasy feeling that we have only seen the upper part of an iceberg, the greater part of which must remain for ever concealed from our sight beneath the Arctic waves of time. How exactly did the argument about 'like' and 'unlike' fit in? Where does the argument mentioned by Isocrates (*Helen* 3) fit in? Isocrates says Zeno tried to prove that 'the same things are both possible and impossible'; was this a separate argument, or a vague overall description of Zeno's method of argument? Again, was there some relationship between the arguments on motion and the arguments on plurality? Could motion and rest have been an antinomy worked out from the hypothesis of plurality? It seems unlikely, but perhaps it might be so.

Whatever other doubts there may be, we can at least see with tolerable certainty that the arguments on plurality raised the same basic difficulties about divisibility as were raised by the arguments on motion. This is what we should expect. We can also see that Zeno was concerned here exclusively with the division of space (or perhaps we should call it more vaguely 'space-being'), and not that of time; this will, I hope, make my interpretations of the arguments about motion more credible.

Zeno's antinomies may perhaps mean that Zeno was unable to appreciate that what is one thing in one sense, may be exactly the opposite in another sense, or in another relation. If so, then the answer to this was the development of the principles of predication—of the various senses in which 'be' and 'one' may be used—by Plato and Aristotle.<sup>27</sup> This applies particularly to the argument about 'categorically many', if indeed that argument belonged to Zeno.<sup>28</sup> As regards answers to the problem of divisibility, Plato appears to have believed in 'indivisible lines', and to have rejected the point as a dogma of the mathematicians.<sup>29</sup> This answer did not appeal to Aristotle, who answered the problem in terms of 'potential' and 'actual': that which is actually one is potentially many. But, according to Simplicius 141.17 ff. (although it can be divided indefinitely), it is not potentially *infinite*; for infinite division is not a thing which even *could* happen.

The vital importance of Zeno's arguments in the development of logic and physics is too

<sup>26</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 106n.

<sup>27</sup> Whether Aristotle's answers are finally satisfactory, is a doubtful matter; but certainly they were a necessary advance in his own time.

<sup>28</sup> See Eudemus's remarks quoted in Simplicius 97.11 ff.

<sup>29</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaph.* 991a20 ff.



obvious to need further emphasis. It was not for nothing that Zeno figured so prominently in Plato's *Parmenides*. An even greater tribute to him is the prominent place which he undoubtedly occupies in the sixth book of Aristotle's *Physics*. Zeno raised fundamental problems which had to be faced before further advances could be made. But always we must realise that Zeno's arguments were based ultimately on the dogma of Parmenides, and that they involved elementary fallacies; they were not uttered with that full and marvellous understanding which some scholars have attributed to him.

### C. THREE FURTHER ARGUMENTS OF ZENO'S

(i) Zeno also had an argument against the existence of place: 'Further, if place itself is an existent, where will it be? Zeno's difficulty demands some explanation; for if everything that exists has a place, it is clear that place too will have a place and so on *ad infinitum*.' (Aristotle, *Physics* 209a23.)

Zeno's difficulty, 'if place is something, in what will it be?' is not difficult to solve' (*ibid.*, 210b23). According to Aristotle, it is just a matter of the different senses in which a thing can be in something else; a place may be in a containing body as an 'accident' or 'state' of that body.<sup>20</sup>

(ii) Zeno also had an argument about Place and Motion, which is rather similar to the third paradox. Diogenes (9.72) gives it as follows:

'Zeno does away with motion, saying that "what moves does not move either in the place in which it is or in the place in which it is not."'

This argument seems to depend on the assumption that a moving object must be in a place; one can argue against this that a movement takes a period of time, and covers a certain distance; in so far as it is moving, it is not in any one position, but it is covering a distance over a period. But there is still the underlying problem of the relation of null distances to a finite distance; and perhaps this argument states the underlying problem more effectively than the third paradox.

(iii) Zeno also argued as follows about a millet-seed (Lee 38; Simplic. 1108, 18):

'... The commundrum which Zeno the Eleatic asked Protagoras the sophist. "Tell me, Protagoras", he said, "does a single grain of millet or the ten thousandth part of a grain make any sound when it falls?" And when Protagoras said it did not, "Then", asked Zeno, "does a bushel of millet make any sound when it falls or not?" Protagoras answered that it did; whereupon Zeno replied, "But surely there is some ratio between a bushel of millet and a single grain or even the ten thousandth part of a grain"; and when this was admitted, "But then surely", Zeno said, "the ratios of the corresponding sounds to each other will be the same: for as the bodies which make the sounds are to one another, so will the sounds be to one another. And if this is so, and if the bushel of millet makes a sound, then the single grain of millet and the ten thousandth part of a grain will make a sound." This was how Zeno put the argument.' In this argument, Zeno took into consideration the fact that we do not hear any sound when the single grain falls; once again he is trying to prove the fallibility of the senses.

Aristotle's answer to this problem is: 'Zeno's argument is not true, that there is no part of a grain of millet that does not make a sound; for there is nothing to prevent any such part from being quite unable, in any length of time, to move the air which the whole bushel moves in falling.' (Aristotle, *Physics* 250a19.) Modern critics add that the fact that we cannot hear very minute sounds does not mean to say that we should distrust our ears altogether.

G. J. Whitrow (*Philosophy*, 1948, pp. 256-61) tries to turn the 'millet-seed' into a much deeper argument. In order to do so, he has to assume that what Zeno really meant to prove was that ordinary arithmetic does not always apply; a number of zero sensations can add up to a definite quantity of sensation. But it is not to Zeno's point to prove that zero quantities of sound *can* add up to a definite quantity of sound; in his view, this is exactly what *cannot* happen. So, even if Whitrow has uncovered a deeper argument, the deeper argument is Whitrow's, not Zeno's. But I doubt if Whitrow's form of the argument is all that deep; for it is absurd to regard inaudible disturbances of the air as zero quantities of heard sound. Zeno appears to have failed to distinguish between sound in the sense of a disturbance of the air and sound in the sense of a noise actually heard. The value of his argument is that it shows the need for such a distinction.

N. BOOTH.

<sup>20</sup> An argument against 'Place' might help our arguments against Plurality and Motion in a variety of ways. Place might have seemed necessary so that a plurality of objects might be separated out (plurality), and also so that things might change place (motion). But compare J. E. Raven, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-2.

*Addendum.* In this article I am much indebted to Mr. F. P. Chambers, of the London School of Economics; also to Professor W. K. C. Guthrie, Mr. H. D. P. Lee, and Mr. J. E. Raven for criticism, comments and encouragement.



## MINOAN LINEAR B: A REPLY

THE tragic death of Dr. Michael Ventris in September 1956 has thrust upon me the task of answering the criticisms made by Professor A. J. Beattie of his decipherment of the Minoan Linear B script (*JHS* lxxvi (1956) pp. 1-17). Reasons of time and space preclude more than a summary reply; but fortunately almost all his points are covered by our discussion in *Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge University Press, 1956), to which the reader is referred. I judge it necessary, however, to correct some wrong impressions and comment on some of Professor Beattie's methods.<sup>1</sup>

The account of the decipherment is tendentious and distorted. The need for brevity prevented a fuller account in *Evidence* (*JHS* lxxiii (1959), pp. 84-103); a more detailed version appears in *Documents*; but the whole story as it unfolded month by month can still be traced in the duplicated work-notes which Dr. Ventris circulated during the period 1950-52. It should be enough to say that the crucial step of applying phonetic values to the grid was based upon the reasonable hypothesis that certain words found only at Knossos represented the names of important Cretan towns. At that stage the language was still unidentified; it was as the result of the values obtained from the place-names that Dr. Ventris was forced to the conclusion that the language was Greek. This led to the recognition of Greek declensions in the Linear B inflexions, not the other way about.

It is evident that Professor Beattie has not grasped the nature of the cryptographic problem or the criteria of the decipherment. The cross-check provided by syllabic values which repeat in different words is itself sufficient guarantee of a correct solution; add to this the fact that the words identified are repeatedly—not on one tablet only—confirmed by self-evident ideograms,<sup>2</sup> and the conclusion is beyond any doubt whatsoever.

Professor Beattie's other objections fall under three heads: (1) the graphic system is inadequate; (2) the forms of certain words are unacceptable; (3) there are allegedly large areas of text which yield no sense.

(1) All graphic systems are only a conventional notation, and many, such as Accadian cuneiform, are considerably more ambiguous than Linear B. The admitted deficiencies are, however, sufficiently accounted for by its derivation from Linear A. The existence of common orthographic practices at Knossos, Pylos and Mycenae shows that the system was highly standardised and would therefore strongly resist innovation. Professor Beattie's 'psychological' argument—that a Greek would have done so and so—is about as cogent as Bernard Shaw's attack on conventional English spelling.<sup>3</sup> Words are recognised by literate persons as whole units, and there seem to be very few cases where the same spelling represents different words; even here, the very fact that we can detect such cases proves that the ambiguity must have been no hindrance to the native reader. Despite the blurring of the inflexions we may doubt whether the difficulties were such as to preclude the writing of simple straightforward prose;<sup>4</sup> the script is certainly adequate for the keeping of inventories and accounts, the only purpose served by existing tablets. The duplication apparent when a word is spelt syllabically and also represented by an ideogram is itself an insurance against misunderstanding; but since the practice is inherited from Linear A, it is open to question whether it does not have its origin in a language which, like Chinese, requires a 'counting-word' to accompany any numeral.

The possible interpretations of any Mycenaean word are theoretically large; in practice, however, they are severely restricted by orthographic rules and the possibilities of the Greek language. Solvers of cross-word puzzles will agree that a few fixed points in a longish word are enough to determine the whole, with the aid of a clue. So here, too, the clue is provided by the context. Greek δ, α, μ, ν are the only reflexes of Mycenaean *d*, *s*, *m*, *n*; the vowels are uncertain only in length; all diphthongs containing *v* are written in full; and the use of digamma and labio-velar stops serves to distinguish spellings which in later Greek might have been identical. It is

<sup>1</sup> I should like to thank Professor D. L. Page and E. G. Turner, and many others, for help and encouragement in the compilation of this reply.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, a picture of a word is accompanied by *pa-ma-2* *phagamu*; a cord by *ta-aka* *thakke*; cloth by *pa-ma-2* *phagamu*; equine head by *ta-qa*, *ma*, *pa-2* *thagamu*, *ma*, *phlo*; a broad dish by *pa-2-qa*, *ph-2-12* *phila*, *phirdi*; amphora by *ta-2-2-2-2* *amphiphoroi*; and so forth.

<sup>3</sup> The asymmetry of the syllabary is the result of an empirical method. The asymmetry of the Greek alphabet, which distinguishes length only in the case of two vowels, is equally illogical.

<sup>4</sup> It may be of interest to record that on a few occasions Dr. Ventris and I communicated successfully on postcards written in the Linear B script in an imitation of the Mycenaean dialect. Here is a sample of one on translation: *se-ma-ra pa-pi-ti-ja pu-to-du-ka tu-fo-ka-ro-fo-u-ai* *se-fo-ka-ta-ka* *ta-ma-2-2-2-2-2-2* *ta-2-2-2-2-2-2* *ta-2-2-2-2-2-2* *ta-2-2-2-2-2-2*. Professor Turner reminds me that in some business documents contained in Greek papyri and ostraca almost every word is abbreviated by suspensive marks; the resultant loss of inflexions does not seem to have caused the users any difficulty.

true that in the case of proper names the context does not give us the necessary clue; but we must suppose the Mycenaean reader to have been familiar with the personnel named in the tablets. The objection that *e-u-po-ro* could be one of a number of known Greek names is no more serious than the complaint that *Smith* in an English list might refer to several men; the scribes have adequate means of distinguishing men when necessary by stating their trade, rank, domicile or patronymic.

The vocabulary of the tablets consists to a considerable extent of formulaic words and phrases. The merely physical lay-out of the tablets, together with the ideograms used, is sufficient to enable the reader to determine in advance the nature of the subject-matter, as is witnessed by Dr. Bennett's system of classification. With this clue the native reader cannot have failed to grasp the significance of even the most ambiguous spellings; it is to us, who are unfamiliar with the vocabulary of Mycenaean accounting, that they present difficulty. No scribe seeing the formula *e-ke to-ro po-mo* WHEAT would waste time pondering the theoretical possibilities for *e-ke* (e.g. *ē ke*, *ēkeia*, *ēkei*); he would instantly recognise *ēke*, and his knowledge of the formula and the circumstances would equally ensure that he read it as present rather than imperfect or aorist; a fact which we have to deduce from the plural *e-ke-si*.

(2) Many of the Greek forms originally proposed are stigmatised by Professor Beattie as 'unacceptable'. That some were wrong or unlikely we should be the first to admit. But we cannot judge the probabilities simply by the standards of Homeric and later Greek; nor is etymology an exact science. It must not be forgotten that the reconstructed forms of the etymologists are merely convenient formulas designed to account for the known evidence, not positive statements of the prehistoric form of the word. Of the words specifically criticised by Professor Beattie, accounts of *Ποσειδάων*, *Ἥρα*, *Δαίδα*, *Φαίδρατος*, *(δ)ήμιος* and *μεσίω* will be found in my article in *Trans. Phil. Soc.* 1954, pp. 1-17. Sneers at 'Arcadian' forms (e.g. *α-πυ* = *ἀπύ*; *o* for *a* under special conditions) are particularly incomprehensible, for it has long been agreed by most philologists that the pre-Doric dialect of the Peloponnese was akin to Arcadian. The confusion of *i* and *e* is, however, probably unconnected with the closing of *e* before nasals in Arcadian; the number of certain examples is very small and may be restricted to words of unknown etymology; in many well-attested words of clear etymology there is no sign of variation in spelling. In *quadrōtes* we have no more an example of contraction than in *τέθρανος*.

Criticism of the meanings assigned to certain words presupposes an indissoluble link between form and sense. It is hard to see how some late inscriptions from Rhodes and Carpathos, eked out by a corrupt gloss in Hesychius, establish the meaning of *κροία* a thousand years earlier. Whatever *dēmos* means in Homer, and in our case at least it is a vessel of heroic size (A 632), there is no proof that it means only 'drinking-cup' in Mycenaean. *Κελαιος*, Professor Beattie assures us, can mean only 'built'; how is it then that Homer can use *κελαιος* of peopling a country? Is it not more likely that *δουρταμος* is a misconstrued echo of the Mycenaean technical term for some sort of private land?

Professor Beattie goes so far as to pronounce confidently on points of style: 'Αἰῶνα νόμω it is in the wrong order; *ἀντα* is incorrectly placed before the substantive; *ταίρος* (*ταίρων* is an Ionicism) should be *ταίρος Ἀσπης*. It would be interesting to know by what means it is possible to deduce such facts about an unknown dialect 500 years older than the next earliest texts.

(3) It would be foolish to deny that a great deal in the tablets still cannot be certainly interpreted; it is surely equally foolish to expect the interpretation to be accomplished in a few months. It is hardly necessary to repeat that not only Cyprian but even alphabetic inscriptions of the Classical period contain passages of doubtful sense. But Professor Beattie's method of sampling the Linear B vocabulary requires some comment.

I have stated elsewhere that at least 65 per cent of the known sign-groups represent proper names. The true figure is certainly nearer 75 per cent. Thus it is unlikely that much more than a quarter of any random sample will consist of vocabulary words; of these we have not in most cases sufficient examples and context to determine which of the possible Greek explanations is correct. There will also have been many words in the dialect of so remote an epoch which will not have survived into the alphabetic records. If we can make a guess at 10 per cent we shall be doing very well indeed. But in the case of Professor Beattie's examples there is a further obstacle which I am almost ashamed to mention: of 111 words quoted in transliteration from Dr. Bennett's *Index* on p. 11 and the first two lines of p. 12, sixteen are wrongly transliterated. This reduces the chances of success by a further 14.4 per cent. It is in the light of this that the remark about the context of 'Εν-ὀνδ-ε-πίος (p. 9, note 3) must be judged. The list of words supposed to end in *-po-de* is wholly fictitious; all end in *-jo-de*, and one has lost a syllable to boot.<sup>1</sup> There are in fact

<sup>1</sup> *ki-ka-ru-ru-jo-de*. The other fifteen are (correctly): *pa-ro-ro-ke*, *ke-ro-ke*, *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *a-ro*), *pa-ro-ro-ke* (for *pa-ro-ro*), *pa-ro-ro* (for *pa-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*), *o-ro-ro-ke* (for *o-ro-ro*).

*jo-de*, *ro-ro-ro* (for *ro-ro-ro*). Correctly transcribed, but incorrect entries in the *Index* are: *o-ro-ro-ro*, *o-ro-ro*, and *o-ro-ro-ro*. Note also *o-ro-ro-ro* (page 8 line 16) which is a misreading by Professor Beattie of *o-ro-ro-ro* =

no comparable words in the *Index*; though we can now adduce *po-ru-po-de-ge* (Pylos Ta722.1) = *Αυ. πολυποδί τε*, and of course *e-me po-de* in Ta631.1, which is almost certainly = *ἐνι ποδί*. It should also be noted that since *-de* is a common allative suffix, a list of words ending *-de* will contain an artificially high proportion of place-names. The words in *-u-er* will obviously include those formed from *o*-stems by the common suffix *-er* (< \**-s-er-s*), as well as the rare words in *-δFης*, *-ωFης*. It is disingenuous to complain that there are no Greek words in *-puws*; there are plenty of nouns ending in *-λος*, *-λον*, *-ρος*, *-ρον* from which adjectives in *-ός* may be formed. Professor Beattie's list contains *ai-to-ro-er* (a man's name) = *Αἰθαλόεις*. Space forbids me to continue this theme; I will be content to remark that *ge-ri-di-ri-jo* which 'could not by any means be twisted into Greek' is a man's name of a familiar Greek type, viz. \**Τηλαίριος* (i.e. *τήλε* ÷ *αἰήρ* ÷ *-ιος*). Really, Professor Beattie is not trying.

Lastly, Professor Beattie underestimates the size of the windmill at which he is tilting. The date when his article was written is not stated, but even the notes contain hardly any reference to the spate of articles on Linear B which has poured out of every country where Greek is studied during the past three years. The statement that 'no journal has yet published a critical examination of the case' is intelligible only if 'critical' means 'unfavourable',\* and even this ignores the friendly agnosticism of Dr. N. Platon's article in *Κρητικὸ Χρονικόν* (viii (1954), pp. 44-53). Ample confirmation has come from the application of the decipherment to new texts, which several scholars have been able to interpret independently with very similar results—the classic test of a decipherment.<sup>7</sup> The adherence of all the most notable Greek philologists may count for little; but the rapidity and unanimity with which support has been forthcoming should give critics cause to reflect.

Cambridge.

JOHN CHADWICK.

*elzerat u* ('Arcadian'), and *ge-to* (page 12 line 57: for *ge-to*). Other readers, who do not know the syllabary well, find P. Mesugi's *Glossario Miceneo* (Torino 1955) useful. Professor Beattie's use of the 'tripod' tablet (Table 1) is incorrect in several details: *o-pu-to ka-u-u-u-u-u* should read *a-pu to-ka-u-u-u-u*, a rational representation of the preverb from the reduplicated participle; the suppression of the numerals after the ideograms masks the concord of dual forms with the number 2; the last two entries form line 4 of the tablet.

\* Critical examinations resulting in favourable conclusions are, e.g.: P. Chantaine, *Le déchiffrement de l'écriture linéaire B à Cherson et à Pylos*; *Rev. de philol.* xxix (1955), pp. 11-33; M. S. Riquet, *Il deciframiento*

del numero lineal B: *Zephyrus* v (1954), pp. 416-50; M. Lejeune, *Déchiffrement du linéaire B*; *R.E.A.* lvi (1954), pp. 154-7; V. Pisani, *Die Entzifferung der mykenischen Linear B und die griechischen Dialekte*; *Rh. Mus.* xcvi (1953), pp. 1-15; J. Friedrich, *Zur Schriftgeschichtlichen Wertung der kreischen Linear-Schrift B*; *Alten* iv (1956), pp. 6-10.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. compare the account of the Pylos *Ta*-tablets by Ventris (*Etanot* iii (1955), pp. 109-23) with that of M. Doris (*Interpretazioni di testi micenei*, Trieste, 1956). That of O. Gallavotti (*Documenti e argomenta del greco nell'età micenea*, Rome, 1956, pp. 134-62) is less happy, but none the less shows a large amount of agreement with the other two.



# AN INTERPRETATION OF AR. *VESP.* 136-210 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STAGE OF ARISTOPHANES

*Vesp.* 136-210

IN front of the house are two slaves, one of whom, the company's chief actor, has been commending the play to the public and explaining the situation. Bdelycleon, who has been asleep on the flat roof, wakes up and calls to the slaves: 'One of you run round here quick; my father has got into the kitchen and he is scuttering around like a mouse inside; mind he doesn't get out through the waste-hole. And you, up against the door with you!' Slave A, the chief actor, disappears round the side of the house, to take up position as Philocleon inside. A rapid change of mask would enable him to poke a head up through the chimney—144 οὐτος, τίς ἐστ' οὗ;—καπνὸς ἐγύρι' ἐξέρχεται—only to be extinguished by the bread-rough and log which his watchful son claps on. (How the chimney was represented, if at all, is anybody's guess.) Now comes a diversion from the ground floor, the exact form of which is unfortunately uncertain. RV give the unmetrical τῇ θυρᾷ ὦθει (imperative): whether this is to be emended as Hermann εἰς τὴν θυρᾷ ὦθει, or whether it is a gloss on the following πείζε νε σφόδρα which has displaced the original text, it is clear that after being warned of the new situation Bdelycleon tells Slave B to press well and truly against the door—which implies that Philocleon is pushing from the inside. 'I'll be down there in a minute myself,' he goes on; 'look out for the bolt, and keep an eye on the bar to see he doesn't gnaw out the pin.' (βύλανος was edible as 'date', 'acorn'.) Bdelycleon thereupon disappears down the back of the roof (there was of course a staircase or ladder giving access to the roof out of sight of the spectators, as required on occasion by tragedy too (*Ag.*, Pl., *Psychostasia*, HF, *Or.*, *Phoen.*)) and comes round on to the stage presumably by the same way as Slave A left it. This would take one or two minutes, and of course the next few remarks in the dialogue with Philocleon are made by Slave B, not by Bdelycleon as in the Oxford Text; he would in any case not address his father as Philocleon (163). The 'net' which Philocleon threatens to gnaw through (164) cannot be stretched across the door, which has to open unimpeded the next minute; it is over the upper part of the house only, covering the window or windows, as we learn from 367 ff., having been put up to prevent him from hopping over the courtyard wall behind (130 ff.). 164 suggests that Philocleon is talking through a window during this exchange, which would make him more easily audible. In the following episode the bolts are temporarily ignored to let out the donkey and Odysseus; at 198 bolts are shut in again and orders are given for a barricade: 'Push a lot of the stones up against the door, put the pin back in the bar, and get the big mortar against the beam; be quick, roll it up.' But before Slave B has time to do this, his (and our) attention is distracted by a clod of dirt falling on his head; 'Perhaps a mouse up there', says Bdelycleon unfeelingly, but it turns out to be a hellast scrabbling beneath the tiling. Philocleon is shoosed back like a troublesome sparrow.

This scene has long been a crucial argument in the controversy over the stage-door in the Greek theatre: did it open outwards or inwards? The evidence for comedy in general is well presented by Professor W. Beare in an appendix to his *Roman Stage*, 277 ff.; his conclusion is that like ordinary house-doors the door in the skene opened inwards. Common sense is so overwhelmingly on his side that it seems at first surprising that the matter should have been so hotly contested. How else could the constant opening and shutting of this double-door (no swing-door, but a stiffly moved contrivance) be controlled on the stage without intolerable fuss and distraction? There are, moreover, two passages in tragedy which are decisive: Euryclea's use of the words «λήθρ' ἀνοσπαστοῦ πύλης, *Ant.* 1186 (where see Jebb's note), and *Or.* 1561-2, where the angry Menelaus, arriving from elsewhere, orders his servants to *push in* the doors of the palace, πρὸς τῶνδε λέγουσθε πύλας τῶνδε.

The only serious argument on the other side is precisely this scene in the *Vesp.* How are we to answer it? I shall not here discuss the view that different scenery (of a surprisingly solid kind) was somehow erected for comedy, since one of the main contentions of this article is to be that the basic essentials of the scene of fifth-century tragedy and comedy were the same, though for any given play—*Philoctetes*, for instance, or *Aves*—they could be modified by the addition of some details of scene-painting, whose nature we can only guess. In any case, the hypothesis of a false front, so to speak, for the house in the *Vesp.*, with a door opening outwards, not only seems pointless; it resolves none of the puzzling contradictions of this scene. Slave B is told (154) to keep an eye on the bolt and bar and pin, and again (200) to put the pin back in the bolt—but bolts and bars are not fixed on the *outside* of doors, whichever way they open. Beare suggests that Bdelycleon is giving orders to someone inside, but that is against the plain sense of the passage

(note *ad* 199; it would need a τοῖς ἐξῶθεν λέγω, or at least a τις). And what of the barricade? The pin and the mortar one expects to be inside, but πολλοὶ τῶν λίθων is surely the stones lying about on the ground outside. Which side of the door are we? At least the pushing from both sides seems clear: Bear indeed argues that the effect of pushing from the outside against an inward-opening door is to force it against its bolts and thus make it difficult for anyone inside to draw them. This is no doubt true, but as an explanation of this scene surely over-ingenious. Would the audience have been able to think it out when they saw Slave B pressing hard and heard that Philocleon was pushing from inside? As slapstick it seems less than funny.

This consideration, I think, gives a clue to the dilemma. Philocleon is trying to get out through a door and the others are trying to keep him in. The simple, farcical way to represent such a situation to the public is surely to push from both sides. Pulling is less effective, quite apart from our uncertainty whether the stage-door had in fact anything to pull by; ordinary houses doubtless had a ῥόπτρον, but grunder ones, with a porter in attendance, perhaps not.<sup>1</sup> In any case, the possibilities of precaution would be exhausted by the simple pull, whereas pushing can be reinforced from the outside by further emergency measures—talk of bolts and bars and pins, and finally of a barricade, all to keep in a single, frantic heliast. It is all talk and scurrying around; there are no bolts and no mortar, and as we saw the barricading is interrupted by the next diversion. This is indicated all the more clearly by the ἀνταδᾶς in 202. The stage-directions in some of our editions (Van Leeuwen's, for instance) make Slave B heave up a beam and a mortar and assemble a heap of stones against the door, all at the caesura of a trimeter. Whatever the relative freedom of metrical delivery in comedy as compared with tragedy, this seems too much to believe, to say nothing of the awkwardness of removing all this paraphernalia before the next opening of the door.

This scene lets in a flood of light upon the technique of Aristophanes. Since Philocleon never does succeed in bursting open the door, the whole normal lay-out of the inside and outside of a house and the mechanism of the door's opening and shutting can be mixed up and turned topsy-turvy for the comic effect of a single scene. Play at a rattling speed and introduce diversions at the right moment, and the audience will take it in its stride. How does this square with the laborious attempts of scholars to provide scenery in advance for all the successive requirements of an Old Comedy? Fashions in stage-directions have changed a good deal: the older commentators indulged in wonderful transformation-scenes, some of them with elaborate stage-machinery of which a whole new set would certainly be required for each play, or else they talked lightly of scene-shifters running about while the audience, far too high-minded to let their attention be distracted, concentrated on the parabasis or some choral song in progress meanwhile. One feels that Aristophanes' chorus-leader would certainly have had a word for it. Moreover, it does seem improbable that it should have been Comedy that called for all this expensive elaboration, while her more highly regarded sister-art was content with the most modest makeshifts and a permanent 'set' with one door which is the basis of every play. In the present century (disregarding such roccoco fantasies as those of Bullel) there has been a welcome simplification; the general principle, with much variation of detail between play and play and scholar and scholar, is that strange and even fantastic juxtapositions did not worry poet or audience, so that for instance in *Ran.* there is a background of three houses (or possibly of one house and two paraskenia), respectively the house of Heracles, the palace of Pluto, and the inn—or perhaps only two, omitting the inn; in *Ach.* the houses of Euripides, Dicæopolis and Lamachus, with some argument over whether what the audience is being asked to swallow is a goat or a camel—is it the closeness of Lamachus and Euripides whom they knew, in fact, not to be neighbours, or the admission of Dicæopolis' country-house between two town-houses? Pickard-Cambridge decides that in announcing his celebration of the Rural Dionysia Dicæopolis is only pretending to be at his country-house; rather a difficult distinction for the audience to appreciate, one would have thought. Also the prologue represents the Pnyx, but scene-shifters can emerge and carry off the benches, and all will be well. In *Eur.* the central door is the Propylaea, and the side ones the houses of Lysistrata and Kalonike; thus topography is still elastic. Other plays again, as *Nub.* and *Ecl.*, only need two houses, *Peis.* and *Phl.* not more than one. In fact the scene is reassuringly like that we are so familiar with from New Comedy, where also there is a certain incongruity, in that rich and poor live at improbably close quarters.

But have reform and simplification gone far enough? In the first place there is still the uncomfortable reflection that fifth-century tragedy never needs more than one door; why was comedy

<sup>1</sup> We might assume from 1412 that Philocleon's house had a regular porter in attendance, but the line has an unmistakable paratragic ring, and is probably not to be taken literally. Van Leeuwen's suggestion that this line is a parody of Eur. *Cycl.* 222 (but why parody a eutyrplay? *ἄρ' εἰς ἵππον τινὲς ἔσθ' ἐπὶ τῷ αἵματι*; is typical of the weakness of that whole case, and it is a pity that

the Bodé editors should have adopted it. All their translation and stage-directions are wrong for this passage; 1412 and 1414 are obviously spoken from indoors and are our earliest instance of that summons from within to open the door which becomes so common in later comedy (cf. *πρόθυρα τῆς οἰκίας*, etc.).



encouraged to be so prodigal of state or choregic resources? Are we to assume a number of comic 'sets', erected afresh between each play, or was there as in New Comedy a single comic set with three doors, of which any number could be used or ignored? Or was there after all a single more or less permanent background for tragedy and comedy, a sort of open rectangle formed of skene with paraskenia, of which it was for some reason the convention that comic poets could use the whole while tragedians confined themselves to the middle bit? In that case the simplicity of the scene in *Vesp.* where Slave A and Bdelycleon run round the side of the house must be sacrificed; they must use a door (the next-door house?) which is not accessible to poor Philocleon. Or perhaps the side-doors were hidden behind some rustic boshage or neighbouring architecture (more scenery?) or was the petit-bourgeois house a grand affair with paraskenia round which they galloped for dear life, by way of one of the parodoi?

Before deciding between these not very attractive alternatives we might remember that honest archaeologists admit that there are very few certain traces of fifth-century lay-out in the Theatre of Dionysus, and that virtually our only evidence is the plays themselves. In later centuries, for which archaeological evidence is much fuller, the action of the comedies of Menander and Plautus and Terence would be clear enough evidence in itself, aside from disputed details, of a permanent stereotyped background of the kind normally postulated. The constant interaction of two or more households is integral to these comedies, and this is naturally reflected in the juxtaposition of the houses. But what, in the name of naturalism or illusion or convenience, is to be gained by the juxtaposition of the house of Heracles, the inn, and the palace of Pluto in *Ran.*? These are not interacting, but *successive*, moments. All Aristophanes wants is a door, and since the same stage is at need the earth, the Styx, the Elysian fields, so the same door disgorges Heracles, a land-lady, Pluto's porter, Aeschylus and Euripides. So in *Lys.* the door is Kalonike's house, then the Propylaea. So the *Ach.* starts on the Pnyx, i.e. on the one or two long steps in front of the skene where characters or Chorus, in tragedy or comedy, normally do sit when the action requires it; then Dicaeopolis enters his country-house (of course he celebrates the Rural Dionysia there; has he not made peace with the Lacedaemonians?); after his colloquy with the Acharnians he knocks at the same door, now the house of Euripides. This cannot be a flanking house, since the cecylema has to bring the poet out, and one of the few fixed points in fifth-century archaeology on the site is the reinforced area in the centre of the flooring (marked 'I' in Pickard-Cambridge's diagrams) where this frequently used contrivance slid in and out. After a long interlude as Dicaeopolis' house again it passes to Lamachus whom a Messenger summons out to fight (1070). From 1096 the fun becomes fast and furious, with Dicaeopolis and Lamachus standing one on each side of the stage and alternate slaves dashing in and out with the various objects called for. These are simply brought out 'from within'—*mai mā phér' ēfō deūpo*: there are no 'houses' at this point. The audience expected no 'scene', properly speaking, in its Old Comedies; it was ready to jump with the poet from one happy improvisation to the next.

Naturally, the total disregard of 'Unity of Space' in Old Comedy has been emphasised often enough, and the number of plays for which only one door has on occasion been postulated is timidly growing, but the full consequences for the staging have not been explicitly drawn. Wilamowitz, in his edition of *Lys.* and in 'Über die Wespen des Ar.' (*Kl. Schr.* i, p. 308) seems half ready to do so, but then he stops short or eludes the question. *Ach.*, he says in the latter, begins on the Pnyx; the Chorus pursuing Amphitruos come upon Dicaeopolis in his deme of Cholleidae; when the latter needs Euripidean stage-properties the poet's house 'is there' (where?) but the Chorus 'must be supposed absent during all this scene'—presumably because the Chorus must be imagined as waiting in Cholleidae while Dicaeopolis visits Athens! After the parabasis he puts Dicaeopolis and Lamachus as neighbours in Athens without being more explicit about their houses, while the end sees Dicaeopolis and his train 'apparently leaving his house'. 'Wie der Regisseur sich geholfen hat, können wir nicht wissen, sollen wir nicht wissen wollen.' The implications of this are not very clear; in fact, of course, the producer had not to do anything about it at all.

It will be objected: 'Yes, that is very well for comedies where these different phases of the action really are successive, but are there not Aristophanean plays where there is cross-reference from one house or building to another? That last scene in *Ach.* is getting perilously near it, and how is it possible to treat a play like *Nub.* and still more *Ecl.* in this cavalier fashion?' Let us then attack the prevailing theory at its strongest point, and consider *Ecl.*, not from the standpoint of modern preconceived notions of what constitutes a 'scene', but from the text itself.

The number of houses in the background is sometimes given as two, sometimes as three, in order to accommodate Chremes as well. I cannot here discuss the part assigned to this character by some editors, but if the much stronger and better presented case for two houses can be demolished, the house of Chremes collapses with it. The best and most detailed exposition is the essay of Ed. Fraenkel, 'Dramaturgical Problems in the Ecclesiazusae' in *Greek Poetry and Life. Essays Presented to Gilbert Murray*, 1936. He regards this play as an intermediate stage between Old



and New Comedy. It has two houses, he says, like *Nub.* and probably other lost plays, but whereas in *Nub.* the identity of the houses remains the same throughout, in *Ecel.* the owners change: down to 729 they are Blepyrus and his neighbour, in the next scene Man A [some say Chremes] and Man B, and in the next the two courtesans (the Girl and the Hag). Nothing here seems to suggest a shift towards New Comedy; the technique seems to be the same as, for instance, that of *Ran.* or *Ach.*, only applied to two houses instead of one. But Fraenkel sees a subtle difference: 'Generally speaking', he says admirably, 'in early comedy the background does not exist for the audience, unless there is a special reference to it in the dialogue. This is not the case in *Ecel.* There the two houses and the street before them are never negligible, but are always of importance both for the conception of the poet and for the imagination of the audience.' The only concrete evidence he advances for this rather nebulous impression is that the assembly on the stage, unlike those of *Ach.* or *Thesm.*, is not an actual assembly but a rehearsal; the chief motive for this, he says, is the impossibility of holding the ecclesia in the street before the two houses. Who can say what a poet's 'chief motive' is in constructing a play one way rather than another? The rehearsal is an integral part of the prologue-exposition; it is much funnier than a real meeting because the performers' lapses can be corrected; and the stage can be cleared when they go off to the real meeting, to make room for the worried and abandoned husbands. It is, of course, true that *Ecel.*, like *Plut.*, is in some respects intermediate between Old and New Comedy; there is no parabasis, for instance, and the characters are all private citizens; the fact that the scene, throughout its imaginary changes, represents the houses of private citizens is a consequence of the whole character of the plot. But the background is no more and no less important and all-pervasive than in any other play; it behaves in the usual intermittent and improvisatory way.

Of the triple series of owners for the two houses postulated by Fraenkel we can omit the middle one; Man A brings his effects out of the house, but Man B simply walks on from the side. There is no mention of his house or his coming out or going in. The others are (1) Blepyrus and his wife Praxagora, and their neighbours (*cf. the* *γείτονα* 33, *ὁ γείτονα* 327); (2) from 877 on, the two courtesans. Now it is clear that the play opens, not with Praxagora coming stealthily out of her door, but with her presence on the stage—probably just in front of the steps, addressing her lamp which she has just placed on them. (The assembling women, who later form the Chorus, doubtless gathered in the orchestra, some of them sitting on the steps.) Praxagora is *there*, just like Lysistrata in a similar opening; and just as Lysistrata presently says of her friend Kallouke that she *ἐξέρχεται*, though later (199) we might suppose the house to belong to Lysistrata herself,<sup>2</sup> so Praxagora (94) speaks of scratching on the door to summon out her neighbour, though the door later belongs to Blepyrus, the husband of Praxagora. This is the usual technique of 'successive' moments. Where then does Blepyrus' neighbour appear in 327? *τίς ἐστίν; οὐ δῆλον Βλέπρου ὁ γείτονα*; Before considering this question let us look at the later scene (877 ff.). Here at last, it will be said, we have quite unescapably the simultaneous occupation of two houses, with the Girl and the Hag defying each other from window to window. So we have—and there is *only one door*.

Let us consider the text. The generally accepted view that the women look out of windows is clearly right, and Fraenkel's odd notion that they both stand in the open on adjacent roofs has no substance. His objection to *ἐστίν* (879) as an unsuitable word for a figure seen by the audience as leaning from a window (*cf. παραβύβασα* 884 and *παρὰ τὸν* 924, as in *Thesm.* 797) is unintelligible to me. Since Aristophanes knew that his actors would in fact be standing on ladders, that would in itself be enough to suggest the word to him. In real life such windows were sometimes in the upper story; exactly where or how they were represented in the skene is uncertain. Since the flat roof is often needed for action in both tragedy and comedy, any projecting pieces of upper story big enough to contain windows (and Philokleon actually gets out, or half out, of his) would have to be temporarily erected for certain comedies. The expedient seems clumsy and improbable. Conceivably the skene in its normal guise of palace or temple front had a kind of metopic band below the flat roof which had gaps big enough to use as windows for comedy.<sup>3</sup> A skene so built would make it easier for the voices of actors speaking 'from within' (Medea's *αναπαύεται* 96 ff., for instance) to float audibly out into the great theatre.

In *Ecel.* 877 ff. at any rate we have the two courtesans making angry exchanges from two windows, which are obviously to be understood as belonging to neighbouring houses. At 934 the Youth is seen approaching in the street below, 936 the Girl withdraws, 946 the Hag follows suit, while announcing her intention of keeping an eye on events; 949 the Girl reappears, saying she has tricked the Hag into thinking she would keep inside. She invites the Youth to join her for the night; the Youth replies with a serenade begging her to come down and open the door.

<sup>2</sup> The demand for objects to be 'brought out' *ἐκέρχεται*, however, implies very little as to ownership of a house, *cf. supra* on *Ach.* and *infra* on *Nub.*

<sup>3</sup> 'Dicaeopolis' wife from such a position might perhaps

be said to 'watch from the roof', *Ach.* 262. And the prologue of *Eur. IT* (113) would in that case refer to an actual feature of the skene. But this is guesswork.

At the third impassioned ἀνείπον (974), the Girl having withdrawn, he knocks urgently on the door. It opens—and the Hag appears (976). The text is unmistakable. Had there been two houses, each with a separate door, the dialogue could not possibly proceed as it does:

αὐτοῦ, τί κάπνεις; μὴν ἐμὲ ζητεῖς;—πόθεν;

'Why the knocking? Looking for me?' 'Is it likely?' asks the furiously disappointed Youth.

καὶ τὴν θύραν γ' ἤραττες.—ἀποθάνοι' ἄρα.

'Fairly battering at the door, you were.' 'I'm damned if I was.' This exchange would be singularly inappropriate if he were knocking at one door and she opened another; the episode turns on the confrontation παρὰ προσόκησιν at the (only) door. To object that if the windows belong to separate houses the dialogue ought not to proceed to call attention to the anomaly of the single door is to misunderstand comic technique, which jumps from one assumption to the other according to its immediate requirements. Even in tragedy there is something analogous in the scenes presented on the *eccyclema*,<sup>4</sup> where the dialogue often vacillates between the imagined interior and the actual stage-front. *Ecel.* 989-90 are, as L. and S. indicate, a metaphor, *sens. obsc.*

To return to the earlier scene, it is now clear that at 327 Blepyrus' neighbour is watching him from a window in the skene, and talks to him through it (so Van Leeuwen and the Budé editors); thus he can ask Blepyrus why he is so oddly dressed without himself being committed to appearing either undressed or in his wife's clothes. Having hit on this scenic expedient Aristophanes employs it twice in the play. The words ὁ γειτνῶν (327) carefully make the situation clear to the audience.

Having reduced *Ecel.* to a single house, or rather a skene with a single door, we are in a stronger position for the earlier plays. Of these, only *Nub.* and *Pax* present any difficulty. In general the solution is the same for both: the skene begins with one owner, passes to another, and then reverts to the former. But the details are a little more complicated than in other plays. The assumption of two houses in *Nub.* seems to be universal, because with our preconception of stability as a normal quality in a stage-scene, the knowledge of later developments in comedy, and the comfortable conviction in the background that at least one other Old Comedy (*Ecel.*) had two houses, that is the natural picture for us to read into the play. Even so, the exact lay-out of the stage has been the subject of some uneasy speculation. Did the two houses balance each other symmetrically, so that the action was always lop-sided, grouped on one side of the stage or the other? Or was the *Ploutisterion* centre-stage, so that we merely have a very lopsided opening (1-132) and close (132-1485), the last few lines returning to centre? For, of course, this kind of 'two-house' stage-setting is very different from that of New Comedy, where the action continually shifts from one side to the other, and where the characters can walk out into the street and meet in the middle, or stand in rival groups by each door. The choice between these two views is easy, except for those who try, at the expense of Aristophanes' wit, to manage without the *eccyclema* (183 ff.). The *Ploutisterion* must be in the centre-background. But as long ago as 1858 Schoenborn declared that Strepsiades' bedroom must be shown by means of the *eccyclema*, and it is hard to see what other supposition is as simple or as natural, not only because this was the accepted theatrical convention for the representation of an interior scene, but also in order to bring on the beds with their sleepers and to remove the former without those bustling but discreet scene-shifters. (Or are the beds, forlorn and unmade, to remain *in situ* throughout the play?) So we are left with the same situation as in *Thesm.*, where first Agathon's house disgorges the poet on his sofa, surrounded by the appurtenances of his craft, and later (at 276, where the old stage-direction has survived) some part of the shrine of the Two Goddesses is thrust forward on the same *eccyclema* from the same door. In *Thesm.* the signal for the change of scene is given by the appearance of the *eccyclema*, in *Nub.* by its withdrawal. First Strepsiades gets up, possibly at 75, then Phicdippides at 82. Strepsiades draws his son to one side to make his earnest appeal; exeunt beds. At 91 he points to the now closed door: ὅπως τὸ θυρίδιον τοῦτο καὶ τῶκεδισι; identifying it as the Reflectory. If Phicdippides at 125 says ἀλλ' εἴποιμε we must suppose that the change of scene is momentarily ignored even now, but the awkwardness of this is a strong additional reason for accepting Cobet's *ἀνεπαρὸν εἶναι*: ἀλλ' εἴποι (cf. *Eq.* 488, *Pax* 232) which he adopted from an Oxford MS. in order to avoid the harsh omission of the participle. 132 Strepsiades knocks at the Reflectory door, and already his own house is banished so far from the scene that he can excuse his clumsiness (138) by explaining that he lives in the depths of the country. The Disciple comes and talks outside, so that at 183 the door has to be opened again, and the *eccyclema* appears, with two or three crouching pupils and other objects of which we hear presently. The pupils obediently run within, on their own feet, at the bidding of the prefect-disciple (195); the *eccyclema* remains with Astronomy and Geometry

<sup>4</sup> See my article 'Seen and Unseen on the Greek Stage', *Wiener Studien*, lix, 1956.



(whatever they may have been) and perhaps a *περίστροφος γῆρας*. At 218 Socrates is swung into view, somewhere and somehow (I confess I have no satisfactory explanation to offer of the swinging mechanism in this play or any other), and at 237 he is dropped to earth. At 254 we find there is a *ἑστὸν σκίμνον*, a mystic camp-bed, there, with a wreath (255); of course all this scene is to be imagined inside the Phrontisterion. Thus when the first part of the play ends, at the parabasis, Socrates and Strepsiades have to *step down* off the back of the *ecyclema* to go inside *εἰσω παραβαθῶν ὡς περ εἰς Τροχωνίου* (508), the *ecyclema* is withdrawn, the doors shut and the parabasis begins.

After the parabasis Socrates walks out in the ordinary way and calls to Strepsiades to carry out his camp-bed; the poet is simply accepting the conditions of the theatre and placing the further lesson outside the door. At 801 when Strepsiades declares his intention of substituting his son he sends Socrates inside *ἀλλ' ἐπαράμενον μ' ἄλλιον εἰσελθὼν χρόνον* (805), and himself simply 'goes to fetch' Pheidippides *ἀτὰρ μέταί μ' αὐτόν*, with no mention of going in. We are not meant to think of any particular locality from which Pheidippides is fetched; he is simply off-stage somewhere; and this is a further reason for accepting Cobet's emendation (125), since it is a general rule, even with all the reckless changes of scene in Old Comedy, that any character who has to return to the stage does so from the direction he went off. The mixture of strict consistency in stage-convention with the wildest disregard of unity of space is entirely typical.

A short choral song fills in the time until father and son return, talking as they come. At 843 Strepsiades fetches the cock and hen from indoors simply; we do not ask whom they belong to, since as we saw in the last scene of *Arch.* all such 'properties' are of course kept ready in the skene and they can be 'brought out' *ἔξω δέσπο* or *ἐνδόθεν* without more ado. Socrates, who is called out (866), announces his intention of absenting himself (887) from the debate of the two Arguments, which looks very like a somewhat transparent excuse for getting him off the stage to dress up as one of the Arguments. The MSS. show that a chorus is missing before 880, which gives him time to do so.<sup>2</sup> If LR is right in saying that the two *λόγοι* were brought on in wicker cages like fighting-cocks (a startling piece of information, perhaps unlikely to have been invented), then they must have appeared on the *ecyclema*, like all heavy objects needing transport. At 1114 the Chorus dismisses everybody for the supplementary parabasis; Strepsiades goes off separately from the rest, who enter the house. He returns (1131) and knocks at the door (1145); Socrates hands over his son and re-enters (1169). At the end of the next scene (1212) *εἰσάγον* we shows that we are back at Strepsiades' house, and there we remain until the last few lines. 1385 Strepsiades calls to a slave to come out with ladder and maul and smash up the roof of the Phrontisterion, and himself runs up there with a lighted torch. The strangeness of attacking the roof—surely not the most obvious place to set fire to a building—has not been sufficiently emphasised, but the reason is now clear: the top part of the house is now doing duty for the Phrontisterion; the slave must have somewhere to transfer himself to, since he can hardly come out and immediately start hacking at the door from which he has emerged. Socrates and the disciples poke their heads in protest through the windows. The improvisation is not unlike that in *Ecl.*, but with the top half of the skene, for this short scene, even more completely detached from the bottom.

The chief difficulty in *Pax* is our total uncertainty as to the *μηχανή*, but the main scenic structure is no longer a problem; most scholars have long recognised that the participation of the Chorus in the liberation of Peace inevitably places Heaven on the ground floor. But also the staging must make do with the ordinary skene. The Budé editors place the whole in the orchestra, so as to bring it within the compass of the Chorus; they have Trygaeus' farmhouse on the right; centre, a cavern blocked with stones, and left the palace of Zeus; in addition, there is in front of 'Trygaeus' house a stable with a practicable door. When and how was such a scene set, and removed?

It all becomes so much simpler, and no whit more fantastic, if the same door is the door of the beetle-house, of 'Trygaeus' house, and of Zeus' house, and at the appropriate time opens to reveal (on the *ecyclema* platform left inside) the pile of stones which cover the pit where Peace has been cast. The transitions seem most easily managed if the *μηχανή* can be assumed to pick up its load behind the skene, swing it over the roof and deposit it on the stage in front of the door; this assumption is not, so far as I can see, inconsistent with the requirements of any other play. Perhaps there was a pause on or over the roof during the pieces of iambic dialogue, first with the servant, then with one of the daughters who run out of the house (130), returning 149; the anapaests (82-101 and 154-72) would then accompany the swinging, with the nervous appeal to the mechanic as the thing settles in front of the door. Since the beetle has disappeared by 720 it was presumably swung off by the same route, probably soon after Trygaeus dismounted, so as to get it out of the way before the Chorus start operations on the cave.

Since there is no place on the stage other than the skene which could possibly represent an *εἴρηπος βαθὺ*, the doors must open to reveal it when Trygaeus asks Hermes (223) 'What sort of a

<sup>2</sup> If Socrates, as seems likely, speaks 105 ff., there is a further lacuna or dislocation at that point.



cave?" Hermes' reply, *Εἰς τοῦτ' ὁ κέρος* indicates that Peace is to be imagined *under* the stones. The obvious, and indeed the only feasible, way to haul her out is on the *ecyclema*, just as once long ago the Dictyulci must have hauled out Danaë's chest. (This means that War and Riot must be able to walk out over the *ecyclema* and retire the same way.) Hence the Chorus have to *enter* to remove the stones (427) *αἰσώμετες οἷς τάχιστα τοὺς λίθους ἀφέλκετε* (the word is on no account to be emended). If the Scholiast on Plato's *Apology* knew what he was talking about in saying that Peace was a colossal statue, then she can only have been a bust, as it were emerging from underground, since only so could she be supposed to whisper in Hermes' ear (653). The rest is straightforward: 'How do I get down?' asks Trygaeus when he finds the beetle missing. *ἤδη παρ' αὐτῆς τῆς θεᾶς*, answers Hermes, and Trygaeus with the two girls steps down inside off the back of the *ecyclema*,\* Peace and Hermes are withdrawn, the doors close and the Chorus strikes up the *parabasis*, after which we are on earth once more.

A. M. DALE.

\* Or possibly even straight down the step or steps into the orchestra, and off by a *parodos*.

## A GROUP OF VASES FROM AMATHUS<sup>1</sup>

### CIRCUMSTANCES

THE vases published below were found during the excavation of foundation trenches for a roadside 'kentron' between the main road and the sea at the western limits of the site of Amathus. They were in clean sand, at a depth of about 2 metres; no traces of bones were observed. The finds were removed in the presence of Mr. Perikleous, Honorary Curator of the Limassol Museum.

There is little doubt that these objects constituted a tomb-robber's cache: Mr. Perikleous was convinced that there was here no question of a tomb, a fact which would seem to detract from the value of the find. Furthermore, the objects are not all contemporary: about half belong to the fifth century, the rest to Cypriot Geometric, with the exception of two imported Protogeometric vases.

In spite of this, it is quite possible that all the objects came from one tomb. Secondary burials after a long period are by no means infrequent in Cyprus. The vases obviously came from a tomb or tombs in view of their completeness—and the Amathus cemetery area is very close.<sup>2</sup> Cypriot tombs are rich in vases, and one tomb would make a sizeable haul for a robber.

I do not propose to publish the later vases. But what I hope to show is that the earlier vases are sufficiently homogeneous to constitute a true burial group, and that the Protogeometric vases are most likely associated with them. So far as concerns the Cypriot vases of earlier type, I propose to set them against vases from Amathus Tomb 10<sup>3</sup> wherever possible,<sup>4</sup> as this burial seems to provide vases nearest in type.

### CATALOGUE

#### A. CYPRIOT VASES

1. *Belly-handled amphora*. Fig. 1. Ht. 0.48 m. Dm. at mouth 0.24 m. Dm. of base 0.14 m. Clay pink-white, rather coarse. Paint blackish to black-brown. Ring base. Scheme and details of decoration as on fig. 1. The curious inverted concha on one side of the shoulder is presumably a mistake, as also the diagonal running into the central motif (perhaps the painter started to draw a triangle?). There are groups of small languettes on the rim, and two bands of paint below the rim, inside. This vase is undoubtedly White Painted II, and is very close to Amathus 10, no. 41.<sup>5</sup> The whole system of decoration is the same, and the shape is almost identical. The chequer motif on the shoulder recurs, though the other motifs differ. The vase from Amathus 10 has similar groups of strokes on the flat rim; it is 5 cm. smaller.<sup>6</sup> The likenesses are so striking that one must conclude that the two vases were contemporary.

2. *Jug*. Fig. 2a. Ht. 0.25 m. Max. dm. 0.18 m. Dm. of foot 0.07 m. Clay brown. Paint purple, alternating with matt black. Orange-red slip. Completely globular. Ring foot. Shape and decoration as on fig. 2a, but note that there are bands of paint round the upper part of the neck, and short strokes on the rim. The handle is barred.

This vase is Bichrome and could be Bichrome II. There is nothing precisely like it in Amathus 10, though no. 51 (Bichrome II) shows similarities in its decorative system. The nearest to it seems to me to be the Polychrome White imported jug from Amathus Tomb 21.<sup>7</sup> This cannot be later than Cyprio-Geometric II.

3. *Jug*. Fig. 2c. Preserved ht. 0.219 m. Max. dm. 0.17 m. Clay dirty white, reddish core. Whitish slip. Paint alternating purple and red. Mouth, part of neck, and handle missing. The two stumps of the handle remain, and it ran from the belly to the base of the neck. The jug is barrel-shaped, and has no foot. The decoration is as shown on fig. 2c; note that on the handle side of the jug the multiple fish-tail ornament is repeated, starting immediately from the base of the handle. The two nipples, one on each side of the body, are painted black.

<sup>1</sup> I am much indebted to the Department of Antiquities of Cyprus for permission to publish these vases, and in particular to its Director, Mr. A. H. S. Megaw, whom I also thank for giving me the opportunity to study the vases, for much information, and for the photographs which are those of the Cyprus Museum. I am also most grateful to Dr. P. Dikaiou and Mrs. Klakkari for their valuable assistance in placing the Cypriot vases in their stylistic divisions. And I wish to record that, but for the late Mr. T. J. Dunbabin, I would not have been aware of the existence of these vases.

Two works, frequently referred to, are abbreviated as follows: The Swedish Cyprus Expedition—SCE. Kerameikos, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen—*ker.* Periodicals are given the standard abbreviations.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. SCE n. 3-4, with particular reference to 'treasure-seeking villagers' on p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> SCE ii, 64-7.

<sup>4</sup> *op. cit.*, pl. xxiii, B.

<sup>5</sup> *op. cit.*, 67.

<sup>6</sup> *op. cit.*, 117. No. 32, pl. cxxxix, 1.

This vase may also be Bichrome II, and no. 51 of Amathus Tomb 10 is by no means unlike it in shape and decoration. Reference may perhaps be made to SCE iv. 2, Fig. xvi, 3 (Bichrome II) for the shape, in particular the relative slenderness of the neck as opposed to the Bichrome III and White Painted III examples.

4. *Side-spouted juglet with basket handle.* Fig. 2b. Ht. 0.14 m. Max. dm. 0.09 m. Dm. of



FIG. 1.—BICLY-HANDLED AMPHORA



[Photo: Cyprus Museum]

FIG. 2a, b, c.—TUMBER JUGS



FIG. 3a, b, c.—AMPHORAE AND JUG

mouth 0.045 m. Dm. of foot 0.033 m. Clay pink-brown, rather coarse. Paint matt black and purple. The spout has been lost. The base is slightly concave underneath. Shape and decoration as on fig. 2b.

It is very difficult to say whether this jug should be assigned to Bichrome II or III. No. 26 of Amathus Tomb 10 has a spout, but it also has a low foot, and no basket handle. I can find no real parallel for the shape, with its very short neck, but flat-based jugs do occur in Bichrome III (SCE iv. 2, Fig. xxiii, 9) and Black-on-Red I (III) (SCE iv. 2, Fig. xxv, 22). The lack of subsidiary decoration is in evidence both in Bichrome II and III. At least this vase has not got the 'sack-shaped body' which Gjerstad mentions as belonging to several of the Bichrome III examples.<sup>7</sup>

5. *Amphora.* Fig. 3b. Ht. 0.157 m. Dm. of mouth 0.11 m. Dm. of foot 0.069 m. Clay dull grey. Matt black slip over whole of outside, and continued, rather carelessly, inside the lip for a short distance. One handle and part of lip and neck lost. Flat rim. Foot flares, and is sharply undercut. Shape and incised decoration as on fig. 3b. (I comment on this vase with nos. 6 and 7.)

6. *Amphora.* Fig. 3a. Ht. 0.14 m. Dm. of foot 0.056 m. Dm. of mouth 0.11 m. Clay and slip as in no. 5. Foot carelessly made, conically undercut. Shape and ribbed decoration as on fig. 3a.

7. *Jug.* Fig. 3c. Ht. 0.165 m. Clay and slip as in no. 5. Foot flares slightly, and is conical underneath. Shape and ribbed decoration as on fig. 3c. Part of mouth and rim missing.

These three vases have reasonably close parallels in Amathus Tomb 10, where there were two Black Slip amphorae, nos. 24 (Black Slip II) and 29 (Black Slip I), and one Black Slip II jug (no. 27). The distribution is the same, and the shapes very similar.

The evolution of Black Slip shapes from I to III is very gradual: the tendency is to go from the elegant to the rather less elegant, from carefully drawn ribbing to extremely careless, until the ribbing disappears more or less completely in Black Slip III. It should be noted, indeed, that examples of Black Slip III wares are very few, and seem to be confined to Cypro-Geometric III B:

<sup>7</sup> SCE iv. 2, 61.



Black Slip II continues in the majority of tombs during the whole of Cypro-Geometric III, according to Gjerstad's table.<sup>6</sup>

I am inclined to think that our three vases are all Black Slip II, with a possibility that no. 7 may be Black Slip I.

### Conclusion

Taking these vases together, one may conclude that they are a reasonably homogeneous group. Similarities with the vases from Amathus Tomb 10, especially in the case of the two large amphorae, are such that a Cypro-Geometric II B date is quite likely. At the same time, there is sufficient uncertainty for one to admit that a C.G. III A date is not impossible.

### B. THE PROTOGEOMETRIC VASES

1. *Skyphos*. Fig. 4a. Ht. 0.14 m. Max. dm. (at mouth) 0.14 m. Dm. of foot 0.067 m. Clay brown, no traces of mica; well polished to a rather yellowish colour on the surface. Paint, very dark brown to brown outside, black-brown inside. The shape and decoration are as shown on fig. 4a, but the following additional points should be noted: the interior of the foot is deeply



FIG. 4a, b.—PROTOGEOMETRIC SKYPHOS AND CUP

conical; the interior of the vase is painted, with the exception of a reserved band close below the lip, and a small reserved circle at the bottom; the belly decoration is the same on the side not visible on fig. 4a, but the two circles intersect; the sets of circles are drawn with a multiple brush; the small white dots visible in some of the segments of the circle filling only indicate areas where the paint has worn away.

2. *Cup*. Fig. 4b. Ht. 0.099 m. Max. dm. (at mouth) 0.096 m. Dm. of foot 0.053 m. Clay well-baked, no traces of mica; light brown to chestnut. Paint brown-red inside; dull red outside, except for the zigzags, which are in light brown paint. The shape and decoration are as on fig. 4b, with the following additional comments: the interior of the foot comes away very shallowly from the edge, and then rises very steeply almost to a point; there is one slight rib about half-way down the foot; a sharp nick emphasises the division between body and lip even more sharply than in the case of the skyphos; the handle is painted; the inside of the cup is painted, except for a reserved band just below the lip, and a small reserved circle at the bottom.

### Commentary

Both these vases are in the Attic Protogeometric tradition, but neither is Attic. Furthermore, both represent shapes that went out of fashion with the end of Attic Protogeometric, to be replaced by low-based or flat-based counterparts, which gained, I think, wide acceptance outside Attica; consequently, it is most probable that these vases were made within the time limits of the Attic Protogeometric series.

There are two main questions. Where were these vases made? And can they be more closely dated in relation to the Attic series?

To the first question, a somewhat disappointing answer must be given. Certain areas can be ruled out: the Peloponnese, Thessaly (and anywhere north of it), Crete, the Dodecanese (on the evidence of the Kos material), probably the west coast of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands. The possibilities are thus narrowed down to Boeotia, Phocis, Euboea, the Sporades and the Cyclades. Boeotia and Phocis are unlikely candidates, from what little is known of Protogeometric pottery there. I am inclined to think that the Sporades are also an unlikely place of origin. Euboea is

<sup>6</sup> p. 190.

certainly a possibility, but next to nothing is known of Protogeometric in this island. The Cyclades are reasonably strong possible candidates, and of these Andros or Tenos are perhaps the most likely; for the flaring foot see in particular the vases from Zagora.<sup>9</sup> Further than that it is perhaps unsafe to go, though deductions might be made from the very high lip of the skyphos. This high, overhanging lip, a complete breakaway from the Attic tradition, is to be found on the skyphos with pendent semicircles which originate in the area of the Northern Cyclades and northwards from there—perhaps the most striking example is the skyphos from Vranesi Copaidos in Boeotia.<sup>10</sup> This element might suggest a place of origin at least no farther south than the Northern Cyclades. But I must most strongly emphasise our ignorance of Protogeometric in these areas, and indeed the general unsatisfactoriness of our knowledge of a style whose development is observable, so far, only from a sequence of tombs.

This leads on to the second question, the answer to which will be found as disappointing as that to the first, and a matter on which I can only express my personal opinion.

The points of difference from the Attic style are as follows. For the skyphos, the shape of the foot and the lip, the lack of thin encircling bands, and the appearance of two sets of circles between the handles (instead of either three, or two flanking a central panel). For the cup, the foot, the lip to body profile, and the shape of the handle.

In spite of these differences, the influence of Attic Protogeometric is clear enough; but the relationship to any particular stage in the development of Attic Protogeometric is obscure.

In discussing the general influence of this style,<sup>11</sup> I had concluded that it had spread outside Athens not before the appearance of Late Protogeometric. I am not now so confident that this conclusion can stand, though I very much doubt whether anything outside Athens can antedate the Ripe stage.

There are two points to be noted with regard to the skyphos: the upper area of the foot left unpainted, and the central filling of the circles. On the first point, a skyphos of the Ripe period<sup>12</sup> of this type (though very different otherwise) is known, and this peculiarity also appears in the Late period.<sup>13</sup> The type of central filling is also known, by one example in the Ripe period, and there are other later examples.<sup>14</sup> Thus there is no conclusive evidence for a date in the Late period. Equally, the zigzags applied with a light brush, as on the cup, are most common in Late Protogeometric, but they could go back earlier. The only consideration I would put forward is that such evidence as we have from the Cyclades (and it is very meagre) suggests that the influence of Attic Protogeometric did not long antedate the appearance of Geometric. This may be purely accidental, and it should also be borne in mind that Protogeometric influence may have made itself felt rather earlier at Smyrna,<sup>15</sup> a fact which could well have a bearing on the areas nearer to Attica.

The local features of these two vases would help if we had more comparative material. The flaring foot is fairly common in imitations of the Attic skyphoi and cups, and is therefore evidence only of inability, or disinclination, to copy the straight-sided conical foot. The very high lip is by no means so common in imitative skyphoi, and here, and indeed in the sharp differentiation between lip and body, as emphasised in the cup, we may perhaps see the same tradition as produced the skyphoi with pendent semicircles and low base, a shape which can hardly have emerged much before the end of Attic Protogeometric (see below, p. 218).

In view of this, I am inclined to place these two vases fairly late in relation to the Attic series. The matter is not capable of proof, but I take this to be the most probable answer.

We therefore have two Protogeometric vases, of probably late date relative to the Attic series. We also have seven Cypriot vases, which are reasonably homogeneous, and may be assigned to Cypro-Geometric II B or possibly to Cypro-Geometric III A, but with a bias in my mind to the earlier dating on account of the strong similarity between the amphora no. 1 and amphora no. 41 from Amathus Tomb 10.

It is evident that the Protogeometric vases cannot be associated with the fifth-century vases, and therefore they are associated with the earlier group, or else there is no homogeneity at all within the finds (which I think is most unlikely). For the subsequent section, I intend to assume that these two vases are associated with a Cypro-Geometric II B group, but the reader must bear in mind the alternative possibilities.

There is one final question before going farther: how did these two Greek vases reach Cyprus? This does not appear to be a matter of trade (otherwise we would surely have found further vases by now), and the choice seems to lie between a visit of a Cypriot to the Aegean area, or the arrival of a Greek in Cyprus, as a migrant. I think the latter explanation is the more likely—a Cypriot sailing to the Aegean would surely have brought back something more valuable and less breakable.

<sup>9</sup> Desborough, *Protogeometric Pottery*, pl. 16.

<sup>10</sup> *op. cit.*, pl. 17.

<sup>11</sup> *op. cit.*, 291 f.

<sup>12</sup> *Ker.* iv, pl. 22 (no. 1072).

<sup>13</sup> *op. cit.*, pl. 23 (no. 2102).

<sup>14</sup> *Ker.* I, pl. 45. For T20, see p. 122.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *JHS* lxxii (1952), 104.

## OBSERVATIONS ON RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE CHRONOLOGY

The two Protogeometric vases published above are the earliest post-Mycenaean objects from the Aegean area so far known or published from the East Mediterranean, and are consequently of considerable interest.

The probable conclusion from the group as a whole is that the Cypro-Geometric II B period coincides with the closing stages of Attic Protogeometric. Is there any further evidence from Cyprus which would help to confirm such a dating? Such evidence is available from two Amathus tombs, nos. 13 and 9.<sup>14</sup> In Tomb 13 a fine Attic Geometric krater (no. 2) was found with Cypriot pottery which Professor Gjerstad has assigned to late Cypro-Geometric III B;<sup>15</sup> this krater may be placed roughly about the middle of the Attic Geometric series.<sup>16</sup> Tomb 9 produced two skyphoi (nos. 76 and 122) with vases which Gjerstad assigns to early Cypro-Archaic II.<sup>17</sup> These skyphoi, whatever their fabric (Gjerstad calls them 'Rhodian-Cycladic'),<sup>18</sup> must be Late Geometric.<sup>19</sup>

So far, then, the relative position of the Protogeometric vases seems reasonable: the sequence Late Protogeometric-Middle Geometric-Late Geometric corresponds to Cypro-Geometric II B-Cypro-Geometric III B-Cypro-Archaic II A.

On the reverse side, no Cypriot vases have yet been published in Greek contexts antedating the end of the Geometric period. Even so, occasional influence on Greek vase-forms,<sup>20</sup> and some imported bronze tripods, are attested in the Protogeometric and Geometric periods. These do not add anything to the synchronisms given above, nor do they run counter to them.

So much for relative chronology. One must now turn to the difficult and delicate question of absolute chronology.

In Volume iv of the Swedish Cyprus Expedition's publication, dated 1948, Professor Gjerstad assigned absolute dates to Cypriot pottery styles, from the Geometric to the Classical. Leaving aside the Classical, he gives the following table:<sup>21</sup> CG I: 1050-950. CG II: 950-850. CG III: 850-700. CA I: 700-600. CA II: 600-475. These dates are derived in the main from equations with Syrian and Palestinian sites, from the evidence of Egyptian objects, and at the lower end in part from Greek sites.

Before discussing the value of these absolute dates, it is worth mentioning that as yet no serious criticism has been levelled against Gjerstad's system of internal relative chronology, and this I have to assume to be reasonably correct.

His absolute dates, however, have aroused considerable criticisms, in particular from experts on Near Eastern archaeology.<sup>22</sup> The most detailed discussion is to be found in the articles of the *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*; Van Beek and Albright take the more radical view, Maister<sup>23</sup> would make slight alterations only. The more radical view claims that CG I must go back to c. 1100 B.C. and probably even earlier; that CG II is a short period, to be dated in the second half of the eleventh century; that CG III should be assigned to c. 1000-900 B.C., and CA I to c. 900-750 (?) B.C.

The Palestinian evidence is based on certain well-stratified sites, whose absolute dates are obtained from the known dates of Israelite kings taken in conjunction with their foundations of cities (e.g. Samaria), and from the destruction caused by the invasion of Shishak I in c. 928 B.C. Such dates are reasonably stable at least from the tenth century onwards (though, as will be seen, there is one notable exception), and the sites concerned include imports from Cyprus.

I give below the table published by Maister:<sup>24</sup>

Megiddo	Tell Abu Hinnun	Tell Qasile	Approx. dates
VII B	V	—	1300-1180 B.C.
VII A	gap	XII	1180-1100 B.C.
VI B	gap	XI	1100-1050 B.C.
VI A	IV	X	1050-980 B.C.
V B	III	IX, 2	980-940 B.C.
V A-IV B	III	IX, 1	940-920 B.C.
IV A	III	VIII	920-815 B.C.
III	gap	VII	800-732 B.C.
II	gap	—	732-540 B.C.
I	II	VI	540-350 B.C.

<sup>14</sup> SCE iv, 79-83 and 75-84 respectively.

<sup>15</sup> *op. cit.*, 83. Cf. SCE iv, 2, 275.

<sup>16</sup> *Kor.* v, 1, 204 for a discussion.

<sup>17</sup> SCE ii, 64-65; iv, 2, 275.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Kor.* v, 1, 145, n. 116.

<sup>19</sup> SCE iv, 2, 292 ff. Burton-Brown, *The Coming of Iron to Greece*, 213 f.

<sup>20</sup> SCE iv, 2, 427.

<sup>21</sup> Albright, *AJA* liv (1950), 175 n. 51, and *BASOR* no.

130 (April 1953), 32. Hanfmann, *AJA* lv (1951), 423. McFadden, *AJA* lvi (1952), 191-92. Maister, *BASOR* no. 124 (Dec. 1951), 24. Van Beek, *BASOR* no. 124 (Dec. 1951), 26 ff., and *BASOR* no. 138 (April 1953), 37.

<sup>22</sup> Professor Maister has now changed his name to Mazar, but I have felt it clearer for the purpose of this article to retain the earlier name, as it was under this that he wrote the article mentioned in n. 24.

<sup>23</sup> *BASOR*, no. 124 (Dec. 1951), 25.



Van Beek's table would differ somewhat from this; for example, he and Albright would not allow so low a date for Megiddo VI A (though I think the date c. 1125-1050 B.C., as given in *BASOR*, no. 124, 27, may have been lowered by now). Also, although the beginning of Tell Abu Hawam III is now agreed to be c. 980 B.C.,<sup>27</sup> Van Beek would still place the destruction of this settlement c. 918 B.C., as opposed to Maisler's date of c. 815 B.C.—a serious matter, as will appear later.

The argument of those who favour the higher dating for Cypriot pottery is that Cypriot imports have appeared on Palestinian sites in dated strata earlier than has been allowed for by Gjerstad. The most difficult problem, as Van Beek says, is the 'Black-on-Red' (B.R.) ware as represented by the ubiquitous handle-ridge juglet or ointment bottle.<sup>28</sup> Gjerstad places this ware as native to Cyprus, not earlier than Cypro-Geometric III; on the other hand, examples of this type of pottery are found on many eleventh- and tenth-century sites in Palestine, and are imports, and are identical in shape and decoration with those found in Cyprus. Hence, it is argued, CG III must go back to c. 1000 B.C., instead of starting in c. 850 B.C., as Gjerstad claims; furthermore, CG III would give way to CA I c. 900 B.C.

Against this Gjerstad argues that, though shape and decoration may be the same, the fabric of this pottery, as found in Palestine, differs from the Cypriot Black-on-Red, and he suggests that this ware was originally made in some area other than Cyprus, and only made in Cyprus at the outset of CG III.<sup>29</sup>

On this most important point, agreement has not yet been reached, and I am, of course, not competent to judge who is in the right.

Other instances are also adduced<sup>30</sup> of Cypriot vases found in Palestine, tending to a greater or lesser extent to confirm a higher dating for CG I and II. This I will not discuss, except only to remind the reader that the dates of earlier strata on Palestinian sites are still a matter for argument, and to say that, as a result of the evidence from Enkomi,<sup>31</sup> where no examples of CG I pottery have yet been reported, the initial date of CG I must, I think, post-date 1100 B.C.

What I am chiefly concerned to show is the effect of these two systems of dating on the absolute chronology of the Protogeometric and Geometric periods in Greece and particularly in Attica.

First of all, though, one further problem must be considered.

In the publication of the Kerameikos excavations, it has been stated<sup>32</sup> that Attic Protogeometric ended shortly before 925 B.C., a date based on two pieces of imported Aegean pottery found in Tell Abu Hawam Stratum III.<sup>33</sup> The cup is stated to be Early Geometric in shape, and the fragmentary skyphos of similar date. It is assumed that Stratum III ended c. 925 B.C.

The problem is twofold. First, does Tell Abu Hawam III in fact end c. 925 B.C.? Second, can the two imported Greek vases be given so precise a relative date?

The answer to the first question is still a matter of doubt. The excavator, R. W. Hamilton, gave it as his opinion that Stratum III covered a period c. 1100 B.C.-c. 925 B.C., and he suggested it as a possibility that Shishak I's invasion was responsible for the destruction of the settlement.<sup>34</sup> Since then, it has been demonstrated that the stratum started c. 980 B.C. (see above). Also, it cannot apparently be proved that Shishak's invasion (now dated to c. 918 B.C.) was connected with its end. Even so, the latest discussion of the terminal date of the stratum<sup>35</sup> upholds the date of 918 B.C., the main arguments being that (a) the ceramic parallels from other sites chiefly belong to the second half of the tenth century, (b) the 'Samaritan' ware found in this stratum appears as early as the second quarter of the tenth century at Megiddo, and (c) the absence from the stratum of 'common Iron II forms and techniques' precludes a ninth-century date. The validity of these arguments, as of the previous ones, I am not competent to pronounce upon, but in view of the division of opinion among Palestinian experts, I feel it would be unsafe as yet to say that the terminal date of Stratum III is absolutely established.

As to the two imports from the Aegean area, they cannot, in my opinion, be dated with any certainty within a limit of a hundred years. Neither, it should be stressed, is Attic: the cup may not be Thessalian, as Heurtley thought,<sup>36</sup> but it does not come from Attica; similarly the fragmentary skyphos has no place in the Attic series.

<sup>27</sup> *BASOR*, no. 138 (Apr. 1955), 38, n. 15.

<sup>28</sup> *BASOR*, no. 124, 27.

<sup>29</sup> *SCE* iv, 2, 270, n. 1; *BASOR*, no. 130, 24 f.

<sup>30</sup> *BASOR*, no. 124, 27 f.

<sup>31</sup> *JHS* lxxiii, 134; Schaeffer, *Enkomi-Alama*, I, 366-9.

<sup>32</sup> Kraiker, *Ker.* i, 163, n. 2. Kübler, *Ker.* v, 1, 70, n. 103.

<sup>33</sup> *QDAP* 4 (1935), 23 f. No. 95, pl. 13. No. 96, pl. 12 and 181, pl. 88.

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*, 68.

<sup>35</sup> Van Beek, *BASOR* no. 138, 34 ff. The writer bases much of his evidence on the stratification at Megiddo,

and this may provide a further problem, for C. Clairmont has recently published (*Berytus* xi (1955), 93 and pl. 22 (nos. 4 and 5)) two Geometric sherds, which he definitely states were found in Stratum V at Megiddo. It is now accepted, both by Van Beek and Maisler, that this stratum ended c. 920-918 B.C.; yet, according to our present chronology for Geometric pottery, these sherds cannot antedate 850 B.C., and could well be much later (*Cf.* *Ker.* V, i, pl. 90, no. 893).

<sup>36</sup> *QDAP* 4 (1935), 181.

Whether in fact the shape of the cup owes its origin to the flat-based cup, which first appears at the end of Attic Protogeometric and is typical of Attic Early Geometric, I would not like to say for certain (our evidence is insufficient). This cup is, however, typical of the whole Thessalian and Cycladic Geometric series, and seems to change its shape little, if at all, over a long period.

The skyphos with pendent semicircles is almost as difficult to place chronologically as the cup.<sup>37</sup> There seems no doubt that its origin goes back to Attic Protogeometric influence, and the earliest examples may well be contemporary with the end of Attic Protogeometric; there is equally no doubt that this distinctive vase was still flourishing in the eighth century.<sup>38</sup> The home of this skyphos extends from Thessaly to the North Cyclades, and there were two variants in technique of manufacture, according to the type of lip. Stylistic development during the very long life of the type is extremely difficult to make out, and, so far as I am concerned, a date c. 820 B.C. for both skyphos and cup would be as acceptable as c. 900 B.C.

Thus there is no necessary connexion between these two pieces and the end of Attic Protogeometric, though one could go so far as to say that it would be extremely surprising if they antedated its end. In other words, if it could be proved that Tell Abu Hawam Stratum III ended c. 918 B.C., then one could be reasonably certain that Attic Protogeometric had ended before this date. As things stand, however, it is better to leave this evidence out of account.

What, then, is the effect of the higher dating system on absolute chronology in the Aegean area, taking into consideration the three Amathus groups and the Greek vases found in them?

CG II ends, on the high dating, c. 1000 B.C. Therefore the Protogeometric vases published above must be dated earlier than this, probably c. 1040 B.C. and, if they are late in relation to the Attic series, which I think is most likely, then Attic Protogeometric may well have ended c. 1025 B.C.

CG III ends, again on the high dating, c. 900 B.C. Therefore the Attic krater associated with CG III B pottery in Amathus Tomb 13 must be dated well above 900 B.C., say 950 B.C.

CA II, finally, begins c. 750 (?) B.C. Therefore the two Late Geometric vases found in Amathus Tomb 9, which is placed by Gjerstad at the beginning of CA II, will be dated c. 750 B.C. or a bit earlier.

What are the consequences of this? First of all, if the end of Attic Protogeometric is to be dated c. 1025 B.C., then one must fit in between this date and c. 1150 B.C. (which I reckon to be about the time of the destruction of Mycenae) the remainder of the LH III C : 1b period, LH III C : 1c, LH III C : 2 (sub-Mycenaean) and Attic Protogeometric. Furthermore, the duration of Attic Geometric, whose terminal date is fairly securely fixed at the end of the eighth century, will be a matter of over 300 years.

These may appear at first sight rather startling deductions, but if one follows the higher dating to its logical end, such are the consequences. I doubt whether any Greek archaeologist would be prepared to accept them, and yet, if this dating is founded on fact, they have to be accepted.

What happens if we suppose that the lower system (Gjerstad's) is the more accurate?

Here, CG II ends c. 850 B.C., and consequently the Protogeometric vases associated with Cypriot pottery dated to CG II B could be dated c. 900 B.C. and the end of Attic Protogeometric perhaps a little later.

CG II ends c. 700 B.C., and so, as the vases with which the Attic krater was found are assigned to near the end of this period, the krater should belong to c. 750 B.C. (not very far from the date assigned to it by Kübler).<sup>39</sup>

CA II, on the other hand, begins c. 600 B.C., and therefore the two Geometric skyphoi found with vases of early CA II could hardly be placed much before 650 B.C.<sup>40</sup> Kübler would be inclined to place them in the 730's, but there seems to be some divergence of opinion on the matter.<sup>41</sup>

On the whole, although Gjerstad's dating of the beginning may seem a bit too low, his other dates do seem to lie within the limits of probability, so far as Attic Protogeometric and Geometric are concerned.

It will be very evident from what I have said that this is no more than a superficial survey of the chronological problems of the Early Iron Age in the Aegean and Near East. If, however, I have drawn the attention of Greek archaeologists to the implications of these differing systems of absolute chronology for Cypriot wares, then the superficiality may be excusable. For any stable absolute dates in the centuries following the destruction of Mycenae, a solution of the Near Eastern

<sup>37</sup> Desborough, *Protogeometric Pottery*, ill. II.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. particularly Al Mina (*JHS* ix (1940), 2), and Larisa in Aetolia (*Larisa am Hermus*, ill. 170 and pl. 57, 4).

<sup>39</sup> *Ker.* v, 1, 304.

<sup>40</sup> Gjerstad (*SCE* iv, 2, 424-3) places CA I as between

700 B.C. and 600 B.C. by virtue of scarabs found in the tombs, and gives reasons for stating that CA II cannot start later than 600 B.C.

<sup>41</sup> *Ker.* v, 1, 145, n. 116. A very much lower date is given by Dunham and Young (refs. given in the note).

problems is vital; furthermore, it may even be that a reconsideration of Gjerstad's relative datings is desirable; and, finally, although in the Aegean area itself, for the four centuries following c. 1150 B.C., the relative chronology of the pottery of Attica is reasonably clear, the same cannot be said of other districts, and the publication of new material from them could have a radical effect on our present views, not only of the pottery of these districts, but also of the general ceramic relation between district and district.

V. R. D'A. DESBOROUGH.

*Manchester.*



## THE DANAID TETRALOGY OF AESCHYLUS

THE humour of the passage in the *Frogs* (1415 ff.), in which the tragic poets reply with riddles on burning political issues, is explicable: research on the *Eumenides* shows that in this play Aeschylus projected political notions in much the way that he is presented by Aristophanes speaking in the *Frogs*: concentrating the attention of the spectator on the past of the Areopagus and on the circumstance of its foundation, he touches directly on the question which arose in 462-1 through the abolition of the political competence of this body, but he replies to it through a parable which is enigmatic for us. It is obviously such an expression as this that Aristophanes had in mind. It rests with philological and historical criticism to show whether in surviving tragedies other than *Eumenides* themes of an immediate public interest are put forward under the cover of myth, themes which, through ignorance of the date or of the exact conditions of the composition of the plays, have so far not been revealed. This essay examines from this point of view the Danaid tetralogy of Aeschylus.

### THE CHOICE OF MYTH

The subject of the Danaid tetralogy is taken from the story of Danaos and his daughters.<sup>1</sup> For this, Aeschylus could draw on both a literary source, the *Danaids*,<sup>2</sup> and probably also on Argive traditions.

Very little is known about the *Danaids*.<sup>3</sup> It did, however, include an account of the events which took place in Egypt between the houses of Danaos and Aigyptos,<sup>4</sup> and it is likely, therefore, that it traced the course of this quarrel from the beginning.

Aeschylus, on the other hand, chooses as the starting-point of his trilogy the moment at which the Danaids fly to Argos, and the choral odes of the Suppliants include from the past only those events which refer to the relationship of the Suppliants with Argos. The dispute between the first two parties does not primarily interest Aeschylus. Attention is focused on the city of Argos. In other words, from the whole myth, Aeschylus has chosen a situation which has developed between the city, her colonial suppliants, and their enemies. Through this choice are emphasised: (a) a definitive political entity, Argos, and (b) a particular historical circumstance—a city becoming involved in the dispute of her overseas kinsmen.

### THE POLITICAL ENTITY: ARGOS

It has been rightly said that the friendship for Argos expressed in the *Suppliants* makes it impossible for this play to have been produced at the time when, as a consequence of the pro-Persian policy of Argos, the relations between Athens and Argos were strained.<sup>5</sup> It has also been said that this display, in the theatre, of friendship for Argos amounts to a hostile gesture to Sparta.<sup>6</sup> On account of this, the tetralogy ought to be dated either before the Athenian-Spartan rapprochement preceding the battle of Marathon,<sup>7</sup> or after the rapprochement of Athens and Argos which resulted in the alliance of 462-1.<sup>8</sup>

A 'hypothesis' to the tetralogy has recently been discovered<sup>9</sup> which confirms the later date of its production, and indicates that this probably took place in the year of Archedemides (spring 463). The friendship shown to Argos in this play may therefore suggest that it was composed in the years immediately previous to the alliance of 462-1.

This view, however, takes into account only one of the main themes, that of friendship for Argos, disregarding the other, the Suppliant theme; it also shows some misapprehension of the topics through which the Argos theme is presented. There are four such topics: (a) the seniority of Argos over Sparta; (b) the consequences of the defeat of Argos at Sepeia (494 ?); (c) pre-Dorian Argos; and (d) Argive democratic institutions.

### A. THE SENIORITY OF ARGOS

In the short account of the story of the Danaids in *Prometheus*, 853 ff., Aeschylus stresses that the royal house of Argos was founded as a result of the marriage of Hypermnestra (the heroine of the *Danaides*). It is added that μακροῦ λόγου δέ τι τῶν ἐπεξελλθεῖν τοιοῦτος (P.V. 870). The account

<sup>1</sup> On the Myth of the Danaids, see Waser, art. 'Danaides', in R.E. iv, 2087 ff.; E. Meyer, *Forsch. zur Alten Geschichte*, i, (1911), pp. 67 ff.; G. Meigs, *Die Sage von Danaos und den Danaiden*, *Hermes* lxxvii (1953), 215-28.

<sup>2</sup> E. Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 69.

<sup>3</sup> Kinkel, *St.P.*, p. 78.

<sup>4</sup> O. Müller, *Eumenides* (Engl. ed. 1835), 118 ff.; Fr. Focke, *Alt. Nachr.*, 1922, 165 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Focke, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Focke, *ibid.*; Pohlenz, *Alt. Tsg.* i, 38 ff., ii, 11.

<sup>7</sup> O. Müller, 118 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ox. Pap.* xx (1952), 2256, fr. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Fr. 1.

of events in *P.V.* agrees with what is developed in the *Suppliants*. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in this account in *P.V.* Aeschylus relates the Danaid story as it had been developed in the Danaid trilogy.<sup>10</sup> In other words, what is said in *P.V.* (865 ff.) concerning Hypermnestra was expounded in detail in the *Danaides*.

From a fragment of the *Danaides* preserved by Athenaeus (Nauck, 44) it appears that the motive referred to in *P.V.* for the disobedience of the heminae, the 'παίδων ἡμερος', was in fact put forward by Aphrodite, on whose authority Hypermnestra was acquitted. This suggests that the consequences of Hypermnestra's desire to become a mother (αὐτῇ κατ' Ἀφροδίτην βασιλικὸν ἔξει γένος, *P.V.* 869) had also been treated in the *Danaides*. Μακροῦ λόγου δεῖ ταῦτ' ἐπεξελθεῖν τοῦτως is therefore an allusion to a detailed exposition concerning the royal Argive house which had taken place in the *Danaides*.

It may be no accident that in *P.V.* two particular generations are specified among Io's descendants: Hypermnestra, who is her fifth descendant, and Herakles, who is her thirteenth. It is likely that such an enumeration was also made in the *Danaides*; that the poet was dealing in that play with the generations from Hypermnestra to Herakles as he dealt with those from Io to the Danaides in the *Suppliants* (*P.V.* 853, 774; *Suppl.* 314-322). The genealogical enumeration from ancient Argive dynastic history is not without political significance: Spartan dynasties do not even go back to Herakles; their founders, Eurysthenes and Prokles, were the fifth generation from Herakles (*Hdt.* viii. 131) who was himself the eighth from Hypermnestra.

The poet does not restrict himself to making this point on the dynasty. When King Pelasgos is asked by the *Suppliants* in what capacity he comes forward to meet them he relates exhaustively all that concerns his birth and describes in detail the limits of his authority (250-259). He is the son of earth-born Palaichthon; he rules over the whole Peloponnese and mainland Greece as far as Strymon and Dodona. In this way the spectators are reminded not only of the seniority of the Argive dynasty over that of Sparta, but also of the seniority of Argos as a political power ruling over Greece.

Genealogies and dynastic questions were far from having only an antiquarian interest in the fifth century. Precisely in relation to Argos, Herodotos relates (vii. 148) that on the eve of the expedition of Xerxes, Persian diplomacy sought Argive neutrality, putting forward the argument that the ancestor of the Persians, Perseus, son of Perseus, was from Argos on his mother's side. Genealogical arguments carried weight, and it must be seen whether the particular Argive genealogy which is given publicly in the *Danaid* trilogy, had at a certain moment a significance affecting international relations.

At about the same time as the Persian embassy, an embassy from Sparta appeared before the Argive Council seeking aid against the Medes (*Hdt.* vii. 148). The Argives agreed to help on condition that there would be a thirty years' truce between them and the Spartans and a common leadership of the alliance, although, they added, leadership by right belonged to Argos. The Spartans had instructions to reply that they had two kings while the Argives had one, and each king in the confederacy must have one vote.

The fact that the Argive argument is passed over in silence and that the Spartan heralds were bearers of an official answer to it means that it had already been brought forward in the past; and the fact that the Spartans opposed to it the numerical superiority of their dynasties suggests that the Argive claim was based on the seniority of the Argive dynasty. Thus the publicity given in the drama to the founding of the great Argive dynasty bears directly on this controversy: it confirms the Argive and refutes the Spartan claim. A display of such titles to leadership would have had meaning only when the question of leadership was at stake; and it was no longer at stake after the negotiations between Argos and Sparta in 481 had broken down. In the middle sixties when, according to the 'hypothesis', the Danaid tetralogy was produced at Athens, the question of Argive titles in the Peloponnese came up again. But by then Athens was already leading a confederacy which she sought at this time to extend to mainland Greece; while she had every reason to encourage the spread of Argive power in the Peloponnese, she had no reason to concern herself with the Argive titles to the leadership of Greece; Athens was now herself ambitious to have this leadership, with Argos as her supporter. It is significant that in the *Orestia*, composed during the years that followed the Athenian-Argive alliance, it is the seniority of Athens which is stressed, while Argos swears allegiance to Athens, and Orestes surrenders to her his fatherland and the Argive people (*Eum.* 287 ff.).

## B. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE TRILOGY TO THE DEFEAT OF ARGOS

### 1. The Prayer (*Suppl.* 625-709)

In the prayer made for the Argives in the *Suppliants*, the prominent position is taken by applications relating to the safety of the people of Argos, to the avoiding of the calamities of war,

<sup>10</sup> Meyer, p. 68, and Waser, p. 2087.58 (above, n. 1).



to the birth of new soldiers and citizens, while those relating to the furnishing of material benefits are very limited. Mazon is therefore of the opinion that the drama refers to conditions in Argos after the defeat at Sepeia.<sup>11</sup> He is presuming that prayers of this type follow some conventional formula which includes certain basic themes; these themes would then be stressed or muted according to circumstances. Though this principle cannot be illustrated by actual prayers preserved in historical contexts,<sup>12</sup> it is supported by the prayer in the *Eumenides* (916 ff.). The same basic themes are included in this prayer as in that of the *Suppliants*, and others of a more special character are added. On the whole the development of the themes is more symmetrical. Prayer for the city's future, and prayers for material benefits and for the safety of the inhabitants each occupy one strophe (*Eum.* 916-26, 937-48, 956-67). The final strophe (976-87) includes a petition for the avoidance of *stasis* and for concord among the citizens. It is generally admitted that this petition refers to the political conditions in Athens during the years of the writing of the *Oresteia*, when political passions ran high following the reform of the constitution, the murder of Ephialtes, and the banishing of Kimon.<sup>13</sup> Thus, at least in exceptional circumstances, supplications relating to the special conditions of their contemporary political life were included in the prayers made in tragedy on behalf of cities. One may possibly attribute the addition of certain petitions and the unsymmetrical development of others in the prayer for Argos in the *Suppliants* to special conditions of its political life. The supplications for the avoidance of the calamities of war, for the protection of child-bearing, for the birth of new defenders of the country, made in this drama would never have been so well justified by circumstances as after the defeat at Sepeia when Argos was 'desitute of men' (*Hdt.* vi. 89). The assumption, therefore, that the prayer in the *Suppliants* is related to these conditions is not unwarranted. Other data support it still further.

## 2. The Main Theme of the Tetralogy: the 'Forced Marriage'

The main theme of the Danaid tetralogy is the resistance and submission of woman to the 'fate of marriage'. The subject of the *Suppliants* is the desperate attempt of a group of women to escape this fate. At the end of the play (1018 ff.), the points of view of women who refuse marriage (invoking Artemis) and of those who accept it (invoking Aphrodite and Hera) are opposed. In the following plays these points of view lead to extreme consequences. Forty-eight of the Danaids, faithful to Artemis, slay the bridegrooms; one, out of devotion to Aphrodite and Hera, betrays her family. Thus side by side Aeschylus brings out both the situation of women who are compelled to submit to marriage and the virtue of one who accepts it out of desire for children. The 'desire for children', the motive of Hypermnestra's disobedience to her family, is defended in court by Aphrodite and rewarded by the Argive demos, which absolves her from guilt. Through her marriage Hypermnestra gave to Argos its dynasty. The example of an Argive woman who accepted a marriage forced upon her in order to bear children was thus consecrated by divine and popular will, and found its reward in history.

The resistance and submission of woman to the fate of marriage is also the main theme of the satyr-drama, the *Amyymone*, which completed the tetralogy. In one of the three surviving fragments of this work there is talk about the process of reproduction (15 N.). In another, 13, the man reminds the woman of their respective fates:

σοὶ μὲν γαμεῖσθαι μέροισιν, γαμῆν δ' ἔρω

From Apollodorus' account, taken from this play,<sup>14</sup> we learn that Amyymone, like Hypermnestra, reluctant at first, then finally accepting this fate, also becomes the cause of great benefit to Argos, conferring on it through her marriage a precious source of natural wealth, the springs at Lerna, revealed to her by Poseidon. Thus the poet has exploited tragedy and satyr-drama in order to commend, on moral and material grounds, the public benefit from the acceptance of marriage. When was this theme historically topical?

The battle of Sepeia deprived Argos, according to Herodotos, vii. 148, of six thousand men. Herodotos describes the conditions which arose in Argos as a result of this disaster: 'Ἀργὸς δὲ διδρῶν ἐχρησθη νῦν, ὥστε οἱ δοῦλοι νῦν τῶν ἔσχατον πᾶσι τὰ πρῆγματα ἀρχόντες τε καὶ διέποντες, ἐς δ' ἐπιβήσαντες οἱ τῶν ἀπολαμμένων παῖδες (vi. 83). Plutarch, drawing on another source, evidently of Argive origin, corrects Herodotos: 'Ἐπαυροῦμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀνιανδρίαν οὐχ ὥς Ἡρόδοτος ἱστύει, τοῖς δούλοις, ἀλλὰ τῶν περιόικων πιστοῦμενοι πολίτας τοὺς ἄλλοιους, συνήκισαν τὰς γυναῖκας.'<sup>15</sup>

Many marriages of Argive women with men whom they did not wish to marry must then have taken place. Virgins and widows of the dead of Sepeia, compelled to marry in order that the

<sup>11</sup> P. Mazon, *Eschyle*, i, p. 3 and p. 36, note 1.

<sup>12</sup> Only prayers on evidence about prayers made in special circumstances, for treaties, alliances, etc., have been preserved. In these circumstances the prayer refers to the success of the particular purpose.

<sup>13</sup> See notably R. W. Livingstone, *JHS.* xlv (1925), 120 ff.

<sup>14</sup> ii. 1. 4.

<sup>15</sup> *Vit. Aul.* 4.



city's losses might be repaired, would certainly have resented the ἐπ' ἀνέγκης ἐρχόμενον γάμον, while the state, if it did not enforce this with oppressive measures, ■ least would have encouraged its acceptance in such critical conditions, and consequently the examples of Hypermnestra and Anymone were relevant. The subject of a forced marriage being accepted for the sake of child-bearing is the only main theme of the tetralogy which at first sight seems devoid of political interest, but in Argos immediately after 494 it was a burning national issue.

This theme, added to the disproportionate development of other related themes in the prayer, lends support to the assumption that Aeschylus wrote the tetralogy having in view the conditions arising in Argos from the catastrophe. It is particularly persuasive that, as in the seniority theme, the poet's intention is again revealed at different stages in the development of his work. For both the trilogy and the satyr-drama, themes are chosen which make it possible to stress the authority of the law of reproduction and the public service of submitting to it. Finally in the *Suppliants* there is a prayer also relevant to the conditions created by the catastrophe.

The display of Argive seniority and the prayer for the healing of wounds such as those suffered by Argos at the hands of Sparta, are not merely manifestations of Argophil sentiments, but are at the same time directed against Sparta. Moreover, the message of the myth and the petition in the prayer for the birth of new defenders of the Argive territory, look forward to Argos being as soon as possible in a fighting condition again. Sympathy for Argos is thus linked with military interests.

The poet's political perspective begins to appear: Argos, through her seniority, has more weighty titles to the leadership than Sparta, and these we recognise and proclaim. May she speedily be in fighting condition.

#### C AND D. PRE-DORIAN ARGOS AND THE ARGIVE CONSTITUTION

##### 1. Democratic Argos

The Danaids' demand for protection and the laying down of suppliant branches set into motion a *democratic* political mechanism, the working of which was exposed to the spectators throughout the play. The highest organ of the executive power brings the question before the demos. The demos votes for the granting of asylum. When the Egyptian herald tries to lead the Danaids away, the highest organ of the executive power acts on the decision of the demos, while he expounds the theoretical basis for its finality. Moreover it is repeatedly stated that the demos has the highest authority in the state and that it alone is competent on the political question that has arisen. The poet certainly could not have taken all this from the epic *Danaïs*. It remains to be seen whether he took it from Argive traditions.

##### 2. Argive Traditions

Pausanias states that the Argives 'from most ancient times loved equality and autonomy' and explains that from the time of Meidon, son of Keisos, their kings were kings in name only (ii. 19.2).

According to the above tradition, the demos became the real ruler in Argos from the sixth generation after Herakles. According to other traditions, however, also related by Pausanias (ii. 19.3-4), the demos already appears as the main political power at the time of the arrival of Danaos in Pelasgian Argos, that is, nine generations before Herakles. This is also how it appears in the *Suppliants*. These traditions report that a dispute over authority took place 'ἐπὶ τοῦ δήμου' between the newly arrived Danaos and Gelanor, then reigning in Argos. They also mention Hypermnestra, prosecuted by Danaos for not participating in the audacious act of her sisters as *ἐπίστατον ἐν τοῖς Ἀργείοις* (Paus. ii. 19.6).

The discrepancy of the Argive traditions as to the time when the demos took over authority may be explained thus: in its struggle for power the demos wished to be associated with the earliest and most glorious pages of Argive history, in order to acquire weighty historical titles showing that the democratic constitution was 'ancestral'. Poets, according to conditions and political needs, would naturally turn to different chapters of Argive history and go back to the remotest past more boldly than chronographers. The legend of Hypermnestra's trial is likely to have been remoulded according to democratic standards after the reform of the constitution through which the demos took over judicial competence.

Moreover a torchlight festival was held in Argos in memory of the acquittal of Hypermnestra and the saving of Lynkeus (Paus. ii. 25.4). The tradition of the trial and acquittal of Hypermnestra was therefore sponsored by the Argive state, for otherwise there is nothing to explain the organisation of a festival lacking religious content.

Two reasons for this state sponsoring are clear: by holding a festival in memory of a judicial decision given by the demos and concerning the ancestress of the Argive kings, the Argive state both stressed in the person of Hypermnestra the seniority of the royal house to which she gave birth, and indirectly paid honour to the court which rendered the decision. It brought out the antiquity

of the demos as a judicial body as well as that of the dynasty. The institution of this public festival must therefore be linked with an internal policy of constitutional reforms, and with an international situation demanding that the seniority of the Argive dynasty should be stressed.

### 3. *The Democratic Reform in Argos after the Defeat at Sepeia*

Herodotos, vi. 83, and Aristotle, *Politics*, v 1303a, both witness that the Argive constitution was reformed after the defeat at Sepeia, and that elements formerly outside the state—*perioikoi* (according to Aristotle),<sup>16</sup> slaves (according to Herodotos)—gained the upper hand.

Forced to recruit its man-power, political and military, from elements which lacked common consciousness, the new state had next to dispel the shame of accepting those elements. At the same time the situation in the Peloponnese required that Argos should have her full strength in hand. It was therefore imperative to find a more favourable theoretic basis for the democratic constitution: 'common' democratic traditions and a democratic Argive history must be created by all possible means, so that the racial and social distinctions of yesterday should be forgotten in the new state. The children of the Dorian hoplites killed at Sepeia might thus be conditioned against reaction, now or later.

The identity of purpose in the registration of the acquittal of Hypermnestra as the action of the demos and the organisation of a public festival, allow one to attribute both these measures to a single political initiative directed, after the defeat at Sepeia, towards a broad programme of reform, not only to make the constitution more democratic, but also to adapt the city's past history to the new political situation.

The 'historical' characters honoured by the festival are precisely the heroes chosen by Aeschylus for his tetralogy, and Hypermnestra's trial becomes the subject of his *Danaides*. Throughout the *Suppliants* he keeps stressing the virtue of democratic institutions and the prestige of the non-Dorian element. I therefore suggest that Aeschylus was the man to whom the new Argive rulers had entrusted the re-moulding of the Hypermnestra tradition in conjunction with the institution of the public festival.

## THE ATHENIAN BACKGROUND TO THE TRILOGY

### 1. *The Supplication*

As we have seen, Aeschylus concentrated his attention on the circumstances of a city becoming involved in the dispute of others. Her people and government are shown facing a dilemma; suppliants of their own race, refugees from overseas, seek protection. To grant this would lead to πόλεμον ἀρασθαι νέον with an overseas power; refusal to help would bring on the city Ζητὸς Ἰκετιῶν κόπον (346) and μίσσημα οὐχ ὑπεροφεισθῆναι (473). Of the two evils, the wrath of Zeus is judged the worse. The demos votes for giving protection. Abiding by this vote the city faces the likelihood of war.

Focke observed,<sup>17</sup> and Pohlenz and W. Schmid accepted his view,<sup>18</sup> that the dilemma set before the Argives in this play is similar to that faced by the Athenians in 499, when Aristagoras of Miletus ἐπέσθην ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον (Hdt. v. 97) asked for help. This help exposed the Athenians to Persian reprisals and signified for them, πόλεμον ἀρασθαι νέον, exactly as the help of the Argives to the Danaids in Aeschylus' play exposes them (*Suppl.* 341). As for the question of whether the Danaid tetralogy was written for performance in Athens, it is indicative that Aristagoras did not turn to Argos for help; the dilemma arising from his supplication was placed before the Athenian demos and its vote had placed Athens alone in danger of a 'war of reprisals'.

### 2. *The Democratic Constitution*

Apart from the general commendation of the democratic regime relevant to both Argos and Athens, a number of questions relating to the constitution are also brought out which appear to have special reference to Athens.

#### (a) *The authority of the Demos*

During the discussions about the asylum sought by the Danaids, a question of competence is posed. While they endeavour to make the king promise the protection of Argos, insisting that he alone has the competence to take a decision in the name of the city and the demos: σὺ τοι πᾶσις, σὸ δὲ τὸ δῆμον (370), he shows that the decision rests not with him but with the people. Furthermore, no opportunity is missed to emphasise the final authority (τέλος) of the demos, and the absolute validity of its psephisma (601, 603, 739, 965). The epic *Danaids* could not have contained even a mention, let alone a complete statement, of this topic. These are additions made by Aeschylus. How can we explain them? The theme in itself has no dramatic interest. The most reasonable

<sup>16</sup> See also Plutarch, *Vit. Alul.* 4, p. 222 n. 4 above.

<sup>17</sup> Pp. 183 ff. (above, n. 3).

<sup>18</sup> Pohlenz, *Gr. Tr.* 1, p. 39 and ii, p. 11; Schmid, *Gr. Lit.* Part I, vol. ii, p. 194, n. 2.



explanation is that the poet is addressing himself to a public intensely interested in the question of the competence of the demos and of the highest organ of the executive authority.

In Argos after 494, the insistence on the 'authority' of the demos would certainly serve the interests of the Argive democrats and would give moral support to the new constitution. In Athens, however, this 'agon' would also be reminiscent of a particular historical event. In 508-7 there were people like Kleomenes, the guest of Isagoras, who for the success of their own purposes might address the Archon, *οὐ τοῖς πόλιν, οὐ δὲ τὸ δῆμον*, and turn to him as having *τὸ πᾶν κράτος*, while others maintained—Kleisthenes was their leader—that *οὐκ ἄνευ δῆμου τάδε*. By repeatedly declaring that the demos has authority higher than the highest organ of the executive power Aeschylus pronounces a verdict which would have met with certain response from the Athenian public, and is likely to have been intended for it. This question must have been topical until the reforms of 487. From 487 onwards, when the office of archon was chosen by lot, the archon ceased to be the highest organ of the executive power. In Ephialtes' time it was already established that the demos had authority and only the powers of the archons and the Areopagus were a matter of dispute.<sup>21</sup>

#### (b) *The Political and Religious Character of Authority*

The Danaids maintain that the authority of the king and his competence concerning their request for protection are linked to the religious character of his office (1370 ff.). Rejecting however as erroneous their belief in his absolute authority (398) and insisting on the higher authority of the demos (367, 398), Pelasgos indirectly rejects the Danaids' conception of the origin from which the highest authority in the state derives. This is among the basic notions which inspired the reforms of Kleisthenes, the creation of new institutions of a *secular* character (the Strategoi,<sup>22</sup> the assembly of the five hundred), intended to weaken the institutions of a religious origin (the nine archons and the Areopagus) in order that political life might be separated from the aristocratic religious tradition without a direct attack on religion and without shaking ancestral norms.

#### (c) *The Clan*

*The Views of the Danaids.* Among the arguments which the Danaids use in order to be heard by the sacred and secular authorities is that of kinship. They both choose Argos as a refuge and seek the protection of Zeus because they have in mind that kinship entails the obligation of help (16, 327, 206). The statement (167), *οὐ δυνάτορ Zeus ἐνέφερα λόγους*, presents this duty as obligatory according to law. The law according to which Zeus would be *ἐνοχὸς δόλοισι λόγοις* if he did not help his relations, was the ancient law of the clan. The king, on the contrary, is persuaded to support the claim of the Danaids only because its rejection would expose the city to pollution (472-79, 615). Among the arguments of the Danaids, those of kinship, of the protection of the head of the clan, and of the antiquity of the clan are completely set aside. Thus, while for the suppliant Danaids the measure of the question is the clan, for the Argive democrats it is the city. The Danaids think and act in accordance with the laws and customs of the aristocratic order, the rulers of the city in accordance with the spirit of the new age and indeed on Kleisthenean principles.

#### *The Trial of Hypermnestra*

In the relevant passage in *P.V.* (865 ff.), it is said that the motive for Hypermnestra's action was *παίδων ἱσπεος* and that she preferred *κλέειν ἀνδρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ μαρφόνορ*. The argument of her defender, known from a fragment of the *Danaides* (Nauck 43), is that the accused acted in accordance with the law of nature. Since it must be accepted that, in Aeschylus' play as in Argive tradition (Paus. ii. 19. 6), Hypermnestra was acquitted, the principles of justice according to which the court voted in the *Danaides* were those of natural law.

According to what justice should Hypermnestra have observed her father's orders or the desires of her sisters, even if in so doing she would have been 'blood-defiled'? If Danaos was the 'plotter', as he was in later Argive tradition, Hypermnestra was guilty of disobedience to the head of the clan. If Hypermnestra transgressed the decision of her sisters, she transgressed the law of mutual support between members of the clan.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, two principles of justice clashed during this trial, those of the clan and those of natural justice, and it was the latter which were enforced. At the same time since Hypermnestra transgressed the principles of clan justice in order to beget children—and the begetting of children was an imperative need for Argos in 494—and since this transgression conferred on the city its royal house, the clash in question amounted in fact to a clash between the interests of the clan and those of the city.

Thus the antithesis noted in the *Suppliants* between democratic and aristocratic standards

<sup>21</sup> Bonner-Smith, i, 251 ff.; 279 ff.; Hignett, *Ath. Const.*, 193 ff.

<sup>22</sup> Wade-Gery, *The Laws of Kleisthenes*, C.Q. xxvii (1933), p. 28.

<sup>23</sup> Glotz, *Solidarité*, 122-3.



reappears in the *Danaides*; in the *Suppliants*, the question was put before the highest *deliberative* body, in the *Danaides* before the highest *judicial* body; in both cases the privileges of the clan are set aside by the two main organs of public life.

This issue was certainly more acute in the nineties than in the sixties.

### 3. *Athenian Friendship towards Argos*

Athenian friendship towards Argos is mainly expressed in the tetralogy in the context of the urgent problems of external policy created by the supplication. The impending threat of foreign invasion pervades the dramatic action. The decisions of the demos are taken under the pressure of conditions imposed from without. Is this more in keeping with the external problems of the sixties or with those before Marathon?

In the sixties Argos was engaged in border warfare with a view to re-establishing her leading position in the Argolid, lost as a consequence of the defeat at Sepeia. At the same time, Athens had put an end to the Persian threat through military successes from 478 (Sestos) to 469 (?) (Eurymedon) and, at the head of a strong alliance, was carrying on a continual struggle against the defection of her allies and for the expansion of her power. The Athenian-Argive alliance of 462-1 was that of cities which had embarked on ambitious plans of expansion. The purposes of this alliance are demonstrated by the war immediately undertaken by Athens against enemies in Greece and Asia and by the size of the enterprises in Cyprus and Egypt.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, there is the testimony of Herodotus as to the Argive political situation during this period (vi. 83): the children of the lost Dorian masters of Argos, coming of age, took back the leadership. It is therefore unlikely that the Argive political set-up in the sixties was such that common political and racial ideals could provide the basis for a rapprochement with the Athenian radicals. On the other hand, common interests in the field of foreign policy indeed provided such a basis, and it is much more likely that the rapprochement was founded on this. In the *Oresteia*, written immediately after the 462-1 alliance, though there is reference to the new domestic issues in Athens, Aeschylus praises Argos as the bearer of military glory and not, as in the Danaid tetralogy, as the cradle of democratic institutions, and the Argive kings honoured in the *Oresteia* are not autochthonous Pelasgians.

In the same way, an entirely different attitude to war indicates that the two dramas were written in the face of entirely different conditions of external policy. In the *Suppliants* the city is under the threat of an imminent war of reprisals and the sea is watched with anxiety. In *Agamemnon* the city is herself undertaking a war of reprisals against an overseas enemy, and the sea is celebrated as the source of wealth (Ag. 958). In the *Suppliants* the leader hesitates before the blood-sacrifice which war involves. In *Agamemnon* the leader declares war unhesitatingly and considers it right to desire the sacrifice of his child, for the sake of its success. In the *Suppliants* the leader submits to *δυσπάλαιστα πράγματα*, coming from without (468); nothing is to be gained from the war except pious fame; in *Agamemnon* the leader himself *ἀνάγκας ἴδω λήπιδιν* (218), and human life is in the hands of Ares, changer of gold (438).

Thus the spirit of the Danaid tetralogy, unlike that of the *Oresteia*, is anything but encouraging to an expansive and commercial foreign policy and hardly in agreement with the spirit of the rapprochement between Athens and Argos in the sixties; but it does correspond to conditions on the eve of the Persian Wars.

Two problems now arise: that of reconciling the writing of the Danaid tetralogy before Marathon with its performance in Ephialtes' time, and that of establishing the likelihood of an Athenian-Argive rapprochement, between the defeat at Sepeia and the battle of Marathon for which there is no evidence except this drama.

In approaching these two problems we must bear in mind the political situation in Athens on the eve of the Persian invasion. After the eviction of the tyrants, the Alcmeonids, in their struggle to dominate the Athenian political scene, encountered the decisive opposition of Sparta, who favoured Isagoras' group as giving more indications of following a policy favourable to their own interests (Hdt. v. 70; *Ath. Pol.* 20. 2). The Alcmeonids faced this situation by strengthening their internal position through approaches towards more democratic elements (Hdt. v. 66. 2; *Ath. Pol.* 21. 1). By a programme of constitutional reforms they sought to give to those elements (and through them to their group) control of the state.

In deciding to base themselves on the demos, the Alcmeonids estranged the conservative elements in their group, but secured a solid majority. In so doing, however, they undertook lasting obligations. First they must satisfy the demands of the electors as a class, so that their own old clan-consciousness would be replaced by a new 'democratic' consciousness, of which they were the champions; and, secondly, through founding a democratic regime in spite of Sparta, on whose

<sup>22</sup> Thuc. I. 102. 4, 104.

protection the *gnorimoi* had been willing to base the security of Athens, they must establish their security through alliances which would not bind them in the field of internal politics where they were exposed to the democratic electors. To this end they first sought the friendship of Persia, and sent messengers to Sardis. When Hippias went to Artaphernes and began a diplomatic struggle against the Athenian democrats (Hdt. v. 96), Athens again sent messengers to Sardis in order to frustrate Hippias' intrigues. Artaphernes declared that if the Athenians desired good relations with Persia, they must call Hippias back.

The demos was still under the effect of this statement (Hdt. *ibid.*) when Aristagoras arrived in Athens. The alliance with the Ionians proposed by Aristagoras was the only possible way out in foreign policy which the protectors of the demos had left, opposed as they were by Sparta and now in disfavour in Sardis. If things went well, they would acquire a true ally disposing of considerable naval and military forces which, because she had been ignored by Sparta at a critical moment, and for racial reasons, would be eager to come to the defence of the Athenian demos against the Dorians of Laconia and Aegina. By this alliance, as by former manoeuvres of the Alcmeonids, the purpose of the political group was pursued within the framework of national interest. The strength of the Ionian powers, and the uncertain knowledge of Persian affairs and intentions, made it possible to expect a favourable outcome of the struggle.

The question was decided within the military year 498. In the spring of that year twenty ships and an Athenian force were sent to aid the Ionians. There followed the campaign against Sardis, the burning of the town, the retreat before superior Persian forces, and the defeat of the allied armies near Ephesus (Hdt. v. 99 ff.). Towards the end of 498 the Athenian force returned to Athens.

There are only two pieces of information concerning the situation in Athens after this defeat: (a) in spite of the repeated appeals of Aristagoras, Athens refused further aid (Hdt. v. 103); (b) for the year 496-5 (hence in the spring of 496) Hipparchos, son of Charmos, of the Peisistratid family, was elected archon (Dion. Halic. v. 77: iv. 1).

The most probable interpretation of events from the recall of the Athenian force (498) until the fall of Miletos (494) is the following: the opposition placed the struggle in the field of foreign policy, in order to exploit the military failure to the full, and to divert attention from the constitutional question on which the protectors of the demos had scarcely two years before secured a victory through the voting of new reforms, and on which they had the majority on their side. Where the question of the constitution was concerned, it is probable that the leaders of the demos remained united. On the main issue of foreign policy, however, there is evidence that they did not maintain a united policy, a section of them under the leadership of Megakles ranging themselves in favour of the appeasement of Persia and another section still supporting the policy of helping the Ionians;<sup>22</sup> over the constitutional and internal policy the opposition groups, the *gnorimoi* and the friends of the Peisistratids each followed their own policy. The majority's support of this heteroclite internal and external policy continued until the fall of Miletos (494). Owing to this weak policy both the attempt at reconciliation with the Persians failed and valuable time was lost.

#### FROM THE FALL OF MILETOS TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON

##### *The Policy of Themistokles in 493-2*

The building of the walls of Piraeus in 493-2 after the fall of Miletos presumably aimed at meeting any aggression in the near or distant future *without recourse to Sparta*. The order for building the walls was therefore ratified by an anti-laconian majority of non-appeasers to which we must also attribute the success of Themistokles in the preceding elections of 493. Themistokles was chosen therefore as a candidate for the office of archon by a group of democrats who had declared for resistance to Persia. Their dominance in these elections must be linked with the immediately preceding catastrophe of the Ionian allies and the suppression of the revolt, which released the Persian forces in Ionia and left the road of the Aegean open. These men must have cast upon their opponents the responsibility for the fate of their fellow Ionians of Asia and for the danger threatening Athens on the refusal of aristocratic Sparta and her Athenian friends to support the revolt. That they did in fact exploit this by every means, official and unofficial, is witnessed by the presentation of the event in the theatre, and the political demonstration which followed the performance. Phrynikhos' play was evidently banned by those who had been accused as responsible for leaving Miletos to her fate.

The Laconophiles, on the other hand, must once more have thrown the responsibility for the danger overhanging Athens on the leaders of the demos, and must have proposed overtures to Sparta in order to secure military help.

<sup>22</sup> Munro, in *CAH* iv. 169; Glotz ii. 29; Busolt, ii. 367.



The democratic group of non-appeasers to which Themistokles belonged must have produced a programme of defence after the fall of Miletos, providing not only for the building of the fortifications of Piraeus but also for the acquisition of foreign allies to oppose efficiently the foreign policy of the other leaders.

Argos' defeat at Sepeia took place at about the same time as the fall of Miletos, as the 'epikoinon' oracle witnesses, and in consequence, according to Aristotle, her constitution was reformed. The new democratic Argos, politically isolated in the Peloponnese, would naturally seek to approach other democratic and anti-Laconian states.

For Athens the friendship of Argos, who had just suffered a defeat as a consequence of which she would be in no fighting condition for another thirty years, was no adequate guarantee against the Persian danger; but it did provide important immediate and future guarantees for the successful outcome of the democratic struggle and for the neutralising of the Laconian threat.

It is likely that Themistokles, who was τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον ἄριστος εἰκαστής τοῦ γενομένου (Thuc. I. 138. 3), foresaw that if he gave moral support to the new democratic constitution of Argos and to the class of new non-Dorian citizens, he would acquire, once Argive power was restored, an important ally in the Peloponnese, who in addition to the old antagonism with Sparta would have from now on racial as well as political reasons for desiring the friendship of Athens.

For the present, Argos provided an *avant-poste* in the Peloponnese and a slogan which could be used to frustrate the adhesion of Athens to the Spartan league; sick or not, Argos was a political entity equal in honour with Sparta, given seniority in the epics heard by the Athenians in their festivals; if the blow she had suffered gave military experts doubts as to her present fighting worth, it would none the less persuade the anti-Laconian demos that a city which had stood up against Sparta was worthy of its friendship. Nevertheless, historical sources bear no witness to an approach of Athens to Argos during this period.

According to evidence from passages of the Danaid tetralogy relative to the events of Argive history, the composition of the drama dates from shortly after the defeat at Sepeia, during the period (493-2) in which Themistokles' group in Athens had every reason for an approach to Argos and absolute need of a slogan which it could oppose to the foreign policy of other political groups.

The Danaid tetralogy furnishes precisely this slogan, and adequately corresponds to the basic demand of this democratic group in the existing conditions. It extols Argos as a democratic entity administered by the assembly and the law-court, like Athens, thus emphasising the devotion of Argos to Athenian political ideals. Furthermore Argos appears as Pelagic, the pre-Dorian head of all Greece, and attention is drawn to the seniority of her dynasty; this would serve not only to refute the reproach of Athenian Laconophiles that the new rulers in Argos were slaves by pointing out that they were the former Pelagic leaders of both Argos and Greece; it would also silence the supporters of an alliance with aristocratic Sparta by pointing out that according to seniority she was not entitled to lead Greece.

#### *The Supplication. The Finality of the 'Psephisma'*

On the basis of the supplication theme, Focke dates the *Suppliants* not long after the embassy of Aristagoras. In itself the subject of the protection of suppliants corresponds to problems which arose in Athens as a consequence of this embassy. But the poet's insistence on the conscientiousness of the supporter of this protection, on the fact that he acted thus out of reverence (the best motive for satisfying popular feeling), on the fact that the voting demos was responsible, and, lastly, his insistence on the finality of the 'psephisma' which the leader was compelled to respect, are fully understandable in 493, as justifying the policy of the democratic group of non-appeasers in the face of the accusation that through the aid to the Ionians they had exposed Athens to Persian reprisals.

There remains the fact that the tetralogy was first produced in Athens in Ephialtes' time. This, however, may be explained by the short stay in office of the group to which Themistokles belonged. The one year during which Themistokles was archon would certainly have been necessary for the writing of the whole tetralogy. Thus, by the time it was completed the friends of Miltiades already had firm control of the state, and perhaps a treaty of friendship with Sparta had already been contracted. Under such conditions an archon could not give chorus and choregos for the production of a work asserting the political line of the anti-Laconian front. The fact that the Danaid tetralogy was not produced in Athens during those years is probably due to the same reasons which caused the banning of the *Capture of Miletos*.

As for the political activities of the Dionysian theatre during this one year, the situation may have been as follows: successful during the elections of the spring of 493 and exercising the lawful control of tragedy, Themistokles, was asked by Phrynichos for a chorus; in his turn he asked Phrynichos to replace one of the four plays with which he would contend during the following



spring (492) by a politically topical play lamenting the fate of an ally, *ὡς ἐγγυθῇ Λαῶς*, and to remind the public of the responsibility of the Spartans, the *gnorimoi*, and the friends of the tyrants who had refused aid. In the nine months or so between the summer of 493 and the Great Dionysia of the spring of 492, there was time for a single tragedy to be written and prepared for production. The *Capture of Miletos* was written in this period and was produced, presumably with three other plays of Phrynichos; but already public opinion had inclined towards the Laconophil policy. The banning of the play must have taken place under the new archon who took office three months later in the summer of 492.

The Danaid tetralogy is both a full declaration of the policy of the democratic group to which Themistokles belonged, and a defence of the new Argive democracy. Aeschylus probably undertook to write such a work in agreement with Themistokles as soon as the latter assumed office. But Aeschylus' work was of greater complexity and length than Phrynichos' play, needed more time for composition, and was probably intended for the poetical contest of the following year (492-1) and for production in Argos as well. Themistokles evidently hoped that for that year also the archon would be from his group. But by the summer of 492, political conditions had changed, and the Danaid tetralogy was rejected by the new Laconophil archon, or it was thought pointless to submit it to his judgment.

A. DIAMANTOPOULOS.

*Athens.*

## THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF AESCHYLUS'S *EUMENIDES*

THE ransacking of Tragedy for indications of the political views of tragic poets is seldom profitable and may be disastrous.<sup>1</sup> But *Eumenides*, like much that Aeschylus wrote, is unusual, and one of its unusual aspects is the clarity and persistence with which the hearer's attention is engaged in the political present as well as in the heroic past; one might almost say, directed away from the past and towards the present. The nature of this re-direction, and its implications, if any, for Aeschylus's own standpoint, are no new problem. My reason for discussing it once more is that not enough attention has been paid to the immediate dramatic context of the passages by which this re-direction is effected or to the relation between these passages and the language of Greek politics in general.

### I. THE CENTRAL STASIMON 490-563

(i) 490-493

οὐ κατὰστροφὰί νέων  
θεσμίων, εἰ κρατὴρ  
οἱ δίκαιε καὶ βλάβη  
ταῖδε μητράκτονον.

Editors of Aeschylus have assumed<sup>2</sup> that these words cannot mean what they appear to mean: 'Now new ordinances are overthrown, if the cause pleaded, and the injury done, by this matricide are going to prevail.' The old laws, not the new, it is said, are in danger of overthrow, and it can only be the old laws which the Chorus defend and lament. Attempts to escape the *prima facie* meaning have taken the following forms:

(a) Emendation to give the sense 'overthrow of old ordinances' (ἐκείνων κ. θ., Cornford), 'overthrow of ordained laws' (κ. νόμων θ., Ahrens), 'overthrow of my ordinances' (ἐμῶν κ. θ., Weil), or 'change to new ordinances' (μεταστροφὰί κ. θ., Meineke).

(b) Interpretation of νέων θεσμίων as subjective genitive, giving the sense 'overthrow (sc. of old ordinances) by new ordinances' (Schleifeld, Schütz, Wecklein).

(c) Acceptance of νέων θεσμίων as objective genitive, with the sense 'overthrow of ordinances, making them new' (Paley, cf. P. I. 301), μεθάρμοσι τρόπους νέους, where, however, μεθ- makes all the difference), or 'end in new ordinances' (Wilamowitz, cf. *Supp.* 342).

We shall not get an answer to this problem by considering the words in isolation. Elsewhere in Greek *κατὰστροφή* with a genitive means 'overthrow of' or 'end of', not 'overthrow by' or 'end in.' Again, we often find in Aeschylus a *nomen actionis* with a genitive which is shown by the context obviously and immediately to be subjective, e.g. P. I. 546, τίς ἐφαμερίων ἀπείξει; or objective, e.g. *Ag.* 204-6, ἔσθ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος γένεσθαι θύγατρός, γυναικοπόλιν πολέμων ἀρωγὴν; we sometimes find a genitive the analysis of which is obscure but immaterial for the argument or picture, e.g. *Eum.* 546-8, καὶ ξενόφρωνος ἐκστροφὰς δαμνίων αἰδομένοσ' τίς ἔσται, *Pers.* 396-7, καίητι βοθιάδος ξυνεμβλήῃ ἐπαισιν ἄλγος; we shall not readily find examples in which the decision between the two types of genitive is both vital and obscure. These considerations militate against interpretations (b) and (c) above, and appear to pose two plain alternatives: either the *prima facie* meaning must be accepted, and the stasimon interpreted accordingly, or we must emend. Yet we are already begging the question. If the *prima facie* meaning is really as absurd as editors assume, the genitive does not fall into the category 'both vital and obscure', and the singularity of *κατὰστροφή νέων θεσμίων* = *κατὰστροφή ἐς νέα θέσμια* is no more objectionable than any other singularity of expression in Tragedy.

I believe that the initial assumption is itself mistaken, the product of misapplied logic and of a failure to see and hear the development of the play stage by stage as it were with the ears and eyes of the original audience. We do not and cannot know what political preoccupations were uppermost in the minds of the audience which entered the theatre one day early in 458 to witness the *Oresteia*. We may have some reasonable inferences on what we know of the history of the time, inferences which may be false in so far as there may have been immediate preoccupations which were trivial *sub specie aeternitatis* and are unknown to us. Of one thing, however, we may be sure. When *Eumenides* begins no spectator, unless he is a very frivolous spectator, is thinking about politics. His attention is engaged by the terrible predicament of Orestes, pursued by one supernatural entity

<sup>1</sup> See G. Zuntz, *The Political Plays of Euripides*, Manchester, 1955, pp. 311-199, for destructive and effective criticism of some common assumptions about historical allusion in Tragedy.

<sup>2</sup> Strictly speaking I should except Stanley's expansion 'Nunc evasio novarum legum, sc. Apollinis et Minervae.

juniorum decorum, = accusatio et punitio huius parricidae obnoctii' and Potter's translation (1759, repeated later in some minor English translations) 'Confusion on these upstart laws!' The latter does not commend itself as a piece of translation, and the former requires us to understand 'for otherwise . . .' with *πῶς; ἔδη κτλ.*

for his obedience to another. The first hint of the link which is to be made between past and present is given by Apollo's command and assurance in 79-84, the assurance being repeated in 224. Orestes invokes Athena's help, Apollo knows what the future holds, but it is the Chorus, not Orestes or Apollo, who ask Athena to decide the case (433-5). In so doing they are seeking a characteristically Greek solution to an otherwise unresolvable dispute, οὗτοι προδίδωμι against οὐ τι μὴ λίποι ποτέ. Athena with hesitation accepts the charge, but for its execution proclaims her intention of instituting a court which will not only judge the case of Orestes but will endure for ever . . . θεσπὼν, τὸν εἰς ἅπαντ' ἐγὼ θήσω χρόνον (484).

We should not be well advised here to use our knowledge of the conflict which is to develop after the verdict, the conflict between the young gods on one side and the old gods on the other, still less our knowledge of the expressions used by Aeschylus to describe supernatural conflicts in other plays, e.g. *P.V.* 149-51. We must allow Athena's decision its full dramatic weight. For the purposes of the story at this point, the Chorus must be regarded as entrusting the decision to Athena in the confidence (not uncommon in litigants) that an impartial judge is bound to decide in their favour. The new institution which Athena proclaims is thus from their point of view an ally, an executive instrument for the enforcement of their law. For the audience, Athena's words θεσπὼν . . . θήσω are the decisive link between the heroic saga and the circumstances of their own time. It is therefore natural that the opening of the stasimon should be about the new institution. εἴν indicates approaching crisis or decision or conflict, as in *Pers.* 405 εἴν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών, *Hdt.* i. 11. 2 εἴν τοι δυνὼν δδύν παρρουσίων, *Γύγη*, δίδωμι αἶψαν, etc. The words which follow εἴν say 'new institutions will be overthrown if Orestes is acquitted', and mean 'the fate of this new court hangs upon this case; if Orestes is acquitted, it will be overthrown, and if he is condemned, its authority will be assured'.

This interpretation seems to me preferable to the assumption that despite their ἐμπροσθὶ to Athena and the audience's interest in her θεσμός the Chorus are lamenting the imminent overthrow of old laws by new. So far I have based this preference on what has led up to the stasimon; it can also be supported by reference to the sequence of thought within the stasimon itself.

## (ii) 494-516.

πάντας ἤδη τὸδ' ἔργον εὐχεται-  
-q σιαπηρόσαι βροτοὺς κτλ.

τὸδ' ἔργον most naturally refers to the possible victory of Orestes' plea; for its use as a mere demonstrative, cf. *Pers.* 765-6 Μηδὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ πρῶτος ἡγεμὼν στρατοῦ· ἄλλος δ' ἐκάλειν παῖς τὸδ' ἔργον ἦναιεν. 'If Orestes is acquitted, no parents will be safe from their children; we shall not punish sin; in vain will men seek relief.' As the picture takes shape, they pass from prediction in the future tense to description in the present: 'Let no one call upon us; the house of Justice is falling.' Why will they not punish sin? On the usual interpretation, this will be a petulant revenge on humanity for the crime of an Athenian court. This may indeed be so, but their threat is more easily intelligible if they are to be conceived as having already surrendered their jurisdiction to the new court, while retaining the power of punishing the criminals detected and convicted by that court. The point will then be: 'if the court, the instrument in the creation of which we have acquiesced, fails to exercise the function for which it is created, we shall not carry out our side of the arrangement.'<sup>8</sup>

## (iii) 517-565

At this point begins one of the most singular passages in Tragedy. Up to the words πίπτει δόμος δίκας (516) all is blood and thunder; with the judicious δὸθ' ἔπαι το δεινὸν εὐ there is an immediate and striking drop in the temperature, and it is only in 553 sqq., where the ship of the sinner is dashed to pieces and the god laughs at him, that warmth and colour come flooding back into the words. The sequence of thought is this<sup>6</sup>:

- 517 Fear has its place.
- 522 Without fear, there is no justice.
- 526 But there should be neither too much fear nor too little.
- 534 From justice comes prosperity.
- 538 Therefore respect justice,
- 542 for injustice is punished.
- 545 Therefore respect your parents.
- 550 From justice comes prosperity,
- 553 but injustice is punished by loss of prosperity.

<sup>6</sup> If the MSS. *οὐκ ἔτι* in 599 is rejected and Elmsley's *οὐδὲ γὰρ* adopted, I translate 'we shall not punish either'. But I am not certain that *οὐκ* is impossible. The antithesis between 'we, the βροτοκόμοι, shall not punish' and 'one man will ask another' does not seem essentially differ-

ent from the antithesis expressed by *οὐδὲ/ἢ* in the examples in Denniston, *Greek Particles*, p. 511. If there is a difference, it lies in the size and complexity of the *οὐκ* number.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. J. Seerwald, *Untersuchungen zu Stil und Komposition der Aischyleischen Tragödie*, D.-Greifswald, 1936, pp. 25 sqq.



If at the beginning of the stasimon the Chorus are lamenting the overthrow of old laws by new, 517 149. must be taken as meaning 'We, the Erinyes, leave our place'. In that case, when we come to 526 194., μήτ' ἀνάρχεται βίον μήτε δεσποτοῦμενον αἰδέσθης, words which have overwhelmingly political, not religious, associations, we must either suppose that the sequence of thought makes an unheralded transition from supernatural authority to political authority, or else that the words are used of supernatural authority and mean 'do not approve either of an (imaginary) world in which the gods exercise no authority or of a world in which men', in Solon's words, ἤδη δεσποτῶν τρομώμενοι, 'are the slaves of the gods'. Neither interpretation is utterly impossible, but neither is attractive. If the words are political, the transition is exceedingly abrupt. If they are religious, the novel conception of a life which is not ruled by the gods needs a more explicit introduction, and it is pointless for the Chorus to decry a life in which the gods exercise the power of masters and to recommend in its place a 'mean'. The acceptance of the stasimon as concerned from the outset with the Areopagus removes these difficulties. τὸ δεινὸν will then be taken by the audience as referring to political authority, and the transition to μήτ' ἀνάρχεται κτλ is smooth and natural.

Kraatz called this central portion of the stasimon a 'tragic parabasis'.<sup>4</sup> This judgment contains a measure of truth in so far as the relation between Chorus and audience seems closer here than elsewhere in Tragedy, not least in the imperatives αἰδέσθης (529) and αἰδέσθαι (539), the latter introduced by σοὶ λέγω<sup>5</sup>—the second person of the potential optative with ἀν has a less personal flavour, cf. Soph. O.C. 1218 αὐκ' ἀν ἰδοῖς ~ Tr. 113-15 τῶν . . . ἄν . . . ἴδου—and the quasi-imperative αἰδούμενός τις ἔστω (549), with which we may compare Alcaeus A6. 12 τὴν τις ἄνθρωπος δόκιμος γελύσθω, Callinus 1. 9 ἀλλὰ τις ἴδὼς ἔτω ~ Tyr. 8. 3-4, and in prose literature many similar orders and exhortations to troops. Yet although the total effect may be compared with a parabasis, the literary affinities of this stasimon are to be sought rather in paraenetic elegy. It is there that we shall find the casting of political and moral maxims into the form of an address to an individual, the rhythm, vocabulary, and sentiments of 530-1 παντὶ μέσω τὸ κράτος θεὸς ὄψασθαι, ἀλλ' ἄλλα δ' ἐφορεύει and 534 δυναστεύει γὰρ ὕβρις τίμος ὡς ἐτόμας, the 'ring-form' of the argument as a whole (cf. Callinus, fr. 1), and the illogical drift of word and picture, e.g. 499 οὐδὲ γὰρ βροτοσκοπῶν κτλ ~ 542 ποιεῖ γὰρ ἔπειτα (cf. Solon, fr. 1).<sup>7</sup>

## II. ATHENA'S SPEECH 681-710

When Apollo and the Chorus have argued their cases, Athena, before the voting of the court, addresses to Ἀθηναῖος δαίμων (681) exhortation which in part repeats the content of the stasimon. Her speech may be divided into three sections.

683-695. 'This court will endure for ever . . . and reverence for it will restrain crime for ever, provided

αὐτῶν πολιτῶν μὴ<sup>1</sup> πικρανόντων νόμους.  
κακαῖς ἐπιρροαῖσι βορβόρῳ θ' ὕδωρ  
λαμπρὸν μινύων οὐποθ' ἐνρήσεις ποτὶν.<sup>2</sup>

The point of αὐτῶν is: 'my court will play its part, if the citizens for their part do not . . .' or 'unless the citizens, on their own initiative (i.e. contrary to what I now ordain) . . .'. πικρανόντων is a *vox nihili*, and I would accept either Thomson's *πικρανόντων* (the usual word for altering institutions)<sup>3</sup> or Wieseler's *πικρανόντων* (cf. Thuc. 1. 71. 3, iii. 82. 3; denominal verbs in *σθν* are abundant in Aeschylus). I keep the θ' of the MSS. and punctuate with F after νόμους on the grounds that Aeschylus more often than not allots one or more complete lines to a gnome at the end of a speech or definable portion of a speech (twenty-four examples out of some thirty in the *Oresteia*), and frequently introduces such a gnome in asyndeton, e.g. Ag. 1359, Cha. 780.<sup>4</sup> We may compare the asyndeton characteristic of lines which are metaphorical or otherwise colourful, e.g. *Eum.* 253, Ag. 322. Within the gnome, ἐπιρροαῖ is the flowing or pouring of new liquid into, and on top of, the liquid which is there already; its point for the context is that it represents bad new laws added to the existing body of law. So in 653-4 σθηππέων γὰρ ριμώτερος χρόνος ἔσται πολίταις τοιαύτῃ there is an image of time accumulating, new time flowing, as it were, on to old time; and in Hdt. ix. 38. 2 ἐπιρρεῖσθαι δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ γινόμενον πλεόντων . . . συμβούλευσε Μαρδονίῳ τὰς ἐκβολὰς τοῦ Κιθαιρώνης φυλάξαι, λέγων ὡς ἐπιρρεῖσθαι οἱ Ἕλληνες αἰεὶ ἀπὸ παλαιῆς ἡμέρας καὶ εἰς ἀπολήμμενον συχνοῖς the point is clearly that fresh troops were coming in to swell the numbers of those already there.<sup>5</sup> Thus this part of Athena's speech means: 'do not change, by bad new laws, the court which I have instituted'.

<sup>1</sup> W. Kraatz, *Stasimon*, Berlin, 1933, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> In treating this phenomenon as unusual I am thinking of image-charged lyric; outside Tragedy, we may find ὁ οὐδ' ἦν; and ἀμφόθεν αἰ τοὶ λέγω; in Alkman fr. 1. 50, 56, and second person imperatives in Pindar.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kraatz, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Thomson, *ad loc.*

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Paley and Sidgwick *ad loc.*, and G. Bromig, *De Asyndeti Natura et opud Aeschylum Usu*, Bonn, Castering, 1878, pp. 25-29.

<sup>6</sup> Professor Dicks in C.Q. n.s. iii (1953), pp. 19-20, offers a different interpretation of the Herodotus passage and draws from it a different conclusion on the point of κακαῖς ἐπιρροαῖς.

The second part, 696-9, is again introduced in asyndeton, which gives it a flavour of Hesiodic ὑποθήκαι, cf. *Op.* 342-67. The words

τὸ μήτ' ἀναρχὸν μήτε δεσποταῖμενον  
 ἅστοις περιστέλλουσι βουλευῶ σέβειν,  
 καὶ μή τὸ δεινὸν πᾶσι πόλεως ἔξω βαλεῖν.  
 τίς γὰρ δεδουκὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν,

follow closely the argument of the Chorus in 517-31.

The third part, 700-6, is extravagant praise of the Areopagus, ending with the words εἰδόντων ὑπερ ἑργηγορὸς φροῦρημα γῆς καθίσταται.

### III. THE POLITICAL CONTENT OF 490-565 AND 681-710

The verbal coincidences between the stasimon and Athena's speech, together with the unique character of each of them and the uniqueness of their relation, enable us to take them together in enquiring into their political content.

#### (i) *The Mean*

Political language, like the language of ethics, is characterised by the use of 'value-words', which convey little to the hearer until he knows the presuppositions and political associations of the speaker. If we hear a man say of a labour dispute, 'This demands a *just* solution', we do not know, until we know more about the man himself, what kind of solution he would call just. In Greek, as in English, 'just' is a value-word, but the Greeks differed from us in three important respects: in their approval of the repetition, in poem after poem and play after play, of passages which, however elaborate and colourful their language, constitute not a philosophical argument but a simple act of religious formalism, the acknowledgement that justice is good and injustice bad: in the respect which men of differing political views attached to law, custom, tradition, and antiquity; and in the extent to which they agreed in treating right behaviour as a mean between extremes.

In consequence we find that the words of Pericles in *Thuc.* ii. 37. 3, τὰ δημοσία διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐδ' ὑπερνομοῦμεν, τῶν τι αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροῦσται καὶ τῶν νόμων, and of Lysias ii. 19, describing prehistoric Attica as ὑπὸ νόμον βασιλευμένους, remind us of a similar description of a dissimilar constitution by Demaratus in *Hdt.* vii. 104. 4, ἐπεστὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ δεσπότης νόμος. Plato, speaking as a critic of democracy, alleges that in a democracy the citizen exults in disobeying the magistrates (*Rep.* 562d), but, unless the orator gravely mislead us, such exultation would have been ill received by a fourth-century jury. 'Anarchy' is the oligarch's description of democracy (e.g. Plato, *Rep.* 558c), δουλεία, with which I take δεσποταῖμενος bias to be synonymous, the democrat's description of oligarchy (e.g. Lys. ii. 56, *Thuc.* vi. 40. 2); but democrats do not boast of their ἀναρχία, nor do oligarchs claim to impose δουλεία. Μέσος, with the related but etymologically different concept μέτρον, μέτριος, is among the oldest 'value-words' in Greek ethics,<sup>11</sup> and what a democrat would call an extreme an oligarch would represent as a mean; thus Megabysus, arguing for oligarchy in Herodotus's famous Persian debate, treats the ἔβρις of a monarch and the ἔβρις of a people as the frying-pan and the fire (iii. 81), and Plato, *Lg.* 893d, 756c, speaks of the authoritarian state which he is constituting as a mean between Persian monarchy and Athenian democracy. When someone says, as both the Chorus and Athena do, 'avoid the extremes of anarchy and despotism; the mean between the two is right', he is not necessarily speaking as a 'moderate democrat' or as a member of a 'centre party'. He is using words which, if we view them from the standpoint of archaic Greek morality in general, merely recommend a reflective rather than a violent attitude to politics. Neither democrats nor conservatives could cavil at these words; neither could claim that Aeschylus was speaking for them and against their opponents. This is not to say that a value-word could not be appropriated by a political party and used so frequently by them that it came to be associated with them and was avoided by their opponents; this eventually happened to οὐβελτικός, and I suspect that it happened to μέσος also. For the present I am interpreting Aeschylus's μέσος in the light of archaic poetry, not late fifth-century politics; the justification of this choice will be considered below.

<sup>11</sup> I grant that to Aeschylus ἀναρχία (ἀναρχος) ἥλιος is primarily a life in which one has no ruler, cf. Professor Fraenkel's note on *Ag.* 883, whereas in Plato the words describe primarily the behaviour or attitude of a man who behaves as if he had no ruler, but I do not think the distinction is material for my argument.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Theognis 333, Solon fr. 16, and in general H. Kahlreuter, *Die Mäßigkeit bei und von Aristoteles*, *Dim.* Tübingen, 1911.

(ii) *New and Old Laws*

In 693-5 Athena appears to be not only prohibiting interference with the court which she has established but also generalising this prohibition and giving a warning against adding bad laws to good. It is precisely the general character of the *gnome* which makes it hard to accept without demur the common interpretation that Aeschylus here intends to accept the reform of the Areopagus which had already taken place but to issue a warning against going any farther. When we remember that the period was one in which the laws had been, and were still being, changed and augmented,<sup>23</sup> the whole passage has a very reactionary ring; and I should find this conclusion inescapable but for one curious circumstance. Aristotle, *Ath. p.* 25, 2, describes Ephialtes' reduction of the powers of the Areopagus thus: ἀπὸ τὰ περιέλετο τὰ ἐπιθετὰ δι' ὧν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακή. The word ἐπιθετός, 'attached' or 'superimposed', seems to be first attested in Antiphon the Sophist, fr. 44, col. 1, 25, where the demands of law are described as ἐπιθετὰ vis-à-vis nature. We do not know whether this view of the reform represents an historian's construction or the claim actually made at the time by the democrats,<sup>24</sup> but I can see no good reason for rejecting the second possibility. Such a claim needed to survive orally for only fifty years at the most; it would then have received a new lease of life in the political arguments provoked by the reactionary movements of the late fifth century, and its perpetuation thereafter would be ensured by historical and political literature. Its truth or falsity is, of course, quite a different question.

Anyone, of any political complexion, may say 'do not add bad laws to good'. Any Greek was predisposed to defend a law which could be given the authority of age: a democrat, as well as a conservative, may invoke tradition when it serves his purpose, as when Cleon and Alcibiades in Thucydides, iii. 37, 3 and vi. 18, 7, both in different circumstances and for different reasons, exploit the principle νόμοις δεινότερος χρῆσθαι. A democrat may indeed invoke tradition even in the midst of a programme of reform, provided that he can represent his reforms as the restitution of original right and—by a process familiar in our own time—represent the most obvious innovations (jury-pay, for example) as consequential administrative measures involving no great issues of principle. Euripidean tragedy freely attributed contemporary democratic principles to the Athens of the heroic age, and this anachronism is expressed in its extreme form in the *Epitaphios* of Lysias. Lest we should suppose it a sophistic phenomenon, we must remember that in Aeschylus's *Suppliants* the Argive king handles the primitive democracy of Argos as cautiously, though with less constitutional necessity, as the Euripidean Theseus does primitive Athens. Thus Athena's words, so far from being a reproach against reform of the Areopagus or a warning against further reform, may well be an adaptation of arguments used by the reformers themselves.

(iii) *Homicide*

So far, it seems that neither the Chorus nor Athena have uttered anything that is unambiguously partisan. Yet in the last part of her speech Athena invests the Areopagus with a dignity and power which are to our way of thinking inappropriate to a homicide court and seem to transform it into the most exalted instrument of the state's authority. Have we here, for the first time, something incompatible with acceptance of the democratic reforms?

We think of murder as a 'private' crime and of revolution as action on the political plane. Although the distinction was made by Greek legal procedure, it was alien to Greek political theory. The Greek community conceived politics (not always rightly) and practised them (not always fruitfully) as a system of rivalry between individuals, a kind of competitive ladder. This is abundantly demonstrated by many political careers in the fifth and fourth centuries, and it is pertinent to recall one imaginary career, that of the defendant in the first Tetralogy of Antiphon. This man has incurred suspicion because as an enemy (ἐχθρός) of the murdered man he has been worsted by him in a long battle of γράφαι (a 5). One of the roads which had to be travelled by an aspirant to political power lay through the courts, and the foundation for the defeat of an opponent in the assembly was laid by defeating him before a jury. Consequently, the Greeks did not put murder and stasis into separate compartments; they clearly perceived that an authority which restrains and punishes homicide is the first step in progress from the life of beasts to the life of a human community, and upon the preservation of that authority the continued existence of the community ultimately depends. They often speak of jealousy, murder, and stasis in the same breath; so Thrasymachus (fr. 1) δρόνους is the antithesis alike of private quarrels and public sedition; cf. Democritus fr. 245, φόρος γὰρ στάσιος ἀρχὴν ἀπεργίζεσθαι. To Demosthenes (xx. 157) homicide is the most serious concern of legislation, μάλιστα ἐν ἀπαισι διατρούσασθαι τοῖς νόμοις. In the same passage Demosthenes speaks of the Areopagus as a special court for a special crime;

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Jacoby, *Fr. Gr. Hist.*, IIIb Supplement, Vol. i, pp. 338-9. Vol. ii, pp. 244-5.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Jacoby, *ib. loc. cit.*



Isocrates (iv. 39) represents the reference of homicide cases to Athens as the first step out of *ἀνορχία* taken by the primitive Greek world; and their words enable us to understand the prestige and political authority with which Athena in the third part of her speech invests what was to the Athenians, democrats and conservatives alike, not only the oldest homicide court in Athens but the oldest in the Greek world.

In arguing that the political language of *Eumenides* is neutral, and for that very reason reconcilable with unreserved acceptance of the democratic revolution, I have assumed that by 458 B.C.:

(a) *μέσος* had not yet been appropriated, if it ever was, by the language of conservatism.

(b) The theory, which we find expressed in the fourth century, that the restraint of homicide is the fundamental principle of society, was already accepted.

(c) The anachronistic belief in prehistoric democracy was already current.

Disproof of the first assumption would invalidate my interpretation, and disproof of either of the other two would throw some doubt upon it. There is, however, a further political aspect consideration of which will make my three assumptions necessary.

#### IV. THE ARGIVE ALLIANCE

When Orestes first approaches the statue of Athena, he salutes her with a brief prayer for her goodwill, a conventional prayer of arrival (235 *sqq.*). When the Chorus have caught him up and again besiege him, he invokes Athena more elaborately and more urgently, prefacing the direct invocation with a promise that in return for her help Argos will be her faithful ally for ever; that is to say, the ally of Athens, for throughout the play Athena is identified with Athens to a degree unparalleled in the case of any other tutelary deity and comparable only with Pindar's treatment of eponymous nymphs. The promise of an Argive alliance is twice renewed: once at the end of Apollo's testimony (667 *sqq.*) and again, most fully, in Orestes' expression of gratitude after his acquittal (762 *sqq.*).

Is it possible to interpret these references as politically neutral? It is true, and natural, that the note of the play as a whole is one of assurance. Athens is fighting the right wars, with the right allies, and has the right institutions; given internal harmony, glory awaits her. The differences between the end of *Eumenides* and the prayer for Argos in *Suppliants* 625 *sqq.* are instructive. In *Suppliants* the order and relative importance of the prayers are dictated by the dramatic context; hence the aversion of war, *μάχης Ἀργεῖ*, takes first place (633-4; cf. 663-6), while the aversion of stasis receives the briefest mention (661-2). In *Eumenides* the words of both Athena and the Chorus are determined not by the dramatic context but by the political circumstances of 458 B.C.; hence war is welcomed (*θραύσας ἔστω πόλεμος*, 864-5), Ares is linked with Zeus as honouring *φροῦριον θεῶν*, the champion of the Greek gods against the barbarian (918-20), but stasis and faction are the danger most to be feared (858-66 and especially 976-87). This is well adapted to a situation in which, on the one hand, Argina was being besieged, the Long Walls were being built, an expeditionary force was in Egypt, there had lately been hard fighting in the Megarid, and more trouble was imminent in Central Greece, while, on the other hand, Ephialtes had been murdered and (Thuc. i. 107. 4) there was a section of the community willing to enlist Spartan help for the overthrow of the democracy. As society depends on the restraint of violence, so survival of the perils of war depends on *δμόνοια*.<sup>13</sup>

In so far as a political situation was made the subject of Tragedy at all, propriety demanded that it should be treated with optimism and confidence; it was presumably the conspicuous lack of this tone in *The Fall of Miletus* which got Phrynichus into trouble. Aeschylus neither made nor wanted to make Phrynichus's mistake; to this extent *Eumenides* could be conceived as containing a conventional message of assurance. But the threefold reference to the Argive alliance invites contrast with political aetiology elsewhere in Tragedy, e.g. the prophecy of Eurystheus in Eur. *Held.* 1026 *sqq.*, Athena's dictation of an Argive alliance in Eur. *Supp.* 1183 *sqq.*, the foundation of the Attic tribes in Eur. *Ion* 1575 *sqq.*, etc. These have their place in the concluding scenes of plays, as do references to the foundation of places (e.g. Eur. *El.* 1275 *sqq.*) and cults (e.g. Eur. *I.T.* 1449 *sqq.*). *Eumenides* differs from all of them in introducing the Argive alliance at so early a stage in the play and in referring to it three times. Secondly, the alliance was an achievement—or perhaps it would be more accurate to call it a gesture—of the democrats, inseparable from their renunciation of the Spartan alliance to which the conservative elements in Athens gave their loyalty. The Spartan alliance was the product of common effort and common suffering in the Persian War; the Argive

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Democritus *frs.* 250, 255; C. O. Müller, *Dissertation on the Eumenides of Aeschylus*, Cambridge, 1835, pp. 121-2; H. Kramer, *Quid valent dydmonia in litteris graecis*, Diss. Göttingen, 1905.

alliance had a distinctly ideological flavour and could be supported by tradition only in so far as Argos and Athens alike had suffered at the hands of Cleomenes. A man who resented the perils which Athens had incurred in consequence of Sparta's enmity and one who resented the process of democratic reform were blaming the same group for both policies.

Aeschylus broke with tradition in laying the scene of the trilogy in Argos instead of Mycenae; he almost certainly broke with tradition in associating the foundation of the Areopagus with the story of Orestes.<sup>10</sup> If he was positively conservative in sentiment, it is difficult to believe that he would have written the *Oresteia* in anything like the form which it actually has. If he was in principle democratic, but mistrustful of the continuation of democratic reform, he has concealed his mistrust impenetrably.

## V. PERICLES AND DELPHI

Clara Smertenko in *J.H.S. lü* (1932), p. 233, pointed out certain analogies between the fortunes of Orestes and those of the Alcmaeonidae. Her suggestion that *Eumenides* could not fail to remind the audience of Pericles' family has not commended itself; but where a play is so heavily charged with political implications one cannot dismiss without enquiry the suggestion of one further implication. The analogy amounts to this: Orestes by his crime incurred the enmity of the Eumenides. Apollo purified him at Delphi and declared him innocent. The Eumenides refused to accept either the purification or the declaration, but it was Apollo who was in the end vindicated. The Alcmaeonidae were originally expelled because Megacles incurred the enmity of the Eumenides, by slaughtering suppliants at their altar. Despite this, they were highly favoured by Delphi,<sup>11</sup> which must mean one of three things: either Delphi did not believe the story about Megacles, or it did not regard the curse as a relevant obstacle to the favour of Apollo, or it purified the Alcmaeonidae and made an end of the matter. Of these three alternatives, the difficulties inherent in the first two are obvious, and the third is supported by other occasions on which Apollo of Delphi prescribed the means by which men might be absolved from offences against other gods, e.g. *Hdt. i. 19. 2*, *Paus. ix. 8. 2*. None the less, the validity of the Delphic absolution was implicitly denied when the curse was used by Cleomenes as a pretext for his expulsion of the Alcmaeonidae and by the Spartans in 431 to discredit Pericles.

Now, before it can be said that this has any bearing upon the play, we need to know whether or not the curse was used as a stick with which to beat Pericles at this early stage of his political career. Direct evidence is entirely lacking, but the indirect evidence is cogent. First, as we saw, the curse was invoked both fifty years earlier and thirty years later. Secondly, it is clear that a belief in the vengeance of the dead and the power of a curse could be publicly assumed in the late fifth century; cf. Antiphon iv. § 8, etc., *Andocides i. 130-1*. Thirdly, although Aeschylus and others found it necessary to believe in the reconciliation of traditional conflicts within the supernatural, I doubt whether the average man had any difficulty in believing that the Eumenides could persecute a family which Apollo had accepted. Fourthly, it was common form in politics to damage a man's reputation by recalling the misdeeds of his ancestors; cf. Antiphon, fr. 1, *Ar. Eq. 445-9*, *Isoc. xvi passim*. I do not believe that political loyalty itself determined Aeschylus's attitude to Delphi, still less that he had Pericles' descent in mind<sup>12</sup> when he put into the mouth of Apollo (657 *sqq.*) a view of genetics held by some of the early philosophers; but I do not think that it is possible to avoid the conclusion that the audience perceived after reflection that on this issue as on others the implications of the play were in Pericles' favour.

## VI. ALLEGORY

I have considered the play throughout as representing a strange event in the heroic past, involving mortal and immortal persons, and have made no reference to Justice, Sin, Law, Order, or any of the other abstractions which are sometimes supposed to be the 'real' subjects of Aeschylean tragedy. I confess that I have little sympathy with scholars who speak as if a theological theory is a proper and adequate subject for tragedy while the murders of a husband and a mother are not. No story is so barren that it has no religious or moral implications; the same may be said of many actual events. Since the Greek poets translated abstractions into the concrete terms of personal relations, I prefer to think of Tragedy as being concerned with persons; and I would explain, for example, Athena's somewhat illogical reason for voting in favour of Orestes (736 *sqq.*) by saying that Aeschylus gives her these words because that is what he thinks Athena would have said.

Similar considerations militate against the suggestion of Sir Richard Livingstone in *JHS xlv* (1925), p. 120, that the play contains political allegory, the reconciliation of the chorus in the last scene

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Jacoby, vol. i, pp. 22-24.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. G. W. Williams, *The Curse of the Alcmaeonidae*,

Hermathena lxxviii-ix (1931-2), especially lxxviii, pp. 45, n. 27, 49.

<sup>12</sup> Smertenko, p. 234.

representing, and thus promoting, the reconciliation of the conservatives to the democratic reforms. The scene lacks one essential characteristic of allegory. The participants are not, to a Greek, fictions or abstractions, but real gods, and the issue of the conflict between them is itself a matter of so high an importance that there is no room for allegory. It is a conflict which mattered on more than a purely intellectual plane to any contemporary of Aeschylus who thought at all seriously about religious tradition and practice. Past conflict within the realm of the supernatural was guaranteed by tradition.<sup>19</sup> Present conflict between deities worshipped in the same community and prayed to for the same blessings was to many, if not intellectually unthinkable, at least emotionally insupportable. This problem could be met in several ways. A man could accept tradition and plead his own incompetence to pass judgment, he could choose between alternative traditions, he could reject tradition as a whole, or he could supplement it, as Aeschylus did, by the supposition of points in time at which the traditional supernatural conflicts were resolved.

## VII. EPIMETROM: EGYPT AND PALLENE

Orestes calls upon Athena in the familiar *eire eire* form of prayer, 292-7:

ἀλλ' εἰτε χώρας ἐν τόποις Λιβυστικῆς,  
Τρίτωνος ἑμφί χεῦμα γενεθλίου πόρου,  
τίθῃσιν ὀρθόν ἢ καταρραφῇ πόδα,  
φίλοις ἀρήγουσ', εἰτε Φλεγραιῶν πλάκα  
θραυτὸς ταυροῦχος ὡς ἀνὴρ ἐπισκοπεῖ,  
ἔλθοι.

It is not surprising if many editors have seen in these lines reference to the foreign wars of Athens. The expedition to Egypt was undertaken originally in support of Inaros, 'king of the Libyans adjoining Egypt' (Thuc. i. 104. 1). The Phlegraean plain was presumably located by Aeschylus, as it was by Herodotus (vii. 123. 1) in the peninsula of Pallene, i.e. near Potidea. Potidea was a colony of Corinth, and her mother city being at this time at war with Athens, may have been giving trouble.<sup>20</sup> All this looks persuasive at first glance, but I am not sure that it survives enquiry.

1. The Athenian force in Egypt fought in the Delta, not in Libya. Aeschylus certainly drew a distinction between the two in *Supp.* 179 sqq. *Λιβυστικαῖς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμφορετέρας γυναιξὶν ἔστι καὶ Νεῖδος ἢ θράψαι τοιαύτων φητόν, Κύπριος χιμακτήρ τε κτλ.* Herodotus ii. 15-17, shows not that some Greeks included the Delta in Libya, but that they made it begin with the west bank of the Nile and ignored the Delta.

2. In 293, before we come to the suggestive words *φίλοις ἀρήγουσιν*,<sup>21</sup> the river Triton is specified. Herodotus (iv. 180) located this in the far west of Libya. We do not know whether the alternative location of Lake Tritonis at Euesperides was known to Aeschylus,<sup>22</sup> and in view of (1) it would help us little if we did. The Athena of legend was closely associated with Lake Tritonis, as *γενεθλίου* reminds us, and cf. Hdt. i.e.

3. The political flavour of *φίλοις ἀρήγουσιν* is weakened when we recall that Orestes has called upon Athena *ἔμοι μολεῖν ἀρωγόν* (288-9).

4. We have no independent evidence of trouble at Potidea at this time, and the Phlegraean plain, as being the scene of the victory of the gods over the giants (Pi. N. i. 67), in which Athena took a prominent part (Eur. *Ian* 988 sqq.), is naturally associated with her.

In the present state of our knowledge it would be incautious to interpret these lines as anything but an invocation of the type which names localities favoured by the god, cf. Theoc. i. 123. The problem is not dissimilar to Athena's words on her arrival (397 sqq.): 'I have come from the Scamander, where territory has been given to Athens in perpetuity.' Seven years after the *Oresteia* Sigeum earned the commendation of Athens for its conduct in circumstances of which we know nothing (S.E.G. x 13). Seven years, at a distance of over two thousand, does not sound a long time, but it is. No doubt the Troad was a scene of actual or potential conflict with Persian forces at this time, but that is true of other areas of the Aegean. Conflict with Mytilene over the Troad was a phenomenon of the sixth century, not the fifth.<sup>23</sup>

K. J. DOVER.

University of St. Andrews.

<sup>19</sup> On the role of tradition in Aeschylus's theology, cf. F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, Ithaca, 1949, p. 197.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Athenian Tribute Lists*, iii, p. 321.

<sup>21</sup> Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 107, ignores the intervention of 293.

<sup>22</sup> It does not seem to me necessary to accept the inference of A. Herrmann in *RA. Mus. Louv.* (1937),

pp. 69-70 from Ap. Rhod. iv. 1490 that this alternative location is pre-Herodotean and implied by Pindar's Fourth Pythian.

<sup>23</sup> This article is a revised version of a paper read to the conference of the Hellenic and Roman Societies at Oxford in August 1953.



## SOLON AND THE MEGARIAN QUESTION

THE capture of Salamis from Megara in the sixth century B.C. can safely be said to mark a turning-point in Athenian development. Considerations both of economics and defence would lead one to expect the island to be a natural bone of contention between the two mainland cities, and hence for it to be controlled by the one which was temporarily stronger. The surprising thing is that in the early part of the sixth century the stronger should have been Athens.

We have, it is true, one piece of evidence which suggests that Athenian naval power and interests were already considerable in this period. This is the account, in Herodotus, Diogenes, and Strabo,<sup>1</sup> of the struggle against Mytilene for Sigeion, a struggle terminated by the arbitration of Periander in favour of the Athenians. The causes and aims of the Athenian venture are a matter for speculation, but whether they went as traders, pirates, or settlers, or as all three, their going underlines the fact that there were in the Athenian community at the time a number of men who had invested their capital and were prepared to risk their lives in a distant naval venture; their successful opposition to the forces of Mytilene in its turn suggests that the naval strength at the disposal of the Athenians was correspondingly formidable. It is possible that the expedition began as a private venture, financed, directed, and executed by a band of interested Athenians without any official backing. In view of the position of Sigeion it seems most probable that the venture was connected with the flow of trade to and from the Pontus: Sigeion was perhaps the base at which friendly ships bound for Attica could find rest and refuge, and from which other ships coming from the straits could be raided with the object of diverting corn cargoes to the home market. Whether the returns outweighed the risks would depend *inter alia* on the price of corn in the market where they disposed of the cargoes. The whole venture was very hazardous, nor is it surprising that the Athenian hold on Sigeion was short-lived. But the episode is important as illustrating the early strength of the shipping interests which made possible the successful Athenian challenge to Megara.

From what is known of Megarian wealth at home, and of the powerful position she held in the north-east trading sphere at this period, it seems clear that the final capture of Salamis could have been accomplished only by a state which was a significant naval power. That Athens had considerable naval interests is to be concluded not only from the fact of Athenian success, but also from the fact that the people of Athens had felt it worth their while to press on to the end with this apparently long and difficult struggle. If Athens had had no considerable naval interests to consider, she could have satisfied herself with repelling any raids upon the Attic coast, and with basing her defensive effort on the city of Athens itself. The occupation of Salamis proves the concern of Athenians for safeguarding, or seizing, a sea route: a considerable element of the Athenian population was thus actively engaged in getting a living directly, or indirectly, from the sea: from fishing, from external trade, or from piracy.

To face a naval power of Megara's dimensions Athens would have needed more than a fishing fleet, which itself requires the protection of faster vessels. We must, in fact, assume that there were both warships and merchant ships at the disposal of Athens at this time. Both Aristotle<sup>2</sup> and Herodotus<sup>3</sup> mention the early existence of the *naucrariae*, apparently charged with the financial provision of public requirements, including, in the first instance, ships: but this is not, of course, to assume that there was in existence any system of taxation for this purpose. It is much more probable that with the growth of Athenian-owned shipping, the owners, who were also the captains, would group themselves together for mutual protection against pirates and would divert some of their capital into the building of warships to protect their convoys. These ships, to which some owners would contribute labour, others money, would then be available for the defence of the coast of Attica itself and be the forerunners of the fifth-century Athenian war fleets. The later development of the Delian confederate fleet would thus be a projection of the same system into the international field.

The war for Salamis was most probably fought to make possible the free use to Athenian ships of the ports of Southern Attica as well as to open the route to the isthmus of Corinth. Perhaps, even with Salamis in enemy hands, Athenian ships, or ships trading with Athenians, had managed to run into the ports of Southern Attica, and no doubt the attempted molesting of such ships had helped to keep the struggle alive. But it is hard to believe that any great volume of trade would have regularly passed this dangerous way; and that there was a volume of trade is fairly well

<sup>1</sup> Herod. v. 94-5. Diog. Laert. i. 74. Strabo 599 f. For the chronology of Herodotus's account see Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, pp. 152-8. A fragment of an Attic vase found at Troy is dated to the late seventh century,

and has been taken as corroborating the general truth of the story. See B. L. Bailey, 'The Export of Attic Black-Figure Ware', *JHS* lx, 1940, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> *Pol.* ii. 8. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Herod. v. 71. 2.

substantiated, not only by the Athenian success against Megara (implying the existence of substantial naval strength), but also by the careers of Solon himself, by Solon's measures affecting international trade, and by the distribution of early Attic pottery.

Archaeological evidence suggests that it was the first quarter of the sixth century that saw a sudden increase in the level of Attic exports to the north-east and to the west. This is the conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the distribution of Attic Black-Figure ware,<sup>4</sup> and although the distribution of pottery is not in itself a sure index to the volume of general trade, it is the best direct evidence available. In the period which saw the capture of Salamis from Megara, Attic pots appear in greatly increased quantities in Greece proper, for the first time in the Black Sea area, and for the first time in any quantity in the west. The sudden appearance of Attic pots on Western sites which had hitherto shown exclusively Corinthian ware suggests that the pots were taken along their usual trade routes by Corinthian shippers. The implied increase in commercial co-operation between Athens and Corinth is consistent with Solon's alteration of the Attic coinage to bring it into line with the Corinthian standard, and with the evidence of Periander's favourable arbitration over Sigeion. This increased co-operation is in its turn surely connected with the capture of Salamis.

Before the occupation of Salamis by Athens the natural way for goods to flow into Attica was through the ports of East Attica, especially through the excellent harbour of Prasiae. The antiquity of the settlement at Prasiae is confirmed by archaeological evidence, including objects dating back to Mycenaean times. Its early importance as a port is attested by a curious tradition preserved by Pausanias<sup>5</sup> whereby 'the first-fruits of the Hyperboreans' were each year transported from Sinope to Prasiae, thence to Delos. Prasiae was the port whence, in classical times, the theoric vessel sailed annually to Delos for the festival of Apollo.

Among the early trade routes of Athens probably the most important was that which ran from East Attica north-west along the coast of friendly Euboea, then north to Thessaly or Macedonia. Grain was the commodity in greatest need in Attica in the first instance, but unless Attica were to be dependent on foreign ships (as at first she undoubtedly was), timber had also to be imported for the shipyards. A plentiful supply of timber was essential for Greek states anxious to supplement their stocks of food from abroad. Without ships a state which was short of timber would find it difficult to import it: but without timber ships could not be built. Moreover, since timber was difficult and expensive to transport by land, even in the case of those states which possessed adequate local resources, if it was to supply the needs of shipbuilding the timber needed to be sited at a convenient distance either from the ports themselves or else from rivers down which the logs could be floated to the ports. In the case of Attica, the local resources were not extensive and were situated inconveniently from the point of view of the shipyards. Fortunately for Athens, Thessaly possessed both grain, and the fir trees from which ships could be built and the run between Prasiae and Pagasae was short, sheltered, and through friendly waters. On geographical grounds, therefore, one would expect Athenian seaborne commerce to have operated within the orbit of Euboean and Thessalian trade in the late seventh and early sixth century. It is interesting that one of the scraps of information we possess about Athenian external activity in this period relates to Athenian intervention in the Sacred War against Cirrha: the crusade was conducted within the framework of the Amphictyonic league, which was dominated by Thessaly. To an observer in the early sixth century, estimating the future development of Attica, it might have seemed probable that she would continue to profit by a modest exchange of goods with Euboea, Thessaly and Macedonia: that this trade might eventually be increased by a higher degree of specialisation in the production of those areas and that the importance of the Attic east coast settlements would grow. In actual fact this route was to remain important to Attica; but although it was a natural timber route, as a corn route its possibilities were limited. Euboea and Thessaly both had a grain surplus, and there was a natural basis for trade between Attica and Thessaly, since the former could produce a surplus of the olives which the latter, for climatic reasons, was unable to produce in any quantity. But the level of Thessalian production, being sufficient to produce a perhaps modest but consistent surplus of primary goods above the needs of the existing population, provided no incentive to any high degree of commercial activity. The surplus meant that there was a generous margin for population increase within the existing social framework, as contrasted with a naturally poor state like Attica, where an explosive situation could result either from an increase in population above the economic potential of the country or from a fall in productivity, due to soil depletion or the derangement of primary production, even though the population level remained constant. Thus Thessaly, like Messenia, produced neither the social stirrings of sixth-century Attica nor any extensive commercial activity. The resulting social pattern was an agrarian state organised on feudal lines, ruled

<sup>4</sup> See R. L. Bailey, *op. cit.*, Dumbabin, 'The Western Greeks'. It would be interesting to know the effect of the loss of Salamis on the Megarian wool trade, but on this archaeology is silent.

<sup>5</sup> Paus. I. 31. 2. See Selman, *Athens*, p. 11.



by an aristocracy whose energies were devoted to the maintenance of their privileged position, and never experiencing the urgent need to accumulate the capital necessary to expand productivity, and the trade wherewith to exploit it.

The route from Pagasae was therefore never likely to guarantee a large volume of grain imports to Attica, although the Thessalian connexion continued in general to be fostered by Athens throughout the fifth century. But it was probably this route which enabled her to overcome the early difficulties caused by a shortage of local timber readily available for shipbuilding. Timber needed only to be conveyed to home ports, where it could be worked, hence the situation of the ports in relation to the city of Athens was of no vital importance. But the rapid expansion of city population<sup>2</sup> altered the situation. Grain could be obtained in greater quantities, and probably at lower prices, from the Pontus area: and secondly, since grain is a bulky commodity, it was highly desirable to land it as near to the city as possible, rather than transport it by road from Prasinae or Marathon. The hazards of the route from Phaleron to the Black Sea were, however, many times greater than the route through the Malian gulf. Other Greek states were strongly entrenched in the Black Sea area, controlling their own trading and raiding bases. Only force could prevent the seizure of the precious cargo, on the homeward journey, by a vessel of Miletus, Samos, Mytilene or Phoenicia, or by the land-based patrols of Megarian Byzantium and Chalcedon. At the end of the journey was the dangerous run by Salamis.

It seems clear that few Athenian traders would have cared to risk their ships, and lives, on such adventures unless the price of grain in Attica were fantastically high. But this, in an eminently rural community, could not be a stable condition of sale, since those who most needed the grain, i.e. the peasants and the dispossessed, could not afford to buy it on such terms, and the market for sale of such an expensive commodity would be almost as incalculable as the risks of the journey. Before Attic trade to the north-east could be developed on any scale, the inescapable requirements would appear to be sufficient naval force to beat off hostile attention, a friendly base in the north-eastern area, and the possession or the neutralisation of Salamis.

Efforts to realise the second of these objectives are reflected in the tradition of early Athenian attempts on Sigeion. The first objective was also a prerequisite of the third. The third meant acceptance of a state of war with Megara with the possibility of Cirrha's fate as the penalty of failure. The broad alternatives before the people of Attica were thus to accept the risk of defying Megara abroad as the price of allowing the city of Athens, and the population of Attica, to develop; or else to acknowledge Megara's mastery of Salamis, and hence of the sea approaches to South Attica, and keep the economy of Attica as self-sufficient as possible, its primary production being supplemented by the modest trade carried through the ports of East Attica. The second alternative meant the indefinite retention of a rural economy at a low standard of life, the concentration on grain production rather than on the cultivation of the vine or the olive, and a social system in which an agrarian aristocracy must be prepared for an explosive internal situation, if and when the living standards of the peasants fell below subsistence level. The defects of such policy, apart from the practical certainty of internal strife, were that it meant concentrating on grain crops, which the soil of Attica was poorly fitted to produce, and neglecting the subsoil crops which she was best fitted to produce; in addition, the population factor could not be controlled, and the inexorable trend to population increase would not allow conditions of economic stability: the dilemma before Athens was either to keep its physical wants static or else to increase primary production to match population increase. But production of cereals could not be dramatically increased: nor would population remain static.

There are excellent reasons why the policy of self-sufficiency at home, friendship with Megara abroad, was eventually rejected. But in Attica, until the question was finally solved by the defeat of Megara and the capture of Salamis, the issue had split the country. Internally, the interests of the majority of the large landowners, who grew a grain-cash crop and hence stood to gain by continuing shortages, lay with the policy of friendship with Megara: the continuation of their social position was also bound up with the maintenance of the rural *status quo*. Broadly opposed to this policy were those who produced a vine or olive crop for sale abroad, traders and craftsmen whose interests lay in breaking the Megarian stranglehold and, above all, the mass of peasants, when increasingly desperate economic strains forced them to realise the practical defects of the situation in which they stood.

The details of the social struggle in Attica and the external struggle with Megara, to which it was related, are not well preserved in our authorities, but it seems to have raged with intermittent bitterness in the latter part of the seventh, and in the early sixth century. Internally, four episodes can be identified: the attempted *coup d'état* of Cylon, the trial of the Alcmaeonidae, the arbitration of Solon, and the seizure of power by Peisistratus.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Sol. 22. 1. το δὲ πρὸς ἀποδοτικόν.



The conspiracy of Cylon was an attempt to seize power in favour of what was presumably, in view of its reception, an unpopular cause. By background Cylon was an aristocrat: against his party stood the followers of Megacles,<sup>7</sup> head of the Alcmaeonid family, which was generally identified by Attic tradition as the champion of radical, never of reactionary, causes. A reasonable supposition is that Cylon was the head or, for later tradition, the symbol of those who were prepared to meet the social crisis with a resort to violence in the interests of a privileged aristocracy. His connexions were directly with Megara: his father-in-law was the ruler of Megara; Megarian soldiers were used by him in Athens to back his coup.<sup>8</sup> His success could have converted Athens into a puppet state of Megara; but he lost, defeated by the masses who swarmed in from the fields.<sup>9</sup> The failure of Cylon's attempt and the success of the Alcmaeonid leaders may thus be interpreted as a set-back for Megara.<sup>10</sup> In the same period we hear<sup>11</sup> of Athenian success externally against Megara and the first capture of Salamis.

The struggle between the followers of Cylon and Megacles continued unabated<sup>12</sup> and so did the efforts of Megara to regain the lost ground. Solon, already a famous man (*ᾧδῃ δόξαν ἔχων*) for his share in the victory at Salamis, is said to have come forward and persuaded the Alcmaeonidae to submit themselves to trial for their share in the murder of Cylon's followers. The religious scruples which occasioned this persuasion had apparently been dormant for some years and one may fairly guess that a change in the political atmosphere was the primary cause of the trial. The Alcmaeonids, inevitably, were condemned, the family exiled; the pious Athenians dug up the bones of the guilty who had since died and threw them outside the borders of Attica. Thus the Attic people ceremoniously disassociated itself from the massacre of Cylon's followers, and the cause championed by the Alcmaeonidae. The cause of Megarian friendship could be said now to have prevailed: at the same time the Megarians recovered Nisaea and Salamis.<sup>13</sup>

The cause of expansion now seemed lost, and it became a punishable offence even to suggest a renewal of the war with Megara. Such a measure could of course be due to a feeling, in the ruling class, of frustration: common sense suggests that it argues that a pro-Megarian party was firmly in the saddle and was ready to use any repressive measure to keep Megarian support. It was about this time that Epimenides of Phaeacia was summoned to Athens to give her the benefit of his advice. Tradition has preserved one pronouncement of his: on seeing Munychia (the fortress on the South Attic coast) he is said to have remarked how blind is man to the future. For if the Athenians could foresee what harm it would do their city they would tear (Munychia) down with their teeth.<sup>14</sup> The control of Munychia means, in fact, the control of the Peiraeus and to control and use the Peiraeus implies the control of Salamis. To destroy it with one's teeth would be a difficult undertaking, but even this would be preferable to allowing its control to pass to an enemy state.

A generous tradition has tried to associate Solon with the eventual recapture of Salamis, in defiance of sensible chronology. But in fact the legislation of Solon was carried through at a period when the policy of challenging Megara was in eclipse, and the compromises of Solon bear witness to the internal repercussions of the external defeat, to the search for self-sufficiency, and the stabilisation, as far as possible, of the rural situation.

Before considering this aspect of Solon's measures, it should be observed that the tyranny of Peisistratus, based, in the first instance, on popular support,<sup>15</sup> coincided once again with the defeat of Megarian interests and the recapture of Salamis; an exploit which tradition associated with Peisistratus himself. In each case, an internal victory for the forces of what might be loosely termed 'reaction' coincided with a victory for the external interests of Megara: a victory for 'popular' forces, with which the Alcmaeonid family was identified, was in each case associated with a setback for Megara. Thus the interests of the 'men of the plains' can be broadly identified with an external policy of co-operation with, or subservience to, Megarian interests and no considerable expansion of trade: the interests of the 'men of the coast' may be associated with a policy of trade expansion,

<sup>7</sup> Plut. Sol. 12. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Thuc. i. 126. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Herodotus (v. 71) preserves a tradition that action against Cylon was taken by the leaders of the navy. It is tempting to believe that this is a vague recollection of the opposition to a pro-Megarian interest in Athens by the ships' captains or owners.

<sup>10</sup> It is notable that at the opening of the Peloponnesian War, the old issue of expelling the Alcmaeonidae was revived by Sparta, the political influence of this family being traditionally associated with a policy of opposition to the Peloponnesian states.

<sup>11</sup> The chronology of the Megarian war is very confused in Plutarch, and other authorities (Herod. i. 39, Aristotle 'Aθ. pol.' 14) seem to refer only to the final victorious campaign. But Plutarch says specifically (ch. 9) that

Solon himself defeated the Megarians, and implies that this was the origin of his influence at Athens: this episode must therefore be dated accordingly. At the same time the final conquest of Salamis is by agreement associated with Peisistratus who could not, by reason of age, have taken part in a campaign around, or before, 600 B.C. Since we are told that Megara recovered Salamis (Plut. Solon 12) we must conclude that Athens had captured it in the earlier episode.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. Sol. 12. 2.

<sup>13</sup> *ἡνίκῃ δὲ τοῖς τριτάτοις καὶ Μεγαροῖς ἐνὶ Σαλαμῖνι ἀνίστασθαι καὶ Νίσαιαν καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνος καὶ Σωλῶνος ἐξέτισαν* Plut. Sol. 12. 3.

<sup>14</sup> Plut. Sol. 12. 5-6.

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle 'Aθ. pol.' 13. 4. *ὑποτακτικῶτατος εἰς αὐτοὺς*.

which involved challenging Megara and mastering the sea approaches south of Attica; with a policy of encouraging the cultivation of the vine and olive, and securing some measure of political power for the representatives of shipowners and craftsmen.

The internal struggle was complicated by two other factors. The city population, although not forming a separate pressure group itself, was a powerful influence. The city lay among the best cultivable land and no doubt was the second home of many rich landowners. But as a centre of commercial exchange and craft production, the interests of the majority of its population lay rather with the expansion of Attic trade. The second complicating factor was the rise of a third main pressure group, the 'men of the hills'. Whether they lived as shepherds, as charcoal burners or even, as has been suggested, as miners, they were dependent upon the plain for their staple food, and an agricultural crisis there would hit them at second hand. As population pressed upon the capacity of the land, none would suffer worse than the landless.<sup>16</sup> The shepherd, who grazes his sheep on the hills in summer and autumn, must descend to the plains in winter to graze on the fallow. The wool which he produces over and above his own needs must be exchanged with the dwellers on the plain for their grain surplus. But the agricultural crisis which had reduced much of Attica's population to serfdom or slavery had wiped out the surpluses.<sup>17</sup> It was then the hillsmen above all who required the import of grain to supplement Attica's poverty, nor is it surprising that we find them later in fidul coalition with the men of the coast, never with the plainsmen. To such men a policy of self-sufficiency, a freezing of the rural pattern which had produced such desperate poverty, meant eventual starvation. From the point of view of the hillsmen, staple diet must either be produced in sufficient quantities in the plains or else it had to be introduced from elsewhere. If the produce of the plains was insufficient and trade could not be increased, all that was left for the landless was emigration; as free men or, by sale, as slaves.

The pressure upon Attica to expand, through commercial activity, was heavy. The chances of holding down that pressure, and keeping Attica to the pattern of an agricultural oligarchy, dwindled as the sixth century wore on. But the settlement of Solon should be properly regarded as an attempt to maintain the existing economic and social pattern, with whatever minimum concessions were unavoidable. It should above all be noted that the Solonian constitution rationed political power solely by the yardstick of primary productivity. Commercial interests and secondary producers obtained no recognition in the assessment of qualification for political office, and this recognition of wealth derived from primary production, as the sole qualification, would have disqualified Solon himself from any occupation of the office of archon.

Details of the *seisachtheia* have been discussed elsewhere.<sup>18</sup> A popular feature of Solon's programme was relief from the injustice of debt slavery, but the effect of his measures was, by freeing the serf, to clear unwanted labour off the land; and, by preventing him from pledging his person, to keep him off. It is evident that a simple prohibition from mortgaging one's person would, in itself, do no more to decrease the poverty of the land than would the prohibition of hire purchase. The serfs, whom the land could no longer support above subsistence level, must be absorbed elsewhere; since Solon's measures included a prohibition on the export of those who had become serfs, a repatriation of ex-serfs and an assisted immigration scheme for craftsmen, the conclusion must be that redundant labour was to be absorbed in secondary industry. The disposal of secondary products in its turn implies an increase in commerce. Thus one side of Solon's measures provided encouragement to trading interests. But his measures seem in other respects to tend in the opposite direction. The ban on the export of all natural products except oil would limit external trade, and unless Athenians were to live on piracy, a limitation of exports must in turn limit the import of the goods for which they were to be exchanged.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Not all shepherds were landless. In the case of those who lived in the plains and simply grazed their sheep on the slopes, no conflict of interests, as between plain and hill, would arise. But the existence of this conflict suggests that the home, as well as the livelihood of many shepherds lay in the hills, i.e. that they had no share at all in that part of Attica best suited to growing their staple food, although some agriculture would be possible on mountain plots spared by erosion. It is a plausible suggestion that some of the mountain dwellers were descended from illegitimate, hence landless, offspring. See Aristotle, *Pol. anal.* 13, 3.

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed discussion of the ecological background see 'The Economic Background to Solon's Reforms', *Glas. Quart.* vi.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> No doubt the main purpose of the ban was simply to prevent the export of grain badly needed in Attica. It is to be noted that the consequent throwing of additional

grain upon the home market could have the effect of depressing grain prices, unless further controls were applied, and hence of actually discouraging the expansion of grain production. The fact that the ban was a general one and not specifically a ban on grain export, would suggest that one of its purposes was to influence the pattern of agricultural production in Attica; the effect on the olive industry would be favourable, on the wine industry unfavourable if the level of production was above the capacity of the home market to absorb its output. The effect on the shippers would be, at least temporarily, unfavourable since they would lose the grain export trade at the same time as Solon's other measures were depressing the slave trade. Thus the immediate result of the ban would be to make more grain available for home consumption by a temporary sacrifice of commercial interests: its long-term effects would depend on other factors, including the movement of grain prices in Attica.



If Solon's legislation fell in a period where the war with Megara had reached a stalemate, then he can hardly have envisaged a solution to Attica's economic troubles by way of a dramatic expansion of overseas trade. The fact that this was in fact the way in which they were overcome, i.e. by an increased specialisation of Attic productivity for the export market, may well obscure our view of his measures. Actually Solon's constitutional settlement broke down into anarchy within a few years, and the external situation, in relation to which the internal measures were adopted, was transformed by the capture of Salamis, the defeat of Megara, the opening of the sea approaches to South Attica, and the capture of a base in the north-east, at Sigeion. These developments, which allowed a considerable expansion of Attic overseas commerce, hence an increased specialisation of production and a consequent increase in wealth, were subsequent to Solon's reforms. At the time when the latter were carried through the situation did not permit, or promise, such a solution. Attica's troubles could be cured only within the general framework of the home economy, with imports a minor palliative. The only solutions apparently available were a redistribution of real wealth, so that the poverty should be equally shared; a decrease in population to scale it down to the carrying capacity of the land; or an increase in productivity of the commodities which Attica most needed, i.e. basic foodstuffs, principally cereals.

The first of these solutions was rejected by Solon, explicitly in his poems, implicitly in his legislation. The second was hardly practicable and certainly undesirable: the sale abroad of indebted labourers was, of course, a manifestation of this trend in practice, and this, too, was rejected as a solution by Solon. The increased production of cereals was outwardly the most attractive, but practically the most difficult of all three.

At this point it is well to remember that to a country whose wealth is preponderantly drawn from primary production, high food prices are to be welcomed, low food prices to be feared, violent price fluctuations are to be feared most of all. What had probably completed the ruin of small farmers who grew a cereal cash crop was that a process of rising cereal prices, due to increasing shortages, had been violently disturbed by sporadic imports of cheaper foreign grain. The effect of foreign competition would be in many cases to induce landowners to stop the thankless job of growing the cereals to which Attic land was poorly fitted, and turn the land over to olives, which Attica could grow in abundance, and which would yield a handsome profit if the oil could be marketed overseas.

In addition, the shortage of grain and the consequent inflation of its price in relation to other commodities had probably brought under the plough land quite unsuited to grain production (as much of Attic land is unsuited), and the inevitable depletion of soil fertility which would follow must have helped to accelerate the agricultural crisis. It was natural that such land, clearly unsuited to grain, should be turned over to olives, which it could grow well; and it would have been folly to try to reverse this process. But if Attica were to be as self-sufficient as possible in basic foodstuffs, it was very desirable, at a time when land was actually being taken out of grain production, that whatever land was reasonably suited to grain should continue to produce it, and not follow the trend to olive or vine culture: furthermore, it was possible that, if sufficient inducement were offered, additional good land could be brought under the plough, e.g. land used for grazing for the rich man's horses.

If a trend away from cereal production were to be reversed the first prerequisite was the assurance of a high and consistent price for grain in the home market. This is the background against which we should consider Solon's reform of the weights, measures and coinage, and of the qualifications for office fixed by Solon.

The unit of produce used as a base for assessing qualification was a medimnus of grain and a metretes of oil or wine; thus one and a half bushels of grain was, for this purpose, equal to about eight and a half gallons of oil or wine. Now it is conceivable that the equalisation for assessment purposes did not correspond to a commercial equalisation, and that, in the market, the price of a 'dry' measure had no relation to that of a 'wet'. If this is so, it is hard to see Solon's point in accepting them as equal for purposes of political recognition either, and the whole system would be based on a calculation inexplicable to us. It seems a much more reasonable hypothesis that a measure of grain, weighed in the new Solonian measures, was roughly of the same commercial value as a new measure of oil or wine. If this is so, both were approximately equal to a price in coin. Now we know from Plutarch<sup>20</sup> that Solon did in fact fix prices of sacrificial offerings, including the offering of a measure of grain: the price was one drachma. If we accept the likelihood of a commercial equalisation of wet and dry measures, the fact that both the measures and the coins were altered make it a plausible hypothesis that they were fixed in accordance with a convenient unit of coinage, and the fixing of a drachma as the price for religious purposes, points to the conclusion that this was the price fixed for market purposes as well.

<sup>20</sup> Plut. Sol. 23. 3 ὁρίσας τιμὰς τῶν . . . ἑταίρων.



The effect of Solon's changes was to increase the size of the measures and to lighten the drachma. The changes seem to be directly connected, if, as seems highly probable, the effect of reducing the silver content of the drachma was to increase the number of drachmas in circulation, then it could be expected that the purchasing power of the drachma would fall, if it covered the same quantity of goods and services. Thus if an old measure of corn had been equal to one old drachma, then the price, in terms of the new drachma, could be expected to rise above a drachma if the measures were unchanged, and assuming that the total quantity of corn offering did not alter.

It is generally argued that Solon's main purpose in altering the standard of the drachma was to facilitate trade with states which lay in the trading sphere of Corinth and Euboea, and this seems likely enough. But the simultaneous adjustment of the measures suggests that Solon was likewise concerned with the exchange value of the drachma in the home market, in particular with the price level of primary products. The mines at Laureion could hardly have been yielding heavy returns at this time, and it is possible that one of Attica's difficulties had been that not enough money was in circulation to cover the value of its production, and that a scarcity of money had been inhibiting the exchange of goods. In particular the owners of grain surpluses had preferred to export their grain if home consumers could not pay the price they asked. The ban on grain export would, in itself, have a deflationary effect, in forcing the farmers to dispose of their grain at a price that the home consumer could pay. The fall in price, in its turn, might well persuade farmers to reduce grain acreages and turn the land over to other purposes. To encourage farmers to increase rather than decrease grain production, it was highly desirable that grain prices should be kept as stable as possible. The fact that more corn would be available in Attica would tend to force prices down, in terms of the drachma, at the same time as the lightening of the drachma would tend to force them up; eventually, after some fluctuation, the price might stabilise itself, and since corn was still scarce, the price would probably reach a level attractive enough to producers. But Attica was living through an agricultural crisis: even a temporary fluctuation might have grave effects on the economic and hence on the social and political stability of the state. Since Solon, by altering the standard of the drachma, was indirectly affecting the level of prices in Attica, it was tempting to go further and plan a series of actual prices to be used in commerce by bringing the capacity of the standard measures into line with the new purchasing power of the drachma, i.e. so that a new drachma would become the official price of a new measure of corn, wine or oil. In this way a new price level would be found at once and it would gain stability from its official origin and recognition.

Solon was apparently a man versed in the ways of business, and presumably aware of the relation between rural development and the price-structure of primary production. He knew that prices in Attica must move in response to his own currency reform, and since it was in his hands to fix both the silver content of the drachma (hence the number of drachmas in circulation), and also the capacity of the standard measures, i.e. the actual prices of basic products in terms of the drachma, then it is difficult to believe that he did not attempt to do so in accordance with the requirements of the economic situation. The Attic market received at the same time a new medimnos, a new metretres, and a new drachma, all fixed and recognised by the state. All three were recognised as of equal value for non-commercial purposes; the probability is that they were equalised for commercial purposes also. We know from Plutarch that Solon fixed prices for sacrificial purposes; it seems equally possible that he fixed them for commercial purposes as well.

Needless to say, such prices must have been related to the actual conditions of supply and demand, taking into account the effects of the new export regulations. An attempt at violent manipulation of prices, even if efficiently policed, would only have encouraged hoarding and driven goods on to a black market; but if the price policy were a reasonable one, and not offensive to the most influential interests, i.e. the grain producers themselves, then it should have been possible to maintain a price structure that would be advantageous to Attic development. If the official price of corn were set at one drachma, then even if the available quantity of corn subsequently increased, the price might still be maintained by three considerations: by the existence of an officially recognised price; by stepping up the issue of drachmas, as more silver became available, to cover the increased quantity of goods; or even by actual supervision of the market.<sup>21</sup> The immediate requirement was stability for the price of grain, but it was equally important that this price should compare favourably with the prices of alternate crops available to farmers, above all, of olives and wine. Thus it is of interest to examine the relation between the prices of these and other commodities, as they are apparent in Plutarch's description<sup>22</sup> of the value set on sacrificial offerings, and also in the qualifications for office fixed by Solon on the basis of the output of the three basic commodities.

Examination reveals how attractive the price of grain was in relation to the other products.

<sup>21</sup> In the fifth century there were at least three sets of officials primarily engaged on the control of retail food prices in Attica, the *dyotaniotai*, *metretaniotai* and *arotaniotai*.

<sup>22</sup> Plut. Sol. 23, 3.

For sacrificial purposes one drachma was not only the price of a measure of corn, it was also the price of a sheep: an ox, perhaps the most valuable capital investment on the farm, was valued at five drachmas. Plutarch points out that these were sacrificial victims, the choicest specimens, many times more valuable than an ordinary animal, thus by Solon a reckoning one and a half bushels of grain was equalised in price to two or three sheep: no wonder that the shepherds, whose living depended on the level of wool prices, were a depressed class! At the same time, Plutarch remarks on the acute shortage of money in Solon's time, as reflected in the fact that the penalty for rape, an offence in some circumstances meriting the death penalty, was in other cases only a fine of one hundred drachmae. The conclusion following from these figures is that the price of grain was fixed by Solon at a most handsome level from the point of view of the producer. In terms of the Attic social struggle the outlook for the 'men of the plains' was bright, for the 'men of the coast' as consumers was poor, as importers it was fair enough. For those who were concerned neither with the production nor the importation of grain (the 'men of the hill') the outlook was grim. In economic terms then, this part of Solon's reforms could have been expected to increase the income of the grain producers without decreasing the income of secondary, or trading, interests, provided that the commodity they imported was grain, and that imports could be kept up. The policy might therefore be regarded as one promising political stability, as between plain and coast, and represented as a kind of compromise between the two interests. But it was a compromise at the expense of the third group.

A striking feature of the scheme was the equalisation of price, by capacity, of wine and oil. Vines will bear in the space of a few years after planting cuttings: their yield can be heavy on poor soil, preparation of wine was simple and wastage small. Olives, on the other hand, require up to twenty-five years to come into full bearing with all the consequent risks of losing the tree in the interim: there is considerable capital expenditure involved in the pressing process, and the oil content is relatively small. Thus, on any reckoning, a given quantity of oil should be much more valuable than an equal quantity of wine. The equalisation of a medimnus to a metretres was generous to grain at the expense of wine: but the return to the olive grower was extremely low. No incentive was given to grow either vines or olives for the Attic market, especially not olives.

If olives were a crop with a short delay in yield, the result of such a scheme in the absence of special concessions in the export market would be for producers to pull out all their olives, over and above what was needed for the household. But no one is likely to cut down an olive tree because of a temporary slump; olive growers can afford to wait for better times, or rather they must wait: for the long delay in yield makes it impracticable to plant or cut down the trees in accordance with immediate price movements. The olive crop was in fact the only one of Attica's staple crops which could have been treated in this way without ruining its future development.

But if oil was a depressed commodity in Attic markets, its value abroad was unchanged, thus Solon's action could be expected to discourage the production of wine, stimulate that of cereals, and channel the oil crop into the export market, where by reason of its high nutritive and economic value per unit of capacity, it could be exchanged for the maximum import of grain that the East Attic transport facilities could cope with. In that case, the prohibition of export of all natural products except oil, falls into place as the regulation in law of Attica's overseas trade in accordance with the requirements of her internal planning.

Conclusions may therefore be summarised as follows. The development of the Attic party struggle was closely bound up with the development of the struggle with Megara — control the sea approaches to the harbours of South Attica, for without the use of those harbours the population of the city of Athens could not develop greatly above the feeding capacity provided by the surpluses (the cash crops) of the surrounding plains. The interests of the cereal producers on the plains therefore favoured the maintenance of the *status quo* and the restriction of city development along the lines of increasing specialisation and secondary production. The interests of those who worked, and lived, around the ports, found their livelihood in trading, building and manning ships, and in producing for export lay in breaking the Megarian stranglehold. The internal success of each party thus coincided with the fortunes of the struggle with Megara. The reforms of Solon were carried out at a time when the struggle for Salamis had been practically abandoned, and his legislation is accordingly an attempt at stabilising the existing situation by political and economic planning, which aimed at settling the social question by the re-establishment by government decree of an economy based squarely on rural productivity. The type of commodities to be produced were so to be regulated as to increase the availability of those commodities most sorely needed in Attica, and the international exchange of goods was likewise to be controlled so as to import a maximum quantity of the goods most urgently needed, and to export solely that commodity which was best fitted for export by reason of its value in relation to capacity, and the surplus of its output. The regulation of production was to be carried out by the establishment of official retail prices for the home market, and by the new export regulations.

The apparent advantage of Solon's attempted solution was that it avoided the choice between exporting population down to carrying capacity, or resisting Megara, so as to increase the supply of foodstuffs by large-scale imports. The price for his policy was to be paid by the home consumers, especially the wool producers,<sup>23</sup> and thus the solution implied an aggravation of the social problem along fresh lines.

But the success or failure of the problem hinged ultimately not on the social implications of a new income pattern, but on the ability of Attica to increase grain production, given the incentives laid down by Solon. It might be hoped that productivity could be raised by more efficient technique and organisation: fragments of Solon's work reveal that he took the trouble to make specific recommendations, to improve farming technique, himself a trader: likewise the *seisachtheia* should have improved the labour situation by substituting hired for tied labour and ridding the land of serf families who had an historical claim on land, even when their services were uneconomical or redundant. Some improvement should have resulted from these measures, but, in the long run, the attempt to increase the exploitation of Attica's poor top soil by cereal crops was bound not to increase but decrease the total yield by depleting the soil's fertility. The inevitable failure of the economic plan implied the failure of the social and political organisations as well. Within a few years of Solon's prudent departure from the hostile atmosphere of Athens, the state experienced anarchy: if the Areopagus was to safeguard the constitution, it failed at the first attempt.

The capture of Salamis forms an epilogue to Solon's reforms. The complex problem with which he had tried to grapple had now been transformed, if not solved, by permitting the rapid expansion of Attic trade and hence the concentration on the subsoil crops which Attica was well equipped to produce: in addition, the exploitation of the Laureion silver mines made possible the quick accumulation of capital needed to expand the shipping industry. The social result was not the rural stability of Solon's plan, but the opening of a period of discord which was to see the decline of agrarian interests and the rise of the new economic interests whose political influence was eventually to dominate the state.

A. FRENCH.

*University of Adelaide.*

<sup>23</sup> The lot of wool producers (and craftsmen) would be actually improved to the extent that there would be increased demand for their products: the prosperity of one section of a community can hardly fail to have some beneficial effect on its other members. But the benefit that they would reap as producers would be far out-

weighed by their losses as consumers, for expenditure on cereals would account for a high percentage of their budget. Until production could be expanded, and the common pool of goods and services increased, the share in that pool of wool and secondary producers must diminish as the share of grain producers increased.



## CHARACTERISATION IN GREEK TRAGEDY

THE editorial introduction to a Greek play will often include a section on the characters, in which their various traits are collected into a series of sketches. There may be sketches not only of the main characters but of minor, anonymous personages together with a sort of collective sketch of the chorus, and they are commonly made without fuss or discussion of critical theory. There has, of course, both here and in general books on the tragedians, always been room for differences of interpretation: as to whether, for example, Pentheus is moral or prurient. It is round such differences that discussion revolves, and the arguments have been heated enough. Why is the Aeschylean Agamemnon made to tread the purple carpet? Professor Thomson suggests that it is by reason of Clytemnestra's irresistible feminine charm.<sup>1</sup> But since this charm, so far from being explicitly attested, is only an inference from three lines of dialogue; since the king has said a little earlier (in Thomson's own translation):

Serk not to unman me with effeminate  
Graces and barbarous salaams agape  
In grovelling obeisance at my feet—

from which any susceptibility to Clytemnestra's charm seems singularly absent; since, moreover, he has brought with him a concubine who is—

of many chattels the elect flower,

—one might be tempted to maintain that even if the charm is accepted as a help towards interpretation, there must be other reasons also for Agamemnon's acting as he does. Very well, you may say, modify the sketch to suit your taste. But there are a number of places where the sketching process runs into serious difficulty. Ruckles occur which cannot be smoothed away. When Antigone, near to death, explains that her heroic deed was done for a brother and would not have been done for a husband or son, because a brother was irreplaceable and they are not, it is a tight corner for the critic, and Jebb's reaction is to enclose that passage in square brackets. But this is nothing to the controversy over the second episode (the *Trugrede*) in the *Ajax*. Two mediaeval clerks may have argued for seventeen days and nights over the frequentative of the verb to *be*, but scholars have been debating what is in Ajax's mind at that point for 127 years and have not yet reached a truce. They come to the tragic figure as to an individual, an independent person drawn in the round, and this, I think, is a primary cause of discontent.

It is not, however, any one thing, any one kind of difficulty, which throws doubt on belief in the *persona* as an individual. Whilst an individual need not be invariably consistent or rational, he is always an entity which can be studied by itself and for its own sake; and the tragic figures may be so inconsistent or so irrational that this kind of study leaves us dissatisfied. But other things leave us dissatisfied too. The figure may be incomplete. Butcher, writing on Aristotle, had an acute sense of this problem when he concluded that the characters 'reveal their personality not in all its fullness, but to such an extent as the natural course of the action may require',<sup>2</sup> and the common construction put upon this phenomenon is, in effect, that they somehow resemble a man firing from behind a tree; you are allowed only a partial view, but knowing that it was a man who did the deed, you subject to characterology all that you can catch of him. Again, the figures may be too dully repetitive, too much of a muchness, to qualify as individuals; they may seem mere embodiments of impersonal ideas; or they may, like Orestes in the *Eumenides* or Adrastus in Euripides *Suppliants*, be too vague to make much character-impression at all. In a word, the concept of individual seems to need modification.

One recourse is to replace the notion of round character by that of flat character or type. Flat characters, as E. M. Forster explained in connexion with the English novel, are the more artificial beings. 'In their purest form they are constructed round a single idea or quality'; because they are simple and known only from without, we easily recognise them when they reappear and soon know all there is to know about them.<sup>3</sup> The usefulness of this type-concept lies close to hand. If Pelasgus the conscientious king, Eteocles the courageous chief, Alcestis the self-sacrificing wife, and Lycus the sheer villain, have little in them beyond what convention would suggest; if good and bad rulers seem to be taken from stock because their attributes repeat themselves almost mechanically; if Agamemnon or Chrysothemis or Jason or Xuthus leaves too many blanks, and

<sup>1</sup> G. Thomson, *The Orestia of Aeschylus*, Vol. i, p. 17. The lines quoted below are on p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (1st ed.), p. 323.

<sup>3</sup> E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel*, pp. 103-18.

Hippolytus or Hermione is found too one-sided, to be interpreted as an individual—the rejoinder would be, 'Just so, for flat and not round character is the nature of this person.' All that is conventional stock and repetitive, all want of full detail in the personality, and all convergence or bias of traits towards a central quality of the figure, are in the first instance accounted for by this hypothesis. Nevertheless, one must hesitate before accepting it. It is a suspicious circumstance that no two scholars agree upon how it is to be applied. One will pick out his types very charitably—a Nurse in Aeschylus, a Guard in Sophocles, a Phrygian Slave in Euripides; another concedes all the figures in Aeschylus except Prometheus, Io, and three persons in the *Oresteia*; another, perhaps, all the tragic figures save those of Euripides; another, with Euripides in mind, grants Messenger, Herald, Nurse and faithful old Servant, and toys with the idea of granting the villains too, such as Jason, Polymnestor, Menelaus in the *Orestes*, and Lycus; whilst a fifth would evidently resign the people of Euripides *en masse*, for his finding is that they are 'nicht charakterisiert, wohl aber *τίμοι*'.<sup>4</sup> If anything at all emerges from this, it is that we cannot make free use of the type-interpretation, and by bringing it against the serious tragic figure we soon see its limitations. There is, in the main characters at any rate, little obvious interchangeability. Type is no better, probably worse, than the concept of round character in accounting for elements of the irrational and incongruous. Simple and cohering round one or two ideas or qualities, it can hardly admit of division and cuckling. And it may be questioned whether the most striking features of the tragic figure belong to the same order of things as, let us say, the impulsiveness of a Polemon or the *semitas* of a Demea. Menelaus in the *Iphigenia in Aulis* is impulsive, but the dominating impression you have of him is of a sharp switch of attitude; you know him less through qualities or general ideas than through his curious theatrical *volte-face*. Medea loves her children and takes vengeance, but she is not exactly a type of mother-love plus vindictiveness: the emotion and the deed are dramatic stuff to which we might give the name motifs. Creon in the *Antigone* acts with signal severity, but you cannot say he centres round that quality. He embodies, if you like, all the dangerous dry powder of severity concentrated in the death-penalty threatened by his edict, but what touches it off is something not of his own choosing, the pious and opposed spirit of Antigone, and when he feels his hand forced, nothing could less resemble the ingenuous and whole-hearted disgust of Demea than Creon's self-holstering indignation, issuing in appeals to the discipline of order, and vexed by a twinge of secret dismay. His harshness is only contingent. Considerations like these—of part or role, of dramatic motifs, of contingency or destiny, hinder, where they occur, the type-interpretation. Flat character may have relevance to the issue, but it seems not to be a complete solution.

Individual and type are two more or less ready-made categories. Some classicists moved on to experiment with others, chief among which is the category of symbol. Starting from the safe ground that Kratos is might, Thanatos death, and Lyssa madness, you might go on to say that the Eumenides are likewise the spirits of race-vengeance, that Clytemnestra, when she murders her husband, personifies the ancestral curse, that Phaedra represents baneful love and Alcestis the supreme wisely *ἀσπεί*, and (in the words of Professor Kitto) that Hermione 'is nothing but Spartan arrogance and narrow-minded cruelty'.<sup>5</sup> Cornford, in *Thucydides Mythistoricus*,<sup>6</sup> was inclined to regard the whole of Aeschylean drama in this light—a view which gained in persuasiveness by being urged within the limits of moderation. Symbolism in the *personae* of the *Prometheus* is patent, and he found it, though to a less marked degree, in the others generally. 'The heroic characters', he writes, 'are still so abstract and symbolic that they are barely distinguishable from the pure abstractions of the lyrical world.' Agamemnon symbolises *ὕbris*. 'If he can be said to have a character at all, it consists solely of certain defects which make him liable to Insolence; if he has any circumstances, they are only those which prompt him to his besetting passion.' We are rarely, however, asked to believe that the plays are stark allegories, and if they are not, the symbolism can be at most only a part of the picture. A main character can be symbolical in respect of the 'universal' element in his fortunes, but what is he apart from that? The hero should be thought of, says Cornford, 'at any given moment as a single state of mind, with no background or margin of individual personality'. Unless the play is a mere allegory, what then (we have to ask) is he at all given moments taken together?

If we are not yet satisfied, there is the more radical approach worked out by Tychō von Wilamowitz and Howald,<sup>7</sup> to make some sense of the incongruities. Sophocles, or (for Howald) the Greek tragedian, is found to aim consistently at dramatic effect—seeks to ensure that each scene as enacted shall produce as powerful an impression as possible upon the spectator, whilst the unity of the whole lies not in the layout of the plot or in anything else objective, but in the progression

\* References are: (1) A. Lesky, 'Die gr. Trag. in ihren jüngsten Darstellungen', in *Neu. Jahrb.* 7 (1931), p. 374. (2) M. Singer, 'L'art du motif dans les drames d'Aeschyle', p. 59. (3) W. W. Merry, *Inroad* (2 ed. of *Prags*), p. 16. (4) W. Zürcher, *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides*, p. 20. (5) H. Drexler, in *Gnomon* lii (1927), p. 452.

(6) H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, p. 232.

\* See esp. pp. 146, 159, from which I quote.

\* T. von Wilamowitz, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* (1917), and E. Howald, *Die gr. Trag.* (1930).



of scenes under developing tension, in their harmonious total effect on yourself as you watch. You neither can nor wish to refer back and forward, your attention centres upon the individual scene, which, as it does not need to be organically related to the rest, gains a disproportionate independence. Thus characterisation as we know it is quite inessential. Howald roundly declares that before the last quarter of the fifth century there is no such thing for the Greek as unity of the human ethos, and that for the older Greek poet unity of character is an absurdity. 'The tragic figure stands in no need of a unitary nature; to demand this and a sound, developed psychology is quite wrong; the so-called incongruities, here as in the action, are really instances of the dramatist's concentration on the effectiveness of the individual scene. Persons are characterised only enough to motivate or make intelligible what they have to do, and it is the situation which determines what traits they will evince. They are creatures of the situation, or (as I should prefer to call them) chameleons. Eteocles, for example,

'is different each time, before the maidens of the chorus, as responsible commander-in-chief, and again at the moment where he appoints himself to combat with his brother. These three figures may never be seen as one'."

Thus character-analysis is likely to be lost labour; to build up character-sketches, says Howald, is plainly grotesque, for all they will yield is *Charaktermonstra*. The chameleon-view has more recently been improved and elaborated, for Euripides, by Walter Zürcher,<sup>9</sup> who perceives that Euripidean *personae* often require interpretation in terms of a serious psychology. But whilst accepting the *Medea* as in germ a psychological study, he nevertheless maintains that the *Medea* who plans to kill her children for vengeance's sake, and the *Medea* who is then forced to kill them willy-nilly or almost out of mother-love (to save them from the Corinthians), do not cohere with each other. *Medea* is a changeling, and will not add up to a unity.

What point have we reached now? To explain the *personae* classicists have been apt to take recourse to round character, flat character, symbol, chameleon, and one or two other tidy categories. When interpreting and analysing they have often been too subjective or too tendentious to persuade each other, and collectively they produce a labyrinthine tangle. Two things seem to follow. First, that we have not yet got the problem shaken into its right terms. Second, the field of discussion no longer remains the exclusive preserve of the classicist. He once took round character for granted—in the first instance because everyone else did. If he now finds that his assumptions fail him, perhaps other critics have had the same experience, and it could do no harm to compare notes with them.

In fact other critics did have the same experience, and not least the Shakespearian critics. I single them out particularly, because classicists have often been tempted to use Shakespearian characterisation as a standard of reference, as though here, at any rate, is round character solid and unimpeachable, something you cannot go wrong about. And of course they could claim to be in tolerable good company, in the sometime redoubtable company of A. C. Bradley, who believed in his heroes as men of flesh and blood and instituted an inquiry (which has since become rather notorious) to establish where Hamlet was when his father died. Bradley disliked flat or abstract interpretations; 'I do not dream of suggesting', he writes, 'that in any of his dramas Shakespeare imagined two abstract principles or passions conflicting, and incorporated them in persons'.<sup>10</sup> But later critics felt driven to the recourse of type or symbol. One may read that Armado 'is a caricature and not a portrait. His features are strained to comprehend the limits of his type'.<sup>11</sup> One may read that *Troilus and Cressida* is an instance of 'a philosophical argument perfectly bodied into poetry', with Thersites 'an extreme personification' of one of two contrasting views of life, that he is 'cynicism incarnate'.<sup>12</sup> One may read that *Measure for Measure* 'tends towards allegory or symbolism', and that in it 'Isabella stands for sainted purity, Angelo for pharisaical righteousness, the Duke for a psychologically sound and enlightened ethic', and so on.<sup>13</sup> Others had been worried by inconsistencies, veiled confusion of motive, and the like, and Bridges' essay 'The Influence of the Audience on Shakespeare's Drama', written in 1907, is pure grist to the chameleon mill. But the Shakespearian critics did not attempt to make a stand there. One ought not to erect a theory on a foundation of stumbling-blocks: not only the ruckles, but the whole general texture of the characters has to be accounted for. After Stoll, who in the 1930's wrote from out in the wilderness, 'The plot is not so much a part of them as they are parts of the plot'.<sup>14</sup> The wheel began its travel towards full circle, and subsequent movement has been towards modified reinstatement of character, on sounder lines. This is a path which it may be practicable for us to follow, provided the issue has first of all been squarely faced.

<sup>9</sup> Howald, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>10</sup> W. Zürcher, *Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides* (1947).

<sup>11</sup> A. C. Bradley, *Shakespearean Tragedy*, p. 19 n.

<sup>12</sup> H. B. Charlton, *Shakespearean Comedy*, p. 273.

<sup>13</sup> G. Wilson Knight, *The Wheel of Fire*, pp. 71 and 57-8.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>15</sup> E. E. Stoll, *Art and Artifice in Shakespeare*, p. 51.



As the tragic characterisation has been looked at hitherto, there seems to be no chance of regimenting it at all. It may partake of roundness, flatness, or symbolism or be vexatiously shifting and inapprehensible. The tragedian can set in his tragic framework figures as diverse in their conception as Thanatos and Medea. In the single figure of *Eteocles*, Murray can find 'clearly studied individual character', Maria Singer can find 'above all the type of the courageous leader', and others can find a symbol or chameleon. In *The Cocktail Party* (which, though professedly a comedy, is at many points informed by the tragic spirit) the person Julia can be metamorphosed from one who speaks like this—

The only reason for a cocktail party  
For a gluttonous old woman like me  
Is a really nice nibbit—

to one who speaks like this—

Protect her from the Voices  
Protect her from the Visions  
Protect her in the Tumult  
Protect her in the Silence.

In our terms there is *no* rule about what the tragic figure can be. As far as our categories go it can be anything, or any mixture of things. The fact is that there is something inadequate in the category-system. It is rather like trying to find subject and verb in the sentence 'Hence, loathed Melancholy' or to decide with which of the official parts of speech the lover ends when murmuring—

I would rather rest  
On my true love's breast  
Than any other where.

A better course would have been to examine the tragic figure simply as a phenomenon, to go and see what it was like, without taking prefabricated frames and boxes with us. And I suggest that an unbiased survey and comparison would convince us of three things, and that any conclusion which ignores one or other of them will come to grief. First there is the wide and juxtaposed diversity which has just been mentioned: Prometheus talks to Io, the Furies to Orestes, the Messenger to Creon, Artemis to Hippolytus, Madness to the audience. Second, our overwhelming natural expectation that most figures should show some continuous identity and some approximation to a human nature would be confirmed—we should be overwhelmingly convinced that most of them do; and to say that this appears only by accident is surely frivolous. But third, compared with independent individuals, the tragic figure is endowed with those intractable ruckles and peculiarities. They are part of his nature, and you are merely obscuring the latter if you try to explain them away. It is in the light of these three conditions that we should study the tragic character—and I think we are quite justified in retaining the word 'character' provided we are alive to the assumptions and problems which an unconsidered use of it involves.

The complex of a tragic drama is a trinity of language, character, and action; and by action is meant both the events and the import of the drama—the particular happenings and their communal or ideal significance. Whatever may happen in comedy, in tragedy these three phenomena are interdependent or (if the expression is permissible) interconstituted, and none of them can be completely abstracted from the others. In so far as there is an order of priority the genesis of the action tends to precede the genesis of characterisation, which is attuned to it; and the language comes third and is attuned to both. But once the play has begun to be created they interact and become inextricable; you cannot disentangle them without doing some injustice to one or other, or to the play as a whole.

These principles need more explaining. One of them is the tendency of the action to control the main lines of, or project, the characterisation. The character tends to be an upshot of the thing done; tragedians, says Aristotle truly, τὰ ἴθνη συμπαράλαμβάνουσιν διὰ τὰς πράξεις.<sup>15</sup> And because the thing done is not necessarily what some individual did do, but can be anything which the fancy invents, so the upshot of this deed may not be the same as an individual. This was happening in all story-making—in the myths before Aeschylus took them up, in the story of the Moor of Venice before Shakespeare first read it; but we sometimes lose sight of it in a tragedy, simply because there the norm of human grandeur, human evil, human suffering and death, come so nearly and so universally home to us. Suppose a tragedian took up the story of Ixion. He would find the trait of ingratitude explicitly given with the core of the action. But this core of action is already vaguely projecting certain less straightforward elements of characterisation. Ixion was such that he attempted

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics* 1450a21.

the bed of the Queen of Heaven: that spirit can be dramatically portrayed, but it means that Ixion can never have more than an approximation to naturalness. And Zeus—Zeus had first cleansed this treacherous man of murder when no human being would, then later caused him to be bound for ever to a wheel of fire. Zeus' nature is to be fashioned in accordance with these two super-human decisions. The action of *Othello* projects an Iago who embarks on diabolical torment without sufficient provocation or motive—inexplicably; and an Othello whose suffering is to be intensified at cost of a blindness which is somewhat unreal. These characters are not independent but, originally, outgrowths from the dramatic centre.

The second principle was the interaction of a play's constituents upon each other. Action affects character not only initially but continuously. I wonder whether even Michael Henchard, the Man of Character (and hero of a *novel*), did not receive the desolation of his last resolve from the action's inevitable last climactic surge. That character shapes action needs no illustration from modern drama, but it happens also in Greek tragedy—for example in the progress of the *Philoctetes* to its final impasse. Action calls up language, when Othello stands in the bedchamber, sword in hand, and says—

Have you pray'd tonight, Desdemona?

Character calls up language, when Clytemnestra cries out for a man-axe—

δοῦναι τις ἀνδρακμήντα πλάσσειν ὡς τόχος.<sup>16</sup>

But sometimes the words or imagery come first, and help either to shape the character, as when Cassandra was—

πολλῶν χρημάτων ἐξέλπετον αὐτός.<sup>17</sup>

or to swell the action to an infinite reach, as in the cry of the Theban chorus—

ὦ γενεαὶ βροτῶν . . .<sup>18</sup>

And of course many moments of tragedy, and particularly the great moments, are a complete interconstitution of all three elements, as when Clytemnestra desires not to be called Agamemnon's wife—

ὦ παλαιὸς ὄριμὸς ἀλόιστωρ . . . τοῖδ' ἀπείραται.<sup>19</sup>

or one of the climaxes in *Richard II*—

For you have but mistook me all this while;  
I live with bread like you, feel want,  
Taste grief, need friends.<sup>20</sup>

It is an effect in which action, character and language cannot be disentangled.

Of course I do not mean to suggest that character-drawing in the ordinary acceptation is just an illusion—that the tragic character is not developed for its own sake. The dramatist certainly tries to visualise his person and round him out as convincingly as may be. And so we have a third principle, an elaborating and overlaying of the projection in the cause of verisimilitude. The figure cannot however be set loose, or he would forfeit his power, the power which he has by being in and of the action, a fertile compromise between its elementary projection and round character. He is to the drama much what a front or side elevation is to a building, basically a resultant of its structure. Elevations can acquire a measure of independence, and we can study them as entities and compare them with one another, but it will spoil the study if we forget what they really are. So when we use our categories we must subordinate them to this idea. If, for example, a tragic figure symbolises, he does so through the import of the action. It is the dementing of Heracles (and that is part of the action) which shapes the person Lyssa, and if Jaeger was right in declaring that Oedipus was 'suffering humanity personified',<sup>21</sup> Oedipus could be thus symbolical because he came out of the view of life which that play's action embodied.

If the characterisation works on this basis some of the problems which have proved vexatious in the past may admit of solution, because obscurity in tragic character no longer requires the same kind of explanation as obscurity in an individual. The later Iphigeneia is what she is by reason of two peculiarities: first, a dramatic action cheapened below the tragic level towards mere

<sup>16</sup> *Choeph.* 839.

<sup>17</sup> *Agam.* 934-5.

<sup>18</sup> *O.T.* 1186.

<sup>19</sup> *Agam.* 1501-2.

<sup>20</sup> *Richard II.* iii. 2.

<sup>21</sup> W. Jaeger, *Paidia, Log. vsm.*, i, p. 283.

theatricality, and second, an inadequate overlaying of the character-frame which belonged to that cheapened action. And now what of the *Tragedy*? Ajax makes as strong an impression as any figure in Sophocles, and it could hardly be so strong if it were not in essentials a clear one. Here is not some vague enigma but a nature as direct and powerful as the drama itself. But if there is any passage in which it stirs us more deeply than elsewhere it is in this very speech: all considerations of reason, motive and character notwithstanding, these famous lines surely sound the note of his full status as a tragic hero. Now the one thing which criticism may be said to have established about this episode is that Sophocles designed it primarily for the sake of the action. The need for the friends of Ajax to be misled, the moving irony of illusory hope before disaster, and above all the mighty law of *yielding*, which the death of Ajax is going so poignantly both to confirm and to resist—all these are coincident features of the action and can be observed making the speech what it is, shaping the attitude of Ajax from the dramatic epicentre. How can these three points—the clear-cut impression, the clinching of it in the *Tragedy*, and the true home of the latter in the action—be reconciled? Only by accepting Ajax's character as the front-elevation of the drama. When therefore a present-day scholar remarks<sup>22</sup> that it has never been satisfactorily explained why Ajax makes this speech, it seems to me that this means no more than that it has never been satisfactorily proved that Ajax is an individual.

That is the groundwork. It remains to adumbrate certain peculiar influences upon the Greek tragedians' technique.

First, characterisation in these plays is pioneer work. Professor Page in his book on the *Odyssey* remarks of heroes in epic that 'their thoughts will be (for the most part) expressed in language which is traditional and typical, not specially designed for a given person in a given place'.<sup>23</sup> But tragedy had to design the utterance of a given *persona* in a given place without prefabricated blocks of traditional language and thought. Naturally some of the results are primitive. The idea of the characterising process hardly comes home at first, though progress in the fifth century is swift. Danaus and Pelagus are hardly realised enough to 'live' the relatively simple drama for which they exist,<sup>24</sup> but by the time of the *Philoctetes* the poet has developed Neoptolemus far enough to speak of the *phōus* which he inherits from Achilles and to let it pull of itself upon the development of the play. There were uncertainties about the shape of a tragic action, and these took their toll. Besides the *Iphigenia in Aulis* there are several somewhat episodic plays, such as the *Trachiniae* and *Phoenissae*, where the characters, through lack of a developing fortune, are still and unarticulated and therefore of less interest. Where the action did provide a good basis of character, the overlay was still noticeably meagre. In consequence, when you try to understand a character you break through into the action too suddenly and abruptly. 'Neither in bad times', exclaims Eteocles, 'nor when all is well may I live in the company of the female sex.'<sup>25</sup> He speaks like a misogynist, but you cannot investigate him as such; the poet makes him say this merely because two formative strands of action—namely, responsibility for defence in the ruler, and shrill demoralising panic in the women—cross each other at that point. Hegio in Plautus spoke much less by contingency of the moment when he justified a harsh pronouncement of his own with the words—

neminis  
miserere certum est, quia mei miseret neminem.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, this spareness is often unstrained, self-respecting, and dignified. The characterisation can accomplish what it aims at, and here and there it achieves master-touches which a more sophisticated age would have missed. When Euripides bespeaks sympathy for Pentheus at the end of the *Bacchae*, he does so less by inventing, by calling up virtues hitherto undisclosed, than by presenting the old character from a different viewpoint. 'Who wrongs you, who treats you disrespectfully, grandfather?' (we learn that he had been wont to ask Cadmus)—

λέγ', ὡς κολλῶ τὸν ἀδικούντά σε.

The effect is one of unexpected subtlety.

So much for pioneering. Another feature is the special tie between tragedy and epic. A number of the epic heroes have fixed characteristics which the tragedian knows before he begins to dramatise at all and which he does not feel at liberty to cancel. They belong inalienably to the name, and recur in drama to this day—the warlike impetuous Ajax, for example, in the play on the Trojan War by Giraudoux. The most noted case is Odysseus, who has in fact led a life of his own all down the history of literature. The importance of these pre-existent characters can, however, be exaggerated. Drama which is willing to borrow them perfunctorily, as perhaps the *Rhesus* does, is seen to be less serious and compelling, less significantly tragic. The serious

<sup>22</sup> D. W. Lucas, *The Greek Tragic Poet*, p. 122.

<sup>23</sup> D. L. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, p. 142.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. D. W. Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>25</sup> *Septim* 187-8.

<sup>26</sup> *Captivi* 765.



tragedian still looks first to his action and conforms the character in the act of borrowing. Or how should we account for the contrasting versions of Odysseus in the *Ajax* and the *Philoctetes*, and of Teiresias in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* and the *Bacchae*? And the Aeschylean Agamemnon is designed for his play, if anyone ever was.

On a different plane, we must consider the effect of the tragic origins. It is thence, of course, that conventions such as the mask derive, and the poet was certainly cramped by these. He was not, however, as cramped as one might suppose, for in all forms of art the conventions can be made more or less vital at will, according to the spirit to be communicated. We have to ask how far tragic origins affected the spirit itself. Here we are in a notoriously controversial field, and I would not do more than suggest that the idea of functionaries in a rite may have been present, occasionally and dimly, to the poet's mind. If it was, this like other things would make him see his figures more as elements in a pattern, from a more external and fatalistic, and therefore less individualising viewpoint, than otherwise. Gilbert Murray wrote of characters in the *Bacchae*, 'One might just as well call them—the God, the Young King, the Old King, the Prophet'.<sup>27</sup> That is an exaggeration, but the personal qualities of these men may very well be partly tied to their ritual meaning, and this is one of the reasons why they are so different in 'feel' from, say, the Characters of Theophrastus. Most worth scrutiny is the effect on the tragic hero. The cynosure in the rite suffered, then triumphed, and the work of his suffering and triumph mattered more than his own attitude to them. Remotely, this may help to explain why Orestes in the *Eumenides* is himself a somewhat externally presented hero: his character is largely indifferent to the matter in hand. And perhaps, though in a still more remote way, the ritual notion of the victim rising to ultimate triumph colours the portrayal of Oedipus in the two plays by Sophocles.

Besides what derives from origins, numerous other elements in Greek religion disavow the *persona* from character as later understood. In Shakespearean tragedy the moral order of the universe does not arbitrarily dishevel the workings of the mind. There is still the sense of choice, of guilt as responsibility for choice made, and of proceeding to action with open eyes in the light of circumstance. But the Greek divine order, at any rate for dramatic purposes, violently tampers with the mind and its choices. If you are inclined to *ἄγασ* the daemon will decisively participate; it will spring upon your head or enclose you in a net which even the nimblest foot cannot overleap. Guilt may be an external *μίσημα* which gives a sense of defilement without a sense of sin. Oedipus's guilt is like that. And again you may move on the path of *ἀτή*, really or symbolically, without being able to give full account of yourself: why *did* Agamemnon yield and tread the purple carpet, and what exactly *could* he think the gesture meant?

Secular habits of thought and speech have likewise their bearing. There have been occasions in the history of drama, for example during the Renaissance, when the association between drama and rhetoric was more formal and academic than it was in Greek tragedy. In an Athens where politics, litigation and all forms of serious inquiry depended so much on putting and hearing the spoken case, it seemed rather a natural requirement of the situation than a matter of scholastic rule for the *personae* thus to argue the dramatic issue. Such debates were *οἷα ἄν γένοιτο*. It has been observed that the typical Shakespearean device of half-concealing, half-disclosing falsity or unsureness behind an impressive verbal façade is anticipated by Aeschylus and Sophocles—in the fulsome imagery of Clytemnestra welcoming Agamemnon or the pompous why and wherefore of Creon presenting his decree. This is finely done, but often, particularly in Euripides, we find that the speech-making hampers rather than helps the characterisation. Apart from crudities of technique such as blinking the limitations of logic, relying on deduction from questionable generalisations, and confusing mere word-play with points of substance, the personality of speakers repeatedly suffers from a restriction of attitude—the preference for simple black and white, the undervaluing of sincerity and compromise, and above all the conventional analysis of crime and passion in terms of the mere 'understanding'. If rhetorical speeches in Beaumont and Fletcher are primarily emotional,<sup>28</sup> in Euripides the engagement of the feelings and the self are largely set aside while the case is put: witness Medea, or the switch from Xuthus' near-staccato to the detached and gnomic exposition of Ion (Ion 582 ff.). It was in fact the playwright's absorption in the case and detachment from the personality which, at an extreme, made possible the occasional discussion of topics alien to the action.

These externalising influences, however, are weakening as time goes on, and are being counter-acted by advance in psychology. Thinkers are beginning to conceive of impulse and motive as things which may come from within. When Menelaus in the *Iphigenia in Aulis* is asked why he has been poking into Agamemnon's affairs, Euripides furnishes him with the answer—

ὅτι τὸ βούλεσθαι μ' ἐκνίξε.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> G. Murray, *Euripides and his Age*, p. 119.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. E. M. Waith, *The Pattern of Tragicomedy in Beaumont and Fletcher*, p. 170.

<sup>29</sup> I.A. 330.

To recognise impulse and motive as psychological matters is the first move towards successful introspection, and with that are opened to the tragedian the great new possibilities of drama in the mind—of a play whose action lies as much in the soul as in outward vicissitudes. Study of the *Innenleben* was carried farthest in the *Medea*, but how exceptional the realistic psychology of this play it can be seen by comparing *Medea* with *Pelagus* or *Prometheus*, or with the little sketch of a conflict in *Neoptolemus* at the opening of the *Philoctetes*.<sup>20</sup> Sophocles was in any case too attached to the heroic code of behaviour (which was largely a bequest from epic) to have been able to portray a *Medea*. And Euripides often falls short, of Sophocles as of much modern drama, in the matter of relating mental phases to the unitary ethos. Given a dramatic situation, he could visualise the mental operations it might induce—the Hippolytus-fixation in *Phaedra*, the conflict in *Medea*—but a play like the *Ion* makes us feel that he might have gone farther than he did towards the portrayal of one continuing mind in a character. The insight is there, but it is futile; and tragedy went into decline too soon for the human approximation which we find in the *persona* to be psychologically elaborated as a whole.

In this brief discussion I have attempted three things: first, to examine some common approaches to the subject and point out difficulties; second, to indicate what seems the right starting-point, namely, to see characterisation as something within the drama, as taking its rise in the action; and third, to touch upon a number of factors which affect the technique of the Greek tragedian and which, subject to underlying resemblances, distinguish his people from those depicted by the playwrights of other times. From all this there results a picture which is very far from neat and schematic. Yet satisfying as it might be to one's detective propensities and one's sense of form to say, 'Here was a cunning encipherment, but—open sesame—here is the key to it', we probably get farther by resisting the temptation to isolate and schematise. We have to remember the whole context and a multiplicity of circumstance and give, in that light, our best judgment on how these characters came to be.

C. GARTON.

King's College, Newcastle upon Tyne.

<sup>20</sup> I do not compare here the passage in the *Antigone* (904-20) which Jebb bracketed. It belongs to that point before the climax where dramatic technique always inter-

feres with ordinary psychology; it is a piece of subdued, dreamy syllogizing which before long fully gives place to lyric.

## INTERPRETATIONS OF SOME POEMS OF ALKAIOS AND SAPPHO

The authority of Mr. Lobel and of Professor Page on all that concerns the Greek lyric poets is so great, and we owe them so much, that their opinions and suggestions, especially when they are in agreement, may often, and not unreasonably, be taken at once for truth. Nevertheless, I think some of these opinions may be mistaken, especially in interpretation, and I am so bold as to express my doubts.<sup>1</sup>

### I. ALKAIOS

1. *Pittakos*. It is a favourite occupation of scholars to pass laws and regulations for the conduct of ancient Greeks, in all their activities but especially for society, as for the proper behaviour of young ladies or the nice observance of class distinctions—this latter the especial favourite of Englishmen and Prussians. Thus Sir Maurice Bowra allays our anxious fears for Sappho in her exile by assuring us that she went to Sicily "with her family" (*Greek Lyric Poetry*, 155); Wilamowitz made his well-known pronouncement, "Naiv ist vollends sich Perikles in menschlichem verkehr mit Phaidias zu denken, der gesellschaftlich und nach seiner bildung (einen hexameter konnte er nicht machen) ein βδαννοος war und blieb" (*Ar. u. Ath.* ii. 100; I wonder whether Kimon could compose hexameters?); and it is interesting to observe how, in his edition of Menander's *Epitrepontes*, after many warning notes on the proper behaviour of free men and slaves to each other, he is reduced to silence in the scene between Pamphile ('eine vornehme Frau') and Habrotonon (whom Pamphile 'would recognise for what she is by her dress'), in which each addresses the other at first, respectfully, γῆνα, and later, affectionately, φιλότητι. So in his turn Professor Page on the high birth of Pittakos (*S. and A.*, 159): he "associated on equal terms with men of noble family in Mytilene; he must therefore have been himself of high rank and respect. The common opinion that he was 'plebeian', and all that follows from that opinion, must be abandoned. The significance of the words ἀπώμενον and τῶν ἐταίρων (in 129 (G1), 14, 16) is clear enough: a party of noblemen formed a society, ἐταίρεα, sworn to achieve the overthrow of the rulers of Mytilene. It is incredible that a 'plebeian' would have been admitted to join that society or to take that oath".<sup>2</sup> Page combines this with a belief that Pittakos' father was a Thracian, nobly born of course, but a barbarian for all that, married to a noble lady of Mytilene. The evidence for the Thracian father is Diogenes Laertios, Soudas, and their like,<sup>3</sup> and is about as trustworthy as the evidence that Hyperbolos of Athens was a slave and his father not Greek. The evidence from Alkaios is as follows: (a) 72 (D14) (Page, 171), the poem which, after the description of a long and heavy drinking bout, goes on:

οὐδὲ τσαύτας ἐκγεγόνων ἔχηε  
τὴν δόξαν οἶαν ἄνδρες ἐλεύθεροι  
ἔσλων εἰστας ἐκ τοκήων  
[ ]

Page is clearly right that κῆνος . . . ἄνθρωπος of the previous stanza cannot be the same man as he who is addressed οὐδὲ in this one, and that the poem was at least as much about Pittakos' mother (if οὐδὲ is Pittakos, which is not quite certain, but highly probable) as about 'that man', and she therefore had been the subject (of abuse) in earlier stanzas; but, as clearly, wrong in supposing that κῆνος is her husband and Pittakos' father. (True, κῆνος drank unmixed wine in great quantities, and that is what Thracians were said to do; but not only Thracians.)<sup>4</sup> No one writes, 'Your father was a bad man and a drunkard; that is the sort of woman your mother was'; it must be *her* father who is κῆνος, and the whole poem, or the whole of this part of a yet longer poem,

<sup>1</sup> References are to Lobel and Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* ('L-P'), to Lobel's earlier editions of Sappho and Alkaios (*S. and A.*), and to Page, *Sappho and Alkaios* (Oxford, 1955) ('Page').

<sup>2</sup> Page, 170, n. 5, on the folksong, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄλλοι, καὶ γὰρ ἡλιθίους ἔδει, περὶ δὲ ἀνδράσιν ἰσοπαλοῦσιν, after disposing of certain fantastical interpretations, says that "grind" may be a metaphor for oppressive exaction of claims and penalties (ὅσοι τῶν ἀλλοίων μὴν, ἀλέουσι δὲ ἀνδράσιν). Perhaps; but hardly in this song. It means 'even Pittakos works hard, has chores to do, has no rest' (or, as Prof. Davison reminds me, 'used to work hard').

The Greeks know that a sovereign's lot was not always either easy or happy.

<sup>3</sup> See Page, 170, n. 8. He even thinks that the statement that Pittakos' father, Hyrraios, had been "king" (? = supreme magistrate) in Mytilene deserves respect, and at the same time that he was a Thracian.

There is the argument that the name Pittakos was known in Thrace in later times—*Thur.* iv. 107, 3.

<sup>4</sup> τὸ δὲ πῶς πατήρασ' ὁ πατήρ, v. 10 of this poem, is not in effect different from δὲ ὁ κῆνος τὸν κῆνον κέλεσθαι; ὁ κῆνος, 54b (L22), Alkaios' own banqueting, even though he did not drink his wine unmixed, but one and two.



will have been about Pittakos' mother and her ancestry (or, if about his father, then with a very different meaning; below, p. 257, n. 7):

(b) ■ (A6) (Page, 182). 13-14:

καὶ μὴ κατασχύνωμεν ἄνδρα  
ἔσθλοισι τότῃσι γὰρ ὕπα κε[ιμένας.]<sup>b</sup>

(c) 130 (G2) (Page, 198). 20-21:

τὸ πῦρ καὶ πατέρος πῦρ  
κυγγ[ε]γήρασ' ἔχοιτες πεδὺ τωιδέων  
τῶν [ἀ]λλαλοκάκων πολιτῶν,  
ἐγ[ων] ἂν τούτων ἀπεληλάμην.

(d) 70 (D12) (Page, 235). 6:

κῆρος δὲ παῖδες Ἀτρεΐδα [   
δαπτέτω πόλιν ὥς καὶ πεδὺ Μυρσίλῳ.

(e) 348 (Z24) (Page, 239):

τὸν κακοπατρίδαν  
Πίττακον πόλιος τῆς ἀρόλῳ καὶ βαρυδαίμονος  
ἐστάσαιτο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαίνεντες ἄλλοι.

(f) 296 (P2) (Page, 299, n. 1):

This is desperately difficult; but Page suggests a political interpretation: 'the city is lost, the best men are dead, and no effort can now prosper; but as for the man who has thus subdued the noble to the base, he deserves slaying'. For my argument the important words are ]δε τῶλα κακῶσιον, the meaning of which is reasonably certain, if a political meaning for the poem is correct.

In his discussion of the political events in Mytilene between c. 605 and 590 B.C. (pp. 171-7), Page has much to say that is wise, especially that the use of *dēmos* more than once in Alkaios does not prove that democratic ideas were at all involved in the struggle for power (Sparta had a *dēmos* with ultimate authority). But he goes far beyond the evidence when he asserts that only certain noble families, grouped in *ἐταίρειαι*, and certain individuals from among those families, were concerned in it—the former endeavouring to maintain the oligarchic constitution (which had been established when the exclusive privileges of one family, the Pentilidai, had been broken), and the individuals each striving for his own personal power, Pittakos being exceptional only in so far as, after obtaining power, he used it with more honesty and intelligence than had been expected; and that therefore the mass of the citizens, including those who, in contemporary Athens, would have been called *zeugētai* as well as *thētes*, had no concern with the *stasis* at all, except now and then, doubtless, as innocent victims. All that we know of Pittakos himself is that he commanded the Mytileneans in the war against Athens for Sigeion, in which Alkaios, almost certainly as a young man, served;<sup>a</sup> and that he worked with Alkaios and his *ἐταῖροι* for the overthrow of one 'tyrant', Myrsilos; then quarrelled with him, presumably over the way the aristocrats conducted affairs after the overthrow of Myrsilos. He was doubtless not of the humblest birth; he made himself *εἰς τῶν δυνατῶν* in the literal sense, 'influential', 'powerful'; he married into the house of the Pentilidai; but there is no evidence that he was from the narrow circle of noble families who would call themselves *εἰσπατρίδαι*. The evidence of Alkaios that he was *not* from this circle amounts of course to very little: it is abuse, and when he calls Pittakos *κακοπατρίδης* and the son of a Thracian (if he did; but it is most likely that this story comes from him) he probably means what Old Comedy means about its contemporaries, 'he is really the son of a slave; his reputed father is not his real

<sup>a</sup> In v. 10 *Πρόδρομος γὰρ μεγ[...]* Page mentions the common interpretation *ἀσθλῶν*, without comment. I find this difficult. The diminutive form is not found, apparently, elsewhere in Greek; Alkaios could easily have formed it himself; but in that case, in the first use of the word, the literal or the derivative meaning of the diminutive will have been intended, and felt by all hearers.

<sup>b</sup> I wish I could believe that Page had solved the difficulties of Herodotus' account of the Athenian wars about Sigeion, v. 93-5 (Page, 195-7). There is indeed no difficulty about *ἐσθλῶντος γὰρ ἔκ τῃ Ἀγέλλῳιον πόλεως ὁμηγερέων*, κ.τ.λ.; but that is not where the obscurity lies. That is in the first sentence, *Σίγειον, τὸ εἰς*

*Περσέωντος ἀρχῇσιν ἀπὸ Μυτιλήνης, κ.τ.λ.*, and the last, *Σίγειον μὲν τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἐγένετο ἐκ' Ἀθηναίων*. For *αἰτία* is the arbitration award of Perikles, after the wars in which Pittakos and Alkaios took part; but no one would suppose so when we have heard just above that it was Perikles who had won the place from Mytilene by the sword. We may easily suppose that Athens had lost it again some time after the arbitration; but Herodotus does not say so. I have sometimes thought that the city of 69 (D11), 'which Lydians helped us, by a large subsidy, to attack', might be Sigeion. Alkaios might either be reviving old memories or have attacked Pittakos at the time, for failing to take the place.)

father'.<sup>7</sup> But his words *ἐσθλὸν εἶναι ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς* 72 (D14), *ἐσθλὸς τόκος* ■ (A6), recall the Leipsydrian skolion, just as *τὸν κακοπατρίδαν* and *ἐστῆσαντο τύραννον* 348 (Z24) recall the song of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. More important, *μέγ' ἐπαίνεστες ἀλλήλους* 348 (Z24) and *τὰλα κἀκαίαι* 291 (P2) remind one at once of Solon and his poems, and not only of him, but of Theognis. Solon was a contemporary of Pittakos and Alkaios; there was undoubtedly a democratic movement, that is, one of the many, the poor, against the few rich, in Athens; and Solon led it and guided it. There had been, a generation earlier, quarrels in Athens between eupatrid families, and between the eupatrids in general and individuals amongst them, just as in Mytilene. There is no reason, as such, therefore, to suppose that there could not have been a democratic movement in Mytilene also not unlike that in Athens. Pittakos in later times had the same sort of reputation as a statesman that Solon had; the difference is that we cannot check it, as we can Solon's, by his own writings. He was probably *ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀσπῶν, μέσος πόλεως*, like Aristogeiton (Thuc. vi. 54. 2).<sup>8</sup>

2. *Thetis and Helen*. Two poems of Alkaios about Helen have survived, partially: the one 283 (N1; Page, 275) simple and direct, in the lyrical narrative style shown also in 298 (Q1, Ajax and Cassandra; Page, 283), and the small fragment, 44 (B12, Thetis and Achilles; Page, 281), the style which was later to be so superbly developed by the Greek poets.<sup>9</sup> The other is very different, 42 (B10; Page, 278), the comparison of Helen and Thetis:

ὡς λόγος, κάκων δ[ι]χος ἔνεκ' ἔργων  
Περράμω καὶ παῖσι ποτ'. ὦλεν, ἦλθεν  
ἐκ σέθεν πίκρον, π[ύρι] δ' ὥλεσε Ζεὺς  
ἴλιον ἱραν.

οὐ ταύταν Αἰετῖδα[ς] ἀγανὸς  
πάντας ἐς γάμον μάκ[υρας] καλέσσαι  
ἄγει' ἐκ Νή[ρ]ος θίων [μελάνθρων]  
πάρθενον ἄβραν

ἐς δόμον Χέρρωνος · ἐλ[ύ]σε δ' ἄγαν  
ζῶμα παρθένου · φιλό[τι]μος δ' ἔθαλε  
Πήλεος καὶ Νηρηϊδῶν ἀρίστ[ας],  
ἐς δ' ἐνίαυτον

παῖδα γέννατ' αἰμυθέων φέριστον  
ὀλβιον ξαίθην ἐλάτ[η]ρα πώλων.  
οἱ δ' ἀπώλουν' ἄμφ' Ἐ[λέ]ναι Φρύγες τε  
καὶ πόδες αὐτῶν.

(The supplements are those adopted by Page, some being his own suggestions, notably *ἔθαλε*, v. 10, *ὦλεν*, v. 2, = *ὦ Ἐλένα*. He translates ξαίθην 'bay'; surely 'chestnut'? φέριστον is not very happy, after ἀρίστ[ας].)

<sup>7</sup> I have suggested above that in 72 (D14) *κῆτος ὠνυρ* is not Pittakos' father, but his mother's father. It, however, I am right here about the origin of the report that he had a Thracian for father, then *κῆτος ὠνυρ* may be this Thracian—that is the sort of woman your mother was; she had a drunken Thracian servant for lover, and you are his son.

<sup>8</sup> It has been doubted by many whether Solon enfranchised the *hektes* with consequent membership of the *ekklesia* (see the discussion in Hignett, *Ath. Const.*, II, iv and v). I think that he did. What made the difference, in the citizen-body, between Athens and some other states, as Sparta and Thebes permanently and Argos intermittently, was that in Athens all the 'autochthonous' were full citizens; in Argos, for example, when a 'democracy' was established, as after Sepeis, it was done by the enfranchisement of those who were called *perioikoi* by their friends and *doioi* by their enemies (see A. Diamantopoulos' paper in this *Journal*, above, pp. 222 and 224). This kind of change did not occur in Athens after Solon (not even, perhaps, in 411 B.C.; see de Ste. Croix, *Histoire*, v. (1956), 1-23); the difference is so important, so fundamental, that the tradition ascribing it to Solon is likely to be sound, and should be trusted. It is more likely than not that if Periklitos had thus changed the basis of the citizenship, it would have been

recorded. This seems to me a better argument than Hignett's that 'such a bold experiment seems alien to the cautious conservative temperament of Solon' (p. 98); the *seisachthia* was a much bolder measure, for powerful noblemen do not like confiscation. Hignett's further suggestion that, though not yet enfranchised (in this sense), many *hektes*, in the troubled times after Solon's legislation, managed to attend meetings of the *ekklesia* without any justification, cannot be disproved; but it looks like the kind of guess that it is idle to make.

<sup>9</sup> In vv. 4-6, of 283

Τραῖν δ' [ὁ]τ' ἀνδρὸς  
ἀκράνεια ἐλ[ύ]σαντο π[ρὸ]ς ἀλ[λ]ήλους  
ἔπειτα καὶ,

Page expresses a slight preference for *ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς* over *ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν* because 'it has the considerable merit' of not requiring emendation (to *ἐναντία*, as well as to the easier *Τραῖν*), and 'it has no demerits, except that *ἐπὶ* with the genitive is less commonly used with *μαρτυρεῖν*'. A graver objection is that a Greek, describing someone maddened for love, would say maddened by a god, not by the object of his passion, by Aphrodite, or Eros, or Pathos or Himeros: *ὅτ' ἐλ[ύ]σε Φρυγῆς, or αἰμυθέων* *ἰμερῶ ἀκρανεία*, rather than *ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς*.

Two things are notable about this strange poem. To take the less important first: why is the comparison made with Thetis? Helen was the bad wife; but Thetis was not obviously the good one. In Homer the assumption is that she left Peleus almost as soon as Achilles was born, and never lived with him again, but with her father Nereus and her forty-nine sisters. She was a loving mother; but she did not look after her husband. Why not Penelope? or if her example was too trite in this connexion, there were other good wives.

The other strikes deeper. "The poem", says Page, "is not inspired by the simple joy of story-telling. It is brief and allusive, and it has a purpose—the lesson to be learnt from the contrast of the two heroines. Helen brought ruin upon all around her; Thetis was happy, and had a brave and honourable son; that son, we are expected to remember, was the instrument of the doom which Helen brought on Troy . . ." a "moral judgement is being passed" (so p. 278, on 283 (N1)). Thetis happy? What strange memory of Homer is this? On the morrow of the great victory over the Trojans and her son's personal triumph, Zeus thus addresses her (Il. xxiv, 104):

ἤλυθες Οὐλύμπονδε, θεὰ Θέτι, κηδομένη περ,  
πένθος ὀλισσυνὶ ἔχουσα μετὰ φρεσὶν - οἶδα καὶ αὐτός.

But there is no need to quote. Achilles, "we are expected to remember, was the instrument" of the doom of Troy; Achilles, *παναίριος*, destined to be killed—by Paris—before ever Troy was taken. οἱ δ' ἀπώλοντ' ἀμφ' Ἑλένῃ Φρύγες τε καὶ πόλις αἴτων, said Alkaios, apparently forgetting that the Greeks suffered too—*Od.* iii. 102 ff., for example; and as he himself had written in the other song about Helen (283).<sup>10</sup> It is as if someone were to write a brief but very serious poem with *Hamlet* in mind, and the moral, 'Claudius did wrong to murder his brother, and Gertrude did wrong when she married him so soon; and you see they were both killed'.

"There was something in Helen's story", says Bowra (*G.L.P.*, 179), "which Greek morality found distasteful." Was there indeed? Page thinks that Stesichoros' *Ἑλένης κακῆγορία* may have been known to Alkaios; and that "we can see, but cannot estimate, the general probability that this poem was written by a man who had in mind the *Adiuvē of Helen*". And Alkaios' purpose was to introduce this novel idea from the west to the old-established and old-fashioned society of Aegean Greece? Says Bowra, "it looks rather as if Alcaeus were contradicting the Homeric account of Helen, and his disagreement represented a real break in the aristocratic tradition". *Homer* gives to Helen the words

Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής,  
ὥς μ' ἄγαγε Τροίηνδ' - ὥς πρὶν ὠφέλλον ἀλέσθαι.

It seems that, to explain the writing of this poem at all, we must go back to Jurenka's view (or to something like it) that it was intended for a symposium, or some such gathering, and sung in answer to another poem in praise—conventional praise—of Helen's beauty (somewhat like Sappho 16), though not, of course, with the opening words *ὥς λόγος* and *κακῶν* referring to what that other poem had said or echoing its words; rather, 'the story is that from your evil deeds, Helen', and so on. That gives it some point, at least an occasion, and explains its extreme, un-Homeric, lightness of touch.

## II. SAPPHO

### 1. FRG. 5 and 15:

Κύπρι καὶ Νηρηίδες, ἀβλάβη[ν μοι  
τὸν καὶ] γνητὸν δ[ό]τε τυῖδ' ἱκευθα[ι  
κῶσσα F]οι θυμῷ κε θέλη γένεσθαι  
πάντα τε[λέσθην.

κ.τ.λ.

and

Κύπρι κα[ί] σ[ε] πι[κροτέρ]ων ἐπεύ[ρο]ι,  
μηδ' ἐκ καυχᾶσ[α]ιτο τόδ' ἐνε[ποι]σα  
Δ[ω]ρίχ[α], τὸ δ' αὖτ[ε]ρον ὥς πόθε[ρον]  
εἶς} ἔρον ἦλθε.

It is extraordinary what conclusions men have rushed to after reading this simple poem. It is easy to make fun of Weir Smyth and Bowra, and Professor Page duly makes fun; but his own interpretation is as far from Sappho's poem as theirs (pp. 50-1): "it was not the fact [that her

<sup>10</sup> Page says in his note on 283, vv. 17-18: "if Achilles was named he was presumably said to have indulged in slaughter (φόνου(1))". Or to have been laid low 'in

death'? Perhaps αἶτο; Ἀ[χιλλεύ]ες, if that is not too long for the space?



brother kept a mistress in Egypt) but the extravagance of the liaison which aroused her fury. Her brother had beggared himself for the sake of his Doricha, bringing contempt and ridicule upon himself and—partly at least because Sappho spread the news so far—upon the family. . . . It appears that she was prepared to forgive and forget; but when her brother declined the proffered reconciliation, she used the weapon which lay ready to her hand: πολλὰ κατεκροτόμησέ μιν [Hdt.; see below], she wrote a poem in which her brother was exposed to a 'great deal of downright ridicule'. There is nothing unnatural in her conduct, and nothing more reprehensible than a want of discretion and good temper".<sup>11</sup> What in fact have we? 'Cyprian and Nereids, grant my brother a safe return' (safe from the perils of a sea-journey); 'grant that he have all that he wishes, that he atone for his past mistakes, and prove a joy to his friends and a bane to his enemies, and may we have no more enemies', and (perhaps) 'may he give honour to his sister'; and again 'I pray, Cyprian, that thou release him' (or, better, us) 'from sorrows'. There, perhaps, this poem ends, and fr. 15 is from another, with several lost stanzas before it: 'be more bitter [or, very bitter], Cyprian, with Doricha: do not let her boast that he has returned to her love'. There is nothing (in what we have left to us) about extravagance—nothing about money at all—or about the ridicule which Charaxos brought on himself, nor of Sappho forgiving and forgetting, or of his refusing to be reconciled; and how anyone, in a comment on these lines, can speak of "her fury" is beyond comprehension. But, we are told (p. 51, n. 1), "the tradition is uniform on this point [that it was the money that mattered] and there is little room for doubt that the common source was Sappho's text; *ἐλθεῖν χρημάτων πολλῶν*, Herodotus (ii. 134-5); *πλεῖστα κατεδαπάνησεν*, P. Oxy. (xv. 1800, i. 7); *factus inops*, the Ovidian epistle (xv. 63 ff.); *πολλὰ ἰσχυρισμένην*, Athenaeus (xiii. 596 B.C.)". But Herodotus does not connect the large sum that Charaxos had to pay to free Doricha (which of course all went to her former master, not to her) with Sappho's poem, but with a lot of other things—her date, her early days (when she was fellow-slave with Aesop), her coming to Egypt with one Xanthos the Samian, her great success as *demi-mondaine* after Charaxos had returned to Mytilene and her consequent wealth ('but only comparative wealth, as shown by her dedication of a tenth of her fortune at Delphi: a dedication to be seen to this day'). How much of that did Herodotus get from Sappho?—he did not even get the name Rhodopis; and though Strabo tells us Doricha and Rhodopis were the same person, Athenaios accuses Herodotus of confusing two quite distinct hetairai. Strabo (xvii. 33, p. 808) says that Charaxos went to Naukratis with a cargo of wine for trade (so much for the family of "noble birth and high fashion"), and there met Doricha: ἄλλοι δ' ὀνομάζουσιν Ποδῶπιν· μυθεύουσι δέ, κ.τ.λ. (the Cinderella story of the slipper and how she came to marry the King of Egypt). It is obvious that there were many stories told about her, and the authors of the little biography of Sappho in P. Oxy. xv and of the Ovidian epistle could have got their details from other sources than her own poems. Only Athenaios says that she attacked Doricha for making a lot of money out of Charaxos, as she probably did; Herodotus says only that she taunted him. If we like we could guess at another cause for the mockery; if Herodotus is right that Rhodopis flourished in the reign of Amasis, that is, in the years after 570 B.C., if we are right in putting Sappho's birth c. 620, and if Charaxos was her eldest brother (P. Oxy.), then she and he were at least in their fifties when he got entangled with Doricha, and she may, in the lost stanzas, for all we know, have mocked him and his white hairs, as Anakreon laughed at his own;<sup>12</sup> but it is better to take warning from the past and not guess, but confine ourselves to what we can read. Sappho's fr. 15 is at any rate not fierce, and it was the last stanza of the poem.

## 2. Fr. 105(a):

οἷον τὸ γλυνκύμαλον ἐρεύθεται ἄκρῳ ἐπ' ἰσθμῷ,  
ἄκρον ἐπ' ἰκροτάτῳ, λελάθαντο δὲ μαλοδρόπης,  
οὐ μὲν ἐκλελάνθοντ', ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐδύναντ' ἐπίκεσθαι.

<sup>11</sup> Page quotes with approval Mure's judgement (*Critical History*, iii. 297-8): "Were the brother of a modern lady of noble birth and high fashion to select as his paramour a beautiful prostitute of the lowest order; were he to provide her with a handsome establishment, provide her in public [in Egypt, several days' journey from Mytilene!], and waste the family estate in ministering to her follies and vices, his sister would hardly be precluded", etc. The italics are mine, and they show that Mure could be as inventive with none of Sappho's words in front of him, as Bowra and Page with a knowledge of some of them.

<sup>12</sup> Herodotus' words, ii. 135. 5, *ἐν μάλιστα Σαπφῶ πολλὰ κατεκροτόμησέ μιν*, suggest to me that he only knew of one poem of Sappho's about Charaxos and Doricha—Rhodopis; in which case presumably frs. 3 and 15 belong to one poem—but it would be a very long one.

<sup>13</sup> Fr. 5 (Dick). I do not believe that those (Bowra

and Page, p. 143, n. 3, among them) are right who see an allusion to 'lesbian' love in this poem,

ἢ δ', ἐστὶν γὰρ ἄν' ἐκείτῳ  
ἰσθμοῦ, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ στήθεϊ,  
λευκὴ γὰρ, κατωμύφεται,  
πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινα χέσεται.

Alas, is only feminine because *σῶμα* is—how else can one take it? And why should Anakreon say that he was scorned for his white hair, if he was only scorned because he was a man? ἄν' ἐκείτῳ ἰσθμῷ does only mean that she put on airs, as one who could pick and choose her men. Speakers of English, unfamiliar with gender-inflections, think to find meanings of which no native speaker would be aware. (This view of the poem would be practically certain if Page were right—p. 143—that the ancient world did not name this perversion from Lesbos; but in fact I doubt that, cf. Ar. *Wasps*, 1346).

Even these lovely and (one would have thought) simple lines have been forced by an unreal and tasteless interpretation. "The context is given by Himerius (*Or.* i. 16)", says Page (121, n. 3): "the girl, like the apple, remains intact despite the zeal of her pursuers". Himerios, for what he is worth, only says that the girl compared to the apple is a bride (and that her bridegroom had been likened to Achilles); the lines are therefore from an epithalamion; but it is not usual to remain a bride, and her husband, on their wedding day, of the number of her past suitors, nor of the fact that she has succeeded in remaining a virgin; and, if some perverse wit did want to do that, he would avoid even the hint that she preserved her virtue only because her suitors forgot her. These lines are a simple case of a simile carried beyond the immediate purpose of comparison, for its own sake, a practice common in Sappho and Alkaios, as Page notes (e.g. p. 95 on fr. 96 of Sappho), and in Homer and other poets. The practice shows too that Weir Smyth's dictum, approved by Page (*Alcman*, p. 160), that descriptions of nature in Greek poetry always serve an ulterior purpose, needs considerable qualification.

If it be said that Sappho did allow herself, at times, some crude humour in her epithalamia (or in marriage songs of some sort), as in fr. 110, the answer is clear: she did not mix her poems, any more than Aeschylus mixed satyr-play (fr. 180) with tragedy or Shakespeare Falstaff (or Cloten) with 'Fear no more the heat of the sun'. Note what Demetrios said of fr. 110: ἄλλως δὲ σκώπτει τὸν ἀγροίκον γάμψιον καὶ τὸν θυρωρὸν τὸν ἐν τοῖς γάμοις εὐτελέστατα καὶ ἐν πελοῖς δόμοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ποιητικοῖς and compare it with 105.

Nor, I am sure are the lines (probably, but not certainly, Sappho's),

οἶαι τὰς ὑβανθῶν ἐν ᾠρεσι ποίμενες ἄδρες  
πᾶσαι καταστειβούσαι χάμμι δέ τε πόρφυρον αἶθος (105c)

more than, at most, a description of a girl betrayed and forsaken (and so perhaps not from an epithalamion): as Page shows in his commentary on fr. 31 (φαίνεται μοι κῆπος), too much reliance should not be placed on Catullus' adaptations of Sappho (even if his lxii is one)

### 3. Fr. 94:

τεθνήκην δ' ἀδόλως θέλω  
ἢ με ψισδομένα κατελίσσεται  
πόλλα καὶ τόδ' ἐπει[έ] μοι (?)  
ὦμ' ὡς δεῖνα πεποιθήμεν, κ.τ.λ.

Surely Schubart was right in suggesting, as he once did, that the first line was spoken by the girl who is leaving (see Page, 82, n. 2); it is not Sappho speaking of her *present* despair by contrast with the comforting words she used to her companion (vv. 6-20, the rest of the poem), as Page understands it. It is she, not Sappho, who is weeping and in despair. Cf. Schadewaldt, *Sappho*, 116: "das schluchzende Mädchen, das die Trennung so schrecklich ankommt, und ihr gegenüber Sappho selbst, ruhig, gefasst" (yet he gives Sappho as the subject of line 1). This is clearer if, as Page suggests we should do, we mark a pause at the end of v. 2, so that v. 3 will mean 'this too she often said to me'. If, with this interpretation, ἢ at the beginning of v. 2 surprises a little, it is not so surprising as the absence of connective if the subject of θέλω is Sappho; cf. v. 6. τὰν δ' ἔγωγ' αὖτ' ἀμειβόμεν.

### 4. Fr. 99:

Page has a very grave discussion of S. 99 and so of the problem whether Sappho used the word ὀλισβας in one of her poems (p. 145), though (1) all the letters are uncertain, the *lambda*, to judge from the plate in *Ox. Pap.* xxi (2291), in particular being improbable, and Lobel reporting that *alpha* is as likely as any other vowel after the *beta*; (2) with the letters restored as Page thinks they must be, the line cannot, as far as I can see, be given any intelligible meaning: ὀλισβ. δοκοῖσι περικαθ. . . . νος, after χόρδαισι διακρέκην σι χόρδαισι' ἴδια κρέκην, almost the only intelligible words preserved in this poem, immediately preceding (one notes that in the index to *L.-P.* ὀλισβο- and περικαθ- are included, but not δοκοῖσι, and no wonder); and (3) it is uncertain whether the poem is by Sappho or Alkaios (since it is in Aeolic and in lyric metre, it is presumably one or other of them). This is important, for Page writes, "I ought to add that it is not outside the bounds of possibility that the author is Alcaeus. . . . But the evidence tells against the supposition (see *P. Oxy.* xxi, p. 10), and I do not reckon with it seriously". But when we look at Lobel's judicious words in *P. Oxy.*, we read, "Aeolic verses in stanzas of three lines are naturally attributed to Sappho, since we know of no poems of Alcaeus so composed, but too little is legible of what was contained in the papyrus . . . for the hypothesis to be either confirmed or disproved". And "there are *prima facie* parts of three pieces", the first including the line under discussion; that is written, it seems, in two-line stanzas, with alternate long and short lines; the other two are in three-line stanzas (and we must assume an error in the MS. at that). No poem, I believe, by Sappho is for certain written in the



metre of the first, nor, for that matter, in that of the other two; see Page, 320. That is, both metres are unexampled in Sappho; and they are therefore as likely to belong to Alkaios. From the evidence of his other poems compared with Sappho's, from the little that remains, e.g. 72 (D14) and 129 (G1). 21, it is more likely that Alkaios would use  $\delta\lambda\iota\sigma\beta\omicron$ - ( $\delta\lambda\iota\sigma\beta\omicron\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\iota$ ?), if either of them did;<sup>14</sup> and the only two lines of the papyrus of which, perhaps, sense can be made, 23-24, from the second poem,

δηῦτε [Πω]λύ[αν]ακρίδαν  
τὸν μάργον δὲ[δ]εῖξαι θέλω.

look much more like his work than Sappho's, even though she is said to have reproached a girl from this family for deserting her (fr. 155). Contrast the manner of her reproaches in 5 and 15, above.

### III. SAPPHO'S USE OF DIALECT

In his introduction to *Δμ.*, to the care and precision of which we are all so much indebted, on pp. xviii-xx Mr. Lobel lays down certain rules for, or makes generalisations about, 'vernacular' and 'artificial', 'literary' languages: "A vernacular or spoken, as contrasted with a literary, dialect has in principle one way and no more of expressing one meaning." This is a proposition which I would dispute with regard to *any* particular vernacular (whatever a vernacular "in principle" may do). "If we find ourselves confronted with a body of writing . . . in which . . . we detect a constant tendency to employ the same form of expression to correspond to the same meaning or function, we shall have a *prima facie* case for assuming that such a body of writing represents some vernacular, or at any rate approaches much more nearly to a vernacular than to a literary language, of which in Greek at least a salient characteristic is the employment of variety of forms with no difference of meaning or function." With this statement we would all agree in so far as it is contrasting the language of Alkaios and Sappho with that of Homer or of Pindar; but when Lobel goes on to say, preparatory to the *comparison between Alkaios and Sappho*, both of them writers who use the same dialect, that "if an author habitually tends to employ alternative forms . . . with no perceptible difference of meaning or function, the reasonable inference is that his linguistic usage is to that extent artificial and literary, and conversely, if an author displays on the whole a regular tendency to employ the same form to correspond to the same meaning or function, the reasonable inference will be that his linguistic usage on the whole exemplifies a normal speech", then doubts will appear about the justness of these inferences.

Lobel gives as examples (pp. xxi-xxii)

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \gamma\tilde{\alpha} \\ \gamma\alpha\tilde{\alpha} \end{array} \right\} : \gamma\tilde{\alpha} \text{ and } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \pi\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota} \\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho \end{array} \right\} : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \pi\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota} \text{ (before a consonant)} \\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho \text{ (before a consonant)} \end{array} \right\};$$

of which, in the first case, the doublet is found only in Alkaios, and the form common to both,  $\gamma\tilde{\alpha}$ , alone is found in Sappho, and in the second case, the doublet is found in both poets. "We should infer", he says, "(apart from other arguments or other knowledge) that the common term, represented in this instance by  $\gamma\tilde{\alpha}$ , was true Lesbian and that represented by  $\gamma\alpha\tilde{\alpha}$  something else"; and, in the second case, with both forms used indifferently by both poets, "that both forms were genuine Lesbian, since that is more probable than that the same poet should admit both  $\pi\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$  and  $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho$  but not admit both  $\gamma\tilde{\alpha}$  and  $\gamma\alpha\tilde{\alpha}$  if there were no difference in nature between the two couples". I am not certain what meaning Lobel here attaches to the phrase "true Lesbian": if he means 'historically true', i.e. that at a time earlier than Alkaios and Sappho  $\gamma\tilde{\alpha}$  was the only form known in Lesbos and  $\gamma\alpha\tilde{\alpha}$  had been introduced, perhaps recently introduced, from elsewhere, I am not prepared to dispute it; but if he means by 'true Lesbian', as he appears to do, for only so is his argument logical, 'the Lesbian commonly spoken by educated Lesbians in the time of the two poets', I would dispute the inference. I believe, on the contrary, that Alkaios with his greater freedom of usage, in vocabulary as well as in form, writes (as far as any poet does) in a manner nearer to the spoken tongue, and that Sappho (in her 'normal' poems) is farther from it. For there never has been a vernacular, a spoken dialect, which has not admitted variety of forms and words, but there have been poets who have imposed on themselves a stricter rule than their contemporary vernacular demanded.

This is not just a matter of words—of the proper meaning to be given to 'vernacular'. It is a commonplace that students of modern dialects, wishing to confirm the use of a word or form in a particular district, find it difficult to discover it from a native of the district, because the latter

<sup>14</sup> As Dr. Wackernagel pointed out to me, this is just the sort of rare word that would have been recorded by the lexicographers if it had been used in Aeolic poetry.



will use the 'standard' form to a stranger, not necessarily from shyness or respect, but because it will come quite naturally to him to use the 'standard' form to any stranger, and the dialect form only to a neighbour (and not always to him—both forms or words will be used in the vernacular). Mr. Lobel will probably reply, 'Just so; the two forms, though not dissimilar in meaning, are dissimilar in function'. But if a poet arise in the district, a poet familiar with the local speech and using it in his verse, what will he do? Use both forms, as his neighbours do, or only the dialect form because it is 'true' to the dialect? If he uses both, he is writing more freely, more in accordance with the vernacular, the normal speech with which he has grown up; if he uses only the dialect form, he is, for a particular purpose, deliberately restricting himself.<sup>10</sup> Or consider a different kind of variety—a 'poetical' form: it has been for generations the convention in English poetry to pronounce *wind* (the noun) to rhyme with *mind*, *kind*, etc.—for metrical reasons, but also, incidentally, in metrically indifferent positions ('the stormy winds do blow'); supposing some modern poet, determined to be modern and to break with the convention, regularly rhymed it with *hind*'d, *ginn*'d, *Ind*, *pim*'d, *sim*'d (and *Sind*) and *tinn*'d, never with *kind*. Is he writing in the vernacular, or is he more artificial than his fellows? At least, his choice is deliberate, he is imposing a rule on himself; his metric is to that extent artificial, he is not writing in what has become the natural manner of other poets.

I would compare the practice of the Lesbian poets with that of Burns. I shall at once be told that there can be no true comparison, because circumstances were so different; there was a standard English in Burns' time, used by almost all Scottish writers since William Drummond as well as by English ones, and no such standard Greek in Sappho's; the only *koine*, if it was already a *koine*, was the 'artificial' dialect of the epic, a purely literary language. Nevertheless I believe the comparison to be a useful one. Burns was born a peasant, he was from Ayrshire, his dialect came naturally to him (though he was far from confining himself to the local dialect). He left school when he was 13. He wrote both 'normal' and 'abnormal' poems, to use Lobel's distinction between two classes of Sappho's poetry, the one in dialect, the other in standard English. (We happen to know of him that he used the latter in his private letters and his diary, whenever in fact he wrote in prose; and when he first went to Edinburgh at the age of 21, already well known as a poet, the doctors and professors of the city were surprised at the 'purity' of his speech—'purity' meaning closeness to standard English.) In his dialect poems he frequently uses a variety both of form and of vocabulary: in, for example, *Death and Dr. Hornbook* he has both *ditch* and *shaugh* without difference of meaning, both *plew*, rhyming with 'new', 'true', 'grow', and *pleugh*, rhyming with 'laugh', 'eneugh' and 'slough'; *Lament for Glencairn*, a dialect poem, begins

Ye scattered birds that faintly sing,  
The reliques of the vernal quire!

where *vernal quire*, even if not contradicting any 'rule' of Scottish dialect, is yet a literary reminiscence, not a vernacular expression; and for this poem Burns wrote a short dedicatory ode to Sir John Whiteford in standard English, because that was proper to this kind of poem. Even in *Tam o' Shanter* he addresses his Muse. Now we may say, if we like, that the word *ditch* and the form *plew* are 'alien' to the 'true' Ayrshire (or Scottish) dialect, that they are 'corruptions of it', introduced from outside. They may have come from one of three sources, or from a combination of them: by contact with neighbours, direct or indirect, from school learning, or from Burns' own reading of English poetry; and the important thing to note is that, in the first two cases, they will be common to Burns and his fellows, that is, the variety will already exist, may have long existed, in the vernacular. All these factors were present in Lesbos at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.: the island was not isolated from the rest of the Greek world (*Chios* is a close neighbour), Sappho and Alkaios went to school, with their fellows, where they will have listened to much poetry, especially Homer, and each read, or heard, poetry, especially Homer, for himself; so that there would, we can confidently infer, already exist 'alien' elements in the spoken vernacular, and both poets will not only consciously recall Homer by their language, but will have been unconsciously influenced by all that they had learned. Hence both *ἀντα* and *στρίσις* in Lesbian with perhaps no difference of meaning,<sup>11</sup> both *πλῆος* (Alk. 2. 22) and *πλήρης* (S. 154), *ἀστρο* and

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Lobel's own summary on synecphorosis in Sappho and Alkaios, Ep. lxiiv, which implies (if I have understood him rightly) that the former used, more often than Alkaios, the metrical licence of a vernacular, of common usage.

<sup>11</sup> Lobel insisted that *στρίσις* in Alk. 326 (Z2): *ἀνταστρίσις τῶν ἀστροῦ στεφάνη* must mean 'the set of the winds, because *ἀντα* was Lesbian for 'quarrel' (can we even imagine any group of Greeks with only one word for 'quarrel'?). and adds an argument that is unworthy of

him, when he says that Alkaios can hardly have said 'I do not understand the quarrel of the winds' because the next two lines show that he did. Page, 187, admits either 'the strife' or 'the quarrel in which the wind lies', for *στρίσις* here, for it clearly means 'strife' in 130 (G2). 26 Page, 194, 206).

In passage: *ἀνταστρίσις* belongs to a class of verbs formed from negative adjectives in -ο; which are rare in classical Greek: some are found, but rarely, especially in verse, as *δωμνῶ ἀτλητῶ*, Soph. O.T. 515, is a notable

ἄστερες,<sup>11</sup> and γὰ and γαῖα, εἶπε and εἶπον (Page, 77), περί and πέρ (and πέρρ, Page, 928), πόρ and once παρό in Alkaios, δὲδ and ζέ; also, Ψαπφώ and Σαπφώ; some of these alternatives may be 'poetical', as *ne'er* and *never* in English (including the English of Burns in dialect poems). It is perhaps irregularities which are, on our present evidence, unique like παρὰ, καὶ shortened before a vowel, φαρξώμεθα, τοιαύτας,<sup>12</sup> διοχέλιος in Alkaios, ὄπλοισι in Sappho (perhaps: see below), most remarkable of all, the position of κε in Sappho, 5, 3, and a good many others (cf. Page, 172, on Alk. 72, 7-8 (hiatus) and 10, πατάσσκε) which are particularly significant; they may represent a change which was taking place in spoken Lesbian in the lifetime of the two poets, and their greater rarity in Sappho (as far as our not very abundant evidence suggests) may show only that she was the stricter, or simply the more conservative of the two, Alkaios the readier to accept the contemporary vernacular. Some of these rare forms, having a metrical usefulness, may indeed be due to the influence of Homer, but to his influence on the Lesbian vernacular (through education and reading), not just to conscious artifice in borrowing; others will be due to neighbouring speakers of Ionic. A parallel will then be found, probably, in metrical varieties in Elizabethan drama:

Report of fashions in proud Italy,  
Whose manners still our tardy apish nation  
Limps after, in base imitation.

(Richard II, ii. 1, 21-3.)

and in the scanning, théâtre and théâtre, representing changes before the pronunciation of these words borrowed from the French had been settled. There is no reason to suppose that réos for réos (both forms found in Alkaios, only réos in Sappho), ἐπίσω for ὑπίσω, μέσος for μέσος, are not of the same kind, though an individual borrowing from epic is not excluded. But direct borrowing from epic is seen much more clearly in phrases, like χρύσιον ἦλθεν ἄρμ' ἐπασσέμεν (S. 1, 8-9), θάλασσαν ἐπ' ὀλύναν (S. 96, 10), φίλοι τόκῃς (S. 16, 10), and εἰστρωτον λήχος (Alk. 283, N 1, 8); and words, such as ἀργέντος (S. 96: Page, 89), ἐπὶβροτος, βροδοδάκτυλος, λαθικάδεος (Page, 308), \*Ἔρος λυσιμέλης (S. 130: Page, 136, 3), have an epic flavour (see Page, 38 and 208); so also has ποικιλόθροος, even though it could not itself be found in epic verse. They are like Burns' "vernal quire". Just as easily may Sappho use a form or word from an alien dialect or speech, as ὀλύναν or ἔρπῃς (141), whether that was already in the vernacular or not. There is, says Page, "nothing paradoxical" in the admission of epic words and forms in those of Sappho's 'abnormal' poems which are in dactylic verse, nor similarly in Alkaios (or Archilochos or Anakreon: see pp. 35-6, 278). Nothing indeed; but are we to suppose that such a practice can have had no influence on their other verse?

If then Sappho is stricter in her use of words and their forms than Alkaios, it is because she is less true to the spoken vernacular. From this an important consequence follows. She has imposed this strictness on herself, she has made her own rules; and, that being so, she is allowed to break them, or even alter them. Language is not a rigid thing; it goes on changing, not only from time to time, but from place to place and class to class, with mutual influence. And poets experiment with words; a word or a form which Sappho denied herself in her earlier years, she may have allowed herself later, the more easily since she was already using them in her 'abnormal' poems. Or vice versa, what she had allowed in her youth, she may have denied herself in her maturity. Therefore, though it is above all things right for us to be as rigid as we can be in restoring lost words (as Lobel has so well shown), it is wrong in principle to emend, or attempt a forced and unnatural meaning on, a word which is otherwise correct, and is only 'wrong' in that its form or its meaning is not elsewhere for certain found in the poet's surviving works, or another form or word is found without change of meaning or function, especially if it is a word or a usage in Sappho that can be paralleled in Alkaios: she too may be taking what was, if we like to call it so, the easier path, a liberty. In Sappho 16, 19-20 we have ἢ τὰ Λύδων ἄρματα κὰν ὄπλοισι | [πρόδομ]άχοντας. As Page says (p. 34), there is no objection to this except the metrical eccentricity, ὄπλοισι (Lobel tried to persuade himself that, as well, hoplites in armour are an anticlimax after Lydian chariots); that is unique in the 'normal' poems at present, and Page's emendation καὶ

instance, perhaps first used by Sophocles. If Alkaios was the first to use ἀνερπηγμῇ, as he may well have been, he meant more than 'I do not know' ('I cannot tell where the wind lies', Page); something more like 'I am stupid about'.

<sup>11</sup> There is no means of determining the distinction of meaning in Sappho. Page, 90. There is, of course, no distinction: cf. fr. 34 and 96.

<sup>12</sup> F.G. 17. This is the solitary instance in which -α- in the words which correspond to Attic τοιοῦτος, τοιαύτη, i.e. τοιοῦτος, τοιαύτη, etc., is not reduced. Lobel, *Alp.* lvi, says: "that τε- here simply represents the pro-

nunciation of το- reduced before a vowel of -ο- quality, and has nothing in common with forms like the Cretan ὅτείν containing -τε- for -το-, is shown by the exception . . . τοιαύτας: for if τοιαύτας were the form from which τοιοῦτος was reduced, τοιοῦτες should reappear when the reduction was neglected". So it should, if we suppose a static language; but by 600 B.C. it is possible that τοιαύτας, though original Lesbian, was already archaic, τοιοῦτος normal usage, and τοιαύτας beginning to be used (by influence from Ionic), and Alkaios ready to experiment.



*παρόπλοισ* is ingenious and attractive; but since the papyrus reading is unobjectionable except for a scansion with which Sappho was familiar in Homer, and which she used freely in her dactylic poems (e.g. in 105), it is scarcely justified. Much clearer is the case of Sappho 1. 23-24, αὖ δὲ μὴ φίλα, ταχέως φύγησι | καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοισα. Because elsewhere in the Lesbians we have only θέλω (for certain),<sup>12</sup> never ἐθέλω, Lobel in *Lx.* read καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοισα, thereby, as Page, 11, says, "expelling one anomaly by admitting another", for οὐκ also is not found in the Lesbians (though Sappho might have borrowed it from Homer as easily as she could ἐθέλω); more disastrously, οὐκ has a forceful, almost rhetorical sense foreign to Sappho's manner. Lobel also suggested (*Lx.* biii-iv) καὶ κε θέλοισα (see, too, *L.-P.*, app. crit.). "however strange it may appear". Strange indeed; and what does "strange" mean but that we are offered something 'anomalous' not only in Lesbian but in all Greek? Page goes farther, in effect; by a forced interpretation of φύγειν in καὶ γὰρ αὖ φύγει, ταχέως διώξει, he concludes that "it means not merely to run after somebody, but to run after somebody who is running away . . . The fact is simple and long-established: Sappho's words can mean nothing but this—if today she is running away from you, tomorrow you will be running away from her. The next line is a variation of the same theme: αὖ δὲ δῶρα μὴ δέχερ' ἀλλὰ δώσει . . . can only mean, 'If today she is refusing your gifts, tomorrow you will be refusing hers'." He therefore thinks well of Knox's conjecture καὶ σε θέλοισαν, which "would reinforce my interpretation of the stanza, and of the poem as a whole". But he forgets vv. 18-19, however they are to be read: τίνα δηρὸν πέλω | ἄψι σ' ἀγῆρ ἐς ἴαν φιλότατα; or Page's own very unconvincing ἄψι τῆγερ ἐς πᾶν φιλότατα ("to be reappointed to your friendship", "to rank among your friends again"—"to be posted"?); which is quite inconsistent with his interpretation of διώξει, κ.τ.λ. He forgets, too, the next stanza: for in what way, on his view, is Aphrodite asked to help her? To escape her unwelcome pursuer? The idea is absurd. And what of the past? It is bad enough that Page should interpret μειδιᾶσα ἔθανάτω προσώπῳ = an indulgent smile (it is rather the contrary of πίκρος as in *Κίπρι καὶ σε πικροτέρην ἐπέυροι*)—a picture of Aphrodite in an avuncularly humorous mood, giving Sappho a nudge in the ribs; it is worse that she should say, 'help me now as you helped me before', if that is to mean, 'help me to run away'. 'She will embrace, even though you would rather she didn't'—what a promise for Aphrodite to make! If we had found καὶ σε θέλοισαν in our text, we should have had to accept it, with whatever misgiving; but to alter καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοισα, which makes excellent sense, in order to introduce a new line of thought, which is bathos and which is not even consistent with the previous and the subsequent stanzas, only because, though "there would be no particular difficulty in believing that the two forms οὐκ and οὐκέ existed side by side in Lesbian" (*Lx.* lxiii), we cannot allow Sappho both θέλω and ἐθέλω (or rather, an occasional use of ἐθέλω), is to ignore all sound canons of criticism. Turyn's defence of οὐκ ἐθέλοισα, that it is imported directly from the epic (*Od.* ii. 50, 110, v. 156; see Page here),<sup>20</sup> is not necessary; or, if it would give any pleasure, we may formulate another rule, which, as far as I have observed, with the aid of *L.-P.*'s index, is consistent with the evidence: that in Lesbian θέλω is regular in positive sentences and presumably in negative ones where the negative is μὴ, ἐθέλω where οὐκ immediately precedes (this would be a rule of the same kind as Lobel's that with verbs of the τελεῖν-class, in the true vernacular, -σσ- was used in all moods of the aorist except the imperative, where -σ- was used: see Sappho. 1. 26, 27). But all that we need keep in mind is that Sappho and all other educated Lesbians were familiar with the form ἐθέλω, and that, even if it had not already found its way into the spoken tongue, she might deliberately use it.

[Another case of forced interpretation in *Sappho and Alcaeus* is that of Sappho 131 and 49. Page, 134:

Ἄρτι, σοὶ δ' ἔμεθεν μὲν ἀπῆχθετο  
φροντισθῆναι, ἐπὶ δ' Ἀιδραμέδαν πότις,

and

ἡράμαν μὲν ἔγω σέθεν, Ἄρτι, πάλιν ποτί - - -  
σμίκερ μοι πῶς ἔμμεν' ἐφάνετο κῆχαρις.

<sup>12</sup> There are one or two cases (e.g. Sappho, *Go.* 91.5, 91.7), in which a lacuna in the papyrus immediately before makes it uncertain whether θέλω or ἐθέλω was used, and one of [*ε* θέλω] 175).

<sup>20</sup> "Sappho fairly often imitates Epic phraseology, but does not, in her normal Lesbian poems, include features of Epic dialect in such imitations." This, of course, would not make such phraseology any the less 'alien to the true Lesbian vernacular'. We may hear in usual too Burns' "Scots wha hae wi' Wallace bled", where (I am told) *wha* is doubly 'wrong'—that it is formed from *who* by false analogy (as *two* and *two*), and that Scots would

have, not *who* at all, but *that* (in the form *tho*). (*Hae* is also, I believe, 'wrong' for *has*.)

Alcaeus did sometimes include features of epic dialect when imitating epic phraseology, as *παῖδες ἰσθμίου* [*ισ*] ἡδὲ [*ισ*] Ἀθήας, 34 (*Bea.* 2, and *ἐλπίς*, 45 [*Bea.* 3].) Compare also Page's remarks about Alcaeus N1, B10, B12 and Q1 (*Ja.* 271); these poems "are the principal examples of a practice seldom observable in the remains of Sappho and Alcaeus, the adaptation of Homeric themes to Lesbian dialect and meter". The practice was at least frequent enough to show that they experimented with language.



"The implication is that Andromeda might have shown better taste." There are few lovelier lines in Greek than *ἡρώων μὲν ἔγω*, and (if, of course, it is from the same poem) *σμήκε μοι πάς ἔμμεν'* *ἐφαίνετο καὶ χάρις* is lightly said, 'a small, graceless girl though I thought you then'. "The outlines are unmistakable, the details seldom or never clear", says Page; it depends on what you mean by the outlines.)

With these considerations in mind, let us look again at that short poem, which can charm most men's ears, but of which both Lobel and Page have such a hate that they have banished it not only from Sappho, but from Lesbian, and leave it lying about, not telling us what, if it is not Lesbian, it is.

ἔδουκε μὲν ἡ σελάννα  
καὶ Πληγάδες, μέσαι δὲ  
νύκτες, παρὶ δ' ἔρχεται ὥρα,  
ἔγω δὲ μόνα οὐ κατεύθω.

[I adopt Luňák's conjecture in v. 4, recorded by Lobel, *Σμ.*, p. 72; it restores the usual meaning of *κατεύθω* (though see *Ar. Eccles.* 938, 1009; and *μονοκοιτούμεν*, *Ly.* 592) and makes excellent sense.]

In v. 1 Conbruch, p. 37, records the best MS. of Hephaestion as reading *σελάννα*. (Lobel does not report this in *Σμ.*, but neither does he deny it; the poem is of course excluded from L.-P.) This seems unmistakable evidence that the poem is Lesbian; and we may confidently, therefore, restore the Lesbian forms *ἄ*, *ὥρα* and *κατεύθω* and Lesbian accentuation, and note the characteristic elision of -αι in *ἔρχεται* (and of α in *μόνα* if *κού* is right). What then is not Lesbian? The article with *σελάννα*, we are told, and the forms *μέσαι* and *παρά*. Both the two latter are, however, found in Alkaios, and of course were familiar from the epic; there is no reason to suppose that they were not, at the time, either finding their way into the poetic language of Lesbos after being adopted by the spoken vernacular, or being consciously borrowed from the epic. More important is the use of the definite article.

I give the following cases where Lobel and Page (or one or other of them) note either a peculiarity (often "inexplicable") or a special refinement which I cannot but think invented in order to cover an 'abnormality', or else one that belongs to a class which would cover *ἡ σελάννα* in this poem. It is not meant to be an exhaustive list.

Sappho. 2. 10, αἱ δ' ἄρ' αἶσται | μέλιχα πρέσιον . . . (? *ἐν δ' ἄ*, or *αἱ δ' ἄ*. *μελίχαι* πρ.? for this latter see below on 132 and 134).

16. 19, τὰ Λύδων ἄρματα ("probably proverbial or familiar"—*Αμ.* lxxviii-ix).

42, τὰρ δ' ἔϊσι τὰ πτέρα ("inexplicable", unless *πῶρ* has the value of a predicate—*Αμ.* xcii).

96. 8, ἡ βροδοδάκτυλος ἡμῖνα ("σελάννα *coni.* Schubart". 'The rule' very doubtful—*Αμ.* lxxxix; but see Page, *S. & A.*, 90).

122, ἀνθε' ἀμέργουσαν παῖδ' ἄγων ἀπάλαν ("num *παῖδα τῶν*?"; but see *Αμ.* lxxvii and Page, 139. 3).

(132, ἐμφέρην ἔχουσα μόρφαν Κλέος, where according to the rule of nouns with predicate adjectives, *μόρφαν* should have the article. This strengthened Lobel's doubts in *Αμ.*, xcii, about the authorship of this poem; but it is accepted in Page, 131, and in L.-P.; and whose but Sappho's can it be?)

134, πλήρης μὲν ἐφαίνετ' ἡ σελάννα (adjective is predicate: *Αμ.* xcii).

168, ὃ τὸν Ἀδωνιν (unexplained, *Αμ.* lxxviii; the fr. is accepted as Sappho's in L.-P.).

Alkaios 70 (D12). 10, τὰς θυμοβόρω λῖας ("unexplained", *Αμ.* lxxviii; Page, 236).

72 (D14). 10, τῷ δὲ πύθω πατάγεσκ' ὁ πύθμην (*Αμ.* lxxviii, xci; 'proverbial' or 'catch-words', Page, 172).

? 130 (G2). 26, [ὃν πολέμον ("the common supplement τὸν π. almost certainly involves a use of the article inadmissible in the Lesbian dialect", Page, 207. "Inexplicable" rather? Note that in this poem Page accepts *πάτερος*, "presumably an abnormal form", and *ταυδεῶν* (epic double flexion and "the only clear example of *ὅδε* used to denote persons not in the speaker's company", and is willing to discuss Lobel's suggestion that *καταγεγήρασ'* was written for *καγγεγήρασι* = *καταγεγήρασι*, though there is no apostrophe in the MS., "γέγηρα is not attested elsewhere, and -οσι for -ουσι in third person plural has no parallel" in Alkaios).

141 (H2), τὸ μέγα κρέτος ("proverbial or familiar". *Αμ.* lxxviii).

326 (Z2). 1, τὰν ἀνέμων στήθεσσι ("whether τῶν or τῶν, inexplicable". *Αμ.* xci; Page, 187).

338 (Z14). 1, οὐ μὲν δὲ Ζεὺς: ("not easily accounted for", *Αμ.* lxxviii; 'perhaps familiar', Page, 309).

346 (Z22). 1, τί τὰ λυγρὰ δμνόμενοι; ("proverbial or familiar", "the sign that it is no longer day", "respectable people did not start carousing before dark"—*Αμ.* lxxviii).

- 347 (Z23). 1, τὸ γὰρ ἀστὲρ περὶτέλλεται ('the star, i.e. the dog-star [Page, 304], familiar'—*Am.* lxxviii).  
 347 (Z23). 2, ἃ δ' ὦρα χαλέπα (with predicate adjective—*Am.* xci-ii).  
 348 (Z24), πόλις τὰς ἀχόλως ('unexplained', *Am.* lxxviii).  
 362 (Z39). 1, 3, περὶ ταῖς δέραισι, ἀπὸ κατὰ τὴν στήθεος ('unexplained', *Am.* lxxxvi; cf. B18).

Besides these doubts and difficulties, we also learn (1) that in Alkaios when a divine name is qualified by an adjective the definite article is not employed (in this unlike a human personal name); but Sappho appears now to use the article, now to omit it (*Am.* lxxviii-ix); which of the two is nearer to the vernacular? (2) The possessive adjectives, ἐμός, σός, etc., are found both accompanied and unaccompanied by the definite article (*Am.* lxxi); (3) that in τὸ γὰρ Ἀρσένι κατβαίνει κῆλον (Alk. 400) we have two rarities, the generic use of the article, and the only articular infinitive (*Am.* cxiv); and (4) "πόλις is sometimes accompanied by the article, though usually not, without there being any visible distinction of meaning between the cases" (*Am.* xci. 2).

In the face of this evidence, to return to the poem we are discussing, it is misleading to say that δέδωκε μὲν ἃ σελάνα "would be incorrect for Lesbian" (*Am.* xci. 1), or, simply, that this poem is "not Lesbian, let alone Sappho's; Lesbian would say σελάνα here, not ἃ σελάνα" (Page, 128. 4).<sup>21</sup> It might at least be one of the 'unexplained'; but not only may it be included within the capacious 'anaphora' class (which for Label covers everything from true anaphora—χείμων . . . τὸν χεῖμωνα (Alk. 338: Z14) to τὸ μέγα κρέτος), but it is closely parallel with τὰ τὰ λύχρ' ὀρμήσαντες: for it is as usual to be asleep when the moon and the pleiads are set as not to start a carousal before nightfall; or, if we keep μόνα κατεύδω, 'others have their lovers'. We have as well Sappho's ἃ βροδοδάκτυλος σελάνα (see above; L.-P. thinks it possible) which also 'breaks a rule' (cf. ἄσπερες μὲν ἀμφὶ κῆλον σελάνα, fr. 34—Page, 90), *Am.* lxxxix. Is it not clear, when we take the evidence as a whole, that the Lesbian dialect, like others, was changing, developing, in the mouths of the people and by the pen of creative artists, particularly, as in Homer, in the sphere of ὁ, ἡ, τὸ (on which see Leumann's *Homeric Wörter*)? That every Greek dialect was influencing, and being influenced by, its neighbour? Perhaps a nearer parallel, in fact, to ἃ σελάνα than τὰ λύχρα, is ὡς μοι κατὰ τὸν αἶον ἀπὸ γούρου παῖδος ἐνισπες ('the fate, now so well known' or 'his doom, which spells the end of Troy') in *Iliad*, xxiv. 388: 'the moon which I have been watching on her path through the sky'.

The poem is, I believe, certainly in Lesbian Aeolic. Whose then is it? (We may ignore Bowra's easy way round the problem, that it is a folk song—and so not in the 'true vernacular'?) Hephæstion gives no name, just as he gives none for Sappho's 192 (the poem about her daughter Kleis), nor even for ποικιλόθρον' Ἀθανάτ' Ἀφροδίτα (see *Heph.* xiv. 1, p. 43, *Constr.*), and no name is given by the quoter of 105c (ὅταν τὰν δάκνυθω), nor for the two lines of 130, which, as L.-P. remark, *Sappho sapient*. Negative evidence is, then, by no means decisive; the poem was apparently written by a woman, unless, like Sappho 94, or Alkaios' A10, it is dramatic (on which see Page, 293). But it looks like a complete poem, and, if so, not dramatic; in its simplicity and directness, in which it is very unlike Alkaios, *Sappho sapit*. The probability is that it is by her.<sup>22</sup>

University of Glasgow.

A. W. GOMME.

<sup>21</sup> It is curious that Page in his book on Alkaios's Parthenion has no comment to make on a much more remarkable use of the article, v. 16, μηδὲ τιμήσει γαμήρ τιν' Ἀφροδίτῃ (nor, incidentally, on the curious string of negative sentences beginning μή . . . μηδὲ . . . ἢ . . . ἢ).

<sup>22</sup> For a general picture of positive confusion in the use of dialect, we may look at the inscriptions, especially the long building inscriptions (official documents), of Epidaurion of the fourth and third centuries, or the

Amphiktyonic cations from Delphi. In the former we have, e.g. in *I.G.* iv<sup>1</sup>, 102 ff., both *ἱερεῖς* and *ἱερεῖς*, *ἐκδοῖς* and *ἐκδοῖς*, *δαῖτες* in *αἰ*, *αἰ*, etc.: "promiscue occurrence", says Hiller, *ibid.*, p. 63. I am not, of course, attributing poetical usage in Lesbos some two and a half centuries earlier, only drawing attention to the changes that take place in dialect and to the odd things that may occur while they are happening.

# NOTES ON THE MONETARY UNION BETWEEN MYTILENE AND PHOKAIA

J.G. xii (2). 1. 13-15.

. . . Αἱ δὲ καὶ καταγ[ρ]ῆθι τὸ χρύσειον κέρ-  
ναν ὑδαρείσσι[ρ]ο[ν] θέλων, θανάτωι ζομα-  
ώσθω.

These lines come from the well-known unique inscription,<sup>1</sup> in Aeolic dialect,<sup>2</sup> recording the terms of a monetary union between Mytilene and Phokaia, whereby each agreed to issue, in alternate years, an electrum coinage for circulation in both cities. The inscription is, on the evidence of letter forms, accepted as belonging to the early years of the fourth or possibly to the end of the fifth century B.C.<sup>3</sup> The story of the poet Persinos, attributed to Kallisthenes,<sup>4</sup> implies that the treaty was still in operation within the period c. 373-55 B.C.

The present note re-examines the meaning of τὸ χρύσειον κέρναν here, and in 11. 4-6 convincingly restored by G. N. Papageorgiou (*Unedierte Inschriften von Mytilene*, 16, no. 53) as:

. . . τὸν δὲ κέρναν-  
τα τὸ χρύσειον ὑπόδικον ἔμμεναι ἀμφὸς  
τέρ[ε]σσι ταῖς πόλεσσι.

There are two main problems, namely the operation, or responsibility involved, and the nature of the product.

Commentators have shown disagreement in their interpretation of the term. The most recent,<sup>5</sup> representative perhaps of current views commented as follows on τὸ χρύσειον κέρναν: 'The arrangements for trial immediately following show that the meaning required here is "debase" not "make the alloy", i.e. simply "coin", as often taken.' There is, however, apparently no ancient authority to corroborate this usage of the verbs *κεράννυμι-κεράνω*.<sup>6</sup> Nor does the evidence justify an assertion that electrum was considered a 'debased' form of gold in the Greek world. The description, by Herodotus (i. 50. 2), of the natural alloy of gold and silver (of Croesus' gifts to Delphi) as λευκὸς χρυσός, is solely intended as an indication of colour, or of category.<sup>7</sup> Hesychius' reference to Phocaean staters as τὰ κάκιστον χρυσόν is due to his apparent ignorance of the fact that they were struck, not from pure gold, but from an alloy.

The verb *κεράννυμι*, however, of which *κεράνω*, or *κερνάω* are abbreviated forms, although used, primarily, of the mixing of wine with water,<sup>8</sup> is also applied to the dilution of metal in the manufacture of an alloy,<sup>9</sup> a natural extension of meaning completed, in the present metaphor, by the expressive adjective *ὑδαρής*. It follows, therefore, that τὸ χρύσειον is, in fact, gold, not 'electrum', as has generally been proposed: ἀργύριον, or *ἀργυρος*, is understood.

It is, however, in the denial of the existence of an artificial alloy that some commentators have

<sup>1</sup> Discovered at Mytilene by C. T. Newton and published by him in *Trans. of Royal Lit. Society*, viii, pp. 349 ff. For subsequent bibliographies see C. D. Buck, *GD<sup>2</sup>*, p. 213, no. 25, and M. N. Tod, *GHI* ii, pp. 34 ff., no. 112. To these should be added I. D. Kondis, *Arch. Anz.* 1940, p. 288 and G. Kortese, *Αεολικὰς Σελίδες* (Mytilene, 1950), 123-9.

<sup>2</sup> The Mytilenean version. See C. D. Buck, *Cl. Phil.* viii, 153-5.

<sup>3</sup> W. W. Wroth, *BMC Trans. Aeolis, Lesbos*, p. lxxv, and B. V. Head, *HN<sup>2</sup>*, p. 558, proposed c. 400 B.C., and Newton, *loc. cit.*, 392 B.C. The problem of dating the inscription has been complicated by its chequered history. Lost soon after discovery, it re-appeared in 1939—see I. D. Kondis, *loc. cit.*—(listed as missing in Tod and Buck.) Although not available for study when I visited Mytilene in 1951, it was later seen at the Museum in 1955. Mr. D. M. Lewis, to whom I am indebted for this information, inclines to accept the earlier date.

<sup>4</sup> Pollux, *Onom.* ix, 93: ἡγοῖται . . . ὁ Καλλισθένης ἐν Ἐπιβαλῶν τοῖς Ἀταρείστον τὸν ποιητὴν Ἀταρείστον ἀμελομένην εἰς Μυτιλήνην ἀπελθόντα θαυμάζοντα γράφει διότι τὰς Φοκαίας, ἃς ἔχειν ἔδωκε, ἔδωκε ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ μάλλον ἢ ἐν Ἀταρείᾳ καταλλάττει. A reciprocity of exchange between

the cities of Mytilene and Phokaia is implied. Persinos clearly means that, had he changed his money at Atarneus, it would have been subject to a discount not in operation at Mytilene. This was, undoubtedly, an important consideration in the Greek world where there was no agreed international standard of exchange in the modern sense.

<sup>5</sup> Buck, *GD<sup>2</sup>*, p. 214. Tod, *GHI* ii, pp. 34-6, no. 112, had followed Buck, *GD<sup>2</sup>*, p. 183, commentary on no. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Pollux, iii, 86, lists the main verbs which mean to strike, or to issue coins.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, ii, p. 265 (Punt Reliefs) where 'Green gold' from Eritrea is mentioned.

<sup>8</sup> Two main expressions were used: (i) *κεράννυμι*, *κερνάω* with *ἕδωκε* understood, e.g. Homer, *Od.* xvi. 14: . . . *κερνάει ἕδωκε οἶνον* and (ii) *μίγνυμι* with *ἕδωκε*, e.g. *Od.* i. 110, *οἱ μὲν δὲ ὄντη ἐμίσγοντο ἐν κρητῆρι καὶ ἕδωκε*.

<sup>9</sup> Dem. xciv. 214: ἀργύριον πρὸς χαλκὸν κεκραμμένον χρῆσθαι. Strabo xii. 1. 36 (*κράμα*). Cf. also R. W. Forbes, *Metallurgy in Antiquity*, p. 215. So LS<sup>2</sup>—*κερνάω*. There is also a usage of *ἀναμίγνυμι* parallel with that in a. B (ii) above—Paus. v. 12. 7: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤλεκτρον ἀναμιγνύμενος ἐστὶν ἀργύρεος χρυσός.



made a more serious error.<sup>10</sup> Literary sources record the existence of two types of gold-silver (or, more correctly, gold-silver-copper) alloy.<sup>11</sup> These may conveniently be distinguished as 'natural' and 'artificial', or *white gold* and *electrum* respectively. The *white gold* of Croesus, to which reference has already been made, was, as calculation has shown, of high quality.<sup>12</sup> Indeed the natural alloy is generally richer in gold content than the artificial product.<sup>13</sup> Examination of early Greek coins from Asia Minor reveals an appreciable variation in quality such, in fact, as to render impossible the detection of any purposeful adulteration of the alloy,<sup>14</sup> for which the prescribed penalty was death.<sup>15</sup> The *hektaï*<sup>16</sup> from Mytilene, however, show on examination a not unexpected uniformity of quality,<sup>17</sup> but this applies over the whole range of their issue from c. 485-330 B.C.<sup>18</sup>

The following conclusions result: the inscription is to be explained either as a renewal of an earlier version or as the official record of a practice of monetary exchange between the two cities which had evolved in the course of the fifth century B.C. *κερναί* implies the preparation, by a magistrate or official, of an artificial alloy according to an agreed standard of fineness.<sup>19</sup> The responsibility of the official for the quality of the alloy must, surely, have ended with the preparation and acceptance by the Mint master, or persons actually striking the issues. Το χρύσιον is pure gold, not electrum—the other constituents of the alloy being understood (comparable with the ellipse of ὄψωρ in the phrase ὄψωρ κερναίμενα). ὀδαφής refers to the degree of dilution, i.e. the quality of the alloy.

I propose the following translation, therefore, for the two passages cited:<sup>20</sup>

11. 4-6: The official responsible for the alloying of the gold, shall, in both cities, be liable to account.
11. 13-15: Anyone found guilty of deliberately lowering the quality of the alloy shall be condemned to death.

University of Manchester.

J. F. HEALY.

<sup>10</sup> Buck, *loc. cit.*, n. 5 above: 'Moreover, the electrum coinage of this time and place was based upon a natural, not an artificial, alloy.' Cf. J. G. Milne, *W* 1946, p. 1. Yet B. V. Head, *HN*<sup>2</sup>, p. 358, had, albeit from the limited evidence then available, written: 'The electrum was, therefore, in this case, not a natural but an artificial alloy.'

<sup>11</sup> Strabo, *lib. 2*, 9; Pliny, *NH* xxxiii, 80; Paus., *v* 12 7; Dionysius, *Ἱστορίαι*, 403, n. 3; Isidorus, *Orig.* xvi, 23.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* i 50, 2, gave the ratio of the weights 14 : 5 and the information that the volumes of the bricks were equal. The specific gravity of the *white gold* would have been 15.46—indicating a gold content of about 70 per cent.

<sup>13</sup> B. V. Head, *W* 1875, pp. 243 ff. and *NC* 1887, pp. 277 ff. J. Hammer, *ZFN* xxvi, 1-144. J. Johnston, *Thermathena*, xlvii, p. 144.

<sup>14</sup> Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

<sup>15</sup> As in the present inscription. Likewise Dem. xxiv.

<sup>16</sup> *242: ἡ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κερναίου διαφθορῆς ὀδαφῆς τῆς ὑμῶν ἐκείνῃ.*

<sup>17</sup> Only one stater survives (Wroth, pl. xxxii, 1), this was clearly struck from an alloy of poor quality.

<sup>18</sup> The results of my experiments in specific gravity measurements and X-ray diffraction analyses, are listed in a paper forthcoming in the *Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress*, Paris, 1953, Vol. ii, p. 529 f. Cf. also i, 190-1.

<sup>19</sup> The earliest coins (Wroth, p. 136, nos. 1-4, pl. xxxi, 6-9) are descended in type and in style from the 'Ionian Revolt' issues, while the latest (Wroth, p. 167, nos. 110-11, pl. xxxiv, 21-2) are linked with Alexander the Great.

<sup>20</sup> This corroborates, in part, Hicks and Hill, *A Manual*<sup>3</sup>, in their commentary on no. 94 (see also Head, *HN*<sup>2</sup>, p. 358)—*τὸ χρύσιον*, however, being gold. Cf. Suraho, xiii, 1, 36.

<sup>21</sup> Following the text of *IG* xii, 2, 1 with Papageorgiou's restoration (l. 4-5).

## THE MYCENAEAN 'WINDOW-CRATER' IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM

This fragmentary vase was discovered in 1895 in a tomb at Curium by the British Museum Expedition (Turner Bequest) and was first published in the *Excavations in Cyprus*.<sup>1</sup> Since then references to it have been made by various scholars,<sup>2</sup> chiefly because of its unusual decoration with female figures inside ladder-pattern frames; these frames have been commonly interpreted as 'windrows', hence the name 'window-crater'.

The same tomb in which the 'window-crater' had been discovered was re-excavated by the expedition of the University Museum, Philadelphia, in 1939, and thirty-five new fragments of the same vase were found.<sup>3</sup> These have now been restored to the main body of the crater in the British Museum, and it has been suggested that in its more complete form it should be re-examined and published with better illustration.<sup>4</sup>

A detailed description of its form and fabric is given in *BMC Vases* and the *CVA*.<sup>5</sup> It is probably the largest of its kind (height, 43.5 cm.; diameter, 43.2 cm.); the fabric represents Mycenaean ware at its best: buff pinkish clay, dark red lustrous paint. Each panel between the two handles is decorated with a chariot scene flanked with groups of female figures.

*Side A* (Fig. 1). In the centre a biga with driver and passenger, moving to right; to left,



Photo: British Museum

FIG. 1.—'WINDOW CRATER', SIDE A



Photo: British Museum

FIG. 2.—'WINDOW CRATER', END VIEW

ladder-pattern frames forming a square divided into four rectangular panels, each containing a female figure; to right similar panels with solid 'shell' motives in each corner.

The chariot-group, though very fragmentary, betrays in its drawing the neat style of the vase-painter. Like some of his contemporaries the artist is conscious that he is drawing two horses, the one behind the other, and he is anxious to convey this by neat drawing, which separates from one another four hind legs and two tails.<sup>6</sup> The horses' hoofs are accurately drawn; the 'tufted' manes<sup>7</sup> are represented in the form of feather-like projections; the profiles of the two charioteers are also neatly and accurately drawn.

The 'ladies in the windows' on the left (Fig. 2) form the best known and the most frequently

<sup>1</sup> Murray and others: *Excavations in Cyprus*, p. 73, fig. 127; see also *BMC Vases* i, Pl. ii, fig. 132 = C 391, also *CVA* Fasc. I, Pl. 6, No. 9, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Sir A. Evans: *Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult*, *JHS* xxi (1901), p. 111; *BMC Vases* xvi, 121; Casson: *Ancient Cyprus*, Pl. iv; Furumark: *MP* 443 f.

<sup>3</sup> *University Museum Bulletin*, Vol. II (1940), No. 1, p. 9, Pl. 10d.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. A. H. S. Megaw, Director of Antiquities in Cyprus, and Dr. P. Dikaios, Curator of the Cyprus Museum, kindly allowed me to take these fragments in

London where, with the permission of Mr. B. Ashmole, then Keeper of the Dept. of Greek and Roman Antiquities in the British Museum, they have been restored to the crater. Dr. J. Benson, who is studying the Mycenaean material of the University Museum Expedition, has given me permission to refer to the new fragments. To the above-mentioned scholars I express here my thanks for their co-operation and generosity.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the British Museum crater C 373; the same idea appears later in Greek Geometric vase-painting of the pictorial style. <sup>7</sup> Cf. Evans: *PAE* iv, p. 229, figs. 810-11.

discussed part of this vase. They are drawn in outline, wear long flowered skirts and raise their hands in what has been described as an 'act of adoration'.<sup>8</sup>

The chariot group of *B* (Fig. 3) is also very fragmentary; it shows the same neatness and accuracy. The horses' heads are clearly separated from one another, each with its own eye and ears; the forelegs are drawn separately with clearly marked hoofs.

On the left (Fig. 4) there is only one panel containing a female figure.<sup>9</sup> The steady curves of its outline, the accurate rendering of the details of the face, the neatly drawn curly hair falling



Photo: British Museum

FIG. 3.—'WINDOW CRATER', MP. B



Photo: British Museum

FIG. 4.—'WINDOW CRATER', END VIEW

back in long tresses, and the graceful attitude of this woman holding a flower in her right hand, make it the finest of all the figures drawn on this vase.

There are two panels on the right, each containing a female figure very similar to that on the left. Only one of them is fully preserved, holding and smelling a flower; of the other (nearer the chariot-group) only the arms are preserved, raised in the 'act of adoration'.

Before discussing the style of the painter of the 'window-crater' another chariot crater, very recently discovered in Cyprus, should be mentioned. It is of similar shape and was discovered by Dr. P. Dikaios at Verghi, near Pyla (Larnaca District)<sup>10</sup>; the rendering of details such as the horses' legs and hoofs, the 'tufted' manes, the charioteers' profiles, betray similar stylistic tendencies. The ladder-pattern here, too, is very frequently used not only in rendering the rocky road (below) and the (?) clouds (above), but also in framing (on the left) the chariot group. Finally, the same neatness and accuracy in the drawing is observed.<sup>11</sup>

As has already been pointed out, this painter is an able artist with a steady hand and a considerable ability, especially in drawing the human figure. His love of neatness is indicated both by the careful outlines of the figures and the way they are distributed in the field, in symmetry and balance, but adequately separated from each other by frames in order to avoid confusion. There are distinct groups and units in the representation, a sign of tidiness.<sup>12</sup>

The naturalism and graceful attitude of the female figures as well as details such as hair tresses, belt and skirt, associate them with the women on the frescoes of the Minoan palaces.<sup>13</sup> Several interpretations have been given of the representation of the 'women' of the 'window-crater'. Evans believed that they represented 'pillar worshippers within a two-storeyed building'.<sup>14</sup> This suggestion, however, seems rather improbable because two of the 'women' hold or smell flowers which may not seem appropriate in the 'act of adoration'.<sup>15</sup> The other female figures raise their

<sup>8</sup> Evans: *JHS* xxi, 111.

<sup>9</sup> Illustrated in the *University Museum Bulletin*, loc. cit. Pl. vii.

<sup>10</sup> A note and a photograph of it have already appeared in *Ann. Archæologiki* vii (1954), 192 f., fig. 44.

<sup>11</sup> When the vase is published in greater detail the identification of its painter will become easier.

<sup>12</sup> The artist's desire for symmetry has already been pointed out by Furumark, *MP.* 445.

<sup>13</sup> The association has already been made by other

scholars: cf. Furumark, *op. cit.* p. 445 and notes 1-3.

<sup>14</sup> *JHS* xxi, p. 111.

<sup>15</sup> Unless the flower could be interpreted as an offering, but one of them is smelling it. A parallel of a woman holding flowers is supplied by the fresco paintings from Thebes, see M. L. Vassier: *Manes and the Monuments* (London 1950), Pl. xxviii, 1; for women offering flowers (lilies?) to a Goddess see M. Nilsson: *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion* (2nd edn.), p. 347, fig. 158. See also new gem from Pylas, LH 11? *ILN* 27, iv, 1957, 690.



hands in a way which recalls the representation of gathering of women on Minoan frescoes, where no pillar-worshipping is suggested, but rather vivid conversation.<sup>16</sup>

It is even doubtful whether the rectangular panels have any architectural significance.<sup>17</sup> As it has already been observed, there is a desire for symmetry which is attained by dividing or separating the different groups or scenes by means of frames in ladder-pattern. They may simply recall a similar method of framing panels in the major art of fresco painting.<sup>18</sup>

If, however, they do have an architectural significance and the women are meant to be looking out of windows we must admit that the artist is more interested in the ceramic, i.e. decorative requirements of his subject than in the subject as such. There is probably here a remote echo from significant representations in fresco painting. Furumark suggested a pre-Homeric *zeugonamia*.<sup>19</sup> One may also suggest that the women are watching chariot races, or bidding farewell to a departing hero (in the fashion of the 'Warrior Vase') or are lamenting a dead hero departing by chariot.<sup>20</sup>

The dress of the 'women in the windows' is purely Minoan: close-fit jacket, bell skirt and belt. Outside Crete this dress prevailed already on the mainland—probably in royal courts—at the time of the shaft graves at Mycenae, and is represented on frescoes of the L.H. III period in centres such as Mycenae, Tiryns and Thebes,<sup>21</sup> and on ivories.<sup>22</sup> In the Levant the ivory from Ugarit is another example, under strong Minoan influence.<sup>23</sup>

The 'window-crater', however, is the only instance where Minoan dress is represented in vase-painting. Men and women on Myc. IIIA vases usually wear a long robe.<sup>24</sup> The nearest parallel to the dress of the 'women in the windows' may be found on a miniature fresco from Chios where women are represented in the theatrical area.<sup>25</sup> The women near the pillars wear a blue shirt with black horizontal lines, and a plain jacket. The striped jacket of one 'woman in the window' (Side A left, lower left window) is paralleled by similar jackets of Mycenaean female figurines.<sup>26</sup> Such figurines have been found on the mainland,<sup>27</sup> Rhodes,<sup>28</sup> Cyprus<sup>29</sup> and Ugarit,<sup>30</sup> and date from the Myc. IIIA: 2 period onwards.<sup>31</sup>

Chronology of the 'window-crater': The shape and style of the pictorial scene suggest an early date. The absence of floral or geometric fillings give it a pre-Amarna date, whereas the close similarity of the drawings with the fresco paintings put it among the earliest Mycenaean vases of the pictorial style. It should probably be dated shortly after 1400 B.C.<sup>32</sup>

## V. KARAGEORGIOU.

### Cyprus Museum.

<sup>16</sup> Furumark: *MP*, p. 445, n. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *BMC Vases*, p. xvi, n. 2.

<sup>18</sup> A narrow ladder-band is also observed on the Chieftain's Vase of stentile from Hagia Triada, where the shield-bearers are separated from the other two figures.

<sup>19</sup> *op. cit.*, p. 445, n. 4.

<sup>20</sup> This suggestion I owe to Mr. H. Catling, M.A., who kindly discussed with me several points of this note.

<sup>21</sup> For references, see Lorimer: *op. cit.*, p. 395; she rightly believes that these frescoes were made on the mainland in the fourteenth century by Minoan artists after the sack of Crete.

<sup>22</sup> A. J. B. Wace: *Afrique*, figs. 55-6 and 101-3.

<sup>23</sup> *Syria* x (1929), Pl. 121; Ugarit was in contact with

Crete already in the M.M. period. Cf. Cl. Schaeffer: *Ugaritica* ii, p. 51, 53 *et passim*.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Furumark: *MP*, fig. 25. Mot. 111, 3-10.

<sup>25</sup> Evans: *PM* iii, Pl. xvi, fig. 28.

<sup>26</sup> Lorimer, *op. cit.*, fig. 53c.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 366.

<sup>28</sup> Furumark: *CMP*, p. 88.

<sup>29</sup> P. Dikaios: *Guide to the Cyprus Museum* (2nd edn.), p. 171: 9-10; Lorimer, *op. cit.*, p. 366, says that no such figurines have been found in Cyprus!

<sup>30</sup> Schaeffer: *Ugaritica* ii, fig. 97: 18-19.

<sup>31</sup> Furumark: *CMP*, p. 88.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Daniel: *AJA* xlv (1941), 121, places it between 1400-1370; similar date is given by Furumark: *Myc. IIIA*: 2c, p. 443.

## POSTSCRIPT

I had overlooked a fragment of Mycenaean amphoroid crater from Enkomi, discovered by Schaeffer and published by E. Coche de la Ferrière, *Essai de classification de la céramique mycénienne d'Enkomi*, pl. 1/7. The facial characteristics of the charioteers are almost identical with those of the 'window-crater' and the Verghi crater referred to above. One may therefore suggest the possibility of tracing in these three vases the hand of the same vase-painter.

## THE SPARTAN EMBASSY TO LYGDAMIS

AMONGST the unattributed *Apophthegmata Laconica* of Plutarch is one (no. 67, 236D) which seems to refer to an episode in Spartan history not recorded elsewhere in the extant sources. The text is as follows:

Ἦκόν ποτε κατὰ πρεσβείαν Δάκωνες πρὸς Λύγδαμον τὸν τύραννον· ὡς δ' ἐκεῖνος ὑπερτιθέμενος πολλὰς συντυχεῖν ἀνεβάλλετο, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι μαλακῶς ἔχει αὐτὸν ἔφη τις, οἱ πρέσβεις 'λέγε αὐτῷ', εἶπον, ὅτι μὴ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐ παλασόμενοι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐληλύθαμεν, ἀλλὰ διαλεχθῆναι μένομεν.

The details of the affair are lacking, but it is clear that the *apophthegm* presupposes a Spartan embassy to a tyrant named Lygdamis, on a subject which made him unwilling to receive it. The identity of the tyrant in question is not immediately certain; in addition to the famous Lygdamis of Naxos, the adventurer who assisted Pisistratus in his final attempt at securing power and was in return himself installed as tyrant of his native island,<sup>1</sup> there was a Halicarnassian tyrant of that name, the son or (less probably) grandson of Queen Artemisia; and her father, who was also called Lygdamis, was quite possibly himself a tyrant.<sup>2</sup> However, the chance that the reference here is to a Halicarnassian tyrant is I think remote. There is no tradition of Spartan dealings with Halicarnassus either in the time of Artemisia's father or in the generations immediately following her, nor can any plausible occasion be suggested; the former period is marked by Sparta's concentration on home affairs,<sup>3</sup> the latter by her complete abdication from trans-Aegean politics in favour of Athens after 478 B.C. Thus whether the *apophthegm* be genuine or invented it seems unlikely that a Halicarnassian tyrant is meant; for even invented Laconisms, if credited with specific circumstances, are usually made to have reference to something either historical or at least plausible.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, although there is no other record of a Spartan embassy to Lygdamis of Naxos, there was certainly a tradition that the Spartans deposed him;<sup>5</sup> and in any reference to Spartan dealings with a person simply designated 'the tyrant Lygdamis' it is most reasonable to suppose the Naxian tyrant to be meant.

If we assume this to be the case here, what value are we to set on the story? The current view of the *Apophthegmata Laconica* is evidently that the work is based on a florilegium of such sayings which had been available to Plato and Aristotle, and thus had a respectable antiquity.<sup>6</sup> The hypothesis may well be correct, but it can do little more than give us general encouragement to look farther. It is not demonstrable that a particular saying must have appeared in the florilegium nor does it necessarily follow that even if it did, it must have been authentic. An individual case, such as is here under question, must be dealt with on its merits.

On this basis, however, I would myself be inclined to believe that the embassy, if not the actual words of the ambassadors, may very possibly be historical. The details of Lygdamis' career were evidently not lost to history at an early date; Aristotle, to judge from scattered notices,<sup>7</sup> was able to gather together not a little information about him, and probably if we possessed the *Constitution of the Naxians* we would find that a fairly full picture of his reign was presented. Hence there is no reason to suppose that a reference to a Spartan embassy of this kind cannot rest on a good tradition. Furthermore, it does not look to me the sort of thing which one would expect to be

<sup>1</sup> Hdt. i. 61. 4; 62. 2. For further details concerning Lygdamis of Naxos, cf. Kahstedt, R.E., s.v. 'Lygdamis' no. 2; How and Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus*, i. 84.

<sup>2</sup> For the elder Lygdamis of Halicarnassus, cf. Hdt. vii. 95. 2; Kahstedt, *loc. cit.*, no. 3; for the younger, Suda s.v. 'Herodotus': Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*,<sup>2</sup> ii. 2. 2; Kahstedt, R.E. no. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Apart from the short-range and disastrous expedition of Anachimolus against Athens (Hdt. v. 63), the only indication of Spartan transmarine activities in the period following the attack on Polykrates is afforded by the appearance of a Spartan thalassocracy in the Eusebius list, between those of Samos and Eretria, probably for the years 517-515 (Diod. Sic. vii. 13). For a discussion of this vexed passage see Myers 'On the list of the thalassocracies in Eusebius', *JHS* xxvi. 99-104. The most likely explanation seems to me that the compiler had in mind the activities of Darius in Libya (Hdt. v. 40), and that he has created a somewhat erroneous impression, since these activities are probably not to be regarded as directed by the Spartan government (*cf. esp. v. 42. 2*).

A truer indication of the official attitude to overseas undertakings in this period is given by the refusal of help to Macandrius (Hdt. iii. 148-9) and Aristagoras (Hdt. v. 49-50). See also below, p. 273 and notes there.

<sup>4</sup> Thus the *Apophthegmata* attributed to Leonidas (224f-225c) afford good examples of how appropriate sayings, some duplicated from other sources (e.g. no. 6, said by Herodotus (vii. 245. 2) to have been uttered by Dieneceus), have been fitted to circumstances either historical (e.g. the general position at Thermopylae) or plausible (e.g. the letter of Xerxes presupposed in no. 10). (I do not of course preclude the possibility that one or two of these *apophthegmata* may be genuine.)

<sup>5</sup> *Plut. de Mal. Her.* 21 (899f); Schol. on Aeschines R. 77.

<sup>6</sup> For a general compendium of the nature of the *Apophthegmata Laconica* see Ziegler, P.-W., s.v. 'Plutarchus' coll. 865 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Ath. Pol.* 15. 2; *Pol.* 1305a41; *Elem.* 1346b7; *Athenaeus*, 348a-c (citing *Constitution of the Naxians*).

fabricated; for it is readily apparent that from the time of Thucydides onwards the typical Spartan behaviour towards tyrants was supposed to have been to depose them, not to send embassies to them.<sup>9</sup> On the whole, therefore, I am inclined to believe that the circumstances indicated by the apophthegm may have a basis in fact.

Indeed, it is tempting to go even farther and speculate whether we may not in fact have here a genuine Laconism. This is admittedly the only one of the unattributed Apophthegmata—apart from the first (232b), which is a paraphrase of Herodotus iii. 36. 1, the reply to the Samians—clearly referable to the period before the Persian Wars; and of the attributed ones those attached to personages of that period, the great majority seem to be either mere inventions, accommodated to the known circumstances of the individual concerned,<sup>10</sup> or else edifying observations on typical Spartan themes (courage, discipline, patriotism, honour, etc.)<sup>11</sup> shared out on the principle that as many as possible of the notable figures of early Sparta should have sayings to their names. But even if, taken as a whole, the Apophthegmata Laconica can offer us little that is convincing for this period, it does not necessarily follow that no genuine saying can have been preserved. On the contrary, it is clear from Herodotus that already in his day there was an interest in notable Spartan sayings<sup>12</sup> (even if some of the ones which then passed as authentic were not really so); and at this time the remembrance of events contemporary with the reign of Lygdamis was still very real, as can be seen from the way Herodotus himself was able to draw on Spartan family traditions for details of the Spartan expedition to Samos.<sup>13</sup> A genuine saying could thus have been preserved; and the tone of this one, blunt-spoken, witty enough without being over-ingenious, and free from the moralising tendency so characteristic of many alleged Laconisms, seems to me to have something like the authentic ring about it. If any genuine sayings have been preserved—and it is but reasonable to suppose that this literary tradition had originally some core of truth—this particular one has, I feel, more claim than most to credence. The point is, however, not one which I regard as essential, being content for the purposes of this discussion with the assertion that the unwelcome embassy which the saying presupposes may well be historical.

How does such an embassy fit into the pattern of events as known from other sources? The Spartan deposition of Lygdamis is commonly accepted as a fact,<sup>14</sup> but an embassy such as is envisaged here does not seem to fit a deposition. It is indeed possible that non-military methods were employed against tyrants (such a thing is perhaps suggested by Plutarch's including depositions amongst the various settlements of the affairs of other states which Sparta from time to time achieved 'without moving a shield, by sending a single ambassador'<sup>15</sup>), but if so, presumably it was done by publicly proclaiming support for the native opposition, so that the tyrant's position became impossible; and it is hard to see how even a non-military attempt at deposition could require the sending of ambassadors to wait daily for an audience with the tyrant.

Yet it is not impossible that there is some connexion between this embassy and the deposition of Lygdamis, for official Spartan dealings with Naxos in the latter part of the sixth century are not otherwise attested, and do not seem likely to have been frequent; and an unsatisfactory embassy is a likely enough prelude to sterner action. The deposition of Lygdamis is commonly explained as a by-product of the Spartan attack on Polycrates,<sup>16</sup> and so placed c. 524 B.C.; but an alternative view<sup>17</sup> is to accept the date given by the thalassocracy-list, c. 515 B.C.,<sup>18</sup> and to relate the deposition to an anti-Persian policy supposed to have been uniformly pursued by Sparta from the time of the Lydian alliance onward. If this view is correct, then the Spartans may have been trying in the embassy under discussion to persuade Lygdamis to undertake the outer defence of Greece, and deposed him when he showed reluctance to shoulder this responsibility. The existence of such a far-sighted and active anti-Persian policy is, however, a hypothesis which I am inclined to regard as dubious, and hope to criticise in detail at a later date; moreover, the relations between Polycrates and Delos seem to me to be most reasonably explained on the supposition that his power outlasted that of Lygdamis.<sup>19</sup> I therefore accept the more usual view that Lygdamis was deposed at the time of the Samian expedition.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Thuc. i. 18, 1; Arist. Pol. 1310b7; Isoc. iv. 123; p. 371. 18, and the passages cited in n. 5 above.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. those attributed to Demaratus (219f–220c). I especially exclude from the generalisation in the text the sections which deal with Lysagoras' institutions (205f–222a), and Cleomenes' Argive campaign (223b–c), which seem to raise special problems, and are in fact hardly to be regarded as apophthegmata at all in the strict sense.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. those attributed to Cleomenes (218b–f), Ariston (20–3; 218a–b), Theopompus (1–2; 221d–e), Polydamas (1. 4; 231e–f) and Chariton (232b–d).

<sup>12</sup> Note e.g. the remarks of 'the Spartans' to the Samian envoys (iii. 36, 1) of Gorge to Cleomenes (iv. 51, 2); of

Cleomenes to Critas (vi. 50, 3); of Syngus to Gelon (vii. 150); of Diemexa about Persian arrows (vii. 226, 2), and of Chilon about Cythera (vii. 235, 2).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 35.

<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., Kahrstedt, *R.E.* s.v. 'Lygdamis' 2; Lenschau, *ibid.* s.v. 'Tyrannis' 1831; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 1, 394; *Life in C.A.H.* iv. 101, and esp. Parke, *Polycrates and Delos*, c.Q. xl. 100 ff.

<sup>14</sup> *Lyurg.* 30, 2.

<sup>15</sup> E.g. Beloch and Kahrstedt, *loc. cit.* in n. 13.

<sup>16</sup> Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants*, 123. Also *ATL*, iii. 98.

<sup>17</sup> Diod. vii. 13 (cf. above, n. 3).

<sup>18</sup> Parke, *op. cit.* in n. 13.



Now if one asks, on this assumption, why the Spartans deposed Lygdamis, the most likely answer is that they did so for reasons of security, since Lygdamis was an ally of Polycrates,<sup>19</sup> and the geographical situation of Naxos was such that a hostile power might be a dangerous threat to a Spartan expedition to Samos.<sup>20</sup> It is, I think, incorrect to suppose that the Spartans deposed Lygdamis because of a doctrinaire hostility towards tyrants in general: in fact, such an attitude probably did not exist at this period. Admittedly the Spartans had already deposed Aeschines of Sicyon,<sup>21</sup> but Herodotus<sup>22</sup> (in marked contrast to Plutarch)<sup>23</sup> regards the attack on Polycrates as due not to a general anti-tyrannical policy, but to particular grievances. These grievances, the theft of a bowl destined for Croesus and of a cuirass being sent by Amasis, are hardly satisfactory reasons in themselves (indeed the first is quite anachronistic), but they may perhaps be regarded as symptomatic of the motives which, together with friendship for the Samian oligarchs,<sup>24</sup> induced the Spartans to attack Polycrates. A clear indication that the Spartans were not as yet rigidly opposed to all tyrants is afforded by the fact that they were still on friendly terms with the Pisistratids,<sup>25</sup> although by now probably with some reservations.

If, therefore, the Spartan concern with affairs in Naxos was primarily to ensure a free hand against Polycrates, it was not in fact essential that Lygdamis should be deposed: a guarantee of neutrality would have been sufficient. And if one is inclined to look farther and inquire why the Spartans should not have taken the more drastic action simply from choice, the reason may well be—apart from the general caution which regularly characterises Spartan undertakings—that they preferred to avoid, if they could conveniently do so, causing unfavourable reaction in Athens by the removal of a friend of the Pisistratids: but that when no other course was open to them, they did not allow such considerations to override the furtherance of their policy in respect of Polycrates. To this it may be objected that, since tyrants were commonly on good terms with each other and in particular since Lygdamis enjoyed friendly relations with both Pisistratus and Polycrates, a friendship must probably have existed between Athens and Samos under their respective tyrannies,<sup>26</sup> so that the Spartans might as well depose both Polycrates and Lygdamis for all the difference it would make towards preserving their good relations with the Pisistratids. Such *a priori* arguments are not, however, compelling. We have a fair amount of information in the extant sources about the states and rulers with whom Pisistratus preserved friendly relations,<sup>27</sup> and Polycrates is not there included. In fact, his buccannering methods<sup>28</sup> probably did not allow him to keep many friends. The possession of a common enemy in Lesbos has also been suggested as a sign of association between Athens and Samos in this period;<sup>29</sup> but it would appear from Herodotus<sup>30</sup> that Polycrates became engaged in a war with Lesbos more or less accidentally, and the state against which he did wage war from choice at this time was Miletus,<sup>31</sup> the traditional friend of Eretria;<sup>32</sup> and Eretria was in turn one of the most prominent supporters of Pisistratus.<sup>33</sup> Indeed Polycrates' subsequent assertion of control over Delos<sup>34</sup> looks very like a snub to Athens—especially after Pisistratus' activity in that island.<sup>35</sup> Altogether it seems to me that a friendship between Polycrates and the Pisistratids is far from certain; if anything the contrary is perhaps the more probable. Thus the Spartans might well have contemplated using different methods to deal with Lygdamis and Polycrates respectively.

I would suggest, therefore, that the Spartans, when they decided to attack Polycrates, were anxious to secure themselves against intervention by Lygdamis, but preferred if possible to avoid the extreme measure of deposing him, particularly as this might gratuitously worsen relations with Athens, the other party interested in that region; and that they therefore sent to Lygdamis the embassy mentioned in this apophthegm to seek a promise of neutrality. Thereupon, Lygdamis, torn between friendship for Polycrates and fear of Sparta, sought to temporise in the manner which

<sup>19</sup> Lygdamis is said by Polyannus (l. 23) to have helped Polycrates to power.

<sup>20</sup> Parker, *op. cit.*, 107.

<sup>21</sup> *Plut. de Mal. Her.* 21 (B59d). Cf. Ryl. 18.

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.* 47, 4.

<sup>23</sup> *de Mal. Her.* 21 (B59c).

<sup>24</sup> The participation of Samos in the Second Messenian war (Hdt. iii. 47) may be legendary, but does at least indicate good relations between that island and Sparta in the early period.

<sup>25</sup> Hdt. v. 63, 2; *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 19, 4.

<sup>26</sup> So, e.g. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte Handb. des Alt.* 198; Cornelius, *Die Tyrannis in Athen*, 30. Cf. also Schachermeyr, *loc. cit.* 98, next 101, 185; Adcock, *C.A.H.* iv, 70.

<sup>27</sup> For a survey, with references, of Pisistratus' foreign policy, see Schachermeyr, *R.E.* s.v. 'Pisistratos,' 180 ff. esp. 182-6.

<sup>28</sup> Hdt. iii. 39, 4.

<sup>29</sup> See How and Wells, i. 267.

<sup>30</sup> 39, 4: *τὴν δὲ δὴ καὶ Ἀσπίον συνιστάσθαι πολεμικῶν*

*Μελισσίου καταστῆσαι πατριῶν αἰῶν*

<sup>31</sup> Hdt. *ibid.* cf. How and Wells *ad loc.* Polycrates seems to have revived the long-standing feud between Samos and Miletus, dating at least from the Lelantine war. It had evidently been interrupted about the middle of the sixth century by an alliance against Priene: *Plut. Quaes. Gr.* 20 (298a). Cf. Halliday *ad loc.* On the relations of Samos and Miletus in general, cf. Dunham, *History of Miletus*, 63-4.

<sup>32</sup> Hdt. v. 99, 1.

<sup>33</sup> *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 17, 2. Cf. also Hdt. i. 61, 2. Pisistratus takes refuge in Eretria; 62, 1 he uses it as a base for his attack upon Athens.

<sup>34</sup> Thuc. i. 23, 6; iii. 104, 2.

<sup>35</sup> Her. i. 64, 2.

the story suggests, till in the end his failure to give a satisfactory answer paved the way for his deposition by the Spartans. The episode is a curious one, but if this conjecture be right, does shed perhaps a little more light on this intricate period, and in particular shows the Sparta of the late sixth century, despite later traditions about her antipathy towards tyranny, prepared to use diplomacy in preference to force even with so absolute a ruler as Lygdamis of Naxos.

D. M. LEAHY.

*University of Manchester.*

## THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRIPOD AND THE FIRST SACRED WAR

### I

THE purpose of this article is to try to show that the legend of the rape of the Delphic tripod by Herakles became associated as symbolic with the First Sacred War and that this association is a chief factor in the great popularity of that subject in late archaic art.<sup>1</sup>

We should begin with the First Sacred War itself, an event whose historical importance is inadequately matched by the quality of our literary sources. The earliest account of it occurs in Aeschines' speech against Ktesiphon (iii, 107 ff.), where he introduced the subject because it provided the theological justification for the line which he had taken when attending the meeting of the Delphic Amphictyony in the autumn of 340. So it is not a simple narrative, but a tendentious statement, carefully designed to bring out the points which suited the orator's case. At the same time it has real value as historical evidence, because it is based to some extent on an ancient *stèle*, a memorial of the war, to whose text Aeschines had referred in his original speech at Delphi. A copy of the inscription was read to the jury, and the extant speech contains quotations and paraphrases of portions of it. We cannot now be certain whether the *stèle* was genuinely a contemporary monument which had survived for two and a half centuries from the time of the First Sacred War or whether it was a later restoration. It may have been original; but, even if not, one need not doubt that it was old and was the best piece of evidence on the traditions about that great Amphictyonic crusade. It recorded a Delphic oracle which justified the dedication of the Krisaian plain to Apollo, and this response was not given in the popular version which appears as a spurious document in our Aeschines manuscripts, and which is quoted by Diodorus Siculus (ix, 16) and Pausanias (ix, 37, 41). Their version prescribes the dedication of the plain by means of a typical example of the sort of ambiguity expected of oracles—the Amphictyons would have to wage war against Krisa until the waves broke on the *temenos* of Apollo. The oracle on the *stèle* was of a much less picturesque and more plausible kind. It told the Amphictyons in hexameter verse to make war every day and every night on the enemy, and added in prose the ritual prescription for the dedication of the plain.

It is evidently from this source that Aeschines took the names of the enemy as Kirrhaians and Kragalidai. (Whether he was right in quoting the first of the two in the form 'Kirrhaioi' may be doubted. He is the earliest author to prefer this spelling to Krisaioi. It suited his particular thesis because by his day the name Kirrha was specially associated with the port on the gulf of Itea, and this was the place actually destroyed in the Fourth Sacred War, with which Aeschines himself was concerned.) The second name, Kragalidai, is for our purpose the more interesting. Aeschines does not explain it, apart from grouping them with the Kirrhaians as *γένη παραπομπάτα*, nor does he mention them after he had finished citing the inscription. Probably the name was already long extinct. The later grammarians found it a problem and argued over the correct spelling.<sup>2</sup> The only explanation of it which they offered, so far as our evidence goes, was that Didymos cited Xenagoras as authority to show that there was a place near Kirrha called *Κραγυλλίδιον*. This name may have been connected with Aeschines' enemies of the Amphictyony, but it is not likely to be the direct source from which *Κραγυλλίδαι* comes. Aeschines was probably right in describing them as a *γένος*, for in any of its various spellings their name remains a patronymic, and evidently calls for some ancestor, probably heroic, as *eponym*.

Just such an ancestor appears in a legend preserved in Antoninus Liberalis (4) and derived from Nicaander's *Metamorphoses* and from a local Ambrakiot chronicler, called Athanadas. According to this story, *Κραγαλέος* was the son of Dryops and lived in the Dryopian land near Thermopylai. He was of a high reputation for righteousness and prudence. So, when he was herding his cattle, Apollo, Artemis and Herakles appeared before him and asked him to decide to which of them Ambrakia belonged. After hearing their cases, Kragaleus decided in favour of Herakles, whereupon Apollo in anger turned him into stone. But the people of Ambrakia down to the writer's day continued to offer heroic sacrifices (*εργασίαι*) to Kragaleus after the feast of Herakles.

<sup>1</sup> The idea for this article occurred to me some years ago and in 1952 I suggested to the late F. J. Dornblath that he and I might collaborate in producing it. He readily accepted and was engaged on collecting and arranging materials when he was cut off by an untimely death in the spring of 1953. In the autumn of that year Mr. John Boardman kindly undertook the task, and the

second part of this article is his work, while in the first and third parts, which are mine, I am under obligations to him for his comments and suggestions.—H. W. PARKE.

<sup>2</sup> Our Aeschines MSS. offer the alternative *Κραγυλλίδαι*. Harpocration indexes the word under *Κραγυλλίδαι*, and cites for *Κραγυλλίδαι* Didymos who preferred this spelling on the evidence of Xenagoras (*F. Gr. Hist.* 240, F 23).



It is difficult to extract much significant matter from their Hellenistic version of the legend. The fact that Kragaleus is represented as a Dryops is of ambiguous meaning. The Dryopes, who existed as a tribal unit only in prehistoric times, appear in legends sometimes as the enemies of Herakles, sometimes as his friends. But when they are his enemies it is usually in association with the motive that they inhabit Parnassus and are the enemies of Delphi, who are conquered by Herakles, and even dedicated by him as captives at that sanctuary. These variations in the relation of Herakles and the Dryopes probably correspond to the changes whereby Herakles is originally unconnected with Apollo or is even his enemy, but in later legends becomes the servant of the god. It would harmonise with this interpretation to take as primitive the picture which we find in Nicander's legend, that Kragaleus, son of Dryops, was a friend of Herakles, with whom he was closely associated in cult, and was an enemy of Apollo. This would be a very appropriate character for the eponymous ancestor of a clan which was engaged in the First Sacred War against the Amphictyony.<sup>3</sup>

If we turn to the other early evidence on the First Sacred War, it is found in the spurious ambassadorial speech of Thessalos, the son of Hippokrates. This was included in the Hippocratean corpus before the time of Erosian (first century A.D.).<sup>4</sup> Pomtow rather enthusiastically attempted to show that the speech itself was written early in the second half of the fourth century B.C. and contained authentic material derived from the family traditions of the Hippocrateids. This is much too optimistic a view of this very romantic work. No doubt Wilamowitz was much nearer the truth when he assigned the narrative to a late Hellenistic date, and we need not suppose that the tale which it tells had any special foundation of fact. The main story, telling how Nebros and Chrysos from Kos helped in the capture of Krisa, is not so important for our purpose as a couple of casual allusions made in the course of the narrative. We are told that the Delphic oracle had promised the Amphictyony success if they brought from Kos 'the son of a deer together with gold, provided that the Krisaians had not previously plundered (*αὐλοῦσαν*) the tripod in the *adyton*'. The enigmatic allusions are of course explained later in the account by the names of Nebros and Chrysos, who came as allies from Kos, but the rape of the tripod is not elsewhere mentioned, except for the statement that Chrysos 'was killed by Mermodeus, the brother of Lykos, who had died by stoning when he had entered the *adyton* to plunder the tripod'. Evidently, the author of the speech did not make any great use of this motive, but he must have derived it from some earlier source. In fact, his vague and allusive references seem to indicate that the attempted rape of the Delphic tripod by Lykos was a well-known episode in some traditional, though no doubt legendary tale of the First Sacred War, which was already current.

What would a legend of an attempt to plunder the tripod from the *adyton* imply? The only other occurrence of the motive is in the legend of Herakles. (For the story of Koroibos whom the Pythia orders to pick up and carry off a tripod from the temple is quite different in significance.)<sup>5</sup> The commonest form of the legend makes Herakles' act merely vindictive in motive. The Pythia refused to prophesy to him; so Herakles in anger attempted to carry off the oracular tripod. But Apollodoros indicates a much more precise motive: 'as the Pythia did not prophesy to him, he wished to plunder (*αὐλοῦν*) the temple in reprisal, and, having carried off the tripod, to construct an oracular shrine (*μναστήριον*) of his own'.<sup>6</sup> There can be little doubt that this is the inner symbolism of the motive, whether it occurs in the legend of Herakles or of the First Sacred War. To carry off the tripod is not a general act of robbery; it is to take possession of the oracle of Delphi itself.

It need not surprise us to find Herakles posing as a prophet. There are various references to prophexies given by him in his life-time or after his removal to the gods, and in a few shrines he had a regular business in giving oracles. In fact, one legend about the death of Aristodemus the Herakleid represents Herakles as a rival to Apollo in prophecy. According to this version Apollo slew Aristodemus with his arrows, because he had not come to his oracular shrine, but had learnt of the return of the Dorians to the Peloponnese from Herakles.<sup>7</sup>

These examples make the symbolism of the scene of Herakles carrying off the Delphic tripod

<sup>3</sup> On the Dryopes and Herakles, cf. *R.E.* xv, 'Dryopes' (Escher) and xv, 'Herakles', Suppl. II, 944 (Gruppe).

<sup>4</sup> *Œuvres complètes d'Hippocrate* (E. Littré, Paris, 1861, tome neuvième, pp. 303 ff. H. Pomtow, *Année* 1918, pp. 317 ff. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Pindaros* (1922), p. 72, n. 2. See also Bousquet, *BCH.* lxxv (1956), pp. 579 ff., for the latest discussion of the relations of the Asklepiads and Delphi, with the new epigraphic evidence.

<sup>5</sup> For the legend of Koroibos see Parke and Wormell, *Delphic Oracle*, p. 346 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Apollodoros, II, 4, 2. Pausanias (*Mor.* 577d) knew a tradition that Herakles had set up the tripod in a temple at Pheneus in Arcadia. But Pausanias, viii, 11, 7, gives a local legend in which Herakles is converted into a deity

servant of Apollo. The latest discussion of the Rape of the Tripod is in *Les thèmes de la propagande délphique* (Paris, 1954) by Jean Dehadas, pp. 123 ff. He gives a complete set of extracts from ancient authorities on the subject, pp. 157 ff. He interprets the general meaning of the legend in the same way as in the present article, but links it with a different point in Delphic history, as a protest of the Delphic priesthood against the intensive influence of the Pylian Amphictyony.

<sup>7</sup> For Aristodemus, cf. Pausanias, I, 6. For Herakles as a prophet, see also Parke and Wormell, *Delphic Oracle*, I, p. 342; and add Pindar, *Isth.* 6, 35, Plut. *Mor.* 387d, and Liban. *Or.* xiii, 47.

less absurd, and give point to Wilamowitz's *obiter dictum*: 'In the rape of the tripod by Herakles which ends with a reconciliation can be found no other meaning but that an attempt by worshippers of Herakles to get possession of Delphi was warded off.' He goes on to point out that Herakles had no site of worship in Delphi, and that in his wealth of legends he does not come into relation with Artemis and Apollo.<sup>4</sup> This last generalisation is somewhat loose. The legends of Herakles show him as consulting the Delphic oracle on various occasions, but these episodes are probably not primitive nor part of the original texture of the legends. They are the result of efforts to rationalise the labours of Herakles into a closely knit story of his life with oracular responses as the guiding authority in his doings. The legend of Herakles' rape of the Delphic tripod stands quite apart from the cycle of the labours. It was usually linked to the rest of Herakles' life by supposing that he had come to Delphi to ask for purification from blood guilt, either that of his children (Hyginus and Servius) or that of Iphitos (Pausanias and Apollodorus).<sup>5</sup> But other literary authorities leave the subject of the consultation vague or omit any reference to it at all. Quite possibly the earliest form of the legend may have simply assumed that Herakles attacked Delphi to seize the tripod without assigning any rational motive. If so, this version may well have existed long before the First Sacred War and have been the product of tribes worshipping Apollo and Herakles as rival deities. The war will then have served to crystallise the legend into a more positive form in so far as it suggested itself as a convenient symbol. The Greeks preferred mostly for artistic and literary purposes to represent their wars in terms, not of realistic and contemporary fighting, but of the combats of the past and legendary beings. To the Athenians of the early fifth century the Persian wars were mirrored in the artistic representations of Amazonomachies, Centauromachies and even Gigantomachies. Similarly, it would not surprise us to find that the attempt of the Krisaians to assert their rights in opposition to the Amphictyony was seen as Herakles carrying off the tripod of Apollo.

Pausanias, x. 13. 8, is our only authority for a literary treatment of the legend which might date from the sixth century. In a vague sentence he writes: 'The poets took over the story and sing of the battle of Herakles with Apollo for the tripod.' But unfortunately he does not identify the poets in question. We know that Pausanias had read very extensively in the early epic hymns and oracles, and frequently cites from these works elsewhere by name. So while it is impossible to prove from his reference the existence of a sixth-century poem, it would be at least a possible supposition. It may be from such a poetic source that the ancient mythologists derive one feature in common which is only rarely found in the artistic tradition—the intervention of Zeus in the struggle.<sup>10</sup>

While the connection of the First Sacred War with a literary account of the struggle for the tripod is uncertain, such a connection with the artistic representations of the subject might almost be assumed on the general distribution in time and place of the known examples of the subject. But we can probably go farther and find actual literary references, though vague and uncertain, to one particular monument which may have been the prototype from which most of our surviving representations are derived directly or indirectly.

(H. W. P.)

## II

The earliest representation of a struggle for a tripod which may fairly be identified as the famous dispute of Herakles and Apollo is of the late eighth century B.C. It appears on the leg of a bronze tripod found at Olympia.<sup>11</sup> Two helmeted figures grasp a tripod which stands between them, and threaten each other with their swords. The composition is symmetrical and neither figure is differentiated in any way, but the tripod seems to be the object of the dispute and not simply a prize for the victor of the duel, and we are therefore probably justified in identifying the figures as Herakles and Apollo. But this is an isolated example and serves only to illustrate the antiquity of the myth, for it is not until the sixth century B.C. that it reappears in Greek art, and then it becomes one of the most popular of Herakles' exploits.<sup>12</sup>

In this new series of representations two distinct schemes appear for the central action of the

<sup>4</sup> Pindarus, p. 180.

<sup>5</sup> Hygin. F. 32. and Serv. ad Verg. Aen. viii. 300; Paus. x. 13. 8 and Apollod. ii. 6. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Hygin. F. 32; Apollod. ii. 6. 2; Servius ad Aen. viii. 300.

<sup>11</sup> Kunze, *Neue Meisterwerke griechischer Kunst aus Olympia*, figs. 4, 5; *Archaische Schildbänder (Olympische Forschungen 5)* Beil. 8. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Luce compiled a list of representations in *AJd* xxxiv (1930), 313–33, and Kunze, *op. cit.*, 113–17 deals fully with the earlier scenes. Debrafax' treatment of the

subject in *Les Thèmes de la Propagande Delphique*, (24 f.), is the weaker for ignoring the above-mentioned works. He discusses the literary references in full (126 ff.). Prof. F. Brommer now publishes in *Verzeichnis von griechischen Heldenfiguren*, 22–6, a list of vase representations of the Struggle for the Tripod which he communicated to the late Mr. T. J. Dunbabin, who first undertook the study of the Struggle in this context. The use of this catalogue Professor Brommer generously accorded me also, and I am deeply indebted to him for it.



struggle. The first we may call the 'stand-up fight' with Apollo and Herakles facing each other, threatening with bow, sword or club, or each seizing the tripod and sometimes lifting it from the ground. This is the style of the geometric scene described above, and it recurs in Peloponnesian art on some shield-band reliefs from Olympia,<sup>12</sup> though on none certainly from the earlier part of the sixth century. On Attic vases the type is met already on work of the years around the middle of the sixth century, notably on the Amasis Painter's amphora in Boston.<sup>13</sup> Bronze shoulder plates from Dodona which also carry the scene have been declared archaizing work of the fifth century by Kunze, who remarks on the Herakles as being a peculiarly Peloponnesian statuary type.<sup>14</sup>

More common than the 'stand-up fight', and with a longer history, is the second scheme for the central action, the 'running fight'. In this Herakles has seized the tripod<sup>15</sup> and is moving away carrying it under one arm and usually threatening with his club the pursuing Apollo. The earliest representations of this type are again shield-band reliefs from Olympia, at least as early as the second quarter of the sixth century, but not sufficiently well preserved for many details of the figures to be determined, and the interpretation of one or two remains debatable. About the middle of the century appears the first representation in stone, a metope from the Heraion by the Silaris near Paestum,<sup>16</sup> and some twenty-five years later we find the motif again in the pedimental group of the Siphnian treasury at Delphi. But it is in Attic art that the running fight won greatest popularity. A black-figured cup fragment from Naucratis bears what may be part of such a scene,<sup>17</sup> but it is unusually early, of the beginning of the second quarter of the century at least, and might be interpreted otherwise. The main run of the scenes on Attic vases begins about 540 B.C., and from then on they are extremely common. Among the earliest are the scenes on the Lysipides Painter's amphorae in Munich (Beazley, *A.B.V.* 255 E, nos. 13, 22), the Andokides Painter's in Berlin (Beazley, *A.R.V.* 1, no. 1), and the cup Vatican 454 (Ajizatti, fig. 154).

We may turn now to the subsidiary figures which attend the central action of the struggle, be it a stand-up or a running fight. Occasional male and female spectators who seem little more than filling may be briefly dismissed, with Hermes, who often attends such functions, and Zeus, although one of his rare appearances seems to suggest that he is mediating between the two parties.<sup>18</sup> The most regular attendants of the action, who must therefore be considered as part of the canonical scene, are two female figures who stand one behind each of the contestants. The figure behind Herakles is normally characterised by her dress as the goddess Athena, the hero's patron.<sup>19</sup> The figure behind Apollo often carries a quiver and bow, and is to be identified as Artemis, the god's twin sister.<sup>20</sup> The mere presence of the tripod is enough to identify the site of the struggle as Delphi, but occasionally other impedimenta also suggest a sanctuary, such as an altar, columns and a palm tree.<sup>21</sup>

For the origin of the renewed interest in the story of the struggle in the sixth century we may look either one or both of two sources, a famous work of art which inspired the representations, or some literary work dealing with this theme. For the former there fortunately exists evidence which suggests the erection of a group of statuary which may have represented the struggle at about the time that the scenes begin to appear in minor art. Pliny (*N.H.* xxxvi. 4) tells of the career of the Cretan sculptors Dipoinos and Skyllis, and their work at Sikyon, *quae diu fuit officinarum omnium italium patria*. The Sikyonians ordered statues to be made, but the sculptors took umbrage for some reason not stated (*iniuriam quaesi*) and retired to Aetolia. Sikyon thereupon suffered famine and sterility, and was told by the Delphic oracle that relief would come *si Dipoinos et Skyllis deorum simulacra perfecissent*. They return and complete the expensive assignment. *Fuerit autem simulacra ea Apollinis, Dianae, Herculis, Minervae, quod de caelo postea lectum est*. These may of course have been individual statues, and Pausanias does not mention them at all at Sikyon;<sup>22</sup> they may

<sup>12</sup> Kunze (n. 11), 113 E.

<sup>13</sup> Beazley, *A.B.V.* 152, no. 27. Cf. also the Vatican amphora 356 (Ajizatti, pl. 46), the kantharos in Tübingen (Watzinger, pl. 2, C19), and the unusual scene on a Chalcidian skyphos, Naples Stg. 120 (Rumpf, pl. 171-4).

<sup>14</sup> Kunze, 113-15 'Verfolgungstypus'. A cut-out clay plaque, *Corinth* xii, pl. 17, 219, is archaic but cannot be closely dated.

<sup>15</sup> *Heraion alle Foce del Sele* ii, 178 ff.

<sup>16</sup> *JHS* xlix, 259 f., no. 23, pl. 17, 29.

<sup>17</sup> London B 316, *JHS* xlvii, 89, fig. 23 (Beazley *A.B.V.* 268, Antimenes Painter, no. 24). Luce, *op. cit.*, classifies the appearances of Hermes, Zeus and other figures. A small winged figure appears behind Apollo on Louvre F 92 (C.V.A. vi, pl. 409, 2, 4; ? Nike).

<sup>18</sup> Sometimes she is seated, as *Mon.Jour.* i, pl. 9, 4; Luce, 213 f., figs. 1, 2, and once with Iolao in a

chariot ready for the 'geraway' (Beazley, *A.R.V.* 99; Nikosthenes Painter, no. 11). Her shield device, a tripod, on e.g. Munich 1765 (Micali, *Storia*, pl. 88, 7-8) and Gerhard *A.V.* pl. 54, is suggestive.

<sup>19</sup> Her name inaccurately inscribed on one vase, Beazley, *A.B.V.* 269, no. 41, unpublished.

<sup>20</sup> E.g. Vicenza 198 (Harpels, *A.B.L.* pl. 24, 1; an altar), London B 38 and Buhl. Nat. 284 (*ibid.*, 206, 210; Gela Painter, nos. 19, 105; altar and columns), Serajevo 102 (Bulanda 34 f.; an altar), Berlin F 1853 and Brussels A 1903 (C.V.A. iii, pl. 120, 3; Harpels *A.B.L.* 214; Gela Painter no. 182; palms), and Gerhard *A.V.* pl. 54 (a tree).

<sup>21</sup> For sources of Dipoinos and Skyllis see Overbeck *SJ*, nos. 321-7. Luce, 333, n. 1, agrees with Stuart-Jones (*Ancient Writers on Greek Sculpture*, 10) that the Sikyon statues were separate, because no tripod is mentioned, but see Lippold, *Griechische Plastik*, 23, and *R.E.* s.v. 'Sikyon' 2545.



have disappeared by his day. If they are a group, the only obvious explanation of it is that it represents the struggle for the tripod. In this case it must have been a group of free-standing statues, because the Athena alone was struck by lightning, and probably of marble as the sculptors were said by Pliny to be among the first to use marble. He also dates them *etiamnum Medis imperantibus priusque quam Cyna in Persis regnare inciperet. Hoc est Olympiade circiter quinquagesima* (580 B.C.). For the appearance of the group we have the choice of the stand-up or the running fight, and the former seems the more probable for the early sixth century rather than the torsion and violent action required in the latter: but this is simply guesswork as both types have Peloponnesian origins<sup>21</sup> and it is the running fight which appears first in stone, in Italy and at Delphi.

It is difficult to dissociate any Sikyonian order for statues in this period from the Orthagorid tyrant Kleisthenes. It may well be too that the group was associated in some way with the *Kleisthenios stoa* which is mentioned by Pausanias as having been built by him from the spoils of the Sacred War (ii. 9. 6). Such a group in the Peloponnese might well have inspired the series of relief representations found at Olympia, but the corresponding and even better attested popularity of the theme in other parts of the Greek world, particularly Attica, is difficult to explain simply by the existence of a group in Sikyon. The explanation could lie either in the erection of a similar group in a prominent and much-visited position elsewhere—and Delphi is the obvious place—or in the second source suggested above for the renewed popularity of the story in the sixth century, some literary work or hymn. A group in Delphi is easy to postulate, particularly as the setting of the struggle lies there if Professor Parke is right in arguing that the story was used to symbolise the First Sacred War. Kleisthenes' associations with Delphi in the war and after it reinforce the argument, and it may be significant that in the foundations of the later Sikyonian treasury at Delphi were incorporated blocks from two buildings of the early sixth century, the so-called *Monopteros* and *Old Tholos*. To the former are attributed the metopes cut in Sikyonian stone, dated around 570 B.C.<sup>22</sup> and La Coste-Messelière has suggested that both buildings were the work of Kleisthenes, and that the *Monopteros* might have been modelled on his stoa in Sikyon.<sup>23</sup> A war memorial group of the struggle associated with either of these buildings could have inspired the later stone or bronze representations of the theme there, on the Siphnian treasury (a running fight in this case), and in the dedication of the Phocians of about 480 B.C.—the work of Corinthian artists, and apparently a stand-up fight.<sup>24</sup> It is interesting to note that in the latter instance a duplicate group was also dedicated in Abai (Hdt. viii. 27. 3).

Whatever the probabilities of the existence of a second group at Delphi, a hymn or poem symbolically commemorating the Sacred War in terms of the struggle seems the most likely source of inspiration for the group, and also provides an explanation for the wide popularity of the theme.<sup>25</sup>

There is another group of archaic representations which cannot be ignored in any discussion of the struggle for the tripod, and which may throw light on the popularity of the Herakles-Apollo contest. These are scenes of the struggle for the Hind<sup>26</sup> between the same rivals, and closely connected with the tripod story in three ways. First, in the representations themselves which, though fewer, can readily be classed as stand-up or running fights, with the hind occupying a comparable position with the tripod in both, either in the middle of the action or tucked under Herakles' arm, and often with the same two divine 'seconds', Artemis and Athena. Secondly, by the actual association of the two scenes on the same vase or on what appears to be a pair of vases.<sup>27</sup> And thirdly, by the intrusion of the hind into many scenes of the Struggle for the Tripod.<sup>28</sup> The hind is of course a common attribute of Apollo, but in archaic art an attribute's first function is to identify its owner, and the hind is for this purpose quite superfluous in the tripod scenes, in fact often crowding them unduly. The Struggles for the Tripod and the Hind seem then to be complementary. Unfortunately there is a complicating factor in the hind scenes, for they are clearly often confused

<sup>21</sup> Kuroki, 115 f.

<sup>22</sup> Lippold, 24.

<sup>23</sup> *La Stoa de Delphes*, 36, n. 7, 78, *B.C.H.* lxxvii 24; Kuro, *Greek Personality*, 130-1. The identification of these buildings is still debated. The stoa in Sikyon has not been found.

<sup>24</sup> *Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος ἔργον τοῦ τρίποδος καὶ ἐς πολεμὸν ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν καθίσταται*, *Ἰσχυρὸς πόλεος* καὶ *Ἀργεῖος Ἀνδρόδωρος*. *Ἠγὰρ δὲ Ἡρακλῆς ἐνέταξεν τοῦ ἡνίου* (Paus. x. 14. 7).

Pomtow wished to restore a Struggle for the Tripod in the pediment of the treasury of the Athenians. *BE Suppl.* iv, 1261n.

<sup>25</sup> It may also explain the vase scenes which may show other stages of the story, as for example the return of the tripod (Lave, 230 f.), but it is far from certain that

such are to be associated with the Struggle at all. We must also remember that the story itself in some form underlies the sixth century.

<sup>26</sup> In Broomer (see n. 12), 42-3, the following are canonical Struggles for the Hind: A. (b.c. nos. 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 21 and B.M.F. nos. 3).

<sup>27</sup> On either side of Vatican 454 (Albani) nos. 154, 155, and the pair of neck amphorae in Wiesburg and Toronto (Heazley, *A.B.F.*, 287, nos. 3, 5).

<sup>28</sup> Broomer, *Herakles*, 86 f., lists nine such instances in black figure, but from his *Katalogos*, 22-7, we may pick out also nos. 3, 74, 42, 43, 33, 70, 73, 83; von Bodmer (271) with 1354, 93; adds vases on the London market, in Boston, and at Northwick Park; and there is *Mon. stud.* i, pl. 9, 4.

with another of Herakles' exploits, the capture of the Kerynitian deer, and are often classed with it.<sup>22</sup> The deer is Artemis' animal, not Apollo's, it is only Artemis who is involved in the action in the scant literary records of the story, and in the scenes which clearly illustrate the capture of the Kerynitian deer the action is the breaking off of the creature's golden antlers, not a struggle with its owner.<sup>23</sup> One of the results of this confusion is that sometimes in the struggle scenes, the 'hind' has antlers like the Kerynitian deer,<sup>24</sup> while in other groups which have simply Herakles capturing the animal, the 'deer' is an antler-less hind. On two red-figure vases also Apollo attends the antler-breaking, once in a Delphic setting.<sup>25</sup> The earliest of the Struggles for the Hind is a stand-up fight on a plate in Oxford of about 550 B.C.,<sup>26</sup> and the scene becomes most popular at the end of the century. As early as the Oxford scene may be others on shield-band reliefs from Olympia<sup>27</sup> where the interpretation is less sure.

The association of the hind with the tripod theme also serves to strengthen their connection with the Sacred War. Just as a threat to the tripod forms part of the war tradition, so does the oracle's advice to enlist the aid of 'the son of a deer together with gold', Nebros and Chryseus from Kos. Both Apollo's main attributes, tripod and hind (or fawn), are objects coveted by Herakles; both again are objectives in the Sacred War, the 'animal' as the ally of Delphi, the tripod as symbol of Apollo's main function there. The introduction of Chryseus into the story later may be explained by the confusion of the hind with the golden deer, already current in the sixth century as we have seen, though it is of course quite possible that a golden hind or deer once stood at Delphi. A further possibility which arises from this is that the centre-piece of the group at Sikyon was the hind and not the tripod, but in view of the relatively greater popularity of the tripod theme, especially at Delphi, this seems improbable.

(J. B.)

### III

The first part of this article has shown some evidence that Herakles had legendary associations with the Krisaian side in the First Sacred War, and that an apocryphal tradition pictured a Krisaian as attempting, like Herakles, to steal the mantic tripod from the Delphic sanctuary. Thus the representation of Herakles carrying off the tripod was the most appropriate counterpart in mythology to the action of the First Sacred War. The myth may probably have been given literary form at this period: in any case, as has been shown in the second part, it became a favourite subject in archaic art of the second half of the sixth century in the alternative schemata of 'stand-up fight' or 'running fight'. One of the most famous representations of this scene, probably in the former version, will have been the marble group by Dipoinos and Skyllis at Sikyon. Our literary evidence for this monument suggests a date just after the First Sacred War, which would accord with the archaeological evidence, and our arguments as to the significance of the subject have shown that it would be a highly appropriate choice for Kleisthenes of Sikyon, if he was wishing to commemorate his part in the crusade on behalf of Delphi. At the risk of adding unnecessary refinements one may try now to interpret more closely the circumstances of this dedication.

Kleisthenes and the Sikyonians, together with the Athenian contingent under Alkmaion and the Thesalians under Eurylochos, were the chief forces on the Delphian side in the First Sacred War, and Kleisthenes was given a third of the spoils for his share. It will have been at this time that Dipoinos and Skyllis received the commission to erect the marble monument in Sikyon, showing Herakles and Apollo struggling for the tripod. Apollo represented the cause of the Delphians as indicated by the Pythia, Apollo's mouthpiece, Herakles the cause of the Krisaians, who were pictured by Delphic propaganda as trying to appropriate the control of the oracle. Because of his legendary association with Kragaleus and the Dryopes, Herakles was specially suitable for this role. Thus Kleisthenes was taking over the symbolism of the Delphians. It is possible that, as Professor Gomme has suggested to me, the conjunction of Apollo and Herakles had a further significance to Kleisthenes himself: to him Herakles may have been the type of the Dorians whose tribal names he had treated with contempt. But this symbolism, if at all present, was probably of secondary importance. The prime purpose was to commemorate how Kleisthenes had taken a leading part in vindicating Delphi against Krisa.

The account in Pliny tells that Dipoinos and Skyllis later took umbrage at some unstated

<sup>22</sup> See Brunnier, *Herakles* 23, where confirmation of the Hind and the Tripod stories is denied; Kenner (*Jh* xxviii, 47-9; Kunze, 126.

<sup>23</sup> E.g. Brunnier, *ibid.*, p. 154, 17.

<sup>24</sup> E.g. *ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>25</sup> On Bologna 305 (A.E. 1910, 25, fig. 9; with altar, tripod, columns and palm-tree, and Louvre G 265; Brunnier, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pl. 10: the extant scene looks like a humorous commentary on the main scene: two cocks fighting over a hen with another hen watching, answering Herakles and Apollo fighting over a hind with a woman (? Athena) beyond.

<sup>27</sup> Kunze, 114, 126.

injustice and retired to Aetolia, leaving the work unfinished. The Sikyonians apparently were content to let the matter rest thus. It was not until after a famine and the opportunity for pressure from Delphi that the Sikyonians 'with great fees and apologies' brought it about that the two artists completed their work.

This apparent indifference of the Sikyonians to the completion of their war memorial may, as it seems to me, be connected with a change of attitude between the Delphic authorities and Kleisthenes. Herodotus (v. 67) records the oracle given by the Pythia when Kleisthenes sought authority to remove the body of the hero Adrastos as part of his campaign against the Argive and Dorian connections of Sikyon. The response contemptuously told Kleisthenes that Adrastos had been a king, while he was only a 'skirmisher' (if that is the meaning of the strange term used by the Pythia). It would be possible to suppose, as do some scholars, that this episode took place early in Kleisthenes' reign as tyrant and that the Delphic authorities before the Sacred War were hostile to him, but changed their attitude after his victory.<sup>38</sup> To the present writer it seems more plausible to suppose that the policy of the Delphic oracle before the First Sacred War was not determined by Krisa, and that the change in attitude came when Thessaly after the war achieved the primacy in the Delphic Amphictyony. The former allies of the crusade fell out with each other, and under Thessalian influence the Pythia refused to countenance Kleisthenes in his policy of strengthening Sikyon's political independence.<sup>39</sup> This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that part of the spoils of Krisa was used by Kleisthenes to found Pythian games, which both took the place of a festival in honour of Adrastos, and also provided a rival contest to the Pythian games at Delphi, over which the Thessalians presided.

It is in a context such as this, when Kleisthenes was estranged from the Delphian Apollo, that he let the war memorial at Sikyon remain unfinished. Perhaps Pliny's account is literally true that a subsequent famine forced him to make his peace with Delphi and complete the monument. Perhaps this is only a more picturesque re-telling of the prosaic fact that later Kleisthenes found that it paid better to compose his differences with the oracle. His policy of influence in the west could best be served by good relations with the religious centre which had so many connections in southern Italy and its approaches. It may have been that at this time he erected in Delphi the monument of which fragments were extracted by the French excavators from the later Sikyonian treasury, and contemporaneously, or as part of this monument, he may also have dedicated there a reproduction of the Dipoinos and Skyllis group.

Whether this reconstruction of Kleisthenes' relations with Delphi is right or not, at least the more general point is sufficiently illustrated in this discussion: that the motive of Herakles' plundering of the Delphic tripod was associated in the early sixth century with the outcome of the First Sacred War and that the popularity of the scene as an artistic motive derived from the treatment of the theme in literature and sculpture as a memorial of the victory over Krisa.

(H. W. P.)

H. W. PARKE.

JOHN BOARDMAN.

<sup>38</sup> W. G. Forrest, *B.C.H.* 1908 (1956), 96-8.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Anaxandrides *Delphos* (*F. Gr. Hist.* 404 F1) for an oracle to the men of Pellene, which might be another example of the Delphic oracle supporting those who resisted Kleisthenes. But the date again is uncertain.



# HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF: NEW GREEK STATUARY TYPES AND THEIR PLACE IN HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN ART

## 1. THE NUMISMATIC AND STATUARY FIGURES

IN the course of examining Roman imperial medallions and coins in connexion with a study of Roman cult images, representations of Herakles Crowning Himself, a figure which appears on the reverses of medallions of Marcus Aurelius, Lucius Verus (Plate I, 2), and Commodus (Plate I, 3), merit further comment.<sup>1</sup> These reverses, whether with or without legend, exhibit identical compositions.<sup>2</sup> In the centre a young, beardless Herakles stands facing, his right hand raised in the act of placing a crown on his head; his left hand, close to his left hip, holds the club upwards in the crook of the elbow. Between club and elbow, the lion's skin hangs down over the forearm to a point midway along the left leg. The head, both forepaws, and tail are clearly visible dangling below. On all the medallions the die designer has made very clear the important point that Herakles rests his weight on the left foot, with left hip thrown out and the right foot slightly back and out, giving a pronounced bow curve to the right side of the body from foot to shoulder. To Herakles' right and slightly behind him appears an apple tree on one branch of which hang the hero's quiver and bow; to his left rear is seen a square altar, festooned with garlands and with an offering burning on the top, and in her comprehensive monograph on Roman medallions J. M. C. Toynbee suggests that 'the picture as a whole had been inspired by some bas-relief or painting now lost to us'.<sup>3</sup> The question of relating the central figure to the whole composition will be taken up in Part II, in reappraising the general problem of famous statue types in medallion compositions. For the moment we may see what further progress may be made in identifying the statue type of the young Herakles Crowning Himself.

The Herakles Crowning Himself has attracted the attention of classical scholars, if only briefly and generally, for some time. Furtwängler mentioned the type as a variant of the crowning motif in connexion with the Westmacott Athlete assigned to Polykleitos, noting that the body position corresponds to the Westmacott type and that club and lion's skin had been added to make the statue a Herakles.<sup>4</sup> In discussing the assimilation of Olympic victor statues to types of gods and heroes, W. W. Hyde included Herakles Crowning Himself on medallions as one of many figures of divinities modified from the statue of the boy boxer Kyniskos by Polykleitos at Olympia.<sup>5</sup> Ameling went farther and suggested restoration of the Herakles in the coffee-house of the Villa Torlonia-Albani who holds a cup in his raised right hand as a Herakles placing a wreath on his head as on the medallions.<sup>6</sup> The restoration with a cup does not rule this out, since there are sufficient remains at the shoulder to indicate that the arm was raised.

This adds new elements to the problem, that cannot be dismissed as the vagaries of later copyism if we are to see adaptation from an earlier statue. The Herakles of the Villa Albani is

<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on material assembled in connexion with Chapter One of *Statues in Roman Imperial Numismatic Art* (Ph.D. Diss., unpubl., London University, 1953). The writer wishes to thank Professors C. M. Robertson and M. Grant for important suggestions and criticisms. Prof. B. Ashmole, Dr. D. von Bothmer, Mr. R. A. G. Carson, Prof. G. M. A. Hanfmann, Dr. C. M. Kraay, Mr. G. K. Jenkins, Dr. E. Paribeni, Dr. Emily Townsend, and Prof. J. M. C. Toynbee have also incurred the writer's gratitude for assistance of various kinds. The coins and gems are photographed from casts of specimens in the British Museum, Ashmolean Museum, the Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), the Museo Nazionale Romano (Grecchi Collection), Sir John Soane's Museum, and several private collections. The writer wishes to thank the Keepers and owners of these collections, also the Directors and Trustees of the museums in which the sculptures and paintings illustrated are found, for permission to reproduce them here. Completion of this paper in England was made possible by a grant from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society. Abbreviations follow the list in *Amer. Journal of Archaeology* lvi (1952), 1-7.

<sup>2</sup> F. Grecochi, *I medaglioni romani*, Milan 1912, ii, pls. 75, no. 1, 77, no. 1, 83, nos. 3, 6.

<sup>3</sup> J. M. C. Toynbee, *Roman Medallions*, New York 1944, 220 'Reliefs and Paintings of Deities', pl. XXII, 2 (Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, British Museum Coll., *vide infra*, note 39). Apollodorus ii, 3, 11; cf. Athenaeus xv, 11-13 (1674-5) 151f. J. G. Frazer, *Apollodorus*, ed. Loeb, London 1921, 228 f., esp. note 3).

<sup>4</sup> A. Furtwängler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture*, London 1895, 249-56, esp. 255, also 49 ff.; the type of the athlete crowning himself with a filleted wreath appears as early as c. 380 B.C. on an Attic alabastron (see C. Blümel, *Sport und Spiel bei Griechen und Römern*, Berlin 1934, 9, pl. 23 [F. 2258]).

<sup>5</sup> W. W. Hyde, *Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek Athletic Art*, Washington D.C. 1921, 74, 'Assimilation of Olympic Victor Statues to Types of Gods and Heroes'; followed on the basis of the Antonine medallions by D. M. Robinson, *ArtSt* xvii (1936), 147. See also the illustrations of Commodus-Heracles coin types, Martingay, *JRS* xiii (1923), 108, pl. VI, no. 15.

<sup>6</sup> W. Ameling, in Heibig, *Führer*, ii, 452 f., no. 1920 (741); Furtwängler, *op. cit.*, 340 f., fig. 145.

older and heavier than the figure on medallions, even making allowance for the latitude of such stylistic evidence from the minor arts. He is bearded, and the lion's skin appears in such a radically different position, around the neck and over one shoulder, as to strengthen Lippold's arguments that this figure and the Herakles and Telephos in the Museo Chiaramonti of the Vatican derive in motif at least from a Praxitelean composition similar to the Herakles of Olympia.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Herakles of the Villa Albani rests his weight on the right, not the left foot, with the right hip thrown out, the general position of the Doryphoros canon.<sup>2</sup>

The obverse of an orichalcum sestertius of Tiberius, issued at Rome in his thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth Tribunician years (A.D. 35-37), is now generally considered to represent the Temple of Concord at the base of the Capitoline Hill<sup>3</sup> (Plate I, 4-6). The temple was restored by Tiberius and re-dedicated in A.D. to as the *aedes Concordiae Augustae*, remaining in this condition throughout most of the imperial period, at least until the restorations, perhaps after the fire of A.D. 284, recorded in the inscription seen on the pronaos by Anonymous of Einsiedeln. Pliny the Elder and others mention the famous works of art standing in this building, objects which placed it among the foremost temple-museums of the imperial capital.<sup>4</sup> Through the portals behind the hexastyle portico can be seen clearly the seated image of Concordia itself, confirming the identification of the coin as representing the Temple of Concord. Concordia in a long, loose chiton, girt so as to produce an irregular overfold, and with a himation about her lower limbs, sits in a high-backed chair on a raised dais. She holds a patera in her extended right hand; her left elbow rests above the head of a statuette of the Archaistic Kore (or Roman 'Spes') type on a turned pedestal. A cornucopia appears either in this hand or against the left side of the chair. These and even more precise details of the cult group can be identified from imperial coin reverses of Hadrian and the early years of Antoninus Pius<sup>5</sup> (Plate I, 7, 8).

On the balustrade of the steps leading up to the podium of the temple, at the front entrance, appear two statues. The statue at the left has been identified as a figure of Herakles, holding the kerykeion in his right hand and a purse in his left. The statue on the right, through the individuality of pose and gesture and the accuracy of the die cutter, leaves no doubts as to its identity. It is the Herakles Crowning Himself of the Antonine medallion series with which we have been dealing. In addition to the gesture of placing a wreath on the head and the position of the club in the crook of the left arm, the die sinker clearly reproduces the throw of the torso with left hip out, weight on the left leg, and a bow curve from right shoulder to right foot. This, then, is a version of the statue which either directly or through the intermediate stage of painting or relief served as the prototype for the Triumphant Herakles of the medallions. Literary evidence, though lacking in this case, could hardly be more explicit in locating a statue type about which other knowledge is

<sup>1</sup> C. Lippold, *Kupfer und Unbildungen griechischer Statuen*, Munich 1923, 292. In the texts to Bfr 694 and 4355 ff., we are reminded that the head of the Albani Herakles does not belong; it belongs to a mid-fourth century resting Herakles, known best through a replica in Copenhagen (P. Poulsen, *Cat. 1921*, no. 2107 and a head in Boston (Bfr 735).

<sup>2</sup> In studying the close parallel of the athlete crowning himself and holding a patera in the left hand, a figure which appears often especially in the so-called Campana terracotta reliefs, Hyde, Furtwängler, and A. Milchhöfer concluded that this figure in so many Greco-Roman variants derived, perhaps through the painting of Eupompas, from a Polykleitan figure of the Westmacott-Kyniskos type (Furtwängler, *op. cit.*, 256; Hyde, *op. cit.*, 110 f.; Milchhöfer, in *Arch. Studien II. Straus dargestellt*, Berlin 1883, 62 ff.; for the Campana plaques, Blümel, *op. cit.*, pl. 41, no. 27, where the athlete is placed near a Herakles; for Eupompas, M. H. Swindler, *Ancient Painting*, New Haven 1929, 266). The development of this motif in later imperial sculpture is traced by F. Castagnoli in connexion with a figure on the large capital in the Pigna Vaticana (*BullComm* 71 [1923-25], p. 11). K. A. McDowell *JHS* xxy (1925), 159 ff.) ought to restore the Albani Herakles as holding about the apples of the Hesperides (vide infra note 18).

<sup>3</sup> H. Mattingly, *Coinage of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, London 1925-50 (hereafter *BMCRE*), I, 127, no. 116, pl. 23, no. 13, also nos. 132 ff., *Introd.*, cxxxviii, and other refs. D. F. Stevenson, *The Temple of Rome as a Type*, *Atter. Num. Soc. Num. Notes and Monographs*, No. 20, New York 1929, 14, 17, etc., pl. II, 1, VIII, 6 (the last a view of the cult image, pediment and roof of

the temple on a medallion of Alexander Severus and Orbinian; *Conoch* n. 2), p. pl. 102, fig. 31; M. Bernhart, *DZbNum* 1 (1929), 146 f.; A. M. Colton, *BullComm* 51 (1923), 337.

<sup>4</sup> S. Platner, F. Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, London 1929, 140 ff.; Pliny, *N.H.*, xxiv, 73, 77, 80, *Strabo*, xxv, 66, 191, 194, 196, cxxvii, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Mattingly, *BMCRE*, iii, Hadrian, pl. 46, nos. 9, 13, 17, pl. 48, nos. 1, 11, pl. 51, no. 15, pl. 54, no. 7, pl. 56, no. 2, pl. 72, no. 2; Sabina, pl. 69, no. 124 f.; Aelia, pl. 67, nos. 1 ff., 6, 11, 9, pl. 100, no. 3 (v.d. Spes); Antoninus Pius (as Caesar), pl. 67, nos. 19 f.; *BMCRE* iv, Faustina Sr., pl. 1, no. 20, pl. 2, no. 1.

Coin types of Elagabalus suggest that the statue was made during his reign to place double cornucopias in the left arm of Concordia and eliminate the statuette of Spes from the position beside the throne. This becomes the inevitable seated Concordia type on coins for the remainder of the century (Plate I, 10 [Pupienus], 11 [Galerius]). Reverses from Nero to Vespasian reproduce the cult image in general but variable terms (Plate I, 12 [Galba], 13 [Vespasian]). Minor variations in coin reproduction are solved if we follow the reasonable hypothesis that the cornucopia and statuette of Spes were removable additions to the permanent containing of the image. A second century A.D. inscribed block in the Galleria delle Statue of the Vatican (Arndt, *Cat.*, no. 301) presents a view of the temple with its cult statue and a statue of Virtus sci beneath the portico (Reinach, *Rép. et.*, iii, 117, no. 31, and the cult image of Concordia appears on the Julio-Claudian altar of C. Marcius in the Lateran (S. Ryberg, *MAAR* xxv [1955], 66, fig. 39b, and other refs. Also *AJA* lxi (1957), p. 241).

meagre in its exact setting in ancient Rome.<sup>12</sup> The fact that the Triumphant Herakles was placed in such a prominent position outside an important temple noted for its art treasures strengthens the suggestion that the statue was at least a copy of some original of merit, if not the original itself.

The die designer of the bronze of Tiberius was not the only ancient artist by whom we have surviving work who looked at the balustrade-statuary of the Temple of Concord. In the Museo Capitolino in Rome there is a relief found about 1680 below the Villa Mattei, near the Via Appia. This relief served as a dedication by Epitynchanus, a freedman of Marcus Aurelius, to the Springs and Nymphs<sup>13</sup> (Fig. 1). Since Marcus Aurelius is mentioned at Caesar, this dedication must



FIG. 1. Votive Relief of Epitynchanus—A.D. 140-161. Rome, Museo Capitolino (GERM. 1941, NEO. 3159)

have been inscribed between A.D. 139-161, the probable date of the relief. From left to right the scene shows the three 'Charities' or 'Graces' in the schema of the Hellenistic statue group made famous in the Renaissance by the copy in the Piccolomini Library at Siena. The ears of corn in the hands of the outer figures are explained in connexion with their adoption as local divinities in Roman times.<sup>14</sup>

In the centre foreground a River God reclines to the left, and at the right the youthful Hylas, a chlamys fastened with a brooch on the shoulder, is being seized by two Nymphs. Behind the River God on a rocky plateau are the figures of Hermes with petasos, purse in his right hand, kerykeion in his left, and a chlamys hanging from his left shoulder over his left arm, and Herakles with his right hand raised to his head, a club in the form of a rough-hewn branch in the crook of his left arm, and the lion's skin hanging from his left elbow. Both Hermes and Herakles are looking towards the left.

The sculptor of the Epitynchanus relief made minor changes in the details of Hermes and the Triumphant Herakles on the temple balustrade. In the case of Hermes it is difficult to verify the objects held in the hands of the statue on the Tiberius sestertius. Examination of a number of coins and casts indicates that, save perhaps for the addition of drapery, the figure in the relief is identical. The Herakles Crowning Himself is similar in essential elements to the medallion type, especially in the important point of the left hip being thrown out and the weight resting on the left foot. The designer of the relief, perhaps in consultation with his patron, threw together a selection of observations to create his scene around the main action of Hylas and the Nymphs. The three Charites with their Roman attributes could have been copied from one of several versions of this popular group that must have decorated imperial Rome. We know that River Gods abounded in the sculptural landscape of the Capitoline area. The Hermes and Herakles are spaced on a rectangular, rocky prominence in the background in such a manner as to suggest that the two statues on the balustrades of the Temple of Concord were added to the background directly from the position and spacing of their original setting. This might explain the presence of Hermes in the composition and consequently the afterthought of the three Charites at the left of the relief. Conversely, the need for a Hermes and a Herakles in the background of such a conglomeration of elements might have dictated the choice of two statues of the gods which were known to a Roman sculptor in their settings side by side in a readily accessible location.

<sup>12</sup> Strangely enough, the sestertius of Tiberius was used as the basis for reconstructed views of the Temple of Concord as early as J. Carrea, *Gli edifici antichi*, ii, pl. XXXV: the two statues on the balustrade are, however, misunderstood.

<sup>13</sup> H. Stuart Jones (ed.), *The Sculptors of the Museo Capitolino*, Oxford 1912, 220, Statue degli Imperatori,

no. 93, pl. 53; A. M. Colton, *MemPont* 7 (1914), 45, fig. 19, as dedicated to the fountains and nymphs of the Valle d'Agro (collis Egeriae).

<sup>14</sup> G. Rodenwaldt, *JRS* 28 (1938), 60 ff., esp. 62; on 61, W. Deonna's collection of monuments illustrating the Three Graces is brought up to date (from R. 1890, 1, 280 ff.; see also G. Becchi, *BullComm* 63 [1937], 4 f.).



There is some evidence that the sculptor of the Epitynchanus relief was led to the Herakles Crowning Himself of the temple balustrade because he needed a Herakles in the specific gesture of the Antonine medallions. In the Loggia Scoperta of the Vatican there is another votive relief, a dedication by T. Claudius and Caecilius Asclepiades to the Nymphs and to Artemis, Silvanus, and Herakles<sup>16</sup> (Fig. 2). The relief is not of a very inspired nature and was probably carved in the second half of the second century A.D. The interest lies in the Herakles at the right end of the row of figures, an Artemis recalling the Versailles statue in Paris, the three Nymphs, and a clothed




FIG. 2. VOTIVE RELIEF OF ASCLEPIADES, VATICAN, LOGGIA SCOPERTA (GERM. INST. NEG. 1926)

Silvanus. Amelung referred to Herakles' gesture as one of shading the eyes, but this is clearly a version of the Crowning Herakles motif. We have endeavoured to explain the presence of Herakles in the Epitynchanus relief on several counts, the most important being his direct connexion with the Hylas myth. Amelung saw the presence of the three divinities in this relief in connexion with their patronage of rural nature, that is hunting for Artemis, the fields and forests for Silvanus, and labour for Herakles. As in the first relief we see Herakles Crowning Himself linked with a votive to the Nymphs, here also fountain Nymphs because of the large shells which they hold against their stomachs.

The presence of Herakles Crowning Himself in both reliefs may stem from reasons beyond mere coincidence. We may consider a series of not impossible speculations. We know the Capitoline relief was found below the Villa Mattei and near the Via Appia. The Vatican relief was formerly in the Villa Mattei before reaching its present location. This gives some suggestion as to provenance. Colini has indicated that during the imperial period there was a shrine or nymphaeum in this region, where dedicatory reliefs to Nymphs, particularly fountain Nymphs, were offered. The presence in this area of two reliefs representing a similar statuary type could indicate that a work of art featuring this motif, a relief or perhaps another statue, was a prominent fixture of the local landscape.<sup>17</sup>

The Herakles of the Vatican relief is too crudely carved for stylistic comment as a statuary type, although the stance follows that of the second Herakles type, to be discussed presently. However, he wears a beard and is of an older physical appearance than any met with previously. The Herakles in the background of the Epitynchanus relief also has a slight beard, although this relief was found broken in several pieces and there is a large break running diagonally across the field just through this part of Herakles' head. Although practically unrestored, the relief has been slightly worked over, and one cannot emphasise a point such as a few chisel marks on the face without mentioning these details. The beard appears in the first known views of the relief, two seventeenth-century drawings in the Dal Pozzo-Albani collection in the Royal Library at Windsor Castle and in the British Museum.<sup>18</sup> The beard in the Vatican relief may indicate that the work

<sup>16</sup> Amelung, *Cat.*, II, 730, Loggia Scoperta no. 3, pl. 89; Reinach, *Rep. rel.*, iii, 386, fig. 2; *Monumenti Antichissimi*, iii, pl. 1311, fig. 1; Dal Pozzo Collection drawing, Windsor no. 8314 (see *ArtB* 38 [1956], 31 ff.). On these Nymph reliefs in general: L. Forti, *Rend. Nap.* 96 (1951), 161-91.

<sup>17</sup> There is still (?) in the Palazzo Mattei a sarcophagus relief the central scene of which, Hylas and the Nymphs, shows a composition close to the corresponding section of the Capitoline relief (Robert, *Sark.*, iii, t. 163 f.,

pl. 43; Reinach, *Rep. rel.*, iii, 298, fig. 3, and older bibl.). The Hylas myth is discussed by W. Grünhagen, *Der Schatzfund von Gross Bollingen* (RGKonia, vol. 21), Berlin 1954, 33 ff., with list of eighteen representations of the abduction scene. On the gesture of shading the eyes, see the various references in L. Jucker, *Der Genuß der Apokopein*, Zürich, 1956.

<sup>18</sup> Windsor, vol. A-40, no. 8186; British Museum (Franks), ii, no. 368 (vide *supra*, note 15).

of art which inspired the sculptor in connexion with the votive to the Nymphs was a bearded Herakles Crowning Himself. In the Capitoline relief, the slight beard may have been introduced for several reasons: the desire to give, along with the rough-hewn club, a touch of individuality to an otherwise eclectic composition, or the desire to make the young Herakles from the temple balustrade appear more like a work of art connected with the region in which the ex-voto was placed. This would be the work of art, a bearded Herakles Crowning Himself, which was also reflected at a later age in the dedicatory relief of the brothers Aselepiades.

Having traced the Antonine medallions to a statue type in a definite setting in ancient Rome, we may speak about the statue itself. As visualised from the medallions, the original followed the



FIG. 3. HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF. OXFORD, ASHMOLEAN MUSEUM (MUSEUM PHOTO)



FIG. 4. HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF. As previous (side view)

older of the two later fifth-century standing positions. This arrangement occurs in the Westmacott Athlete and in other works associated with Polykleitos and his school, through signed bases found at Olympia and elsewhere and Roman copies of lost statuary.<sup>16</sup> We can say the prototype represented the young, beardless Herakles, with a head of curly hair, although little else can be said about the head. Little more can be added concerning the body beyond the negative fact that the pose differs from the Villa Albani Herakles and its variants. Style in the work of the late fifth and fourth centuries is debatable enough even when reasonable statuary material, much more when only a small medallion, is at hand for direct examination.

The Ashmolean Museum at Oxford possesses a small statue of a young Herakles which probably represents a good Antonine copy after the statuary type sought here.<sup>17</sup> (Figs. 3, 4.) There are, however, several questionable points brought about by the broken and re-worked condition of the

<sup>16</sup> Hyde, *op. cit.*, 159; the standing Diskobolos of Naukydes presents the extreme development of this type (*AJA* lix [1955], pl. 43, fig. 13, the Duncombe Park replica); the unpublished headless statuette in the C. Ruxton Love, Jr., collection in New York is closest to the *Macro-Massolai* statue, Munzli, 115 f., no. 4. Miss Iris Love brought the small statue to my attention. McDowell (*vide supra*, note 8) illustrates (fig. 2) a bronze statuette of a bearded Herakles of the type of the Capitoline

relief. He would restore the statuette with the apples of the Hesperides in the raised right hand; this Polykleitan figure may have influenced the details of the Herakles in the relief.

<sup>17</sup> From the Arundel and Poudret collections: A. Michaelis, *Ancient Marbles in Great Britain*, Cambridge 1882, 538 ff., no. 39, and older refs.; Reinach-Clarac, *Rep. stat.*, 465, 4; McDowell, *op. cit.*, 161 f. (called to his notice by Prof. P. Gardner).

figure. At first glance the right arm appears to be too far from the side of the head to suit the crowning motive; the character of the plastered joint at the shoulder indicates that the restorers, misunderstanding the position of the forearm, set it ~~too~~ far forward and too vertically. Breaks on the lion's skin just above the forearm and the patch on the shoulder indicate where the club was broken away when the left hand was knocked off. The club was held as on the Antonine medallions, vertically and against the upper arm.

The right shoulder of the statue is slightly higher than the left, and from the remains at the neck the head was turned to the statue's left and slightly inclined. This brought the crowning hand close to the side of the head. The marked turn of the torso produced by the raising of the



FIG. 5. ATHLETE CROWNING HIMSELF. ROME. MISSED BARBACIO.  
(Photo E. Richter, 734)

right shoulder is carried throughout: the left hip is thrown quite far out, and to balance the resulting curvature, the right leg is set so the right foot was turned out. The weight rested squarely on the vertical left leg. The right leg has been scraped and polished but is too much in character with the rest of the statue to be a restoration; the violent recutting was reserved for the lion's paw behind.


The lion's skin, necessary evidence for a statue of Herakles, is draped over the left arm, head and forepaws hanging down at the left side. At this point the copyist introduced a necessary deviation from the figure on Antonine medallions. Needing support for the marble figure, he brought the body, hind paws, and tail of the lion's skin around behind the lower legs of the statue in such a way that the right hind paw could hang over a small stump against the back of the right foot, with the left paw and tail falling along the most lower portions of the left leg towards the plinth. This gave two necessary supports to the marble figure while creating a variation of the simpler design of a stump at the left side under the lion's skin. Most of the skin was broken away when the lower left leg was shattered, but enough remains behind the left leg to indicate the curve of the skin. The restorer, finding the right leg separated from the body and most of the lion's skin at the back vanished, had to restore the missing fragments of the body of the skin and dutifully recut the paw which hangs down behind the right leg.

The Herakles of the Ashmolean statue is a youthful figure with little sense of muscular strength beneath the soft body surfaces. This is the system of proportions of the Praxitelean youths (and Satyr) and, ultimately, the young athletes of Polykleitos. There is something of elongation of contour in the form and balance of the body which would suggest that the prototype was a creation





MEDALLIONS AND COINS OF HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF, AND RELATED TYPES




MEDALLIONS, COINS, AND GLASS SHOWING ROMAN LEAF DESIGNS RELATED COMPOSITIONS, AND THEIR GREEK STATUARY PROTOTYPES



MEDALLIONS, COINS, AND GEMS SHOWING GREEK STATUARY IN ANTONINE ECCLESIASTICAL COMPOSITIONS





ALTERNATIONS COINS, AND GEMS SHOWING ROMAN COIN IMAGES, REVERSE COMPOSITIONS, AND  
THEIR LARGER STATUTORY PROTOTYPES



MEDALLIONS, COINS, AND GEMS SHOWING GREEK STATUARY IN ANTONINE ETRUSCAN COMPOSITIONS



a



b

BOETTIAN KRATER IN TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE



of a school such as that of Pasiteles in the first century B.C. That the type traces back through the successors of Polykleitos to the youthful athletes of the Argive master himself is emphasised when a photograph of the Ashmolean statue is compared with the derivative of the Westmacott Athlete in the Museo Barracco (Fig. 5), which D. M. Robinson cited for its soft, round youthful form and its difference from the severity which Polykleitos is thought to have possessed as an Argive sculptor and which we see to a greater extent in the Westmacott Athlete and in copies of his other recognised works.<sup>20</sup>

Although the Westmacott Athlete and similar types inspired the Herakles Crowning Himself, the modification may be attributed to a Greek original which in turn inspired reproduction in the minor arts, not to the odd, isolated re-uses of the Westmacott type which seem to have caught the fancy of copyists from time to time.<sup>21</sup> The original statue was probably that which played a prominent part in the Roman scene from at least the time of the Emperor Tiberius. We do not know whether the statue was imported from Greece or created in Rome by a master working there; Pliny's anecdote about the Apoxyomenos of Lysippos (*N.H.* xxxiv. 62) is proof enough of Tiberius' interest in outstanding works of Greek sculpture.

On the reverses of silver tetradrachms, drachms, and obols of Demetrios I and Agathokles, kings of Baktria (c. 190-166 and 175-165 B.C.), appears the figure of a youthful Herakles standing, crowning himself with a wreath in his right hand and holding club and lion's skin in the left<sup>22</sup> (Plate I, 16-18). This Herakles agrees in every respect with the figure discussed previously except he has the weight on his right foot and his right hip thrown out, the opposite of the Antonine medallion figure. The die designer has been careful in all other details and consistent in emphasising this point. The reverse does not appear to have been borrowed from any other Hellenistic or earlier Greek coin type, and the interest of the Baktrians in the figure is attested to by its use alone as a countermark on a silver drachm of Demetrios I in the British Museum collection.<sup>23</sup>

What weight can be attached to the appearance of Herakles Crowning Himself on Baktrian tetradrachms of c. 200 B.C.? Beyond evidence of the type's existence at the beginning of the second century B.C., a study of other reverses of the Baktrian series indicates that the single figures of divinities standing and seated on these coins reproduce statuary types which must have been well known throughout the Hellenistic world. The most notable of these is the enthroned Zeus, holding eagle and long sceptre, which derives from some fourth century or later cult statue in the image of the Phaidian statue at Olympia (perhaps a statue by Lysippos) through coin types of Alexander the Great and his successors.<sup>24</sup> There are also figures of a young Herakles facing, ivy-crowned, holding an ivy wreath in his right hand, in his left the club and lion's skin<sup>25</sup> (Plate I, 19), and slight variations of a bearded Herakles seated left on a rock, on which is spread the lion's skin. He holds the club vertically on the rock beside his right leg; his left hand touches the rock at his side<sup>26</sup> (Plates I, 24; II, 1-9).

<sup>20</sup> D. M. Robinson, *ArtB* 18 (1956), 140.

<sup>21</sup> A number of these are collected and discussed by Robinson, *op. cit.* 144 ff.; the most novel is surely the leonine found near the Via dell'Impero (D. M. Robinson, *Il Museo Mussulini*, Rome 1939, 93, no. 16, pl. LIII, 216 f.; see also 149, no. 10).

<sup>22</sup> E. S. G. Robinson, *Syllage Numismata Græcorum*, II, The Lockett Coll., London 1938, no. 9331 f., pl. IIX; British Museum Cat., *Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria and India*, London 1886, 6, nos. 1-12, pl. II, nos. 1-12 (tetradrachms, drachms, and obols; the B.M. Coll. has been considerably enlarged since compilation of this catalogue), J. Kozulovski, *Seaby's Coin and Medal Bulletin*, Feb. 1954, 54, nos. 918 ff., fig. 39, Oct. 1954, 397, no. 142, fig. 64; A. B. Brunt, *Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Cat. of Greek Coins*, Boston 1955, 195, no. 2237, which is G. H. Chase, *Greek and Roman Antiquities*, Boston 1939, 121, fig. 150. The British Museum Cat. has been revised on historical points, needless to say, by the works of Sir W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, London 1951, and R. B. Whitehead's articles in *Nordharn*, 1924, 1929, 1947, and 1951. New types of Herakles Crowning Himself on tetradrachms of Lysias are illustrated by A. D. H. Blyth, *NumSoc* 52 (1954), 137 ff.

<sup>23</sup> B.M.C., *Greek and Scythic Kings*, 6, no. 3; also an unlisted specimen from the Sir Alexander Cunningham Collection. The letters ΦΑΡ on this countermark are probably the name of a Baktrian Satrap of Demetrios. The type was copied on a silver hemidrachm of the Indo-Greek ruler Theophilos; Whitehead, *Cat. of Coins in the Panjab Museum, Lahore*, Oxford 1912, I, 67, viii, pl. IX, on a copper of the Indo-Scythian King Azes (*ibid.*, 124,

no. 254), and on coppers of Vimaes with Spalagames (here Plate I, 21) and Spalagadames (*ibid.*, 131, nos. 375 ff., pl. XIV, 150, no. 385, pl. XIV). These pieces, like the others in their series, copy reverse designs of the older tetradrachms, which were by then highly valued.

<sup>24</sup> B.M.C., *Greek and Scythic Kings*, 10, no. 1, pl. IV; Kozulovski, *op. cit.* 326, no. 137; A. B. Cook, *Zeus* III, 761; A. Zaidak, *Jahrb. JRS* 21 (1938), 55, notes 35 ff.

<sup>25</sup> B.M.C., *Greek and Scythic Kings*, 8, nos. 1 ff., pl. III, nos. 1 f.

<sup>26</sup> B.M.C., *op. cit.* 4, nos. 1 ff., 5, no. 1, (pl. I, nos. 10 f., etc.; Kozulovski, *op. cit.* nos. 140 f., fig. 63. For earlier 4th tetradrachm of Antiochos I, 270-261 B.C.), see E. L. Newell, *The Coinage of the West Seleucid Monarchs*, *A.N.S. Num. Studies* no. 4, New York 1941, 271, 274, 274, etc., no. 1456, pl. LXXI, 3; and for later Baktrian dynast, use of the type, A. R. Bellinger, *FCS* 8 (1944), 53 ff., esp. 56, 67, pl. I. Also in group in Graeco-Roman coins, e.g. with the stag, on a cornelian intaglio in the University Museum, Philadelphia (Somerville Coll., Cat. 700, no. 112).

The identical statuary type, seen from the right front, is reproduced on a medallion of Commodus (Plate II, 6, *Quacchi*, no. 11, pl. 20, no. 7) and, seen from the left front, on a small AE medallion of Hadrian (Fouquier, *Roman Medallions*, 191, notes 109 f., pl. XXII, 6). With ordinary attributes and trappings, the statue is viewed frontally on coins of Hadrian (Plate II, 4) and a medallion of Antoninus Pius (Plate II, 5). Similarly, *B.M.C.H.* 253, no. 97, pl. 48, no. 16; *Quacchi* III, 2, II, pl. 45, no. 4). These reverses reproduce a Roman cult statue of Hercules Invictus. M. Florent Squarciapino, *RullCem* 73

Reverse types of parallel Hellenistic issues strengthen the impression that the statues of deities reproduced on these dies were the common heritage of the Hellenistic world and transcended local barriers. Whoever designed the dies for states as remote as Baktria could have reproduced a local work of art, but more likely copied a work in a more renowned locale. The Baktrian Herakles Crowning Himself was probably derived, through several possible methods of transmittal,<sup>27</sup> from a statue located in some spot closer to the centre of the Hellenic world.

This type must have also influenced a statue known to the city of Herakleia in Lucania, for there is a youthful Herakles Crowning Himself on a silver stater of that city, struck in the years 281-272 B.C.<sup>28</sup> (Plate I, 22, 23). Herakles stands facing, weight on the right foot; he wears the lion's skin over his head and around the left arm, and the club is held at the side in the left hand, with the end on the ground. The head is turned towards the left shoulder and up; there is a pronounced throw of the hip as the weight rests on the right foot.

Although this figure is not included among her lists, the arguments that Mrs. P. W. Lehmann puts forth in her discussions of two other Herakles types on staters of Herakleia in Lucania as reproducing statuary types, probably in the city itself, might apply equally well to this figure.<sup>29</sup> The points of difference from the types with the weight on the left foot and the Baktrian coins (the lion's skin over the head and the shifting of the club from left shoulder to a position on the ground) point to an early Hellenistic modification of the Baktrian statuary type. This statue might have been made in Greece and exported, or produced by a local artist after imported models; at least the chances are quite strong that the statue stood in Herakleia, a city which naturally specialised in statues of its patron.<sup>30</sup>

The type of the Herakles Crowning Himself on Baktrian coins may copy a statue in Corinth. This Herakles appears to be reproduced with the Aphrodite of Aegoracanth on a bronze of that city struck under Commodus. The position of the club and the stance correspond; the right arm is raised and appears to be suited to the gesture of self-cornation. The coins are very rare (none in the British Museum), and only the worn condition of the known specimens makes positive identification difficult. The coins appear in a series of reverse types reproducing statues well known to the Corinthians.<sup>31</sup>

[1949-50], 205 ff.; P. L. Struck, *Untersuchungen zur ethnischen Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts*, II, Stuttgart 1933, 88 f.), which also appears in one of the Hadrianic tondi on the Arch of Constantine (BrBr no. 365, fig. 2, H. Bulle, *JdI* xxiv [1919], 149 f. [not Gadianus, another coin type]; H. P. L'Orange, *A. von Gerkan, Der spätantike Bildschmuck des Konstantinibogens*, Berlin 1930, 169, 174, 178, fig. 4) and as decoration with the Capitoline Jupiter on the altar in a scene on the Arch of Galerius at Salonike (Ryberg, *op. cit.*, 139 f., fig. 76).

As this was being completed Miss A. M. McCann pointed out a minor variation of the Poseidon of Melos on a scarce Baktrian tetradrachm of Antimachos (C. Seltsman, *Greek Coins*, London 1953, pl. LV, no. 3). The coin is dated c. 180 A.D. W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, Cambridge 1938, 90 ff.; *ibid.* *supra*, note 22).

<sup>27</sup> Hellenistic and Roman imperial die designers in remote regions could reproduce famous statuary types on coins without seeing the statue or a copy, through such media as gems (*vide infra*, note 53), models for silverwork, state seals, etc. The dry Egyptian soil has preserved stucco plaques used as models for small reliefs in late Hellenistic or imperial times (e.g. those in the Gayer-Anderson Coll. at University College, London, *AJA* lx [1955], 141) and plaster casts from metal reliefs (G. M. A. Richter, *Three Critical Periods in Greek Sculpture*, Oxford 1951, 33). The best links between Alexandrine stucco and plaster models and the further regions of the Graeco-Roman world are the finds from Begram in Afghanistan (see J. Hackin, *et al.*, *Nouvelles recherches archéologiques à Begram* [1930-40], *Mém. de la Dir. Archéol. Française en Afghanistan*, II, Paris 1954, and older bibl., esp. nos. 99, 101, 128, 139 [figs. 292 ff.] and others featuring well-known fourth century to Hellenistic motifs: Ganymede and the eagle drinking, the theft of the Palladion, etc. [cf. figs. 417 ff.]; summary and rev., M. Hallade, *des Ariologies* = [1955], 234-9, esp. 238 f., on the section 'Begram et l'Occident gréco-romain', by O. Kurz). Terra-cotta models were used in the fourth century A.D. in the dissemination of motifs from the world of the Arch of Constantine (*Nachtr.* 61 [1953], 297 ff.), and

their connexion with metalwork from the late Archaic period to the fourth century A.D. is well known (D. R. Thompson, *Hesperia* viii [1939], 285-316; *idem*, *Hesperia* Suppl. viii, 1949, 363-72).

<sup>28</sup> British Museum Cat., *Italy*, London 1873, 30; E. S. G. Robinson (n. 22), nos. 347, 349 f., 352, pl. VI; Lockett Sale Cat. (Glendinning and Co., 23-6, x, 1935), nos. 240, 242 ff.

<sup>29</sup> P. W. Lehmann, *Statues on Coins of Southern Italy and Sicily in the Classical Period*, New York 1946, 5 ff.; see the whole Introduction, 'A Numismatic Approach to Sculpture' (1-8), which gives a concise summary of the problems connected with investigation of statue types on Greek coins of the fifth-fourth centuries and the Hellenistic period. The conclusions drawn as to the statuary origins of statue reverses parallel to the type discussed here strengthen the belief that this composition derives from a free-standing bronze statue. See also D. von Bothmer, *BMAA* 9 (1951), 156 ff., on an early South Italian column krater showing a painter using the encaustic technique on a statue of Herakles comparable to those on Herakleia staters.

<sup>30</sup> On the allied subject of Athenian artistic influence and type transmittal to Southern Italy and Sicily in the period c. 450-350 B.C., see *JHS* lxxxv (1955), 104-113. A frequent reverse type on silver coins of Bruttium, 282-203 B.C. (B.M.C., *Italy*, 15-28), shows a nude athlete standing facing, a spear vertically on the ground in r. hand, drapery over l. arm, crowning himself with the r. hand. The weight likewise rests on the r. foot, with the r. hip out.

<sup>31</sup> L. Lacroix, in *Mélange Charles Picard*, *RA*, 1948, 534, fig. 1, no. 3, 336 ff. K. A. McDowell (*loc. cit.*, esp. 159) discussed these coins in connexion with a Polykleitan or later statuary type of Herakles holding aloft the apples of the Hesperides. His bronze statuette from Cyprus (*vide supra*, note 18; also Reinach, *Rep. stat.*, iv, 127, 6), however, follows the stance and proportions of the Antonine medallion figure; the different stance in the Corinthian coin types cannot be explained away as carelessness on the part of the die designers. Too many examples adduced here disprove this.

In the Museo Chiaramonti of the Vatican there is a torso of a Herakles statuette, the right arm broken off close to the shoulder, the left holding club and lion's skin in the manner of the Herakles Crowning Himself<sup>22</sup> (Fig. 6). Enough of the right arm remains to show that it was raised, and there are traces on both shoulders of the filleted wreath that crowned the missing head. Amelung connected the statue with the motif of the Apollo Lykeios and saw the torso as representing Herakles, triumphant, resting from his labours. He related the type to the Villa Torlonia-Albani Herakles, which at another time he thought might be restored as Herakles Crowning Himself.<sup>23</sup> When we



FIG. 6. HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF. VATICAN, MUSEO CHIARAMONTI (Vatican Neg. XXVIII-4-347)

compare this torso with an Apollo Lykeios torso nearby, or with the Berlin statue,<sup>24</sup> the position of the right arm is not high enough to reproduce this motif. Its position suits a Herakles Crowning Himself, especially since the head was tilted back and turned to the left. An important feature of the Vatican torso is that the right hip is thrown out, the stance of the Albani Herakles and the Herakles on Baktrian tetradrachms.

In Istanbul there is a statue of a victorious athlete from the Baths of Faustina at Miletos; a herm of Herakles wrapped in the lion's skin serves as support. The athlete was crowning himself and held a palm in his left arm against the shoulder.<sup>25</sup> Mendel observed that the head was inspired by an athletic type created in the fourth century for the young Herakles. The pose of the body,

<sup>22</sup> Amelung, *Op. cit.*, i, 413, Museo Chiaramonti (LV-16) no. 162, pl. 43 (l. side). The statue is unrestored, and the r. arm goes straight out. There appears to be a support on the shoulder for the reversed bend of the arm to the brow; remains of the l. leg indicate that the foot was turned out. The copy dates after the mid-second century A.D. <sup>23</sup> *Ibid. supra*, note 6.

<sup>24</sup> Amelung, *op. cit.*, 508, no. 293, pl. 32; M. Bieber, *AJA* xliii (1939), 717; C. Blümel, *Katalog*, v, Berlin 1938, 19 f., K227, K228; G. E. Rizzo, *Praxiteles*, Milan-Rome 1932, 79 ff., pls. CXIX ff., Paris statue, Cassel torso. Cf. also the derivative type of the Apollo *qui tenet citharam*

ascribed to Timarchides (M. Bieber, *The Sculpture of the Hellenistic Age*, New York 1955, 160, figs. 678 ff., and older refs.).

<sup>25</sup> G. Mendel, *Musées Impériaux Ottomans, Catalogue des sculptures*, I. Constantinople 1912, 334 f., no. 129 (1998); Reinach, *Rep. stat.*, V, 293, no. 2; G. Lippold, *Handbuch der Archäologie*, iii, 1 (Munich 1950), 264, note 15, as a Roman adaptation of a work of c. 340-330 B.C., in the manner of Euphranor or Skopas. My attention was called to this statue by Professor Ashmole, who kindly lent a large photograph, procured in Istanbul. Dr. N. Firati aided first-hand study in July 1957.



weight on the right foot, parallels that of the Vatican torso and the Baktrian tetradrachm, although the second century A.D. copyist style of the torso, closer to Praxiteles than Lykippos or Skopas, does not bear enough individuality to venture on more specific attribution.

The Villa Albani Herakles, the Apollo Lykeios, with these the Vatican Herakles torso, and several other statues with right arm raised and standing in the general construction of the Baktrian type, the Olympia Hermes to cite the most famous, have been ascribed to Praxiteles or his school. Pending discovery of further evidence such as a more complete copy, one can venture no farther in associating the second Herakles Crowning Himself, the type of the Baktrian coins, with a famous fourth-century name. The presence of the term of Herakles in the Istanbul statue and its place of discovery support the general indication that statues of the young Herakles, like those of victorious athletes, stood in the athletic centres of ancient Greece. If this statue was of sufficient renown to inspire reproduction on the coinage of Baktia and adaptation in the art of the Graeco-Roman copyists, the prototype must have been well known and accessible to the Greek world. We have suggested on the evidence of worn Antonine coins that the statue probably stood in Corinth. The reasons we do not have more copies or adaptations are possibly that the taste of the motif, while suitable for victorious athletes, did not appeal in statuary form to the Roman market when used in a divinity or that the work was difficult to multiply in marble owing to the raised and bent position of the arm.<sup>21</sup>

On the basis of what we have said, we may see if there are any heads which might possibly satisfy the requirements for a Herakles of the Baktrian coin type. These would be heads of a young, beardless Herakles, with a wreath on the head and with ends hanging down on the shoulders, or else with traces where a bronze wreath was fitted to the head. Such a head or heads, if marble, might have traces of the hands remaining on one side, but this would not be necessary if the hands were beside the wreathed head, as in the Westmacott Athletic copies, or if the head had been adapted for use as a gymnasium or household herm.<sup>22</sup>

During reconsideration of a group of so-called Skopasian heads of the young Herakles assembled by B. Graf from dissimilar fourth-century styles, a herm head in the Palazzo dei Conservatori was considered Praxitelean by B. Ashmole.<sup>23</sup> This head, which Graf related to the Tegera heads, is said in the Conservatori Catalogue to present far more affinity to the style of Praxiteles than to that of Skopas and to be connected with the former sculptor by comparison with the Olympia Hermes and the Petworth Aphrodite. Although the Catalogue saw more reason for terming the head Dionysos because of the modelling and the sensuous expression, the head may equally represent Herakles, and in countering F. P. Johnson's argument that the head is only a Skopasian modification, the Catalogue noted 'the possibility of contamination either in style, subject, or both, must not be overlooked'.<sup>24</sup> In debating a problem of this sort, we can only reach certainty in stating that the features of the Herakles Crowning Himself on the Baktrian tetradrachms are probably to be sought in heads such as this, heads which, as the variants of the Lansdowne Herakles and the poplar-wreathed bust from Genzano in the British Museum demonstrate, leave room for speculation as to attribution even when the statue type is known or well conjectured.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> There are traces of a small, secondary support on the 2, shoulder of the Istanbul Miletos athletic, indicating that the copyist-adaptor had to leave a strip of marble to bolster the forearm in its reverse bend to the crowning head (*vide supra*, note 32). It would not be too ingenious to suggest that one reason for the popularity of the Westmacott Athletic type in marble was the greater structural unity afforded the copyist in the head of the head and body to meet the arm (see following note).

<sup>22</sup> See Hyde, *op. cit.*, 143 ff., discussion of metal wreaths on marble copies of the Nymphae type. The first century A.D. copy of the head in Sir John Soane's Museum, London, has a marked circular furrow in the hair where the wreath was set on. (A *New Description of Sir John Soane's Museum*, London 1853, 45, fig. 188; 1870 facs no. 974M, p. 601, and there are copies with remains of a *pauille* where the hand met the 1. side of the head (Robinson, *op. cit.*, 130 ff. and lists). I would be inclined to place among the late Hellenistic-Augustan variants any Westmacott copy which could be restored as no athlete with a curl rather than the wreath in the 1. hand (C. Hahn, *SBHrid* 1955, 1, 7-22, esp. the Baltimore copy, fig. 7, with a *pauille* on the 2, shoulder). The difference in location of the *pauille* from that on the Istanbul athletic (notes 35 f.) may be explained by the greater bend of the Westmacott figure.

<sup>23</sup> B. Graf, *RM* iv (1889), 189 ff.; Ashmole, *JHS* xlii (1922), 242 ff., figs. 6 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Johnson, *Lykippos*, Durham N. C. 1927, 53 f.; H. Stuart Jones (ed.), *The Sculptures of the Palazzo dei Conservatori*, Oxford 1926, 90 ff., cat. 23, pl. 33. Although a herm, the head is inclined to the left, as was the case with the Museo Chiaramonti torso (*supra*, note 32).

<sup>25</sup> The Lansdowne variant are well known, the statue being now in the J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu, California (J. Paul Getty, 1953, 147; B. Schweitzer, *JDAI* xxxix [1924], cat. 15). A H. Smith made (but identification of the Skopas statue seen by Pausanias in the gymnasium at Sikyon is in question and shown on Greek imperial coins of that city (F. W. Luedemann-Blumer, P. Gardner, *A Numismatic Commentary on Pausanias*, *JHS* 6-8 [1886-87], 30, pl. II, cat. 1) from a little-known Herakles with unbroken Genzano-type head, now in the Los Angeles County Museum (A. J. H. 1953, 134; *An Ancient Greek Statue of Herakles, From the Arnold and Hope Collection*, Spink and Son, London 1928; Reinach, *Rep. stat.* v, Br. no. 6). A late Hellenistic modification of this figure, likewise with original head, is at Osterley Park, Middlesex (A. J. H. 1953, 134, pl. 45, fig. 20).

Relation of the Genzano type to a statue of Herakles Crowning Himself would (1) indicate an original head somewhat like the Aberdeen Herakles, a late Praxitelean work with Skopasian qualities (Rizzo, *op. cit.*, 74 f., pl. CXI), (2) suggest a later fourth century B.C. contamination of a Genzano-type Herakles head in a Praxitelean motif. There remains only the meagre evidence of a

## II. THE NUMISMATIC AND RELATED COMPOSITIONS

To return to the Antonine medallion and to the subject of the composition as a whole, the question of whether many of the reverse types and compositions in the Roman imperial coinage, particularly in medallions, derive from lost paintings and to a lesser extent reliefs can never be resolved because of the lack of surviving material. It is true that prototypes for many of the medallion compositions have been related to relief copies; we have some basis for judgement when literary evidences are included particularly, as in the case of the Eupompas painting, when an older Greek work is described for its *hunc* or *beauty*.<sup>41</sup> The great stumbling-block to definite conclusions concerning compositional sources for Roman numismatic types is the general lack of state painting, whether in originals or copies, from the Roman imperial age, particularly from the Antonine age in Rome itself, the ultimate ancient storehouse of such works of art. Paintings from



Fig. 7. SARCOPHAGUS RELIEF, MARS AND RHEA SILVIA. LATERAN, MUSEO PROFANO.

Pompeii and Herculaneum, the Roman finds since Raphael's time, and the evidence of mosaics go a long way towards strengthening the notion that between the statue of Herakles Crowning Himself and the Antonine medallion probably lay a painting or a relief which has not survived, but the question can never be positively resolved. Examining several imperial medallion and coin reverses from the Hadrianic age to the end of the Antonine era (A.D. 117-192), we may see what parallels there are for the Herakles Crowning Himself as a composition based on the placing of a known statue type in an artificial background setting, either by painter, sculptor, or perhaps by the patently superior craftsman who designed the dies of the second-century coinage.

A series of coins issued by Antoninus Pius in A.D. 140-43, have as their reverse the myth of Mars and Rhea Silvia (Plate II, 7, 8). Mars, helmeted and with a short cloak over the left arm, holding a shield on this arm and a spear in his right hand, strides forward from the left towards Rhea Silvia who lies half-draped, in the traditional Hellenistic sculptural attitude of slumber, her head supported by her left hand and her right arm crooked over to form a pillow behind her head. That the coin composition appears to be derived from a similar representation in painting or relief, probably the latter, is borne out by the vogue for exactly similar treatment of the subject in sarcophagi of the later Antonine and Severan periods<sup>42</sup> (Fig. 7).

A relief now in two fragments in the Lateran and the Museo delle Terme, showing an imperial procession, is generally considered to represent part of the west front of Hadrian's Temple of Venus Felix and Roma Aeterna in its background. In the pediment, unfortunately just where the break occurs, is a scene which has been interpreted as Mars visiting Rhea Silvia, the composition of the coin reverse with the figures exactly reversed. Mars approaches from the right, and Rhea Silvia reclines right with left arm over her head.<sup>43</sup> With this evidence we may suggest that the Antoninus

Greco-Roman bronze in the Bronze Room in the Louvre (no. 4153; de Glean gift), a normal leg in the enriched furniture tradition. Herakles Crowning Himself, with facial features of the Genzano type and with r. hip thrown out, springs from the foliage terminating in an animal's paw. <sup>41</sup> *Vide supra*, note 8.

<sup>42</sup> *BAUCRE* *ib.*, pl. II, no. 19, 32, 100, 14; Robert, *Sark.-rel.*, III, 1, 108 L, pl. 25, no. 88, 227 ff., esp. 227 L, note. *ib.*, pl. 604; G. M. A. Richter, *Ancient Italy*, Ann Arbor 1955, 95, fig. 273 (illustrated here).

<sup>43</sup> Flower and Ashby, *op. cit.*, 354; *Nouv.Circ.* LXIII (1955), 372, fig. 4.

Pius coin compositions are derived from some well-known representation of the Mars-Rhea Silvia myth existing in Rome at least as early as the early part of the reign of Pius, perhaps from the pedimental sculpture of the architectural landmark of the closing years of Hadrian's reign. This would explain its sudden, unlabelled appearance on coins of Hadrian's successor, who launched extensive issues with types exalting the myths and glories of the Roman race, and the inclusion of the theme in the repertory of the sarcophagi manufacturers. Within the century of its execution the pedimental group of Hadrian's temple as interpreted in the Terme relief also inspired a copy of the composition in a relief now walled up in the Vatican Belvedere<sup>41</sup> (Fig. B).

The figure of Mars from both coin and sarcophagi compositions, however, has an older and



FIG. B. RELIEF PANEL, MARS AND RHEA SILVIA. VATICAN, BELVEDERE  
(Gitt. Inst. Neg. 99407)

more distinguished history. As a single figure he appears, usually with a trophy over the left shoulder, on coins from Galba to the Tetrarchs. He is labelled MARS VLTOR on certain coins from Augustus to Claudius II, MARS VICTOR on numerous issues from Galba to Probus<sup>42</sup> (Plate II, 9-19). From coins, gems, and the many related bronze statuettes, this figure has been identified as a Republican cult statue of Mars which eventually stood in the little temple on the Capitol consecrated by Augustus in 20 B.C. and perhaps later in the precinct of the Mars Ultor temple in the Forum of Augustus.<sup>43</sup> When seeking a prototype for the figure of Mars in a Mars-

<sup>41</sup> Amelung, *Cat.*, II, 87 f., no. 36, pl. 9. There are versions of the composition, with Mars walking in either direction, in all media, including a painting from Corridor 16 of Nero's *Domus Aurea* (E. S. Strong, *Art in Ancient Rome*, New York 1928, II, 25, fig. 286, etc.). Although an intermediate painting or relief probably explains the sarcophagus sculpture, and the designers' reversal of the pedimental composition, mirror reversal was much practised among second century A.D. copyists in all media and was, of course, a natural step in stamping coins from an intaglio die. Robert *loc. cit.*, esp. 230) has seen other influences of the Venus and Rome Temple sculptures in Antonine and Severan sarcophagus enrichment; he saw the Venus Felix image as influencing figures in nos. 183, 183a, and 190, and as Phaedra in nos. 164 f. (p. 205). The cult statue is well known from coin reverses of Hadrian, Lucilla, and Julia Mamaea (Plates II, 25, 30; III, 1).

<sup>42</sup> Examples illustrated are, sestertius of Galba (no. 9),

denarius of Vespasian (10), denarii of Augustus (11, 12), sest. of Tiber (13), sest. of Antoninus Pius (14), sest. of Alexander (15), den. of Elagabalus (16), carnelian intaglio gem in Sir John Soane's Museum (17; see *Ashm. Mus.* 66 [1952], 396, fig. 4), Antoninarius of Probus (18), and Ant. of Numerianus (19).

<sup>43</sup> For a detailed discussion of the Mars Victor statue, see *VimCin* lxii (1955), 371 ff.; the Augustan cult statue of Mars Ultor, also appearing in a variety of views on coins (Plate II, 25-31), is considered in the light of numerous appearances in several media (*op. cit.*, 316 f.). This bearded Mars in Greek warrior armour becomes mixed with the iconography of Mars Victor and Romulus Augustus, an early imperial decorative figure, on imperial coin reverses from Antoninus Pius to Florianus (Plate II, 20-4). This is quite characteristic of the Hadrianic and Antonine eclectic tendencies under consideration in this section.



Rhea Silvia pediment or relief composition, the Hadrianic sculptor had only to borrow this well-known Mars Victor type, alter the trophy in the left hand to a more appropriate shield, and set the Mars in his natural position of balance in the grouping, that of appearing to stride down upon the sleeping Rhea. With the integration of the statue type into a suitable prototype for copies in relief, the subject as a whole could enjoy popularity on coins and sarcophagi in years to come.

The general type of the Poseidon attributed to Lysippos appears with variations as a later Republican, earlier imperial coin reverse and then, in full, careful treatment on the coins of Hadrian. On coins of Octavius (Plate III, 5) and Vespasian the figure is represented standing to the left with right foot on an orb and holding a wave, also on coins of Vespasian in similar pose except with foot on a prow, holding trident instead of spear, and a dolphin in place of the wave (Plate III, 6). On coins of Hadrian the figure stands as the last, with drapery over the right leg and with the wave more frequent than the dolphin (Plate III, 3). Poseidon also appears in the same detailed treatment standing to the right with dolphin, or occasionally wave, in the left hand, drapery on the left thigh, left foot on a prow, and the raised right hand holding the trident<sup>37</sup> (Plate III, 8). When combined with our knowledge of the types on Hellenistic tetradrachms (Plate III, 4) and Greek imperial reverses, these variations substantiate the belief that there must have been several derivations of the type in statuary, reliefs, or paintings known to the die designers of imperial Rome.

J. M. C. Toynbee has stated of the reverse of a medallion of Marcus Aurelius as Caesar, 'In the type of Neptune standing before the walls of Troy, the figure of the god is based upon the Lysippic Poseidon; but the prominent and carefully rendered architectural background of city walls and gate is treated precisely after the manner of architectural motifs in Hellenistic and imperial reliefs'.<sup>38</sup> The Poseidon in this setting in fact corresponds to the first of the two Hadrianic numismatic types and also to the stance of the Lateran statue. In recent cataloguing of the Cordova puteal,<sup>39</sup> A. García y Bellido concludes that the composition representing Poseidon and Athena is probably a Hadrianic election, possibly inspired by some famous late fifth- or fourth-century relief like that mentioned by Pausanias as standing on the Acropolis in Athens.<sup>40</sup> He notes that this scene, which has its counterpart in other media, represents a grouping of a Lysippic type Poseidon with an Athena who also appears contemplating the vengeance of Orestes in sarcophagus reliefs. The Cordova relief as we know it, therefore, represents the insertion of a Poseidon of the second Hadrianic numismatic (or Eleusis statuette) grouping into a scene, the other main figure of which is of an eclectic nature and to which a background and accessories have been supplied. Other appearances of this composition include a medallion of Hadrian and one of Marcus Aurelius as Caesar.<sup>41</sup>

We can point to an Antonine medallion reverse composition where this election and recombination of elements, initiated in discussion of the medallions with Herakles Crowning Himself, does not appear to spring from sources beyond the die designer's own store of talents. This compositional creation from separate elements appears on a bronze medallion of Commodus showing the Emperor pouring a libation to the Lysippic Poseidon<sup>42</sup> (Plate III, 2). The Poseidon of the Cordova puteal and Hadrian's numismatic Type II faces the veiled and togate Emperor, who stands to the left and pours from a patera over a small altar between the two figures. We have a vivid example of the combination of the divine, artistic, and real worlds. Poseidon is in every detail a statuary type easily recognised by any Roman glancing at the medallion. The Emperor appears as the sacrificing magistrate in civic garb of a thousand other coin reverses and many other works of art. This reverse has its pendant in another bronze medallion of Commodus in which the grouping and action are identical except that it is the Farnese Hercules (clearly the Antonine interpretation of the Lysippos type) and the Emperor who contemplate each other<sup>43</sup> (Plate III, 12).

<sup>37</sup> Coins of Octavius: BMCRE i, pl. 15, no. 5; Vespasian, Type I: BMCRE ii, pl. 9, no. 4, 12, etc. Type II: *ibid.*, pl. 11, no. 1, 19, no. 1. Hadrian, Type I: BMCRE iii, pl. 81, no. 3 (dolphin), no. 6 (wave). Type II: pl. 81, no. 3 (dolphin), no. 4 (wave). Most representations in statuary, Greek imperial coins, gems, paintings, etc., are collected in Johnson (n. 39), 144 ff. Hadrian Type I equals (roughly) Johnson 1-12, gem 3, and the mosaic, or the Lateran group. Hadrian Type II equals 18-20, gem 2, or the Eleusis statuette group. Octavius and Vespasian Type I are best paralleled by Johnson 14, a bronze statuette in Paris. See further, A. Janko Jitta, *JHS* lviii (1937), 224 ff.; Richter, *Three Critical Periods in Greek Sculpture*, 19.

<sup>38</sup> Toynbee (n. 3), 220 f.; Gnecchi (n. 2), ii, pl. 62, no. 6.

<sup>39</sup> *Esculapio Romano*, Madrid 1949, i, 408 ff., ii, 291.

<sup>40</sup> Pausanias i. 24. 3; Johnson, *op. cit.*, 145 f.

<sup>41</sup> Gnecchi, iii, 146, nos. 8 f.; Toynbee, 216 f., note 58,

pl. XXIV, 2; G. P. Stevens, *Hyperia* xv (1946), 1 ff., the Antonine medallion wrongly labelled 'coin of Athens'. Stevens assumes that 'the group' consisted of statuary and accessories on a base rather than a relief on a base, a point not made clear by Pausanias.

<sup>42</sup> Gnecchi, ii, pl. 82, no. 4.

<sup>43</sup> Gnecchi, ii, pl. 83, nos. 81; Toynbee, 214; Johnson, *op. cit.*, 202 ff., pl. 37; cf. also the groupings of Fortuna Redux and Jupiter Capitolinus with the Emperor on parallel medallion reverses (Plate III, 14, 18, both Commodus and in the British Museum: Gruber, nos. 18, 9).

Two other representative examples of medallion election featuring statuary types are the Commodus reverse of Jupiter Capitolinus enthroned between the Dioskouroi of the Capitoline balustrade and other representations (Plate III, 15; cf. 1, 14 [pediment group on medallions of Antoninus Pius], 15 [bust of image destroyed A.D. 69, on denarius of Civil Wars]) (Gnecchi, ii, pl. 83, no. 2;

The general inspiration of the reverse of a large bronze medallion of Antoninus Pius may, as J. M. C. Toynbee suggests, reflect a scene from the inner frieze of the Pergamene altar, but there are many differences in details (Plate III, 91). The medallion shows Herakles standing beside a tree, leaning on his club and contemplating the child Telephos being suckled by the hind.<sup>45</sup> The medallion composition is a grouping of four separate elements to produce a scene much as a photographer would move people and props about his studio to secure desired angles and balance. The figure of Herakles is again the Farnese type, perhaps again in its interpretation by Glykon of Athens; on his left rear the tree is introduced, a standard prop suited to the curve of the medallion plaquette. To the right rear is a rocky ledge on which the Telephos group, strongly reminiscent of the Roman



FIG. 9. WALL PAINTING, HERAKLES AND TELEPHOS. NAPLES. MOULD TAKEN FROM HERCULANEUM.

Wolf and Twins of Antonine bronzes, is set in such a position that the structure of the Farnese Hercules type is naturally suited to the needs of a resting Herakles contemplating this scene. The Lysippos Herakles was itself perhaps originally or in a Hellenistic adaptation part of such a group as this medallion scene, but as Johnson states, 'in none of these cases is the Herakles exactly reproduced and the presence of Telephos is usually recognised as a modification'.<sup>46</sup> This Herakles-Telephos scene is, however, one of the medallion compositions where we can at least cite a parallel from the surviving major Roman paintings. The Herakles Telephos scene from Herculaneum, now in Naples<sup>47</sup> (Fig. 9), with its like interpretation of Pergamene sculptural types, indicates that

Toynbee, 215; B. Ashmole, *A Catalogue of the Ancient Marbles at the Blenheim Hall*, Oxford 1929, 101, nos. 271 C, pl. 201. The twin on the L. appears in another Commodus reverse, facing the Emperor who is seated in military uniform on a curule. Plate II, 100; this creature an Emperor-divinity assumes continuation motifs to the Poseidon and Herakles groupings discussed previously (Giacca n. pl. 83, no. 11; Toynbee, 215; see further, S. L. Ciano, *BullCom* 33 [1927], 103 ff. esp. pl. IV).

<sup>45</sup> Giacca, n. pl. 83, no. 11; Toynbee, 215; J. Pottier, *Mon. Max. Collation Pergame*, Paris (nos. 2) H. Whitehead, *Albumes des Pergames*, III, 2, pl. XXXI, 6.

<sup>46</sup> Johnson, n. 100, 1002. The Lysippos resting Herakles appears on a denarius of Q. C. Metellus P. Scipio, struck by his legate M. Epurius in Africa 97-96 B.C. (F. A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic*, London 1932, 175, no. 1051, pl. 28, and older refs.).

<sup>47</sup> J. D. Beazley, B. Ashmole, *Greek Sculpture and Painting*, Cambridge 1932, 98 ff., fig. 210; M. Gabriel, *Monum. of Campanian Painting*, New York 1932, 27 ff. esp. 30 and

note; R. Hamano, 'Herakles findet Telephos', *Asklepi* 9 (1922), 17 ff.; F. Maaz, *Idol* 39 (1914), 65 ff. Herakles in the Pergamene frieze suggests a fourth century Attic grave relief rather than free-standing sculpture (e.g. Diepolder, *Die attischen Grabreliefs*, 16, 53). The headless statue in the Helios Museum (Smith, *Cat.*, 61, no. 1728, fig. 19) is a modification of the Lysippos type with the r. hand placed on the hip. The whole is the slightly altered counterpart of the Antonine medallion.

The artist of the Pergamene-type painting from Herculaneum has used a statue group such as that in the British Museum seen from the back as model for his Herakles-Telephos composition. The figure of Herakles suggests the Lysippos type as reflected in the Uffizi and Villa Borghese copies (Johnson, n. 249, pl. 281), the Pergamene relief and the British Museum group reflect a totally different prototype. We conclude that the creator of the Herculaneum composition knew the combination of the Lysippos-type Herakles with Telephos and the Hind

the Antonian medallion may reflect in its immediate prototype a painting, certainly a painting of the same eclectic spirit as the Mars-Rhea Silvia group, the Lysippic Poseidon combinations, and the groupings of emperors and divine statuary types discussed previously.

The fragmentary sarcophagus of M. Aurelius Bassus and his wife, found in 1940 in excavation along the Via Praenestina near Rome, is dated to the end of the Antonine period and shows in its centre panel a figure of the bearded Herakles in a position less bent than the Farnese type and closer to others of the Lysippic influence<sup>31</sup> (Fig. 10). The interesting aspect of this figure, carved in low relief in the rectangular area between the striated surfaces, is that Herakles is carefully placed in a background setting of trees, calculated to represent the Gardens of the Hesperides.




FIG. 10. SARCOPHAGUS OF M. AURELIUS BASSUS AND HIS WIFE. HERAKLES IN A GARDEN SETTING. ROMAN MUSEUM, NATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL MUSEUM, WASHINGTON.

We have an artificially composed or combined setting, an effect similar to that produced by the medallion integration of Herakles Crowning Himself against a background of locality. An identical composition appears on an intaglio gem in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, which can also be dated about the end of the second century A.D.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, in placing the medallion of Herakles Crowning Himself among Antonine eclectic compositions, we may compare two contemporary medallions of the same general subject, Herakles Victorious Over the Robber Cacus. This is the group to which H. Mattingly related the medallion type of Herakles Crowning Himself. The 'large apple tree' noticed by J. M. C. Toynbee could place the scene in the Gardens of the Hesperides,<sup>33</sup> but the tree may be an olive, with the olives slightly enlarged, bringing the scene into connexion with a known myth of Herakles crowning himself. The first of these medallions, of Marcus Aurelius as Caesar, shows the nude, thick-set bearded Herakles standing to the left. His right hand rests on the end of the club which he holds on the ground in front of him; his left hand rests on his hip, and two of the three apples are visible in the palm. Behind him, to the right, the ground rises abruptly to form jagged rocks and the entrance to a cave, before which stretches the body of the dead Cacus.<sup>34</sup> The second large bronze medallion, of Antoninus Pius, shows the identical setting with the addition of the gnarled tree curved along the upper right border, Cacus stretched out before the mouth of the cave, and the same figure of Herakles (Plate III, 13). The chief departure from the previous composition is that as Herakles stands in this pose a Roman, of about two-thirds the height of the hero, with three

when he planned his composition in the second century A.D. It follows that the Lysippic original was a group of this sort but not the only inspirational prototype, as witnessed by the Pergamene frieze of the Copenhagen statue type, *supra* note 71, or that the Lysippic Herakles within about a century after its creation was being adapted to a statuary group connected with Pergamene legends. Single figures exhibiting more baroque qualities than Lysippos possessed, such as Glykon's statue in Naples, may derive from this Pergamene re-styling of the fourth-century type (cf. the Herakles holding Telephos, in the Museo Chiaramonte, re-styled from the original of the Villa Torlonia-Albani Herakles, *rels. supra* notes 11 f.).

When the Pergamene painter borrowed the Herakles for his painting, the exigencies of composition led him to view the statue from the back. The Telephos group, however, when compared with its counterparts in the British Museum statuette and even in the small Pergamene

frieze appears not to have been viewed from the back by the painter but in correct frontal view, demanding a position for Herakles as in the Antonine medallion. In his sketch-book the painter merely rearranged two elements of the same statue group to suit his own composition, an earlier manifestation of the eclectic process which reaches its fullest development in later Hadrianic and Antonine mimetic art.

<sup>31</sup> *Dall'Occ.* 72, 1936-40, esp. f. 11. Fuhrmann, 1-1, 1941, col. 539 f.; *Capitolium* 17 (1942), 4.

<sup>32</sup> No. 1775, Sard intaglio.

<sup>33</sup> Mattingly, *BMQ* 12 (1934-35), 50, no. 39; *vide supra*, note 3. An Alexandrine drachm reverse of Antoninus Pius is also generally identified as Herakles in the Gardens of the Hesperides, but again we may have the hero plucking a branch with olives enlarged by the die designer (J. W. Curtis, *JEA* xli (1945), 119, pl. XXIV).

<sup>34</sup> Guceci, ii, pl. 64, no. 2, Toynbee, 222.



of his compatriots looking on, has come forward (filling the empty space of the first medallion) and appears to be kissing the hand of the deliverer.<sup>61</sup>

There are of course several possibilities: these two closely allied compositions derive from parallel works in painting or relief which either copy each other or a common source.<sup>62</sup> One of these compositions copies a major work of art, the other the first medallion. These points can hardly be proven with present evidence, but from what we have seen in the medallions discussed previously it is possible that, like the Herakles Crowning Himself, this figure of Herakles derives from some well-known work in sculpture or painting. Around this figure, set in an illusion of



FIG. 11. HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF. ALEXANDRIAN TETRADRACHM OF MAXIMIANUS I. NEW YORK, COLL. F. S. KNOXLEDGE

continuous space, the die designer built two similar variations of the same theme by merely introducing or removing the necessary secondary figures or objects from his usual repertory of motifs. Whether this process of selection and rearrangement went on at the die designer's level or at the hand of a sculptor or painter, this combining of known Greek statuary types to create new compositions in new backgrounds appears to have been a common practice in Hadrianic and Antonine art. As amply demonstrated by the Herakles Crowning Himself medallion type, only lack of evidence prevents us from stating in specific cases at what level the process of combining old elements to make new took place. The artists of the remarkable series of Hadrianic and Antonine medallions must not be denied any share of the credit in their field, a field in which at least we have enough surviving material to begin to judge these conclusions.

### CONCLUSIONS

In treating the subject of Herakles Crowning Himself, the purpose of this study has been to show that the figure in the reverse of Antonine medallions existed as a statue type and to try to locate that statue both geographically and artistically in ancient Rome. There were at least two statuary types of Herakles Crowning Himself, the second perhaps more famous in the Hellenistic world but also known in Rome. Until we know more, we can only state that the first type goes back to a creation of the fourth century B.C. with possible ancestry in the period of the young athletic statues of the circle of Polykleitos. The second Herakles Crowning Himself traces back at least to the third century, and considerable evidence would indicate that the original might lie in the school of Praxiteles. The first Herakles Crowning Himself was reproduced in ancient art at least as late

<sup>61</sup> Gieseler, *ib.*, pl. 53, no. 1; Toynbee, *loc. cit.* (n. 60).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. esp. in the attitudes of the delivered, the second of these two compositions and the two Campanian wall paintings of Theseus Victorious Over the Minotaur (Hermann-Bruckmann *Denkmäler der Malerei*. Munich

1906-31, Series I, 1, 107 f., pl. 81, 195, pl. 145). Richter (*Ancient Italy*, figs. 231-42) illustrates other examples of close compositional parallels in Campanian and later paintings and mosaics.

as A.D. 295, a long tradition for any statuary type to enjoy<sup>40</sup> (Fig. 111). In discussing the reasons for the presence of this statuary type in an Antonine medallion composition, parallels have demonstrated the popularity of eclectic recombinations in the Hadrianic and Antonine ages, not only in the art of the die designers themselves but in the works from which they sought their inspirations.<sup>41</sup> Disregarding the difficult question of 'lost prototypes', both medallion designs such as the Herakles Crowning Himself and those which appear to have no deeper inspiration than the hand of the die designer are tangible evidence of the selective taste in which a multitude of Roman second-century works of art were conceived.

C. C. VERMEULE

*Byn Maur College.*

<sup>40</sup> On an Alexandrine billon tetradrachm of Maximianus I, in the collection of F. S. Knobloch of New York, who has kindly supplied the cast illustrated here. The coin seems unique (published by F. S. Knobloch, *Vnum* li [1946], 128, no. 16, pl. XXXIX). The reverse is copied from the Antonine medallions, with omission for lack of space of the altar in the r. The Antonine composition, with tree and altar omitted, appears on an onyx

intaglio gem in the Museo Archeologico, Florence (S. Reinach, *Pierre gravée*, Paris 1895, 25, pl. 18, no. 36, 2, and older refs.).

<sup>41</sup> The Epitynchanus relief in the Museo Capitolino, discussed for its inclusion of the statuary on the Temple of Concord balustrade (*supra*, note 13) is a classic example of Antonine eclecticism in relief sculpture.




FIG. 1.—CYRENE PLAN.

Fig. 1. — Cyrene Plan.



## CYRENE: A SURVEY OF CERTAIN ROCK-CUT FEATURES TO THE SOUTH OF THE SANCTUARY OF APOLLO

### I. THE CAVE OF THE PRIESTS OF APOLLO

#### *Present Condition*

**Basic Structure:** A broad flight of twenty-one steps leads up from the south-west angle of the Temple of Apollo to a partially paved court immediately in front of the lower face of the scarp. This is given a quadrilateral delimitation by the angular revetment of an irregularity in the scarp to the west, and by the monumental water tank to the east of the entrance to the grotto. The entrance was hewn in the cliff face in the form of three arches (now much destroyed), and was revetted with large well-draughted limestone blocks. Of these, only the lower two courses are now *in situ*, but individual blocks of the upper courses have been collected and amongst them are those with crowning mouldings and one bearing the fragment of a Greek inscription (height of letters, 25 cm. approximately).

The interior of the grotto consists basically of a central oblong depression, paved and cemented, surrounded on the two sides and the back by a raised staging—thus giving rise to the term of reference 'TRICLISTON'—while between the staging and the walls are the tanks and channels associated with the water supply and drainage.

Considered longitudinally, the interior may be divided into three entities. The first extends from the entrance to a pair of rock-hewn columns bearing rude inscriptions. Immediately above this compartment lay the terrace of an ancient rock-cut path and its collapse has breached the path and totally unroofed this section of the grotto. In consequence of this, much earth and debris has accumulated on the floor, obscuring features and thus perhaps artificially enhancing the distinction between this compartment and the one adjacent, which extends inward from the piers to the rear of the central depression. Finally, at the rear, is a trapezoidal arrangement of rock cutting. In these latter two sections the roof is intact and both the structure of the raised staging and the central depression well preserved.

**Water Supply and associated features:** At the rear of the grotto, two engaged piers project forward to form three apsidal chambers corresponding to the three entrance-arches. It is in the east pier that a large multiple fissure provides a continual water seepage, which seems to be the only source of supply within the confines of the grotto. The water so entering is stored in the adjacent rock-hewn tank which forms the east apse and the overflow led off from a small basin into a rock-cut gutter around the foot of the east wall. In addition, from this overflow basin another duct leads in the opposite direction to communicate with the central depression. There is no apparent intake for the large circumferential channels paved with flagstones and it is presumed that they deal with general seepage in periods of heavy rainfall.

Some indication of the purpose for which water was conserved remains evident. Along the inner margin of the raised staging occur semicircular structures—there are two still recognisable, but it is possible to identify a total of five—symmetrically positioned. The Italians referred to them as seats,<sup>1</sup> which indeed they may have been, but the provision within them of an interior channel seems to indicate that the occupant sat surrounded by water or was baptised in a seated position. In one extant example this water channel communicates with the central paved area and this may have been the case with the others. That the central paved area was intended as a place for aquatic activity is evident from its construction and by the superficial drainage channel which pierces the threshold sill and leads off into the drainage system of the court.

#### *Embellishments and Additions*


The external aspect of the grotto was expressed in monumental masonry: the storage tank replete with two columns with Pergamene capitals flanking a moulded and inscribed facade. Behind the rock-cut piers of the entrance is a corresponding three-vaunted built structure devoid of ornament. This is secondary (the masonry is of different character) and must have been intended as shoring to that part of the roof which subsequent downfall has proved least stable.

The two central pillars bear each an inscription on their opposed inner faces, but toolings seem to indicate the former presence of inscribed plaques. Similar indications also attest the original existence of plaques on the faces of the two apse piers.

The rear wall of the central apse is recessed to engage beams supporting a canopy and on the rear wall of the eastern apse are three small rectangular niches arranged in a triangle.

**Designation.** Taking all the above-mentioned features into consideration it would seem that

<sup>1</sup> It remains a bare possibility, on the analogy with the Mithraea, that these may have been the bases for cult figures.



THE CAVE OF THE PRIESTS OF APOLLO




FIG. 3

the only conventional architectural term apposite to such a structure is 'MYSTERY BASILICA'; the commonly illustrated subterranean mystery basilica at Porta Maggiore in Rome immediately suggests itself as an analogy.

*Appendix by R. D. Barnett*

*Purpose.* It might seem obvious from the proximity of this cave to the shrine of Apollo that it was connected directly with his worship. Yet the purpose of this cave is somewhat mysterious, and in fact the manner in which it is cut deep into the cliff, the triple raised bench forming the so-called *triclinium* on which were once seats, and the remains of an apse at the end, are much more reminiscent of a shrine of Mithras or some similar mystery cult than of the cult of Apollo. The presence, however, of small watercourses, apparently intended to fill a sort of basin in the centre of the cave, does not agree with other Mithraea known, and suggests a different rite. The only clues are afforded by the inscriptions, hitherto unrecorded.

On the west pillar inner face we have:

Κ . . . ΜΑΡΚΙΑΝΩ  
ΝΕΩ  
Τ [Ω] ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΚΑΛΛΗΤΕΙ  
ΕΥΤΥΧΩΣ

On the east pier, inner face, we have:

ΔΥΣΙΒΙΩ ΡΟΥΦΩ  
ΝΕΩ  
ΕΥΤΥΧΩΣ

and below:

. . . ΘΕΟΔΩΡΩ  
ΤΩ ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΚΑΛΛΗΤΕΙ  
ΕΥΤΥΧΩΣ



These are clearly salutations to individuals, who would seem to have been priests—to judge from the lettering, of the second century A.D. or later—who are described by the excessively rare but evidently laudatory epithet, *καλλέτης*, peculiar to the Apollo cult of Cyrene. Professor M. N. Tod has, with his usual kindness, drawn my attention to its only occurrences in SEG. ix. 173, cf. Add. p. 121 and 186, and to the discussion of its meaning by L. Robert in *Hellenica* i. 11-12. There can be little doubt that it means as he proposes, 'A is bonne et heureuse année', 'our who has had a good, or felicitous year', presumably of office, or perhaps more exactly 'he who has enjoyed the year of beauty', whatever that implies. There is evidently some ritual meaning, now lost. The significance of *ΝΕΩ* is also obscure, though it would seem to be parallel to *καλλέτης* and suggests renewal by ritual, perhaps in some mystery cult which had become associated with the adjacent Apollo cult. It should be mentioned that, though, as remarked above, these features described above by no means all fit into what is known of the cult and ritual of Mithras, yet two fragments of Mithraic sculptures<sup>2</sup> were formerly found not far from this cave, and a Mithraeum must therefore at some time have been located somewhere in the vicinity. Nevertheless, in the present uncertainty, it may be best to let the popular name 'The Priest's Cave' stand until a better can be found.

## II THE SOURCE OF THE FOUNTAIN OF APOLLO

The entrance to the water channel supplying the fountain is at present walled up by substantial mortared masonry set up initially by the Italians in approximately 1930. At this stage, however, the partition stopped slightly short of the roof of the cavern, leaving a small aperture sufficient to permit access. This state of affairs is attested by a contemporary photograph in the Museum archives. The purpose of the walling was presumably in connexion with the modern water supply which is drawn from the fountain. Shortly before the outbreak of war the partition was supplemented and the entrance completely closed. The channel has been explored several times and the following are the major records of its nature which subsist:

1. Beechey Brothers, *Proceedings of the Expedition to Explore the Northern Coast of Africa*, pp. 550-5.
2. Smith and Porcher, *History of the Recent Discoveries at Cyrene*, pp. 25 and 26 (quoting and confirming above).
3. Mühlhofer, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Cyrenaika* (Speläologische Monographien), Wien 1923 (with plan).
4. Oliverio, *Notizium Archeologico*, Roma, Fascicolo iv, 1927, esp. p. 253 (Le fonte di Apollo).

Mühlhofer supplies a plan and there are sections, photographs and copies of the inscriptions in Oliverio's article.

They all agree on a narrow channel generally of approximately 2 metres calibre with cutting in the latter stages of its course which penetrates the hillside approximately 40 metres before becoming prohibitively constricted. The one feature which diverted these investigators was the use to which the water-borne mud within the channel had been applied. This has been generally plastered over the sides of the channel and used as a vehicle for rude graffiti. The Beechey brothers could not conceive that such a temporary medium could antedate a recent visit of a British man-of-war and were amazed to find that some of the inscriptions were fifteen hundred years old.

## III. THE INTERCONNECTED GALLERIES

In and behind the scarp face which forms the southern limit of the sanctuary of Apollo and continuing eastwards, there is a succession of rock-cut passages and galleries admitting of upright human passage, which may be followed from a point immediately in front of the feature known to the Italians as the 'fontana nuova' until earth-fall in a shaft some distance past the ritual baths blocks further progress. The total traverse, independent of sinuities, is thus of the order of 250 metres.

In this system as at present accessible there are three clearly defined stages:

1. From the point immediately in front of the 'Fontana Nuova' to a point in the scarp face opposite the Propylaeum.
2. From the point opposite the Propylaeum to a point where the Roman retaining wall abuts on the scarp face at this level.
3. From this last point onwards until the blockage.

At present neither the original commencement nor termination of this system is apparent,

<sup>2</sup> Vermaseren, *Corpus inscriptionum et monumentorum aegyptiacorum* (Mithraea), 106, 107.

and conjecture on this matter involves a consideration of the adjacent features which might have been associated with Water-Cults.

The fountain of Apollo provides the western terminus of these features. To recapitulate: the spring of the fountain issues from the mouth of a channel in the rock into a series of cut chambers. The watercourse has been ascended several times, and all the records agree on a narrow channel generally of approximately 2 metres calibre which penetrates the hillside for about 40 metres before becoming prohibitively constricted. It is beyond doubt that this channel itself does not communicate with any other feature to be here discussed.

Immediately to the west of the chambers fed by the fountain of Apollo is a somewhat similar




FIG. 4.—PHOTOGRAPH OF DOUBLE GALLERY

cavetti, containing water which issues from a fissure in the rock. This feature the Italians called 'The FONTANA NUOVA'. The rock face between it and the Fountain of Apollo chambers has slipped and fallen, and it is just possible that they may have been connected by a narrow passage immediately behind the scarp.


The 'Fontana Nuova' has features which are reminiscent of the Cave of the Priests of Apollo. There is a cut gutter around the rear walls at external ground level, while around the ledge nearest the cliff face is a built gutter interrupted by two 'ritual seats'. This gutter has a Greek inscription giving a date in terms of an Egyptian month—*MECOPH 19*. The cavern is incompletely excavated and it is difficult to determine whether it was originally as immediately accessible as it now is.

Beyond doubt, the system of passages and galleries open into the 'Fontana Nuova', and the contingency of communication between the 'Fontana Nuova' and the Fountain of Apollo is of interest as determining which of these two features was the original western terminal of the system.

Five metres of blockage now separate the cavern of the 'Fontana Nuova' from the first stage of the passage leading eastward around the scarp face. In its immediate approach to the cavern, the passage is roofed with large stone blocks visible from the surface, but it soon becomes wholly rock-cut and runs parallel to, and about 10 metres inside, the cliff face, in which it has access through three short passages, i.e. at right angles. Eventually it debouches into the cliff face opposite the Propylaion.

From this point begins the second stage, which comprises a monumental double gallery supported by piers. This is open to the light, and along the outer margin of the outer gallery are cut seats like those in the ritual baths.

The inner gallery is divided into compartments by barriers recessed in the rock, which have the function of regulating the water supply—see Fig. 4. This area in front is paved to form a walk about 3 metres broad. The paving stones are worn and heavily rusted, and it seems possible there may be a water channel beneath them. The gallery terminates in a cul-de-sac, but the








FIG. 6

outer makes an elbow and approaches the point where the scarp at this level abuts on the Roman retaining wall.

From this point commences the third stage, where the passage is narrow and winds deep under the cliff past the Ritual Baths at a lower level, and then an indeterminate distance onwards. At intervals there are vertical shafts to the surface and two of these occur immediately in front of the Ritual Baths. One of these bears evidence of having been used as a well-shaft, to supply the baths, for traces survive of a pipe which connected the head of the shaft with a cemented storage tank. Eventually a fall of earth down a further shaft brings the passage to a close. Thus its original extent and the nature and purpose of its destination remain unknown.

#### IV. THE RITUAL BATHS<sup>3</sup>

The Ritual Baths are cut in a higher terrace to the east of the other features. They comprise six chambers of varying appearance and function, hewn inwards from the cliff face. Immediately in front of these once stood a complex of built chambers at present attested by imperfectly excavated

<sup>3</sup> An account of these appeared by G. R. H. Wright in the *Illustrated London News*, July 14, 1953. For any detailed study of the nature and purpose of these baths

reference must be made to the strikingly similar structures being excavated by the French at Gortys in Arcadia and reported on in *BCH* lxxvi, 1952, pp. 246-7.

walls together with extensive recessing in the cliff face for the engagement of rafters. At present, however, they are so indeterminate as not to justify detailed consideration.

The rock-cut chambers, considered from east to west, fall into two classes. The first four display elaborate ritual arrangements, while the fifth and sixth seem to be the service apartments. The characteristic feature of the former consists of a series of baths resembling high-backed arm-chairs with a basin for the feet. In this basin is a small circular sump while high up on the back of the bath is a small niche. Invariably each bath is surmounted by a larger apsidal niche.

The first chamber is a miniature domed cavern, entered directly from the cliff face. It is at a higher level than the other chambers and entirely separate from them. The walls are plastered and show a succession of apsidal niches as in chamber 2.

Chamber 2 communicates with Nos. 3 and 4 and is at present entered by a small ante-chamber at its eastern extremity. However entrances appear to have been continuously opened



FIG. 7.—PHOTOGRAPH OF CHAMBER 2




FIG. 8.—PHOTOGRAPH OF CHAMBER 3

and closed in the rock so that the front wall of this chamber and the next is now largely built. The chamber is circular and domed and like No. 1 shows a succession of apsidal niches in the middle register of the walls. Placed as if for a president in the centre of the rear wall is a 'chair' bath, and to the east side of this is a circular bench, above which is a rock-cut gutter. The floor is tessellated, with a shallow rectangular pit in the centre. The western section of the floor leading to chamber 3 is broken down to a lower level, and from this area a narrow passage winds up behind chamber 2. This passage may have originally reached the surface, but is now blocked by earth. (See Fig. 7.)

Chamber 3 is rectangular with a slightly vaulted roof. The floor is tessellated. The walls are surrounded by the standard type of 'chair' bath and in addition there is one of the tub variety. (See Figs. 8 and 9.) Chamber 3 owes its peculiar shape to the rubble west wall which has transformed an original rectangular chamber into two separate entities. It shares the same flat roof



FIG. 9.—PHOTOGRAPH OF CHAMBER 3

with chamber 5. The floor is tessellated, and again the walls are surrounded by the standard arrangement of 'chair' baths and niches. A door gives access to this chamber direct from the scarp face.

The appearance of chambers 5 and 6 proclaims their different functions. The walls are not plastered, nor are the floors tessellated, and there are no 'chair' baths. However, their several features indicate that they provided and stored water for use in the ritual chambers. In the rear wall of chamber 5 are two large fissures, now partially silted up. A water conduit leads from beneath one of these to a storage tank, and a branch conduit pierces the rock wall and communicates with chamber 6. This chamber, which is in the form of a narrow gallery, has vertical shaft to the surface as its inner extremity and is intersected at right angles by a conduit, now choked with fill, which may originally have carried water. The drainage of the gallery is outwards and passes beneath a built portal in the scarp.

#### V. IDENTIFICATION OF THE NYMPHAION OF ARTEMIS

M. François Charnoux makes reference to some of these features in his recent publication *Cyrene sous la Monarchie des Battinides* (1954). His thesis is that the nature of certain of the rock cuttings in the scarp taken in conjunction with epigraphical evidence leaves no doubt that this is the location of the 'NYMPHAION', the sacred grotto of the mysteries of ARTEMIS, to which women according to the text of her decree were obliged 'to go down' on certain specified occasions, especially before marriage: *εὐφροὶν τὸ νυμφῆιον ἐκ Ἀπραιῆ κατεβῆναι δεῖ*. The plausibility of this idea is not to be disputed, but it is worked out in terms which betray a slight insufficiency of attention to the totality of the features concerned.

Charnoux isolates for regard on this point only the triangular terrain enclosed on the south by the scarp face, on the north by the high wall (re-erected by the Italians) flanking the pseudo-'SACRED WAY', and on the west by the transverse wall from the vicinity of the propylaion to the



scarp face. This is precisely the area referred to as stage 2 of the interconnected galleries, the stage of the monumental double gallery open to the light, lined with rock-cut 'chair baths'. M. Chanioux's description (p. 316, para. 2) confirms that it is this feature, and this alone, to which he adverts; the only possible source of confusion lying in his description of the subterranean chambers parallel to the cliff face as intercommunicating 'en certains endroits sur deux rangs de profondeur'. 'Profondeur', however, must be understood here in a horizontal sense, as signifying depth inwards from the cliff face.

The penetration of M. Chanioux is commendable in disassociating this area from the hum and bustle of workaday man and beast, with which Oliverio is supposed to have involved it. However, since all his arguments apply *a fortiori* to the 'RITUAL BATHS' situated on a higher terrace immediately to the east of this terrain, it is difficult to understand why he has not included them in his survey.<sup>4</sup> That a group of rock-cut caves (especially one associated with lustrations) should be dedicated to the nymphs, has much to recommend it. But the real difficulty is that the term seems to be associated by other inscriptions not with the baths but with the channel of the Apollo Fountain, the Spring of Kyra, where, in the water passage which runs far into the cliff, there are many graffiti. Two of these in the second section of the passage mention (with gaps) *ἐν τῇ νυμφαίῳ*<sup>5</sup>; two record that persons entered *ἐς τὸ νυμφαῖον*;<sup>6</sup> more explicitly three mention persons entering *ἐς τὸν νυμφαῖον*.<sup>7</sup> It is hard to resist the idea that here must have been the true shrine of the nymphs, the *nymphaion*,<sup>8</sup> although it is fully possible that from this water passage the term was at an early date extended to the passages and baths to the east.

G. R. H. WRIGHT.

*Oriental Institute Excavations, Tolmestou*

<sup>4</sup> Presumably because certain aspects and analogies might suggest a late date for these features.

<sup>5</sup> SEG ix. 266, 273-6, 289, 293.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 271, 284.

<sup>7</sup> Oliverio, *Scavi Recenti di Efeso . . . in Bericht über den VI Internat. Kongress für Archäologie, Berlin 1940*, p. 455.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Oliverio, *Nachrichte Archäologica, Roma*, fasc. iv.,

1927, p. 241: 'The second, upper part which is cut by man is sacred to the nymphs'. It is probably to this part of the fountain that the following inscription on the cliff face adjacent to the pedimental cutting refers—*ἱερὸν τοῦ Νύμφαιον* (Corpus Inscriptionum ii. 3134). Cf. Smith and Porcher, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

## NOTES

### The Battle of Salamis—a Correction

In Map J of my article on the Battle in *JHS* lxxvi, p. 32, the position of the Greek fleet's front line *c. 8 a.m.*




FIG. 1.—POSITION OF THE GREEK FLEET'S FRONT LINE ABOUT 8 A.M.

was incorrectly shown. It should be as shown here by the dotted line, in accordance with the text of the article on pp. 46 and 50.

N. G. L. HAMMOND

### Philo of Byzantium and the Colossus of Rhodes

In his article on the Colossus of Rhodes in *JHS* lxxvi, Mr. Herbert Maryon argues that the statue was not cast as is usually assumed, but formed of hammered bronze plates. He bases his argument on the figure of 300 talents given by Philo Byx (iv. 6) for the weight of bronze used in the statue. A statue 120 feet high using this quantity of metal would, he calculates, have walls rather less than one-fiftieth of an inch thick, which would be impossible thin for a large casting.

But Maryon runs into difficulties, I think, when he tries to make Philo's description of the statue tally with this conclusion. For Philo unquestionably believed the Colossus to have been cast. The relevant passage has already been ably discussed by M. A. Gabriel in *BCH.* lvi, 1932, pp. 332-32, but is perhaps worth examining again here to bring out the particular points at issue.<sup>1</sup>

iv. 3: Ὑποβέας δὲ βάσιν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μαρμαρίτιδος πέτρης ἐπ' αὐτῆς μέχρι τοῦ ἀστρογάλῳ ἀνώτατος ἤρσαν τοὺς πόδας τοῦ κολοσσῶς, ἐνθα τῆς συμμετρίας ἐφ' ἧν ἡμέλλε θεὸς ἱδρυμηνοντέοντος ἐνέστησαν τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῆς βάσεως ἦδη τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνδριάντας ἀπερκεύοντο. περὶ τοὺς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκτελεῖται βλαστάνοντα τὸ λευκὸν ἐπιχρυσάμενον δ' ἔδει τὰ στήθεα καὶ καὶ ἄλλα ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνδριαντισμοῦ ἀναστῆσαι τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐφ' αὐτῶν

Having built a base of white marble, (the artist) first fixed upon it the feet of the Colossus up to the height of the ankle-joints, having worked out the proportions suitable to a divine image destined to stand to a height of seventy cubits; for the sole of the foot already exceeded (in length the height of) other statues. For this reason

<sup>1</sup> I have used R. Hercher's text (Paris 1858), Orselli's text (Leipzig, 1896), which is printed in Overbeck's *Schöpfungsgeschichte* and used by Maryon and Gabriel, is frequently misleading.

it was impossible to hoist up the rest (of the statue) and place it upon (the feet), but the ankles had to be cast upon (the feet), and, as when a house is being built, the whole work had to rise upon itself.

*Ἐκχυρῆσαι* is a key word for the whole of Philo's description. An unfortunate slip in the translation used by Maryon confuses it with *ἐκχυρῆσαι* 'to fill up' and so destroys the sense of the passage. *Ἐκχυρῆσαι* means 'to cast upon' the part already cast, and that implies casting *in situ*. It is contrasted with *ἐπιθεῖναι* 'to place upon', which would imply that the casting was done at a distance. Since in 'casting upon' the molten metal which was to form the new part would presumably have come into direct contact with the existing part, fusion (i.e. 'casting on' in the technical sense) would probably have resulted.

iv. 4: Κινεῖται δὲ τὸ πᾶν τοῦδε μὲν ἄλλως ἀνδριάντας οἱ τεχνῖται πλάσσαντες ἀνέστη, ἐνθα αὐτῶν μέλι διελέσας χωρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸδε ἄλλως συνθέντες ἐστήσαν αὐτὸς δὲ τῆς πρότης χωρεῖσθαι τὸ δεύτερον μέρος ἐκτελεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦτο γυμνασθῆναι τὸ τρίτον ἐπιθεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς ἐργασίας ἐκχυρῆσαι ἐπὶ τοῦ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ μέλι τὸν μετὰ τοῦτο κινεῖται

And for this reason, while other statues are first modelled, then diminished for casting in parts, and finally reassembled and erected, in this case, after the first part had been cast, the second was modelled upon it, and when this had been cast, the third was built upon it, and for the following part again the same method of working was adopted. For the individual metal sections could not be moved.

Having illustrated the process of casting *in situ* by the initial example of the foot and ankle, Philo goes on to say that the same process was repeated again and again so as to build up the statue in courses, a method radically different from that employed in casting statues of normal size. The last sentence repeats the reason already given in iv. 3 (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον *κ. τ. λ.*) for this procedure.

iv. 5: Τῆς χωρῆας δὲ γαστήρης δὲ τῶν προτετακμένων ἔργων αὐτὸς ἐκχυρῆσαι τὸν κορμὸν καὶ τὸ πῆγμα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐστήσαν καὶ τῶν ἐκτελεσμένων περὶ τοῦ ἐκτελεσμένου τὰ στήθεα, ἐνθα αὐτῶν τῆς ἐργασίας τελευτῇ τῆς ἐκτελεσμένης καὶ τοῖς ἀνδριάνταις ἀνέστη τοῦ κολοσσῶς χεῖρες γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, κρητῶν τὸ πεποιημένον ἦδη κατέστη, τῆς τῶν ἐργασίων ἐκτελεσμένης ἐκτελεσμένης χωρῆας.

'After the casting [of a new course] upon that part of the work already completed, the spacing of the horizontal tie-bars and the joints of the framework were looked to, and the stability of the stone blocks placed within the figure was ensured. In order to prosecute the plan of operations on a firm basis throughout, the artist<sup>1</sup> heaped up a large mound of earth round each section as soon as it was completed, thus burying the finished work under the accumulated earth and carrying out the casting of the next part on the level.'

Philo has already told us in iv. 2 that the Colossus had an armature constructed partly of squared blocks of stone (*εὐρακὸς λίθου*), held together by iron tie-bars (*σύνδεσμοι ὀρείων*) and partly of iron frameworks (*ὀρείων σκελετοί*); but its precise form must remain conjectural. Maryon suggests that the object of the mound was to provide a ramp by means of which the stone blocks and metal for the armature could be hauled up to the heights at which they were needed. No doubt, if the mound was in fact conical,<sup>2</sup> Chares would have used it for this purpose. But it is very questionable if that is what he built it. Maryon does Greek engineers less than justice when he asserts (p. 69) that 'in the ancient world it was not possible to lift such heavy masses with any available tackle' and to *τοῖς ἀνδοροῦχοις ἐπὶ τοῦ πύλου κενὸν περὶ τὸν πύλον*.<sup>3</sup> And Philo gave a different and very convincing reason why it was built. It was built, he says, in order to provide, at each successive stage of operations, a firm and level and, we may add, incombustible platform on which to carry out the casting. 'Εξέτατο, in the context, not only man 'on the level at the top of the mound' as opposed to *κατάπερος*, 'buried under the top of the mound'.

Philo's account of the casting of the bronze coils here. Nobody, I think, who reads it with an open mind could fail to admire that it is a surprisingly consistent and credible account to find in the pages of a late antique rhetorician, and it is hard to believe that it does not go back to a good Hellenistic source. Are we to reject it simply because a single figure, mentioned by Philo once and not supported by other evidence,<sup>4</sup> cannot be reconciled with it? Since figures are notoriously liable to corruption, it seems more reasonable to reject the figure. But, whatever we do, let us at least try to understand what Philo actually said.

D. E. L. HAYES.

<sup>1</sup> Gabriel (op. cit. 336-B) makes the ingenious suggestion that Chares mounded the earth into a towerlike scaffolding of wood copied (man, or possibly) actually formed by, Demetrius Poliorcetes' *βελίπλοια*.

<sup>2</sup> 'Aristotle', *Metaphysics* xix. For the archaeological evidence see Koldewey and Padelstein, *Die griechischen Tempel in Unteritalien und Sizilien*, 224 f.

<sup>3</sup> Philo himself tells us (iv. 1) that the amount of bronze used in the Colossus 'was so great that it nearly caused a dearth in the mines; for the casting of the statue was an operation in which the bronze industry of the whole world was concerned'. There is also Constantine Porphyrogenitus' *de adm. imp.* 21, repeated by Theophanes (*Chronographia*, ed. Classen, i. 327) of the caravan of 980 camels upon according to Theophanes, which transported the bronze after it had been sold as scrap to a Jewish merchant. Such traditions are doubtless exaggerated, but their existence suggests at least that the quantity of bronze was impressively large, not a mere 12½ tons. It is difficult to know what to make of Polybius' statement v. 82 that Ptolemy III Euergetes promised the Rhodians, for the reconstruction of the Colossus after the earthquake, 300 talents, 100 architects, 350 workmen and 15 talents a year for their keep. The 3,000 talents, as Lohdy points out (*Annuaire de l'École*, 1901, n. 331), were probably bronze metal, but why should more bronze have been required?

## A Greek Inscription found in Malta

On the 27th November, 1951, at a little distance outside the ditch which marks the walls of the Roman town at Melita (now Rabat-Melita), in an area covered with Roman tombs, a huge stone was found measuring 60 in. in length, 27½ in. in height and 19½ in. in breadth (152.4 cm. × 73.6 cm. × 33.3 cm.). It is a funerary altar with a simply decorated mensa and sides. The back has no decoration and its surface is rough. When excavated the altar was found in a place where the rock was cut to allow of its being placed against it and between it and the wall of rock there was an empty space of a little depth, clearly indicating that the space must have been filled by some architectural structure of a nature slight enough to be completely destroyed at a later date. The front part is considerably decorated and bears the following inscription:

ΧΑΙΡΕ  
ΠΑΙΛΙΟΣ ΕΡΜΟΛΑΟΣ  
ΠΕΡΓΑΜΗΝΟΣ ΚΩΜΩΔΟΣ  
ΚΑΙ ΛΥΡΙΣΤΗΣ ΕΒΙΩΣΕΝ  
ΕΤΗ : ΚΕ : ΥΓΙΑΙΝΕ

In English: Hail Publius Aelius Hermolaos, a comedian and harp-player from Pergamon. He lived 25 years. Farewell.

The inscription is written in Greek because Hermolaos was Greek and, presumably, also because Greek along with Latin was up to a point the language of culture of Roman Malta at the time.

On the left-hand side of the inscription, in the triangular space, there is the letter Ε and in that on the right there is the letter Κ. They stand for *Εὐχαι*, *εὐχαριστία* which is a Greek translation of *Dis Manibus*, which, in the abbreviated form *D.M.*, is often found in Latin sepulchral inscriptions. On the left-hand side of the inscription there is a comedian's mask and, underneath it, an actor's scroll. The lyre on the right-hand side of the inscription points to Hermolaos' proficiency in the playing of that instrument. The hanging decoration surrounding the inscription is either just a decorative element or, perhaps, a decorative wreath with which actors might be crowned. Underneath the inscription there is a tympanum and a plectrum used in playing on the musical instrument.

The funerary altar must have been raised in imperial times, in the second century, possibly at the time of Hadrian. The rounded  $\epsilon$ ,  $\chi$ ,  $\eta$  for  $\epsilon$ ,  $\chi$ ,  $\eta$  suggest this.

An interesting complementary feature is the fact that a few ashes and remains of broken glass were found not inside or behind the altar but underneath it. Presumably a little space was dug underneath the altar and a glass jar containing the ashes was put in it; in time the altar, by its sheer weight, pressed upon and broke the glass container.

From the discovery of this inscription use or two deductions of an historical nature may be made. In the second century A.D. social life in Roman Malta must have been developed to a considerable extent for drama (and possibly Greek drama) to be enjoyed and appreciated. Although no traces of Roman or Greek theatres have as yet been found in Malta, dramatic entertainments may have been held in the capital city or at least in the private houses of well-to-do people. The name P. Aelius Hermolaos suggests a Greek freedman, perhaps of the Emperor Hadrian, whose full name was P. Aelius Hadrianus. The taking of non-imperial names by





FIG. 1.—INSCRIPTION FROM RABAT-MEDINA. ROMAN VILLA MUSEUM, MALTA

freedmen was relatively infrequent in the second century, and the fact that Hermolani was an artist points to the same conclusion.

Besides, the place where the funerary altar was found should indicate the place from which one of the Roman roads leading out of the old city started. A number of tombs were also found in the neighbourhood, and there is ample evidence that in Roman Malta cemeteries were built just outside the city gates as in other Roman cities.

EDWARD COLEBOURNE

*University of Malta.*

#### An Inscription from Karpasia in Cyprus

Mr. K. Nikolou, a native of the village of Rizokárpaso in the north-eastern extremity of Cyprus and student of archaeology in the University of London, in a letter dated April 12th, 1956, reports the discovery of an interesting inscription. 'The stone', he writes, 'was brought to my notice just before this last Christmas. I visited the place, about 200 m. south-west of the Church of Ag. Philon, and having dug all round, I noticed the inscription on top. . . . This church, some two miles north of Rizokárpaso, marks the centre of the site of the ancient *Karpasia*. Of the inscription we offer together

the following account, Mr. Nikolou contributing photographs, squeræ, hand-copy and description of the stone.

*Phanokles, son of Nikolaos, is honored by the Council and People of Karpasia*

Pedestal of a slate-blue marble, in the form of a rectangular *temn* capped with a cornice supported by double mouldings. Towards the bottom of the right and left faces is a projecting circular base. Save for the loss of the cornice to the right, its mutilation to front and rear, the stone is virtually undamaged. H. 0.61 m.; w. at top (including cornice on the left) 0.711, at bottom 0.695; th. at top (with both cornices) 0.724, at bottom 0.62. Above are two sets of oval-dowel-holes arranged in the following pattern, and drawn to scale:




FIG. 1.—INSCRIPTION FROM KARPASIA



FIG. 2.—INSCRIPTION FROM KARPASIA



feature and in the nature of the headgear. Normal Boeotian heads wear either a snood e.g. *A.J.A.* lvii, 1953, pl. 66, fig. 1), which is found on those which come early in the series, or a scarf or kerchief with a variety of decorative patterns, wrapped round the head in various ways, but always leaving a considerable mass of hair exposed on the forehead (*op. cit.*, pl. 68-70). The Trinity head, on the contrary, wears a *sakkos* with a pom-pom on the top, bound to the head with ribbons and concealing all the hair except a bunch of curls over the ear. We see a similar *sakkos* on the New York *lebes gamikos* 144 by the Washing painter,<sup>1</sup> worn by the bridal attendant carrying torches. If the ribbons confining the hair of the bridesmaid next to her (who is about to tie a fillet round the head of the bride) were bound in the same way about the *sakkos*, the effect would be a good deal like that of the Trinity head. The *sakkos* with pom-pom was especially fashionable in Athens in the latter part of the fifth century, while it occurs only rarely on Boeotian vases. This and other indications, such as the tendril accompanying the head on the back of the vase and the quality of the folds on the front, give the impression that the painter was influenced to an exceptional extent by Attic masters.

A. D. UAU.

University of Reading.

<sup>1</sup> Richter and Hall, *Red-Figured Athenian Vase*, pl. 147.

### Notes on some Attic Black-Figure Vases with Ship Representations

I had put together some conclusions I had drawn from a study of Greek ship representations on the attribution of several Attic black-figure vases, but the publication of Sir John Beazley's *Attic Black-figure Vase-painters* (*A.B.V.*) has both forestalled and corrected me. I append some comments that might still be of interest.

#### 1. EXEKIAS

In *A.B.V.* 136/20 Beazley has now decided that the fragmentary dinos, Villa Giulia 50599, was painted as well as signed by Exekias. Indeed, the ships on this vase together with Exekias' Munich ship are the only ones that can stand comparison with those of Kleitias for delicacy and precision. The ships on the Vienna dinos, 3619, are also clearly connected with Exekias, and the painting on the top side of the mouth shows that (this vase is near 'E' Group) (*A.B.V.* 140/3, the Painter of the Vatican Mourner). Another contemporary dinos, Louvre F.62 (*A.V.* pl. 1, 1-2, Giraudon photographs 37744-5 taken after the cleaning of the vase; whence fig. 1) is decorated on the inside of the mouth with ships that are close to those on the Rome dinos signed by Exekias, but lack his extreme care of execution: for example, the rail and supports on the dinos of Exekias are painted, on the Paris ships the rail is lacking and the supports are omitted; the long mouth-line, running from the tip of the ram to a point aft of the eye, a feature found only on the Munich, Rome, and Vienna ships, is also omitted, but for the rest, particularly in the markings on the hull under the bowsprit, these Paris ships are nearer the Rome ships of Exekias than the Vienna ships are. The figure decoration on the top side of the mouth of the Paris dinos confirms the influence of Exekias, and would seem to tie it to the *psykter-amphora* in Naples (fig. 38), attributed by Beazley to Near Exekias (*A.B.V.* 148/3).

Judging from the drawing in Millingen (Coghill, pl. 38) and allowing for the fact that the ship has been perversely restored with a flag attached to the stem-post, blowing against the direction of movement, and with two sails, I should guess that the Coghill dinos was also connected with the Paris vase.

<sup>1</sup> That the Acropolis frag. 505 (*A.B.V.* 78/1) provides a second ship painted by Kleitias, I have little doubt.

#### 2. ANTIMENES PAINTER

The fine Madrid dinos, 10904, has been attributed to the Antimenes Painter (*A.B.V.* 275/133). There is another ship dinos, Leningrad 85 (*Greece and Rome*, xviii, 1949, pl. 87, 3b; here fig. 2), which is by the same hand. The ships are identical except that here there are no oar-ports (but still the oars emerge from below the gunwale), and the heads of the rowers have no detail.

The dinos, Louvre F. 61 (*C.V.* pl. 2, 2-4), has ships that are close in style to those on the above two, but they are less carefully drawn, and Beazley has attributed the vase to the manner of the Antimenes Painter (*A.B.V.* 270/50). The ship dinos, Villa Giulia 5571 (*C.V.* pl. 55, 3), has also



FIG. 1.—LOUVRE F.61



FIG. 2



FIG. 3.—LONDON B.240



FIG. 4.—LONDON F.2



been attributed to the manner of the Antimenes Painter (*A.B.V.* 279/51), but the markings on the hull underneath the bowscreen conform rather to those on a prow used as a shield-blazon on a neck-amphora in San Francisco, Legion of Honor 1814, which Beazley has attributed to the Group of Würzburg 199 in the Antimenes Painter's school (*A.B.V.* 287/3). I should, therefore, be inclined to attract the Villa Giulia dinos into this Würzburg 199 Group.

### 3. LEAGUES GROUP

The ships on the following vases are clearly by the same hand:

1. Cup, London, E.2: *A.B.V.* 390/1; here fig. 4 (R.M. photo.).
2. Cup frag., Amsterdam 2182: *A.B.V.* 390/2.
3. Cup, Calanet des Médailles 322: *A.B.V.* 380/296.

This is confirmed by Beazley (*A.B.V.* p. 390), but he attributes nos. 1 and 2 to the red-figure Group of London E.2, and no. 3 to his Antiope Group 1, implying that although the ships are by the same hand, the rest of the painting on 1 and 2 may be by a different hand from the painting on 3. Who, then, is the painter of the ships? Is he to be equated with the painter of 1 and 2, or with

the painter of 3, or is he a separate personality? I suggest that the latter is the case, and that he was the painter of the London neck-amphora, Beazley fig. 3, B.M. photo.). This vase is not included by Beazley in *A.B.V.*, but is mentioned by Haspelt (*A.B.L.* p. 39) as having points in common with her Daybreak Painter, who is a companion of, if not the Antiope Painter himself. On the obverse a winged warrior flies over a ship, overlapping it at several points, so that it is hardly likely that there is a division of work here. The stem of this ship and the upper contour of the ram are restored, and the eye is lost, but the style is the same as on the cups, and in particular the pattern of irregularly curved lines on the hull beneath the bowscreen is not found on ships outside these vases; on this neck-amphora there are two groups of such lines; on no. 1 there is one group on each ship; on no. 3, one or two groups; again, the assimilation of rowers' heads to rail-supports is found also on 1 and 2. Now as the rest of the painting on this vase was not done by either of the artists responsible for the decoration other than the ships on nos. 1 & 3, and as the overlapping of ship and warrior would seem to preclude a division of labour, the only conclusion is that the painter of the ships was the painter of the neck-amphora, London Beazley.

R. T. WILLIAMS.

Durham

## NOTICES OF BOOKS

**Festschrift Bruno Snell zum 60. Geburtstag am 18. Juni 1956 von Freunden und Schülern überreicht.** Munich: Beck, 1956. Pp. 257. DM. 24.

Twenty-four friends and pupils of Bruno Snell have joined in celebrating his sixtieth birthday. The number of those chosen to honour this great and well-loved scholar, who has done so much for classical scholarship and for international goodwill, for his University and for his country, was restricted to those who have worked or are working in Hamburg, and their contributions are arranged in the chronological order of their arrival in Hamburg. Here only those can be briefly noticed which are of particular interest to readers of this journal. Karl Reinhardt attributes the Homeric hymn to Aphrodite to the same poet as the *Arkteia* of Aeneas in the twentieth book of the *Iliad* and deals sympathetically with cross-references between the hymn and the *Iliad*. Ernst Kapp discusses the origin of the term 'accusative case'. Paul Maas notes the variations of Callimachus' practice in using hepthemimeral after penthemimeral caesura. Kurt Latte emends the text of Theocritus, *Idyll* 13, 68-9. Kurt von Fritz, in a long study of the prologue to Hesiod's *Theogony*, defends many doubtful lines as genuine Hesiod. Hans Diller traces the pre-philosophical uses of *Kommen* and its verb. Hans Rudolph interprets the *Lycurgos stelen* and ascribes it to Chilon in the seventh century. Wolf H. Friedrich shows how Roman epic poets overtrump Greek epic poets in descriptions of storms. Wilhelm Hoffmann points to old and new elements in Homer's conception of the *polis*. Ernst Siegmund gives a new and more reliable text of the two Epicurean fragments in the papyrus, Heidelberg 1740 recto. Andreas Thierfelder argues that Epicharmus fr. 254K. is genuine. Ernst Fraenkel explains the Homeric *μυρία* as *μυρ(ί)στα* 'council-weaving'. Richard Walzer writes on the legacy of the classics in the Islamic world and notes what Arabic texts of Greek writers have and what have not been translated into a Western language. Hartmut Erbse analyses the first sentence of Herodotus. Hans Hartmann considers the function of the Greek perfect. Walter Spierri interprets a fragment of Aristoxenus preserved by Hippolytus in *Ref. mathematicum* II, 12-14.

T. B. L. WEBSTER.

**Festschrift für Carl Weickert.** Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1955. Pp. 159. DM. 25.

Carl Weickert will be known chiefly for his work on Greek Architecture. The writer of the preface, E. Boehringer, therefore points out, appropriately enough, the preponderance of architectural studies in this *Festschrift*. But, on reading it, one finds the architectural articles of a distressingly light weight: and the volume is imperfectly redeemed only by the contributions on other topics.

I take the architecture first. E. Langlotz devotes six pages to the origins of the pendentive. Coins of Roman Imperial date, especially those of Syria and Asia Minor, often show canopies over altars and cult-statues, and Langlotz interprets the roof on one or two of these canopies as a dome sliced by four vertical arches, and shaped as a result like, e.g., the dome over the crossing in the Tomb of Galla Placidia. Alternatively, and more obscurely, he suggests an origin for the plan of the same tomb in three-lobed tombs, which are not known to have had pendentives, of the second century A.D. in Asia Minor. But how did these very different prototypes coalesce? The dome which Langlotz thinks he sees on the coin of Antioch (*BMC, Galatia*, etc., XXV. 12) exactly resembles a shape on a coin of Baalbek (*ibid.*, XXXVI. 6), which is certainly

meant to represent the pediment and central archivolt of the Great Propylon (Robertson, Fig. 97). The Severan coin of Pergamum (*BMC, Myria*, etc., XXX. 7) may afford better—though still desperately uncertain—evidence for Langlotz' dome. I do not know why from many three-lobed buildings all over the Empire—at Mex., Ostia, etc.—Langlotz should select one or two at Sardis. Besides, we already know of pendentives in tombs with square chambers and corbelled beehive roofs in Etruria, Egypt and the Crimea (see, e.g., Minns, p. 194). Langlotz has not, I think, narrowed down this famous problem.

W. Andrae considers the psychic states of the planners of the first single-roomed temples in Mesopotamia. He concludes that the rectangular rooms entered asymmetrically on a long side preceded in time the long rectangle entered on a short side, and that last of all there appeared the 'Babylonian' rectangular room, entered in the middle of a long side. This last, he says, originated about 2000 B.C. at Tell Asmar, and was canonised by the later Assyrians as an antechapel, by the Babylonians as a shrine, with the cult-statue opposite the door. He connects these various forms each with its own theology. I am reluctant to see the vast difference that Andrae sees between asymmetrical and symmetrical cross-axial rooms, especially when I remember the extremely clumsy execution of so much Mesopotamian architecture. Besides, one had supposed, from Otis, *Handbuch*, p. 656, Abb. 46, that important symmetrical cult-rooms, arranged on cross-axes, existed in the very early temples of Uruk. Nor is it very profitable to isolate single rooms, as Andrae does, from these enormous architectural aggregates. For Babylon, at least, Andrae is committed to believing that the god drew physically nearer to his worshippers as the millennia wore on. But this seems contrary to normal religious development.

F. Kraus, who describes the 'Basilica' at Paestum, follows the latest fashion by turning the article into a quasi-mathematical exercise. However, he does use an 'Ionic' foot of 34.9 cm., very different from the feet which Dinsmoor uses for his ruins: and he does suppose, reasonably, that the temple was meant to have an external length of 150 ft. on the stylobate. Apparently the cross-walls of the cella did not come where Koldewey and Puchstein put them. But this article is thin. Why, too, does Kraus call the pronos the 'pronon'?

H. J. Lenzen regards Parthian architecture as a bridge between East and West. I do not see that it is anything but a blind alley. Are the half-classic frontispieces of Assur really the forerunners of anything at Sasanian or Ctesiphon? Lenzen does not show that they are. And what did Parthia transmit westwards? He makes one half-frivolous (or desperate) suggestion that, since triple-arched façades are found in Parthia, perhaps it is no accident that Augustus' triumphal arch, put up for the recovery of Crassus' standards, is the earliest known to have had three openings. But Lenzen has ignored the Arch of Orange, which may well be even earlier. If the *Litaeon*, the tunnel-vaulted Parthian hall with side-aisles or side-chambers, were an old-established Asiatic form, it might have had time to work westwards and influence Domitian's Throne Room. But Lenzen denies that it appeared before late Parthian times, when its form was possibly suggested by that of Parthian nomadic tents. He ignores Wachsmuth and Neumann, who believe that *litaeon* are found in Syria about the ninth century B.C. (see, e.g., Oppenheim, *Tell Halaf* II, p. 397. Lenzen does credit the Parthians with extending the use of the tunnel vault. It is, of course, generally assumed these days that few Babylonian cross-axial rooms had tunnel-vaults.

But what real evidence have we? Timber and large stones must always have been scarce in Babylon, and almost every kind of vault known to antiquity is already found in the predynastic 'Royal Tombs' at Ur. Besides, walls, especially side walls, in Babylonia are normally very thick.

The weakest architectural contribution is perhaps that made by Gerda Bruns. She derives both the Telesterion at Eleusis and the cellas of fifth-century Doric temples from the 'megara' of Tyrris and Pylos. For, as we see from *Odyssey* 7, prayers were occasionally said and libations poured by the nobility assembled in Homer's *megara*. Because, presumably, she has not consulted Powell's *Lexicon*, she affirms, and seems to think it significant, that *diōra* and *megaron* are synonymous in Hesiodos. With Nilsson and against Siegen, she decides that the degenerate 'megaron' of Tyrris was already a temple, chiefly because she wishes to believe that its Mycenaean predecessor had itself been half-holy. Everywhere she labours to see the indicators of a complicated religion and tradition in the primitive Greek cella or hall, which seems so often the simple and obvious answer to a simple architectural problem. It is the Classical peristyle that needs explanation. But on this she has nothing to say.

We now turn to the more fortunate subjects of this *Festschrift*.

Of the two philological contributors, G. Klaffenbach enters two minor inscriptions and discusses with care and sense the important Athenian decree for the treatment of Ioulis (*IG II/III*, 111). M. Gelzer, on Pragmatic Hagiography in Polybios, hardly helps to redeem this *Festschrift*. He concludes that Polybios never claimed to explain everything—he believed, after all, in Tyche—and that he learnt his craft not from Thucydides but from later historians. This paper, too, is thin, and ignores English contributions to the subject, for instance that made by C. N. Cochrane. Articles by other scholars (e.g. Bruns and Langhans) have already shown a similar ignorance.

Of the other contributors, G. Karachitis-Weinberg publishes the remains of the cult-statue of Juno Sospita at Lanuvium, an imaginative work which he plausibly assigns to the age of Antoninus Pius. E. Kunze considers in detail a Corinthian helmet apparently dedicated by the younger Miltiades at Olympia, with a suitable inscription, after his conquest of Lemnos. Kunze compares it with other helmets of the period, notably BM 251 (= *Kuhahn Taf. 4*, nr. 5 and 6). Those who desire a clear account of the shape, development and history of the Corinthian Helmet—something not easily found—could hardly do better than turn to this article. K. Bittel collects the few fragments that are at present known of Hittite Relief Vases of the late second millennium. These are interesting. Despite their early date, it seems to the reviewer that they possibly inspired in some way the creators of the East Greek 'Wild Goat' style. F. Matz considers the history of the Round Centaur as a motif in Classical art. Up to late Roman times, when Centaurs started to draw the chariot of Dionysos, it is apparently always Herakles who bound them. In Apelles' famous picture of Alexander triumphing over War, Alexander perhaps figured as Herakles, War as the Centaur.

W. H. Schuchhardt, starting with the Chiaramonti Head, seeks to isolate a family of heads of the Early Classical style. This is an interesting paper, and none of the heads are worth study. But the Chiaramonti Head has a lower jaw and forehead quite different from those of the others. If one neglects the slight difference in coiffure, is not the Humphrey Ward head, not mentioned by Schuchhardt, at least as close in feeling as the Chiaramonti Head to the head in Victoria? And is it not premature of Schuchhardt to consider all his heads 'Argive-Sicyonian'?

Ernst Buehler points out that the Greeks, like Goethe, saw Nature as an organising principle, while for us moderns Nature is a kaleidoscope of *disjointed members*. Let the authors of this *Festschrift* speak for themselves!

Finally, H. Diepolder, in what is perhaps the most acute and interesting paper of the collection, traces the development of the Nessos Painter, assigns two amphorae, each with its painting of a woman's head in profile, to definite stages in his art, and even gives his works, with some plausibility, dates contemporary with those of individual early Archaic sculptors.

The format of this *Festschrift* betrays what we are told of the prosperity of modern Germany. Moreover, to the usual drawbacks of its genre it adds one other yet more serious. Weickert, as the preface makes clear, desired no *Festschrift*. So the editor had to amass his material by surreptitiousness and haste. It is no good, then, for eminent honorands to dislike such volumes. They cannot kill them—only make them worse.

HUGH PLYMMEK.

LEVY (G. R.). *The Sword from the Rock. An Investigation into the Origins of Epic Literature and the Development of the Hero*. London: Faber & Faber, 1953. Pp. 236, with 4 plates and 1 map. 30s.

Miss Levy begins by describing Hittite sculptures at Yasilkaya at or near the site of the ancient Hattusas, comparing others at Alaca Hüyük and Malatya, and writes, p. 26: 'It is hoped to show in the following pages that the ritual which maintained the political stability of the states during the centuries of migration of peoples who were eventually to dispossess them, became the formal source and earliest centre of dispersal of the first categories of epic literature to be studied here, and contained the seed from which the third type developed its independent existence among the new nations.' She adds soon after: 'Archaeologists are generally agreed that the wall-reliefs of Yasilkaya illustrate rites which actually took place there.'

The sculptures are of course impressive, and are taken as almost comprehensive. Miss Levy writes, p. 44: '... the plastic analogies of Yasilkaya are of great importance as presumably illustrating the widespread acceptance of the ritual in Western Asia, not under the separate categories familiar to us from the description of classical writers, but as a compact organism which related the cults of local gods to the service of state deities, and prehistoric agricultural rites to the political and religious duties of king and people.' She thus takes a step, and supposes that Yasilkaya exposes and explicitly reveals a complex unity implied to have existed somewhere by the occurrence elsewhere of what are presumed to be parts of it, in fragmentation, or imperfectly reported. Perhaps we cannot securely assume a single complete archetype, or, if there was one, feel sure that Yasilkaya presents it to us. Miss Levy is aware of this, for later in the book, after citing Delaporte and comparing the rites of Marduk and the drama exposed in the rock-carving at Yasilkaya, she writes, p. 53, note 1: 'It must be emphasised that the ritual connections of these reliefs with the Mesopotamian ceremonies of renewal is an aesthetic deduction supported by very fragmentary archaeological evidence. The sculptures are introduced here as the only body of illustration in Asia Minor which may offer an imaginative basis for the existence of similar ceremonies at a distributing centre of Mesopotamian culture in the second millennium B.C.' Here, surely another step is taken; and there may be some doubt whether these steps are really steps forward, and indeed whether, if the qualifications are necessary, as they seem to be, the first part of the book ought not to have been recast to avoid a certain obscurity concerning the argument.

Nor is it very clear to me that the Hittite sculptures at Yasilkaya look likely to present a good and typical example of a Mesopotamian or indeed Near-Eastern fertility-rite-system. So far as I know, the important figure of the Sword-God himself is insufficiently paralleled elsewhere. We should have liked more details about how the Hittites may be supposed to have blended together the religion



which they brought with them and the religion or religions which they found in south-west Asia, if indeed the evidence is as yet strong enough for any argument. The connection of the monuments with epic is not as certain as we might wish, so that *The Sced from the Rock* as a title is not so satisfactory as the delightful comparison of the Hittite sculptures with the myths of Jason and Arthur and their cognates, to which indeed the Hittite conception may well be ancestral. On the other hand, the Babylonian *Epic of Creation* looks as if it stems from ritual; but here some additional comparative material might have been desired, such as the Malayan 'Genesis' which used, I believe, to be recited on each occasion before tin-working was started. *The Epic of Gilgamesh* also seems to have ritual roots, but there are complications in the task of unearthing them. In this kind of work it is hard to be sure which elements are essential and which are not; I should doubt that a half-human companion of a central hero is typical of epic, or that the comparison of an Odysseus who is a bear, as Professor Rhys Carpenter sees him, is relevant in this context. The idea that ancient epic arose out of ritual has long been attractive, but in spite of the attempts the chain of evolution still has missing links.

The plan of Miss Levy's book is to trace epic poetry from an origin in Mesopotamian ritual myth through the successive occasions of accretion and enrichment of contents down to the *Morte d'Arthur* and *Pandora Lost*. It fills some of the gap between Dr. W. H. D. Rouse's *God, Man and Epic Poetry* and Sir Maurice Bowra's *Heroic Poetry*, and certainly the gap needed to be filled. But one moderate-sized volume cannot do much towards that; and Miss Levy, for all the usefulness and fascination of her book, might have been better advised if she had sought to cover less ground and had taken a squall, or not so small, part of the field instead of all of it. As it is, she travels fast, and often intuitively. Some readers may even wonder, not quite fairly, just how much farther we have got when we come to the end, and wish for more patient plodding.

It seems to me that there are three large questions, each needing at least one quite large volume: (1) Whether the epic of ancient Asia is in fact based on myth-ritual; (2) if so, exactly what that myth-ritual was; and (3) whether, and in what sense, the epic of Mesopotamia and other parts of south-west Asia, of Greece, and of India should be regarded as cognate, and stemming from a common origin, or similar origins. Miss Levy's book treats of all of them, and more besides; and not surprisingly, it does not quite hold together, and may even be misleading to those who forget her considered intention, as many may.

Meanwhile, the parts of the book which are descriptive and can be taken easily as descriptions and not arguments, are on the whole very useful, very instructive, and even exhilarating. Indeed, the argument might almost be better away. It is not necessary for the enjoyment of the magnificent sculptures, so well pictured and described and interpreted. And it hardly succeeds in connecting the sculptures with what follows. Here, however, something is done which deserves very high praise indeed. Mesopotamian, Greek and Indian epic are taken into one synopsis, and learnedly exposed in translated passages for comparison helped by descriptive comments which are often most illuminating, for example when Miss Levy finds a similarity of structure in the three epics. Miss Levy takes risks by handling large matters in a short space, but her handling can be masterly and her insight keen and revealing. I imagine that much remains to be done in continuing the comparison of the three poetries. But the writer leaves us wanting more and proceeds to trace the later history of epic. That is much less urgent, and perhaps not quite in place, where there is no room for a new and comprehensive interpretation of the tradition. But again there are many illuminating comments; though surely it is rather late in the day to scorn the sublime and perhaps unapproachable later books of the *Aeneid*.

Miss Levy has done a service in pressing for the synoptic view of ancient epic which has probably become all the more important since the intervention of the Pylion Tablets and the increase of knowledge concerning the early I-E speaking 'invaders', Greek and others. She has seen a vision of continuity through long and wide perspectives. Some people may think that her proofs have failed her just when they were most needed. But even if they are right, the vision itself and the account of what she believes to have happened, may be true; it may even be the truest general picture hitherto drawn.

W. F. J. KNIGHT.

FINLEY (M. L.). *The World of Odysseus*. With a Foreword by Sir MAURICE BOWRA. London: Chatto & Windus, 1956. Pp. 101. 13s.

This survey, by an acknowledged authority on ancient Greek practice, of the economic, social, and ethical background of both the Homeric poems, prefaced by some useful remarks on early Greek history and the technique of epic poetry, is a welcome addition to Homeric scholarship. Dr. Finley is concerned only with the framework within which life moved and no knowledge of material culture is presupposed or supplied. It is shown that but for a few anomalies both early and late such a framework both exists and is coherent and intelligible. Society was bound by the concept of status with the principal cleavage between the nobility and the rest, who include specialist craftsmen, freemen, slaves (mostly female), and thetes. The unit of society was the independent household. Hence Eumaeus, who was within it, was better off than a thete, who was outside. Status and household, together with kinship, defined a man's life. Social stresses were produced by the existence of the community which competed with the household for loyalty, and by the individualism of the aristocracy who tried to assert the superiority of the kingship over the household. The use of *Ida* with *domestica* confesses that the sanction of kingship was not always moral. In a brief note on religion Finley justly emphasises the eclipse of chthonic and fertility deities and suggests that this reflects a comparatively sudden religious revolution. Since the household was, except for metal, self-sufficient, economic activity was at a minimum. Finley analyses and stresses the importance of gifts and their anticipated counter-gifts in all relations in this society, personal, public, and international, both between individual nobles and households, and between nobles and their dependents. Any 'fee' or service counted as a gift and created an obligation in its recipient.

With most of this we must agree, and Finley is to be thanked for elucidating in language so free from jargon and technicalities the workings of society in the days before the supremacy of the polis. More open to dispute or clarification are the assumptions and methods by which this social world is extracted from the epics and the attempt to place it in time.

Finley would date the *Odyssey* to the late seventh century. But history, it is argued, shows that the social background is not contemporary with this date. Nor can archaeology admit that much of the material background is Mycenaean. It is inferred by analogy that the social world is not Mycenaean either, and must therefore belong to the ninth or tenth centuries. No attempt is, or indeed can, be made to confirm this date by external evidence. It is generally held that the material world of Homer is a chronological Europe with its lower limits in the eighth century. It would be expected that the social world would be an equal medley. But this would depend chiefly on whether there had been changes as radical as that from bronze to iron. When Finley wrote first he had not the advantage of the Linear B decipherment. The effect of this discovery he now discusses in a brief Appendix, where it is maintained that the *World of Odysseus* is far poorer and more primitive than that of the tablets and marked

off from it by a 'complete social transformation'. F. has since elucidated this suggestion in *Hilfsmittel* 6 (1957), p. 233. Of course, there are differences, or perhaps distances, between the tablets and Homer. The tablets have no recognisable themes, Homer has no clear notion of differences in land tenure. But the key features of the Homeric background, the slave-holding households, the craftsmen, and the hierarchical structure, are proved to be Mycenaean. Roughly speaking, the fall of the Mycenaean palaces destroyed or discredited the upper layers of the social pyramid discernible on the tablets. Symptomatically, Homer does not differentiate the *basileus* and the *phaidros*. Even after the time of the polis traces are to be found of feudal and clan organisation. Can we not then view the social background of Homer as parallel as its history to the material, his showing a general coherence instead of confusion because it reflects a real continuity underlying the inevitable changes? We should not then wish to extract from the epics a general picture of an intervening period which is neither Mycenaean nor seventh-century Ionian.

Only trivial changes have been made in this, the second and English edition. Indices, source references, and a reasoned bibliography of selected items are included.

J. H. MANSWORTH.

**Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta.** Ed. E. Lobel and D. Page. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955. Pp. xxviii + 367. £2 10s. od.

**Sappho. Griechisch und deutsch herausgegeben von M. Treu.** Munich: Heimeran, 1955. Pp. 247. DM. 10.80.

PAGE (D.). **Sappho and Alcaeus.** An introduction to the study of ancient Lesbian poetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957. Pp. ix + 240. 48s.

The appearance within a twelvemonth of three books on Lesbian lyric poetry is a notable event, and the names of Treu, Lobel and Page lend it further distinction. Two of the books have an air of finality about them. The Lobel-Page edition provides a definitive text of Sappho and Alcaeus; it brings up to date the separate texts published by Dr. Lobel in 1925 and 1927. Professor Treu's pocket-size volume, which is a companion to his 1952 edition of Alcaeus, furnishes not only his own opinions of Sappho, but to some extent also those of a generation of German scholars inspired by Wilamowitz. The third volume, however, is of an experimental nature. It gives a foretaste of a full-scale commentary on the Lesbian poets. Professor Page has selected only the longer and more important fragments and a few others which he himself considers specially interesting. Although he does not promise more, it is to be hoped that he may yet continue his commentaries and extend them to the entire corpus.

The excellence of the Lobel-Page edition has been obvious to all since the day of publication. Its authors have left out nothing that is strictly necessary, everything that they include is presented clearly and succinctly. After the shortest of forewords, they give us first a catalogue of manuscript sources and then a series of comparative tables in which their own numbering of the fragments is recorded with the systems of Bergk, Lobel and Diehl, and with various editions of the papyri. Next comes the Greek text, containing 213 fragments of Sappho, 452 of Alcaeus, and 27 of uncertain authorship. In this part of the book the punctuation not only of the text but also of the apparatus criticus deserves the highest praise.<sup>1</sup> Finally there are separate word-lists for each poet; these include every word and word-form that is complete or the MSS. or can be restored with certainty or probability.

It is unlikely that many more poems of Sappho and

Alcaeus will come to light in future. This edition, coming so soon after the publication of the most recently discovered papyri, enables us to take stock of all that remains. And its pages—scholarship and typography apart—make a disappointing spectacle. So many fragments consist only of a few part-lines, so many of a handful of words, so many of a few unintelligible syllables or a mere jumble of letters. Such poems may contribute one or two items to a word-list; they can hardly do more, except by some miracle of joining or restoring. Our understanding of the two poets still rests on a few major fragments in each case—a mere dozen or two in the case of Sappho, rather more for Alcaeus. It is indeed fortunate that the stock of pieces that are both substantial and intelligible has been about doubled by the papyri, although the new pieces have brought not only new light but fresh problems. Clearly, however, any future advance in the field of Lesbian poetry must depend on the continued investigation of the major fragments, through constant re-assessment and occasional restoration of the text.

The Lobel-Page text is conservative; few conjectural readings are admitted as genuine, and not many more find a place in the apparatus. This is all to the good. Even those who (like the reviewer) think that the editors' definition of what is possible and what is not possible in the Lesbian dialect is somewhat too rigid will have to admire their restraint. What is regrettable is that in the thirty years that separate Lobel's *Sappho* from this new edition classical scholars should not have done more to mend the text, even in passages where context and construction are fairly certain and the extent of the corruption must be very limited. Are we to suppose that such passages as Sappho fr. 96.8 *α ποδοδουρην τ' αμν*<sup>2</sup> or fr. 138 *οις τε αδων εδωκε* are beyond repair? There is hardly a stanza in the longer passages of either Sappho or Alcaeus that is free from such difficulties, which impede reading and, as long as they remain unresolved, call for more discussion than they really deserve. Now that we have an edition that is both authoritative and accessible, a modest amount of experimentation may remove some of the old doubts and make the Lesbian poets easier to read.

Treu's book is addressed to a wider public than the Oxford edition. It provides a text and translation of all the surviving fragments, and has a long Appendix which contains a bibliography, an essay on Sappho's poetry, and a set of short explanatory notes on the text. A supplementary essay contains an account of other editions and some remarks on the numbering of the poems. In all this the author evidently has in mind not only the trained classical scholar but also the beginner, and usually the general reader as well.

The poems are numbered by Treu himself in two ways. For the most part he uses the order established by Diehl for the Teubner edition, but for the most recently published fragments the numbers are taken from the Lobel-Page edition. Moreover, the new fragments are printed before the old ones. This curious arrangement stresses both the quantity of the new poems—they form a seventh of the whole—and their importance in any re-assessment of Sappho's art. But it cuts across the ancient division of the poems into books.

The Greek text contains many more emendations and supplements than are accepted by Lobel and Page. This is, of course, inevitable in a book that is intended to interpret Sappho to the layman. The readings adopted are not of a revolutionary character; most of them were previously known through editions and published papers. The German translation is always close to the text, but at

<sup>1</sup> In Sappho fr. 1 the editors seem to have sacrificed appearances to their zeal for precision; it is a little irritating to find the only complete poem in the volume more heavily adorned with brackets than any other.

<sup>2</sup> It may be worth considering whether not a rose-fingered moon but a moon with a ring around it is meant. Among the Aegean islands the full moon in a clear summer sky is often seen within a distinct halo of a rose-red colour. If this fact were relevant, something like *ποδοδουρην* might be read. A scribe might change this to the well-known epic form.



the same time (so far as the reviewer can judge) fluent and readable.

Opinions of the Appendix will certainly vary. The first part of the critical essay, on the qualities of Sappho's poetry, is likely to win most praise. Here the author shows the good sense and the sympathy for Greek literature which distinguish his other writings. His account of Sappho's life is less satisfactory. He accepts the Wilamowitzian idea that Sappho, after her return from exile, ran a finishing school for young ladies. Subjects of instruction in this school are described as 'feine Sitte und Eleganz der Kleidung, Tanz und Saitenspiel und Gesang'. Sappho's reputation in the centuries following her death is also discussed. And in accordance with Wilamowitz' attitude, the age-old charge of homosexuality is dismissed as being a gross misrepresentation of the ordinary bonds that existed between teacher and pupil. Against these views we must now set the arguments advanced by Page, who maintains (rightly, it seems) that the finishing-school hypothesis is without foundation and is willing to concede (too willing, perhaps) there may have been some kind of homosexual relationship between Sappho and some of the women of whom she sings. Whatever the truth may be, it seems certain that Freud and, before him, Wilamowitz, draw more from the text of the poems than is just.

Freud's commentary represents a valiant attempt to compress much learning into a short space. It is certainly useful, in so far as it may remind the expert of details long forgotten or suggest to the scholar who is not a specialist the outline of a problem with which he will have to familiarise himself later on. Nevertheless, its account of MS variants and conjectured readings is too cramped; anyone seriously interested in the questions underlying such notes will have to turn elsewhere if he is to comprehend the nature of the problem or discover the answer. But with this limitation the commentary is good. And the book as a whole is a sound introduction to Sappho's poetry, as well as a worthy addition to the *Tivoli* series.

Page's book is in two parts, which are about equal in length but of different design. The first part deals with twelve poems of Sappho. It gives the text of each poem, along with a critical exposition and detailed commentary; and it concludes with an essay on Sappho's life and character. The second part begins with Alcaeus as soldier and citizen (which necessitates lengthy discussion of historical sources) and proceeds to the text of a large number of poems, grouped according to subject-matter. First come the political poems, then poems about gods and about heroes, then non-political poems (mostly about drinking), and finally a number of short fragments, which are described as 'characteristic of the poet's style', but seem too mixed and too slight to suggest any definite character. At the end of the book are two short notes, one an Appendix on the metres used by Sappho and Alcaeus, the other a summary of the literary dialect of Lesbos. These notes are in their way excellent. They are likely to be of use not only to undergraduates but to many others. The arrangement of the dialectal features in the second note is occasionally, however, a little haphazard.

The first chapter, on Sappho fr. 1, is a fair sample of the whole book. Few of those who read this part of Page's commentary will ask for more information or a sounder appraisal of such words as *μαυροδίνης* (a throne decorated with inlay or with tapestry coverings), *σπεύδουσιν* (sparrows, 'because they are notorious for wantonness and ferocity')<sup>1</sup> or *φιλότης* ('friendship, or love?'). Wherever an explanation is seen to be possible, it is given with vigour and precision. When the author cannot decide,

as at fr. 18-19, *τίς δὲ φέρει τείβης κτά*, he states the main possibilities fairly and offers his own solution with proper reserve—in this case *ὅς τις ἄνθρωπος*, which he suggests, is not very happy, and he seems to dismiss *ὄψιν* 'lead' on insufficient grounds. When he comes to the general interpretation of fr. 1, Page is more inclined to take an independent course. He argues forcefully, and in the reviewer's opinion rightly, that the poem represents Aphrodite as amused by Sappho's falling in love and that the poetess has adapted the form of a solemn invocation to this personal and trivial subject-matter. (He does not actually call it a parody of an invocation; one wonders why.) But at one point Page's argument seems to run away with him. 'The fact is simple and long-established', he declares: 'Sappho's words can mean nothing but this—"if today she is running away from you, tomorrow you will be running away from her."'<sup>2</sup> The basis of this and other assertions in the same passage is that *ἀνατρέχει* means not merely to run after somebody, but to run after someone who is running away. Even Bentley, who invented this 'rule', had to concede that there were a couple of contrary examples. And Sappho fr. 1.21 may yet prove to be a third.<sup>3</sup> For some scholars think that Sappho is not praying that the tables may be turned on the person she loves, but that Aphrodite may inspire the loved one to return her love; and Page has not really disproved this opinion.

The author's treatment of the other eleven poems of Sappho is likely to call forth a large measure of approval, tempered, however, in certain places by doubt or censure. But it is the closing chapter on Sappho that is not only the most important but also the most successful. The opening sections, on the number and contents of the books of Sappho and on the Epithalamia, are beautifully set out; the conclusion that there were eight books and a short book containing those of the Epithalamia that were not included in the other books is well established. There follows the demonstration—irrefutable, it would seem—that, so far as the evidence goes, Sappho cannot have been either priestess of Aphrodite or teacher of young ladies. And this brings us to the vital question, what really interested Sappho as a poetess. Apart from a few political allusions and references to her own family, she evidently concerned herself in the main with a circle of girl and women friends, for whom she felt and expressed at various times the strongest affection and hatred, and a variety of other emotions.<sup>4</sup> In this chapter, the opinions of Wilamowitz, which tend to be both grim and quaint where Sappho is concerned, go flying like ninepins. If the argument is too relentless and severe for those who like to dream and sigh over Sappho's poems, nevertheless scholars will appreciate its high qualities. One would only wish that at the end of this chapter the author had not suddenly turned his back on argument so as to obscure the problem of Sappho's moral character with a page and a half of John Addington Symonds at his worst.

Whatever the truth may be about Sappho's character, no one will feel compelled to probe the causes of Alcaeus' conduct or defend it. Perhaps it is the absence of a deep psychological problem that makes Page seem much more at home with Alcaeus than with Sappho. Or it may be that the problems which do present themselves in the later chapters are of a kind more suited to his dialectic methods of analysis and exposition. At any rate the first two sections of the chapter on political poems are among the best in the book. The account given here of Lesbian history in the late seventh century is neat and convincing. The author must be right also in claiming that Herodotus

<sup>1</sup> It seems that in love, where one party *piresis*, the other party may not *fly* but may simply remain *indifferent*. In war and sport *πύσις* necessarily implies flight, but perhaps nowhere else.

<sup>2</sup> She might be thought to have been interested most of all in her *own emotions*. Page does not, I think, give due weight to this aspect of the case.

<sup>3</sup> The notion (*μ. τίς*) that anyone who saw a flock of sparrows descend to rest on the ground might imagine Aphrodite in her chariot invisible behind them is surely far-fetched.



v. 94-11. is not at variance with the rest of the tradition. Where he perhaps goes astray is in assigning to *pep* at c. 94-5 a meaning which is indeed common enough, but seems not to be in place there. For, on Page's interpretation, there would be *no* accounts of the Athenian occupation of Sigeonside by side: of its capture by Hegesistratus son of Peisistratus and of its transference to Athens through the arbitration of Perikles after a long war; and these accounts would be irreconcilable.

To follow the argument of the book from poem to poem would be an enormous task, far beyond the scale of this review. Let it be enough to mention the discussion of Pindarus' parentage (Page is sure that his father was a Thracian), the analysis of the 'Ship of State' fragments (especially of fr. 2 (14), which is found to be probably a parable, and a political one at that), the demonstration of a Boeotian and Hesiodic strain in the myths of gods and heroes. Throughout the commentaries in these chapters the reader will observe once more the close argumentation and fine perception that distinguish the chapters on Sappho.

In both parts of the book there is an evident willingness to supplement or amend the MS. text; Page does not always feel himself bound by the readings of *Poetum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*. His supplementation of frs. T 1 and B 10—not all the additions are his own—seems particularly successful. But his attempt at emendation is not all convincing. This, however, is an activity in which success is elusive, and the present reviewer for one will not find fault on this ground.

To conclude, this is a book in which the established results of long labour are combined with innovations of great value. If the reviewer ventures here and there to disagree with the author's opinions, that should be taken as a measure of their originality and liveliness. Professor Page's book will long be an indispensable companion to students on Lesbian lyric poetry.

A. J. HEATHE

TREU (M.). *Van Homer zur Lyrik* (Zetemata, Heft 12). Munich: Beck, 1955. Pp. xiii + 332. DM. 28.

Belonging to a tradition of linguistic enquiry which the scholarly world in general associates with the names of Snell and Herrmann Fraenkel, this book begins where diachronism *De . . . copia verborum eius*. Treu is concerned with the extent to which differences in linguistic usage imply differences in 'mode of perception' (*Schmerz*) and argues from the history of certain words that the mode implied by their use in the *Iliad* is replaced by a different mode in sixth-century lyric poetry, the change being begun, and in some cases far advanced, in the *Odysses*. The argument necessitates the detailed interpretation of many Homeric passages, classified under

such headings as 'size and beauty', 'landscape', 'time', etc., and the analysis of the mode of perception implied by these passages is always interesting and often illuminating.

The strength and weakness of the method are well illustrated by the treatment of *dekalos*. In Sappho this epithet implies beauty, grace or pleasure, being used to describe girls (823, 126), a girl's neck (94-10), a girl's hands (816-2, cf. Alc. B 14.6), and flowers (96.13); in 94-22 it presumes appreciation of obscure, but its context is sexual gratification. In the *Iliad* it is predominantly an epithet of the neck (T 371, N 202, P 49, L 202, P 49, L 117, T 265, X 327, cf. 2 (10) or cheeks X 123) and in at least five of these passages it implies neither beauty nor pleasure but physical vulnerability and weakness. Thus difference exemplifies two changes in mode of perception which Treu regards as fundamental in archaic Greek poetry: the movement away from 'articulation', rushing Sappho to apply to a person as a whole (112a, 126), a word used by the *Iliad* only of a part of the body, and the increasing use in a 'qualitative' sense of epithets originally 'functional'.

It is true that the difference cannot be ascribed to semantic differences between regional dialects or to ordinary semantic shifts in time, for the vulnerability of that which is *dekalos* is the justification for the use of the word in Archilochus 112.3 (*dekalos d'epros* assailed by Love, cf. the *dekalos hron* of the fawns destroyed by the lion in A 115), Hes. *Op.* 379 (*dekalos*), *h. Mer.* 279, and probably 246; (*dekalos* *phaidon*), which Treu attractively interprets as 'laugh helplessly', whereas its sensuous beauty is the justification in v. 223 (*dekalos*) and *h. Ven.* 88 and 90. It is also true and significant that there is no epic synonym for Sappho's *dekalos*; the poet of the *Iliad* perceives a scene as action and passion, the lyric poet appears as the discoverer of its visual and tactile qualities.

Yet it does not follow necessarily that the difference in mode of perception between two genres of poetry, of which one genre is earlier than the other, reflects a change in the perceptiveness of Greek society as a whole. Treu qualifies his general conclusion by many doubts and warnings, and it is the reviewer's business to suggest and particularise them. To consider *dekalos* alone: the five certain references to the vulnerability with neck in the *Iliad* are statistically impressive, and seem to have discouraged Treu from making a serious attempt (cf. pp. 170-30, 247) to incorporate into the history of *dekalos* the doubtful feet of Ate T 62; cf. the dancing Muses of Hes. 74. 3, the dancing women of *Pan. 126. 5* (Insert. *Acet.* 162), and the girl cowering in fear in *h. Cr.* 287; and the *dekalos* *phaidon* of P 373. But what allowance must we make for formulae and adaptations? What if four of the five passages are modelled on the fifth, and the fifth reflects the idiosyncrasy of an individual poet?

Moreover, we naturally treat extant lyric as a representative sample of lyric from the seventh century onwards—we have no choice—but we dismiss too readily the possibility that it may be equally representative of the unwritten lyric of the preceding centuries. No human society was so touchy that it does not sing; lyric is primeval. If Treu's argument is correct, the lyric of the Greeks at the time when epic was first taking shape should have reflected the mode of perception which he regards as characteristically epic. Perhaps it did, but some of Treu's own examples suggest an alternative possibility. In the *Odysses* *ipe te pēne* re occurs only in 1508, *panepi pēne* only in 1452 and 1539, and in all three cases Treu sees (pp. 38-40, 73-4) a comparatively 'heroic' turn of phrase; in 1508 Polyphemus is speaking of a secret of earlier days (*foer ne deidōs pēne*), in 1450 he is addressing his great ram, and in 1539 it is the ghost of Achilles that *phōte pēne pēne*. The poet of the *Iliad*, occupied exclusively with the theme of heroes at war, may have maintained consistently convention which the poet of the *Odysses* adopted occasionally, and in one case Treu admits that this is the case (pp. 56, 317): *reptēre*

\* (On the other hand, the passage can be understood, and that in a sense that will not conflict with Page's main argument, if with *Hesiodos* in c. 941 we supply *o Nēstros*. Thus the passage will describe an expedition of the Nēstidae to the Troad, shortly after the great Trojan war, and the subsequent warfare, which ended only in the time of Alcæus, Pindarus and Perikles. Incidentally, the family history of the later Peisistratidae will be rid of a hazard for whom it has scarcely room. And in the story of the Nēstid Peisistratus and Iason we may see the mythological justification used by Peisistratus the tyrant and his family to excuse their own interest in the Troad.

\* Sometimes one feels that Page has not considered all the possible alternatives sufficiently. For example, at fr. 61. 2-27 his *me* *gallor* is one way of correcting *me* *gallor*. But one might at least be mentioned also. At 1. 21 of the same poem too much attention is given to Lakel's *me* *gallor*, which is an unattested and quite improbable form, and not enough to *me* *gallor*. One might read *me* *gallor* at 1. 23, as Page suggests, and supplement *me* *gallor*, third plural imperfect of *gallor*, 'they survived'.

in the *Iliad* is used of the face or head only in *Il* 798, *Il* 24, and *N* 495, and in all three cases past *χρῆς* is contrasted with present dirt or death. Such a restriction suggests the idiosyncrasy of a poet rather than the mode of perception of a people, and its operation may be observed in other words, e.g. *δαδός* (soft flesh contrasted with hard metal), *ῥάπῃ* (pp. 188-9), and the only instance of *καλός* as *καλός* is applied to a mortal—*Φ* 108, where Achilles says that even he, for all his beauty and stature, is doomed. We are bound to consider the possibility that what we have come to regard as evidence for the limited perception of Homeric Man may be in fact the artistic conventions, immensely influential but nevertheless personal and unrepresentative, of a poet or school of poets; the possibility that the aesthetic perceptions of primitive lyric were excluded from the *Iliad* as consciously and as completely as indecent humour.

K. J. DOVER

ALFMAN, *The Parthenion*. Ed. D. L. PAGE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. xi + 170, 211.

(This review was first sent in by the author in 1954, but apparently went astray after the death at that time of the then editor.—ED.)

The Parthenion has suffered too long from the reputation of being one of the most difficult and controversial of Greek poems. This reputation is just, but misleading. The difficulties are real, the controversies largely insoluble. But it is not hard to forget both, and to remember only the brightness and the enchantment. In reading the Parthenion, as in looking at Simone Martini, there is all the excitement of being present at the birth of a new civilisation. Homer, like Ravenna, is almost the background, rather than the origin, of Greek literature. In Alfman (as in the roughly contemporary Archilochoi) there first appears that personal yet unromantic style, so characteristically Hellenic and so familiar in the two centuries which follow: *φιλοκλέης μὲν εὐκλέης*.

The charm and novelty of the Parthenion, combined with its obvious fascination for both the historian and the philologist, fully justify Professor Page in devoting a book of nearly 200 pages to editing and expounding so short and fragmentary a poem. As was to be expected from its author, it is a book of considerable distinction, well deserving the general welcome it has received. It is clear, farcical and, in the best sense of the word, scholarly; Professor Page can compel his readers by a thorough understanding of his subject, without burdening them with irrelevant erudition. All his scholarship cannot quite keep out of his style that half-poetic quality which so marked his little essay on the lost Dorian poets in *Greek Poetry and Life*, the 1937 *Festschrift* for Professor Murray. The result is not only a major contribution to the study of early Greek literature, but also a pleasure to read and to own.

The book is in three parts: text, commentary and an essay on the dialect. The first is invaluable. As the Preface points out, no reliable edition of the text and its scholia had previously appeared. The present version is accompanied by an exact transcript of the papyrus original, as well as by a full apparatus and an analysis of the metre. It may well claim to be definitive. The cruxes will of course continue to be argued, but the groundwork has now been done. The transcript, which rightly avoids all conjecture, misses nothing that is really in the papyrus; given the illegibility of the scholia in particular, this is no mean achievement. The only possible inaccuracy is a very minor one: in line 15 of column ii *οὐκ* is clearly intended, but in the papyrus the omission is in fact a delta (for a parallel to the absence of the upward extension of the right-hand stroke normal in this writing, see the first delta in line 20 of column i). In the one or two cases where Professor Page unexpectedly omits the subscript dots of previous editors, we are quite ready to believe that he has sharper eyes than either they or we: e.g. in the case of the third and fifth letters of line 15 of

column ii. Less certain is his statement (in the *app. crit.* on line 7 of column ii) that rho in this handwriting always has a straight tail: what appears to be the tail of the rho in *ῥο* (line 6 of column ii) is not straight, but it scarcely matters. If only a photograph of the papyrus were given, the reader could debate these idiosyncrasies for himself. This might be thought of for a future edition: the infamously sodden photographs now available from the Louvre authorities are in several places actually easier to read than the original.

The commentary in Part II is given the rather sinister title of 'Interpretation'. On the fragmentary first half of the poem (the Hippocoon legend and its moral) Professor Page is excellent, with views at once imaginative and restrained. On the second and more exciting half he is less happy. His conclusions are respectable, but they are argued with too much truculence. The graceful faculty of understanding the opinions he rejects, which the rest of the book so well exemplifies, seems to desert him here. Like the Player Queen, he protests too much. 'Continuing our impartial survey of the text . . . ' (p. 50); ' . . . the plain testimony of the text . . . ' (pp. 30 and 51); ' . . . others have put forward the uneasy hypothesis . . . ' (p. 63). It is all rather like an editorial in *Probus*. It is often easy to agree with Professor Page that his views are an improvement on those of his predecessors; it is more difficult to share his confidence that this is because he is impartial where they were willfully blind. Like all good scholars, Professor Page is extremely partisan; he would do himself more honour by admitting it.

It is, after all, important to remember that, in the present state of the evidence, the puzzles of the second half of the Parthenion cannot possibly be answered with finality. There must always remain, for each of the major cruxes, two or three hypotheses; we may prefer one of them, but we should be rash to dismiss the others completely. It is the greater pity that Professor Page has not made his commentary more of a *variorum* edition. Too often he fails properly to state the main arguments in favour of hypotheses other than his own; too often, even, he ignores such hypotheses altogether.

It is worth looking briefly at some examples of this:—  
(a) 'The text indicates, without the least obscurity, that [Acusimbrata] is the keeper of a training-school for choir-maidens' (p. 63). It is indeed likely that this is what line 73 means. But 'without the least obscurity' is absurd, when it is not even quite certain that the girls listed are choir-girls at all or that *Ἀκουσμβρατάς* is a genitive.

(b) In this same line (73), the words *ἄλλοις ἄνθρωποις* are translated, without comment, as a generic second person. Yet a *feminine* generic is unparalleled in Greek.

(c) Professor Page is certain, from the *lemma* 'ὄφθιμ' *φάρμακ'* in *Schol.* XII, that the Alexandrines thought the ceremony connected with the goddess Ortheia (p. 73). The possibility of *ὄφθιμ'* (which will not scan) being a simple *lapsus calami* for the *ὄφθιμ'* of the text (line 61) is not even considered.

(d) The Agido-Hagesichora complex in lines 39-44 is the best example of all. 'One or two will have it that *ἀγὶο* *ἐκτεταγμένη* in vv. 43-6 actually refers to Agido; but no attempt is made to elevate Agido above Hagesichora in this poem will succeed' (p. 49). But this 'attempt' is not made from sheer waywardness. It is made because it is so hard to believe that *ὁ* *πῶς* *ἄλγος* in line 50 does not refer back to the *ἄλγος* of line 47. *ὁ* *πῶς* naturally means 'the horse', i.e. the horse already mentioned; Alfman did not write *ὁ* *πῶς*. But if the *ἄλγος* is the same as the *ἄλγος*, i.e. Agido, then so is *ἀγὶο* *ἐκτεταγμένη* (line 45) and so is the *ἀλγος* *ἐκτεταγμένη* (line 44). *πῶς* (line 44) certainly cannot be reflexive; but it can quite well be neuter (cf., *inter alia*, Pindar, *Pyth.* 4. 232), referring to *τὸ* *ἄλγος*. *πῶς* in line 41 can equally be neuter, which indeed makes the repetition of the name Agido (line 42) more natural.

In Part III, on the dialect, Professor Page is back at the high standard of objectivity that we have come to



expect of him. Knowing Laronian Greek better than most of us know Attic, and warm in his affection for its every particular, he endows the somewhat arid subject of linguistic practice with an unexpected charm. He concludes that Alceian's poetry was originally written in the ordinary Laronian vernacular, coloured here and there by borrowings from Epic. Since later choral poetry was always written in a literary language of its own, this is an exciting discovery. It is based on a careful study, feature by feature, of the language of the Penthemion and of the 'quotation fragments'. The argument is unforced but persuasive. It is sad that space could not be found for the inclusion of the quotation fragments in an appendix; with Diehl and Edmunds unreliable and Berck long out of print, this would have been a great convenience and would not after all have taken up many pages.

The book ends with two useful historical appendices: on the date of Alceian, and on his birthplace. A little more history would have been welcome, but at least the way is now open for the historian to an extent that it never was before. Although Professor Page perhaps wisely, nowhere lets himself be drawn into the Laronian controversy, his action on the Chion's ornaments (pp. 48-51) suggests that he shares the common belief that the Penthemion portrays a brief Spartan civilisation which was extinguished by a wave of Persian reforms at the end of the seventh century B.C. 'Over Lacedaemon darkness and silence were soon enough to fall. . . . There is a splendour, a glory and glow about these verses which will not be found again in the . . . history of Laronia'. This has become the standard version of early Spartan history. It is scarcely justified by the evidence. Certainly the brightness had vanished by the time of Xenophon and Isocrates; probably even by the time of Thucydides. But in the early fifth century the Spartans that Herodotus and loved were still as gay and generous as Alceian's *hika kai zupoi* and *Alceian kai dykai* (frag. 103 C.C.T.). The archaeological arguments, to which Professor Page briefly refers, are very meagre. All we have to go on in Laronia, some temple (Ortheia) and the busily excavated metropolis. We lack the graves which are so common and so helpful elsewhere. In such circumstances it is dangerous to argue *a silentio*; the situation can be explained in so many simpler ways than by pushing a general impression of impurity *a loco*. Besides, it is less than just to say that native Spartans 'do not degenerate until the end of the sixth century' (p. 48, n. 1), with the implication that it does degenerate then. So far as the surviving evidence goes, it suggests steady improvement throughout the whole sixth century; even in the early fifth the former work retains its quality, although the history is of course overshadowed in an every other Greek city by Attic red-figure. Whatever reforms were instituted in seventh-century Sparta, they did not destroy her industries. But that is another voyage.

R. L. WALT-CRAW,

NORWOOD, GILBERT. *Essays on Euripidean Drama*. University of California Press, University of Toronto Press, and C.U.P., 1944. Pp. 195. £1 15s. 6d.

The four essays contained in Professor Norwood's (as he writes, he tells us, 'conceived and first written' in widely separated times). They differ from each other enormously both in scope and in quality.

'Towards Understanding Euripides' is a dissertation, concerning the canon of Euripidean criticism. Norwood touches upon most of the well-known themes—tragic prologues and episodic plot; univocally philosophical reflections and irrelevant choral odes; melodramatic situations and melodramatic theopiasms. But what does he say about them? It is most difficult to discover which of his argument leads; so disordered is his presentation, and so inconsistent are his various conclusions.

The essay begins (pp. 1-5) with a condemnation of Aristotle for having posited, as his criterion of dramatic art, a 'Platonic Idea of Tragedy'—a pattern to which

poeticians must conform. There is, Norwood claims, no such pattern of tragedy: Aristotle 'has but created a chimera lambasting by a temporary vacuum'. Why then are we later told (p. 11) that the Athenian playwrights sometimes wrote 'irregular or defective' dramas simply because they could not have the benefit of advice from Aristotle and other critics? Why does most of the essay presuppose Aristotelian canon, and why is departure from them, on the part of Euripides, finally attested (pp. 32-3) as indefensible? It is all very difficult. Perhaps the matter could have been made clearer if Norwood had pointed to the difference between *mythos* and *mythos*, and had not illustrated his remarks on the identity of tragic forms by references to plays which he subsequently classes as melodramas.

Our judgments of Greek drama, Norwood tells us, must not depend upon artificial rules, but must be subjective, though our subjectivity, it appears, must be tempered with objectivity (pp. 2-3). In the search for this objective viewpoint we must examine those elements of which we disapprove in Euripidean dramaturgy, and decide which of them are due to inadvertence, and which are there *a set purpose*, while the former may justifiably be excused, the latter must be condoned (p. 3). This rather questionable criterion is at first applied rigorously: thus we are told (p. 17), for instance, that 'we must not call Euripides a bad playwright because, in the words of an ancient critic, he mixes physical science into the legends', for he 'means these things quite deliberately. They are not slips or concessions to other people's taste'. But Norwood later loses sight of this principle. He draws upon two catalogues: the first (pp. 18-30) contains 'mumbling words'—'things that Euripides was justified in doing but which happen to repel us'; the second (pp. 30-47) contains 'flaws'—'features that are condemnable without hesitation because it seems impossible to imagine any purpose underlying them'. The confusion and caprice which reign within these catalogues may be judged from one example: the 'tedious prologues' occur twice (pp. 28-29, 39-40); not only, in the list of 'things which Euripides was justified in doing', where they are condemned, and secondly, in the list of 'features that are condemnable without hesitation', where some plea of mitigation are put forward. In the second catalogue the defence that a feature was 'meant quite deliberately' is now disallowed, and even counted as an aggravating factor, so that the 'fashion' of *Andromache* and *Hecuba*, originally (p. 3) granted extensive exemption, is suddenly subjected (pp. 45-7) to savage condemnation.

The above is a sketch, by no means complete, of the perplexities and vexations which await the reader. Nevertheless, some remarks on the 'whimsical' elements of Euripidean art, and on the unstable character of his genius, may be accounted valuable.

'In *Boeotus* and in *Riddle*' is eminently lucid. Since the time when he wrote *The Riddle of the Boeotians*, Norwood has changed his mind. *Boeotus*, it appears, was a god after all, and the miracles were real miracles. The author starts astonished at the very simplicity of this scheme.

'This new idea obviously renders most of the *Riddle* [by the Boeotians] untenable.' Norwood does not, however, wholly retract. He puts forward another explanation of the 'paleo-miracle' scene, which is scarcely more convincing than the one he has withdrawn.

'Good and Man in *Hippolytus*' is, on the whole, a sound (and, indeed, orthodox) exposition of that drama's merit and meaning. The essay is not exempt, however, from the faults which are characteristic of Norwood's dramatic criticism. There, since they waste so much of Norwood's work, must now be eliminated:—

1. It relies far too much upon a belief that the

The criticisms of Norwood's theories on the *Boeotians* and *Suppliants* will be substantiated elsewhere; space precludes an adequate discussion here.



emotions of *dramatic personae* can be detected in the form, rather than in the content, of their speeches. Thus senarations and logic-chopping, which delighted Euripides as much as they disgusted Norwood, are adduced again and again as proof of a character's immaturity, while phrases which Norwood considered ill-sounding are often quoted to support his contention that a character is of vulgar disposition. This is a most dangerous technique of criticism: its *seductio ad absurdum* would be to claim that the Aeschylean Agamemnon was only pretending to be killed, since his three-fold cries of *temonion* are too articulate for a mortally wounded man. But just as Agamemnon, in *extremis*, preserves the proper *decorum* of tragedy, and his feelings are revealed, by convention, in the import, not in the diction, of his lines, so, to a large extent, throughout Greek tragedy, character and emotion must be judged with this convention in view.

It is folly to discount such conventions: Hamlet may be mad, but this is not proved by the fact that he talks to himself.

(2) An auxiliary technique, for examining diction, may be termed 'trial by translation'. Selected phrases are put into their literal English equivalent, and held up in ridicule. *Carters* is an 'unhappy dog' (*ἄδελφός μου*), at *IL*, 1366, while, at *Hipp*, 1247, the bull is an 'unhappy animal' (*ἀδελφὸν ζῷον*). Cf. *Tru*, 91: 'corpses that have died' (*νεκρὰν ἄνθρωπον*), *Hec*, 4941: 'raise your side aloft' (*μετὰ τοὺς ὤμους ἔλθω*), and *Hipp*, 13241: 'the kindness of one who has got a wish' (*ἀποθυμῶν ἔσθ' ἔσθ' ἡδύμενος*). Other phrases are condemned without trial: *καὶ ποῦ* (see p. 94, n. 3) and *καὶ ποῦ* (*L.A.* 1936) are ugly; *καὶ ποῦ* ... *ἡδύμενος* (*Hec*, 932) is indestructible; *ἐξ ὧν* (*Tru*, 137) is 'hideous'. But this is intolerably subjective. Why did not Norwood use a dictionary? Beck's index would have shown him, for instance, the falsity of his remark (p. 93) that *καὶ ποῦ* never means 'guilty' [i.e. 'inflicting misery' rather than 'suffering misery'] in Euripides—cf. *Tru* 666; *δολοφονία* *καὶ ποῦ*, *Hipp*, 1378; *δολοφονία* *ἀπὸ*. Lidell and Scott would have informed him (*L.A.* 1936) that the personae he dignifies as 'agains' thrive in one verse! (p. 39) is idiomatically unobjectionable, and *καὶ ποῦ* (*Hec*, 932) that 'corpses that have died' (p. 40) could not have sounded so odd to a Greek, since the Homeric poems abound in similar phrases—cf. also *Soph.*, *Ant.* 513; *ἡ καὶ ποῦ* *ἐκείνῃ*. And what decides the choice of victim? Why is *καὶ ποῦ* *δολοφονία* translated 'celestial fragrance' (p. 100)? Why not 'O godly breath of a snail'?

(3) If the selection of offending phrases is erratic, their treatment is no less incalculable. They may, as has been seen, be adduced to indicate subtleties of Euripidean characterisation. Thus *καὶ ποῦ* (*Tru*, 91) shows (p. 98, n. 1) that 'Artemis is completely out of her depth'. But they may contribute towards indicating a whole play's atmosphere. Thus *καὶ ποῦ* (*Hec*, 932) helps to show (p. 39) that the *Helen* was 'intended to be silly'. But, again, they may show that Euripides had no artistic conscience; so *καὶ ποῦ* (*Hec*, 932), *μετὰ τοὺς ὤμους ἔλθω*, and *ἐξ ὧν* (*Tru*, 137), or, alternatively, that Euripides never wrote the passage (last essay, *passim*). Differences of treatment do not seem to be graded by the offence's gravity: phrases which help to prove the *Suppliants* spurious (p. 145) are no worse than others which, in the *Hippolytus*, are excused (p. 76, n. 5) because 'the poet is plainly not concerned here to depict the prince as logical or wise.'

(4) Minor self-contradictions, including certain 'geographical inexactitudes', are similarly treated. The latter form of inaccuracy, whereby different versions are given of a character's parentage or place of origin, is excused (p. 17) as being deliberate (cf. 2 on *Hec*, 3), while a case of *Tru* *Hippolytus* helps to prove a character dim-witted (p. 61, cf. p. 103). Another case is offered as contributory evidence (pp. 113, 145) that the *Suppliants* has 'nonsense at its very root' (p. 117), and is subsequently dismissed as trivial (p. 162, but cf. n. 5, 6 there).

What then, one wonders, are we to make of the *Phonist* chorus, who figure briefly (p. 38) in a list of 'Little Songs'? They, according to Norwood, were not to know whether they come from Tyre or from Sicily. Are they engaged, rather unsuccessfully, in some gigantic hoax? Or did Euripides, for some reason, mean us to understand that they were of feeble intellect? Or was *Phonist* at first written as a comedy? Or are the verses spurious? Norwood does not tell us, and we shall never know.

The chapter on the *Suppliants* is an attempt to prove that the play, as we have it, is a conflation of two 'lost dramas', one by Euripides, the other by (?) Moschion, put together in the second or third century A.D. by an anonymous 'botcher'. Much of the material used in Norwood's statement of that play's problems is irrelevant to the conclusions reached, and some important evidence is neglected. The theory is, in the reviewer's opinion, quite untenable.

G. A. LONGMAN.

**Fragments of unknown Greek Tragic Texts with Musical Notation** (P. Oul. inv. no. 1419), I. The text, by S. EITZEN and L. AMUNDSEN. II. The music, by R. P. WILKINSON-INGRAM. [Symbolae Osloenses. XXXI.] Oslo: 1955. Pp. 87. Price not stated.

Musical papyri are all too rare, and the publication of a new one is an important event. This publication, moreover, is a model of its kind: the collaboration of experts in papyrology and in Greek music has produced a document of unusual interest, which contributes some evidence on old problems and poses many baffling new ones.

The text, in a hand tentatively assigned to the early second century A.D., consists of one large and a dozen small fragments: the former shows two sections, of which A is anapaestic, B (remarkably) iambic trimeter, and the musical notes confirm the complete break between the two. There appears to be a tenuous connexion of subject-matter in that Pyrrhus-Neoptolemus is concerned in both, but in a carefully reasoned argument the editor rejects as improbable any idea that both sections could be accommodated within the limits of a single play. A is the description of *ἄνδρας* of Achilles from the underworld, in which Pyrrhus was present and some Trojan women with drawn swords; the scene is described by an *εὐνομήτης* (apparently a servant) to Didymus. B apostrophises *Λέωνος* and then presents (in all probability) the young Pyrrhus: *ὦ πάτερ Ἀχίλλεος υἱός*, recalling the Sophoclean *Philoctetes*. The editor suggests, very tentatively, that the document may have been an anthology of scenes from various plays about Pyrrhus, meant to be sung by a *πρωτοῦς* as a series of solos, possibly with the help of an assistant to play, *εὐνομήτης*, Didymus and Pyrrhus in A and B respectively; and they summarise what little is known of such performances. Within the scanty limits of our knowledge, the hypothesis seems a reasonable one. Perhaps one might bear in mind Lesky's suggestion (*Hermes* 81, 1953) of a possible type of Hellenistic drama which disregarded the classical unity of action (to say nothing of time and place); it is not conceivable that both A and B might come from a single play of this kind. The words *παρὰ*, *ἀπὸ* *ἐκ* *ἐκ* *ἐκ* come strangely in the middle of the narrative, and still more surprising is the absence of any speech from Achilles, who is apparently bundled straight back into Hades, *ἄνδρας*, *καὶ ποῦ*, without space for even a résumé of any message. Could this possibly mean that we have here a performer's copy, giving only one side of a sort of dialogue (rather like a B.B.C. dramatised reading), in which the *εὐνομήτης* contributed an expression of alarm from Didymus and a solemn pronouncement from Achilles? (And perhaps more: cf. the curious *asyndeton* in I and II 4.)

This is rash speculation, but it would perhaps give some support to W.L.'s suggestion that the hand may be that of the composer. The text so well, or misad, would

\* See footnote on p. 324.





EURIPIDES, *Four Tragedies* (*Alceste*, trans. R. LATTIMORE; *The Medea*, trans. R. Warner; *The Heracleidae*, trans. R. GLADSTONE; *Hippolytus*, trans. D. GRENE). With an introduction by R. LATTIMORE. Chicago: University Press, 1955 (London: Cambridge University Press). Pp. vii + 221, 281.

This book belongs to a series of translations under the editorship of David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, a series which already includes the *Orestes* and the *Theban plays* of Sophocles and will eventually comprise the whole of Greek tragedy. Here we have the first four plays of Euripides, with three pages of general introduction on Euripides by Professor Lattimore, and a page or two on each play by the translator. If there are to be introductions, it is a pity that space could not be allowed for more adequate treatment than is possible within these limits.

The aim of the translators seems to be to produce a verse translation in idiomatic English which will give as nearly as possible the exact sense of the original. The prevailing fashion of metrical laxity makes faithfulness to the original more feasible, and the translators do, generally speaking, avoid importing what is not in the Greek, and give the sense of what is there. But the manner is frequently very different from that of the original. Euripides may admit more resolutions than Aeschylus or Sophocles, and may employ more frequently colloquial expressions and prosaic diction, but in comparison with many passages in these versions his metre is far more strict and his diction and idiom more clearly differentiated from everyday usage. It is, of course, reasonable to aim at giving the sense of the original in a form more familiar and acceptable to modern readers, but should not translators into verse indicate, for the benefit of the Greekless, to what extent, if any, they claim to reproduce the manner as well as the matter of the original?

In Lattimore's *Alceste* the metre chosen for the dialogue is a fairly long line of about twelve syllables and generally six stresses in varying positions. Anapaests and lyric metres are done into shorter lines, sometimes approximating to the rhythm of the Greek metres and observing minor strophic response. The very flexible metre of the dialogue has obvious advantages, but a good many of Lattimore's lines are indistinguishable from prose: e.g. v. 54, 'You would not take more than one life, in any case'. There are also passages where diction and idiom are too aggressively colloquial: e.g. v. 709, *ἀντίθε* becomes 'Get out of here now'. In some passages the connotation seems wrong: e.g. v. 391, *ἄνα*, 'Are you really leaving us?' 410, 'Good-bye' sounds more like an afternoon call than a dying farewell. Sometimes, on the other hand, the language seems rather strained and reads too much like a translation: e.g. v. 123, 'Chant responsively the hymn of the unsacrificed-to god below', and v. 569, 'O liberal and for ever free-handed house of this man'. It would, however, be unfair to draw attention to less satisfactory lines without adding that there are many successful passages. Let me quote a few lines from an important speech of Alceste, vv. 932 ff., where Lattimore well represents the unaffected simplicity and directness of the original:

Whom shall I speak to, who will speak to me, to give me any pleasure in coming home? Where shall I turn? The desolation in my house will drive me out when I see my wife's bed empty, when I see the chairs she used to sit in, and all about the house the floor unwashed and dirty, while the children at my knees huddle and cry for their mother and the servants mourn their mistress and remember what her house has lost.

As regards accuracy, translations edited by such distinguished scholars should presumably be assessed by the highest standards, and in that case the translation of the *Alceste* is rather less accurate than might have been

expected. Thus in v. 197 to translate *ὡς δαίμο* as 'he would have lost her' surely robs the passage of all point, and in v. 680, '(you) fail to hit me, and then run away' will not do for *οὐ βέβαιον ὄντος ἔσσε*. I noted about twenty other passages where there appears to be some inaccuracy or some omission. Lattimore mentions six passages where he has adopted readings different from the Oxford text, in three of which at any rate I believe him to be right. In two passages not listed he is in fact translating readings other than those printed by Murray.

In metre and style the version of the *Alceste* by Rex Warner is rather similar. Here overfaithfulness sometimes produces a translation that sounds awkward or obscure: e.g. vv. 364-5:

Things have gone badly every way. No doubt of that  
But not these things this far, and don't imagine so.

Moreover there are many passages where the translation keeps close to the sense of the Greek but is much nearer to prose than the imitations of Euripides: e.g. v. 532, 'On this I will not go into too much detail'. Incidentally, the Latinisation of some Greek names must, no doubt, be regarded as established, but 'Hefius' is to me new and unwelcome.

There are apparently some inaccuracies: for instance, vv. 410-11 is a statement, not a wish; v. 680, *εἰ* and *τίνα* are interrogative, not indefinite; v. 1350, *δουλοῦ* can hardly mean 'my life is over'; v. 482, 'I gave you the safety of the light' is odd for *ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν σωτηρίαν*. The translator does not, however, indicate what text he takes as standard and where he deviates from it, so that one cannot be sure what Greek he is translating; in v. 934 he is evidently translating Verrall's emendation. After these criticisms it would again be unfair not to add that there are many successful passages.

Ralph Gladstone's *Heracleidae* differs from the other translations in that he adopts a shorter line for dialogue, a very free blank verse, and is more markedly colloquial in diction and idiom. Here are a few examples: v. 11, *ἀντί* *διόμμενος* *αὐτοῦ*, 'I could use a guard myself'; v. 61, *οὐ δῖρα*, 'Not on your life'; v. 132, *οὐκ οἶ* *τὸ* *ἐπιτελεῖ* *ταῖς*, 'Stranger, it's up to you'; vv. 390-2:

... since a man who sets  
Up for a decent general has got  
'To see these things himself. . .

The choral lyrics are mostly done in short lines and rhyming couplets, sometimes with a diction and swing rather more suggestive of comic opera than of tragedy. Vv. 372-5 are a fair example:

We're peaceful men, but in advance  
We warn a king who's gone berserk  
To keep away. He'll have no chance  
To carry out his dirty work.

The subject-matter of this play provides opportunities for the use of a number of modern semi-technical terms such as 'refugee', 'displaced children', 'losing face'; and here and elsewhere in Euripides the thoughts often seem surprisingly modern, and may encourage the translator to express them in the most modern idiom. Mr. Gladstone's version is certainly lively and forcible, and gives accurately enough the general sense of the Greek; but the effect of metre and diction is presumably not intended to be anything like that of Euripides. Here, therefore, even more than in the other translations, one misses an introductory paragraph indicating to the reader who knows no Greek the kind of relationship which the translator believes to exist between his version and the original.

David Grene's *Hippolytus* seems to me to be the most successful of these four translations. I have noticed few inaccuracies. Lines 513-14 of the Oxford text are omitted, perhaps intentionally, and in 1304 in the words *ἐπὶ τῇ* *ἑρμιόπῃ* Artemis is surely referring to Phaedra, not to herself. His metre is a little more regular in its



rhythm than that of the other translators, but it is still sufficiently free and flexible to enable him to give a fairly close translation, and he generally contrives to produce good idiomatic English. In diction and turn of phrase he keeps in the main to language that is free from any special connotation, prosaic or poetic, and thus manages to avoid on the one hand the note of triviality and on the other the rather cloying sweetness that continuous poetic diction tends to produce for modern ears. From this level he can move either to a more prosaic, more colloquial or more poetic level, as the tone of the original may require. I am sorry that space does not enable me to quote from a translation that should give much pleasure and a rather better idea than many versions of what the style of Euripides is like.

P. T. STEVENS.

LEVER (K.). *The Art of Greek Comedy*. London: Methuen, 1956. Pp. xi + 212. 21s.

This book, which offers the Greekless reader a brief history and appreciation of Greek Comedy, is admirable in intention but sadly disappointing in execution. The translation of *eporos* as 'lover' (p. 52) raises the suspicion that the author is herself Greekless. This is not the case, as the numerous translations of comic passages which she offers seem to be her own, but their quality is low. Their mistakes (e.g. p. 91: *And.* 300, 305) are of a kind which could be redeemed by vigour and liveliness, but that is just what they lack; they are often slovenly and inartistic (e.g. p. 98: *Av.* 128 ff., sometimes meaningless (e.g. p. 149: 'Not him? Not her?' = *And.* 283; p. 184: 'The poem of Middle Comedy did not undertake "poetic form"'). *Amn. Dr Com.* 12). Resembling as they do the work of a second-class student in a hurry, they will not convince the reader of the truth of the assurance he is given in the introduction: 'Greek comic poetry is intrinsically delightful.'

The author is well read in modern scholarly literature, and her account of the early history of Comedy is not unenlightened; it is agreeable to hear a little more than usual of the *ambogrophers* and little less of Dionysiac ritual. Occasionally she makes a true and penetrating judgment, e.g. (p. 96) that Aristophanes is unusual among satirists 'because he presented what he liked as vividly as what he disliked'. Yet the Greekless reader is likely to be bored by superficial catalogues of phenomena (e.g. pp. 118-19), baffled by such statements as 'life' (i.e. in the fourth century B.C.) 'was a word, a euphemism' (p. 168) and often misled on matters of fact. The author appears to say, for example, that Cleisthenes (*Han.* 426, etc.) belonged to a class of the population officially designated *gynandros* (p. 103), that Aristophanes invented the verb *gymnos* (p. 145), and that Mages was a rival of Aristophanes (p. 131). These, I presume, are instances of bad presentation, not of erroneous belief on the author's part, but there is much else to suggest that she has not thought hard enough about the texts which she discusses. She misses the point (Meincke saw it eventually) of Epicharmus fr. 11, quoted on p. 177, and a disturbingly hazy recollection of *Clouds* is implied by: 'Picture, for example, Socrates shirk in his basket, lost in contemplation of the sky, while below pale scholars stare upon the ground. Then Strepsades comes knocking at the door, shouting and exclaiming, ...' (p. 120).

K. J. DOVRE.

WEBSTER (T. B. L.). *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*. London: Athlone Press, 1959. Pp. xvi + 359, with 16 plates. 25s.

Professor Webster's *Greek Art and Literature*, 530-400, was not reviewed in *JHS* owing to the war, but *gl.*, e.g., Kittu, CR LIII, 172. This is not simply a continuation, for the fourth century does not lend itself to generalisation about style applicable to all arts, and this book is not so rich in examples of W's eye for similarities of approach in different fields. Successions of style are

replaced by successions of attitude, and W. distinguishes a phase of seeing the contrasts, a phase of seeing the structure, and a phase of seeing the appearance. Overlapping is of course frequent, and the phases may become so entwined as to lose their value for us. The real interest shifts to theory. The fourth century is a good deal more articulate, at any rate for us, and W. subdivides his material between the age of Plato, the age of Aristotle and the age of Theophrastus. The rejection of art in the early Academy shifts to Aristotle's successful attempt to find a place for it and to explain the development of its structure, and finally to Theophrastus' interest in the individual and his environment. The influence of theory on art and literature can be sketched, though with due warnings about our ignorance.

Our ignorance is considerable. We have the *Poetica*, but next to nothing of fourth-century tragedy, though W.'s attempt to improve our knowledge with the use of vase-subjects is a signal, though limited, success. Middle Comedy, despite W.'s efforts, is still very shadowy. Our knowledge of contemporary theory of sculpture and painting is poor. Painting has gone almost entirely, and one would like to think better of it than the mediocre reflections in vase-painting suggest. The interrelations of the philosophical schools in the first half of the century are still highly mysterious, though W. makes an important and plausible contribution here, seeing an important influence on Aristotle in the move of Theodectes from Isocrates to the Academy in the sixties.

These are deep waters, but W. navigates them skilfully. Since artistic examples are rightly taken from outside Athens as well as inside, I feel he is wrong to exclude coins, which might have strengthened the argument in one or two places. He seems to have lost an opportunity over Leochares. Ashmole has shown us a good deal about him, and we know Isocrates as far as him, so that here we have a clue to the art of art at least one philosophical school liked. But in general he moves with enviable freedom in his varied fields.

A few quibbles. Menander's first play is dated to 324, although no one, as far as I know, has yet answered the case for 324, best put by Dinsmore, *Archons of Athens*, 41). There is a slight distortion in the account of the development of sculpture, caused by a rather too early dating of Demetrius of Alopeke (cf. *BSI L.* 4). In the Chronological Table, Theopompus' *Stem* has dipped under 303 as well as 373. There is authority for the spelling *Gylus*, but I doubt whether it can be maintained. Thompson's medallion portrait of Zeus (*Hesperia* XXII, 56, Pl. 170) would be worth a mention on p. 118.

I have only noticed rival misprints, and the Athlone Press has produced an attractive book.

D. M. LEWIS.

MEYER (C.). *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*. Munich: Beck, 1955. Pp. 102. DM 9.50.

The author of this short treatise died prematurely in 1950, leaving a nearly complete manuscript which has now been edited and published by H. Erbse. Its object is to examine the context of the treaties given in *extra* in books IV, V, and VIII to see what use Thucydides made of them in his narrative, and to determine whether that narrative presupposes the creation of the texts in full. In every case the conclusion is that Thucydides intended full citation.

Meyer had read widely in this controversy—his knowledge of the English contribution is especially impressive—and scrutinised the text minutely. If the overall result is disappointing, it is largely because he tended to run together three distinct problems: whether Thucydides possessed the treaty text when he wrote a particular passage, whether a passage implies that the reader already knows a particular clause of the relevant treaty, and whether the full text of a treaty is necessary to the reader's understanding. Pp. 24-5 cite and extend Kirchhoff's

list of passages showing that Thucydides knew the text of the Peace of Nicias when he wrote them. One of these, the reference to *αὐτοκαταστροφῆς ἀσφάλει* in V 27.1, is so framed as to suggest that the reader knows already that the peace was to last fifty years, which he can discover only from 18.3, the treaty text itself: the rest prove merely what Kirchhoff said they did, and where Thucydides takes the trouble to paraphrase a clause of the peace in his narrative (29.2) we certainly cannot infer that the reader is supposed to know it already. Yet by p. 28 Meyer believed he had demonstrated that these passages were all 'intended for a reader who is acquainted with the clauses of the treaty in their original wording', and he continues with four more references to *τὰ φησισί τε* and the like, of which he says, 'Sie wären skandalös und auch sprachwidrig, wenn der Leser die echte Gestalt jenes Urkunds nicht kennen würde.' There is much argument like this, some of it fully as extravagant as anything Schwartz produced. In fact there are not more than half a dozen passages, more in the eighth book than the fifth, which presuppose knowledge only to be found in a treaty text, and none which presuppose knowledge of the full prospect.

Meyer naturally rejects the stylistic rule alleged by Wilamowitz and Schwartz against the inclusion of such texts. It is indeed easily overrated, and Thucydides was prepared to incorporate phrases from documents where they would help him to give the reader adequate and exact information, as IV 16 in some detail. But he does not encumber the reader—as Meyer remarks on p. 33, provoked by commentators complaining of Thucydides' reticence, 'Thucydides, der belanglose Vorgänge mit schlechten Sätzen zurückdrängt, überflüssiger Wortschwallöe des Lesers nicht Rede steht'—and it is surprising that he should tell us who was epistates on 14 Epiphebolia 223, or tell us twice that Pericles was epheor in the spring of 427. In his introduction and conclusion Meyer seems only half aware of this problem. The armistice of 325 was, he points out, only of short duration, and the peace between Aramania and Ambracia of no great importance to the chief combatants: but if these are reasons for not giving a full text, are there not stronger reasons for condemning the Spartan-Acive treaties, V 77 and 79? If Thucydides published some treaties complete and summarized others of apparently equal importance, we need a full and serious discussion of his reasons. One possible answer is that he was dissatisfied with his earlier method and changed it, as Wade-Gery argued in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, though here too the Spartan-Acive documents are hard to explain: another is that Wilamowitz was right, and Thucydides never meant to insert the treaties entire.

In the course of his investigation Meyer contributed some useful observations on difficult passages of books V and VIII, and knocked down some of the strange assertions made by Kirchhoff and Schwartz, and even by Wilamowitz. But the problems raised by these great scholars exist and the attempt to reason them altogether away is not fruitful: these books are not without life, and if so much argument is needed to show that they make sense,

A. ARMSTRONG.

HEMMERQUIER B., *Essai sur l'histoire du texte de Thucydide*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1935. P. 75. Price not stated.

The study of the history of a text can be extremely dull. Whatever else can be said about this book, it is not that. Those who go to it for authoritative answers on matters which puzzle them will be disappointed, but they will find on every page much to start them thinking on unfamiliar, but profitable, lines.

This capacity to start new lines of approach is Hem's main contribution to the study of Thucydides' text. Its most important result is the sudden rise to prominence of the fourteenth-century MS. Parisinus Graecus 1734 (H). That Hem, can now say with only slight exaggeration,

'H est, avec B et C, l'un des trois plus importants manuscrits de Thucydide' and command the reader's assent, is entirely due to his lack of reverence for authority. To this solid achievement, he adds in this book valuable new information about the variants in B and a demonstration that F once belonged to Maximus Planudes and that S (Caselanus MS. hist. fol. 3) has notes by him.

The book, however, contains much more. The lines of Hem's approach to the ancient history of the text will be familiar to those who know his earlier articles (*REG* LXI (1934) 103-17; *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica*, NS. XXV (1930) 80-93). They will not expect to find any reference to that best situated of all ancient editions, the thirteen-book edition, regarded by Hem, as purely fictitious. They will find again the view that all our MSS. descend from an Athenian copy in which the Milesian numerals of the Alexandrian Library have been reconverted to acrophonic numerals. I hope to deal elsewhere with numerical corruption in Thucydides, and can only say here that the fact that acrophonic numerals never represent ordinals and the probabilities about the use of numerical abbreviations in book-texts and the use of acrophonic numerals in Hellenistic Athens make Hem's deductions very dubious. To these known views Hem now adds an contribution of our eight-book edition to Aristophanes of Byzantium, apparently because he would be the only Alexandrian scholar to realise that there was a problem about α and π. The eight-book edition is attributed to Alexandria purely by analogy, and the *termini ante quem* furnished by Diodorus, Dion. Hal. and Aelapion ap. Marc. Vita Thuc. 38 (what does *ἀντίγραφον* mean?) go unnoticed, as does Sch. Aristid. 402, 2 Dind., which might have saved a paragraph. On the whole, the ancient history is sketchy and unsatisfactory, and the few scraps of real evidence, Strabo 374 (surely Demetrius of Skepsis) and the early interpolation in II 20.3 found in *H* and not in the later *H* pass almost unnoticed.

We now pass to the archetype of our medieval MSS., which Hem considers a fourth-century edition composed of eight ~~some page~~ codices with eleven ten-letter lines to the page. This monster fortunately rests on very little evidence, for of the three 110-letter jumps adduced by Hem, the first (II. 49.3-6) is not a jump but a doubler, and the 2-26 which Hem considers intrusive is printed as text by Luchinat, correctly, I think, and the second and third (VIII 23.1, VIII 93.1) might be held to be glosses. Even if they are not, jumps do not necessarily come at the beginning of a page. The search for the archetype might more profitably have followed Powell's methods, and if Hem had added to Powell's agreement in error between B and a papyrus at VIII 10.1 (of which he gives an unsatisfactory account) other agreements between B and the sources of Steph. Byz. and an alarming one between B and Diodorus (VIII 106.3; XIII 40.3, where both omit *ἐν Βαυκίῳ* Hem), he would have been led to a much earlier date. See now *JHS* LXXVI 98, which settles the matter.

To our knowledge of the next landmark, the separation of the tradition represented by C from the tradition represented by ABCEM, Hem adds little except a rather hypothetical attribution of MSS. to personalities and monasteries of 'la renaissance monacale'. The *siglum* it receives its third meaning in twenty years without warning given, and one must here an investigation of the types of text used in the later stages of the Suda, which might have had some profitable results.

Hem's desire to attribute MSS. to personalities reaches its furthest extreme in his Chapter V. On his reconstruction, the fallen Theodoros Metochites was between 1330 and 1342 in the monastery of Chora, and had there four of our present main MSS., ACEM and a fifth from which he copied H. Besides copying H, he put the replacement pages in C, F and M, and put a note on A which referred to M. Hem gives us plates to enable us to check the identity of hands. To me, at any rate, the dissimilarities were more marked than the similarities,



and I find it hard to understand either why Theodoros should have copied the new pages for C and F from I and C respectively, the new pages for M from I (I suppose) A (though this will not need examination), and H only from his extra MSS., thus writing three different versions of the first chapter of Thucydides, or why, having the meritorious congeners of H at his disposal, he was not tempted to import any trace of it into ACFM. All I can see which can be safely deduced from this is that C and F were certainly together at about this time, and that, since I had belonged to Plamates, as Hem. candidly shows, they may well have been together at Chora. That A, M and H were ever together or at Chora seems unproved, as does the connexion with Metrochites.

On the relationship and ancestry of B and H, Hem. is more solid, although I think his view unsatisfactory. For him there are two texts in the offing which transcend the archetype of ABCFM, but one is a Decurtatus beginning only at VI 92.3. Realising its merits, the scribe of the model of B produced a complete text, orthodox up to VI 92.5, relying on the Decurtatus from then on. H is a descendant of B, but a MS. intermediate between B and H has been collated with a second unorthodox text, this time complete. This enables one to explain almost any variation from B in H, since in cases where H has a different text-reading from B, the scribe will simply have selected an interlinear reading instead of a text-reading, and this makes the concept of descent practically valueless. H is certainly very close to B throughout, but the presence of H of text-readings not in B as well as the fact that H is much less rich than B in references to the orthodox text after VI 92.3 would in any case make one suspect that H was independent of B, even if there were not reasons for doubting Hem.'s view of the congeners of H. It also seems more likely that the scribe of the ancestor of BH used an orthodox text ending at VI 92.5 than that he prepared his edition in order to utilise the little he had of the unorthodox text.

My greatest difficulties, however, are caused by Hem.'s assertion that all readings in H, marginal, interlinear, or in the text, are in the same hand. This explains some puzzles I have had about De Romilly's apparatus, since she uses Hem.'s collations for H. My own observations of H suggested to me that there were at least two corrector's hands to be seen at work, that there was seldom any difficulty in distinguishing them from the first hand, and that the good interlinear readings in Books V and VI were to be attributed to one quite distinctive hand. If this is so, it is H itself and not an intermediary between B and H which has been collated with an unorthodox source. A slight pointer which may indicate a distinction between this source and that used by the ancestor of BH is the corrector's *ἐκκατάθετος* at VI 96.3, where the text of BH both have the normal erroneous *ἐκκατάθετος*, but from their abnormal source. If I am right, the distinction of hands in H becomes a matter of some importance, and we can only hope that Lachmann's edition will provide the evidence we want.

Hem. is good on Valla, although I cannot quite understand why he says Valla must have used H itself. Valla must have used something like H, but since Hem. also shows that he must have used something very like I (Parisinus gr. 1698), we cannot be quite certain. And may not the reason why the editors have not restored H<sup>2</sup> (VII 23.5) in full conformity with Valla be that there is no room on the papyrus?

But whatever its defects in detail, this is not a book to be ignored. Hem. has a salutary Introduction on the principles to be followed in a text where contamination has been at work and more than one source in play. We have been too much under the spell of the seven great MSS., and reconstructing the text of Thucydides. Following the lead of Pasquali, Powell and Heminandinger have shown that *manuscripts* are not necessarily *determinants*. Putting the manuscripts about which one knows in a *clan* does not prove that all other MSS. are derivative, as we

have found. As our knowledge grows, even our old *clan* has developed more and more of the dotted lines of collation. A *clan* has a descriptive, not a prescriptive function, and Hem. thinks the situation in Thucydides already too complicated to describe diagrammatically. He is perhaps over-pessimistic, but at least our old complacency has gone for ever, and no small part of the credit for this is due to him.

D. M. LEWIS.

#### DEMOSTHENES. *Plaidoyers politiques*. Tome 1.

*Contre Androtion, Contre la loi de Leptine, Contre Timocrate*. Texte établi et traduit par G. NAVARRE and P. OASINI (Assn. G. BUNÉ). Paris: Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1954. Pp. lxxiii + 223. Price not stated.

DEMOSTHENES. *Plaidoyers civils*, I. Texte établi et traduit par L. GARNIER (Assn. G. BUNÉ). Paris: Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1954. Pp. 254. Price not stated.

The text, apparatus and translation of Demosthenes' three earliest *plaidoyers politiques* were prepared for the Budé series before the war by Professor Navarre and M. Orsini jointly, and Professor Navarre had completed an introductory essay (pp. xdx-lc) on their rhetorical technique. His death left M. Orsini with the task, interrupted by the war, of adding an historical introduction (pp. vii-xxix), a note on the text, a short introduction to each speech and the customary brief footnotes to the translation, with supplementary notes (pp. 199-222) at the end.

N. and O. have followed S 'presque toujours' in preparing their text, which therefore differs little from Butcher's. In their apparatus they report a little more fully the readings of A and F, though without adopting them more often. In XXIV, for example, they follow A or F in twenty-two places in which Butcher followed S, but follow S in twenty-three places where he preferred A or F. They do not cite other MSS. individually, except (for some unexplained reason) L. They are even more reluctant than Butcher to admit conjectures; even so, they have admitted a few that seem unnecessary. XX 26, XXII 35, 66, 88i, including one of their own (XXII 42: *ἀναπαύσας*) that is surely impossible.

The translation reads agreeably; I have noted only one inaccuracy—*ἀνέστη*, rightly retained in XX 92, cannot be rendered 'plus inconnues'.

The merit of O.'s historical introduction to the three speeches lies in his insistence that from the outset of his political career Demosthenes' preoccupation was with foreign policy, with the *ἀσφα* of Athens. Both here, however, and elsewhere, O., following in Cloché's footsteps, is too willing to accept Demosthenes' assertions at their face value. At many points 'die ungewöhnliche Veranlassung' of these three speeches requires sharper analysis if they are to yield their full value for the understanding both of Demosthenes' personality and of contemporary Athenian history. Some of the statements concerning Athenian institutions are also unsatisfactory, especially those referring to the making and unmaking of laws. Here much, admittedly, is still uncertain; but Demosthenes' own statements in his speech against Leptines (89-102), deliberately confusing though they are, nevertheless furnish evidence against the view, which O. favours, that it was delivered before nomothetai. O. emphasises (pp. 125, 137 n. 5) the difference between *νομοθέται* and *ἐκκατάθετοι νομοί*, but he does not elucidate it; and it was decidedly not 'à partir du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle' (p. 209, cf. p. 213), but above all in the fifth century that the Athenians legislated by decree. O. states as a fact (p. 211) that from 358 Diophantos 'était président des préparatifs au *liturgion*'; this is a mere conjecture, not supported by the texts to which O. refers.

I have noted very few misprints, only two of them worth mentioning: on p. 29 read H<sup>2</sup> 45, on p. 211 *Cont. d'Ath.*, LVIII 3. The references to inscriptions are



intolerably unsystematic: Attic inscriptions are cited sometimes from the edition minor of IG, sometimes from the edition major or even CIA, once (p. 55 n. 5) even from 'Wordsworth, *Athen and Attica*'. For IG 1585 (p. 210) read CG 1585 (= IG VII 2407): but the content is not what O. seems to believe. In his reference (p. 219) to IG I<sup>2</sup> 304 O. has taken over a blunder from Dalmeyda (Andocides, *De corat.* p. 47 n. 1); and IG I<sup>2</sup> 530 is not a decree, as O. (p. 206) implies. Similarly, in utilising (p. 206) without acknowledgment a footnote in Glotz-Cohen, *Histoire grecque* (III, p. 45 n. 59), O. has failed to discover that neither Theopompus nor Diodorus mentions Evagoras' Athenian citizenship.

For the *philologer* *cliché* M. Gernet has adhered to the traditional order. His exceptional mastery of Greek law and of the modern literature on the subject and his gift for lucid and concise analysis of the legal problems that these speeches present make this volume one of the most welcome in the whole Bude series.

In the *Notae generales* (pp. 7-23), after discussing briefly the character of this part of the Demosthenic corpus, G. argues, against previous editors, that for the *philologer* *richt* A represents a different and better tradition than SEQD, in spite of many obviously wrong readings, attributable to the carelessness of A's copyist or his predecessors. He has thus been led to accept some forty of A's readings rejected by both Blais and Rennie. In about a dozen places, however, he follows Rennie in rejecting readings of A that Blais accepted; but otherwise his text is closest to that of Blais, many of whose emendations and deletions he accepts. Indeed, in the deletion of supposed glosses he goes farther than Blais: at least eight hitherto accepted words or phrases are bracketed, and in the apparatus doubt is cast on another eight. A few new emendations are suggested, mostly slight: in XXXII 19 the *θετο* of the MSS. is replaced by *θετο*. In XXVII 1 G. has adopted Schwahn's ingenious punctuation, and in XXXIII 23 Paoli's tempting emendation, which makes the sailing season the period during which *δίκαι* *ἐμπροσθεν* were *ἐμπροσθεν*. The apparatus is a little briefer than that of Blais or Rennie, but again, I think, nothing of significance for a reader: I noted, however, at least eight readings that seemed to be wrongly attributed or misplaced.

A few small points: XXVII 6—this passage does not necessarily imply (as stated on p. 34 n. 2) that *ἐκδοσις* was progressive (Sainte-Croix's more satisfactory hypothesis must have been published just too late for Gernet). Pp. 68-9—the best explanation yet of *Against Aphobos* III. P. 69 and elsewhere—the title is rightly given as *Kur* 'Ὀντοπος'. P. 69 n. 4—364 not 363. I noticed only a few trifling misprints in the apparatus and elsewhere.

To a foreigner, G. seems to have succeeded notably in finding French equivalents for the spirit as well as the sense of these speeches, uneven as they are in quality and tone. His subsequent volumes will be eagerly awaited. (That this notice is so belated is the fault of the reviewer.)

C. ROHRWALD.

**PLATO. *Philebus and Epinomis*.** Translation and Introduction by A. E. TAYLOR. Ed. by R. KLIMANSKY with the co-operation of G. CALONARO and A. C. LLOYD. London: Thomas Nelson, 1955. Pp. vi + 272. 21s.

We learn in a Foreword that these translations, discovered amongst Professor Taylor's papers after his death in 1945, were probably made in 1933-34. 'There should be no need', writes Prof. Klimansky in his Preface, 'to justify the publication of these versions, left by one of the foremost Platonic scholars of our age'; yet he also states that 'the manuscripts lack the author's last revision', and the question may legitimately be raised whether Taylor would have wished this unreviewed work to be published. Mr. Klimansky and his fellow-editors have wisely refrained from tampering with Taylor's text, save for obvious slips and small omissions, and have relegated to the end of the book certain points where they regarded

his version as incorrect or doubtful: but it must be regretfully remarked that a considerable number of passages remain where inaccuracies or inadequate renderings are to be found.

Some instances from the *Philebus* must suffice: 26a, it is surely impossible to supply *ἐνταῦθα* as the object of *ἀναμνησκόμενος* and *ἀναμνησάμενος*; it is to be supplied from *ἐν αἰσθήσει* and is therefore *ἐνταῦθα*. 27a, *ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν νοῦν* means 'we see, I suppose', not 'we must consider'; two lines later *καὶ . . .* is omitted. 32a, *οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπονοητῶν ἐλαττωμένων* means not 'by some offence towards our competitor', but 'by making a mistake about your (our) candidate'. 308a 5, 'hardly' is not in the Greek. 36a, *μὴ δὲ μὴ* means 'warrantably then help me out with the argument'. 51b, *ἐν τῇ ἰδέᾳ* means not 'a single note' but 'a single series of notes' (i.e. a melodic line). 56a, the probable corruption of the text cannot excuse the absurdity of so translating that the *αὐτός* becomes a stringed instrument: here surely *ἐνταῦθα*. 57a, *ἐνταῦθα*, *ἐνταῦθα*, *ἐνταῦθα* is partitive genitive (cf. 360-1). 391b, the idiomatic *ἐν* before *οὐ καὶ ἐν* is disregarded. 66a, the force of the two prepositions in *ἐνταῦθα* is unexpressed.

The translation is preceded by Taylor's own introduction to the *Philebus* (that to the *Epinomis* being by one of the editors, Mr. A. C. Lloyd). This is of great value and interest, running to some 90 pages and consisting mainly of (a) a discussion of the occasion of the dialogue and of the person or groups of persons taking part or referred to in it; and (b) an interpretative analysis. There is, as was to be expected, little substantial difference from what Taylor had already given us in the chapter on the *Philebus* in *Plato, the Man and his Work*, but the treatment is rather fuller, and exhibits the author's usual learning, lucidity and incisiveness.

Some points may be queried: if Protagoras is 'mature' in contrast with the 'mere eager boy' Philebus, it seems strange that he is addressed as a *παις*; both by Philebus and by Socrates himself (53a, a passage not cited in T.'s note on p. 12); and it is reasonable to infer from 16a that Philebus is older than Protagoras and his other supporters. On p. 24 the *δεναι* *τῶν ἀπὸ φῶν* (not, by the way, *δεναι ἀπὸ φῶν*) are by implication identified with, or not discriminated from, the *καὶ τῶν* of the *ἐκδοσις*-*πῶν* doctrine; this is certainly wrong, and indeed on p. 79 their difference is recognised, and their identity reduced to a 'point of contact'. Coming to the metaphysical section (230 ff.) T. writes (p. 39): 'We see thus that, to take one modern example, temperature is an "indeterminate", 20, 30 or any other number (rational or irrational) is a limit.' But Plato has made it perfectly clear that by *ἄπειρα* he means not *number* but *ratio*; this confusion, together with a failure to recognise that Plato is running together two notions, viz. that of a mixture of opposites (e.g. hot and cold) and that of a so-called 'mixture' of Form and Matter (or determinant and indeterminate), makes T.'s analysis of these pages unsatisfactory.

On p. 89 we get no adequate explanation of the demand for *ἀλφειά* in the mixture (64B), and of the relation of this demand to the subsequent declaration (64E-65A) that *ἀλφειά* is one of the notes or aspects of goodness; the puzzle is that it would naturally be supposed present already, not needed as a further ingredient.

Mr. Lloyd provides an interesting and helpful introduction, of a dozen pages, to the *Epinomis*, 'intended', as he says, 'to put the studious reader on the track of the literature that is relevant to the *Epinomis* but could not reasonably have been mentioned in the translator's footnotes'. On its authenticity, strongly maintained by Prof. Taylor elsewhere, he suspends judgment.

R. HACEFORTH.

**ARISTOTLE. *Parva Naturalia*.** A revised text ed. with introduction and commentary by Sir DAVID ROSS. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955. Pp. xi + 336. 40s.

The general scheme of this volume follows that of Sir David Ross's other Aristotelian editions and commen-

series: introduction and text, followed by commentary with a summary of contents at the beginning of each chapter. In the first part of his introduction R. deals with the date of composition of the treatises. He scrutinises the datings proposed by Nuyens and Lulofs, neither of whom he tends to be entirely correct. Taking the three periods distinguished by Nuyens: (1) the early period, during which Aristotle accepted the general Platonic outlook; (2) the 'biological' period, 305-327; and (3) the period of the *de anima*, 327-334, R. agrees with Nuyens that the *de parva* and the *de respiratoria* should be assigned to the middle period. The *de sensu*, *de memoria*, *de somno*, *de insomniis*, and *de divinatione* were assigned by N. to the last period, on the basis of correspondences between *de sensu* and *de insomniis* and *de partibus*, and the importance attributed to the heart as the seat of sensation and movement. R. argues that at least the latter part of the *de somno* belongs to the middle period, and he is inclined (as against Lulofs) to think the evidence that the first part belongs to the *de anima* period not conclusive: he would put the whole of the *de somno* and the *de insomniis* into the middle period. The *de longitudo*, which according to N. lacks definite marks of date, but 'is already near to the last period', R. claims should 'properly belong to the biological period', quoting correspondences with *de partibus*. The *de sensu* and *de memoria* are, R. argues, later, perhaps contemporary with the earlier parts of *de anima*, but earlier than *de insomniis*. These conclusions are subject to the proviso that the treatises cannot be placed down to the middle period; they cannot have been begun earlier than this, although they were completed before Aristotle had adopted the *étreidgen* theory of the soul. There is perhaps still room, before accepting the rigid distinction between these last two periods, for a further investigation of the *étreidgen* theory and its relation to the 'two-substances' view.

The three following sections of the introduction are a valuable analysis and general commentary on the various treatises. On the subject of the heart, R. rightly draws attention to the importance of the Hippocratic treatise *peri kardihs*, and Aristotle's indebtedness to it, and to the need of further work on Aristotle's indebtedness to the Hippocratic corpus. The treatment of the *néphros*, however (pp. 30-43), is somewhat incomplete, and tends to point out its function as the vehicle of *urina*, i.e. as transmitting the *urina* proper to them. Its 'analogy' to the fifth element is recorded, but we miss the reminder that there is also an 'analogous' substance in the transparent media which are concerned in the operation of some of the senses. It is, I think, a little difficult for a classical reader to get a balanced picture of Aristotle's views on these matters from the introduction; and it might have been helpful also for the non-classical reader (who should be interested in Aristotle's views on these matters) to give a rather fuller and less allusive account of them.

There is a useful account of the MS. tradition and of the policies adopted by modern scholars. R. himself has collated P and N for *de somno* onwards and M, S and Z for *de divinatione* onwards. R.'s conclusion is that the merits of the two main groups of MSS. is fairly evenly balanced: when the balance is even the testimony of Alexander, or failing him, P should turn the scale; and a number of instances show that none of the MSS. usually cited can safely be neglected. I have noted the following slips, which should be corrected in a future printing. At the foot of p. 16 (i.e. at the end of the second sheet of the volume), some words, perhaps a whole line of the text, have dropped out at a critical point in the argument; on pp. 56 and 57 the Hippocratic treatise *peri kardihs* is five times described as *peri kardihs*; Karl Bitterauf is described as C. Bitterauf on p. ix but as E. Bitterauf on p. 102.

A. L. PECK.

**Eudemus of Rhodes.** Ed. F. Wehrli (Die Schule des Aristoteles, Heft VIII). Basel: Birkbeck Schwabe, 1935. Pp. 127. S.Fr. 16.

For reviews of earlier fascicles in this series, see *JHS*,

Vol. LXXIII (1953), pp. 160-1 (on Vols. II, IV and V), and Vol. LXXV (1955), p. 172 (on Vols. I, III, VI and VII). The programme envisaged is that the series should be completed by a collection of the remains of Hieronymus, Praxiphanes, Phanias, Chamaeleon and Crisostomus, with an historical survey of the Peripatetics down to the first century A.D. and a set of indexes, these remaining sections to occupy two or three fascicles in all.

Eudemus is one of the most interesting authors whose remains are collected in this series, apart from any consideration of the part he may have played in the publication of Aristotle's ethical works. There is little to be known of his life, the references to which occupy fss. 1-6; the most famous of these (for what it is worth) is fr. 5 (from Aul. Gell. *Noct. Att.* XIII, 5), the anecdote recounting Aristotle's choice of Theophrastus as his successor in preference to Eudemus.

The fragments of Eudemus' works fall almost entirely into three sections, the logical (fss. 7-29), the physical (fss. 31-124) and that devoted to the history of mathematics and astronomy (fss. 133-49). The logical fragments come mostly from the commentaries of Alexander and Philoponus on the *Pris Analytics* and from Boethius; in a note (p. 79) on the relation of the logic of Theophrastus and Eudemus to that of Aristotle, Wehrli quotes Heidegger's view that both used material from Aristotle's later years which is not to be found in the *Organon*. The points dealt with in the fragments of the *Analytics* (9-24) mostly concern modal and hypothetical syllogisms. These are followed by a few fragments of the *Metaphysics* and by one from the *Metaphysics*. Then come those from the *Physics* (31-124), almost all taken from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's work of that name. Wehrli examines the general character of Eudemus' *Physics* on pp. 87-9, with special reference to its dependence on Aristotle and its place in the teaching of the early Peripatetics, and in reproducing the fragments he makes textual suggestions in Simplicius from time to time. In this section of the work one may mention particularly the one (pp. 94-5) on fr. 43, which is valuable for the history of the idea of categories (with what is said of predication here one may contrast Antisthenes), and also the long note on *kinema* (pp. 99-100); to the note on fr. 31 (p. 89) one might add a reference to Simplicius' tendency to make Aristotle's philosophy coincide with Plato's wherever possible.

Frs. 125-32 are on animals, and are largely discussions of animal cleverness to be found in Aelian. The fragments (133-49) from the histories of geometry, arithmetic and astronomy are considerable in bulk; they come largely from Proclus' commentary on Euclid's *Elements*, Bk. I, and from Simplicius—in particular, the full account (fr. 120), from his commentary on the *Physics*, of the attempt of Antiphon and of Hippocrates of Chios to square the circle. Fr. 141, from Eutocius, is on Archytas' attempt to double the cube (cf. T. L. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics*, vol. 1, pp. 245-9, mentioned in Wehrli's note). At fr. 150 Wehrli reproduces a long passage from Damascius on the history of theological and metaphysical conceptions, which, however, he is very hesitant about associating, as Damascius did, with Eudemus; he is probably right to be cautious.

At p. 11, l. 2 from the bottom, read *ἀνακρίψαντες*; at p. 11, l. 6, place *δὲ* at the end of the line instead of the beginning; at p. 71, l. 12, read *οὐκ*; at p. 91, on fr. 36, read *ἡδύς ἀνακρίψαντες* and *ἀνακρίψαντες*.

The editor is to be congratulated warmly on the completion of this further stage in his arduous and important work.

D. A. REES.

**Arati Phenomena.** Introduction, texte critique, commentaire et traduction par J. Marnett. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1936. Pp. xvi + 197. L. 2.000.

There was room for a good modern commentary on Aratos, and this excellent addition to a useful series



supplies the want, adding a critical text based on a more complete knowledge of the MSS. than former editors enjoyed. This does not mean that the *Phaenomena* as we read them in this edition differ widely from what had been hitherto printed. I had the curiosity to compare the first 130 lines with a much older text, that of Buhle (1793). Apart from differences of punctuation, the changes averaged one in ten verses, five being more or less acceptable conjectures of various scholars and but few affecting the sense. The editor himself (p. lx) draws attention to the slightness of the difference between his text and that of his predecessors; it is fair to add that where he has made changes (generally with ancient authority, Greek or Latin) they are usually improvements.

The matter of the commentary is for the most part factual, not much attention being paid to syntactical difficulties, of which perhaps more might have been said with advantage here and there, for Arator's grammar is at times odd. The criticisms of Hipparchos are given at considerable length. Here it might have been better to insert from time to time the findings of modern observers concerning the apparent brightness and relative position of the stars. For example, on line 238 Martin reports, correctly, that according to Hipparchos the seventh Pleiad is visible under favourable circumstances; I can testify that this is so, given a clear, moonless night and the keen sight of youth. But no-doubt considerations of space limited the editor.

That everyone will agree with the chosen readings and interpretations is what, presumably, neither the editor nor anyone else expects. I mention some points which I think need reconsideration. Line 331: Martin prints *dyxatou* for the traditional *dyxator* (*dyxatou* is a patent scribal error). He may be right, but he is wrong in saying that the MS. text is *dyxatou de xar*; I see no reason why Asmaios should not be called 'the ancient father of the stars'. In 107, he translates *dyxatou* by 'favourables au peuple', a meaning which the word admittedly can have, but surely justice belongs neither to the *optimatus* nor the *populatus*, but unto the adoption of laws for the good of the whole state, *dyxatou* rather than *dyxatou*. In 313, the MSS. give *dyxatou*; Martin reads *dyxatou*, as Aratos elsewhere uses the adjectival construction. This seems unnecessary, since either that or the adverbial use is perfectly correct. At 441 he seems to miss the construction of *dyxatou* for he renders *une autre file*; it is rather *un autre objet, la Bête*. At 434, once both *dyxatou* and *dyxatou* are good enough Alexandrian poetic Greek for 'lying', and both are attested, I would print the former, which has the authority of the best MS., simply on general principles. At 571, it would have been better to mention the conjecture of Voss and Maas, *dyxatou* *dyxatou* for *dyxatou* *dyxatou* in the app. crit.; as it is, the explanatory note (with which I agree) is obscure. At 692, attention might have been called to the form *dyxatou*, which seems elsewhere to occur only in the stock phrase *dyxatou* *dyxatou*. In 747, *dyxatou* seems rather gen. of time than gen. abs. At 966, he defends the *dyxatou* by the analogy of passages in which an initial liquid strikes a long syllable out of a preceding short vowel, but here the *dyxatou* is medial. I think we have what NT critics call a 'primitive error', the intrusion of a *dyxatou* at a date earlier than any archetype we can reconstruct. In 1043, I gravely doubt his rendering of *dyxatou*, 'l'émulation et le soin d'exercer sur beaucoup de choses à la fois'. Is it not rather 'many a (ploughman)', like *dyxatou* *dyxatou* Polyb. xv, 26, 10? Martin, however, has the scholiast on his side.

The great problem concerning Aratos is, for a modern, why he was so immensely popular. Martin has something to say here, p. 177. 'Aratos, dans tous les domaines, fait transition: entre l'Orient et l'Occident, entre l'astronomie et l'astrologie, entre l'ancienne poésie et la nouvelle, entre le monde grec et le monde latin. D'où sa fortune exceptionnelle.' It is to be hoped that he will expand this into a treatise or a long article; it would

make a desirable companion to the work on the history of the text which he says is forthcoming.

H. J. REES.

Will. (E.). *Korinthische. Recherches sur l'histoire et la civilisation de Corinthe des origines aux guerres médiques*. Paris: De Boccard, 1955. Pp. 719, with 3 maps. Price not stated.

These researches into the history and the civilisation of Corinth from its origins to the Persian War are thorough and ambitious. Dr. Will rightly observes that the bulk of our evidence on Corinth belongs to the early period and is difficult to interpret. As each problem arises he tackles it with vigour, clarity and originality, except that much of the archaeological evidence has to be given in résumé and accepted sometimes without further analysis. In the archaeological field he acknowledges the debt we all owe to the work of Payne, Dunbabin and others, and to the American excavators of Corinth, and he has made a valuable contribution not only to the history of archaic Corinth but also to that of the archaic period generally by writing a comprehensive and up-to-date study. There are critical investigations of the literary sources and of modern scholars' views, and these add much to the length of the book, which exceeds seven hundred pages. The reviewer must admit that at times he recalled Dr. Will's own comment on Porzio whose interesting and sound ideas were described as 'noyées dans un verbiage insupportable'. But few will read the book at one stretch, and its value depends upon the fullness of treatment which is accorded to each problem.

Dr. Will begins with the geography and the prehistoric archaeology of Corinthia, and he discusses the movements of early Hellenic trade, suggesting with more caution than Heurtley that the Boeotian coast rather than the Isthmus area was the point of departure for trade with Ithaca. When he comes to the archaeological evidence of Corinthian contacts with Ithaca in the ninth century, he finds it difficult to account for a colonisation of this (now) infertile island and suggests that it was a stage on a trade route along which tin was imported to Corinth. Corinth is described as a harbourside in the centuries before 750 B.C., when the main currents of development ran from Cyprus to Athens and, as Demargue has argued, Crete and Sparta were in close contact. But he holds that Perachora was acquired c. 830 B.C. by Corinth and was much visited by pilgrims from Argos, which is hardly consistent with backwardness in Corinth. He concludes this section of his book with a tribute to the penetrating judgment of Thucydides on the archaic period for which he has a healthy and welcome respect.

In the next chapter he deals at length with the cults and traditions of Corinth, as Hanell has done with those of Megara. This is a full treatment, covering a hundred and fifty pages, and it contains an interesting study of Hera as a Chthonian deity. In the next section the literary traditions of Corinth are investigated with care and with more reliance on early genealogies than is usual. Dr. Will does not hesitate to suggest that the Sisyphus legend is the earliest Greek memory of Corinth, deriving from the 'Mycenaean' epoch c. 2000-1700 B.C. The list of the Corinthian kings from Aletes to Telestes is investigated against the background of the myths about the Dorian invasion, and the quotient of 39 years to a generation is advanced by Dr. Will. The change at Corinth from four racial tribes to a system of eight tribes is not attributed by him to the beginnings of the Dorian 'polis' but to a later time. The source of these early traditions is considered to be a Corinthian epic, named after one of its poets 'Eumelus' but traditional in character, which was first elaborated in the eighth century and may have been revised later. An excellent study of the Iacchidae, collating the literary and archaeological evidence for the period, concludes the history of Corinth before the tyrants.

More than two hundred pages are devoted to the



Cypselids. This is the best section of the book, for it combines a critical study of the sources with a fine grasp of the general problems which affected colonisation, tyranny, coinage, land-tenure and so forth in the seventh and sixth centuries. It must suffice in a review to mention only a few points. He decides in favour of the low chronology which Bechoff advanced—putting the rise of Cypselus c. 650—and of the lower date for the adoption of coinage which Robinson has recently favoured, and he places the fall of the tyranny c. 550 with the decline of Corinthian pottery. There is perhaps a dangerous tendency to equate political and economic changes too precisely and confidently. He brings the Lelantine War down to the first half of the sixth century, on grounds which the reviewer does not find convincing. The revolution caused by the tyrants at Corinth and Athens in the matter of land-tenure receives careful analysis. The conclusion is that they redistributed the land, but it is admitted that there is very little evidence to support this conclusion. A section on the colonial system of Corinth is admirable, and very interesting suggestions are made about the way in which a state first issued coinage without disrupting an agrarian economy. Many excellent comments are made on the supposed line of succession, 'aristocracy—tyranny—democracy'; on the sources of silver in the north-west; and on the much disputed fragment of Nicodemus Chalkandekas about the constitution after the fall of the tyrants and the difficult passage in Aristotle, *Politics* iiii.11.

The book closes with chapters on art at Corinth and the history of Corinth between 550 and 390, a bibliography, an index of passages cited and a good general index. Altogether a most valuable contribution to early Greek studies, so well printed that I noticed only two misprints (p. 381 l. 1, 'Admetida' and p. 391, l. 4).

N. G. L. HAMMOND.

MERRITT H. D., WARR-GRIFF H. F. and MCGILLIVRAY M. F., *The Athenian Tribute Lists, Vol. III*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1954. Pp. xx + 406. \$10.

MERRITT H. D., WARR-GRIFF H. F. and MCGILLIVRAY M. F., *The Athenian Tribute Lists, Vol. IV*. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1955. Pp. xii + 298, with 1 plate. \$10.

Vols. I and II of this monumental work, which present the texts and a very generous supplement of related material, were reviewed in *JHS* LXX (1951), 300 and *LXX* (1952), 104, respectively, by Dr. M. N. Tod, whose eminent labours in Greek epigraphy enabled him to give due praise to the authors' technical achievement. The present reviewer, who claims no such qualification and in this respect can only echo Dr. Tod, must concern himself more with the historical picture presented mainly in the third and longest part of Vol. III. For the late appearance of this review he is alone and shamefully responsible: the delay, however, allows him to assume the reader's knowledge of the contents of the volume and of some of the issues raised since its appearance.

In the long process of preliminary studies the authors—and here A. B. West must be named with them—have sorted out so much material and considered so many possibilities that now, when all is to be summed up in our volume, they have an unrivalled and familiarity with the evidence. The qualities that stand out in their work are the freshness of mind with which throughout the development of their theories they have varied their hypotheses to meet new evidence or to deal more effectively with what was known already; the tenacity with which they strive to comprehend a large body of exactly studied material under a relatively uncomplicated hypothesis; the accurate and relentless vigour with which they follow out all the implications of an interpretation and make each entry or sentence yield all it can. The epigraphic texts are listed enough to stand this extreme pressure—indeed with the fragmentary remains of a systematic list

fresh progress is possible by no other method, and if uncertain restorations are sometimes printed with too certain confidence we ought probably to accept this as a defect of the method's quality—but when the same pressure is applied to Thucydides the results give our pause.

Thus the massive examination of the original membership of the league, weighing the claims of each category district by district, was needed in order to establish firstly the discrepancy between the total of conceivable money payments for 477 and the 460T which Thucydides gives for the original assessment, and this discrepancy forms the basis for their important thesis that these 460T include the value of the ships contributed by many members. Three sentences of Thuc. I. 96 are then subjected to close analysis, from which it emerges that the assessment was in two stages—first Aristides estimated the proper value for each city's contribution, then the Athenian state determined which cities were to send ships and which to pay money. It is at this point that the reader of Thucydides is left slightly out of breath (cf. R. Meiggs in *CR* n.s. II (1952), p. 97): we are convinced that this is what happened, but the reader could not detect without knowledge of the arguments displayed in *ATL* III that in the sentence  $\eta\psi\delta' \delta' \sigma\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\sigma\ \phi\acute{o}\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota$  he has been taken back from the second stage of the assessment to the first. Again, in the chapter on 'The Chronological Background of the Fifty Years' Thucydides' criticism of Hellanicus (I. 97.2) is made to yield an implied promise that Thucydides himself will follow an exact chronological order 'without any deviation whatever': this is really a *sic* issue and must be thrashed out elsewhere, but I record here my doubt whether the principle can be established by these means even if Thucydides followed it in fact.

The most impressive exhibition of the lengths to which epigraphic analysis can go is in the discussion of the list of the second assessment period, where a process begun by Meritt and West in 1928 is carried to its limits and the material has now been laid out in such a way that even the least epigraphic of historians can readily see what may and what may not be made of it. An example on a smaller scale of the authors' passionate pursuit of consequences is their treatment on p. 370 of *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 126 (*Tod* 151), where they first argue that tribute paid by the Chersonese cities to the Odrysians implies *a fortiori* tribute paid by the cities of the Thracian coast, then that the description of this tribute in 357 as  $\tau\omicron\beta\eta\ \phi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\beta\eta\ \mu\iota\sigma\theta\omicron\varsigma$  implies that the Greek cities already paid it to Sitalces and Scythia in the great days of the Odrysian kingdom in the fifth century, which may help to explain fluctuations in the Athenian tribute in this area.

The second period brings us to the main controversial issue, the structure of Athenian and imperial finance from 449 to 432. (The following notes do not do justice to the complexity of the argument, of which not even a summary can be attempted here.) (a) It is possible to regret that subsequent controversy (A. W. Gomme, *Hesperia* II (1933) 1; Meritt, *Hesperia* XXIII (1954) 185; Gomme, *Historia* III (1954) 393) has centred so much on Thucydides' linguistic habits: the rule governing his use of the article with  $\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$  does not seem to be invariable in the form in which Meritt asserts it, but neither has anyone produced a good parallel for  $\tau\omicron\beta\eta\ \alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$  in the same  $\delta\tau\iota\ \sigma\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \eta\psi$ . (b) It remains a serious objection to the Aristophanes scholar's text of Thuc. II 13.3 that it does not expressly state the argument from which the  $\tau\omicron\beta\eta$  in  $\tau\omicron\beta\eta\ \mu\iota\sigma\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$  is to be subtracted; Meritt (p. 194, speaking of an imaginary parallel) concludes that the language is fortitious. But the flow of the argument is better in the scholar's text, that is, it is more encouraging to speak of a steady sum almost all of which is still there than to point to a maximum of which two-fifths are gone already. (c) In these circumstances more may be laid on the factual objection to the book-text. The contention of 477, III seems secure, that there was never any sum approaching 7500T on the Acropolis at one time, and Gomme's alternative

scheme (1953, p. 26) does not work: in *ATL* III (p. 120) it is too readily conceded that Thucydides might have been misinformed. (2) Meritt (p. 214) shows signs of abandoning the lemma *ἡ δὲ ἀπορία ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως* in 1.6 of the *Anonymus Argentinensis*. Any substitute must take account of the fact that one would expect the Council's shipbuilding duties to be explained earlier—they are the basis of Demosthenes' argument and are given in both extant hypotheses as something which the reader needs to know before he begins. The problem of these lines is not so simple as Gomae makes it when he cites them (1953, p. 13) as irrelevant to Demosthenes' text to justify the irrelevance of his own tentative restoration of ll. 5-8. The comments in the rest of the papyrus are brief and (where they can be restored) fully relevant, and create a presumption that the less brief comment in ll. 5-15 is relevant too; but no restoration which takes *ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας* literally (as meaning 431/0) has yet proved relevant, nor is it likely that any will, so that probably ll. 5-8 refer throughout to the building programme and the *ATL* restoration is on the right lines. (3) It must be borne in mind throughout that the *ATL* hypothesis embraces a wide range of phenomena (the 'rising' list, the figures 3,000 and 10,000 in Isocrates and Diadorus, Kallias' decree, the Saites accounts and 'the eleven years' of the logistai record, and much else) which must otherwise be explained piecemeal or by a better comprehensive theory. The conception of a long-term financial programme launched in 449 and continuing the hellenonomiai for 15 years to pay 200*τ* annually to Athens holds the field, and any challenger must master the whole field.

It would take too long to attempt a catalogue of the new contributions in the rest of this adventurous book. It contains far more than the inferences to be drawn from the lists themselves, far more indeed than the background of imperial and financial history necessary for the understanding of the lists. Yet it is not complete as a history of Athenian imperial finance, partly because of its proportions and partly just because there is so much advance into new territory. The opening phase of the league, and the earliest quota lists, must inevitably be given broader treatment because it is specially important to get the beginning straight (and if the later years had been treated on the same scale another volume would have been needed and more of the authors' time), but the disproportion in this volume is disturbing and one cannot help wishing that some of part II and the opening of part III had been compressed so that the final chapters could be expanded. Secondly, in the matter of argument it is sometimes hard, especially at first reading, to distinguish what is being asserted as fact and what is treated as more or less probable inference. This is perhaps natural in a wide-ranging book packed with new inferences, but it is also one of the reasons why we still need a full-scale history of the Athenian empire, more homogeneous than this outstanding volume.

These two volumes are as lavishly and beautifully produced as the first two. In Vol. III this has allowed the authors sometimes to repeat text or information rather than send the reader back to some other part of the volume. Vol. IV, the indexes and bibliography, is on the rather generous scale. The General Index appears to include everything, and if there are some entries that are not likely to be consulted often, the more obvious subjects are broken up into manageable sub-entries and the reader is not confronted, even under 'Athens', with a long row of undifferentiated page numbers. The reviewer can testify that this Index passes the stringent practical test of looking up a reference in a hurry before giving a lecture.

A. AMBLYE

Neoplatonic *Athens* *Politis* and the author of this work shows that little has escaped his notice. Anyone wishing to study the subject might find the collection of theories and opinions useful, but it is perhaps unlikely that many readers of this journal will find much to occupy them.

After some preliminary remarks as to the nature of the work and its relation to the Sophists (11 *ἡ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐν γένει οὐκ ἄνιστος* Anonimo), G. passes to a discussion of the questions of date and authorship. Beyond the limits of 431-411 he finds it neither necessary nor possible to go, and he likewise declines to attribute to any individual a work which he supposes to have been published anonymously. This section involves a more or less brief discussion of Thucydides, son of Melesias, and five pages save the honour of the son of Oloros. In the next chapter, G. considers the debate in Herodotus 3.80-82, its place in the development of Athenian political ideas and in particular its relation to Pseudo-Neoplaton, and goes on to compare Herodotus and Pseudo-Neoplaton in their attitude to democracy. The final chapter is devoted to showing that the instances cited in III. 11 are not to be taken literally but as illustrations of the extreme tendencies of the work. This warning is perhaps necessary, but G.'s assumption that the reference to Milesius concerns the events of 440 confirms suspicion that the author has concentrated his attention too narrowly.

Altogether, the book may prove helpful, but seems to contain little that is at once surprising and satisfying.

G. L. CAWKWILL

AMBRIDGE (A.). *The Greek Tyrants*. London: Hutchinson, 1956. Pp. 157. 8s. 6d.

The matter of this excellent little book may be summarised almost in the words of the chapter headings: 1. The Background; 2. The Word Tyrant; 3. The Military Factor: Persia; 4. The Overthrow of an Aristocracy at Corinth; 5. The Racial Factor: Cleisthenes; 6. The Spartan Alternative; 7. The Economic Factor: Solon; 8. Mytilene; 9. Peisistratus; 10. The Persian Danger (from Polycrates to the Ionian Revolt); 11. Military Monarchy in Sicily; 12. Epilogue. This last chapter deals with the late classical and Hellenistic tyrants, showing how tyranny becomes endemic again in Greece with the breakdown of the classical synthesis. In between lies the great age of Greek political history, when the institutions which Greece had created were in full working order and there was no gap for a tyrant to fill (p. 150). How far Greece generally can be credited with this political success, and how far we ought rather to attribute the infrequency of tyrants in classical times to the examples and opposition of Athens and Sparta, might be a subject for further discussion.

In general, this short book seems to omit almost nothing (unless indeed something might have been made of Athenians VI. 234, on the Erythraean tyranny, or of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, VII. 2, on Aristodemus of Corone).

Professor Ambrose does not choose one explanation of the rise of the tyrants and ride it to death, after the manner of some earlier books on the subject. He notes the aristocratic origins of some tyrants and (which is still more decisive against any tendency to see the tyrants as consciously anti-aristocratic, bourgeois or proletarian leaders) the readiness of Athenian noble families to intermarry with them; and even treats with perhaps excessive reserve the tradition (Diod. VIII. 21, *Op. Pap.* 1963) that Orestheus was a son of the people. He is clearly right to stress (with Aristotle) the importance of the military factor, the rise of hoplite armies, in shifting the 'centre of gravity' of political power from the upper towards the middle classes; though he himself perhaps slips into oversimplification in such a sentence as 'Persia may really be a precursor of the tyrants and exemplify the view that their support came from the hoplites' (p. 42). Generally,

GIANNI M. J. *La Costituzione degli Ateniesi. Studi sulla pseudo-Senofonta*. Naples: Giannini, 1953. Pp. 199. L. 2,500.

Much has been written on the subject of the Pseudo-



it is the great merit of his book that it warns us against this tendency to identify 'the' supporters of the revolutionary leaders with any one of the many discredited elements—scribs, industrial workers, agrarian debtors, unenfranchised merchants, disgruntled jobbers—who could, as even our fragmentary evidence shows, support a revolutionary leader in the seventh or sixth century. It is certainly an over-simplification to write (p. 31) 'At the beginning of the seventh century the Greeks [my italics] changed their style of fighting and began to use . . . hoplites'. The new tactics were slow to penetrate parts of the Greek world; Philipposmen induced some Achaean League members to adopt them late in the third century! (Pausanias, 50)—and we have no reason to suppose that their earlier penetration of the more progressive regions was instantaneous.

Among points for agreement, it may be noted that A. follows the ancient sources and not modern theory in declaring that 'Solen did not use . . . the Areopagus' for *probouleus*, 'and instituted a new lower council' (pp. 88-9). He has the support of the analogy of the *dyonisiou pankh* in the Chios inscription (Tod, GHI 1), even if its date is post-350. Among points for doubt is whether the *areopagos* (p. 161) had a sixth of the produce. W. J. Woodhouse maintains that olive compounds of *sympos*, such as *lathropos*, *echropos*, *sympos*, uniformly mean *sharing an equal share in an early death or no luck*; and if the *echropos* were those who 'worked the lands of the oak for this life', as the *Ath. Pol.* says—that is, good land in the phyle, perhaps in addition to their own highland crofts or 'pocket-handkerchief' properties—the idea of our *stul* in use as payment need not be abandoned. Obviously there were poor men of more than one kind in Solonian Attica; and the author of the *Ath. Pol.* was already feeling the temptation, where evidence is scanty, to suppose that past history was simpler than it ever is when we know more about it.

The prose convincing and other *minutiae* are good; though on p. 151 the list of elements of *First Greece* omits Alcibiades and Sappho (Vol. I). On p. 106 Machiavelli has acquired a redundant 'e'; and if elsewhere we may write Cassander, Perikander, why, on pp. 129, 131, 134, the unpleasant hybrid 'Cleandria'?

It is perhaps a little difficult to see the 'general reader' desiring this book; if he wants to read Greek history, he will want something more general. But there must be few scholars who would not profit by reading it, and it will be a standby for 'Greats' and other Ancient History Honours students for a long time to come.

A. R. BURN.

HACKER (E.). *From Alexander to Constantine. Passages and documents illustrating the history of social and political ideas, 336 B.C.-A.D. 337.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xxv + 504. 50s.

With this book Sir Ernest Hacker bids us farewell. Those who in their own studies have been learning a good deal from his work could easily be forgiven if they were grateful and—greedy enough not to take this book as his last. Still, there are limits even to the most creative scholar's activity, and there is the justified wish of the octogenarian to sit back and let the others go on. To accept this, I feel, is the duty of everybody who has read the moving preface of the present book.

Sir Ernest regards the volume as a kind of continuation of his translation with notes of Aristotle's *Politics* (1928), and both together as the *longue œuvre* for the second volume, never written, of that invaluable work *Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors* (1918). Indeed, we have now, although in very different forms, Professor Barker's view on the whole history of Greek and Roman as less than Jewish and Christian political ideas in ancient times. The new volume is an anthology of translated passages, interrupted and connected by notes and comments. It is surprising how readable this *maximal compendium* actually is.

More than that: it is immensely instructive and interesting and, of course, not only, not even primarily for the classical scholar. Naturally, a reader may have preferred another passage now and then: naturally, one does not always see eye to eye with Sir Ernest on certain points; naturally, he relies to some extent, though not unreservedly, on modern experts who may not always be equally reliable. But all that is unimportant. What matters is that we are safely guided through a wide and partially little-known country. We are by no means tied to the beaten track, but as with any good guide-book, it is left to us to stay behind occasionally and have a further look for ourselves.

From Alexander and the Hellenistic schools of philosophy, the way leads first to the two outstanding political creations of the Hellenistic age, federal league and kingship. The next chapter, somewhat surprisingly, deals with Polybios and the Book of Daniel, as a Greek and a Hebrew view on the process of history. This aptly brings us to the next section on Hellenistic-Jewish thought, both inside and outside the Old Testament. Rome follows, from Laetantius and Cicero to Tacitus, Pliny, and the jurists; even inscriptions, our most important source for the emperor cult, are not forgotten. The next part deals with late Greek thought, from Pseudo-Aristotle (if we only had more of him!) via Dio of Prusa and Plutarch to the emperor Marcus, to Plutarch, to the late writers on monarchy. Finally, we are given a fairly ample selection of passages from Christian sources (and in Celsus one anti-Christian).

This short survey does not really show how rich the contents of the volume are. It is still less possible for this reviewer to produce relevant criticism. In fact, this is not a book to be read critically, but with an open and receiving mind, willing to learn and to be guided. One general impression is obvious, indeed so obvious that it need hardly be stressed: in each single chapter, under whatever name or title, we meet the Greek mind, ever fertile and creative.

VICTOR EATONHURST.

NILSSON (M. P.). *Die hellenistische Schule.* Munich: Beck, 1935. Pp. xl + 161, with 8 plates. DM. 12.

This is an unpretentious book, simple in style and light in its scholarly apparatus; but we should not be deceived by its appearance. The great historian of Greek religion did not turn to a study of Hellenistic education without a serious view of its significance. We have Rostovtzeff's survey of social and economic conditions in the Hellenistic world; Marrou has clarified the stages of educational development in antiquity; and Nilsson now elaborates on the central position of the school in maintaining the intellectual traditions of the Greeks in the Hellenistic period.

In the older *polis*, he shows, an intense civic life had provided, almost spontaneously, for the further education of boys in their adolescence, once they were reasonably athletic, literate and musical. Their elders helped them to grow in wisdom as in stature while they played their part in the social and religious activities of the State, and they were called up for military duties or, in Athens, certainly by the 430's, for the *ephebia*. There was little need for formal education in their middle years. After Alexander, however, with the expansion of Greek civilisation, boys had to be made more systematically conscious of their national inheritance, especially in the Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires, where the Greeks were upholding their traditions in the midst of the native cultures.

Even allowing for the difficulty of the scattered references, Nilsson makes a strong case for distinguishing three groups under the Hellenistic terminology: a primary group of *paidai* (7 to 13 years of age), who received private instruction; a secondary group of adolescents *epheboi* (15 to 17 years), who attended the city school; and a third group of *paides* (18 to 21 or 22 years), the young adults, who



would take up their citizen duties as *ἐπίστοι* in the older Attic sense of the word. It is the formal instruction of the secondary group that marks the chief development in educational practice between the Greek polis and the Hellenistic city.

Both the causes and the effects of such a development are of broad historical interest. As Nilsson shows, Hellenistic secondary education retained the older emphasis upon physical training along with its cultural elements. Did it then grow out of the Athenian *êphêbia*? If the *êphêbia* was a flourishing institution in the 450's, it had declined by the mid-third century; and when, after a gap in our evidence, it reappears in the late second century, it was more educational than military. Nilsson asks whether the *êphêbia* influenced the Hellenistic school, or vice versa in the later stage. The alternatives, however, are not exclusive. Certainly, the Athenian *êphêbia* does not seem to have exercised a continuous influence. But as the earlier *êphêbia* became less military, it may still as a civic institution have influenced the new educational development; then this development in turn encouraged the revival of the *êphêbia* as the highest stage of what began at school as the full education of a young Greek gentleman. We have to look for an answer in terms of the changing circumstances of Greek life as a whole. Nilsson does this with special reference to the evidence from the Seleucid cities and the Greek cities and settlements in Ptolemaic Egypt. In the latter case he makes good use of Lanney's *Épistoles de les écoles hellénistiques*; for education, athletics and military service were never separate in Greek thought. Here he shows the function of Hellenistic education in keeping alive the traditions of Greek civilisation. Can we now make more of Hellenistic literature in the light of this evidence for the basic literary training? And, to take the matter further, if we consider Hellenistic civilisation as a whole, how far did the Greek model of educational organisation influence developments among the non-Greek population? We know that the Greeks themselves became less exclusive. These are questions which Nilsson's brilliant exposition has helped to clarify and set in better perspective.

The reviewer has handled this book in the spirit in which it was written, that is, with an eye on the main problems of social history. The scholar will return to the evidence for Hellenistic culture, not least that provided by the inscriptions, with a sharper appreciation of the chief issues where these affect his interpretation of individual points. The general reader will also find an account, in fair detail, of earlier Greek education and the Athenian institutions of *gymnasion*, and a description of the buildings, munificence and school organisation, and teaching methods in Hellenistic education, not to forget a stimulating analysis of the position of the Greeks amid the alien corn of Egypt.

A. H. McILKINARD.

LEAHY, L. S. J., and MAYHEW, R. S. J., *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie*, Tome IV, Laodicee, Apamène (Nos. 1243-1997). *Chronologie des inscriptions datées des Tomes I-IV*, Paris: Geuthner, 1955. Pp. 279. Fr. 5,200.

The new volume of *Ins. gr. et lat. de la Syrie* follows with commendable speed after the appearance of III, 2 in 1933. There is one important innovation in this volume; the texts are here presented for the first time with accents and other normal typographical features. The volume contains the inscriptions of the region of Lanchia and Mare and Apamea, and, as usual, the great bulk of the material is Christian, though one notable Hellenistic text (nos. 1261), the decree of the *synagoge* of Lanchia of 173 B.C., is produced, as well as a number of inscriptions, imperial, municipal and private, some of them in Latin, of the Roman period.

Syria is rich in dated inscriptions, rich to a degree that fills the Anatolian epigraphist with envy. The present volume includes nos. 1044-1097 of the series, and duplica-

tion or multiplication of many of the numerals and the accession of seven letters in the *Additions*, etc., must bring the total list of inscribed stones, weights, gems, etc., up to over 100 (74 of them being marked 'Inedit'). Of these 239 contain dates surviving and legible; many others are datable within narrow limits by internal or other evidence. To the Christian epigraphist the main interest of the volume lies less in an individual item, most (of course not all) of which are commonplace, than in its richly documented evidence for the development, decade by decade, from Constantine to Justinian and later, of typology, symbolism, orthography and formulation. (The volume of course contains its quota of Christian epitaphs from the pre-Nicene period—see *Anatolian Studies* v. 1955, p. 28, or *M.A.M.A.* vii, p. xxvii—but he would be a bold man who would venture to identify them. The reviewer allows himself one guess—no, 1786 with its flanking palm-branches, illustrated also on Ramsey *C.H.* no. 201. As for the name, did not the Christians go to the lions for refusing to sacrifice to the gods whose names they bore?) To our knowledge of the evolution, from period to period, of Christian epigraphical and (symbolical) usage the Syrian inscriptions, in this series assembled and admirably annotated, have an invaluable contribution to make.

Not that the chronological element derived from dated monuments in Syria or elsewhere is to be used as a bar of Procrustes to which the chronology of undated monuments in other areas must be adjusted. Take the symbol of the Cross. Sulzberger in his article in *Byzantion* II, 1925, pp. 337 ff., drawing mainly on the evidence of Rome and Syria, found that the earliest dated example of the Constantinian was of A.D. 323, of the Latin Cross of A.D. 334. It was already known that undated examples of both of these, belonging to the later third century, occurred in Phrygia (*JHS* xvi, 1924, p. 73, no. 200, and Calder, *Philadelphia and Montanism*, p. 24, no. 12; add now *M.A.A.* vii, no. 377). It is now known that the Tau Cross was in use in Phrygia in the same period (*ibid.*, p. xxxix). And if the reviewer's interpretation of the epitaph published in *Anatolian Studies* v, 1935, p. 38, no. 2, is correct, the Greek Cross (on an *ἀγκύρα στυλοβάτου*) which would have rejoined the heart of Epiphanius, and is the earliest known instance of the hot cross-bun) is attested in Cilicia A.D. 170-80.

A few notes on points of detail. In no. 1801 ἀγάθητος (a new word) is translated 'loyauté'. Yes, but with the suggestion that loyalty is also plain common sense—a Semitic trait. In no. 1861, a prose epitaph, [α]γαθή[ν] μου, is perhaps preferable to [ἀ]γαθή[ν] μου. In no. 1903 ἐμνήσθητι τῇ Μνήμῃ, a quaint expression, appears to be established in the sense 'of pious memory'. With no. 1909 ἀγαπῶν ἀποκατερόν . . . cf. *M.J.M.A.* vii. 279a, ἀγαπῶν ἀποκατερόν ὁ τι καὶν ὁ ἱερεὺς . . . the first occurrence of this use in Phrygia, where Hellenistic Christians are relatively scarce. To the rare inscriptional examples of χορηγεῖσθαι (see nos. 1379, 1440, 1921) add this unpublished item from Galatia—(Zivce on the road Ağaboz-Koçhan, doorstone, letters of c. A.D. 400, Calder, 1910): ἐδόθη κερδέν δ[ι]σκόλος τοῖς θεοῖς ἡδύς ἡδύς δ ἀπο(σ)φύσσας) ἐ-ἀγαπῶν τῷ || (5) χορηγεῖσθαι) θε[ῶ]ν, with abbreviation marks after R in line 4 and K in line 5. The wording of the note on no. 1925 may convey the impression that the reviewer (in *Ant. Stud.* . . . *Buckley*, pp. 15-26) held the appeal *πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς* to be 'païen, paï chrétien'. In fact the reviewer was at pains to demonstrate the contrary. The grammatical construction *τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς* . . . was used by pagans in southern Anatolia, but there is no evidence for pagan use of the formula *τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς τὸν (ῥήμα) θεόν*, which was adopted as their protective sepulchral formula by the Christians of the upper Maeander basin towards the middle of the third century, spread thence a few decades later to eastern Phrygia (see now *M.J.M.A.* vii. pp. xxviii ff.) and even filtered through to Vassada

Caesarea Capp. (here on the gravestone of a Phrygian), Oxyrhynchus and Rome. Current rightly treated an adjuration *an elav tou qurra* (in Amisus, *Stah. Pont.* iii, p. 26, no. 13) as early Christian or Jewish.

The editors, *ἀρχαὶ λογιώτατοι καὶ ἐκπαιδευμένοι*, have produced a work in the high scholarly tradition of the Society of Jesus.

W. M. CALDER.

AMAND DE MENDIETA (E.). *Le Mont-Athos. Le presque des exilés*. Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955. Pp. lx + 300. Fr. fl. 250.

Athos, the monastic republic in northern Greece, administratively autonomous, virtually theocratic, of which 'God is the sovereign and the Panagia the queen', has become for the outside world and in spite of itself more and more an *amateuristic* curiosity and an object of study. In the place of the pilgrims who used to visit it as the living centre and stronghold of the East Christian tradition there now come, from Europe and America, an increasing number of scholars to work among what is still the richest collection of Greek manuscripts in the world, to observe, date, describe, its countless frescoes and icons. Athos is becoming the paradise of philologists, Byzantinists, historians of art and music. It is a typical, and a depressing, sign.

Le Père Amand de Mendieta, although his motive for visiting the Holy Mountain was in the first instance scientific, did not confine his attention only to his research. He realised that Athos was a great deal more than 'a gallery of curiosities and antiquities from which the life is gradually draining'. He set himself to discover and to describe something of this 'great deal more', the actual monastic community and its way of life. He acquainted himself with its constitution, its ceremonies, its customs, its history. He recorded his impressions, his dislikes and admimations, his conversations, his judgments. He sought to grasp its spiritual foundations.

The result is the present book. Briefly, it is divided into three sections. The first is a factual survey of the general history and constitution of Athos; the second is both an account of the individual monasteries which the author visited, and a travelogue that includes descriptions of place and person, and digresses into such subjects as the nature of Athos art, the significance of the Liturgy in Eastern Christianity, local traditions and practices; the third section—the final chapter—deals with the mystical and ascetic ideal of the monk. The author accompanies his text with abundant footnotes, and there is a bibliography which, while it does not pretend to be exhaustive, is extremely adequate.

There is no question that this book provides the most complete and satisfactory general introduction to Athos that has yet been written, and it will probably remain so for some time. It is all the more to be regretted, therefore, that the author should have misconceived that spiritual 'ideal' to which the monastic community owes its foundation and its continuity, and which determines not only its art but, ultimately, its whole existence. For if it is, with reservations, true that this ideal is one of a tradition which, incorporating the teachings of St. Paul, goes back through the later masters and early Fathers of the Greek Church to Plato, it is very false to assert that it is based upon a body-soul dualism of a radical and absolute nature; to do so is, indeed, to accuse it of being both un-Orthodox and at the same time non-Christian. Nor is it quite clear why the author should describe as 'pessimistic' an ideal rooted in the certitude that man can achieve his deification and possess eternal life. These misrepresentations are the more surprising because, generally speaking, the author, in spite of his own religious convictions—and Roman and Orthodox Catholics are not always the best interpreters of each other's viewpoint—is very just in his appreciation of the East Christian tradition. The subject is, however, one of considerable complexity, and if I mention it here it is only because the

author's treatment of it in this book aims what is otherwise a most scholarly, sympathetic, and discriminating study.

P. O. A. SHEERARD.

WESTERMANN (W. L.). *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1955. Pp. xli + 182. \$3.

This work was planned as a revised and expanded version of the article on 'Slavery' in *R.E. Suppl.* vol. VI, written by the same author. Parts are not very different from the original article; the chapters, however, on slavery in the Eastern Mediterranean after Alexander's conquests and those on slavery in the post-Augustan and Christian world are very considerably recast and enlarged, and the evidence reinterpreted. New material and the results of recent scholarship have been incorporated, and the whole is equipped with a massive array of footnotes (of which more below).

There is a place for a scholarly and readable work in English on Greco-Roman slavery, which would be supported by reference to the ancient evidence, and would give the reader a picture of the institution at different periods, the attitude of men to it, and the influences which effected changes in it. This book, however, fails to fill this need. None of the chapters give a clear picture of their theme, all except the first, which is jejune, are muddled by the inclusion within them of every piece of evidence which seems to fall within the period, whether it is illustrative or exceptional, trustworthy or suspicious. Unrelated topics stand cheek by jowl with each other for no easily discernible reason; general statements are frequently based on evidence which shows the case to be exceptional; and the result is a series of statements of varying veracity, with little or no co-ordinating thread. The chapter-divisions themselves are not always happily chosen for building up a unified picture; sometimes the same topic is dealt with in two chapters, sometimes there is material in one chapter which should more properly belong elsewhere. The style and the English add further to the lack of clarity; the style, in seeking to be objective and scholarly, contrives to be dull and monotonous; the English is cumbersome and in places wholly obscure.

There is little attempt to put slavery into its social context at different periods, to show how it fitted into the pattern of life, or what were the feelings of men about it. True, there are references to the evidence for such matters; but the evidence turns to dust by being used to provide yet one more 'fact' about slavery, instead of being interpreted in its human and emotional terms. Unless the reader is aware of its living nature, a dull chronicle of a number of ancient passages where the words 'slave' or 'slavery' occur is hardly more valuable than would be a Bradshaw to describe a railway journey to a reader 2,000 years hence.

None the less, such a book could be of great value to the professional scholar as a comprehensive collection of the relevant evidence for slavery in different periods. Unfortunately, the work falls very short of the standards of accuracy one would look for in such a work. The team of research scholars who helped to collect the evidence often failed to understand the Greek or Latin text of a passage, with the result that an untrue statement appears in the text, based on a mistranslated passage; quite frequently the passage quoted simply does not state what is claimed for it in the text. Wrong or inaccurate references are common; and there is often inconsistency in quoting the titles of works and in their attribution.

The use of the evidence is often far from satisfactory; it all tends to be regarded as of equal validity; an exceptional case becomes the foundation of a general statement. There is little attempt to assess the evidence in terms of its context and of its source; the presence of the word 'slave' is too often the only touchstone. Further, there is an inadequate understanding of the history of the periods dealt with, and some astonishing inaccuracies and wrong



statements in respect of historical facts and events. Some random examples of these failings taken from both the Greek and the Roman sections are given, to illustrate and justify the criticisms.

P. 9, 2, n. 67: The treaty to which Demosthenes is referring belongs to 336 B.C., not 336 A.C.

P. 10, 1, n. 72: A reference is given to C.E.A. instead of to *IG II*, as one might expect; and *Stasis* is referred to as a city-state.

P. 11, 1, nn. 93 and 94: W. is clearly unaware that in these two notes he is citing the same evidence twice over, once directly and once from an article by Kroll.

P. 11, 2, and n. 104: Aristophanes, in *Plutus*, 521, is speaking of kidnapping, not slave-dealing.

P. 12, 2, and n. 15: Wilmonowitz does not in the passage referred to suggest that merchants used slaves as oarsmen.

P. 13, 2, and n. 32: The Letters of Aeschines are used as the evidence for a statement about Aeschines' personal slaves, although their genuineness was fully accepted. In the Bibliography they are referred to as pseudo-Aeschines.

P. 16, 1, n. 83: Xenophon's *Constitution of Athens* is here, and p. 17, n. 119, treated as a genuine work of the author; on p. 25, 1, and n. 47 it is referred to by a different title as pseudo-Xenophon, and so listed in the Bibliography.

P. 17, 1, and n. 110: We are told that 'basimadoi' Greek *basimadoi*.

P. 17, 2: A statement is made that 'slaves could not appear before the *boule* or assembly except . . . under assurance of freedom from persecution'; for which Andocides 1, 12, and Thucydides 6, 27, are quoted as evidence. These passages refer to the exceptional measures taken at the time of the mutilation of the Hermae, and the freedom from prosecution was offered equally to citizens, metics and slaves.

P. 18, 1: We are told that the historian Hecataeus was a tyrant of Miletus, who used the military support of enfranchised slaves to strengthen the power which he held (Diodorus, 11, 23 (it should be 26 also), is quoted as the authority for this statement).

P. 18, 2, n. 137: How and Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus*, 94-5, are quoted as authority for dismissing as 'unhistorical' the revolt of the Argive slaves, described in Herodotus, 6, 83. H. and W. discuss the matter, pp. 96-7, and do not reject the story, but think it refers to serfs rather than slaves. On the strength of what H. and W. are alleged to say, the story, although 'unhistorical', is taken 'as proof of the possibility of mass emancipation . . . of slaves'.

P. 61, and n. 66: We are told, on the authority of Livy, 34, 50, 4-7, that 'twelve thousand slaves from the Roman armies, found in Asia, were released at the request of Plautius in 195 B.C.'. Livy says 1200.

P. 61 and n. 69: It is stated that 'the presence of Roman prisoners as slaves in Africa is attested by a provision of the treaty with Carthage for the return of captives, as well as deserters, who were found there at the close of the Hannibalic War'. The authorities for the statement are Polybius 13, 18, 3, and Appian, *Punica*, 9, 54 (wrongly and irrelevantly quoted in n. 13 instead of here; the whole of n. 13 is unsatisfactory). Neither source says the Romans were enslaved.

P. 74, n. 110: The *Pro Sestio* is here referred to as *Pro Sesto*, in n. 147 as *Pro P. Sesto*. In n. 108 and n. 109 the *pro* is translated as 'in defence of'; though in n. 108 the *Pro Roscio* becomes simply *Roscio*. Such inconsistencies and inaccuracies in nomenclature are common *rec.*, e.g., p. 77, n. 7: *Post reditum in Senatum*; p. 79, n. 29: *In Pinnum de Iurisperitis republ.*

P. 76 and n. 130: Cato is said to 'speak of the chaining of rural slaves, but only during the winter season'. Cato, *De Agric.* 56: *Cibaria . . . compedens per hiemem*. 'Per hiemem' goes with the words following, not with 'compedens'.

P. 77, n. 7: On the strength of Cicero, *De Flamm. Resp.*, 24 we are told that 'the ludi Megalenses were turned over to

the slaves by the aedile . . . in 56 B.C. (The other two supporting references do not refer to this incident.) This is one of many examples of Cicero's rhetorical exaggerations being regarded as sober fact.

P. 78, n. 11: On the strength of Dio, 38, 24, 1, we learn that 'freedom was sometimes granted in order to place slaves (ex-slaves?) upon the list for the grain dole'. A good example of a single incident, whose significance has been missed, becoming the basis for a general statement, which in any case is rather unsensical as it stands.

P. 78, n. 18, and p. 81, n. 83: Are single references to Horace, Epodes, and Plautus, *Carina*, sufficient evidence for important general statements about the status and rights of slaves?

P. 81, n. 78: We read of 'the long period of abeyance of the census after 167 B.C.'!

P. 82, n. 99: Is a single reference to Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*, 63, 176, sufficient for the statement that the evidence of slaves was customarily taken by torture. And what is the relevance of the reference to the Life of Pertinax in the *Historia Augusta* in this chapter on the later Republic?

This by no means exhaustive list of inaccuracies, wrong statements, irrelevancies and wrong use of evidence in these two sections chosen at random, indicates the caution with which the work must be used, and the limits of its usefulness to the general reader. The hazy and unconvincing nature of many of the arguments in the text cannot here be dealt with, but scholars will frequently find it difficult to agree with the argumentation and the conclusions reached. It is a pity that a work into which so much labour has gone should be from many points of view so unsatisfactory; none the less, there is a mine of information contained in it, and any scholar who should wish to work on the subject will find a very great deal of his material collected in this book; and there are many worth-while observations, to which there is not here space to refer.

The Bibliography seems to include almost all the books and articles which are referred to in the text (rendering superfluous the lengthy particulars in the footnotes, where even the publishers of century-old books are named repeatedly); one wonders, however, what is the value of a bibliography of ancient sources which lists, e.g., Martialis-Epigramma, Aeschylus-Tragedia, etc. The Index is far less comprehensive.

R. E. SMITH.

#### SINGER (C.). *Galen on Anatomical Procedures.*

Translation of the surviving books with introduction and notes. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege (for Wellcome Historical Medical Museum), 1956. Pp. xxvi + 289, with 26 text figures. 37s. 6d.

In this small and fascinating book, Professor Singer gives us a translation of a dissecting manual for students of anatomy, probably given as a course of lectures in A.D. 177. At that time anatomy was the background to the whole medical training and it is not, therefore, surprising that this text contains a great deal of what would in the present day be included in physiology and surgery. But of course the translation is not the whole of this book. The text is throughout penetrated by Professor Singer's wisdom and clarified by his knowledge.

The book has a short introduction, but these few pages cover the main background of the career to which the text is related. In this short introduction there are not only chronological tables, but a quick and penetrating assessment of the 'schools of medical thought' at the time and an assessment of the major difficulties in relating this Galenic text to the modern idiom.

The text itself is a translation from Kühn's edition. Apart from its interest to the anatomist and medical man there is the added interest, upon which Professor Singer lays stress, that this book on anatomical procedures 'has the unique distinction of preserving the very words of the teacher'. It is suggested that the text is based on shorthand notes made by a pupil and possibly then edited by the



author. There is naturally an uneven emphasis in the different parts of the text. The limits, the diaphragm, respiration and vocalisation are all treated fully. But the sections on the viscera and the brain are very superficial.

The section on the arm makes very interesting reading. The observations are clear and full, but straight away in this section we meet the problem, which Professor Singer discusses in some detail, of the animals on which these observations were made. There seems to be little doubt that Galen was familiar with the human skeleton and to some extent with human dissection, but in his public demonstrations on which this text is based he used the Rhene monkey, the Barbary ape and the pig and some other unspecified animals rather than man. The text is, as general, however, a description of the soft parts of the ape imposed on the skeleton of man.

In reading this part of the text one is amazed by the continued emphasis that Galen places on those muscles that he claims to have discovered. They include interosseus muscles of the hand, popliteus, intercostals, pinniculus carinae and the *serus capitis*: posterior major and minor. It is perhaps on the continued introduction of these structures and the emphasis that the author is continually placing on his own originality that leads to the exclamation 'we must remember that he was a conscientious, verbose, argumentative fellow'. However, in spite of these defects the first four books make interesting and consecutive reading and it is after these first four books that we get the more crude inequalities of the text. But from the first this latter part is extremely interesting for another reason, as that, in this part of the book particularly where Galen is discussing the intercostal muscles and the production of voice, we get a description of the experimental approach that forms such an important part of Galen's contribution to scientific progress. In fact, his enthusiasm and reputation of his vivisection procedures, particularly on the pig, have one with the feeling of his great interest as well as his great courage in his experimental work.

It appears that the original text had few if any illustrations. This shortcoming has been made good in Professor Singer's production by the addition on the back of the book, so that they do not interrupt the continuity of the original text, of a series of figures of the anatomy described taken mainly from the Rhene monkey. One cannot leave this book without comment on Professor Singer's copious notes on the text. In the text itself the modern nomenclature for the various parts described is included, but the real clarification of difficult points is dependent very largely on these excellent notes.

Professor Singer says that he has been working on and off with this text for some fifteen years and one must feel extremely grateful that long familiarity with this difficult material has led to the publication in Professor Singer's eightieth year of this fascinating text, in which the triumph of his long consideration of the material is seen throughout and has made the subject so attractive and straightforward for the reader.

GILBERT CLARY.

FLAHERTY (C.). *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*. [Zetemata, Monographien zur Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 11.] Munich: Beck, 1956. Pp. xvi + 255. DM 24.

GATTI (C.). *Gli delfini morali. Saggio sugli usi religiosi e personalisti umani nella tradizione storico-letteraria classica*. Milan: Istituto Editoriale Caspary, 1956. Pp. 134. L. 1,000.

Although dealing with closely related subjects these two monographs are very different in tone, manner of approach, and scientific value. The former is a careful consideration, based on a large collection of relevant material, of the deification of prominent men, mainly Hellenistic kings, by Greek states (not larger political units), and their reasons for this procedure, often interpreted as flattery pure and simple. Part I collects and

lists the material, under appropriate headings, beginning with Lysandros at Samos after the Peloponnesian War and ending with the Attalids. Naturally, a large part deals with inscriptions, as being the most authentic records we have and often capable of exact dating; but attention is paid to the many points of reading, restoration, interpretation, and, in the case especially of literary evidence, credibility on which it is necessary to come to some conclusion before going further. Here and there the reviewer does not quite agree with the author. On p. 33 the anecdote of Alexander telling Dareios' harem that Hephaestion was 'also Alexander' is explained by the combined cult of the two. It is not quite so likely to have grown out of the often-mentioned fact that Alexander was a pupil of Aristotle, who said (*EN*, 1170b11) that a friend is *τερος νόρος*? On p. 101, I am not sure that the language of the decree of Smyrna quoted on the preceding page from L. Robert, *Et. anatolien* 1937, p. 90, proves as much as Habicht supposes. It says that Seleukos II and his deified mother Stratonike were duly honoured not only by the community but privately by every citizen. This seems to me rather to testify to somewhat exuberant loyalty on the part of the author of the inscription than to any particularly outstanding benefits received from the royal deities. It seems to me that the gratitude leading to the worship is a unanimous feeling. However, these are small points, and the criticism on the whole is penetrating, sane and moderate.

Part II, which incidentally contains further criticism, sets out to describe the cult as completely as possible, remembering, as the author does (pp. 129 ff.), that the material is fragmentary and of uneven value. Such things as the erection of altars, temples and so forth, processions and other ritual, and the choice of honorary epithets are disposed of on pp. 129-39, and Habicht then approaches the more interesting question of the motives leading to these cults. He holds, rightly as I believe, that the institution of worship of any human being has nothing to do with his character, but is invariably, in the case of the Greek cities, a response to some one specific (a) resulting in great benefit to the community in question, such as deliverance from a dangerous enemy, restoration of its constitution after a period of tyranny or foreign domination, or the like. I would phrase it somewhat as follows: Habicht several times implies a similar view, but seems not to state it explicitly. This or that potentate has saved the state; therefore he is a *saviour*. Now that is exactly what a god worshipped by the state ought to be, but too often is not; Athens, for instance, did not save Athens from being garrotted by Demetrios of Phaleron in the interests of Macedonia, nor Hera Samos from the triumph of the democratic party and the exile of the oligarchs. If, therefore, a Demetrios Poliorketes or a Lysandros can perform this divine task, why not honour him accordingly?

Smyrna (131), on the other hand, is interested in traces of the idea that some men are superhuman, as she finds them in authors up to the time of Alexander, rather than at the date mostly included in Habicht's work. Such ideas might indeed lend up in time to the conception that certain prominent contemporaries were gods or on their way to become gods, and indeed seem actually to have existed, although not early. But it cannot be said that her work is critical or thorough enough to throw much light on that interesting subject. When she deals with hero-cult in her first chapter, for example, she confines it with the ordinary tendency of kindred dead. When, in Chapter II, she speaks of the divine honours paid in Magna Graecia to Demetrios and other epic heroes, she neglects the strong possibility that some at least of them were assimilated to local gods. Her argument is often thoroughly bad, as when she concludes (p. 58) from Silius Italicus' poetical hyperbole *flagit* if a *vates* (lgt. *g*, *j* Diels) is an actual cult of those who fell at Thermopylai. To her, the anecdote about Agamemnon refusing divine honours from the Trojans *quo i troiani in dubio* (p. 92), it had found at least one opponent as far back as 1937, see

Habicht, p. 180, n. 64, and its falsity is pretty clear. Again and again she attaches strange ideas to the word *glaupus*, a result partly of uncritical use of the suggestions of modern authors.

H. J. Ross.

POUILLOUX (J.). *Recherches sur l'Histoire et les cultes de Thasos. 1. De la fondation de la cité à 196 avant J.-C. (Études Thasiennes, III).* Paris: De Boccard, 1954. Pp. 491, with 48 plates and 1 plan. Price not stated.

On pp. 322 ff. the author makes it very clear why he has not written, and no one at present could write, anything like a continuous history of Thasos. Up to about 500 B.C. our historical sources, while very scanty, are good, but we have little archaeological material (next to none for the earliest period, p. 14). From then on, archaeology furnishes us with a considerable number of inscriptions and other material, but so little of relevant historiography has survived that we have no continuous and reliable narrative, however sketchy, into which to fit these welcome facts. He therefore is fully justified in describing his book simply as *researches*, which are indeed laboriously thorough, making the most of the material available and coming to a number of tentative conclusions. He has in hand another volume, which shall deal with the less obscure Roman period; this study stops at the date when L. Sestinius forced Philip V to quit the island and restored it to nominal independence.

The fragmentary picture which emerges of Thasos from about the fifth century B.C. onwards (for we still know next to nothing of the early history, interesting though that would be) is not entirely edifying. Of somewhat mixed origin, with the number of non-Greek names, more assuredly Thracian, it was an important commercial community, on account of its geographical position and the popularity of some of its exports, not least in wine, besides the availability of the Thracian mines, assured by a rather precarious hold on parts of the mainland. This being so, its government, whether oligarchic or democratic for the time being, seems always to have made trade its chief concern, shifting allegiance from Athens to Sparta and again to Macedonia on occasion more, and earlier still being subservient to Persia when that seemed profitable. It is not a heroic record, though the size and position of the community perhaps made it inevitable.

Pontikou describes an important part in the political, secular and religious, of the fifth century to Theogenes the boxer, so the inscriptions spell his name; the literary sources call him Theogenes, at least in our MSS. According to him, he was a central figure in the developments which brought Thasos into the Athenian alliance, and also had much to do with the establishment of some of the most outstanding features of the local cult of Herakles; the chron is developed in Chap. II. That he was famous in his lifetime for his prowess and had heroic honours after his death is of course beyond doubt; but all we know of the man suggests that he was little more than a professional boxer, apparently violent in temper and perhaps claiming, or allowing to be claimed for him, worship to Herakles. It seems unlikely that, if indeed he was associated with a democratic movement in politics, he was anything more than a figurehead. That he had something to do with the development of that hero's cult is indeed quite possible, but certainly is not proved by the (so ingenious interpretation of 39) of Plutarch, *Ala. 81d, c.*

In general, Pouilloux seems to me too ready to associate the secular with the religious developments at Thasos. That they had nothing to do with each other would, of course, be an absurd proposition, contradicted by all we know of state cults in Greece; but the duality which he finds in Thasian religion (Chap. VIII, *Attain*) appears to me much less marked than he supposes. For example, the fact that Artemis and Zeus are given the titles respectively of *Hyperesia* and *Hyperesia* (p. 327 f.) is a rather

late inscription is not of much significance; the adjective need hardly refer to anything more than the position of their shrines, altars or images, and certainly does not suggest any new or peculiar conception of their nature. Much is made also of the elaborate dual cult of Herakles; but for Herakles to be worshipped both as hero and as god is not very uncommon (see, for instance, Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults*, pp. 23 ff.), and for any recipient of worship to have more than one shrine in a city, as the Thasian Herakles apparently had, is nothing new. Certainly the evidence adduced on p. 47, that the art-type of Herakles, known to have been in use at Thasos, which showed him as an athlete is not much like the 'athlete', 'brutal et violent' which portrays him for instance on the Athenian treasury at Delphi proves very little, nothing like enough to demonstrate a dual origin for the Thasian cult. The strange statement of Herodotus (ii, 44) that he found the Thasian Herakles worshipped at Tyre and a Phoenician cult of Herakles at Thasos remains unexplained, though foreign influence in the worship of so composite a figure as the Herakles of classical times is far from unlikely. Nor am I much impressed by the existence of chthonian cults alongside Olympian (pp. 335 ff.) as indicating non-Greek influence. Of that indeed there is remarkably little direct evidence; the popular Thracian Rites, Heron, makes his appearance perhaps as early as the beginning of the fourth century B.C. (p. 342 f.) and Zeus is given the extraordinary title *Tyrtios* (p. 342), if that is anything more than a carver's blunder. Foreign influence did exist, must indeed have existed, but Greek adaptability was enough to absorb it to a very large degree.

I have dwelt perhaps unduly on doubtful conclusions of the author. It is too right to say that his tone is always moderate and his material, historical, archaeological and philological, interesting, and much that he says perfectly sound or at least well within the bounds of legitimate speculation. I unfortunately lack space to do more than mention things so worth examination as the account of the Thasian magistracies (pp. 238 ff.), or the ritual in honour of the *tyrtai*, i.e. men killed in action against the enemy (pp. 471 ff.), to name but two sections out of many. The epigraphist will find some new inscriptions and many suggestions concerning older ones.

H. J. Ross.

SEITMAN (U.). *The Twelve Olympians and their Guests.* London: Max Parrish, 1956. Pp. 208, with 16 plates. 17s. 6d.

Dr. Seitzman's book is a revised edition of *The Twelve Olympians*, published by Pan Books Ltd. in 1952, and is meant presumably not so much for the Greekless student of comparative religion or literature (who will find a more detailed and deliberate study of the subject in W. K. C. Guthrie's *The Greeks and their Gods*) as for the wider circle of readers whose existence is attested by the sales of Penguin translations into English and by the popularity of translated texts of Greek authors in Italian, French and German. A short and bewilderingly mixed bibliography, which combines learned references with books for general reading (*Real-encyclopædie, 5te Aufl.*, will not enlighten many readers more than its abbreviation R.E.; and Nilsson's *History of Greek Religion* is omitted) is followed by a list of the principal Greek deities with their Roman equivalents, and by a prologue which lays stress on the human warmth of the Greek gods and upon their terrestrial and aetherial environment. Before proceeding to a brief account of the twelve Olympians, Dr. Seitzman writes some personal and lively paragraphs on the beliefs of the Greeks, which he warns the reader in the Preface are not to be taken as expressions of his own personal views so much as an attempt to express a religious climate different from our own. The attempt is necessary and the incidental comments on contemporary views diverting; though it may be doubted both whether cause and effect are really proven when he attributes freedom of thought



in Greece to the absence of a priestly caste, and whether the absence of martyrs, missions, dogmas and a sense of sin are entirely complimentary to the Greeks. It seems a pity that the not very attractive map of the Greek states was inserted in the middle of this chapter and not made an end plate for the book. The twelve Olympians are presented in turn in their main aspects with due reference to the syncretism of gods from different parts of the Mediterranean world and with handsome quotations from the Hymns and the more important myths. Dr. Selman's favourites are not hard to detect, and he writes with a sympathy which does much to make his point. 'That theory is sometimes presented as fact is inevitable and not often important, though this and the need for brevity sometimes produce minor distortions, as happens, for example, when Poseidon's title of "frankmaker" is explained simply as originating with the stamping press of horses in full career, and his "transference to the sea" is not qualified by any kind of reservation. After the Olympians come accounts of groups of mortals elected to honorary membership of Olympus, Herakles, Asklepios, Alexander and Augustus being chosen to illustrate dedication in different ages and for different reasons.

Finally, an epilogue makes use of evidence from coin to illustrate the thesis that the Homeric Gods remained live and real forces in Greek life and thought until the last stages of the pagan world. Here, as in the admirable choice of illustrations from sculpture and vase painting, Dr. Selman's special skill and taste give the book its particular charm and force; for, despite his disclaimers, it is in his personal attitude to the whole question of religion and life that he brings most forcibly to the reader's attention the gentle, cultivated, uninhilited humanism which characterized so much of the classical approach to things spiritual, and brought even Dionysos into membership of the Olympian 'Athenaeum'. That there was also a rawer and rougher, more elemental kind of thinking, is less explicitly demonstrated.

P. C. MASON.

ΚΩΣΤΑΠΟΥΛΟΣ Κ. Δ. *Ηπειρωτική γραμμή της Μινωικής γραμμής* [Platon, 28]. Athens: 1935. Pp. 57.

A retired naval officer who since the war has divided his employment between the Bank of Greece and a passionate study of the Minoan-Mycenaean script, Ktistopoulos is almost the only Greek representative of the widely scattered band of amateurs and professionals which has contributed to its decipherment (his compatriot Bufidis' work is not yet published). His previous series of articles has been devoted to statistical counts of the Linear B signs, and to attempts to isolate proper names of 'Aegean' form with the aid of phonetic values derived in part from the Cypriot syllabary. His views on the grammar and vocabulary of the Linear B language were nowhere made explicit.

The present book interrupts this series in order to present to Greek readers a critical survey of forty books and articles on Linear B texts which appeared between Ventris and Chadwick's first suggestion for decipherment and the middle of 1935. A particularly valuable section, and one which will deserve wide imitation as the literature of the subject grows, is that devoted to eight of the now discussed tablets (Aco3 [134], An2 [107], Jno1 [89], Taf31, Koz [Tn316], Em [312], Elq3 [297] and Sdog3) where the varying interpretations by different scholars are compared.

Ktistopoulos reserves judgement as to the degree to which the decipherment may be accepted in detail, but adds a welcome acknowledgement that Western scholars, in spite of (or perhaps by virtue of?) their historical, linguistic and emotional detachment, are on the way to enlarging the Greeks' own perspective of their mother-tongue, and calls on native scholars to take an increasing part in this work.

M. VASTRIS.

ΒΕΝΝΕΤΤ Ε. Ι., ΤΣΑΔΒΙΚ Γ. J. and ΒΕΝΤΡΙΣ Μ. J. *The Knossos Tablets. A revised transliteration of all the texts in Mycenaean Greek recoverable from Evans' excavations of 1900-1904 based on independent examination.* (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplementary Papers, 2.) Edited by M. Ventris. London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1936. Pp. iv + 125, 151.

ΒΕΝΝΕΤΤ Ε. Ι. *The Pylos Tablets. Texts of the inscriptions found, 1939-54.* With a Foreword by C. W. Blegen. Princeton: University Press for University of Cincinnati, 1955. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. Pp. xxii + 252, 402.

These two books contain the full texts of the Knossos and Pylos tablets (with the exception of the tablets found in 1915 at Pylos). Since Ventris and Chadwick's *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* is now published, no account of the contents of the tablets is needed here, but these two books are still essential for those who need the full range of material. *The Knossos Tablets* comes very soon after R. Browning's edition of *The Linear B Texts from Knossos*, but the revision is amply justified by further study of the originals in the Iraklion Museum by E. I. Bennett, J. Chadwick, and Michael Ventris and by the discovery in 1953 of over a thousand new pieces of tablets. We have, therefore, complete transliterated texts of the Knossos tablets based on the readings of three experts, whose disagreements with *Scripta Minora II* (as well as their rather minimal disagreements) are scrupulously recorded. The texts which have already been published are arranged by the classification given by Bennett in his *Minoan Linear B Index*, but joins and new readings have made it necessary to reclassify a certain number of tablets: their classification, however, can easily be found from the concordance at the end. The new fragments are similarly classified, but the refinements, e.g., of the D classifications are necessarily omitted and the outline of the tablets have been added to aid the making of joins. No praise can be too high for the scholarly quality of this edition, which gives the reader everything that he can have without actually handling the tablets himself. I have noted very few misprints: Ap 623.2, *wa-ra-ti-ta* should be *wa-ra-ta-ta*; Da 1098, the erased edge (recorded by Bennett) has fallen out—*ka-ra-ra*, *pa-ra SHEEP* 100; L 641, plate reference to *Scripta Minora* should be 44, not 45.

In *The Pylos Tablets* Bennett has printed the Ventris transliteration (as published in *B.A.C.S.* 1) in his index, and his table of ideographic signs agrees in numeration and interpretation with the table in *The Knossos Tablets*. In the body of the book, however, the Linear B signs are retained. An introduction on the excavations by C. W. Blegen is followed by an introduction by Bennett and an inventory and classification of the tablets. The latter makes it possible to find the old numbers of the 1939 tablets, which all have been numbered for inclusion here (this is a major inconvenience to all those who have been working on the tablets, but in view of the handiness and completeness of the new volume the new numbers will now be our standard). The text consists of (a) drawings of the tablets 'made by tracing in Indian ink the lines of the stylus as they appeared' on photographic prints, which were then bleached (these show the exact layout of the tablets); (b) the texts in normalised Linear B characters. The readings here are based on autopsy by Bennett and on many cases by Ventris, and restorations have been included in square brackets. This, then, and not the drawings from the photographs, constitutes the authoritative text. It is an extremely good text which can only rarely be questioned. In Tn 31610 (old Kn 901 Chadwick and I read on the tablet *di-wo* instead of *di-wo* and Chadwick suggested the emendation *di-wo i-jo-re-wo*. In the F tablets a good deal of reclassification and restoration has taken place and is discussed by Bennett in *A.J.A.* 60 (1956) 103. In particular a large number of the smaller tablets have been identified as raw material for the larger tablets (En and Ep series).



A daring instance is the restoration of *Es* 441 (old *Es* 6) from *En* 659, 1-4; at first sight this seems impossible—the total in the first line according to the facsimile is different, *Es* 441 has five *o* signs instead of four, *Pa-go-to* is called *Pa-da-jee-se* in *En* 441 and *Pe-re-go-to* in *En* 659; Bennett, however, assures me that renewed autopsy confirms the text reading of *Es* 441 as 2 WHEAT as in *En* 659; the numbering of two *o* signs in the later tablet has a parallel; and either *Pa-da-jee-se* or *Pe-re-go-to* is an intelligible mistake for the second name of *Pe-go-to*, because the owner of the *kyrma*, whose name is *Pe-re-go-to* *Pa-da-jee-u*, is called consistently *Pa-da-jee-u* by the *Es* scribe and *Qe* (= *Pe-re-go-to*) by the *En* scribe (for the confusion of *Qe* and *Pe* by a single scribe, cf. *qi-gi-pi* in *Am* 356 and 555). I have dwelt on this to show how convincingly and skillfully Bennett has dealt with the material; the one case where I cannot yet follow him is the reclassification of *Es* 03 as *Es* 173, and I do not think that the grounds advanced in *AJA* (loc. cit.) are sufficient for reckoning this land as *kikimena* (and therefore *Es*) instead of *kakimena*; the terminology suggests *kakimena* and it is taken up into *Es* 617 which is the summation of *kakimena*.

The following addenda and corrigenda may be noted for a new edition of the index: p. 209, *a-pl-a<sub>2</sub>-to* *En* 159 should be *En* 109; p. 214, *u<sub>2</sub>-za-wo-ni* *En* 128.1 should be *En* 198.5; p. 216, add *zo<sub>2</sub>-ku-si-jo*, *Am* 610.12; p. 218, *re-wo-to-ro-wo-to* should be *re-wo-to-ro-ko-wo*; p. 219, *i-re-u*, *En* 609.16.18 should have a separate lemma, *i-re-jo*; after *pu<sub>2</sub>-to-re*, add *pu<sub>2</sub>-to-ma-re*, *En* 820.2; *ti-mi-ti-ja* *Xu* 61 should be *Sn* 64; p. 224, *e-be-ra<sub>2</sub>-u<sub>2</sub>*, add *e<sub>2</sub>-be-ra<sub>2</sub>-u<sub>2</sub>* (*av*, *En* 1410.1); p. 224, *e-ra-to-e*, add (*Jn* 819.10); p. 225, *e-ko-ma-ro* *Cn* 14 should be *Cn* 40; *e-ko-si*, *Sa* 799r, should be *Sh* 739r; *pe-re-u* *En* 30 should be *En* 324; p. 230, *ri-ku-ur*, *Jn* 750.20 should be *Jn* 725.20; p. 235, *o-zi-de-la* *Wa* 731, the word is not necessarily complete; *o-pe-m*, delete *Ma* 393.3 and add *o<sub>2</sub>-pe-ro-ye*, *En* 940; *o-pe-u-la*, add probably *Cn* 491; p. 238, *ke-ri<sub>2</sub>-u<sub>2</sub>* *Nu* 831, perhaps be restored *ke-ri-a<sub>2</sub>-de-ro*; p. 244, *ku-ma-da-ro* should be *ku-da-ma-ro*. Compare also the list in *AJA* 60 (1956), 293.

I. B. L. WEBSTER.

Buck (C. D.). *The Greek Dialects. Grammar. Selected Inscriptions. Glossary.* Chicago: University Press, 1955 (London: Cambridge University Press). Pp. xiii + 373. £4 10s.

This book, now taking the place of the author's *Introduction to the Study of the Greek Dialects* (edition 2, 1928), will be the same indispensable guide as was its predecessor. For over thirty years students have owed much to Buck's sane and lucid instruction in this field, and it is good that he lived long enough to complete this last revision of his work.

For any future revision Mycenaean will be most important, but results are hardly sufficiently established yet for Buck to have been able to draw on them largely. He does indeed refer to the work, to illustrate the sibilant treatment of labio-velars before front vowels in Arcado-Cyprian (footnotes on pp. 6, 62-3); to this he might have added Mycen. *pe-ri*, with reference to the forms *pe<sub>2</sub>* and *pi<sub>2</sub>* (§ 61.4a); or *de-o-to*, for *de<sub>2</sub>o<sub>2</sub>* : *de<sub>2</sub>o<sub>2</sub>* (§ 25.7), among others. The interrelation of the dialects, especially the position of Arcado-Cyprian and Aeolic, will also have to be reconsidered.

The basic plan of the book remains the same as in the last edition, and in Part I, the grammar of the dialects, the resemblance is carried so far that the numbering of the sections is kept almost wholly intact. But comparison soon reveals many changes and additions. Among these may be mentioned §§ 75 (with inclusion of *da<sub>2</sub>*), 89 (doubling and simplification of consonants), 150 (*ε-συν* subjunctive), 159 (verbs in *-ho*, etc.), 161-2 (a variety of verbal stems), § 200 is now a summary of Pamphylian characteristics; and there has been a general increase in this part, most notably in §§ 268-9 (Thasian and Cyprian).

In Part II, containing the inscriptions, the total number

is increased by three by omitting 17 of the former selection and adding 40 new ones. Among these especially noteworthy are Nos. 16 (Arcadian), 31 (Thessalian), 39 and 42 (Locrian), 48 (Delphian), 59 and 60 (Locrian), 83 (Argolic), and 115 (Cyrenaean—this dialect not previously represented). There are also some different readings and new notes among the old inscriptions.

The section on Notes and References has unfortunately been cut severely, all that remains being the notes on literary usage and on the forms of the alphabet. Here reference should be made to Page's discussion of Alrman's dialect (in his edition of the *Parthenon*); and to the texts of Snell and Turyn for Pindar. In place of the former references and discussion Buck (p. 342, footnote) now sends us to Schwyzler's grammar. But this is not satisfactory, since not every user of Buck can always carry Schwyzler around with him, to say nothing of the time consumed in frequent reference of that sort; Schwyzler's book itself is not completely up to date; and, worst of all, the student now receives no warning where there are conflicting views (except very rarely indeed, in Part II). I regard this as the greatest defect in the new edition.

Former Chart 1a (now 1) appears in an intelligible form (as previously it did not). Old Charts 11 and 111 are not repeated, nor is the coloured dialect map, whose absence I regret.

Two small comments. On no. 16 Buck translates 'let her perish' for *ἔσθλοισι*. Beattie (*CQ* XLII (1947) 701) argued against this, suggesting that excommunication is meant. With this compare *θός ἄλο δὲ* (Buck, no. 116, Cretan, sixth century), of the penalty of an official who is certainly not put to death. No. 23 (Cyprian): in solution of the old difficulty of *zo<sub>2</sub>-u<sub>2</sub>* add Lejeune's attractive suggestion (*Bull. Soc. Ling.* 1 (1954) 68-78) of *yo<sub>2</sub>* (*yalo<sub>2</sub>*) 'to enjoy', which involves revaluation of the *zo* sign.

It is unfortunate that the former high standard of accuracy has not been maintained. Of a number of errors which I have noted, those in English words are not liable to mislead (except perhaps p. 353, right column, l. 22, read *Epid.* for *Epic.*). Certain confusion in accent and breathing is also not serious. But other errors in Greek may cause trouble, especially in a work of this sort where literal accuracy is vital. P. 53, l. 20, read *ε<sub>2</sub>*, 11; p. 62, l. 3 *in*, *ἀντιφθόριος* for *-ειος*, also *ἀντιφθόριος* for *ἀνθ<sub>2</sub>*; p. 63, l. 3, add *h* after *and*; inser. no. 1 B, l. 8, comma for stop after *αδωδ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 18, l. 20, restore *ε* in *αὐτοῖς*; no. 21, restore accents on *μῆρ<sub>2</sub>* (l. 8) and *νῆρ<sub>2</sub>* (l. 32), and comma for stop (l. 68); no. 22, l. 23, *διπλοῦν* for *-ου*; no. 23, l. 10, after *ἀπὸς* add *εἰς*, and l. 28, restore *ῥήτα*; p. 112, l. 20, *ισθῆρ* for *-εῖ*; no. 24, divide *ῥῆρ<sub>2</sub>* no. 36, l. 5, read *Ἰαλίων* for *Ἰαλίων* ('Lone Wolf', not 'Wolf to the Sheep'); no. 40, l. 10, restore *ὀδὸς* for *οἰδὸς*; no. 42, l. 24, *h* for *η*; no. 49, l. 5, *[μῆρ<sub>2</sub>]* for *[μῆρ<sub>2</sub>]*; no. 52 C, l. 21, omit comma after *αἰετ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 53, l. 10, *τῆ δὲ* for *τὴ δὲ*; no. 57, l. 38, *ἀντιφθ<sub>2</sub>* for *-ου*; no. 61, l. 6, *τῶδ<sub>2</sub>* for *γῶδ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 69, l. 22, *ῥῆρ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 79, l. 20, *h* should have accent, as also in l. 21 (cf. § 25.4); no. 87, l. 1, *ἐπιφθόριος* for *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 90, l. 16, *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>* for *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*, and l. 25, stop for comma after *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 104, l. 4, *Ἰαλίων* for *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 106 (Cela) should be no. 105; no. 106 (Agrigento), l. 10, restore *μ<sub>2</sub>*; no. 114, l. 1, punctuate at end, and l. 2, *ἐπιφθόριος* for *-ου*; no. 117, l. 1, *h*, 38, *διπλῶν* for *-ου*; III, l. 45, *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>* for *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*; V, l. 10, restore *εἰ*; VII, l. 14, comma for stop after *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*, and l. 19, *αἰφθόριος* for *-αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*; VIII, l. 39, restore *εἰ*; IX, l. 22, *αἰφθόριος*, and l. 47, *αἰφθόριος* for *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*, and l. 54, restore *εἰ*; no. 119, l. 10, *αἰφθόριος* for *αἰφ<sub>2</sub>*; p. 360, col. 2, l. 8, *εἰ* for *εἰ*.

A. C. MOORHOUSE.

ROBERTS (C. H.). *The Codex* [*Proc. Brit. Acad.* XL]. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1955. Pp. 36, with 1 plate. 4s. 6d.

In the thirty-odd pages of this stimulating essay Mr. Roberts has given a remarkably suggestive account of

the origin, date and significance of the revolution which substituted the book in codex form (a collection of sheets fastened at the spine) for the book in roll form (a continuous surface, unwound by the left hand, wound up by the right). His thesis is that the codex caught on because Christians popularised it. Only one out of the 111 Christian texts that can be dated before the end of the fourth century is in roll form, while the earliest known Christian writing, the Rylands St. John of about A.D. 125, is a codex. The decisive step towards the modern book was taken when Julian Mark, about A.D. 70, wrote his gospel in a parchment notebook. Mark was familiar with the Jewish custom of writing rabbinic sayings on tablets, while in Rome he moved in a commercial society whose merchants had parchment account-books constantly in their hands. Only in Rome or a predominantly Roman milieu could such a fusion have occurred: only by its occurrence early could it have determined, partly by way of authority, partly by way of sentiment and symbol, that the proper form for Christian writing was a book, not a roll, even though made of papyrus, not parchment. It was not until the third century that classical literature followed suit, perhaps at first for economic reasons.

The reviewer finds this closely argued account as convincing as it is exciting. In all the many strands of evidence collected, and it illuminates many an obscure corner of bibliography, palaeography and scholarship.

E. G. TURNER.

THESELL, R. L. *Studies on the Greek Superlative*. [Societas Scientiarum Fennica. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, XXI 3.] Helsingfors: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1953. Pp. 120.

Dr. Thesell's new work so resembles in form and method his *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek* (Helsingfors, 1934) that it is no surprise to learn that the research for both books was mostly planned and carried out together. Like the *Studies*, this book proceeds from considerations of theory and terminology to a detailed (though less statistical) review of the evidence, accompanied by comments and inferences which are brought together in a final chapter of 'Conclusions', a chapter which affords a retrospect of the whole work unimpeded by factual details. The book is principally, but not merely, an investigation of the absolute or elative ('very') meaning of the Greek superlative, and of its relation to the relative or culminative ('most') meaning. For the primitive meaning of the form as inherited from Indo-European Thesell accepts in the main the views of Benveniste (*Noms d'agent et noms d'action en indo-européen*, Paris, 1948). In discussing these he is led to put forward a rather hypothetical argument (an attempt to show that the 'illogical' use of the superlative to denote, not the highest degree of a quality manifested also by the other term compared, but simply the possession of a quality more or less absent from the other term) is not improper—certainly not a linguistic and perhaps not a logical one. However, the main point, that the relative meaning is the original, is not affected, and Thesell lays it down as a working hypothesis that in Greek superlative should be taken as purely elative until the possibility of culminative meaning has been excluded.

The second chapter is a matter of superlative uses from Homer to Plato, with the object of classifying them as culminative or elative, and of showing the latter's comparatively late emergence as a distinct and always rare meaning. This procedure brings further distinctions and technical terms, including the important sub-class of 'all-culminative', the emotionally charged and hyperbolic superlative with only the most general range of comparison expressed or implied, from which it seems, the elative arose by a process of banalisation. Some authors are selected for specially full treatment. Homeric usage receives close attention, and the scarcity of elatives is noted. Thesell lists a number of cases in which he

thinks culminative meaning doubtful; of these only two (L. 6.56, O. 4.442) seem in fact to be elative. His interpretation of *diopro* as culminative in O. 4.211 may be supported by other expressions of the heroic ideal, notably L. 6.77-9. The culminative meaning of the superlatives in L. 22.90 and O. 17.92 is unshaken by Thesell's apparent error about the relative brightness of Venus and Sirius. The study of the superlative usages in choral lyric and tragedy provides criteria of stylistic differences between Pindar and Bacchylides and between the three stasichians; it would have been interesting to learn whether the work of one author, say Euripides, at different periods shows similar differences. In all these writers the culminative meaning is dominant, though with intermediate degrees of development towards the elative. From the fact that Pindaric superlatives without expressed range of comparison are 'particularly common', in an all-culminative rather than an elative sense, Thesell infers that the elative was not usual in the contemporary spoken language. It is, however, surely conceivable that in the colloquial language the superlative might already have had a banal use which poetic style rejected. Aristophanes provides the occasion for a change of procedure. His numerous and varied superlatives are first classified under syntactical heads and only afterwards evaluated according to semantic and stylistic criteria. Hence are derived important observations, especially on the stylistic difference between the elative as attribute (mainly in high—including paratrage—style) and as adverb (mainly colloquial), and on the rarity of the culminative as attribute, of the elative as predicate. Among prose authors Xenophon and Plato are found to make especially frequent use of superlatives. Those of Xenophon occur usually in emotional contexts and often in rhetorical figures (superlative correlation, superlative antithesis) which, to judge from Thesell's paragraph on *Georgos*, may well be due largely to Sophistic influence. The Platonic superlative is less used for pathos and elevation of style. In introducing as a special category 'the philosophical high culminative of exemplary, "ideal" concepts', Thesell carries classification too far. These superlatives do not constitute a grammatical, a semantic or even a stylistic class: they are merely culminatives, occurring in similar contexts but essentially unaffected by them. In contrast to these, it appears from Thesell's evidence that the use of the superlative in rejoinder does tend to constitute a category of usage, a category moreover which has some stylistic relevance.

In his third chapter Thesell considers a number of particular superlative forms and constructions. Among the former the chief place is given to *pihōta*—in his view a superlative formative rather than a true superlative. He therefore (like some others) sees a corruption in *Lyktas* 13.20 *hō de Pihōtēs* . . . *diaproplos eūthēter*, *hō tēre*, *pihōta* and suggests for the last three words *hō pihōta*, though (as he elsewhere makes clear) this phrase is not otherwise known outside Herodotus and Thucydides. He follows Schwall in using the misleading term 'adverbial' for *pihōta* in the senses 'approximately' and 'precisely', 'just', a usage almost exclusively classical, though Thesell is inclined so to understand the *pihōta* of O. 17.190 *hō yēn pihōtōter pihōta hōn*.

Some of Thesell's arguments are rather over-subtle, and their difficulty is increased now and again by a vagueness of expression. Understanding of the statement (p. 83, n. 21, in *Hp. Aff.* 14 *doubliōvōntai hō pihōta* *hōpōtōn hō eūthēter*, *pihōta* does not go with the numeral adjectives but with the verb), depends on the meaning to be attached to 'to go with'. A more baffling use of language is found in the last paragraph of section 99, and the second sentence of section 132 is decidedly difficult to grasp. But apart from a few such passages, Thesell's expression is clear and businesslike; difficulties and uncertainties are inescapable in classifying a material which, as he stresses, has no clear-cut boundaries. His book will be of special value and interest for the history



of the Greek language and literary style; it must also be taken into account in the establishing and interpretation of texts.

D. M. JONES

**Papyri Michaelides.** Being a catalogue of the Greek and Latin papyri, tablets and ostraca in the Library of Mr. G. A. Michaelides of Cairo. Edited with translations and notes by D. S. CHAWWRAH. Aberdeen: University Press, for Egypt Exploration Society, 1935. Pp. xii + 166, with 4 plates. 5s. 6d.

The publication of the *Real University Papyri* in 1933 had already established David Stewart Crawford's reputation as a papyrologist. This volume, the manuscript of which was finished on the day of the author's untimely death in the Cairo riots of January 1932, contains a mixed collection of texts, including fragments of extant and unknown literary works, and documents on papyri, ostraca and wooden tablets. The manuscript has been published almost as it left its author's hand, Professor R. G. Turner's suggestions and improvements having been added in parenthesis. In general the editor's work is patient and judicious: the excellence of his reading may be seen by comparison with the photographic plates. The style adopted by him in the reproduction of texts is unusually literal; if this is sometimes carried to excess, it is a good fault; the same may be said of his careful and sometimes perhaps unnecessarily detailed description of the appearance and condition of the papyri.

No. 1 is a second-century fragment of Chrestos, *Chaeront and Callitrichos*, a work which papyrology has done much to place in its proper context in the history of Greek literature. The variations from the received text are not startling, but still considerable enough to illustrate the textual fluidity of this kind of semi-popular composition. Two papyri of the *Iliad* (2; 3: the former is autograph), present no very remarkable features. In 4, a puzzling text, already published by Deschêre, I suggest that line 1 be restored: *ἰσχυρὸν ὁπλῶν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος*, and suspect that the reference in l. 4-5 to the use of the astronomical table (*παραστήριον*) mentioned in P. Oxyrhynchus 470, 11; the fragment may be from an astronomical or cosmographic work in which astronomical calculation is related to the height of the Nile's rise. But I cannot identify the 'small animal inhabiting islands' which, as the seventh hieroglyph in a series, has the value of fourteen cubits. No. 9 is an anthology of a sort; from its poor appearance probably a school text; it seems hard (in spite of Turner's suggestion, p. 16) to see in it the unity of subject characteristic of the *gnomologion*. Turner suggests that one of its fragmentary passages is from Chærestus of Samos. In 6, a word list, *ΖΗΝΩΝ ΗΓΓΩ*, 'The King (= Emperor, Zeno', in l. 6, makes the text Coptic, as well as giving it a *terminus post quem*.

The documentary texts which form the bulk of the volume are arranged in chronological order. Although they are a well-preserved and varied collection, few of them present points of general classical or historical interest. In 7, the only document of Ptolemaic date, some of Crawford's readings and consequent conclusions are shown by Turner to be wrong or doubtful. It contains some unfamiliar words, and 24 an interesting dating by year 2 of the pretender Domitina Domitiliana, 33 (late fourth or fifth century) shows *πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς* by now assimilated to private land by a process whose beginnings are already traceable in a second-century petition to be published in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. XXIV. In 36 (a phylactery's list), fr. B, l. 2, we should perhaps understand *ἀντίθετος* as a *γυμνάσιον*, which were used in Greek, and earlier in Egyptian medicine. 39, an almost unbelievably ill-spelt letter of Byzantine date, shows several forms and idioms which anticipate Modern Greek usage. 40 to 46 are all sixth-century documents from Aphroditë, some of them utilising papyrus known from previously published documents from that place. Of the two texts written on wooden boards or tablets,

one (61) is a Latin fragment, probably of a birth certificate, the other (62), already separately published by the same editor in *Aegyptus* XXIII (1933), is a plaster-covered writing-board of a kind used since the Pharaonic age in Egyptian schoolrooms, containing arithmetical division tables, and problems such as the Egyptians, with their preference for concrete examples, used from the earliest times in the teaching of mathematics; the editor has been very successful in expanding and interpreting the writer's obscure abbreviations. 63 to 123 (and probably 123) are a group of names from Akhmim (Panopolis), mostly after for payment of farm produce, which may be dated A.D. 200. The publication ends with two later names (126, 127).

This fine piece of work will make all who read and use it deplore yet more deeply the tragic outrage which has deprived papyrology of a most careful, talented and promising scholar.

JOHN HARRIS

**The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part XXIII.** Edited by E. LAMER. Pp. xv + 112, 15 plates. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1936. 2s.

Only one comment is possible on this volume taken as a whole, and a resident in Yorkshire may borrow it without scruple from that well-known Yorkshire educationalist, Mr. Warkford Squeers: 'Ere's richness!' As the then General Editor (Mr. T. C. Skeat) has now joined Professor R. G. Turner in that office) announced in his Preface to Part XXII, this part is devoted entirely to literary papyri—and nearly all of them are entirely new. We have first two important fragments of Hesiod's *Catalogue* (2354, the beginning of Book I; 2355, including the part of Book IV (?) where the episode begins which a later hand detached and expanded into the *Shield of Heracles*). Lyric poetry is represented by some scraps of Sappho (2357) and one of Alcaeus (2358, with a title on the outer side), two sizeable fragments of Simeonides (2359, reasonably ascribed to the *Suotheros*; 2360, apparently from the *Nomoi*), four fragments which are certainly Bacchylidean (2361, perhaps from an *Erotikon*, incorporates fr. 19 Snell; 2362, on Nioche—type of poem uncertain; 2363 = *Epin. XIV*, XIVB Snell; 2366, a scrap of a *hymn*?) and two which may be his (2364, part of which has already been published from another papyrus as Pindar fr. 342 Bowra, 336 Snell; 2365, which could be by Simonides, as Lobel points out), to say nothing of five fragments of Boeotian lyric verse (2370-4, of which 2370 is certainly by Corinna, and the others are almost equally certainly by the same author as PSI 1174, the ascription of which to Corinna has not gone entirely unquestioned, cf. D. L. Page, *Corinna* 27-33). 2367 and 2368 contain fragments of two contemporary or choral lyric, epinicians and dithyrambs or parasts respectively; it is probable, but not certain, that the original poems were by Bacchylides. Sophocles' *Inachus* represents tragedy (or perhaps satyr; drama—2369), and Hellenistic poetry is increased by two fragments of Callimachus' *Heleas* (2376-7, and by another fragment 2375, which may also be Callimachean, 2378 contains 'Aen verses in the Aeolic dialect', which Lobel does not think it possible to ascribe to either Alcaeus or Sappho. A scrap of the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (2379), a fragment of Theognis (2380), both of considerable interest to textual critics, a further piece of the list of *Alcibiades* of which part was published as POxy 222 (2381, for Cl. 96), and the 'Cyges' fragment (2382, cf. *Proc. Ber. Acad.* XXXV, 1939, 207 ff.), together with a few addenda and an index of words and names, bring up the rear.

For the appearance of this *lana aurea* so quickly upon the heels of Part XXII, we must thank not only the editor and the printers, who have done their parts with their accustomed care and skill, but also the Jowett Copyright Trustees, who have generously undertaken the full financial responsibility for this volume. How long it takes to get a volume like this into the hands of its readers, and





MARTINSEN (R. D.). *The Idea of Space in Greek Architecture with special reference to the Doric Temple and its Setting*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1950. Pp. xv + 191, with 26 plates and 25 text figures. 32s. 6d.

This is a valuable book. Its defects are grave, but fortunately obvious: and, in spite of them, it says many wise things. In general, M., living as he did in South Africa and having little Greek, relied equally for his history on good and poor authorities, some of them out of date even in 1949, when he apparently wrote. His style, especially in the earlier chapters, is often ponderous and turgid. But he had an eye, rare these days, for the specific virtues of Classical architecture. He is therefore a very interesting guide to the sites that he has visited; and he shows in several instances how the Greeks evolved from simple architectural elements aesthetic combinations of almost infinite variety. He studies the Greek temple in its setting, and shows in a generally convincing way how carefully the Greeks considered the relation of a few formally simple and almost unchanging entities, temple, terrace, stoa and propylon, so as to make a completely individual ensemble, a consciously unified composition, of each famous Greek sanctuary. Every building had its due place, and no more than its due place in this unity. The temple dominated, especially perhaps in the first full view from inside the Propylon. There was little place for haphazard ('picturesque') grouping, even at Delphi, where throughout the long ascent the visitor was dominated by his goal, the great Temple of Apollo. The Doric temple was so designed and placed that, though set intimately in an embracing countryside, it 'demands homage of its surroundings' (p. 84). This seems to the reviewer a very good phrase. It reminds us that the Greek temple neither capitulates to its surroundings, like many Tudor manor-houses (contrast, e.g., Geylurst and its Classical neighbour, Tynningham), nor splits them asunder, like most creations of the twentieth century.

The archaeologists who want facts and dates will clearly get little from M. But we study the Greeks, in the last resort, for their spiritual attitude, as M. rightly pleads. Our view of Greek aesthetics is bound to have practical consequences. For instance, M. boggles at the restored Acropolis of G. P. Stevens, who allows no decent view of the Parthenon from the Propylaea, and thus contradicts what M. has inferred from every other site. But, apart from such practical matters, archaeologists will starve their own subject if they do not occasionally think about the intentions of Greek designers.

Because this book is basically sound and should be read by architects, it is important to list its more disputable features.

(1) The illustrations and their interpretation are not always beyond reproach. M. has pressed Hult's restoration of Temple 'C' at Selinus (his own Plate 13) too far. 'The bold effect' (p. 71) of the slender rectilinear volume of masonry would have been far less apparent in fact than in Hult's elevation. M. gives no notice for his very interesting plan of the main Temenos at Suvium (Fig. XXIII). I know of no published plan with his elaborate arrangement of terraces. Did he make it himself? Fig. XXV, the plan of Epidauros, is based on Defrasse. M. has not apparently understood that what is there shown as the south-east Propylon of the Temenos is not the main entrance, but merely the entrance to a gymnasium. This is the stranger, because Fig. VI shows this very gymnasium, with the Propylon included. The main entrance to the Temenos was surely from the north.

(2) There are some historical blunders. On pp. 77-8, we are told that the Greeks had no notion before the mid-fifth century how a solid marble building of any size would appear. But the Alcmeonid temple at Delphi had an east front of solid marble (cf. Poulsen, *Delphi*, p. 151). On p. 30, M. says of the Echo Stoa at Olympia that it 'dates from the fifth century B.C., but was, according to Gardiner, rebuilt in Hellenistic times, when it was known

as the Stoa Poikile, a name which reflected the wall painting that decorated it'. Gardiner is in fact less confident. He does not date the wall paintings. But, like most scholars, he does assign most of the Stoa to the mid-fourth century. Here the only serious dispute involves the date of the back wall (see now AJA 1948, p. 490).

(3) Some aesthetic judgments seem wide of the mark, notably that of p. 17, that on the Mycenaean mainland 'the spirit of free creation was dead'. A child of the 'thirties, M. regards the Parthenon pediment as decadent after Olympia. He does not consider how little we still know of their main figures and composition. Contrast Leach's verdict (*Greek Buildings*, p. 113): 'They are not mere statues, they are creatures proper to temples, born in marble.' In several places (e.g. pp. 29 and 80) M. criticises the 'overstatement' and 'blurring' inherent in the Parthenon's octostyle façade, that 'overweening' departure from the hexastyle norm. He ignores the exceptional angle contraction designed to offset the 'blurring', the difficulties of finding marble blocks massive enough for the column-drums of a hexastyle temple of this size, the foundations and building-blocks, demanding re-use, of an earlier and smaller marble hexastyle temple and the advantages of an octostyle plan in widening the cella (too narrow at Olympia) and increasing relatively the area of pedimental sculpture. P. 58 perversely pronounces the Second (?) Pompeian Style a premature form of 'Constructivism', much as other writers have seen an early 'Cubism' or 'Surrealism' in the Third. It is better not to insult the Pompeian Styles. P. 78 commends Bagelal for recognising a special 'Sicilian' Doric in temples where the architrave does not overhang the top of the column-shaft. But the same feature is characteristic of Metapontum. I cannot agree with M.'s pronouncement on the same page that the Temple of Paestum at Paestum 'still carries the general atmosphere of an archaic structure'.

(4) I have noticed the following details which need correction. On p. 27, n. 27, for 'Aristotle, page 314 ff.' read 'Aristotle, *Politics* 1330 ff.'. On p. 31, six lines from the foot, for 'boudeterion' read 'boulaterion'. On p. 32, n. 6, for 'Weigand' read 'Wiegand'. On p. 60, n. 25, read 'Eyle, p. 138'. On p. 72, four lines from the foot, for 'nonastyle' read 'enneastyle'.

But the book is strong in its architectural analyses. The Classical Greek, urges M., always pictured his city as a whole. Nowhere in Greek art do selected, symbolic buildings represent a whole city. In the same spirit, the Greeks could create an entire city, like Priene, of a strikingly uniform texture. Every building has just the importance that its function warrants, and the forms of the great public stoas are repeated in miniature in the courts of the private houses. Never has there been a city more homogeneous, less dependent upon stray picturesque-ness for its effect. M.'s aesthetic analysis of Priene on pp. 40 ff. is the most understanding that I have ever read.

In his summary, M. shows how the Classical notation, more familiar to a people, permits the architects an infinite variety of design and a delicate balance, in satisfying each programme, between the absolute and the local, the abstract and the practically useful. Abstract shapes at once strong and familiar, as he sees, will always be needed for a successful design. He also recognises the great advantage of the Classical orders, noted by F. M. Simpson long ago, that they look well, to whatever scale they are executed.

M. leaves his reader to put the final great question, whether the Classical shapes and proportions are necessarily superior to any others, or whether they are merely the most beautiful that have yet been discovered by man. He sees, indeed (p. 150), that 'scale in relation to human size is necessarily a compelling term in the Greek system' (could as much be said of modern, Gothic, or even Romanesque buildings?); also that the members of the Greek Temple, like the buildings of its Temenos, are effective because they are both carefully articulated and



apartly related in simply analysable ways to the whole architectural system. Nor can we doubt that he believed that the pub. of architecture is proportion, and that it is knowable. Most modern 'architects', by denying that proportion is teachable (and therefore knowable), in fact deny its existence.

HELEN FLORENCE.

#### Ancient Art in American Private Collections.

A loan exhibition at the Fogg Art Museum of Harvard University, December 28, 1954-February 15, 1955, arranged in honor of the 75th anniversary of the Archaeological Institute of America, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1954. Pp. 13, with 100 plates. Price not stated.

The seven hundred objects in the exhibition, coming from Egypt, the Near East, Greece, Rome, and Prehistoric Europe, exemplify each of the major and many of the minor arts, and cover a period of more than three millennia. After a short introduction by Professor G. M. A. Hanfmann, nearly four hundred exhibits are briefly described, and some two hundred and fifty are illustrated on plates, in general of high quality. The compilers of the catalogue have been compelled by reasons of economy to keep the text as short as possible, and to illustrate occasionally as many as eight objects on one plate. They have, nevertheless, made the volume a worthy memento of the exhibition. But the aim of producing a record as comprehensive yet as brief as possible of a general exhibition precludes a degree of selectivity which would have been welcomed by scholars. Objects published elsewhere are illustrated in this volume, while others not adequately published remain so. For instance, in the section devoted to Greek pottery, of just over forty Attic vases exhibited, several are illustrated both here and elsewhere, but a dozen not published elsewhere are not illustrated in the catalogue. Further comments in this section are: no. 254, the amphora with the earliest Andokides signature (ABF, p. 263; though recently come to light, is worthlessly illustrated; no. 255, 'Strife painter', although already attributed to Lydos by Beazley (*Dap.* p. 47 = ABF, p. 112, 34); no. 256, 'Little Master Cup type', is a Siana cup (ABF, p. 75, 3); no. 257, pelike from the Morgan collection, in view of Bodmer's list (*JHS* lxxi, p. 42) an illustration would have been useful; no. 260, kalpis, not attributed in the catalogue (though Beazley accepts Hollmer's attribution to Leagros group (ABF, p. 695); no. 261, Panathenaic amphora, dated c. 400 though Beazley (*A7d* xlvii, p. 453 = ABF, p. 410, 3) dates 'probably to the 'thirties'; here it is unillustrated and the catalogue does not state that part of the vase is in London; the mixing handles of no. 259 are not noted. 2 are other unillustrated items fragmentary, no. 263, Piskelina amphora, dated 375-350, though Cook (*B&A* xxiv, p. 11) dates 350-300.

There are some obvious errors in dating, e.g. no. 254, Greek bronze horse, 450 B.C.; no. 270, painter of the Leagros Contamachy (ABF, p. 710, 1), 700-600, and some misprints, e.g. no. 260, 'ibel', no. 349, 'Prinios'. The head of the Amazon (no. 151), the bronze hydria handle (no. 266) and the neck amphora (no. 278) appear, but are not stated, to have been restored. When no information is given regarding the condition of items known to be restored or fragmentary, the reader obtains descriptions of unillustrated items.

J. M. T. CHARLTON.

LEVI (M. A.) and STEREO (A.). *Pittura greca: disegna vascolare*. Milan: Mondadori, 1956. Pp. 161, with 3 plates in colour and 132 text figures. L. 450.

In readable and concise form and in beautiful Italian this little book presents the story of Greek painting 'from the time before Perikles to the generation after Perikles', that is, from about 600 to 300 B.C. It is confined almost entirely to Attic vase paintings, with a glance or two at Corinthian and East Greek. In other words the

author has selected the epoch that represents the height of achievement in Greek drawing and about which, moreover, a great deal is known from thousands of actual examples.

Though meant for the general public, the book is by no means superficial. The information is given in a pleasant, non-didactic way, and is up to date, derived from the latest discoveries. All the chief aspects of the subject are dealt with—the shapes of the vases used, their techniques, and their decoration. Not only the subjects of the pictures but especially the styles of their painters are analysed in a clear and vivid manner. In fact, after the reader has spent a couple of hours perusing the book, he will have become acquainted with the chief personalities of this great art—with the Nessos Painter and Kleitias; with Exekias, the Andokides Painter, and Psiax; with Epiktetos, Euphronios, and Euthymides; with the Kleophrades Painter, the Panathenae Painter, and Brygos; and with the best artists of the early classical and classical periods. The enjoyment of the period is enhanced by the wealth of illustrations—pictures of ensembles and details, the latter in largish size, for margins are dispensed with.

Many of the illustrations are reproduced from the drawings made by Reichhold for Furtwängler's *Griechische Vasenmalerei* and by L. P. Hall for my *Red-Figured Athenian Vases in the Metropolitan Museum*. For such borrowings only a general acknowledgment is given (in a footnote on p. 153), not, as is usually done, with specific references. The latter could easily have been inserted in the list of illustrations and would have been a great gain, especially in the case of little-known pictures, like the fragment by the Niobid Painter in Halle (fig. 113). One can, of course, search for the information in Beazley's *RFV* and *BFV*—where one will invariably find it—but the reader of the booklet is not likely to have these volumes at hand. Furthermore, for the figures 1-25, which illustrate shapes of vases, not even the locations are given. (The majority are in New York and Boston.)

A few further remarks that may be useful for a second edition: The captions for figures 26 and 27 have been accidentally interchanged. It is no longer a subject of controversy whether the Pentheileia Painter and the Pirochomis Painter were the same artist (p. 164). That the real name of the Kleophrades Painter was Epiktetos is likewise, I think, no longer 'a subject for discussion' (p. 75). The black-figured kylix by Psiax (fig. 42), formerly in the collection of Mons. Jameson in Paris, is now in the collection of Dr. Robert Kappeler in Mennem (cf. Beazley, *RFV*, p. 294, no. 21). The vase with Alkaios and Sappho in Munich is not 'perhaps by Hermokles', but 'in the manner of Brygos' (cf. Beazley, *RFV*, p. 260, no. 27). A short index of names would have been welcome.

The moderate price of the book, its attractive text, and the copious illustrations should ensure for it a wide circle of readers.

CAROL M. A. RICHTER.

BONATI G.). *Oreficerie antiche dalle micene alle barbariche*. Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1955. Pp. 245, with 178 plates. Price not stated.

COHEN DE LA FRÉRE (E.). *Les bijoux antiques*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1956. Pp. 102, with 28 plates. Fr. 1,200.

For long there has been no good general work on ancient jewellery. This want has at last been amply supplied by the two excellent books under review.

Bonati, in a really sumptuous volume, gives an illustrated history of the goldsmith's art in the ancient world. It ranges from the second millennium B.C. to the seventh century A.D., and includes examples of everything in this field with which the classical scholar is likely to come in contact. In addition to Minoan, Mycenaean, Greek, Etruscan and Roman jewellery, B. illustrates and describes pieces of Phoenician, Celtic, Iberian, Scythian and Scandinavian origin.



We are glad to meet many old friends here, but even more delighted to find that so much recent material has been incorporated: the *Iskonia Bowl*, for instance, and jewellery from recent excavations at Pylon, Chios (Khanio Tekké) and Vix. Mention of the decipherment of Linear B as Greek, with all that this entails, is also timely. It is, moreover, refreshing to find that the Thistegens have been condemned to the oblivion which they undoubtedly deserve.

The photographs are good, some of them very good, but the choice of a dead white background is unfortunate, since the critical reader cannot always be sure the outline is correct and has not been cut out. The historical résumé is full and clear, as are the descriptions of the individual pieces. There is an excellent bibliography, full onomastographic and findspot indices, and a good general index.

A few minor points. The Argina Treasure (plates XXIV and XXV) cannot be simply dismissed as Orientalising: the problem is much more complex than that. No. 334 is surely a Ptolemaic portrait; why not Berenice II, as B. almost suggests? And surely no. 372 is Cypriote?

Equally successful is Coche de la Ferté's little book. In a much less ambitious format he sets out to provide a description and a history of Greek, Roman and Etruscan jewellery—the title is misleading, implying as it does that the book embraces all antiquity. Not only the informed layman, for whom the book is intended, but also the scholar will find most of what he wants to know within these 122 pages.

The first part of the book goes back to first principles. We start with the place of the goldsmith in society, and are then led to consider the ancient sources of gold in the Near East. The technical processes of hammering, repoussé-work, chasing, soldering, filigree, granulation and engraving, are described with exemplary clarity. The less common materials are then described: silver, electrum, iron, enamel and precious stones.

The second part is concerned with the historical development of Greek, Etruscan and Roman jewellery. The influence of the Caucasus, Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria and Phoenicia are clearly demonstrated. Then follows a history of Greek, Etruscan and Roman jewellery, from Geometric times up to the first centuries of our era. The final section takes us up to modern times, with a discussion of ancient collections, prices paid, and famous forgeries. There is a good bibliography.

The plates are of high quality, and, although not very numerous, serve to illustrate the text to a surprising degree.

Finally, one small criticism: the lack of an index will be greatly felt in such a useful little book.

R. A. HIGGINS.

BRADLEY (J. D.). *Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xvi + 831. 6s. 6d.

In 1942 Sir John Beazley's *ARI* appeared, thirty-two years after he had inaugurated his study of these painters with the article 'Cleophrades' in this Journal. The author's first published monograph on a black-figure artist was the article on the Antimenes painter which appeared in the same Journal in 1937, and since then he has continuously worked the two fields of Attic red-figure and black-figure, besides excursions into Campanian and Etruscan vase-painting and other subjects. The present volume is in format, title and arrangement a pair to *ARI*, but it is not precisely similar in scope. The earlier work laid no claim to completeness, but it did include a high proportion of the known surviving red-figure vases painted in Athens in the first century and a half of the technique's existence—in the case of the finer works a very high proportion. The new volume covers a much longer period—some of the vases in the first section must belong to the third quarter of the seventh century, while the latest Panathenaea listed on pp. 415 ff. are dated in the last quarter of the fourth—but it is substantially shorter (831 pp. against 1,136) and

the proportion of those listed to those extant must be very much smaller. It is true that some of the material exhaustively treated by Miss Haspels is for that reason omitted here, but the difference remains. In character and value, however, this book is a worthy pair to the other.

An 'Instructions for Use' at the beginning lucidly and briefly explains arrangement and use of terms. Of the latter he writes rather sadly: 'My attributions have often been misquoted. I may perhaps be allowed to point out that I make a distinction between a vase by a painter and a vase in his manner; and that "manner", "imitation", "following", "school", "circle", "group", "influence", "kinship", are not, in my vocabulary, synonymous.' The moral is pointed by an article which appeared almost simultaneously with this book and in which another scholar publishes a fine fragment with the statement that Sir John Beazley in a letter had ascribed it to the Antimenes painter. He may have; but it appears in this book in the chapter 'The Antimenes Painter and his Circle', under the heading 'N. The Group of Würzburg 199'. This heading has a rubric: 'Most of these, or all, should be by one hand.' 'Group' is used more freely here than in the red-figure book: sometimes, as in this case, a cautious designation for what may prove to be the works of a single painter; sometimes, as with the huge and important 'Leagros Group', to cover works certainly by several hands but all painted in a consistent style, probably in one workshop. 'Class' as opposed to 'Group' is used not of style but of vase-shape. Much work has been done in recent years on the shapes, the potter-work, of vases, and so there is a good deal more about that in this than in the red-figure book. More than half of the book deals with a period at which red-figure was being produced as well as black-figure, often by the same artists or in the same workshops, sometimes on the same vase, so that there is some overlap with and modification of the earlier work. The most important modification is the re-separation of the black-figure 'Lysipides painter' from the red-figure 'Andokides painter', in spite of the six amphorae with the picture (thrice a repeat) in the different techniques on the two sides, and the similar cup in which the pictures of a fight at each handle are half in one technique and half in the other. Such a division, as Sir John confesses, is surprising; but he has been considering the matter for thirty years or more, has more than once changed his opinion, and if he now, with his unrivalled knowledge and understanding of style, feels convinced of an essential difference here that overrides the improbability, he is likely to be right. Such a solution does, however, raise interesting problems about the production of these vases. In the cup at least, one artist must have produced a design which the other followed; it can only be in the most literal sense the hands that are different. Moreover, the Andokides painter's are among the first red-figure pieces, he must have been trained in black-figure; and if he is not the Lysipides painter then some other group of black-figure is likely to be his. The book is largely a catalogue, the connecting continuum cut down to a minimum (the reference on p. 298 to 'those who are reading the book through' is delightful). The coherent history of the style is supplied by *The Development of Attic Black-Figure* (1951), but one could have done with a little more information here about the relations of different painters to one another. We are told (254) that the Lysipides painter was a follower of Exekias, but not that the Antimenes painter may have been a pupil of Lydos. *Development* 74, not a anything said of the relation between the Handelberg painter and on the one hand the C. painter, on the other the Amasis painter. *Development* 30. It is true that references are given and the information can be traced, but it would perhaps have given the book greater cohesion to have repeated it here. Another useful piece of information, not so easily gleaned elsewhere, would have been the shield-device on any Panathenaea prize-amphora mentioned. At one period at least these clearly constituted a painter's or workshop

mark, and deserve to be recorded alongside painters' and potters' signatures and names. These are small points that might be considered in another edition; I add one correction: p. 17, no. 26; these frs. are now in the B.M. and are among those mentioned in the Addenda to p. 16 (674). To consider the book further in detail is impossible here: in general one need only say that it is not only an invaluable work of reference and guide to the field, but a storehouse of knowledge, learning and understanding.

MARTIN ROBERTSON.

COOK, R. M. *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum. Great Britain, fasc. 13, British Museum fasc. 8, Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities. London: British Museum, 1954. Pp. 116, 67, with 40 plates. £1.*

Like some other recent fascicles, this departs in some respects from the original principles of the C.V.A. The illustrations are full-size, and separate plate-numbering is given for the different classes, but pl. 60 of I.L.D. is printed on the verso of pl. 1 of I.L.H.p. while pl. 100 of I.L.D. contains also pieces from I.L.H.p. and I.L.H.e. It would be impossible to reshuffle them by class, and the text is in any case printed continuously and bound. Moreover, the text goes outside the usual range of the Corpus. The material covered is the later archaic East Greek vases: 'Fikellura, Chazmenian and its relatives, and the so-called Simulacra as they have been added the Attic black-figure and miscellaneous pieces from Tell Defneh, in that the publication of the Greek pottery from that neglected site may be as complete as possible, and as a make-weight the Chazmenian sarcophagi, which by their decoration and nature rank as large pieces in the East Greek style.' The section on Fikellura begins with four pages of corrections and additions to the author's earlier study; that on the Simulacra with as many of catalogue and account of the whole class, that on the Chazmenian sarcophagi with a workshop list and discussion of two pages; while a three-page Appendix lists all the traceable painted Greek pottery from Tell Defneh and discusses its dating and historical implications; and there is also a short second Appendix on the pottery from Ninivite. The work has, in fact, many characteristics of a monograph rather than a fascicle of the C.V.A.; but whatever its definition it is a most excellent and useful publication and study. Mr. Cook knows the field better than anyone else: his discussion of individual pieces and classes is lucid and careful; and his general conclusions are of the greatest interest. The most important of these is that in Appendix A (the painted pottery from Tell Defneh). Mr. Cook shows good reason to think that the Greek pottery there comes to an end abruptly, somewhere round the middle of the second half of the sixth century, in conjunction with the abandonment or destruction of some part of the fortress-buildings; and he concludes that this is to be associated with Cambyses' conquest of Egypt in 525 B.C., and that Tell Defneh thus offers an absolute date for Greek archaeology, even more than the supposed date of the Siphnian Treasury, a finding of the greatest significance. The discussion of the Simulacra follows into three groups with numerous conclusions about phases of manufacture and date, a also some enlightening. A few points of detail: Fikellura pl. 1, p. 100 and identified fragments are illustrated; in other cases no inscription is not visible in the photograph; Desmets of all inscriptions might well have been given (Chazmenian pl. 3, 1: might A show Herakles, still unproving, led to wonder by Huxley? The inscribed 'staff' is carried more like a club. Pl. 7, 1: further against the identification as Odysseus and the Sirens: surely the Sirens would not be in flight? Pl. 9, 17: is it both hands tied together? or one hand gripping the other's wrist which is bound to some reason, attached to the wrist. Pl. 11, 1: Athena mounting a chariot is surely common to Athenian vase painting without reference to the judgement of Paris.

Simulacra, pl. 9, 8 (2, 13): panther carrying prey also found in Attic black-figure (JHS 1929, 254, no. 4, pl. XV, 10; early sixth-century shpe-fragment from Naucratis in the British Museum). Pl. 10, 1: East Greek rams and ram's head occur also in the form of plastic vases. Chazmenian Sarcophagi: pl. 1: the illustration of only two details from this large and elaborate work seems a serious departure from C.V.A. principles, and renders the interesting and very long discussion impossible to follow without reference to further publications elsewhere.

MARTIN ROBERTSON.

VATTERSON, J. K. *Handbook to the Greek Vases in the Otago Museum. Dunedin: Otago Museum, 1953. Pp. 61, with 10 plates and 1 map. Price not stated.*

This guide-book is written for visitors to what is the largest collection of Greek vases in New Zealand. It is not a fully documented account of them, as these vases will soon be published in C.V.A.; some of them indeed have been published before by Professor Trendall in JHS LXI (1937, 1938, 39). The writer of the present booklet modestly disclaims any scholarly pretensions for his text; in fact, however, his guide-book is a well-informed and carefully written account of the vases on show in the gallery, with general characterisation of the main styles represented, and the learned, too, will appreciate some of his observations. The plates illustrate some handsome pieces, a fine centosian jar, a good amphora near the Perseus painter, a neck-amphora by the Antimenes painter, a charming early red-figured amphora, an alabastron by the Simulacra painter (different pictures). There are other nice things too, amongst them the Caeretan hydria, published at greater length by the same writer in the last volume of JHS. The recently acquired white-ground alabastron (pl. 12, 13) is by the Strymon painter—not a themed, surely.

It is interesting and comforting to reflect that all the pieces singled out in this list have, to judge by their inventory number, been acquired between 1925 and 1935. There was, it is true, the windfall of the A.N. Cook Collection, which reached Dunedin through the Fels Memorial Gift, but even so the Otago Museum shows that with wise buying backed by local generosity it is possible even nowadays for a museum with limited funds to acquire a well-balanced collection, particularly when help helps the collecting.

B. B. SHEPHERD.

BREITENSTEIN, N., and JONASSEN, K. F., *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum. Denmark, Copenhagen, National Museum, fasc. 7. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1954. Pp. 212-45, plates 27, 310. D.Kr. 60.*

This fascicle, like the two preceding ones, is devoted to the Western Isles. It contains the black-glazed and painted wares of Southern Italy and Sicily, and common wares (pre-Roman and Roman) of North Africa. The highlights are the Calene relief wares, a couple of Camian tabulae vasa, some Hellenistic plastics and a Roman moulded bottle; but by and large this is an unassuming fascicle and the authors must feel thankful that their long labours on the Corpus are at an end. They have given a meticulous catalogue such as we have learnt to expect from them, with up-to-date references where necessary and much while. In their dark corner of Greek-Roman ceramics they were wise not to attempt more. Only the different black-glaze forms could perhaps have been distinguished more closely.

J. M. COOK.

YONAS, J. H., and (S. H.), *Terracotta Figurines from Kition in Cyprus. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1953. Pp. 1-20, with 75 plates and numerous text figures. \$5.50.*

Whatever Cypriot terra-cottas may lack in quality, they certainly make up in quantity, and when a large deposit



is systematically excavated and clearly published, we can expect to find the answers to a number of outstanding questions. The excavations of the University Museum of Philadelphia at Kourion in Cyprus were clearly admirably conducted and the terra-cottas are no less admirably published by Mr. and Mrs. Young, so that a number of important questions are in fact answered.

We are warned at the outset that this is a purely regional study, and that there is no such thing as a typical Cypriot terra-cotta. But the general conclusions drawn for technique, dress, cults, and other matters must be in many cases valid for all Cyprus, and in some even farther afield.

Most of the pieces catalogued are hand-made, sometimes with moulded faces. The subjects are chiefly victories, chariot-groups, riders and bulls. Perhaps the most interesting part of this book is the technical study of moulds, their origins and the use made of them, following the lines laid down by Jarrow and Nichols. Here, as with Nichols' *Attic* terra-cottas, there is enough material for a division into 'generations' of moulds: frequently as many as three generations are recognised. The good point is made that the generation of a mould is no indication of date, since terra-cottas could still be taken from an original mould when its 'grandchildren' were in use.

It is interesting that the white slip proved on investigation to be a lime wash. The slip on a number of Greek terra-cottas analysed in the British Museum was a white clay, fired on.

The drawings in the text are plentiful and clear; the photographs are quite adequate for the purpose; and the use of the Van-typer, in the interests of speed and economy, has much to recommend it.

R. A. HUGHES.

**BANDINELLI (R. B.). Hellenistic-Byzantine Miniatures of the Iliad (Ilias Ambrosiana).** Offen. Un Graf-Verlag, 1935. Pp. 180, with 253 figures. Price not stated.

Though the Ambrosian *Iliad* is, with the two copies of Virgil in the Vatican, one of the three most important illustrated manuscripts of classical times that survive, it has been accorded curiously little attention in art-historical literature. Professor Bandinelli's magnificence and amply illustrated volume thus fills an important gap. It does so admirably, for there are full discussions of every aspect of the book's illustrations. But the book is something more than a straightforward publication, for it is packed with learned and most penetrating comment, and the first chapter, which deals with late antique art as a whole, constitutes one of the most important contributions to the literature on the subject that has appeared for some years.

Professor Bandinelli begins with a re-examination of a number of earlier theories: that of Wickhoff on the Roman style, that of Rost on the historical development of Roman art, that of Strzygowski on Eastern origins, and that of Myers on the nature of the Alexandrine and 'neo-Attic' styles. He criticises all of them for not paying enough attention to practical problems. The real question, he holds, is how far a work of art is to be attributed to the personality of the artist, and how far to an anonymous passing on of fixed iconographical and stylistic schemes. The Ambrosian *Iliad*, for him, was copied by one man from originals of five distinct types. In view of the crowded nature of the compositions, these were originally large paintings and not miniatures, though the Ambrosian *Iliad* was not the first of the manuscript copies. Bandinelli has no place for the hypothetical panoramic type of illustration, either in comparison with the *Iliad* or any other work. He also refutes the suggestion that it is to be regarded as a piece of 'popular Roman art', by means of a comparison of the time and expense which must have gone to its making; he shows that none but a rich patron could have sponsored it.

Chapter II consists of a detailed description of all the scenes illustrated, using the engravings of Mai's publication of 1835 as a basic catalogue, in view of the fact that the actual plates of the present book are grouped not according to the succession of events in the story, but according to their stylistic and iconographic character. Chapter III is taken up with notes on the state of the manuscript, the technique of the paintings, the nature of the preliminary drawings, and the written notes, followed by a series of 'antiquarian observations', in which penetrating studies of a number of points of detail are undertaken. First he deals with clothing and footwear, then with the 'vegetants' or patches that are so often depicted on costumes at this period, then with armour, hair-dressing, insignia, buildings, ships, personifications, labels and characters. The observations on the *vegetants* are particularly interesting, and constitute a most valuable addition to the literature on the subject. One small point here may be corrected: on p. 102 he states that no type of *vegetant* is to be seen in the mosaics of the Great Palace at Constantinople. In fact the two *vegetants* attacking a tiger and the four boys playing with hoops in a Hippodrome all have the square *tabula* on their costumes. In both cases it would seem to be associated with one of the factions of the circus.

Chapter IV is devoted to the iconography of the individual figures. Figures clearly constituted the most important element in these illustrations, where the backgrounds had little part to play, in contrast to those of the Pompeian paintings and such illuminations as those of the Vatican Virgil (no. 325). Chapter V is concerned with style, and other manuscripts, including those of early times with Christian illustrations, are compared, as are certain mosaics, notably those of the nave of San Maria Maggiore in Rome. This section includes an examination of the problem of dating these mosaics. He distinguishes four groups, and assigns the earliest of them to just before the time of Pope Sixtus III. His conclusions are thus in accordance with the most recent theories of Crocchielli, and refine the older ones, upholding a date earlier in the century.

In a final chapter Bandinelli conveniently summarises his conclusions, and suggests a date late in the fifth or early in the sixth century, and proposes Constantinople as the provenance, citing the mosaics of the Great Palace mentioned by the Walker Trust and the silver in the Hermitage published by Maniowski as evidence of the late survival of early styles and of the excellence of workmanship that characterised the capital. The non-naturalistic nature of the colouring supports the late date. More exactly, a date between 495 and 505 is proposed, on the supposition that the predominance of green in the colouring of the mosaics may perhaps coincide with an age when the green faction was in power. This suggestion is ingenious, and is typical of the liveliness and brilliance of Professor Bandinelli's treatment. It shows an admirable blend of sound scholarship, profound and wide knowledge and brilliant reasoning. The book is one of the very first importance.

D. TALBOT KILG.

**ΝΥΜΦΩΝ (or A.). Manuel Panselinos.** Copies, drawings and ornamental designs by P. ΖΑΧΑΡΙΑΣ. Athens: Athenaidition, 1936. Pp. 22, with 15 plates and numerous line-drawings. Price not stated.

It was not until the very end of the thirteenth century that painters in the Byzantine world began to sign their works. Recent research has, however, been responsible for the discovery of quite a number of names of men working from about 1200 onwards. The most famous of all these names is that of Manuel Panselinos, but little is known about him, and there has been a great deal of dispute as to when he lived and what he actually did. Professor Νυμφών here identifies him as the author of a series of important wall paintings in the church of the Porcelain at Karyes on Mount Athos. The date of these



paintings has also been disputed, but there is archaeological evidence (not noted here) which suggests that they were done when the church was repaired in the reign of Andronikos Palaeologos (1282-1328). The date is also supported by their similarity to work in a chapel attached to St. Demetrius at Salonika, which is firmly dated to the first ten years of the fourteenth century, as well as to others in the narthex of the Bogoroditsa Levishtka at Plovdiv, signed by a painter called Astrapas, and again firmly dated.

The thirteen colour plates in this book are all of death. They would appear to be very faithful, and certainly serve to give a good idea of the works themselves. But in the short text, Professor Xyngopoulos' care for identifying Panteleios as their painter is hardly substantiated. He himself admits the lack of certainty, and states that it is of little importance whether the painter was called Panteleios or not (p. 12). As the book bears the title *Almond Panteleios*, this seems a curious attitude to adopt. True, it is the character of the work that is fundamentally important, not the name of its painter. But in that case, why associate them with a name when there is little or no evidence to support the authorship? Apart from this, the introduction is in other ways disappointing, for it is of a very superficial character, and one would have wished for something more on lines of the same author's excellent *Thessalonique et la Peinture Macédonienne* as a supporting text to the plates. It would appear that the publisher must have asked for a 'popular' text: the result is a text which is not likely to be very popular, so far as the general public is concerned, and is certainly useless from the scholar's point of view. In fact, a good opportunity has been missed. If the series is to continue—there is crying need for good reproductions in colour of Byzantine paintings in Greece, more especially those of Mistras—it is to be hoped that the plates will be accompanied by texts of greater merit. A few photographs in monochrome, in addition to the sketches that appear here, would also have been an asset.

D. TALBOT RICE.

JACOBSTHAL (P.). *Greek Pins and their connexions with Europe and Asia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xvi + 250, with 650 illustrations. £8 10s.

This is an authoritative, comprehensive and fully illustrated account of the straight pin in Greece, and of its relatives in Europe and the East. Although one might envisage a rather different presentation of the material, it is a work unlikely to be bettered for a long time. It is difficult too to think of a scholar better qualified to tackle a subject which demands both patient assembly of material and a sympathetic understanding of Greek ornament.

In the first part, which deals with the Greek pin as home catalogues and rigid typologies are avoided and the material is treated in more of a narrative form. The geometric and orientalist groups are characterized, but even in these periods in which the pins do follow a fairly clear pattern of development it becomes clear that exceptions to the rules may often be in the majority. This leads to a rather disjointed discussion of individual groups and types as they occur, and more general discussion about the derivation of particular motifs arises as a result sometimes confused. Thus, from pp. 37-9 it is not clear whether the origin of the Ephesian fruit-pin is to be sought in the Late Bronze Age, or in the 'naturalising' of abstract forms; both explanations are offered. In the course of the discussion of the early pins a number of interesting and relevant digressions are pursued; there are indeed not the least attractive features of the book as a whole. Gift pins, usually identified as *aspis*, are assigned their proper role. A separate chapter on figure pins inevitably dwells on the problems set by individual pieces and the material again resists rigid classification. Considerations of the material and size of pins are summarised, and a note provided on the use of hairpins. Finally, the external

evidence of ancient writers, inscriptions, vase paintings and finds in tombs and sanctuaries is assembled to yield a comprehensive account of the use of the straight pin for clothing and of the chronology of some of the most important types. Miss Larimer's work in this field is largely ignored.

Throughout this first part of the book the appearance of each new motif challenges the author to uncover its significance and history. He never fails to pick up the gauntlet, even in instances where many would happily have let it lie. The result is a fascinating succession of digressions on architectural motifs, on fibres which can be paralleled to those met on pins (though rarely exactly matched) such as sickle-knife and the pegs on griffins' foreheads, and even more general topics like the representation of bees and frogs in Greek art. The reader is well advised to note these digressions as he enjoys them, for, without a subject index, he may well find some difficulty in tracing again some relevant aside. To appendices are relegated more detailed accounts of finds in Greek art, of the Trebenishite grave finds and of tremulo lines on metal work; the variety well reflects the range of subjects treated.

The discussion of the Greek pins stimulates more speculation than criticism on various points. On p. 45 the inspiration for the fluting of Samian column bases is discussed: it would be interesting to derive how much the Ephesian type of base owes to Urartu-Assyrian motifs as fig. 481. P. 47, to the floral handles add the oddity from Chios, *BCH* 1956, 328, fig. 5, *JHS* 1956 Suppl. 37, fig. 5; the motif is probably responsible for the trezene or bud which rises between the arches of the upright double handles on many Attic lebetes gamikoi and some Late Corinthian pyxides. P. 57, n. 2, on the coin cited it is a legend that appears, not a griffin's crest, and Forwängler's observation remains valid. P. 67, the floral in the centre of an Ionic capital's volute cushion appears on the early Naxian capital in Delos, the motif might have been suggested by the 'Aeolic' capital's floral wedge, and this sort of decoration may have been practised intermittently from the earliest days of the Ionic capital (compare the Kavalla rosettes), becoming common on Ionic-Corinthian capitals. P. 68, for a combination of pine-cone and floral motifs, declared un-Greek, see the possible example on the moulding from Pharos, *ADelt.* 1, 86, figs. 27-8; Shaw, *Greek Mouldings*, pl. A 10. P. 73, for the snake final to a gold chain, see now *BSA* L 37. P. 93, Miss Gray points out to me that *Odyss.* XVIII 292-4 is mis-translated, 'two gold pins and six gold fibulae', for 'twelve gold fibulae'; the reference is lacking in Index 3. P. 95, a rare misreference, read Fig. 194 for Fig. 11. P. 96, pins are not entirely unknown on the Acropolis at Athens, cf. *RS* II 1948, L 20. P. 119, 'cruel and painful to pierce the lobe of the ear with a tube measuring in diameter 0.7 cm.: an archaic Cypriot head in Oxford (1912, 351), about two-thirds life-size, wears spiral earrings rather over 0.5 in diameter; cf. *BSA* XLII, pl. 33 top, *SCV* IV, 2, pl. 9, and p. 387 f. for the disc type; for the adornment of the person some people are prepared to suffer the greatest pain—think of African lip-plugs and neck-rings, and the modern guépière.

The second part of the book, entitled 'Greek Pins and their Connexions with Abroad, chiefly Europe', brackets problems which the classical archaeologist too rarely has to face. On p. 121 a chart relates the European cultures which are discussed in a modestly non-committal manner. Jacobsthal proceeds to relate the 'unconventional' types of Greek pin with their more numerous kin outside Greece. Many of these types are survivors from the Bronze Age, but in the absence of any positive dating evidence from Europe and with their comparatively poor representation in Greece, only broad suggestions of chronology are possible. More than anything it is the collection and relation of material which lends this part its greatest value for both the classical and European archaeologist. But the chronological uncertainty and geographical distances

involved make some of the parallels drawn seem very tenuous and here a sceptic might readily find grounds for comment.

Ample illustration is provided by the 530 figures. The extreme variety of sources from which the photographs and drawings have been taken does not lend itself to uniformity, but this is readily sacrificed in favour of the number of illustrations salvaged from so many obscure or forgotten works. Reproduction is fairly good, but in the reviewer's copy there are signs of a number of grubby edges to blocks, intolerable in a work of this academic upbraid and cost, but certainly no fault of the author's. Indexes give a key to illustrations, sites and countries, ancient writers and inscriptions, and a concordance to a selected number of important books. The absence of a subject index is regrettable. Dr. Jacobsthal seems to be congratulated and thanked for again contributing to the establishment of order in classical archaeology.

JOHN BOARDMAN.

SCHACHERMAYER (F.). *Dimini und die Bandkeramik* (Prähistorische Forschungen herausgegeben von der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien). Horn-Wien: Verlag Ferdinand Berger, 1954. Pp. 39, with 3 plates. Price not stated.

We have in our lifetime, more's the pity, seen the Baltic controlling the Danube and part of the Mediterranean. We have records of Goths, Visigoths, and Huns coming from the north to overrun the fertile south. There is a part of the Central European mind that cannot or will not attribute any prehistoric cultural change to any other cause. All honour, then, to our author that he follows V. Milojčić in adopting the common-sense view that the initial production of painted, Neolithic pottery in Europe went from Sesklo in Thessaly northwards. This book attempts to prove that the users of Thessaly II (Dimini) pottery are newcomers to Greece, invaders from Central Europe.

S.'s first argument is that the people who built the town of Dimini were certainly foreigners, (2) for they brought two new things to Dimini, the Megaron and rubble fortifications. The fortifications ought to pin-point the invaders. What users of painted pottery built fortifications with stone tools? S. does not tell us, but leaving this argument in the air, he plunges into others. He returns to the Megaron later, but we hear no more of fortification, which is a pity. The Thessalian Megara are not too well attested, whereas the fortification at Dimini is a fact quite beyond argument.

Weinberg's solution of this problem must be correct. We have no account of floor-levels within the walls of either Dimini or Sesklo. If the inhabitants of the second cities were still using painted pottery, the date of it must be brought down into the Bronze Age. I would add that the engineers can most easily be brought from Syria, two days' sail to the south. Weinberg pointed out that the engineers conveniently left two of their bronze axes-heads outside the walls of Sesklo.

If identity of shape implies conquest, the inventors of the Dimini amphorae (pl. 3, second line) are also more easily brought from Syria than from the Danube; but let that pass. The burden of the proof depends on similarity of patterns. This is a dangerous theme; it caused Vasile to date Neolithic pottery from Serbia in the Greek archaic period, and Dörpfeld to equate orientalisising Greek pottery with Mycenaean pottery, and to invent everyone else's stratification. When will archaeologists realise that geometric themes are limited and must recur? The claim that Thracian meanders must be earlier than Greek meanders, because they are derived from Northern Palaeolithic meanders (13), is hardly convincing. In the course of the hundred thousand years of the period's estimated duration, man would have many opportunities to discover and forget meanders.

Our reason that makes me doubt whether Thessalian II can be derived from anything but Thessalian I is the

extreme difficulty I have found in distinguishing between them, first at Athens, and later in Chieronica Museum. They must be alike when two such experts as V. Milojčić and E. Kunze put the same three vases in different categories (Kunze, *Oichomene II*, pl. XXVI 3 and 4 a, b; Milojčić, *Chronologie der jüngeren Steinzeit*, p. 7, nos. 7-9). One of these is the face-vase whose style S. wishes to derive from the North (31 and pl. IX). It is awkward for him if the vase can be mistaken for one of the original Southern models. The photographs from which these two indifferent drawings are made show two strikingly dissimilar vases. It is idle to speak of conquest either way in regard to them.

No one will deny Danubian lands some degree of influence on Mediterranean lands, even as early as the Late Neolithic period. The north-easterns probably invented subconicuous lugs. A flowing type of spiral and meander reached the northern Aegean at Dikiliash from the Danube, but we cannot yet trace any definite Boian farther south, and no direct intercourse with Dimini is apparent.

S. BENTON.

POLAZZO (L.). *L'Atleta Cirene-Perinto*. Roma: Bortolucci, 1955. Pp. 47, with 23 plates. L. 6,000.

An interesting marble fragment discovered at Cyrene in 1936 completed the head of a youthful male statue which, together with the trunk, had come to light between the years 1911-15 near the Kadra Foligno, site of a Doric temple of archaic type (vide A. Rowe, *Cynaetan Expedition*, p. 27, fig. XIII).

Professor Polazzo's monograph *L'Atleta Cirene-Perinto*, partly descriptive (pp. 11 ff.) but mainly analytical (pp. 18 ff.), examines the importance of the statue in the general development of Greek sculpture. The careful finish and detail suggest an accurate copy of a bronze original (p. 16). Sufficient of the limbs remains to show that the statue was an adaptation of the conventional *kouros* type, comparable with the 'Omphalos Apollo' of c. 480 B.C. The muscles further indicate that the missing left fore-arm hung by the side and that the right was held out in front (p. 17).

The head lacks any element of idealism attributable to divinity so that P. convincingly identifies the subject as a pancerast—a votive statue (pp. 15-17). Secondly, it provides chronological evidence, since, together with the almost identical head from Perinthos (p. 18)—both were probably copies of a common original—it belongs to the first half of the fifth century B.C., to the category of the youths from the Acropolis and Agrigento, the Delphic character and the Olympian pedimental figures (cf. especially the Laphis bitten by the Centaur, p. 19). This dating is confirmed by comparing the rendering of the hair with that of heads in the Hermitage and Vatican Museums (pp. 19-20).

Stylistically the pancerast sculptor was 'un Maestro del ritmo . . . spaziale e non soltanto lineare' (p. 23). P., defining his main period of activity as the second quarter of the fifth century B.C. (p. 32), links his sculptures with those from Olympia—both being products of the same inspiration. Other characteristics of the Master are defined as criteria for the attribution to him of unidentified works (pp. 24-31). P. discusses, in some detail, four other works of the period c. 470-50 B.C. Earlier than the pancerast (p. 29) they are, in chronological order: (1) Ludovisi Diskoboulos, (2) Warren Epimetheus, (3) Nikias athlete—found at Ateia, (4) Adetno athlete. Similar inspiration is seen in the 'Omphalos Apollo' variously attributed to Kalamis or Pythagoras.

Auti, following Loewy, defined two main trends in Classical bronze sculpture, wherein the sculptors were concerned with: (1) balance, composition, symmetry and rhythm (Kalamis, Kalamis, Polykleitos), and (2) expression, representation of 'actions', and content rather than form (Kritios, Myron, Phidias, Kresilas). The pancerast sculptor belonged to the former group sharing



with Pythagoras' choice of subjects, interest in rhythm and symmetry, and, in particular, the manner of rendering hair (*vide* Pliny *NH* XXXIV, 59).

In conclusion (pp. 32-3) the main unidentified names of the period c. 480-38 B.C. Ageladas, Hegias, Pythagoras—are considered. P., attempting, perhaps unwittingly, to establish the identity of the panathenaeic sculptor, concludes (p. 32) 'non possum inclinare che verso quest'ultimo' (Pythagoras).

The notes, indexes of plates and contents occupy pp. 35-47. Misprints are few: on p. 36, p. R, read '7728 XXV, 1901' *iv*, XII: the figs. of pl. XVII, although correctly numbered, are in the order '1, 2, 3, 3'.

The presentation of this valuable and interesting study with its many excellent plates deserves special mention; the absence, however, of a frontal view of the statue complete with the new fragment is somewhat disappointing.

J. F. HEALY.

**Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Catalogue of Greek Coins,** by A. B. BERTI. Boston. Museum of Fine Arts, 1955. Pp. xvi + 340, with 115 plates. Price not stated.

The collection of Greek coins in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston (Mass.) may not compare in volume with those of the great national collections, but the quality of its content, if we look upon it from the aspect of artistic merit or consider its state of preservation, enables it to rival almost any other in the world. The 2311 choice, carefully selected coins, almost wholly of gold, silver, and electrum, catalogued and illustrated in this handsome volume, could hardly be more suited to present the peculiar beauty and variety that Hellenic coinage can offer to all who are prepared to look for it. There is much, too, for the historian or student, though the collection, which is mainly the personal choice of a single collector, is naturally and legitimately strongest in those series which were of particular interest to him.

The major portion of the collection is formed from two groups of coins amassed by the late Edward P. Warren, of Lewis, Sussex, the larger catalogued by Dr. Kurt Regling under the title *Die griechischen Münzen der Sammlung Warren* (Berlin, 1906), the other consisting of coins acquired from the Catherine Page Perkins Fund, of which a survey appeared under the heading *A Guide to the Catherine Page Perkins Collection of Greek and Roman Coins, Museum of Fine Arts* (Boston, 1902). Both these groups, together with a number of other specimens, many of which are also connected with Warren, have now been collated in the present volume by Mrs. Baldwin Beall to the general benefit of numismatists.

The catalogue is preceded by a select bibliography of standard works and a short introduction. It is followed by a most useful bibliographical appendix (i) referring the reader to the most authoritative work on the coins of individual mints or kings and special topics of numismatic interest. Further appendices provide lists of the principal standards for gold, electrum, and silver, of the specific gravities of electrum coins of Ionia, Lesbos and Phokaia, and a general concordance table. The catalogue itself is concise, though not lacking in detail where an elaborate or unusual type calls for special mention. Particularly valuable for the student are the identifications, or in cases of doubt suggested identifications, of the standard beside the weight of each coin, and the many short notes of historical or purely numismatic interest. The plates, with a few exceptions, are uniformly good.

Reference has already been made to the element of personal choice inherent in such a collection. The Boston cabinet is fortunate that Warren's taste was admirable and that, if certain areas, notably Ithaca, north-western Greece, Crete, and certain Aegean isles, are but sparsely represented, this is more than made good by his interest in other mints or regions that are of particular importance. The Syro-Phoenician series is notable, and the two great North Aegean mints, Abdera and Ainos, are unusually well

represented; the same, too, could be said of Elis, Klazomenai, and several south Italian cities. But the real strength of the collection lies in the electrum coinages of Asia Minor, and particularly in the extremely representative array of Kyathene staters; this latter is especially useful as von Fritze's publication of the electrum coinage of Kyathos (*Die Elektrumprägung von Kyathos, Namima, vii, Berlin, 1912*) is not often found outside the libraries of museum coin departments.

In a field covering so wide an area as this catalogue it is inevitable that some reasons for disagreement or comment arise. It is a pity that the stater of 9.82 g. used by Thasos and by other mints on the mainland opposite, though recognised as the basis of the Thracian-Macedonian standard recently expounded by Mr. Raymond (*Macedonian Royal Coinage to 413 B.C., Numismatic Notes and Monographs* no. 126, New York, 1953), is not described as a Thracian-Macedonian stater (for which it must have passed locally) instead of a Babylonian stater, after the system from which it may originally have been derived. Contemporary coins of identical weight are described at Abdera as Phoenician tetradrachms (reduced) and at Maroneia as Phoenician tetradrachms, though the term Phoenician is a misnomer anyway, these coins being derived from the Thracian-Macedonian standard like the 'Macedonian' tetradrachm of Akanthos, Amphipolis, and the Chalkidic League, belonging to approximately the same period. At Neapolis-by-Antiara, which surprisingly appears in the Chalkidic, the series with the head of the local Parthenon surely supplants that with the Gorgoneion long before 411. The chronological arrangement of the attractive hemidrachms struck for the Arcadians, whether at Herai or elsewhere, presents difficulties. The possible continuation of the lighter AV staters of Croesean type after 376 B.C. and the origin (and, therefore, date) of the Persian daric combine to present a stimulating problem which the reader must solve for himself. Points such as these, however, arise mainly from the great efforts made to help all those who have recourse to this catalogue and cannot detract from its value as a whole.

J. M. F. MAY.

**MARTIN (R.). L'urbanisme dans la Grèce antique.**

Paris: Picard, 1956. Pp. 309, with 32 plates and 64 text figures. Fr. 3,500.

This book is very valuable and very dangerous. Valuable, because it describes with the clarity and detail that we now expect of Martin the actual administration that town-planning involved; dangerous, because Martin knows so little architectural history. Fortunately the administration, discussed in Part I, is kept separate, where possible, from the architecture, treated in Part II.

After a provocative preface (is it true that 'in moments of stagnation and equilibrium urbanism scarcely flourishes'? What about Hadrian or Louis XV?), Martin well shows that the surviving scraps of Greek theory dwell on the efficiency, even the moral results of town plans, rather than their beauty. Hence, he suggests, the Greek love of grids. But he shows also that Vitruvius considered the beauty of towns. Did town-planners begin to worry about it, as Martin suggests, just after Alexander? At least, cities of 'cultural reason' are a Hellenistic creation. Martin well classifies the various types of older city: that, for instance, represented by Strabo in north-west Greece, which was a mere enclosure for refuge and mobilisation; or the composite colony, represented by Thuri. (But how is it that the four longitudinal and three cross-roads of Thuri 'découpent douze quartiers'? I get twenty myself.)

Martin now traces, in the best pages of the book, the relations of public and private planners. Some cities showed all private properties on an official plan. Others relied on boundary stones. Methods of expropriation and compensation are best shown by IJC II, 36 (from Tauagras), principles of zoning by the refounded city of



Colophon (c. 300 B.C.; cf. L. Robert in *Rev. Phil.* 1936, p. 158). The famous inscription of the Pergamene Asynomaï best shows how a city was maintained. From Periclean Athens upward official city architects existed. But extraordinary jobs were entrusted to extraordinary architects.

This first part of Martin will long remain standard.

The unhappy second part suffers first from the decision to treat only Greek town-planning, not ancient town-planning as a whole. But from later Republican times Rome cannot be ignored. To swell his book, Martin has to take many Eastern towns, even of Imperial date. Only by much special pleading can he argue that their colonnaded streets, for instance, may owe something to Hellenistic cities—Alexandria, perhaps—rather than Rome; and even then he has to admit, on pp. 171-2, that the arrangement of such streets at Damascus is typically Roman.

Martin prefers to see in Pergamum the fructifying centre of later Hellenism. Classical Greece had laid out towns on grids, which, as at Priene, make monumental effects impossible—unless, indeed, Alexandria had a long colonnaded central street. The dynasty, first of Halcarnassus (perhaps springing from Persopolis) and then of Pergamum, exploited the picturesque, monumental effects of temples laid out in the centres of terraces on the tops and slopes of hills. The Pergamene spirit, for Martin, is responsible for all that is good in later Greek work.

But (1) the picturesque is seldom the monumental or truly architectural, even at Pergamum. (2) The classical grid permits truly architectural grouping—at Priene, for instance, to which Martin, like Patrick Abercrombie, is thoroughly unfair. Both authors should read the excellent Martensen's *Idea of Space in Greek Architecture*. Martin contrasts the irregularity of the houses within the 'insulae' of Priene with their regularity at Olynthus. But Priene lasted over a millennium, Olynthus barely a century. He also finds the houses more 'pinched' at Priene than Olynthus. But Priene, unlike Olynthus, was not laid out with the full resources of Macedonia. The average house-plot at Priene (see *Priene Abb.* 303-7) is far less than the 17 metres square of Olynthian house-plots. To obtain a proper yard and southward-facing main room, the two essentials, one had to pinch and elongate the house-plots of Priene. (3) Persopolis is far better organised than any terrace at Pergamum (and probably Halcarnassus). It has 'Palladian' staircases, axial approaches and even, it seems, a pivotal propylon. No plan, surely, resembles this until Roman times. (4) Classical Greek terracing more sophisticated and orderly than the Pergamene appears at Marmaria. Classical Velia anticipated the effect of Halcarnassus. (5) It is hard to believe that the degraded architecture of Pergamum had any lasting influence. What resemblance is there between the isolated, eccentrically sited two-storey Doric and Ionic stoas of Pergamum and the single-storey, continuous, axially-grouped colonnades of later Hellenistic towns?

Midian theorists prefer 'conscious picturesque' to order. So they overrate both the merits and supposed influence of Pergamum. Hellenistic towns changed their appearance when the Greek stoa with its pitched roof, Doric external and loftier Ionic internal colonnades gave way to the continuous colonnaded street with its lofty external Corinthian Order. Long symmetrical vistas, unbearable with Doric, are quite pleasant with Corinthian. Whoever changed the Order (and I should like to think it was the Romans) also changed the art of town-planning.

Martin's details, too, are often unsatisfactory. In saying that the Athenians placed their agora between their main centres of habitation, he just ignores Thucydides II, 15, 4. Martin describes Late in Crete, where the houses formed continuous lines of fortification. Yet he does not connect it with the sort of town envisaged in Plato *Lysis* 799b (which he has quoted earlier), which was perhaps a well-known type of primitive city (cf.

W. A. Edén in *B&A.* 1950). It would be strange if, as Martin alleges (p. 103), Hippodamos did not design the Hippodamian Agora at Piræus. Our judgement of Magesias depends on which way the Great Altar faced—a topic ignored by Martin on pp. 115-16. According to pp. 147-6 the Pergamene stoas, 'because of their ample lines', had a Doric exterior. Was not Diana's temple at Ephesus on ample lines? Then, 'salvati la tradition classique', their upper storeys had to be Ionic. What 'Classical tradition' at this time? Martin says that the site saved the ensemble of Pergamum from a roocco effect. But it was a style of interior decoration. On pp. 155-6 Martin seems to deny that the retaining arches were concealed behind the Stoa of Eumenes. Contrast *AAI.* (1878, Taf. 7. On p. 227 Martin praises 'Socrates' functionalism in *Nec. Mem.* III, 8, carefully suppressing this 'Socrates' dislike of painting and sculpture. The *insulae* ('*plintzeis*') of Egyptian villages, says Martin (p. 203), must derive from Alexandria. But they are found in villages of the New Kingdom. On p. 257, Martin considers that the colouring of Greek temples was to emphasise their structural articulation and stress their function: how? Koch, in his *Theostempel*, shows how in colour denied its structure. On p. 261, Martin accepts G. P. Stevens' 'first good view of the Parthenon'—a view in which the all-important krepis is not properly visible. The stupa of Banae, says Martin (p. 262), is a 'perfect expression of Classical Architecture'. Yet, alone of such temples, it stands on no proper terrace.

The book is well produced, with few misprints. Fig. 17 should have provided some thread for the great labyrinth of Pergamum. On p. 211, at paragraph 3, line 13, for 'Sainte-Prudentienne' read 'Sainte-Pudentienne'. On p. 277, in line 2, for 'Anapof' read 'Anapof'. Why does Martin call Peistratus' architect 'Parnas'? What happier name than 'Parnas' for an archaic architect?

HAROLD FLEMING.

WOOLLEY L. **Alalah. An account of the excavations at Tell Atchana in the Hatay, 1937-1949.**

[Reports of the Research Committee of the Society of Antiquaries of London, No. XVIII.] Oxford: University Press, for Society of Antiquaries, 1955. Pp. xi + 411, with 131 plates and 81 text figures. £7 7s.

*Alalah* is the final report of the final excavation by one of our greatest excavators, pursued over several campaigns of exceptional difficulty and changing political conditions. Almost the whole of this great work is from Sir Leonard's own pen, except for a section from Professor Gadd on a model liver for divination, and a couple of pages by myself on the Hittite hieroglyphs, which Woolley, with his characteristic generosity, has acknowledged on the title-page. To review this complicated subject really adequately would require a covey of experts, and a discussion of its contents would afford material for many papers. I can only skim the surface at a few points.

The excavation of the lofty mound of Tell Atchana in the Amuk plain was encouraged by the Trustees of the British Museum with the express intention of 'tracing early cultural relations between the Aegean and the Asian mainland, throwing light, if possible, upon the development of Cretan civilisation and its connexion with the great civilisations of Near East Asia'. Sir Leonard Woolley, like the Three Princes of Serendib, may not have found what he was looking for, but by his genius he has hit on much else. He has greatly helped to fill the void in our knowledge which existed both of the history and archaeology of ancient Syria. The inscription of Ishrîm and the cuneiform tablets from the palaces alone have justified the undertaking, by informing us of Syrian affairs in the eighteenth, sixteenth and fifteenth centuries, on which we have had nothing new since the Amarna letters were unearthed seventy years ago. Praise is superfluous if not impertinent: my few criticisms are really confined to the interpretation of chronology.

The excavations were also carried out at a number of spots to a great depth (in the lowest levels inside a crisscross, probably nearly to virgin soil, though water prevented certainly on this point). A sequence of levels was thus produced, which Woolley has numbered from XVII to O, and dates from 3400 B.C. to 1140 B.C. The XVIIth level follows directly, in terms of contents, on the topmost level at the nearby site of Tabara-el-Akrad, which is mainly of the chalcolithic period. In its uppermost level were found sherds of the type of Archana Level XVII, mixed with sherds of Khirbet Kerak ware, which, though dated in Palestine to about 2700 B.C., is here assigned by Woolley to 3400, and attributed to the proto-Hittite, since it certainly has contacts with Anatolia and the Caucasus. Woolley's dates, he warns us (p. 380), 'will not easily win acceptance'. It is, in fact, a slight strain to believe that nearly a thousand years can separate Level XIV (dated by Woolley 3100-2900) from Level XI (2250-2200) or even VII (c. 1800 B.C.) when these levels appear throughout to use virtually unchanged an identical painted pottery. Woolley has really (it seems) dated these early levels on the basis of the chance discovery in them of one or two cylinder seals, of the history of which in Syria we as yet know little, or (in the case of Level XVI) by an Egyptian date palette, about the predynastic character of which even Woolley has some doubts (p. 359). It seems to me, with all due respect, that Levels XVII-XIV would be more convincingly dated around 2900 B.C. at the earliest, probably later, and that there is something wrong with the dating which Woolley here assigns to 'Tabara-el-Akrad'. Level XIII at Archana contained an allegedly 'Early Dynastic' Syrian cylinder seal, which if this is correct, would give us a date about 2500 B.C. Level X contained another seal with a cuneiform inscription of Cappadocian type which must date the level about 2000. (On p. 383 Woolley speaks as though it had been found in Level IX, but this seems to be a mistake.) On this seal see further below.

These early levels, in fact—whatever their exact chronology—cover a period of exceptional interest in the history of the Near East. The late H. Frankfort and others have repeatedly dwelt on the appearance of undoubtedly Mesopotamian features in the culture of Early Dynastic Egypt. By what route did these features travel? The land-bridge of Syria and Phoenicia seems indicated, but Archana has thrown little fresh light on this problem. This is chiefly due to the fact that the area at which these deeper levels were reached was necessarily so reduced as to give a very inadequate idea of the culture of these periods. It seems that in most of the third millennium the Amuk plain was a cultural backwater. Babylonian temple plans and other fashions did not enter till Level XI, the period of the epoch-making campaigns of Sargon and Naramsin in these parts, while cuneiform is first met in the cylinder seal of Level X. Certainly it would seem that these early Mesopotamian features were not transmitted to Egypt through the Amuk plain.

In spite of the inadequate picture obtained of these early levels, we gain from a few cylinder seals some interesting information as to the artistic capacities and affinities of the region in the later third millennium. On a seal from Level XIII referred to above, the simple Syrian scene of two seated figures drinking convivially through tubes, occurs. From the temple of Level XII comes another in which Woolley notes affinities to the art of Lagash. But it seems to me more important a leading on by the style of its cutting to the Cappadocian cylinder seals; and Level X contained, as mentioned, a seal with a cuneiform dedication of Adad-hani the scribe, written in a script identical with that of the Cappadocian tablets. Woolley concludes from this (p. 383) that a colony of 'Cappadocian' merchants, i.e. from Assur, was established

at Archana, as well as at Khirbet. But this is at present unproved. What may be implied is the discovery that from this part of North Syria was derived the Cappadocian school of writing, the source of which has always been something of a mystery.

As to the seals or impressions from Levels XIII and XII, I have elsewhere<sup>1</sup> pointed out their importance as the first dated examples of the so-called Syro-Hittite style, showing that it was already fully formed with a long tradition and repertoire by the time of Hammurabi. As it has been shown at Mari that the subjects of monumental fresco paintings can be, and are, mirrored in miniature on cylinder seals, we may assume similar fresco paintings to have existed at Archana. Certain seals again such as pl. LSI, 23, from Level VI, and LXII, 40, 42, from Level VI, are significant as prototypes of the Mitannian style best known at Kirkuk. It is only fair to say that Woolley would have increased the value of this section if he had furnished drawings of some of these seals which in the photographs are very faint, such as pl. LXII, 42, showing a chariot group from Level V, a subject of unusual importance.

By the time of Level VII (1750-1730, or according to Albright 1700-1650), the period of Hammurabi of Babylon, and the great period of Mari, Archana is named Alalakh after the Hurrian deity Alalu, a fact which marks the rise of a Hurrian element in the population. What its previous name was seems to be unknown. Under Yaram-lim, king of Yamhad, Alalakh reached its cultural zenith. The fine sculptured head, wearing a headband with ophiocods, found in Yaram-lim's palace is plausibly identified by Woolley as a portrait of the king himself. It has enabled L. Mootgat-Correns elsewhere<sup>2</sup> to date a fine Syrian bronze figure to this period. A smaller head (pl. XI) was also found in the same palace, in which Woolley claims to see Egyptian influences. I myself cannot see them. It is in fact, remarkable how completely absent at Archana any trace of Egyptian consciousness, in spite of the strong contacts of Egypt under the XIIIth Dynasty with Ras Shamra not very far away.

The light which these discoveries shed on cultural relations between the Aegean and Asiatic mainland is distinctly meagre and fiful. Yaram-lim's palace does not in the least resemble the Palaces of Mallia or Knossos, though certain constitutional details of the Level IV palace can be paralleled in Crete. However, the fragments of fresco painting from Yaram-lim's palace, chemically analysed by Mr. Barker, are identical in technique with those of Knossos; and though fresco painting is indeed known from other Asiatic sites (Nuzi, Qatna, Baghaz-kei and elsewhere) it must be admitted that the fragments of vegetation and a bull's horn (?) from Archana do recall Cretan art by their curvilinear freedom. For the rest, we have a fine Cretan lamp in reddish stone from Level II, an ivory handle with incised spirals in Levels III-IV and an MM III sherd from Level V. Crete, therefore, if it received artistic impulses from the Asian mainland, like Egypt, did not do so through the Amuk plain.

Level V, the period of Mitannian domination, is marked by a remarkable temple slightly below the level of the surrounding ground; Woolley must ingeniously identify it as a subterranean Mithraeum, since Mithras was certainly worshipped by the Mitannians, and it is in the Hittite-Mitannian Treaty that the earliest mention of this god occurs. To the same horizon belong some very crude basalt, Hurrian or Mitannian, to which parallels have been noticed at Ur and Diarbahr. The same period of Mitannian dominance produced the remarkable statue of Idnani, with its important historical text (published elsewhere by S. Smith), the only major work of art—if it can

<sup>1</sup> *Catalogue of Seals from Nimrud in the British Museum*, pp. 35 ff.

<sup>2</sup> 'Westenrömisches in der Bildkunst Mesopotamiens', *Arch. für Orientforschung*, XVI, fig. 7.

<sup>1</sup> See Hood, 'Excavations at Tabara el Akrad', *Anatolian Studies*, I.



be so called—of the Mitannian period from any site. The statue was discovered in a well of Level I, already old.

When, after a period of disturbance, we reach Level IV, with the palace of Niquempa, son of Idrimi, and his successors, we reach more tablets, probably the most important of Atchana's contributions. Here was found an interesting archive of palace records, published elsewhere by D. J. Wiseman (*The Alabakh Tablets*). But at this point we tread straight into a hornet's nest of controversy concerning the chronology of the levels, which Woolley has ably, but still not lucidly enough, summarised in a special chapter. Two rival schemes of dating for these L.B. periods, utilising the material of Woolley's preliminary reports, are championed by Sidney Smith and Albright respectively. According to Smith, Level VI covers the period 1700-1595, Level V 1594-1483, Level IV 1483-1350 B.C. According to Albright these dates should be 1665-1550, 1550-1435, 1435-1370. The argument in the case of Level VII turns on the well-worn subject of the date of Hammurabi of Babylon. Woolley (p. 166, note) claims 'to have followed Albright's chronology throughout'. Yet on p. 390 in the chapter on Chronology, in discussing Levels VI to V he seems to argue strongly against it in favour of that of Smith, which he says 'accorded perfectly with the archaeological evidence'. The obscurity to the reader is deepened by the misprinting on p. 390 of the date 1515 for 1595 B.C.

The dating of Idrimi is another controversial, though smaller, issue, depending not merely on the rival chronologies but on a difference of opinion regarding Idrimi's position in his family tree. Albright and Wiseman, taking him as Niquempa's father, place him about 1490-1480 B.C. in Level V. Smith makes him Niquempa's grandson, and puts him late in Level IV. But Smith's reasonings are based on a misreading of Idrimi's inscription of the name of a Mitannian king, whom Smith takes for Shutarna, but which the Assyriologists agree is really that of an earlier king, Paratarna. (It may well surprise those unfamiliar with cuneiform that such divergences of reading are even possible.) Woolley apparently opts for Albright's view (p. 385), though again presenting the strongest possible sympathy for that of Smith ('the opinion that I am entitled to express is, that while Albright's system does not agree with the archaeological facts, Smith does' (p. 394)). In fact, on p. 394, Woolley finally claims to have followed Smith. It seems Woolley at first followed Albright, but has since changed his mind. Yet by such limitations he seems involved at times in almost contradictory positions. Woolley's readers may well find themselves halffed.

The evidence of pottery in this real chronological labyrinth does not always help: indeed sometimes adds to perplexity. I suggest that a L.M. III chariot-ware fragment (c. 1400 B.C.) from Level V (p. 317) must have strayed downwards, and the presence of L.M. III sherds in Level VI in the fortress (p. 316) may be due to an undetected rubbish pit or other ancient disturbance. But there are many surprises: 'All Cypriot types of pottery go out of use (at Atchana) 75 or 100 years before their manufacture in Cyprus comes to an end' (p. 360). And the White Slip I ware, which is succeeded in Cyprus by White Slip II milk bowls about 1400, not only starts much earlier at Atchana in Level VI, but was used concurrently with the milk bowls in Level IV. Nuzi painted ware last at Atchana well into Level II, at a date when it is long dead at Nuzi. These important divergences in accepted pottery datings must be due to changes of taste or of the directions of trade or to the migrations of potters. Woolley has some interesting suggestions to make that the White Slip ware was imported from Northern Anatolia.

I personally accept the chronology of Albright against that of Smith and Woolley for Levels VII-IV, but make a reservation that Level IV may end a little later than they both suppose (1370). The multiple ring-beads of Plate LXVIII, 22, are characteristic of el-Amarna and an L.M. III sherd, dated by Stubblings 1400-1350, was

found in the palace which the accepted dating assumes was destroyed at the latest in 1400. In my view it seems more likely that the palace, which we know was destroyed half-way through Level IV, was in fact sacked by Subbilibium during the Hittite invasion of northern Syria, about 1375 B.C., an event which Woolley invokes as the cause of destruction of the whole level. The level itself need not have ended until 1358, where Smith puts the beginning of Level III. At this date the castle was burnt and the fortress and Hittite palace were built. The tablets from the palace themselves cover an approximate period of fifty years, which takes us from 1400-1350: we are not compelled to assume that the archives which were found by chance were all that there had been, or that they are exactly co-extensive with the palace that contained them.

If Level III began only in 1358, Level II, with its wealth of Hittite seals and L.M. III B pottery, must then have begun somewhat later than Woolley suggests, but its ending about 1275 B.C. is most reasonable. Level I, almost certainly destroyed by the Sea Peoples in 1194, contained L.M. III B ware, which Furumark ends about 1200. Woolley argues for a lowering of Furumark's dating to about 1200, with which it is hard to disagree.

It will be seen that Archana-Alabakh was an excavation of the greatest importance both to Oriental and to classical archaeologists, and its brilliant if controversial final report is a book which cannot be lightly treated. In addition to all that we have mentioned, it contains important material on the earliest history of glass and glazing. This wealth of material is such that even if there be temporary disagreement about some of its chronological implications, it is clear that Sir Leonard Woolley has once more placed science under a great debt.

R. D. BARNETT.

CLAREMONT (C.). *Greek Pottery from the Near East* [Berytus XI]. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1953. Pp. 57, with 13 plates. Price not stated.

This is a list of Greek vases and fragments from the Near East (the boundaries are Eastern Turkey, Persia and Egypt) at present in native, European or American collections. Supplementary surveys are planned to cover modern imports of Greek vases into Near Eastern collections and black-glazed ware of Near Eastern provenance. The scattered finds from Naucratis and Tell Defneh are omitted, as are the Al Mina vases except those still in Antioch. A brief introduction precedes this survey which introduces and illustrates many important pieces lost to the classical scholar in Near Eastern publications or museums. The illustrations are clear but many (handles, rims, etc.) are superfluous, and both shards and complete vases are cut-out (for vases unforgivable). There are no scales and few measurements quoted, many misprints and some wrong labelling of plates. No doubt many of the incomplete descriptions, mis-attributions, misdatings, irrelevant references and omissions will be put right before the project reaches corpus stage.

One may remark in particular the following among the important earlier pieces. A8 is late or sub-geometric rather than about 800, the earliest Greek fragment in Egypt. A35 is a unique helmeted head vase, Corinthian, early rather than late sixth century, and not certainly an Amazon. A59 and A60 are not Naucratic, A60 not Chios. A59 is in fact surely Corinthian Transitional, and, after A8, can share with Boston 09.210 (Fairbanks, pl. 37, 340) the distinction of being the earliest datable Greek pottery in Egypt. A60 and A62 are 'Rhodian'. On p. 106 add to the Mikellou fragments from Memphis (*Memphis II*, p. 22, 6; *CVA British Museum VIII*, pl. 375, 2), and an Al Mina piece should have been mentioned (*JHS LXVI*, 125; another fragment in Oxford). The Naucratis fragments are deliberately omitted from the catalogue, but also, on p. 109, are forgotten in the remark that no Attic black figure in the Near East is earlier than 550. B118 is from a krater, not a kourthophoros, and a



joining fragments in Bonn (Ad 1935), 488-901 strongly suggests an Athenian rather than Egyptian provenience; in the sixth century Attic *prothesis* vases seem to have been made only for the home market. In Oxford are most of the Al Mina black-figured fragments, including scraps that bridge the illusory sixth-century gap, and from Zagazig a phrygian head from a Chazanian vase (F&D II, pl. 401, 22; BSJ LXVII, 126). A81 is Oxford 1924.264, and with it from Karnak came a fragment from the rim of an Attic column crater (1924.265). There must be more Greek vases in Cairo Museum than those in Edgar's 1911 catalogue, in whose preface the reader is warned against assuming that the pottery was all found in Egypt.

JOHN BOARDMAN.

REMYT A. Archéologie, II. Die Archäologensprache. Die antiken Reproduktionen (Sammlung Gösschen, Band 539). Berlin: De Gruyter, 1956. Pp. 136, with 12 plates and 7 text figures. DM.2.40.

Students of classical archaeology have long felt the need for a handbook or guide to the basic principles and idiom of a study which has become excessively involved, by reason both of its long popularity and of the often unmanageable marriage of the arts and sciences which it demands. The need is now in part met by Rumpf's contributions to this series of pocket-books, which are as it were German Pelicans. Current book prices being what they are, I doubt whether such good archaeological value for money is likely to be met with again, unless it be in another volume of the same series. The form these handbooks take may well dismay what we may call the professional archaeologist who deals with other ancient cultures, for nowhere will he find stated in it the principles of excavation and classification which are the basis of all modern archaeological studies, be they classical or otherwise. This is simply because classical archaeology is at once an older and a broader study. Centuries of dilettantism, collecting and art criticism have shaped already the figures to stand before, though often to be adapted to suit, the backcloth provided by the archaeologist. Rumpf starts both where the excavator stops, and long before him.

In Volume I the history of classical archaeology was told, in Volume II it is the archaeologist's idiom and the principles of copying in antiquity which are discussed. In the first part the technical terms which tend to be so loosely and erratically applied are dissected, the grounds for their use evaluated and a number of amusing anomalies uncovered. At what size can a statue qualify for the title 'colossal'? And as *kolumen* in Greek can be applied to a statuette (the Colossus at Rhodes being responsible for the current usage of the word) we should feel at least a little conscience about using it at all. Usage determines many of the terms we commonly employ, rather than accuracy: the statue known as the Hestia (Justiniani) is no Hestia and no longer in the Giustiniani Collection. Consideration of the archaeologist's language leads to that of his style, and here Rumpf succinctly defines many of the diseases of modern scholarship against which not only the archaeologist, who is after all often dealing with first-hand material, but also any other classical scholar needs inoculation. Among them are the books as large as a front door or of a price beyond the means of most students; career-scholars who count their reputation by the poundage of paper they cover, and who write for the sake of writing and not because they want to say something; the *in primis* man claimed by so many excavators and museum officials for the material in their care; the endless multiplication of periodicals and illustrations; the lack of restraint and proportion occasioned by the desire to say everything. A bleak prospect.

The second part of the book contains rather more solid matter. First, the materials in which original works were executed in antiquity are discussed, and this is

followed by a study of ancient copies of works of art. This covers both the many periods in which original work was produced in a deliberately archaizing or classifying style, and the copying, in either a mechanical or summary manner, of earlier works of art—in which we owe our only knowledge of many of the famous sculptures of the classical period. For a number of well-known pieces a short history is given of the way in which their Roman copies were identified and the original's date and artist discovered, also the ways in which a copy might, in different periods and in different details, be expected to deviate from the original.

Virtually nothing comparable with this has been written before, and we may be thankful that it has been undertaken by a scholar of Rumpf's unrivalled reputation in both Greek and Roman archaeology. The student might perhaps wish for fuller documentation in the second part, but Rumpf can answer with his own quotation of Voltaire, 'le secret d'amuser est celui de dire tout'. An English translation of these volumes is urgently needed.

JOHN BOARDMAN.

SCHACHERMAYER (F.). Die ältesten Kulturen Griechenlands. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1955. Pp. 300, with 16 plates, 78 text figures and 11 maps. DM. 18.

This book was designed to be the first part of a work intended to cover the whole of the Bronze Age in the Aegean, but Venturi's decipherment of the Linear B texts induced the author to postpone the publication of the later part and to take 2000 B.C. as his final terminus. The book is therefore to some extent complementary to *The Prehistoric Foundations of Europe*, by C. F. C. Hawkes, so far as concerns the Aegean since we have the same cultural landscape seen from opposite viewpoints.

On the whole the two surveys agree well enough as we may see if we compare Schachermayer's description of the infiltration of the Dimini culture (Ch. 13, Figs. 24-7, and Map 3) or his account of Vinča (Ch. 12) with those of Hawkes (*The Prehistoric Foundations*, etc., pp. 105-8 and pp. 92-6), but the absence of palaeolithic and scantiness of epipalaeolithic material in Greece allowed Schachermayer to omit discussing anything earlier than 5000 B.C. After a brief outline of the subject and previous researches on it the author states his chronological scheme which differs little from those offered by Mühljčić, Maix and myself.

Of course many dates are highly debatable. 3000 B.C. seems rather early for the beginning of Feneos and Cuaterni A and 2600 B.C. a trifle late for the beginning of Kum Tepe, but these are matters of opinion except where the dates can be checked either by the radio-carbon method or by synchronising with the historic cultures of Egypt and Mesopotamia, etc.

In Part I the author develops, very successfully I think, his own version of the 'ex oriente lux' theory, quoting the first appearances of agriculture at Jarmo and Jericho, and later at Tell Halaf, Arpachiyah and 'Al Ubaid and the invention of pottery. Schachermayer suggests that a mother goddess and a dying vegetation god were natural deities for such cultures.

The short discussion on possible survivals in the Aegean of epipalaeolithic cultures includes a very welcome drawing of the clints from the Seidi cave excavated during the last year and not previously, I think, illustrated in any book on the Aegean. The most serious defect of the book is shown on Map 1, where no arrow leads to Cyprus, the island is not mentioned in the index, and the only reference to the stone bowl culture quotes Dikaios' little *Guide to the Cyprus Museum*, so that it would appear that the latter's monumental publication *Khirkiffe* was probably inaccessible to Schachermayer.

As evidence of his 'Oriental drift' the author quotes the facts that Schaeffer's discovery of 'Al Ubaid ware' at a depth of 15 metres at Malatya, examples of Tell Halaf were found in Armenia, and a Danubian I bowl from

Statenice in Czechoslovakia with a double axe, resembling the Arpachiyah one, incised inside and outside another double axe surrounded by a quintuple spiral, a variant of the more usual quadruple spiral but occurring on the lid of a stone pyxis from Maronia in Eastern Crete (H. Kantor, *The Aegean and the Orient in the Second Millennium B.C.*, Plate 11 f.).

Schachermeyr profits by Milojević's important but unfinished excavation at Otzald Magoula to reassess the Sesklo culture which he divides into Proto-Sesklo (corresponding more or less to Weinberg's Early Neolithic in the south), Sesklo II (Middle Neolithic) and Sesklo III and Sub-Sesklo (Late Neolithic).

Chapter 7, on the Cretan Neolithic culture, is rather sketchy. A Furum's article is noted with approval, but her suggestion that Cretan Neolithic may have been derived from the Gulluk culture is not mentioned, nor does Schachermeyr make any use of Vickery's excellent monograph on 'Food in Early Greece' (*Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, Vol. XX, No. 3, perhaps inaccessible).

The next chapters contain a stimulating account of what the author terms 'the Seskloid outzone' in the Balkan and Danubian countries, and the inter-connections of cultures with twisted spiral decoration such as Bukk, Tripolje and Butmir and others such as Starcevo characterised by rectilinear painted decoration.

In tracing the influence with local variations of the painted Sesklo pottery on its northern neighbours the author notes that while some features of the Sesklo pottery technique such as the high bases and funnel-shaped mouths are found at Körös, vase-painting, on the other hand, does not at this period go north of Starcevo. He is misled, however, by Fewkes and Milojević into stating that no painted fabrics were found in the lowest levels on that site, whereas Ehrlich confirmed by the testimony of other members of the expedition makes it clear that painted pottery was found right down to virgin soil.

Here for the first time in Europe we meet examples of Marz' torsion (which he now derives from Anatolia) and Fig. 21 shows a fine example of twisted meanders from Erőd. Fig. 22 provides a most instructive series of Oriental vase shapes paralleled in Eastern Europe, some of them probably copies of imported metal vessels. Sometimes the resemblance may be accidental, but others, such as that between 16 from Alisar and 17 from Erőd can hardly be due to chance.

Schachermeyr argues, I think with justice, that the Chalcidian neolithic pottery, for which he takes Galepsos as his type site, characterised by an absence of meanders and hardly by any proper spirals, is closely related to Starcevo ware and bears little resemblance to Dimini ware proper (B 3 β) with its elaborate mixture of spirals, meanders and chequers, and its very odd habit of dumping an orphan spiral in the middle of a rectilinear pattern—a habit to some extent paralleled in the crusted Gumelnitza wares of Thrace. Indeed I think the Danubian influences in Dimini ware illustrated by Fig. 26 might have entered through the Struma rather than through the Vardar valley. Schachermeyr is perhaps too apt to assume that a cultural drift implies a human drift and Miss Benson (who has also pointed out parallels in Dimini ware to Cycladic shapes) even goes so far as to say that 'all we need to transport spirals is one traveller carrying one vase' (*B.S.A.* XIII, p. 172). The rest of the chapter discusses the Gumelnitza culture of Thrace, familiar to students of Aegean prehistory by its extension into Eastern Macedonia. The late Neolithic Greek polished fabrics of Greece (Figs 1, 2 and 3) are termed the 'Grundmann wares' by Schachermeyr who now reverts to the older view put forward by Tsakonas, Wace and Thompson that these are post-Dimini and characteristic of the third Thessalian period along with the 'crusted' wares (Figs 4 and 5). The eastern Macedonian variety of the *Pia* wares is illustrated on Fig. 32 by the fine vases from the still unpublished excavations by Pelekidhis and Kyriakidhis at Konvotini.

The Cycladic civilisation Schachermeyr divides into the two cultures of Pelos and Syros, the former obviously derived from Anatolia; the latter, with its elaborate returning spirals, he connects with Butmir. This old and previously unconvincing theory he backs with some new evidence from a site called Griza Nowak on the island of Iliar (Figs 37, 38). There must have been some contacts between Iliar and the Aegean, but how did they operate? Three sherds (Figs 38, Nos. 6, 7, 8, and the fine whole vase (Fig. 38, No. 1) remind me somewhat of M.M.IIA sherds, but they may be much earlier. I should not like to express an opinion until I know more about this most interesting site.

In general the author regards the Neolithic civilisation of Greece as founded by Oriental 'food-producers' settling in countries very sparsely occupied by epipalaeolithic 'food-gatherers', and thinks that the first lackwash from Eastern Europe is provided by the painted spirals of Starcevo III, followed by the Dimini and Gumelnitza cultures, and by influences from the Lengyel-Butmir zone on the Early Cycladic culture. For an additional Oriental element in the Early Cycladic culture not mentioned by Schachermeyr see Stuart Piggott in *Ancient India*, No. 4, p. 26, and a note of mine in *Antiquity*, No. 99, p. 220.

The review of the early Bronze Age in the Aegean opens with a brief account of the Anatolian cultures, especially that of the Troad, which so strongly affected the development of the Early Helladic culture. The astonishing expansion at the end of the Early Cycladic period is referred to, and I was glad to see in Fig. 51 two old friends of mine, the M.C.I jugs from Marseilles and the Balearic Isles, which never seem to have attained quite the publicity they deserved, and on Fig. 57 a plan of the splendid city wall of Argina, the most impressive of all Early Helladic structures. Fig. 58 suggests that the Germans might well excavate some more of the intriguing round building at Tiryns without seriously damaging the Mycenaean palace.

In the account, following Fuchs, of the possible influences on the Early Helladic civilisation of the battle-axe and corded ware cultures I must protest against the statement on p. 201 that the battle-axes did not reach Crete or the Cyclades, and refer him to my own paper, 'Battle-axes in the Aegean' (*Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society* for 1950, pp. 52-63 and Pl. IV), and for the converse picture of Aegean double-axes in the West to Hawkes' paper, 'The Double Axe in Prehistoric Europe' (*B.S.A.* XXXVII, p. 141 f.). And what is the hunting leopard of Mallia but a Minoan version of a Trojan battle-axe? Schachermeyr's suggestion that an Indo-European dynasty might have been established in Troy II is improbable since no horse bones have been found there earlier than Troy VI, which contained a large quantity, but it is, of course, quite possible that the destruction of Troy II might have been caused by Indo-European invaders.

The Early Minoan culture is discussed in Chapter 21 and representative vases of the four ceramic styles of E.M.I. illustrated on Fig. 66. Three of these I should regard as due to immigrants rather than as developments of varieties of the Cretan Neolithic which seems far more uniform to me than it does to Schachermeyr.

The author follows Evans in deriving the round graves of the Mesara from Libya, ignoring the possibility of influences from Khirbatna and Arpachiyah. Chapter 23 sums up the growth of the Early Bronze Age cultures of the Aegean civilisation, 'the somewhat younger, yet gifted and fortunate brother of the East'. The lands both east and west of the Aegean the author regards as a unity during this period, marked by closely related cultures inhabited mainly by 'Mediterranean man' (in Sergi's sense of the word) and speaking an 'Aegean' speech probably related to Etruscan.

It should be noted that here and elsewhere where the author is indulging in legitimate but hazardous speculation he presents his material honestly enough without attempting to make it masquerade as incontrovertible facts.



Among these more speculative suggestions are the equation khyphalic statues = representations of Hyakinthos or Kretan Zeus, and the relationships of the stories of Helen and Ariadne to vegetation myths like that of Persephone.

The last chapter tackles the most thorny subject of all—the nature of the Aegean substratum in the Greek language. He accepts Ventris' transliteration of the Linear B texts, but this does not help us much in defining the 'Aegean language' or languages except perhaps that it is an additional reason for rejecting, as Schachermeyr does, Brandenstein's theory that place names in -athos and -adas had been introduced into the Aegean about 1200 B.C. by another Indo-European but non-Hellenic wave of invaders. The author reverts to Kretschmer's original theory whereby these suffixes and such prefixes as Lar-, Myk-, and Pyr- all belonged to the same 'Aegean' language. He discusses briefly the possibility that we may have survivals of these Aegean languages in the modern languages of the Caucasus, referring to Kretschmer's theory that the Lak people were the Leleges (but not to Lopatin's suggestion that 'Aguos' is simply the Abchasian word for flannel!).

The book contains something of interest for almost any student of the prehistory of Eastern Europe after the Palaeolithic periods, but will be especially useful to people like myself who know their Aegean stuff pretty well but whose knowledge of the surrounding cultures is a trifle shaky. The plates and figure are well chosen, and though the former include a number of hackneyed examples there are others such as Dr. Giannakakis' figurine from Crete, the gold and silver vases from Kibora and the medals from the first city of Troy, that have been little illustrated if at all in general works of this kind. The notes at the end of the text comprise a great deal of bibliographical work and omit little of importance except in Cyprus.

I note a few slips or misprints which might be corrected in a later edition: (i) 'Woolley' on p. 24. (ii) No. 9 on Fig. 14 is not in stone but a shell bracelet. (iii) 'Domini' in the description of Fig. 26. (iv) and (v) on pp. 215, l. 19, and 217, l. 16. F. Hell. III should presumably have been F. Min. III. vi) P. 253, l. 10, 'Poparchurke', = 10, N. 142, Alexia, presumably a misprint rather than an intentional Germanisation of a personal name.

R. W. HERTHONSON.

REINOLD B.: **Kretisch-Mykenische Siegelbilder. Sallgeschichtliche und chronologische Untersuchungen.** München: N. G. Ebers. 1934. Pp. 176, with 10 plates. DM 14.50.

This short but important book is essentially a complement to the work done by Matz on the Cretan seals of the Early Period (*Die Frühkretischen Siegel*, 1928). It deals with the Cretan and Mainland seals of the 'Bloom' (M.M. III-L, M. I, and the contemporary Shaft-grave and early Tholos tomb phases on the mainland) and the Late (M.M. L-H, III) Periods. It is appropriately by a pupil of Matz and dedicated to him.

The lists at the end of the book of all seals and sealings of these periods found in a safe and desirable context are set out in an admirably clear and informative manner, and will, as Herwits claims, provide a valuable basis for further study of the subject. Since the book is admittedly more a declaration of principles and methods than an exhaustive treatment, it is much to be hoped that B. himself will continue this. B. follows Matz in assigning the Hieroglyphic Deposit sealings from Knossos to early M.M. III not M.M. II as Evans.

Most illuminating is the last section of the book, VI, on Forgeries. B. subjects some of the more notorious dubitanda to a thorough and methodical analysis, and convincingly assigns them to three distinct stylistic groups which no doubt reflect the activity of three different workshops or hands. This bold and largely successful assault on the problem of forgeries in Minoan-Mycenaean glyptic is extremely important, because, as B. and others before

him have noted, the whole picture of certain aspects of Bronze Age life, notably in the sphere of religious beliefs and practices, is materially altered by the introduction of forged seals as evidence.

A valuable new weapon that B. brings to bear against forgery is the realisation that the Bronze Age gem-engraver invariably regarded the gem itself as the field for his picture, and not the impression like the gem-engravers of Classical and modern times. One concrete aspect of this is the fact that in the Bronze Age right and left hands appear correctly to right and left on the original seals, and reversed left for right, right for left on the impression. B. proves this by reference to figures of adorants, who always appear with the left hand raised on seal impressions, but raising the right hand in the bronze statues, and of course on the seals themselves. Lists of seals and sealings which show adorants, together with the bronze statues for comparison, are given at the end of the book. This feature of Bronze Age gems can also naturally be traced in the handling of weapons and other objects. Note, however, that the seal-engravers do from time to time put left for right on the original seal for convenience of the composition, notably in amuletic scenes where two similar figures oppose each other holding similar attributes (e.g. PM II B31, Fig. 546: sealing of goddess holding spear with lion; IV 453, Fig. 378: seal from Vaphio Tomb with winged genii holding vases).

B. attempts to distinguish between seals of Cretan (Minoan) and those of mainland (Mycenaean) manufacture or tradition. Admittedly for the present at any rate it is impossible to distinguish them on ordinary external grounds, the materials or shapes of the seals, the nature of the subjects depicted, details of dress or ornament, etc. B., however, claims to detect an essential difference in the basic structure of the designs between seals of Cretan and those of mainland inspiration. He selects for analysis and comparison the 'Battle of the Glen' gold signet from shaft-grave IV at Mycenae, and the sealing with a similar battle subject, which also appears to be the impression of an oval gold signet, found at A. Triadha in Crete. He concludes that the 'Battle of the Glen' signet, and the other great gems from the Mycenaean shaft-graves, are of mainland manufacture and the work of a native mainland artist, not a Cretan.

This conclusion, although as B. says astonishing, is in harmony with present trends of opinion, and may therefore meet with approval. But whether B.'s theory of structural differences, or its practical application, are really viable is perhaps open to doubt. One point, however, may be noted. B. claims to identify the different structural principles underlying Minoan and Mycenaean glyptic with Furumark's Unity principle for Minoan, and his Tectonic principle for mainland pottery decoration. But in Furumark's account of these concepts (*The Mycenaean Pottery*, p. 116) it appears that the Tectonic style of decoration is something quite universal, and is incidentally present side by side with the Unity style in Crete itself at all periods. Unity decoration in Furumark's theory is in effect a 'higher' style of art arising out of the universal Tectonic at different times in different places, and flourishing alongside it. In other words, while all Unity decoration must on present knowledge be regarded as Minoan, Tectonic decoration may be either Minoan or Mycenaean.

B. perhaps exaggerates the independence of seal art from the great art of the frescoes. He regards the frescoes as essentially a frieze art, as opposed to the pictures within the boundary of a frieze represented by the seals. But it seems dangerous to assume that every fresco was in the form of a frieze, and that 'pictures' in B.'s sense did not occur as well. On the other hand, a number of seals and sealings surely do, as Evans noted and B. indeed admits, introduce elements, e.g. rows of figures with spirit, etc., borders below them, that seem directly and deliberately copied from the frescoes.

Minor points that may muddle readers: P. 44: The



rectangular gold seals from shaft-grave III are Figs. 2, 18, 19 and not 21-3. P. 45: The scheme in Fig. 118 is upside down.

M. S. F. HOOD.

JANTZEN (U.). *Griechische Greifenkessel*. Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1955. Pp. 119, with 64 plates. DM. 35.

At the time when the flood of Oriental influences swept over Greece a new type of bronze cauldron with plastic ring-handle attachments and a conical stand came to supersede the old Geometric tripod. The first examples seem to have been imported from the Orient (probably, as Jantzen says, through Al Mina), and they bore the siren handle-attachments which have been so brilliantly elucidated by Kunze. But in the hands of Greek copper-smiths the cauldron underwent a transformation, being equipped with half a dozen apotropaic griffin protomes rising from the shoulder; and it quickly became a standard article of archaic Greek manufacture. This is the 'griffin kettle'; and the protomes are 'kettle griffins'. The appearance of these contraptions has long been known from finds in Etruscan tombs; but the great majority of the existing protomes in fact come from dedications in Greek sanctuaries. The prototype of the Greek griffin is unquestionably Oriental, but it is transmogrified and quickly develops in bronze into the haughty, terrifying, slightly preposterous peg-topped aristocrat of the Greek bestiary. In the course of time, however, in-breeding tells, and the race degenerates to end in a goblin fowl frozen in an arrested yawn or sneeze. There is still an element of uncertainty about the connection of the griffin protomes with the Oriental (and Greek imitation) siren attachments, and also about the kind of stand which normally supported the Greek griffin kettles. J. approaches both these difficulties with good sense. In brief, he maintains that the Greeks did mount protomes on cauldrons which were equipped with siren attachments (though presently they came to omit the siren attachments as unnecessary) and that the cauldrons from Etruscan tombs which have both attachments and protomes were exported from Greece in that condition. He contends that the normal stand for the Greek griffin kettle was the 'Stab-dreifuß'; since so little survives, it is perhaps easier to think in terms of iron, or at least some material other than bronze.

Jantzen's original mandate was the publication of the griffin protomes from the Samian Heraeum. But this involved him in a wider study, of which this excellently produced book is the fruit. Lurking the 95 from Samos, he has assembled 197 protomes, of which he illustrates more than 150; and he distributes them into a dozen groups which he believes to be entirely of Greek manufacture. His study and arrangement of the material shows a masterly grasp and concentration on the essentials, and his writing is clear, concise and to the point. To summarise briefly: J.'s first groups consist of beaten protomes, which start about the end of the eighth century with a thick-necked, round-mouthed breed, stumpy of ear and peg; the next stage of evolution is towards more clear-cut forms, heightening of the expression (especially by inlaid eyes), then holder surface decoration (with double spiral locks). Hollow-casting of protomes seems to have been practised in Samos almost from the outset; the first results were crude, but with the clarification of the individual elements and the wider swing of the neck they soon caught up on the beaten protomes. Casting could not, however, match the increasing size of the beaten ones, and a temporary compromise was reached in the 'monumental group', cast heads being set on beaten necks; the grandest of the Olympia heads, with their impressive plastic quality, belong here. The climax has now been reached; and though fine engraving is found in the immediately following group, the subsequent history of the cast griffin protome is a decline, refinement at first leading to mannerism, the clitic wing of the neck turning into a permanent crick; the eye loses its intense

glare, the corrugated brow becomes plain and arched in a look of mild surprise; the spiral lock vanishes. Olympia gives out and production is almost exclusively Samian. Export, however—to Etruria and even to Spain—reaches a peak, and a master of some originality appears ('Bosio-Typus' the wild goat protomes, Pl. 47, are a curious premonition of Indian deifying horns such as are treated by Buschor in *Mitth. Jahrb.* XI). But after this export ceases; the protomes are confined to a uniformly small format, indicating that they no longer ranked as costly offerings; the peg is attenuated, the eye is small, expressionless, and no longer inlaid. Numerous flaws in the casting, which the craftsmen did not trouble to conceal, show that in the last phase the griffin protome was not highly prized.

This consistent and variously detached evolution, spanning so much of the archaic era and ignoring provincial boundaries in art, raises an acute problem of place of manufacture. J. distinguishes two main trends, corresponding to production centres, one Eastern (in fact Samian), the other Peloponnesian. The Eastern tradition he finds more naturalistic, with a liking for delicate outlines. The Peloponnesian is more abstract with roughly plastic elements, and the marked emphasis on vertical and horizontal axes, which becomes universal in the 'monumental group', is at home here. Unless one were prepared to carry to an extreme the conception of itinerant tinkers going the round of the fair, no more convincing explanation can be offered. At the same time it is difficult to see how, without imported foreign models, the type could have developed so consistently in centres so far apart; and one is tempted to wonder whether there may not after all be Oriental originals lurking among the earlier beaten groups.

As regards chronology, with his concentration of viewpoint J. has perhaps not taken sufficient account of better dated comparative material. The commencing date of near 700 B.C., based partly on a find from the make-up of Hekatompedon II cannot be disputed and gains support from comparison with the Griffin Jug. But the placing of the 'monumental group' around 650 is more questionable. The grand plastic quality, which J. stresses, seems more appropriate in the later seventh century; and the griffin mother relief (1. *Ol. Bericht*, Pl. 37, Kunze, *Neue Meisterwerke* no. 35), which goes with the 'monumental group', shows the same proportions and stylised renderings as late seventh-century 'monumental' painting (cf. especially the Argina Chimera Painter, Köhler, *Abh. Mainz*, figs. 72-4; typologically also the East Greek painted griffins of the later seventh century (as opposed to those of the sixth) are still 'pre-monumental'). J.'s date in the opening years of the sixth century for the date of the griffin kettle leaves an awkward gap of half a century before La Garenne (p. 82), and does not account for the survival of precisely similar protomes in Chalcidonian chryseis poles (cf. *Akrotirion, Archäologische Terrakottaplatten in Stockholm*, vol. pls. 1 and 3).

This study is more important than appears at first sight because of the dominant position of the griffin protome in early Greek sculpture in the round. For the beginnings of hollow cast bronze sculpture it is of unique importance. The two early Samian rejects whose casting failed (Pls. 17 f.) not only prove that there was a hollow casting industry at Samos in the early seventh century, but show a use of piece-moulds in an attempt at duplication which coincides with current views on the subject but is in harmony with the peculiarly Samian attitude towards mechanical aids in art and their practical exploitation of the sciences; if we ask why the Samians went on making kettle griffins after others had given up, it is not, I think, just that quixotic strain which one sees elsewhere in their championship of lost causes, but rather a sign of their persistence in the process of hollow casting which in fact (Pl. 18) in the same generation to their successful achievement of life-size bronze sculpture.

J. M. COOK.

PENDLEBURY (J. D. S.). *A Handbook to the Palace of Minos at Knossos with its dependencies*. Foreword by Sir ARTHUR EVANS. Introduction by Sir JOHN MYRES and Sir JOHN FORSDYKE. London: Max Parrish, 1954. Pp. 76, with 14 plates, 8 text figures and 1 folding plan. 12s. 6d.

It is a pleasure to welcome Max Parrish's new edition of the guide first published by Macmillan and Co., perhaps the only perfect and absolutely fool-proof guide to an archaeological site in the English language. I recall the remark once made by a grateful American tourist (and quoted to me by Miss Edith Keeble), 'why when it says here you go up two steps, you really do go up two steps'. The editors and publishers have rightly left the actual wording of the guide proper intact except for the sad but inevitable omission from the list of dependencies of the Royal Tomb at Isopata, which can no longer be visited since it was completely destroyed during the German occupation by the Austrian General Ringel who employed the stones to build some military buildings. The photographic plates are almost the same, but the general view from the south is omitted and the Grand Staircase is allotted an extra illustration. Further, the plates and plans are not collected at the end but distributed through the text at appropriate places, and personally I regard this as an improvement.

The introductory survey of the Minoan civilization by Sir John Myres and Sir John Forsdyke is clear and informative, introducing the reader to the results of Ventris' researches into Linear Script B and the consequent inference that an Aegean dynasty must have been established at Knossos about 1450 B.C.

The statement on p. 17 that there were no areas of concentration of ritual seems to ignore the town shrine at Gournia, while the statement on p. 11 that 'there are no public shrines like those of the Greeks' is rather misleading. There were indeed no temples apparently, but there were civic shrines at Gournia and at Karphi, the only two town sites completely excavated, and we cannot argue from their absence on other town sites such as Knossos, Phaistos and Mallia since such small areas proportionately of the latter group have been excavated. One misprint, 'Britomartis', occurs in this section. The only serious complaint I have to make against this edition concerns the chronological table on pp. 11 and 12. If this table is to stand above Pendlebury's signature it should have been left unaltered with a footnote explaining that it might now be modified to agree with the later dates now assigned to Hammurabi of Babylon and to the Old Kingdom dynasties in Egypt.

If, on the other hand, the amendments to Pendlebury's chronological table have been inserted by Myres and Forsdyke, why do they assign 900 years to the transitional Neolithic and the E.M.I. period (200 years longer than the estimate given by Pendlebury, who wrote before Smith's revision of Hammurabi's date and so had much more excuse for a high estimate).

This, however, is a minor blemish and the book remains an invaluable guide, and is now supplemented by a useful general index.

R. W. HUTCHINSON.

Kunze (E.), *V. Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia*. Mit Beiträgen von H. VOLLMER-KRUMHOLTZ and H. WERNER. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1955. Pp. 176, with 83 plates and 74 text figures. DM. 42.

The last detailed report on the German excavations at Olympia appeared in 1934. The new report covers the work done on the site in the winter of 1931-32 and autumn 1952, and includes the publication of the most important finds, with some relevant pieces found in earlier seasons. Most is from the pen of Kunze, who conducted the digging and whose precision and skill in Olympian matters we may again here enjoy. Excavation was for the most part confined to the Stadion, whose history is now clear. Before the fourth century it formed

an integral part of the sanctuary with its finishing line in full view of the great temple and its altar. Only later, with its removal further east and the building of the Belus Stoa, was the athletic centre removed from the religious one.

Olympia has always been rich in bronzes and fully half of the new report is devoted to them. Kunze discusses the shield dedications illustrating the earliest round shields and the developed 'Argive' form. The dedications include new fragments of the Corinthian spoils from a war against Argos, a shield given by the Zancleians after victory over Rhegion which matches an inscribed grave found earlier, and a puzzling dedicatory inscription of the mid-fifth century mentioning Syracuse and Agrigentine, but whether as rivals or defeated allies is not completely clear. Uncertainty is expressed about the place of origin of fine fragments of a round shield with central gorgoneion and animal friezes, but the close parallel is a Greek shield from Carthage and their diamantary to known mainland work seem to point decisively to East Greece. Cut-out blazons figure Typhon, a cock, a bear and a human forearm with palm and extended fingers displayed in a gesture as unmistakable in antiquity as it is to-day used by an Athenian taxi-driver. The now famous helmet dedication of Miltiades receives definitive publication here and Kunze reaffirms his attribution of it to the younger Miltiades before his return to Athens. A bronze casing with a wedge-shaped front carries, as casting device, two rams' heads in relief, and is explained as the earliest preserved (mid-fifth century) Greek example of a battering ram. With its frontal attachments of only some 25 x 25 cm. and the softness of the metal compared with iron, I find it hard to see it as a 'Mauerbrecher', except of a rubble house wall, or perhaps a wooden doorway. The spikes which fringe the wedge are not explained: it may be that their purpose was to ensure that the wedge did not penetrate too far and lodge fast after the impact. The statuette of a bronze youth is declared Laconian of the third quarter of the sixth century and is the occasion of a valuable discussion of Laconian archaic 'Kleinplastik'. The spiked 'Thyrsos' crown which he and some of his fellows wear is perhaps best paralleled by the lead volute wreaths from Sparta which are exactly similar in form (e.g. *AB* pl. 11, figs. 1, 2; 188, 28, 34). For terra-cotta, Cnephredon's head is added to the famous group and Mingazzini's counter-identification of Poseidon and Pelops is answered. New fragments of a clay warrior group of Corinthian workmanship are also assembled and dated around 490. The inscriptions published do much to reinforce one's confidence in Pausanias, including as they do the Apollonate dedication which he quoted (*V*, 23, 3) and an epigram dedication by the Ergoteles hymned by Pindar which Pausanias mentions (*VI*, 4, 11).

The Olympian feast is completed by Herrmann's publication of new bronze reliefs, including an interesting Late Hittite plaque which occasions a review of Oriental imports to Olympia. Other reliefs represent a griffin-bird, Gorgon and Pegasus, and a sphinx (perhaps dated too late). Weber publishes a fragmentary marble statue of a youth, dated to the second century A.D., and discusses its relationship to the Antonine tradition and contemporary portraiture.

Olympia publications have about them an air which rarely distinguishes comparable reports. Excavators will be jealous of a site which seems to produce only masterpieces with none of the dross which forms the major part of finds elsewhere, but they will be grateful too, that the material is published so quickly, so expertly and with such fine illustration.

JOHN BOARDMAN.

Will (E.), *Diion. Exploration archéologique faite par l'École française d'Athènes. Fasc. XXII. Le Dédékaléon*. Paris: De Boccard, 1955. Pp. 191, with 16 plates and 63 text figures. Price not stated. The interesting shrine published in this volume of *Diion* was discovered by Homolle in 1895, excavated by



Leros in 1906, and identified by Vallois in 1929; the first study was undertaken by the present author in 1938, and now the results are fully and magnificently published.

Vallia's identification of the shrine as the Dodekathicon (cf. *en dodeka theia* in some inscriptions), made on topographical and other grounds, has not been disputed. But there are some puzzling questions. W. points out that the Delian shrine is, with the altar at Athens, 'le seul ensemble de ce culte qui soit connu à l'heure actuelle'. He suggests, very tentatively, some connexion with Athens and the Peisistratids. But as he himself says, the Athenian shrine is radically different, with its single altar and square enclosure. At Delos we have a temple, containing a base for two statues, and a number of altars distributed around the shrine, some of them apparently dedicated to friends of deities. The cult of the Twelve is still involved in obscurities. R. Martin, in an interesting discussion of the subject in *L'Agora Grèque* (p. 172), differentiates *hypod Arion* and *dodekathicon*; W., on the other hand, calls the Delian site an *hypod Arion* (p. 9).

The main part of the book is devoted to a careful description of the remains and to the restoration of the temple. W. is keenly aware of the difficulties caused by the scantiness of the material. The temple was a Doric building measuring 15.18 m. by 8.58 m. on the stylobate; it was amphiprostyle, with six columns on each end, a broad cella and a pronaos but no opisthodomos. On all criteria W. finds that it belongs to 'le douzième siècle' and places its date about 500-450. In some ways it imitates the temple of the Athenians, but this imitation is confined to 'les grandes lignes': the Dodekathicon is a good deal later in date and is 'bien moins raffinée' in style and technique. The first epigraphical reference to it is in 450 B.C.

There was probably a simple shrine on the site in the archaic period; fragments of archaic statues have been found. The oldest existing altar is of the fourth century. When the temple was built the shrine was enlarged and reorganised, but it was never particularly rich or impressive. It may be assumed that the rebuilding was due to the patronage of some Hellenistic ruler, but W. is very dubious about its suggested association with Antigonos and Demetrios. He questions the restoration in an inscription of a reference to the 'Alms of the kings', denies the identification of a sculptured head as Demetrios, and leaves the question open. The new prosperity of the shrine did not last long, and other monuments soon began to encroach on it.

Illustrations, both photographs and drawings, are on a lavish scale and of excellent quality. Not many of the 'figures' are actually embedded in the text to which they refer. Most of them are gathered together on groups of pages, free of text, here and there in the book. It would have been easier for reference if more figures could have been incorporated immediately in the text and others added to the separate loose plates.

R. E. WYMERLEY.

CORMACK, J. M. R.). *The Inscribed Monuments of Aphrodisias*. Reading: The University, 1955. Pp. 65, with 14 text figures. Price not stated.

This booklet contains an account of the history of the inscriptions of Aphrodisias which will form vol. viii of *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiquae*. The publication of a separate work on such a theme is not easily justified. Granted that every inscribed stone has its history, however modest, and that it is important that it should be recorded, such a history, separated from the text of the inscription, has only very limited value. The 'notes', therefore, will only yield profit when *MAA* is published. In the meantime, though it may be convenient for those who are concerned with the inscriptions of the city to have access to such a working hand-list, it is to be most earnestly hoped that others who have compiled similar

lists, preparatory to the publication of the inscriptions of this or that site, will not regard this wasteful and expensive procedure as a precedent.

This said, there is little ground for complaint in the arrangement of the list and the notes. It may, however, be pointed out that practical use of the book is vitiated for the ordinary student by the fact that Cormack has confined himself rigorously to the history of the stones, and has ignored the history of the editions of the printed text. This may mislead some who might (not unreasonably) expect to find such information here.

There is an appendix on the epigraphical journey of Shierand, with notes on the subsequent history of the stones seen by him, accompanied by diagrams showing how the texts have been built up from the fragments.

P. M. FRASER.

CHAMONX (F.). *Fouilles de Delphes. Tome IV, Monuments figurés: sculpture, Fasc. 3, L'Aurige*. Paris: De Boccard, 1955. Pp. 91, with 23 plates. Price not stated.

This is the latest exchange in a small Sacred War which French and German archaeologists have been waging at Delphi for the past half-century. In 1941 Hampe, after a secret raid on the inventory, published a comprehensive, and apparently definitive, study of the Charioteer in Bruno Bruckmann's *Denkmäler*, nos. 786-90. Now Professor Chamonx seeks to overturn Hampe's main conclusions, which have been widely accepted, and to vindicate Homolle, whose publications of the bronze in *CHAI* 1891 and *Mon. Piot* 1892 have come in for a good deal of German criticism. But despite the undertones of war this new fascicule, plentifully illustrated by excellent collotype plates, is a worthy and welcome addition to *Fouilles de Delphes*, in which no exhaustive study of the Charioteer has hitherto appeared.

The main defect of Homolle's two publications was that they contained little or no information about the circumstances of the find. A careful record of how the parts of the Charioteer and the fragments of horses and chariot were related to each other in the ground might have thrown much light on the vexed questions of the composition of the group, the pertinence of certain fragments, and the situation of the monument in the sanctuary. Unfortunately, C's account of the discovery, which draws on the excavation diary, extinguishes any lingering hopes that such a record was kept. The diary appears to have been little more than a day-to-day log of finds, and incomplete at that. In the single, but not unimportant, instance where an individual finding-place is noted, there is a disturbing discrepancy between the diary's testimony and that of one of the excavators: for while, according to the diary, it was the lower part of the Charioteer that came to light under a Roman drain, Bourguet expressly states that it was the upper part (*Revue de Delphes*, p. 239). C's claim that the diary, Homolle, Bourguet and Coqueret all speak with one voice must be accepted with reserve.

C. restores the group as a frontal composition: that is to say, with the horses facing towards the inscribed front of the base, the trace horses a little in advance of the yoke horses. The Charioteer stands alone in the chariot, and the head of the right-hand trace horse is held by a stable lad, represented among the remains by the isolated left arm of a child. C's reconstruction starts, as any reconstruction must, from the surviving slab of the base, on the front of which is inscribed part of Polyzeos' hexametric dedication, and in the top of which are sunk three fixing holes for horses' hooves. C. claims that the hole at the rear of the slab, near the (spectator's) right-hand corner, is surrounded by clear imprints in the stone of a hoof which faced towards the front of the slab; and, further, that these imprints so exactly coincide with the hoof of the fragmentary left foreleg, Inv. 3597, that this leg must have stood here. That this was, as C. maintains, the



congruence noted by Homolle in *CRH* 1896 (pp. 383 ff.) can hardly be true: for in 1896 Homolle restored the chariot in profile (op. cit. p. 385). In fact, it is doubtful whether 3597 can have come from this particular hole at all. The leg, as *Mon. Piot* 1897, p. 172, fig. 2, proves, was unadorned with a lead facing plug still attached under the hoof and apparently intact (it has since been removed), while the hole in question is itself still full of lead. But these considerations do not, of course, destroy C.'s main argument. Given the existence of an imprint such as he describes—and a photograph would have helped to convince sceptics—the rest of his reconstruction follows persuasively enough.

Much of the controversy which once centred on the dedicatory inscription is now dead. We now know that in its original form the second half of the first hexameter read Πόλεως ἀνδράσιν ἀνδράσιν and Frickenhauer (*JdI* XXVIII pp. 52–81) has shown that for chronological reasons 'the lord of Gela' can only be Polyzeus himself, whose name appears in the rasura: Πόλεως ἀνδράσιν ἀνδράσιν. But so far no very convincing explanation has been offered of the alteration itself. Influenced, no doubt, by the presence of Polyzeus' name in the rasura, most scholars have assumed the alteration to have been made in the tyrant's lifetime, and have conjectured either that it was prompted by Hieron after a hypothetical expulsion of his brother from Gela, or that Polyzeus won a second victory after the completion of the monument and changed the inscription to commemorate the fact. The explanation now proposed by C. is, to my mind, far more satisfactory. Stressing the fact that the lettering in the rasura would, on its own merits, certainly be dated in the second half of the fifth century rather than the first, he postulates a longer interval between the original and revised versions than has hitherto been supposed, and suggests that it was the democracy established at Gela after the fall of the Deinomenids that caused the alteration to be made, in order to obliterate the memory of tyranny.

A central feature of Hampe's study of the Charioteer was the revival of the theory—already considered and discarded by Homolle but later re-proposed for examination by Furtwängler (*Sik. Museum* 1907, p. 159)—that a second inscribed slab, found to the south of the west pediment of the Theatre and bearing the signature of an otherwise unknown sculptor, Sosadas of Thespiae, also came from the base of the Charioteer. The theory, as restated by Hampe, has been generally accepted, but C. gives good reasons for rejecting it. Admittedly the two inscribed slabs match in material and height, but this, he points out, is of little significance, for the material being Parosian limestone and the height the Delphic foot, both occur commonly in Delphic monuments. On the other hand, the lateral clamp-holes of the two slabs, so far from being identical as Hampe maintained, differ in form to such an extent as to preclude any possibility of the two slabs ever having been incorporated in the same monument: on the Polyzeus slab the clamps were flat with a slight dovetail, on the Sosadas slab parallel-sided with vertical hooks or pins at either end.

In discussing the technique of the Charioteer, C. is bold enough to cross swords with Kluge. Like other scholars, particularly in this country, he ascribes to Kluge the belief that the Charioteer was cast in a sand-box, but this, I think, is a misinterpretation. Nowhere in his remarks on the Charioteer or on early Greek bronzes in general (*JdI* XLIV, pp. 1–30) does Kluge mention sand-box casting, all that he explicitly claims is that the thickness and unevenness of the walls of the Charioteer rule out a lost wax casting, and that the cast was taken from a wooden model which had been divided into 'in Lehm abformbare und gießbare Teile'. His later remarks quoted in *Einblick in die Vorgänge in Olympia*, 1936–37, pp. 38–3, suggest that he was thinking of single two- or three-part piece-moulds of refractory clay, such as we now know were used in Samos in the seventh century B.C. for casting griffin protomes (Jantzen, *Griechische Gräfen-*

*herald*, pp. 57–60). However that may be, Kluge's technical description of the Charioteer contains, as C. notes, such gross inaccuracies of fact—notably his assertion that the feet and lower part of the body were cast in one—that it was high time for someone to question some of his more *ex cathedra* conclusions. C. cites Casson as a precursor, but Casson's technical hybrid, with head, arms and legs taken from a wax model and drapery from a wooden model (*Technique of Early Greek Sculpture*, p. 137), arose not, of course, from any misgivings about the correctness of Kluge's views, but from a confusion of his text. C. himself is convinced that the bronze is a lost wax cast throughout. Not only would any other process be an anachronism at a time when Greek artists were already normally using lost wax technique, but no signs of the use of another process are evident from the bronze itself. A thick cast, C. rightly argues, proves nothing, since wax can be made to produce any desired thickness or variations of thickness. He suggests that the reason why the Charioteer was given thick walls was because it had to be robust enough to withstand the winter storms of Parosus; but I suspect that all Greek bronzes tended to be thick-walled, and technically rather naïve, at least until Hellenistic times. The Barber's head from Cyrene in the British Museum (Bronze no. 268), an undisputed lost wax casting of the fourth century B.C., has very massive walls, and the inner contours follow the outer only very approximately. C. is probably right in thinking that Kluge was unconsciously comparing the Charioteer, not with its contemporaries, but with the late Hellenistic and Roman bronzes on which he had been working. Nor has Kluge's conviction of the 'wooden' character of the drapery any more value than that of a subjective judgment. Such efforts, as C. observes, may be obtained quite as readily by modelling wax as by carving wood. A further and, I think, decisive objection to the theory of a wooden model is that it would need an extremely complicated piece-mould, such as no one has ever yet attributed to antiquity, to mould the deeply undercut lower part of the statue for casting in one piece. On this practical problem Kluge is silent. As to the head, which was admittedly cast in several parts—though not as many, C. assures us, as Kluge distinguished—the separation of the cranium was no doubt due, as C. suggests, to the need to get inside the head after casting to insert the eyes, and also to secure the (?) copper plating of the lips (for that, surely, must be the purpose of the holes at each end of the mouth and of the bar of lead found inside it). Other details, such as the curls in front of the ears and the ends of the fillet, may, I think, have been cast separately owing to the difficulty which would arise in a large casting of making the metal run into such restricted cavities without an elaborate system of vents.

The exclusion from the monument of the slab bearing Sosadas' signature reopens the problem of attribution, which must once again be argued on grounds of style alone. In the course of a detailed and illuminating analysis C. isolates two chief tendencies which he considers especially characteristic of the Charioteer's style: a tendency to geometrical simplification in the composition of the whole and a tendency to a naturalistic variety in the rendering of details. The combination of these two to some extent contradictory characteristics is not to be found, he thinks, in Aeginetan or Peloponnesian works, while any attempt to discover them in Pythagorean is idle so long as no work of that master can be certainly identified. It is in an Attic work, the Critian boy, that C., returning to a suggestion of Furtwängler, sees the closest stylistic parallel for the Charioteer, and he accordingly attributes the Charioteer to an Attic workshop, if not to that of Critias himself. 'L'étude du style', to quote C., 'est la voie dangereuse, où l'élément subjectif entre pour une si grande part que toute conclusion on peut précéder évite la défiance.' I fear that C.'s own conclusion may prove no exception.

LOYD (SERU). *Early Anatolia. A description of early civilisation in Asia Minor, as revealed by the last half-century of excavating and exploration.* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955. Pp. xx + 231, with 32 plates and 12 text figures, 3s. 6d.

Mr. Seru Lloyd has been working in Anatolia since 1949, and knows well the problems and products of its archaeology. Yet his approach retains its vivid freshness unspoilt by familiarity: he can still see and sympathise with the needs of newcomers to the Anatolian field, and is thus well equipped to guide and interest them. The same freshness of vision makes his comments enlightening and stimulating to other specialists. He presents a fascinating topic in a manner which is original without being unorthodox.

It can have been no easy task, for in spite of the title's limitations, the book covers a large field, beginning with the prehistoric periods and ending about the middle of the first millennium. No other work has dealt with all that since Göze's *Altiyasien* (1933), unless we except the not very adequate sketch in the last chapters of *OIP XXX* (1937) and the text accompanying Buxton's pictures (1942): no English handbook has hitherto been published. From Mr. Lloyd's bibliography we can see how much literature has appeared on individual subjects, particular phases. Had he done no more than summarise and present that accumulated material, our debt would already have been great.

In actual fact, he has contributed something individual to all the periods he covers, and has told a story that should appeal to readers variously equipped. An introductory chapter, enjoyable on geography and useful on terminology, is followed by two eminently readable ones displaying the exciting program of exploration and discovery. A fourth chapter, called *Progressive Interpretation*, might perhaps have been assimilated elsewhere or reserved till later, to enable us to keep clear the parts played by the actual sites, which have been described already and will be considered in greater detail in the chapters which follow. It is, nevertheless, an interesting statement, for it includes discussions of origins and foreign contacts, enriched, like much elsewhere, by the author's wide knowledge of lands farther east. Otherwise the arrangement is as admirable as the contents, which are supplemented by well-chosen plates, delightful drawings of typical objects, a chronological table which also explains conflicting terminologies, and a good index. Professor Şenyürek has contributed an authoritative appendix on physical remains.

A few small corrections could be made, but none of them are of sufficient importance for mention here; some theories could be debated or challenged, as is always the case when new ground is covered. One theory, however, is sufficiently revolutionary to need amplification and a reference: it concerns the ancestry of metalwork in Asia. Mr. Lloyd maintains that the idea of a Mesopotamian origin has been discarded, whereas many may feel that the last word has not been said, since a Western source would not account for technical devices so accomplished.

Yet criticism is hardly appropriate in the case of a book where there is so much to praise, and the main reaction of all reviewers should be to call attention to sections especially valuable or pleasing. Their first choice may well be the pages which make the merchants of Kultepe come to life, but those assessing the essence of Hittite and Post-Hittite architecture are also wholly excellent. Anyone who reads will enjoy making his own selection. Nor will *Early Anatolia* become less useful when fresh discoveries throw light on regions obscure when it was first written, as may be seen from Mr. Lloyd's supplementary note on his own excavations at Beycesultan.

W. LAMM.

RICHTER (G. M. A.). *Ancient Italy. A study of the interrelations of its peoples as shown in their arts* [Jerome Lectures, 4th series]. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege), 1955. Pp. xxiv + 137, with 305 illustrations, 120s.

This handsomely produced and well-illustrated volume is an amplified version of Miss Richter's Jerome Lectures delivered at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in March 1952 and subsequently at the American Academy in Rome.

Of the six chapters into which the book is divided the two first are devoted to Greek, Italic and Etruscan art in Italy during the Archaic period and the Classical and Hellenistic periods respectively. With the help of a large number of skilfully chosen illustrations Miss Richter sketches the artistic endeavours of the non-Greek peoples of ancient Italy against the background of the unique achievements of Greek artists. Of these peoples the Etruscans naturally claim the largest share of her attention. Without going into the vexed question of the Oriental characteristics of archaic Etruscan art, Miss Richter concentrates on the increasing influence which Greek art exercises in Etruria from about 600 B.C. onwards. Despite continual copying of Greek models and adaptation of Greek subjects and myths, she finds in Etruscan art an individuality, a spirit of gaiety or abandon, a sinister ferocity and lack of proportion which are altogether absent from Greek art. So long as the Etruscans remained in close contact with the Greeks of Southern Italy, their art developed on much the same lines; but after the disruption caused by the expanding power of Rome, Etruscan art begins to stagnate in archaic formulae. It is only after the whole of the Italian peninsula is under Roman domination that an international Greek Hellenistic art begins to emerge in Italy, fostered by peaceful conditions and improved communications. However, local peculiarities are not entirely swept away by this artistic Koine, and we can still recognise certain local workshops which produce works of art of a particular type (such as the bronze industry of Praeneste and the alabaster urns of Volterra).

The picture of the art of pre-Roman Italy presented by Miss R. in these two chapters is on the whole a convincing one. But inevitably the compression of this vast theme into two lectures has meant that nuances of light and shade had to be sacrificed in favour of a firmness of outline which is sometimes deceptive. The printed text has, it is true, the support of footnotes and references to additional illustrative material; but specialists will look forward to an extended study of the subject which Miss R. is so obviously well qualified to write.

It is in the following four chapters and the appendices that the great value of the book lies for scholarly readers. Here Miss R.'s enormous erudition and the lively interest which she has always taken in the technical problems of sculpture find full scope in a detailed and lucid discussion of Graeco-Roman art in the Republican and Imperial periods and of the methods used in copying and adapting Greek originals. In her 'Three Critical Periods in Greek Sculpture' Miss R. has already collected a wealth of evidence for her claim that most of the sculptors working for Roman patrons were Greeks drawn from all parts of the Hellenised Mediterranean. Here she strengthens and develops her argument.

About 100 B.C. the hitherto predominantly Hellenistic art of Italy begins to show signs of eclecticism. The triumphant Roman armies had brought back with them as great numbers of Greek works of art which gradually gave the Romans a taste for all periods of Greek art. As the supply of Greek originals could not keep pace with the ever-increasing demands of Roman fashion, a flourishing copying trade developed, greatly facilitated by the invention about this time of the printing process, which enabled faithful copies of original statues to be produced mechanically. A Greek original could



be reproduced with comparative ease in bronze by taking a piece-mould and casting from it by the indirect lost-wax method. But such piece-moulds could also be used to produce an indefinite number of plaster casts, which the various Egyptian workshops could then multiply in number by means of the painting process. Often, however, mechanical reproduction from a cast was not feasible. The original might be too wasted or too large or too complex to be moulded, or it might be a substantive group or statue which it was desired to reproduce in relief, on an altar or a stela, or a narrative panel; or it might be an heroic body which was to be combined with a Roman person's head. In such cases the Egyptian was bound to adapt his model to greater or less degree. Where, however, several versions of a single type of Greek original are found in copies of the Roman age, Min R. is not inclined to agree with the prevailing view that this diversity is due to the Egyptian. She suggests that they may well have been several original Greek versions, variations, or to speak on a favorite theme, of which the Roman examples are all straight copies.

Not only do the sculptures of the Roman period which copies and adapt Greek originals. The Romans' taste for classical Greek sculpture is well attested and it is not surprising that they corresponded themselves with copies of it. But Min R. shows how the Roman passion for things Greek provided every branch of art, bronze sculpture, silver-work, pottery, terracotta and glass, textiles, glassware, coins, medals, gems, and wall-paintings.

In her last chapter Min R. seeks to define the original contributions of the Roman age. Roman originalities consist in her view not in any new, specifically Italian artistic impulse, but in the response to the new demands made on artists by their Roman patrons. Even in those branches of ancient art which have hitherto been considered typically Roman—architectural—esoteric portraiture and historical relief—the external artists were still predominantly Greek. There is, as Min R. admits, almost no epigraphical evidence to support this claim; but she undertakes the much better documented case of the Egyptian sculptures that it may contain a good deal of truth. Nevertheless, the question remains that in more than three centuries of contact with Greek art some artists, at least, must have learnt to carve and one cannot help wondering what in fact they did carve.

Two interesting appendices, one on the modern painting process and the other on the Mosaicists' work, with a new and convincing interpretation of three phases in Ptolemy dealing with taking casts from statues, an index and a bibliography round off this extremely knowledgeable and stimulating book.

Three small points: on p. 22 the scene on Euxine mirror (fig. 83) is described as Odysseus seizing Circe by the hair. He is, however, brandishing the scabbard of his sword, which appears behind Circe's head. P. 22 the engraving of bronze mirrors is stated to have started in Central Italy during the fifth century B.C. Gerhard (*Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft*, 1857, 158) suggests that bronze mirrors were already being engraved by the end of the sixth century B.C. P. 117 Pyramis should read Pyramus.

SIMON HAYMAN.

Heinrich Schliemann. Briefwechsel, aus dem Nachlass in Auswahl herausgegeben von E. Meyer. Band I. (1873-1875). Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1934. Pp. 211. 24. (The Mann pocket-book series.)

Dr. Meyer's well-known article, 'Die Briefwechsel Heinrich Schliemanns und die private Entwicklung eines Schliemanns', in *DAW* LVII (1931) is the first of a series of papers on the private life of the excavator. The second, on the private life of the excavator, is a further collection of Schliemann's letters, taken from his papers and his correspondence. It is a volume of the *Germanische Literatur*, on which Dr. Meyer has been assisted by Schliemann's daughter, Mrs. Anna Schliemann, and his son, Alexander, with the aid of expert publishing help.

The present volume is the first of two and carries the story of Schliemann's life as told in his correspondence down to 1875. It includes the beginning of his work at Troy from 1870 onwards and a short account of his first trip to Mycenae in 1874. These are the parts of the volume which are of special interest to archaeologists. The general revelation of the man at Herculaneum and the changes of opinion which came about as the work progressed are of great interest and should be studied in the light of Schliemann's own books on his excavations and of Dörpfeld's *Troja und Ilion*. Schliemann's struggle to obtain recognition for his work at Troy is to us today hardly conceivable. It is difficult now to understand how wrong was the resistance of scholars to accept Herculaneum as the site of Troy and to believe that Herculaneum had been a reality. His relationship with the Culver family who helped so much at Troy is particularly interesting. Those who have ever had any experience of dealings with officials of the old Imperial Ottoman Government will sympathize with Schliemann in his negotiations with it. We note that in Turkey he had the support of the American representatives in view of his claim to be an American citizen.

The notes on his last soundings at Mycenae in 1874 are important because none of them has ever before been published. Many of Schliemann's shafts are marked on Steffen's plan of the acropolis of Mycenae, without specific mention of his name, and in these notes (telling where he dug and what he found) are most valuable. Schliemann apparently was looking for an area on the acropolis where there was a deep deposit. He makes no mention of the probable site of the traditional graves of Agamemnon and his companions. He remarks that in his Mycenae shafts he found plentiful painted pottery and terracotta figures. He observes the difference between the Trojan pottery which was unpainted and the Mycenaean pottery which was decorated. Unfortunately the shaft which he sank in 1874 led him to excavate in (1) on the lower terrace within the Lion Gate because he found a deep deposit there. It is interesting that long before he ever began his excavations at Mycenae Schliemann talked much about this site, which he seems to have always regarded as one which he must explore.

The letters otherwise in general throw much light on Schliemann's character. He was much and at times easily annoyed. On the other hand, he could be generous and devoted to his friends and admirers. He was scornful, as seen in his letters to his family and in particular to the letter to his father about the death of his brother Ludwig in California. The California letters give vivid glimpses of life in the goldfields and his brother's letter about his pursuit of the man who had robbed him is amusing. Though Schliemann was apt to be carried away by his enthusiasm and had a tendency to exaggerate, he was a man of practical common sense which was useful to him in his excavations. He the amateur had a sound idea of the value of stratification, which his learned contemporaries, the average classical archaeologists, hardly yet appreciated.

In No. 170, written in 1875, we see how Schliemann was to soothe himself, who suspected anti-French feeling in German archaeologists. In the war of 1870 Schliemann's loyalty as a German was aroused by his involvement in home property in Paris. His activities are revealed in letters Nos. 147 and 148 and the latter of these gives his impression of Paris after the siege. We see, too, from No. 147 that Schliemann got into Paris with a false passport. In the same year, in No. 149, he expresses his opinion that Germany will become a republic in 10 years. His lively interest in everything can be seen in his letter addressed to the Convention of American Philologists about the teaching of the classics.

Schliemann was always anxious that his work should receive proper recognition and this is evident in his correspondence with Comar and Max Müller. He much admired Medtze who was one of the first to display



active interest in the work at Troy, and his friendship with Sir Charles Newton is noteworthy. Newton stood by Schliemann and helped him much, especially during and after his discoveries at Mycenae.

During his travels Schliemann was constantly on the alert as regards all business and commercial possibilities. We remark his interest in American railroads in which he invested and his ideas on the business outlook in the Southern States after the Civil War and his approval of openings in Jamaica or Cuba. One letter, No. 89, shows how any suspicion that he was being cheated could rouse his anger and bitter resentment.

Schliemann had a great reputation as a linguist, but after reading many of his letters in foreign languages we are led to wonder whether his facility as a linguist was not more in spoken languages than in written languages. His English at times falls to be idiomatic, as also his French and his Italian, for instance in the letter to Finelli, No. 229. There is something wrong with the Aeslus in No. 199. Some of these may be due to the difficulty of reading his handwriting, on which the editor comments in the Preface, in the copy of the letters in the letterbook. The phrase 'Cold's Revolver Pistol' in his brother's account of the pursuit of the three robbers is, of course, not an error of Schliemann's.

Dr. Meyer has done his work excellently and deserves our best thanks for giving us this life-like portrait of Schliemann, but perhaps the notes might have been slightly more informative. George Finley, for instance, is merely described as 'Kenner der griechischen Geschichte' and his pioneer work in the study of the prehistory of Greece is not mentioned. The reference to the 'Marathon Murders' in Note 299 is inaccurate and should be more explicit. Such, however, are small blemishes in a most interesting book which has demanded much of the editor's time and patience. We shall eagerly await the second volume.

A. J. N. WARR.

MÜNCHEN (H.). *Die Quellen des griechischen Alexanderromans*. Munich: Beck. 1934. 8p. xi + 253. DM. 74.

In this compelling study of the Greek Alexander Romance (pseudo-Kallisthenes) M. distinguishes two main sources. The first (die literarische Quelle) was a romantic historical biography, in the 'bad' tradition of Cleisthenes and the 'Vulgata', a work which relentlessly sacrificed historical truth and even verisimilitude to the aim of arousing, in the manner of tragedy, emotions of fear and pity in the reader. A warning just given for the comparison is perhaps given by a quotation from Favorinus in 1, 17, 4, but much of the material goes back to Hellenistic times.

The second main source was an amalgam of pseudo-historical letters and analogous documents (die Briefsammlung), the nucleus of which was an Alexander Romance in epistolary form. That a Hellenistic epistolary romance by Heliodorus pseudo-Kallisthenes was long ago conjectured by Rohde, but M. is here able to show that fragments of it have survived independently in two recently published papyri: Papy. Soc. It. 1215 and Papy. Hamburg 129. The other ingredients of the amalgam—each originally a self-contained composition—were Alexander's two great terminology letters, one addressed to Hermias (III, 13) and the other to Aristotle and Olympias (II, 23-31), and two Hellenistic treatises, one on 'Alexander's Conversation with the Gymnosophists', and the other on 'Alexander's Last Days'. The two letters, of which the first is also preserved in a Latin translation, need particular interest because they contain, besides much purely legendary and mythical material, also the reflection of the actual experience of Alexander's army. Of the two treatises, the 'Conversation', also known from Ptolemy, was originally a Cyrenaean imposture from the East and critical of Alexander; while the 'Last Days' was a political pamphlet of 321 B.C. supporting

Perdikar against Antigater and later interpolated with pseudo-Rhodian passages.

The Alexander Romance itself was probably compiled about 250 B.C. in Alexandria. To his two main sources the author added first, by way of introduction, a patriotic local legend fathering Alexander on Nectanebus, the last of the Pharaohs, and second, some unimportant episodes of his own in which a recurrent theme is that of Alexander disguising himself in order to visit his enemies (Darina, Candace). A man of no learning or literary skill, Pseudo-Kallisthenes mixed his ingredients with utter disregard for chronology or geography or even simple logic, and the result was a monstrous absurdity—test an absurdity that captured the imagination of the world as no book before or since. No doubt, as M. suggests, the paradox is partly to be explained by the elements of grotesque myth that he found in the drama.

M.'s general exposition of his thesis is followed by a detailed analysis of the text of the Romance, by a series of excursuses on particular questions: 'A's Conversation with the Gymnosophists', the Meta Epitome, 'A's Last Days', the Epitome of Arrianism, the 1st reduction of the Archiprestes Leo, the later MSS., the *Discutimus Alexander*, and Lvy LX (B), and finally by a treat of the epistolary Romance as far as it can be reconstructed from Pseudo-Kallisthenes and the papyri together with parallel texts of the *Tekmairion Alexander* from Pseudo-Kallisthenes and the Meta Epitome.

It is overgenerous to say that M.'s work sets the study of the Greek Alexander Romance on a wholly new footing. D. L. L. HAYES.

CANT. (G.). *The Medieval Alexander*. Ed. D. J. A. Ross. Cambridge University Press, 1931. 8p. xvi + 419, with 9 plates and 3 text figures. 38s. 6d.

This is a posthumous work. George Lay presented a first draft of it as a thesis for which he was awarded a Fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1909. He intended to revise and enlarge it for publication in book form, but was prevented by his premature death early in 1923. The Fellowship Election of the college, rightly thinking that it was worth publication, secured the services of Dr. Ross to make it ready for the press, which he seems to have done with great competence.

The subject is an assessment of the medieval views of Alexander, as reflected, not so much in one or two outstanding authors of this or that period, but rather in the general average of the writings which have come down to us and form a sort of continuous *corpus*—our kind of Quintus Curtius, Orosius, the pseudo-Kallisthenes and his followers, on the other of the Biblical references to Alexander in Daniel and 3 Maccabees and mentions of him in philosophical or semi-philosophical writers, notably the younger Seneca. To do us all this adequately involves a review, brief but sufficient, of the writers of the Middle Ages, religious and secular, historical or *romans*, poets and theologians. This, however, is not the main contents of the work, nor does it take much room, for the Alexander legend has long been fully studied. It is finished by p. 24. The reviewer is not in a position to criticise it in detail, but points out that the statement on p. 16 that Quintus Curtius wrote 'probably in the reign of Augustus' has little to recommend it. The most likely theory, that of J. Bidez, places him under Vespasian.

Page 31 marks the beginning of the end. It is no wonder to discover what the Middle Ages generally thought of Alexander; there is no reference to be placed on such values. . . . The safest guide to the establishment of a general conception is a periphrastic recitation of medieval men who have never thought very hard about the matter, and have no reason to be misapprehended in their opinion. A beginning is made with the *romans*. . . . Some material came directly from Chaucer and some from John of Salisbury, who uses Valerius Maximus; a quote the *romans* on this subject but what he copied from Valerius was almost equal from him into the popular

books of *exempla*). Of these two, Seneca is of course Stoic, while Cicero's eclecticism results among other things in his landing on not a little Peripatetic criticism of Alexander. I gather that neither Cary's (not Ross's) researches have found any use made of Juvenal (x, 168-72), which seems curious, considering his wide popularity during that period. Naturally, one of the channels of communication was the Fathers, for instance St. Augustine, eked out by sundry Latin tracts which correspond to passages in pseudo-Kallisthenes and record the interviews of Alexander with Brahmin sages, who, like Diogenes in the famous anecdote of his encounter with Alexander, are thought of as a kind of Christian ascetics or something nearly approaching thereto.

Theologians of course started from the Biblical passages, helped by what Josephus had to say. They got their conception of Alexander's character largely from Orosius, who makes him a bloodthirsty, war-mad conqueror, and therefore on the whole were unfavourable to him, whereas the moralists tended to think well of him. Allegory was rampant, and not only the unpopular Antiochos Epiphanes but Alexander himself was on occasion identified with the devil. On the other hand, Alexander was often represented as an instrument in the hand of God. Writers and preachers who depended upon, or borrowed, books of *exempla*, took a much more favourable view, for the little stories concerning him which were their material turned commonly on such characteristics as his liberality.

Finally, the secular writers of what may be generally classed as romances vary a good deal according to their individual prejudices. For instance, Lamprecht (about 1155) in his German *Alexander*, being a priest, is naturally in touch with the theological tradition. His Alexander is valiant, but bloodthirsty, tyrannical and a reprehensible heathen. For Gautier de Châtillon (about 1180 and a score of others, Alexander is a superhuman hero, having all the qualities most appreciated in a prince of those times, with here and there a touch of criticism, as one or another of the ancient attacks on him wins the attention of the writer. Practically all agree that he was magnanimous, but as to what precisely *magnanimitas* means opinions differ considerably (pp. 197 ff.). Naturally he and his surroundings take on a mediaeval colouring, and naturally also the old dispute, reflected for instance in Plutarch's essays (Mor., 348d-349b), as to whether Alexander owed more to fortune or to his own worth continues, with a strong tendency to replace Fortune by God. It need hardly be said that the bulk of these writers make full use of all manner of fabulous additions to the historical facts: Alexander is generally the son of Neptunus the exile Minos with his Egyptian magic; he meets not only philosphizing Brahmins but all manner of extraordinary monsters during his campaigns; he tries to fly up to heaven in a vehicle drawn by gryphons; he occasionally threatens hell, and so forth.

As the Middle Ages drew to a close, a new class made itself prominent—the bourgeoisie, which was not much impressed by courtly and chivalrous ideals. It tended to relegate Alexander to his place among the Nine Worthies (pp. 236 ff.), as little more than a figure in a pageant or a capacity 'stripped of his character and his power to move' (p. 248). Alternatively, it made him a name, hardly more, in moral tales, generally not much to his credit (pp. 263 ff.).

Last of all the Revival of Letters led to a reappraisal of the long-lost feeling for historical criticism. Gradually the myths disappeared as Arrian and Plutarch were rediscovered and took the place, at least in scholarly opinion, of the fables. The way was opened for the modern estimates of Alexander as a comprehensible, if extraordinary, human being.

All this and much more is to be found in the text of the book: in addition, there are about 76 pages (273-351) of close-packed notes for the benefit of those who would research further into a curious and fascinating subject.

H. J. ROSE.

BAYNES, N. H., *Byzantine Studies and other Essays*. London: Athlone Press, 1955. Pp. xi + 392, with 1 plate, 35s.

The handsome volume prepared by Professor A. M. Mathias and Mr. A. D. Humphreys of the Department of History, University College, London, is a fitting tribute to a great scholar and a great humanist. More than thirty lectures, essays and reviews written by Professor Baynes over a period of more than forty years have been collected here. Three are published for the first time. Their author's historical vision, his untiring power, the wide range of his ideas and interests, and the minute attention to the detail of his sources stand out in every chapter of the work.

As one would expect, the majority of these papers are devoted to different aspects of the history of the East Roman world. But even so, Baynes looked beyond the wide scope even of Byzantine history back into the Hellenistic world from which it had developed. His essay on Isocrates is one of the most thorough and enlightening in the collection. The first four lectures may be treated as an entity and run up the author's views on the civilization and place in world history of the Byzantine Empire. He returns to these themes in the excellent 'The years before Iconoclasm' (pp. 225-45) and in his discussion of 'The *Pratum Spirituale* of John Moschos' (pp. 261-70). A second group of papers is concerned with aspects of the history and thought of the early Church, and apart from examples of Baynes' work on Eusebius of Caesarea and on Athanasius, the publishers have included the famous study written for the Historical Association in 1936 on 'The Political Ideas of St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*' (pp. 288-306). A third group contains a number of writings on the later Roman Empire in the West. This includes some of Baynes' notable reviews in the *Journal of Roman Studies*, among them his assessment of the work of Lat and Rostovtzeff in the *JRS* of 1921 and of William Seston's *Duclien et la Thrace*, i, in the *JRS* of 1941. Particularly welcome is the reappearance of his defence of his own standpoint concerning the date and purpose of the *Historia Augusta* (pp. 209-18). So far, the suggestion that the *Historia* was written during the reign of Julian has never been successfully refuted.

What do we mean by 'Byzantine civilization'—for this is the heart of this volume? How far was it a continuation of that of Rome? Or, alternatively, did not Byzantium very soon cease to be Roman in all but name and become an Oriental monarchy? In what appears to the reviewer to be the most important essay in the book, Baynes takes up this latter view as expressed by Diehl in his *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Princeton, 1925). As he had previously stated himself in *The Byzantine Empire* (Home University Library, p. 63), Oriental influences had played their part in moulding East Rome from the third century A.D. onwards, but these influences did not suffice to alter its nature. Even such developments as the wearing of the diadem by the emperor and the belief in the sanctity of his person could look back on a long past in the Hellenistic East. The real character of Byzantine civilization was derived from the fusion of Greek and Roman influences, and, as he states, 'what Oriental elements there are in its composition are not the essential and characteristic features of the Byzantine world' (p. 69). It was the Hellenistic civilization which had developed in the Eastern Mediterranean from Alexander to Augustus that claimed East Rome as its heir. This is true intellectually and materially. Baynes points out (p. 71) that 'in their lack of scientific curiosity, in the supremacy accorded to the inspired writing, the Byzantines are the spiritual heirs of the later Alexandrians'. The Gnostic creeds and the cult of Fate which accompanied the decay of scientific interest may have owed something to Persian dualism, but seem also to have been essentially native developments. The same may be true of an institution like the *synagoga* levied on the provincials to supply the



social services. For 1,500 years, from the time of Herodotus to that of the compilation of the *Suda*, it was an enduring factor in the life of the Anatolian peasantry. Few things illustrate the continuity between Hellenistic kingdom, Roman Empire and Byzantium better than this age-long liturgy.

Another aspect of Byzantine civilisation is treated in a notable lecture, 'Alexandria and Constantinople, a Study in Ecclesiastical Diplomacy' (pp. 17-115). In this the author traces the long-drawn-out rivalry between Constantinople and Alexandria for the leadership of the Christian Church in the Eastern Mediterranean. Behind the bitter and involved arguments concerning the Nature of Christ lay political motives. The fortunes and even the lives lay in the case of Bishop Flavian of Constantinople of the protagonists hung on the manoeuvres that led up to the great Church Council that dominated the century and a quarter from Nicaea to Chalcedon. In the last resort one would suggest that Chalcedon decided not only the doctrine of the Two Natures but also the loss of Alexandria to the Greek-speaking world.

There are two other papers, this time reviews, which show the great qualities of their author's work. In both one sees the search for the real causes that move men to act, in both the rejection of now and attractive theories which would make individuals the pawns of some materialist historical process. Could one really speak of alliance between the peasantry and soldiers in the third century A.D. and of their united attack against the bourgeoisie? At first sight the events in Africa in 298 in which the Gordians were overthrown by the revolt of an Legion would seem to lend colour to Rostovtzeff's thesis (*Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, Oxford, 1926, Ch. xi). Yet, as one learns from Herodian (ed. Stevenhagen, vii, 4), support for the original move by the Gordians against Maximian had come from agricultural workers armed with clubs and axes (*ἐκείνη ἡ ἀντιτελεμένη ἀνταρμαχία*) as well as from the nobility. Soldiers and peasants were therefore not on the same side even in Africa. The more one considers the evidence the less tenable Rostovtzeff's approach becomes. Inscriptions and papyri show the soldier as the willing executive of the orders of Imperial officials or the magnates. He was not their enemy. Indeed, he 'was the bogey-man of Egypt' (p. 107), and to judge from the inscriptions of Aga Bey (*Or. Orient. Ind. n. 519*) and Scaptopara (Dittenberger, *S.I.G. II. 9. 1088*, p. 606) this was true of Asia Minor and Thrace as well. We may accept Baynes' view (p. 309) that 'the Roman of the third century were not indoctrinated into the teachings of Marx'. The same judgment would apply to a criticism of an American author's approach to the career of Quintus Aurelius Symmachus (pp. 361-8): Dr. McGrathy had contended that 'the economic aspects of the rights of paganism were more important than such symbolical questions as the status of the *Atrium Vestae*'. With care coupled with great learning and a complete mastery of his sources Baynes shows how baseless was this 'modern' interpretation of the conflict between Christianity and paganism in the West. Conservatism, deep-felt patriotism and apprehension of the results of the decline of the Empire were motives which inspired the tenacity of the pagan aristocracy in the Senate, in Gaul and in Africa alike. To men such as Ammianus Marcellinus Christianity was a revolutionary force (*Ann. Mar. xxi, 10, 11*), working for the destruction of the Empire (*cf. Zosimus, Hist. Nova, iv. 39, 31*). Religion rather than economic theory was the driving force in men's lives in the fourth century. This was the background against which Augustine wrote the *De Civitate Dei*. It was Babylon at the time, and it should be equally clear now.

And so one comes to the last lecture, 'The Custody of a Tradition' (pp. 371-88), delivered to the members of University College, London, in March 1938. The editors are to be congratulated on its inclusion. This is the final commentary on what has gone before. The real springs of Baynes' uniring zeal are revealed and the historian

becomes the philosopher with a profound message for his hearers. All in all, this is a splendid book. It will be not only of lasting value to the student, but will serve as a memorial to a distinguished scholar in the name of all who have had the privilege of his guidance and friendship.

W. H. C. FREED.

**Digenes Akrites.** Ed. with an introduction, translation and commentary by J. Mavrougkato. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936. Pp. lxxiv + 279. 45s.

This book is a re-edition of the *Geometastata* text (with some very short insertions from the Tregitzand and Andros versions) of *Digenes Akrites*, as it was printed, with critical notes, by Legrand in 1892. Legrand's edition is long out of print, but it should be noted that GRCO was re-edited by Kallimachos at Athens in 1924 (that by 'Akro II, 1-188'). M.'s edition is preceded by 73 pages of Introduction (in five sections: Discovery, Versions, Story, Discussions, Conclusions); accompanied by an English translation and footnotes, and followed by four Appendices and two Indices. The production of this complicated work is wholly admirable: the typographical errors in nearly 4,000 lines of Greek text and a Greek index are so few and unimportant as not to be worth noting. The only odd feature is that in the Introduction the Greek quotations are printed in an italic transliteration. A special word of praise must be given to M.'s blank verse translation, because it is not likely that proper justice will be done to it outside England. It is a masterpiece, most accurately turned and most beautifully polished. It bears all the marks of a labour of love, and one cannot help regretting that such excellent taste should have been lavished on a Greek text which, whatever its literary and historical interest, ranks very low indeed as poetry. M. prints the GRCO version because, as it stands, it is the earliest we possess (fourteenth century), and because, he believes, it is not very different from the poem as originally written. The English reader who wishes to know the epic itself, and what has been found out or conjectured about it, will find what he wants in this important book.

It is the Introduction (pp. xi-lxxiv) which will be most widely studied and criticised by international scholarship. This is very lucidly written, and gives a generally fair account of previous researches into the origins and composition of the romance. But, where so much is conjectural, M. cannot be other than controversial. He is especially sceptical of theories advanced by Dr Henri Grégoire and his colleagues. The chief of these, developed in many articles and brilliantly summarised by Grégoire himself in his *Legende Byzantine* (New York, 1932), are in brief outline, as follows: the legends attaching to the Borderers took shape in local ballads as early as the ninth century; they grew up round the figure of an historical hero, one Digenes, who was killed in a skirmish with the Saracens in 988; during the first half of the tenth century they became locally attached to a border area of the Euphrates between Kizil Dagh and Samosata, which was famed for the exploits of the historical Armenian general Melik or Melik; these exploits were added, in local folk-lore and mythology, to the already preponderant and legendary figure of Digenes; and, finally, the epic itself was composed, before 1044, by a scholarly poet in the capital, who used material from the ballads, but made his own story out of it and interlarded it with a number of literary and historical references which are out of keeping with the original character of the folk-poetry. This original *Digenes* was so popular that it was re-edited in innumerable versions during later centuries, and thus acquired a large number of references to historical events of later date.

M. rejects much of this, for reasons which seem to me to be inadequate. To start with, he doubts the priority of the ballads, and their connexion with the *Digenes* (pp. xxv-xxix). He denies the connexion of the hero with an historical Diogenes (pp. lxxi-lxxii). He rejects the identification of the 'kerchief of Noaman' with that



of Abgar of Edessa, and with it Grégoire's attempt to date the first version of the poem before 944 (pp. xxv, lxxvii); he thinks that the poem was written more likely in the middle years of the eleventh century (p. lxxvii). He is at least sceptical about Grégoire's geographical identification of the epic background (p. lxxix). These points cannot be discussed at length here. M. himself (p. xxix) notes a similar instance of lack of contemporary evidence for ballads underlying an English epic. As for the historical Diogenes, Grégoire's comparison of him with the historical 'Himodandus Britannici imperii praefectus' (Roland) is to me convincing, and M. is wrong in rejecting it, as he is in translating *ἀρχηγός τῆς διαβολῆς* (*archigós tēs diabolēs*) as 'a good regimental officer' (p. lxxix); the phrase means 'the capable lieutenant-governor of the Anatolic province', a very different matter. As we know, Cappadocia was until the third quarter of the ninth century a *thema* (county) of the Anatolic province (*Tell. Rep. in Byz.-News. Jbld.* 3, 1928-29, 140, nos. 111); and, were enough, at *Dig. Akz.* p. 14, ll. 265-6, the titles of Diogenes, who hailed from Cappadocia, declare that they come from the Anatolic province. If this Cappadocian turns the historical Diogenes may have been, and very probably was, the efficient hero in 768. The name *Diogenes* is (pace M.) exactly the sort of aetiological form which a tenth- or eleventh-century pedant would have created out of *Διόγενος*; and the latter survives as *Gidanes* in some of the ballads themselves. Again, it is not easy to reject part only of Grégoire's closely reasoned hypothesis without getting into difficulties. Grégoire has shown pretty clearly that the locale of the ballad on which he thinks the tenth-century epic was based was Comnagene (Lykandos); M., rejecting the ballad intermediary, has to place the author of the *Digenes* himself in this area (pp. xxv, lxxix); a far less probable hypothesis, if we consider his literary and cultural affinities with the capital. I do not myself feel that M. is right in rejecting the identification of Nannai's tower with Abgar's (cf. *ibid.* p. 27; but on the other hand, to accept the identification is not necessarily to see in it a piece of decisive chronological evidence, as Grégoire and Rynkowski do: an author so well up in his chronicles could easily make the adjustment of supposing the relic still at Edessa many years after its historical removal (944). But whether M.'s conjectured date for the epic's composition, 1032-34 (p. lxxvii), can be upheld, is not clear. It seems to me that there are many other factors to be considered before any final conclusion about this can be reached; notably, *Dig. Akz.* p. 155, l. 706, *ὑπὸ φαντασίᾳ*, which could yield important chronological evidence after consultation with Anna Komnene (III, 10, 1) and Professor Grierson; as could pp. 220-2, after consultation with Professor Krüger.

There are some points—and there are some more—on which it is clear that the Introduction will not command universal assent. They are not cited with any idea of confusing M., but merely of illustrating how much in this difficult field still awaits further research and final settlement. M.'s views are always worthy of full consideration; and for a state of his criticism at its best, the reader may be referred to pp. lxxvi-lxxvii, which gives an admirable characterization of the epic in general, and a salutary corrective to those who would regard it as an historical document rather than as a romance embodying historical elements.

The footnotes to the text are useful and informative. Here and there a fuller reference to tenth-century historical documents might have helped; for instance, at pp. 32 and 36 an interesting and suggestive comparison might be made with *De Cirimouh* (Romm) 500/6-16, 505/9-10. There are one or two queries to make about place-names: at p. 158, l. 260, *Σαῦς* is an obvious error for *Ζαῦς* (not 'under the yoke', but 'in the Anti-Taurus Mts.'): on p. 245, the note on *Bathyrthyaki* is a curious oversight; and at p. 146, l. 67, *τὸν πόντον* seems to conceal a place-name, though I would not care to suggest which. The Appendices, especially B (Conspectus of Versions and Episodes), are a most valuable part of the book.

R. J. H. JENKINS.

SHERARD (P.). **The Marble Threshing-Floor. Studies in Modern Greek Poetry.** London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1936. Pp. vii + 258. 41s.

This book consists of separate essays on the five best Greek poets who have written since 1821 (Solomōs, Palamās, Caváfis, Sikelianōs and Seifris), and a final essay on 'The Poetry and the Myth'. Study of the work of four out of the five (Caváfis is *au géométrique*) reveals a fundamental similarity of outlook and approach to life which Dr. Sherrard calls 'traditional', or, as we should say, mythopoeic. In all of them is discernible a constant pattern, of Fall, Death and Resurrection, with Woman who plays the leading part both in the original sin and the ultimate redemption. Dr. Sherrard would trace this myth back through its Christian version to the parallel mythical religions of remote antiquity. He believes that it survives in the modern Greek mould of thought because that mould was never, as in the West, shattered by the impact of Renaissance humanism and later romanticism. This highly original thesis is argued with much force and illustration. If it be accepted, its importance for an understanding, not only of the poetry, but of every aspect of modern Greek life, requires no emphasis.

Well as Dr. Sherrard has done his work, he would have done it better still if he had adopted a rather less personal and partisan approach. For him, the European Renaissance was a disaster; and the archetypal myths of 'traditional' poetry really do embody profound truths now lost to Western man, as he fumbles about with the puny apparatus of his own intelligence. This is perilous ground for a scholar. The achievement of the great men of the Renaissance was to dispel the clouds of dogma and superstition by the unrestricted exercise of reason, a faculty with which, as they very justly argued, the Creator would not have endowed them if He had not intended them to make use of it. It can be, and often has been, argued that the murky atmosphere of myth and superstition is conducive to the production of better poetry than is the clearer air of rationalism. But to assert or imply that the fairy-tales of man in his cradle represent the ultimate verities is an altogether different matter.

Dr. Sherrard's text is full of quotations from his poets, which are excellently rendered into English. This is especially true of his citations from Caváfis. Caváfis does not indeed confirm in Dr. Sherrard's pattern; but the sketch of him is so penetrating and moving that we cannot wish it away. This is, in any event, the most stimulating book on modern Greek poetry yet written in English; and should be read by all who are interested in the modern literature and history of Greece.

R. J. H. JENKINS.

# BOOKS RECEIVED

- ALVARADO, M.: *Las Necrópolis de Ampurias*. Vol. II. Necrópolis Romana y Necrópolis Indígena. Barcelona: Diputación Provincial de Barcelona and Departamento del Instituto 'Rodrigo Caro' de Arqueología y Prehistoria, 1955. Pp. 437, with 16 plates and 365 text figures. Price not stated.
- ANDERSEN, H. E.: *Flowers of Hellas, gathered from the Greek Anthology*. Eton College: Alden & Blackwell, 1956. Pp. 96. 5s. 6d.
- ARISTOTLES. *Nikomachische Ethik*. Übersetzt von F. Hirnleier (Aristoteles Werke in deutschen Übersetzung). Ed. E. Geymayer, Band VI. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1956. Pp. 606. DM. 42.
- ASTERII Sophistae commentariorum in Psalmos quae supersunt. Accedunt aliquot Homiliae anacrynicae. Ed. M. RICHARD (Symbolae Olsensiae, fasc. supp. XVI). Oslo: A. W. Brøgger, 1956. Pp. xxi + 273. Price not stated.
- Attic and South Italian Painted Vases at Haverford College. Ed. H. Comfort. Consists of a series of photographs in a folder. 1956.
- BAGLIO (G.). *Odisseo nel Mare Mediterraneo Centrale*. (Ricerca e coordinazione del profilo di thalasso-geo-etnografia di Omero nei libri V e IX-XII dell'Odissea). Rome: Bretschneider, 1957. Pp. 82. L. 600.
- BERNARDINI (M.). *La Rudiae Salentina*. Con prefazione di P. Romanelli. Lecce: Editrice Salentina, 1955. Pp. 173, with 53 illustrations and 1 map. Price not stated.
- BERNARDINI (M.). *Panorama archeologico dell'estremo Salento*. Corredato di una piccola guida bibliografica della Mostra permanente del centri archeologici dell'estremo Salento allestita nel Museo provinciale 'Sigismondo Castromediano' di Lecce, in occasione del I Congresso Internazionale di Studi Salentini, promosso dalla Società di Storia Patria per la Puglia. Lecce: Adriatica Editrice, 1955. Pp. 71, with 19 text figures. L. 800.
- BLANKEN (G. H.). *Andreas Kalvos, glorie en tragiek van modern Hellas*. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1956. Pp. 24. Fl. 1.25.
- BÖHLER (G.). *Untersuchungen zum rhetorischen Sprachgebrauch der Byzantiner mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schriften des Michael Psellus*. Mit einem Geleitwort von Franz Dölger. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1956. Pp. xxv + 278. DM. 48.
- BOTSFORD (G. W.) and ROBESON (C. A.). *Hellenic History*. 4th edition. New York: Macmillan Company, 1956. Pp. xciii + 519, with 10 plates and 63 maps and diagrams. 47s.
- BOUTRON DE PETRILLA (F.). *Il problema dell'arte e della bellezza in Plotino*. Florence: Felice de Monnier, 1956. Pp. 177. L. 850.
- CHRISTOPHILOPOULOS (A.). *Ἡ εὐφυΐα καὶ ἡ παιδεία τοῦ Ἀρχαίου νεοελληνισμοῦ [Hellenismos tis 'paideia: 'dhyfias]*. Athens: Academy, 1956. Pp. vii + 239.
- Corpus Fabularum Aesopiarum. Vol. I fasc. 2. Ed. A. HAUBRAT. Leipzig: Teubner, 1956. Pp. xvi + 335. DM. 14.40.
- DAY (J.) and REYES (C. W.). *Tax Documents from Philadelphia. Papyri of the Second Century A.D.* (Columbia Papyri, Greek series, V). New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. (London: Oxford University Press.) Pp. xviii + 342, with 2 plates. 80s.
- DELUK (H. H.). *Εὐδοκίου καὶ Ἀντισθένηος περὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων τῶν ἀπορρητῶν ὑφ' Ἀντισθένη Κορίνθου*. Salonica, 1955. Pp. 32, with 20 plates and 1 map.
- DRAYER, W. and SCHIEFOLD, K.: *Pompeii. Zeugnisse griechischer Malerei*. Munich: R. Piper, 1956. Pp. 18, 19 plates in colour. Price not stated.
- Dumbarton Oaks Papers. Numbers Nine and Ten. (Dedicated to the Memory of Alexander Alexandovich Vasiliev, 1867-1953.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. ix + 316, with 116 illustrations. 81s.
- DUNBAR (T. J.). *Sir John Myres (Proc. Brit. Acad. 1954)*. Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. 17, with 1 plate. 2s. 6d.
- The Fogg Art Museum of Harvard University. Ancient Coins. Picture Book No. 41. Cambridge, Mass. Fogg Art Museum, 1956. Pp. 36, with 34 illustrations. Price not stated.
- FRANKE (P. R.). *Alt-Epirus und das Königtum der Molosser*. Kallmünz: Verlag M. Lassleben, 1955. Pp. x + 89, with 2 plates. DM. 8.
- GOSSET (R.). *Platon à Héliopolis d'Égypte*. Paris: Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1956. Pp. 83. Price not stated.
- GORDON (C. H.). *Homer and the Bible*. The origin and character of East Mediterranean literature. (Hebrew Union College Annual, XXVI.) Ventnor, N.J. Ventnor Publishers, 1957. Pp. 66. \$1.
- HEIN (R.). *Der antike Roman*. 2nd ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956. Pp. 80. DM. 4.60.
- JÄGER (F.). *Griechische Historiker*. Pauly Realencyclopädie. Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1956. Pp. 354. DM. 48.
- JENKINS (R. J. H.). *Richard Macgillivray Dawkins, 1871-1955* (Proc. Brit. Acad. XLII). Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. 16, with 1 plate. 2s. 6d.
- JEPTSEN (K.). *Labraunda. Swedish Excavations and Researches. Vol. I, part 1: The Propylaea*. Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae series in 4 V. 1: 11. Lund: Gleerup, 1956. Pp. xi + 32, with 23 plates and 30 text-figures. Sw. Kr. 35.
- JONES, J. W.). *The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks. An introduction*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. x + 347. 42s.
- JUCKER (J.). *Der Gestus des Apokopein*. Ein Beitrag zur Gebärdensprache in der antiken Kunst. Zürich: Jura-Verlag, 1956. Pp. 136, with 48 illustrations. S. Fr. 12.20.
- KARLOPOULOS (P.). *Ἡ ἐν Ἀθῶναις διὰ τῶν 51 ἐτῶν 529 πρὸς Χριστὸν ἑλθόντων Χριστιανικῶν*. Athens, 1956. Pp. 233.
- LAUTER (S.). *Abriss der antiken Geschichte*, with contributions by G. VELLER and F. KLEIN. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1956. Pp. 180, with 3 maps. DM. 17.80.
- LEIST, A. *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956. Pp. 349. DM. 14.50.
- LEVI (G. R.). *Plato in Sicily*. London: Faber, 1956. Pp. 191, with 2 maps. 14s.
- LÉVY (S.). *Discours sur les patronages*. Texte inédit, annoté et commenté par L. HARMAND. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1955. Pp. 214. Fr. 1.000.
- LIVADIS (C. J.). *The Structural Iron of the Parthenon* (Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, 1956). Pp. 18, with 15 text figures.
- LILLIES (R.) and HINWIS (M.). *Greek Sculpture*. London: Thames & Hudson, 1956. Pp. 88, with 256 monochrome plates and 8 colour plates. 69s.
- MAROT (K.). *A görög irodalom kezdetei*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1956. Pp. 577, with 12 plates. Fl. 50.

- NEWTON (J.). *Epikur. Philosophie der Freude.* Eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften übersetzt, erläutert und eingeleitet. Stuttgart: Kröner, 1956. Pp. 99, with 1 plate. DM. 4.50.
- MONUMENTA ASIAE MINORIS ANTIQVA. Vol. VII. Monuments from Eastern Phrygia. Edited by Sir WILLIAM CALDER. Manchester: University Press (in association with the American Society for Archaeological Research in Asia Minor), 1956. Pp. xlviii + 162, with 30 plates and 21 pages of drawings. £4.41.
- MURRAY (G.). *The Literature of Ancient Greece.* 3rd Edition. Chicago: University Press, 1956 (London: Cambridge University Press). Pp. xxxi + 420. 15s.
- NATALITIUM CAROLI JAX SEPTUAGESIMARIO A.D. VII. KAL. DEC. MCMLV oblatum (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft, Band 3, Heft 2, 3). Innsbruck: Sprachwissenschaftliches Seminar der Universität, 1955. Pp. 194, with 11 plates. Price not stated.
- NEXELE (W.). *Griechische Geistesgeschichte von Homer bis Lukian, in ihrer Entfaltung vom mythischen zum rationalen Denken dargestellt.* Stuttgart: Kröner, 1956. Pp. xi + 555. DM. 13.70.
- NEWMAN (E.). *Amor and Psyche. The Psychic Development of the Feminine.* A commentary on the tale by Apuleius. Translated from the German by R. MARHEIM. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956. Pp. 181, with 1 plate. 25s.
- PIERCE (Th.). *Das Fasten bei Basileios dem Grossen und im antiken Heidentum* (Commentationes Aemilionenses XI). Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag, Wagner, 1955. Pp. 135. O.S. 100.
- PERRARO. *Olympicas.* Edition de M. Fernandez-Galiano. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1956. Pp. 345. Price not stated.
- POCOCK (A. G.). *The Landfalls of Odysseus.* Clue and detection in the Odyssey. Clarendon, N.Z.: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1955. Pp. 16, with 6 plates and 4 maps. 3s. 6d.
- RICHTER (G. M. A.). *Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Catalogue of engraved Gems, Greek Etruscan and Roman.* Rome: Bretschneider, 1956. Pp. xlii + 147, with 75 plates. L. 9.000.
- RICHTER (G. M. A.). *Catalogue of Greek and Roman Antiquities in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956 (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege). Pp. 77, with 27 plates. 40s.
- REHNER (G.). *Platonica selecta.* Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1956. Pp. 141. Sw. Kr. 9.75.
- SCHWARTZ (E.). *Zur Geschichte und Literatur der Hellenen und Römer* (Gesammelte Schriften, 2). Berlin: De Gruyter, 1956. Pp. x + 335. DM. 38.
- SCOTT-KILVERT, (J.). *A. E. Housman.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. (for the British Council and the National Book League, 1955). Pp. 40. 2s.
- SUSSEX (P. L.). *Excavations at Soba, with a section on the Glass by D. B. Harden.* (Sudan Antiquities Service, occasional papers No. 3.) Khartoum: Sudan Antiquities Service, 1955. Pp. 84, with 30 plates and 47 text figures. 10s.
- STOLL (H. A.). *Der Traum von Troja. Lebensroman Heinrich Schliemanns.* Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1956. Pp. 523, with 41 illustrations and 3 plans. DM. 10.80.
- VALERIO (E.). *Achille, eroe impietabile.* Turin: Edizioni Rosta, no date. Pp. 125. L. 750.
- WILL (E.). *Doriens et Ioniens. Essai sur la valeur du critère ethnique appliqué à l'étude de l'histoire et de la civilisation grecques.* (Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg, 192). Paris: Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1956. Pp. 109. Price not stated.
- XENOPHON. *Die sokratischen Schriften Memorabilia, Symposium, Oikonomikos, Apologie,* übertragen und herausgegeben von E. Dux. Stuttgart: Kröner, 1936. Pp. 333, with 1 plate. DM. 9.80.



# INDEX TO VOLUME LXXVII (Part II)

## I.—GENERAL.

### A

- Alcæ, sculptured group at, 286  
 Arcadian cuneiform, 202  
 Admetus, 282  
 Aegina, 275  
 Aeschines, orator, on First Sacred War, 270  
 Aeschines of Sicyon, 274  
 Aeschylus: political notions, in Danaid tetralogy, 220 ff.; in *Eumenides*, 220 f., 230 ff.; propagandist for Argive rulers, 224; for Themistocles, 228 f.; attitude to Areopagus, 235; in war, 235; to Pericles, 236; to Argos, 220 ff., 226 f., 235 f.; to Sparta, 221 ff.  
 Aesop, 259  
 Alkaios, interpretation of some poems of, 253 ff.; Lesbian vernacular in, 261 ff.; imitator of epic dialect, 264 n.  
 Alkibiades, 226, 236; anti-Megara, 240 f.  
 Alloy, types of, 267 f.  
 Amasis Painter, 279  
 Amsterdam, cup frag., 2182, 316  
 Andocides Painter, 279  
 Andros, pottery from, 245  
 Antimenes Painter, 279 n., 315 f.  
 Antiope Group (vases), 316; Antiope Painter, 316  
 Apollo, 236; rivalled by Herakles, 277; struggles with Herakles represented in art, 278 ff.; sanctuary of, at Cyrene, 301 ff.; cult of, at Cyrene, 303 f.  
 Apollo Lykeios, 291 f.  
*Apophthegmata Laconica* of Plutarch; respectability of, 272 f.  
 Arendia (Gortys), excavations, 279 n.  
 Arcadian verbal forms, 203  
 Areopagus, in *Eumenides*, 231 ff.; linked with Orestes, 235, 240  
 Argos: rivalry with Sparta, 221; defeat at Sepeia, 220, 222; compulsory marriages in, 222; democratic trends, 223 f., 237 n.; friendship with Athens, 226, 235; in Aeschylus's plays, 220 ff., 226 f., 235 f.  
 Aristagoras of Miletus, 224, 227  
 Aristodemus, 277  
 Arutogiton, 257  
 Aristotle, as authority on Zeno, 187 ff.  
 Aripharnes, 227  
 Artemis, cult of, at Cyrene, 309 f.; Nymphaion of, at Cyrene, 309 f.; representations of, in art, 279 ff., 286  
 Athens, identified with Athens in *Eumenides*, 235; represented in art, 279 f.  
 Athens: relations with Sparta, 227, 235; with Corinth and Euboea, 239, 241; with Argos, 226 ff.; with Megara, 238 ff., with Samos, 274; naval power in early 5th century, 238; early trade routes, 239; population increase, 240; social struggles, 240 ff.; citizen-body, 257 n.; in First Social War, 281 n.; Kerameikos excavations, 217  
 Attic Black-Figure ware, 229  
 Attica: importance of southern ports, 238, 245; relation of internal struggles to Megarian rivalry, 240 ff.; agricultural and economic crises, 242 ff.; effect of Solon's changes, 244 ff.

### B

- Baths, Ritual, at Cyrene, 301, 303 ff., 307 f.  
 Beattie, A. J., 202 ff.  
 Bergson, philosophy of, 187, 192 n.  
 Berlin, Andocides Painter's amphora, 279  
 Boeotian heads, on vases, 315  
 Britain, Amasis Painter's amphora, 279  
 Bronze, quantity of, for Calpurnia of Rhodes, 314 n.  
 Burma, Robert, 282, 263 n.

### C

- Cambridge, Trinity College, Boeotian krater, 314  
 Campana (plaques), 284 n.  
 Carpathos (inscriptions), 203  
 Charaxos, brother of Sappho, 259  
 Chares, 312  
 Chariot-races, on vases, 269 f.  
 Chrysoi of Kus, 277, 281  
 Cleomenes, 276  
 Cocktail Party, *The*, 250  
 Coins: Concord, temple of, on austerus of Tiberius, 284; *Comitia* type, 284; Herakles on coins of Bactria, 289 f., 292; Herakles on coins of Corinth, 290; Herakles on coins of Herakleia (Lycania), 290; Herakles on coins of Maximianus I., 292; Mars on Roman Imperial coins, 294; Mars and Rhea Silvia on coins of Antoninus Pius, 293 f.; Ptolemy of Lysippos on Imperial coins, 295; from Mytilene, 288  
 Colossus of Rhodes, 311 f.  
 Commission of Ten, in Athens and Sparta for treaty-making, 177 ff.  
 Concord, Temple of, 284 f.  
 Corinth, trade-relations with Athens in 5th century, 239, 244  
 Corinthian artists, *Struggle for the Tripod of*, 280  
 Croesus, 267 f.  
 Cyclades, 214 f., 218  
 Cydon, connections of, with Megara, 240 f.  
 Cyprus: vases from Amathus, 212 ff.; from Curium, 269 ff.; from Verghé, 270; figurines, 271; inscription from Karpasia, 313; doubtful sense of some inscriptions from, 203  
 Cyrene, rock-cut features, 301 ff.; cave of Apollo's priests, 301 ff.; *trichium*, 301, 303; *Mysterion Basilica*, 303; fountain of Apollo, Fontana Nuova, 304; galleries and chambers, ritual baths, 304 ff.; Nymphaeion of Artemis, 309 f.

### D

- Danaid Tetralogy*, political matters in, 220 ff.; date of, 228 f.  
 Danaos, *The*, 220  
 Daybreak Painter, 216  
 Delos, 274; Confederacy of, 231  
 Delphi, 230; Siphnian treasury at, 270 f.; Sicyonian treasury at, 280; Monopteros and Tholos at, 280; Amphictyony of, 276, 280; oracle of, concerning First Sacred War, 276; gift of Croesus to, 287  
 Delphic tripod, rape of, by Herakles, 276 ff.; popularity as subject in art, 276 ff.; attempted rape by Lykos, 277  
 Demetrius Poliorcetes, inscriptions of, 312 n.  
 Democracy, growth of power in Athens and Argos, 223 ff.; as issue in *Sappho* and *Danaides*, 224 ff.; anachronistically represented in tragedy, 234  
 Dionysus, Theatre of, 207  
 Dipoinos sculptor, 270, 281  
 Dokkani, bronze shoulder-plates from, 275  
 Doricha or Rhodopis, in Sappho's poems, 259  
 Dryopes, 277  
 Dumbabin, L. J., 276 n., 278 n.

### E

- Egypt, Athenian expedition to, 237  
 Elzevir, 193  
 Electrum colnage, 267 f.  
 Elizabethan drama, metrical varieties in, 263  
 Eakomi, vase from, 271

*Ephialtes*, 225, 228, 235  
*Epir*, heroes of, 252: influence upon Sophocles, 254  
*Epimenides* of Phaeacia, 241  
*Escuela*, 271  
*Euboea*, trade-relations with Athens in sixth century, 239, 244  
*Eumenides*, as enemies of Pericles, 236  
*Eupompos*, 281 n.  
*Euripidean tragedy*: intrusion of democracy, 234: political aetiology, 235: rhetoric, 233: psychology, 231  
*Exekias Painter*, 313

## F

Female figures, on vases, 269 ff.; on Minoan frescoes, 270 f.  
*Figurines*, Mycenaean, from Rhodes, Cyprus, Ugarit, 271  
*Female Nympha*, at Cyrene, 304 f.  
*Forms*, Platonic, relations between, 281 ff.  
*Forster*, E. M., 247

## G

Galilean relativity, principles of, 193  
*Gela Painter*, 274 n.  
*Gimnasion*, J., 252  
*Grain*: problems of trade and production in Attica, 239 ff.; effect of Solon's reforms on, 244 ff.  
*Gnaphion system*, 262

## H

*Halicarnassus*, Lygdamis tyrant of, 272  
*Harmodios and Aristogeiton*, Song of, 257  
*Helen of Troy*, references to, in poets, 257 f.  
*Herakles*: connection with Kranaos in First Sacred War, 270 ff.; 282 ff.; cape of Delphic tripod by, 276; eremity with Apollo, 277 ff.; as prophet, 277; representations in art, 278 ff.; on medallions, 283; on coins, 284 ff.  
*Hermes*, on coins, 284; on votive relief, 285  
*Hind*, animal of Apollo, 280; object of struggle between Herakles and Apollo, 280 f.; in art, 281  
*Hippias*, tyrant, 227  
*Hippocritean Corpus*, 277  
*Homer*, 262 f.; influence on Sappho and Alkaios, 264  
*Houses*, as background in Greek comedy, 266 ff.  
*Hyperbanchos*, 220 ff.  
*Hyrtas*, father of Pittakos, 253 n.

## I

*Il.* 2<sup>2</sup> 16-4, 173; 82, 84, 178; 84-37, 180, 268, 302, 176; 302, 180; 304-9, 178; 443, 179 n.; 370a, 178; 772, 179; 816, 178; 810-1, 350, 86, 103, 179; 850, 180, 178; 851-54, 179; 1072, 178; 11<sup>2</sup> 40, 177; 358b, 100-78, 164, 10, 1745-7, 179 n.; 1750-11, 2355, 6354, 171; 6813, 170 n.; 20, 2, 4 ff., 13 ff., 267  
*IKR* 931, 944, 314  
*Ionian revolt*, 217  
*Isagoras*, 225 f.  
*Istanbul athlete* from Bath of Faustina, Miletus, 201

## J

Julio-Claudian denarius, 314

## K

*Kallisthenes*, 267  
*Karpasia*, inscription from, 313 f.; status of, in early Principate, 314  
*Kerynthian deer*, capture of, by Herakles, 281  
*Kleisthenes*, reforms of, reflected in *Supplians*, 225  
*Kleisthenes*, Orthagorid tyrant of Sicily; connection with Delphi, 280; dedication after First Sacred War, 281 f.; treaty and reconciliation with Delphi, 282  
*Kleoboulos* of Samos, 280  
*Kleistias Painter*, 313  
*Kranos*: tablets, 202 ff.; traces, 271

*Kranos* in Sappho's time, 262  
*Koroibos*, legend of, 277  
*Kragaleu*, 270 f.; legend of, 276; connection with Herakles, 270 f., 281  
*Krisa*, plain of, in First Sacred War, 276; inhabitants known as *Kirrhains* and *Kragalidai*, 276  
*Kyra*, Spring of, 310

## L

Ladder-pattern frames, on vases, 269 ff.  
*Laureian silver mines*, 244, 246  
*Leipysitron skollon*, 257  
*Leiningrad*, dnos 86, 315  
*Lesbos*, 274  
*'Lesbian' love*, 259 n.  
*Lesbian word forms*, 261 ff.  
*Linear A*, 262  
*Linear B*, 262 ff.  
*Label*, E., 255 ff.  
*London*, British Museum, vases: B240, 315 ff.; B316, 279 n.; C301, 269; C373, 269 n.; E2, 315 f.  
*Lygdamis*, identity of, Plutarch, *Apophth. Lar.* 67, 236d, 272  
*Lygdamis of Halicarnassus*, 272  
*Lygdamis of Naxos*, 272 ff.  
*Lykippides Painter*, 279  
*Lysippos*, 289, 292, 295 ff.

## M

*Macedonia*, trade with Athens, 239  
*Madrid*, dnos 10908, 315  
*Malta*: Greek inscription from, 312; social life in second century A.D., 312; funerary altar at, 310 f.; cemeteries, 311  
*Manner-Bariet*, 257, 178  
*Mathematical continuity*, theory of, 192  
*Medallions* of Antoninus Pius, 289 n., 296 f.; of M. Aurelius, L. Verus, Commodus, 283, 293, 293 ff.  
*Megara*, 236, 240 f.  
*Megara*, rivalry of, affecting Athenian internal affairs in early sixth century, 238 ff.  
*Megidlo*, pottery from, 216 f.  
*Melissos*, 196  
*Miletus*, fall of, 227 f.; war with Polykrates, 273, 274  
*Minoan dress*, in art, 271  
*Mithraic sculpture*, fragments of, 364  
*Mithras*, shrines of, 301 n., 303 f.; cult of, 304  
*Musich*, amphora, 13, 22, 279; 1765, 279 n.  
*Munich*, 241  
*Murder and riots*, in Greek theory, 234; Athenian attitude to, 235  
*Mycenae*, frescoes and ivories, 271  
*Myrsino*, 256  
*Mystery Basilica*, examples of, 303  
*Mytilene*, 237, 250 f.; monetary union with Phakia, 267 f.; coins from, 268

## N

*Naples*, skyphos, Sig. 120; 279 n.  
*Naukratis*, h.f. cup fragment, 270  
*Naukratis*, in Athens, 238, 241 n.  
*Naxos*, 270 ff.  
*Nekros of Koi*, 277, 281  
*New York*, *Letes gamikos*, 144, 115  
*Nikosthenes Painter*, 279 n.  
*Nympha*, associated with Herakles, 286

## O

*Olive*, export trade of Athens, 239 f., 242 f.; discouraged for home market, 244 f.  
*Olympia*, bronze tripod, 278; shield-band relief, 279 ff.; statue of Kyniskos by Polykleitos, 284  
*oskon*, 193 ff.  
*Oxford*, Ashmolean Museum, plate depicting Struggle for Hund, 281; statue of Herakles, 287 ff.

## P

- Page, B. L., 255 ff.  
 Palestine, pottery from, 216 ff.  
 P. Oxy. xv 1800 n. 7, 259; xvi (2291), 260  
 Paris, vases. Bibl. Nat., 284, 279; Cabinet des Médailles  
 282, 286. Louvre F61, F62, 315; G653, 281; statue of  
 Artemis, Versailles, 286  
 Parmenides, in relation to Zeus, 196 f., 201  
 Peisistratids, 227, 274  
 Peisistratos, 240 f., 256 n., 257, 272, 274  
 Peloponnesian war, examples of, 270 f.  
 Penitents, 256  
 Pericles, 238 f., 256 n.  
 Pericles, 236  
 Persians, poet, 267  
 Philo of Byzantium, 311  
 Philosophical theories, early, primitive nature of, 192  
 Phlegraean plain, 237  
 Phokian, 267 f.  
 Phrygians, Fall of Miletus, burning of, 222 f., 233  
 Pitakos of Mitylene: descent of, 235 f.; command of  
 war against Athens, 256; reputation, 257  
 Piræia, Long Walls, 227, 235  
 Plato, on false and meaningful statements, 181 ff., on  
 Zeus and Parmenides, 197, 200 f.  
 Polykleitos, 283, 287 ff., 298  
 Polykrates, 273 f.  
 Potidaea, 237  
 P. I. 1904, 179; 1340, 179 n.; 6637-6727, 6703, 7317, 7445.  
 10407, 12402 - 12410, 178  
 Ptolemy III Euergetes, 312 n.  
 Pythagoreanism, 194, 198  
 Pylos: tablets, 204 n.; gem, 270 n.  
 Pythia, The, 277, 281 f.  
 Pythian games, at Sikyon, 282

## Q

Quantum theory, 192 f.

## R

- Rhodes: inscription from, 203; figurines from, 271;  
 Colossus of, 311 f.  
 Rhodopis of Doricha, in Sappho's poems, 259  
 Rome: Barracco, athlete, 289; Capitoline, relief of  
 Epitaphios, 285 ff.; Chiaramonti, Herakles, 291 ff.;  
 Chiaramonti, Herakles and Telephos, 284; Laurentian  
 and Terme, relief of Imperial procession, 293; Museo  
 Capitolino, relief of M. Aurelius Bassus, 297; Palazzo  
 dei Conservatori, herm, 292; Vatican, relief of Mars  
 and Rhea, 294; Vatican, relief of Asclepiades, 286;  
 cup, 254, 279; Villa Giulia, dinos, 950, 50599, 307  
 Villa Torlonia-Albani, Herakles, 283 f., 291 f.  
 Russell, Earl, 187, 190, 192 f.

## S

- Sacred War, First, 299; associated with *The Struggle for  
 the Tripod*, 276 ff.  
 Sakkar, in vase-painting, 315  
 Salamis, importance to Athens and Megara, 238 ff.;  
 position of Greek fleets at, 311  
 Sappho, interpretation of poems of, 258 ff.; use of Lesbian  
 dialect, 264 ff.  
 Sculpture: Apollo Lykeios, 291 f.; Athlete, from Miletus,  
 291; Athlete, Westmacott, 283; Athlete, Westmacott, in  
 Museo Barracco, 289; Herakles, in Ashmolean Museum,  
 287 ff.; Herakles crowning himself, 289 ff.; Herakles,  
 in Museo Chiaramonti, 291 f., 283; Herakles, in Villa  
 Torlonia-Albani, 283 f., 291 f.; Herakles, Farnese,  
 293 ff.; Herm in Conservatori Coll., 292; Kynoskotos  
 of Polykleitos, 283; Struggle for the Tripod, statue group,  
 279 f.  
 Reliefs: of Asclepiades in Vatican, 286; of M.  
 Aurelius Bassus (Museo Nuovo Capitolino), 297.  
 Cordova puteal, 295; relief of Epitaphios, Capito-  
 line, 285 ff.; Mars and Rhea Silvia, Laurentian Museo  
 Profano, 293; Mars and Rhea Silvia, Vatican Behve-

- der, 291; Mars and Rhea Silvia, on Imperial pro-  
 cection relief, Lateran and Terme, 293; Struggle for  
 the Tripod, 279 f.  
 Sea-creatures, in vase-painting, 311  
 Shakespearian characterisation, 246  
 Shield, on kantharos, 314 n.; of Achilles, on Boeotian  
 crater, 314  
 Ships, on Attic h.-f. vases, 315 f.  
 Shoshak I, 216 f.  
 Siphion, struggle for, between Athens and Mitylene, 238,  
 256; importance to Athenian traders, 240; captured by  
 Athens, 242; references to, in Alkaios and Herodotus,  
 256 n.  
 Similes, in Greek poets, 260  
 Skopos, 292  
 Skythian sculptor, 279, 281  
 Solon, 257; background and motives for reforms of,  
 241 ff.; restricted to Megarian ascendancy, 241 ff.;  
 effect on Attic commerce, 242; plan for grain produce,  
 243 ff.; price-reforms, 243 ff.; export policy, 242, 245  
 Sparta: relations with Athens, 227, 235; with Akteionids,  
 241 n.; thalassocracy of, 272 n.; behaviour towards  
 tyrants, 273 ff.; anti-Persian policy, 275  
 Stage in Greek theatre: scenery, 205 ff.; doors, number  
 of, in comedy, 205 ff.; in *Ecd.*, 208 f., in *Clouds*, 209 f.;  
 in *Peace*, 210 f.  
 Struggle for the Delphi Tripod: The popularity of art sub-  
 ject, 276 ff.; as 'stand-up fight', 276 ff.; as 'running  
 fight', 270; possible theme of Sicyonian statue group,  
 279 f.; of group at Delphi, 280; at Akte, 280; of  
 literary work, 279 f.; on Attic vase, 279; connection  
 with *Struggle for Hind*, 280; with *Leprosy of Kerynitian  
 deer*, 281  
 See, ix, 173, 304; 266, 275-6, 289, 293, 310; x, 13, 237;  
 15, 170; 80, 177 n.

## T

- Tell Abu Hawan, pottery from, 216 ff.  
 Tell Qasile, pottery from, 216  
 Terme, pottery from, 215  
 Themistokles, 227 f.  
 Theophrastus, 249  
 Theophrastus, 'Characters' of, 253  
 Thersites, trade-relations with Athens, 239, social pattern  
 of, 239 f.; in First Sacred War, 281; head of Am-  
 phictyony, 282  
 Thesis, on Boeotian crater, 314  
 Timber, importance to Athens, 239  
 Tragedy, characterisation in, 247 ff.; characters as  
 individuals, 247; as types, 248; as symbols, 248 f.;  
 in Euripides and Sophocles, 248 f.; in Shakespeare,  
 249, 253; in combination with action and language,  
 250 f.; tied to epic conception of hero, 250 f.; ritual  
 element in, 253; effect of psychological advances on,  
 253 f.  
 Treaties, number of Athenian and Spartan repre-  
 sentatives for, 177 ff.  
 Trilinium, in Cave of Apollo (Cyrene), 301, 303  
 Troad, 237

## U

Ugarit, ivory and figurines from, 271

## V

- Vases: from Curium (Mycenaean window-crater), 286 ff.;  
 from Enkomi (Mycenaean amphoroid crater), 271;  
 from Naukratis (h.-f. cup fragment), 279; from Verghi  
 (chariot-crater), 270; and see Amsterdam, Athens,  
 Berlin, Bologna, Boston, Cambridge, Leningrad,  
 London, Munich, New York, Naples, Paris, Rome,  
 Vienna  
 Vienna, h.-f. vase 3619, 316

## W

- Washing Painter, 311  
 Water-colourist, Chios, 205



Water supply, in Cave of Apollo's priests, 301; source of, 301; method of regulating, 309  
 Windows: in Greek stage scenery, 208; in art, 269 ff.  
 Wine, as produce of Attica, 241 f.  
 Wool, as produce of Attica, 242, 243 f.

Z

Zeno, paradoxes of, 187 ff.; intelligence overrated, 187 ff.; prominence in Plato's *Parmenides*, and in Aristotle's *Physics*, vi, 201  
 Zeno, 278 f.

## II.—INDEX OF GREEK AND LATIN AUTHORS

Aeschines, *In Cicero*, 3, 167 ff., 279

Schol. on Aesch., ii, 77, 279 n.

Aeschylus, *Agam.* 218, 226; 224-6, 230; 327, 232; 438, 226; 954-7, 231 n.; 958, 226; 1359, 232; 1501-3, 231 n.; *Amazons*, 222 f.; *Choeph.* 780, 222; 889, 231 n.; *Eum.* 490-267, 230 ff.; 681-710, 232 ff.; *Passion*, 230-7; *Pers.* 396-7, 230; 405, 763-6, 231; P.P. 149, 231; 246, 230; 853 ff., 220 f.; 865 ff., 225; *Sept.* 187-8, 232 n.; *Suppl.* 279 ff., 237; 625 ff., 235; *Passion*, 201-9; *fr.* 180, 230  
 Alkaios, *Ab.* 12, 232; *Ab.* 13-14, 236 ff.; *Bio.* B12, 237 f.; *D12.* 6, 236 f.; *D13.* 253 ff.; 261, 61, 13, 16, 235, 201; *G2.* 20-1, 236 f.; *N1.* 257 f.; *P2.* 256 f.; *Q1.* 257; *Z22.* 255 n.; *Z24.* 256 f.; *Passion*, 262-6

Anakreon, *fr.* 5, 239 n.

Anaxandrides Delphus, *FGH* 401 f1, 282 n.

Aristakides, *L.* 94, 279 n.; i, 130-1, 236

Antiphon, *Tatulegy* No. 234; 178, 236, *fr.* i, 236

Antiphon, *Sophist.* *fr.* 41, col. 1, l. 25, 234

Antoninus Liberalis, *l.* 276

Apollodorus, *ii.* 6, 2, 278 n.

Aristophanes, *Ach.* 1070, 1096 ff., 207; *Birds.* 822, 176; 1124-7, 179; 1127, 1293, 178; *Clouds.* *Passion*, 209 f.; *Ecl.* 1-729, 208; 877 ff., 208 f.; 938, 1009, 265; *Frogs.* 1419 ff., 220; *Lys.* 83, 178; 392, 265; *Pace.* 928, 178; *Passion*, 210 f.; *Thesm.* 797, 208; *Wasps.* 136-211, 207, 11, 1183, 178; 1416, 259 n.; 1482-4, 206 n.

Aristotle, *Art. Pol.* 8, 3, 238 n.; 13, 4, 241 n.; 13, 5, 242 n.; 14, 241 n.; 15, 2, 272 n.; 274 n.; 19, 4, 274 n.; 20, 2, 21, l. 226; 25, 2, 234; 29, 1, 178; *Econ.* 1340 ff., 272 n.; *Phys.* 209-23, 210-23, 201; 212-25-6, 193; 213-22, 194 n.; 234-222, 102 n.; 234-224 ff., 189; 239-10, 190; 239-13-9, 11-13, 13-18, 188; 239-13-24-20-18, 189; 250-10, 201; 263-11 ff., 191; 262-15-28, 190; 1450-221, 230 n.; *Poet.* 1448-23, 179 n.; *Pol.* 1303a, 241; 1303-141, 272 n.; 1312-17, 274 n.; [Met.] xix, 312

Athenaeus, 546 BC, 234, citing *Constitution of Naxos*, 348A-C, 272 n.

Callinus, *l.* 9, 232

Catullus, *lat.* 266

Constantine Porphyrogenitus ap. Theoph., *Chronogr.* 1, 327, 312 n.

Democritus, *fr.* 243, 234

Demosthenes, xx, 257, 231; xxiv, 312, 268 n.; 214, 267 n.; xxv, 38, liv, 7, lxx, 24, 178

Didymus, 276 n.

Dionysius Siculus, xli, *fr.* 13, 272 n.; ix, 16, 276; xli, 75, 177

Diogenes Laertius, i, 74, 238 n.; ix, 51, 178; 72, 201

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, iv, 1, v, 77, 227

Dionysius Periegetes, 293, n. 3, 261 n.

Eudemos ap. Simplicius, 97, 13 or 138, 32, 198 f.

Eupolis, *Demos* (Gr. Lit. Pap. p. 206, ll. 5-10), 178

Euripides, *El.* 1275 ff., *Hell.* 1026 ff., 235; *Ion.* 582 ff., 235; 988 ff., 237; 1575 ff., 235; *I.A.* 330, 233; *I.T.* 1449 ff., 233; *Or.* 1561-2, 205; *Suppl.* 1183 ff., 235

Harpocration, 179, 279 n., 276 n.

Herodotus, *l.* 11, 2, 231; *id.* 2, 235, 59, 2, 267 f.; 59, 241 n.; 61, 2, 274 n.; *id.* 1, 272 n.; 62, 1, 274 n.; 64, 2, 272 n., 274 n.; *id.* 12-17, 237; 134-5, 238

*id.* 36-4, 274 n.; 35, 273 n.; 81, 233; *id.* 180, 237; *id.* 272 n.; 51, 2, 279 n.; 63, 272 n.; 69, 2, 274 n.; 66-2, 226; 67, 224; 70, 226; 71, 241 n.; 71, 2, 238 n.; 74-5, 238 n.; 236 n.; 66, 227; 97, 224; 98 ff., 227; 99, 1, 274 n.; 103, 227; *id.* 50, 3, 273 n.; 89, 222, 224, 226; *id.* 99, 2, 272 n.; 104, 4, 233; 123, 1, 237; 148, 221; 159, 273 n.; 266, 2, 272 n.; 273 n.; 235, 2, 273 n.; *id.* 38, 2, 232

Himerius, *Or.* i, 16, 260

Homer, *Iliad* xi, 632, 207; xxiv, 104, 258; *Odyssey* ii, 50, 110, 263; iii, 102 ff., 258; v, 156, 264

Hesiod, *Op.* 342-87, 293

Isidorus, *Orig.* xvi, 24, 268 n.

Isocrates, *Helen* 3, 200; iv, 99, 233; iv, 105, 273 n.

Libanius, *Or.* 13, 27, 277 n.

Lysias, ii, 19, 26, 233; x, 4, 27, 179 n.; 12, 179 n.

Ovid, *Ep.* xv, 64 ff., 259

Pausanias, *l.* 31, 2, 239; 35, 2, 179 n.; *id.* 9, 6, 280; *id.* 1, 292; 19, 3, 223; 19, 6, 225; *id.* 1, 6, 277 n.; *id.* 12, 7, 267 n.; *id.* 8, 2, 236; *id.* 13, 7, 280 n.; 13, 8, 278, 278 n.; 37, 4, 276

Philo Byz., iv, 1-6, 311 f.

Philoponus, *Phys.* 29, 9, 187; *Bo.* 23 ff., 198 f.; 817, 6, 189; *Photius*, 179 n.

Pindar, *Isthm.* i, 6, 51, 277 n.; *Nem.* i, 67, 237

Plautus, *Apol.* 320, *Ep.* vii, 324, 179 n.; *Euth.* 283-284, 184; *Gerg.* 172, 179; *Lag.* 698, 756, 233; 763-7, 761, 762-9, 177; *Mena.* 343b, 179; *Parm.* 127, 197; 127-1-5, 191; 128, 197; 129a, c-c, 181; 129d-e, 198; 130c ff., 181; *Phaedr.* 261d, 198; *Phaedr.* 14c, 15a, 181; *Repub.* 358c, 36d, 233; *Soph.* 240c ff., 197 n.; 251a-263c *Passion*, 181-8; *Theoc.* 105a, c, 185 ff., 182; 201d ff., 186

Plautus, *Capt.* 765, 252 n.

Pliny, *N.H.* xxxiii, 80, 268 n.; xxxiv, 62, 284; 73, 77, *Bo.* 89, 90, xxxv, 96, 141, 143, 196, 284 n.; xxxvi, 4, 279; xxxvii, 4, 281 n.

Plutarch, *Apophth.* *Lac.* 216-236d *Passion*, 272 f.; *Lycurg.* 38c, *de Mal. Ilia.* 21, 859d, 274 n.; 859d, 270 n.; *Quaest.* *Gr.* 20, 296a, 274 n.; *Sol.* 9, 241 n.; 12, 2, 3, 5, 6, 241 n.; 22, 1, 240 n.; 29, 3, 243 n.; 241 n.; *Port. Mal.* 4, 222; *Moralia.* 387d, 357c, 277 n.; [*Pl.* X *Or.*] 835a, 178

Pollux, *Onom.* 86, 93, 267 n.

Polyacmus, *l.* 23, 274 n.; *id.* 11, 1, 179 n.

Polybius, v, *Op.* 312 n.

Proclus, *On the Parmenides* ii, 143, 197

Sappho, *l.* 15, 258 f.; 107, 259 f.; 31, 94, 96, 110, 260; 99, 260 f.; 156, 261; *Passion*, 262-4

Sevius, *Virg. Aen.* vii, 500, 270 n.

Solon, *fr.* i, 232

Sophocles, *Ajax*, 247, 252; *Antig.* 1186, 205, *Or.* 1218, 232; *O.T.* 1186, 251 n.; *Tr.* 113-13, 232

Simplicius, *Phys.* 139, 16-18, 199 n.; 200; 139, 27 ff., 200; 140, 27, 34, 199; 141, 17 ff., 200; 101, 10, 186; 110d, 18, 201

Stephanus Byz., 178

Strabon, *Geog.* i, 18, 1, 194 n.

Sirabo, in. a. d. 268 n.; xiii. t. 50, 267 n.; 36, 238;  
xvii. 13, 239  
Nicolaus, 178 f.  
Theocritus, l. 123, 237  
Thrasymachus, fr. 1, 234  
Thucydides, i. 13, b, 274 n.; ii. 1, 273 n.; 71, 3, 232;  
102, 4, 104, 236 n.; 104, 1, 237; 107, 4, 235; 126, 5,  
241 n.; 138, 3, 238; ii. 37, 3, 233; iii. 37, 3, 234; 82, 3,  
232; 104, 2, 274 n.; 105, 3, 179; iv. 27, 3, 178; 75,

(vi), 3-4, 180; 107, 3, 255 n.; 119, 2, 180; v. 12, 1,  
18, 9, 19, 2, 24, 1, 24, 2, 177; 113, 4, 180; 113, 4, 177;  
110, 3, 180; vi. 18, 7, 234; 10, 2, 233; 34, 2, 237; 105, 2,  
170; viii. 9, 2, 23-1, 73, 4, 89, 2, 179  
Tyrtaeus, fr. B, 3-4, 232

Xenagoras, 276 n.

Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 4, 182, 171; *Hell.* i. 3, 13, 178 f.;  
5, 16, 6, 21-2, 7, 3, 179; ii. 3, 2, 178; 3, 39, 179 n.;  
iii. 2, 6, 177 n.; iv. 8, 13, 179

### III.—INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

ἀρχαία, 233  
ἀρχιερεύς, 314

βελτίος, 11, 233

γά, γαίη, 261, 263  
γένη, 181 ff.

δῆμος, 236  
δέναι, 203

εἶδεν, εἶδον, 264  
εἶδη, 181 ff.  
εἶδον συμπληρωθῇ, 181 ff.  
εἰσέλευτο, 234  
εἰσέλθαι, 311  
εἰσέρχεται, 312  
εἰσέρχεται, 232

ἐπιχρᾶναι, 311  
ἐκτίμησας, κτίμης, 203

θεῖς καταχρησάμενος, 312

καλλιέτης, 304  
κατάχρησις, 312  
κατατρέφει, 230  
κράττει, κρείσσει, κρείσσει, 267 f.

λόγος, 182 ff.

μέσος, 233, 235  
μνηστήρ, 210

μυθήσεται, 310  
νῆς, 231

ὄγκος, 189 f., 193, f.  
ὄνομα, 183 ff.

πορῶ, πέρ, 261, 263

ρήμα, 183 ff.  
ρότρεται, 206

σάλητος, 263 f.

τόν ἔργον, 231  
τόποι, 241

ὄρεται, 233, 241, 253  
ὄρεται, 267 f.

χαρᾶς, 241  
χρησται, χρησται, 267 f.

### IV.—BOOKS NOTICED

Amand de Mendicis (E.), *Le Mont-Athos. La presqu'île des*  
*admirables*, 358

*Ancient Art in American Private Collections*, 348

Anderson (J. K.), *Handbook to the Greek Vases in the Oxford*  
*Museum*, 370

Andrews (A.), *The Greek Tyrants*, 333

Banciuelli (R. B.), *Hellenistic-Byzantine Miniatures of the*  
*Book of the Ambrosiana*, 351

Barker (Sir E.), *From Alexander to Constantine, Passages and*  
*Documents illustrating the History of Social and Political*  
*Ideas*, 338 B.C.—A.D. 337, 336

Baynes (N. H.), *Byzantine Studies and other Essays*, 368

Bendley (Sir J. D.), *Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters*, 349

Becchi (G.), *Oreografi antiche dalle miniere alle barbariche*,  
348

Bennett (E. L.), *The Pylae Tablets. Texts of the Inscriptions*  
*found, 1935-54, with a foreword by C. W. Blegen*, 342

Bennett (E. L.), Chadwick (J.) and Ventris (J.), *The*  
*Knossos Tablets [Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies,*  
*Supp. 2], ed. M. Ventris*, 342

Bierant (H.), *Klein-Ägyptische Siegelbilder. Stilge-*  
*schichtlich und chronologische Untersuchungen*, 360

Breitenstein (N.) and Johansen (K. F.), *Corpus Vasorum*  
*Antiquorum. Denmark, Copenhagen, National Museum,*  
*fasc. 7*, 350

Brett (A. B.), *Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Catalogue of*  
*Greek Coins*, 334

Buck (C. D.), *The Greek Dialects. Grammar, Selected In-*  
*scriptions, Glossary*, 343

Cary (G.), *The Medusa of Alexander*, ed. D. J. A. Ross, 307

Chamoux (F.), *Fouilles des Delphes, Tome IV, Monuments*  
*figurés: sculpture, Fasc. 5, L'Aurige*, 363

Clairmont (C.), *Greek Pottery from the Near East [Berytus*  
*NT], 357*

Coche de la Ferté (E.), *Les bijoux antiques*, 348

Cook (R. M.), *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum. Great Britain,*  
*fasc. 13, British Museum fasc. 3, Department of Greek and*  
*Roman Antiquities*, 350

Cornack (J. M. R.), *The Inscribed Monuments of Aphro-*  
*diasia*, 363

Crawford (D. S.), *Papyri Michaelides (ed., trans. and*  
*notes)*, 345

Dale (A. M.), *Euripides, Alceste (ed., introduction and*  
*commentary)*, 326

Elton (S.), Amundsen (L.) and Waddington-Ingram  
(R. P.), *Fragments of Unknown Greek Tragic Texts with*  
*Musical Notation*, 325

Festschrift Bruno Siedl zum 60. Geburtstag am 18 Juni 1936  
von Freunden und Schülern überreicht, 317

Festschrift für Carl Weickert, 317

Finley (M. I.), *The World of Odysseus, with a foreword by*  
*Sir Maurice Bowra*, 319

Gatti (C.), *Gli dei fra i mortali. Saggio sugli onori religiosi*  
*a personalità umane nella tradizione storico-letteraria ellenica*  
*classica*, 340

Garnet (L.), *Demosthenes. Plaidoyer Civilis I (text and*  
*trans.)*, 330

Gigante (M.), *La costituzione degli Ateniesi. Studi sulla*  
*pseudo-Senofonte*, 335

Habicht (G.), *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*, 340

Hennrichsen (B.), *Rætti og l'histoire du texte de Thucy-*  
*dide*, 329











# THE JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES

VOLUME LXXVII (Part 1) 1957

*This Volume in honour of Sir David Ross is published with assistance from the Trustees of the Nuffield Foundation, and with the aid of contributions from Members and others.*

## CONTENTS

PAGE		
1.	ACKRILL, J. L.	PLATO AND THE COPULA: <i>SOPHIST</i> 451-259.
7.	ALLAN, D. J.	MAGNA MORALIA AND NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.
12.	CALOGERO, G.	GORGIAS AND THE SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE <i>NEMO SUI A SPONTE PECCAT</i> .
18.	CHERNISS, H.	TIMAEUS 38A-B13.
24.	DODDS, E. R.	NOTES ON SOME MANUSCRIPTS OF PLATO.
31.	FURLEY, D. J.	EMPEDOCLES AND THE CLEPSYDRA.
35.	GLUTHRIE, W. K. C.	ARISTOTLE AS A HISTORIAN OF PHILOSOPHY.
42.	HARRISON, A. R. W.	NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V, AND THE LAW OF ATHENS.
44.	HUCKEN, WINIFRED F.	KNOWLEDGE AND FORMS IN PLATO'S <i>THEAETETUS</i> .
54.	JAEGER, W.	ARISTOTLE'S USE OF MEDICINE AS MODEL OF METHOD IN HIS ETHICS.
62.	KNEALE, W. C.	ARISTOTLE AND THE <i>CONSEQUENTIA MIRABILIS</i> .
67.	LANGERBECK, H.	THE PHILOSOPHY OF AMMONIUS SACCAS.
73.	LUTJES, H. J. DROSSAART	ARISTOTLE'S <i>ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΥ</i> .
81.	MANSION, AUGUSTIN	LE TEXTE D'ARISTOTE <i>PHYSIQUE</i> II, 1-3 DANS LES VERSIONS ARABO-LATINES.
87.	MERLAN, P.	METAPHYSIK: NAME UND GEGENSTAND.
93.	MINIO-PALUELLO, L.	A LATIN COMMENTARY ON THE <i>PRIOR ANALYTICS</i> .
105.	OWEN, G. E. L.	A PROOF IN THE <i>ΠΕΡΙ ΛΟΓΩΝ</i> .
113.	REES, D. A.	BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN THE EARLY ACADEMY.
119.	SOLMSEN, E.	THE VITAL HEAT, THE INBORN PNEUMIA AND THE AETHER.
124.	TARRANT, DOROTHY	PLATO, <i>PHAEDRUS</i> 74 A-B.
127.	THEILER, W.	EIN VERGESSENES ARISTOTELESZEUGNIS.
132.	TOD, M. N.	SIDELIGHTS ON GREEK PHILOSOPHERS.
142.	WALZER, R.	AL-FARABI'S THEORY OF PROPHECY AND DIVINATION.
149.	WEBSTER, T. B. L.	SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS IN GREEK TRAGEDY.
155.	WILPERT, P.	DIE STELLUNG DER SCHRIFT 'ÜBER DIE PHILOSOPHIE' IN DER GEDANKENENTWICKLUNG DES ARISTOTELES.
163.	NOTICES OF BOOKS	
174.	INDEXES	

THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES  
50 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1.  
PUBLISHED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE SOCIETY



# THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL FOR 1956-1957.

## President

PROF. A. W. COOMBE, F.R.S.

## Vice-Presidents

The following are Vice-Presidents:

SIR RICHARD LIVINGSTONE, B. Litt., LL.D., 1935-41  
 PROF. WILBERT MURRAY, O.M., 1915-27  
 PROF. E. R. DODDS, B.Litt., F.R.S., 1943-50  
 PROF. I. B. L. WEBSTER, F.R.S., 1952-55  
 PROF. DOROTHY TARRANT, 1956-57

PROF. SIR FRANK ADCOCK, B.Litt., F.R.S.  
 PROF. BERNARD ASHMOLE, C.B.E., F.R.S.  
 PROF. N. R. BAYNES, D.D., F.R.S.  
 SIR JOHN BEAZLEY, D.D., F.R.S.  
 SIR HAROLD IURIS BELL, C.B., C.B.E., F.R.S.  
 SIR JOHN FORSEY, K.C.B.

PROF. C. E. ROBERTSON, F.R.S.  
 E. E. C. ROBINSON, C.B.E., F.R.S.  
 SIR JOHN SHEPPARD, M.B.E., Litt.D.  
 SIR WILLIAM TARN, F.R.S.  
 PROF. A. J. B. WACE, F.R.S.

## Council

Elected 1956

J. P. V. D. BALSDON  
 PROF. A. I. BEATTIE  
 PROF. J. M. BLOEMFELT  
 V. DRECHOWSKI  
 MISS D. H. F. GRAY  
 PROF. W. H. G. SUTHER, F.R.S.  
 PROF. G. H. KIRKEND  
 PROF. A. D. MCMILLAN, F.R.S.  
 DR. F. H. STUBBINGS

Elected 1955

PROF. A. H. ARMSTRONG  
 PROF. H. C. HALLIDAY  
 J. M. LARKE  
 H. M. LARKE  
 G. A. W. TATE  
 J. G. DUFFIELD  
 I. R. D. MATHURSON  
 PROF. I. I. D. ROBERTSON  
 PROF. C. M. ROBERTSON

Elected 1954

PROF. K. J. DOVER  
 DR. A. J. GOSWELL  
 G. T. GIFFITH  
 N. G. L. HAMMOND  
 G. T. W. HARRIS  
 G. E. HARRIS  
 H. LIND JONES  
 F. H. SANDHURST  
 MRS. A. G. L'KE  
 PROF. H. A. WESTLAKE

## Executive Committee

THE PRESIDENT  
 THE HON. TREASURER  
 THE HON. SECRETARY  
 THE EDITORS

PROF. A. ANDERWES  
 PROF. DOROTHY TARRANT  
 A. G. WOODHEAD

Elected  
by the  
Council

## Acting Editorial Committee

PROF. A. W. COOMBE (Editor)  
 J. P. C. KENT (Anti-Fake)  
 PROF. P. J. STEVENS (Review Editor)  
 M. S. F. HADD, is *ex-officio* a Member of the  
 British School of Athens

PROF. H. G. L. BITTO  
 PROF. GILBERT MURRAY  
 PROF. C. M. ROBERTSON  
 PROF. I. TATE  
 A. G. WOODHEAD

## Trustees

PROF. SIR FRANK ADCOCK

PROF. BERNARD ASHMOLE

PROF. E. J. H. JETTING

## Hon. Treasurer

SIR T. ST. QUENTIN HILL, M.C.M.G.

## Hon. Secretary

SIR JOHN FORSEY, K.C.B.

## Hon. Secretary for U.S.A.

PROF. STERLING DOW

## Secretary

MRS. M. WINNIEGTON-ISHAM

## Hon. Auditors

MESSRS. DAVEY, BRIDGWATER & CO.  
 15-17, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.4.

## Bankers

MESSRS. CHURCH & CO.  
 1, COMILAR STREET, E.C.4.

## Officers of the Joint Library

### Hon. Librarian

PROF. E. G. THOMAS, F.R.S.

### Librarian

MISS J. E. JOURNAN

### Keeper of Lantern Slides

MRS. M. J. JOURNAN

Contributions to the Journal should be sent to Prof. A. W. Coombe, The University, Glasgow.  
 Books intended for review should be addressed to The Librarian, 15 Bedford Square, W.C.1.

# THE JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES


VOLUME LXXVII (Part 2) 1957

*This Volume is published with assistance from the Trustees of the Nuffield Foundation*

## CONTENTS

PAGE		
177.	HENDERSON, M. L. ANDREWES, A., and LEWIS, D. M.	GILBERT MURRAY. NOTE ON THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.
181.	BLUCK, R. S.	FALSE STATEMENT IN THE <i>SOPHIST</i> .
187.	BOOTH, N.	ZENO'S PARADOXES.
202.	CHADWICK, J.	MINOAN LINEAR B: A REPLY.
205.	DALE, A. M.	AN INTERPRETATION OF ABL. VESP. 116-210 AND ITS CON- SEQUENCES FOR THE STAGE OF ARISTOPHANES.
211.	DESBOROUGH, V. R. d'A.	A GROUP OF VASES FROM AMATHUS.
220.	DIAMANTOPOULOS, A.	THE DANAID TETRALOGY OF AESCHYLUS.
230.	DOVER, K. J.	THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF AESCHYLUS'S <i>EUMENIDES</i> .
238.	FRENCH, A.	SOLOON AND THE MEGARIAN QUESTION.
247.	GARTON, C.	CHARACTERISATION IN GREEK TRAGEDY.
255.	GOMME, A. W.	INTERPRETATIONS OF SOME POEMS OF ALKAIOS AND SAPPHO.
267.	HEALY, J. F.	NOTES ON THE MONETARY UNION BETWEEN MYTHILENE AND PHOKAIA.
269.	KARAGEORGHIS, V.	THE MYCENAEAN 'WINDOW-CRATER' IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM.
272.	LEAHY, D. M.	THE SPARTAN EMBASSY TO LYGDAMIS.
276.	PARKE, H. W., and BOADMAN, J.	THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRIPOD AND THE FIRST SACRED WAR.
283.	VERMEULE, C. C.	HERAKLES CROWNING HIMSELF: NEW GREEK STATUARY TYPES AND THEIR PLACE IN HELLEN- ISTIC AND ROMAN ART.
300.	WRIGHT, G. R. H.	CYRENE: A SURVEY OF CERTAIN ROCK-CUT FEATURES TO THE SOUTH OF THE SANCTUARY OF APOLLO.
	NOTES—	
311.	HAMMOND, N. G. L.	THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS—A CORRECTION.
311.	HAYNES, D. E. L.	PHILO OF BYZANTIUM AND THE COLOSSUS OF RHODES.
312.	COLEIRO, E.	A GREEK INSCRIPTION FOUND IN MALTA.
312.	MITFORD, T. B., and NIKOLAOU, K.	AN INSCRIPTION FROM KARPASIA IN CYPRUS.
314.	URE, A. D.	A BOEOTIAN KRATER IN TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
315.	WILLIAMS, R. T.	NOTES ON SOME ATTIC BLACK-FIGURE VASES WITH SHIP REPRESENTATIONS.
317.	NOTICES OF BOOKS	
321.	BOOKS RECEIVED	
323.	INDEXES	

THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES  
50 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1.  
PUBLISHED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE SOCIETY



# THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL FOR 1956-1957.

## President

PROF. A. W. GOMME, F.R.S.

## Vice-Presidents

The following ex-officio:

SIR RICHARD LIVINGSTONE, B.Litt., L.D., F.R.S.  
 PROF. E. R. DODGE, D.Litt., F.S.A., 1944-52  
 PROF. T. B. L. WERTHER, F.S.A., 1944-52  
 PROF. DOUGHEY TARRANT, 1954-56

and

PROF. SIR FRANK ADCOCK, D.Litt., F.R.S.  
 PROF. BERNARD ASHMOLE, C.B.E., F.R.S.  
 PROF. N. H. FAYNE, M.D., F.R.S.  
 SIR JOHN BEATLEY, L.D., F.R.S.  
 SIR HAROLD DICKS, B.Litt., C.B., C.M.G., F.R.S.

SIR JOHN FORSDYKE, K.C.B.  
 PROF. D. S. ROBERTSON, F.R.S.  
 E. S. G. ROBINSON, C.B.E., F.R.S.  
 SIR JOHN SHEPPARD, M.B.E., 1954-56

## Council

Elected 1955.  
 PROF. A. H. ARMSTRONG  
 PROF. R. C. BARRY  
 J. M. COOK  
 E. M. COOK  
 C. A. W. DILLIS  
 J. G. GRIFFITH  
 J. E. D. MATTHEWSON  
 PROF. L. J. H. RICHARDSON  
 PROF. C. M. ROBERTSON

Elected 1956.  
 PROF. K. J. ELLIOTT  
 DR. A. J. COBURN  
 G. T. GRIFFITH  
 N. G. L. HAMMOND  
 G. T. W. HOOKER  
 G. M. JENNINGS  
 H. LEITCH-JONES  
 P. H. SANDRACH  
 MRS. S. D. LEE  
 PROF. H. D. WESTLAKE

Elected 1957.  
 PROF. O. J. ALLAN, F.R.S.  
 A. R. BURN  
 P. E. CORREY  
 D. J. FISLEY  
 D. E. L. MATTHEWSON  
 C. J. HERRINGTON  
 MISS L. H. JEFFERY  
 PROF. H. D. F. KITTO, F.R.S.  
 PROF. F. I. STEVENS  
 A. G. WOODHEAD

## Executive Committee

THE PRESIDENT  
 THE HON. TREASURER  
 THE HON. SECRETARY  
 THE EDITORS

PROF. A. ANDREWES  
 PROF. DOUGHEY TARRANT  
 A. G. WOODHEAD

Elected  
by the  
Council

## Acting Editorial Committee

PROF. A. W. GOMME (Editor)  
 J. P. G. WENT (Asst. Editor)  
 PROF. F. I. STEVENS (Reviews Editor)  
 M. S. P. BODD, ex-officio as Director of the  
 British School at Athens

PROF. H. D. F. KITTO  
 PROF. C. M. ROBERTSON  
 PROF. J. LATE  
 A. G. WOODHEAD

## Trustees

PROF. G. MARTIN ROBERTSON

PROF. BERNARD ASHMOLE

PROF. R. J. H. JENNINGS

## Hon. Treasurer

SIR T. ST. QUENTIN HILL, K.C.M.G.

## Hon. Secretary

SIR JOHN FORSDYKE, K.C.B.

## Hon. Secretary for U.S.A.

PROF. STERLING DOW

## Secretary

MRS. M. WINDINGTON-ECGRAM

## Hon. Auditors

MESSRS. DAVEY, BRIDGWATER & Co.,  
 24-25 BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.4

## Bankers

MESSRS. COATES & Co.,  
 15 Lombard Street, E.C.3

## Officers of the Joint Library

### Hon. Librarian

PROF. F. G. THIRNER, F.R.S.

### Librarian

MISS J. E. SOUTHERN

### Keeper of Lambda Slides

MRS. M. J. THORNTON

Contributions to the Journal should be sent to Prof. A. W. GOMME, Long Crooked, Ayrshire, Scotland.  
 Books intended for review should be addressed to The Librarian, 36 Bedford Square, W.C.1.



# THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES

50 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1.

## HONORARY MEMBERS

H.M. the King of Sweden.

Abougar, Prof. E., *Ustî Tarih Fakültesi, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara, Turkey.*

Biegen, Prof. C. W., *University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.*

Boncin, Prof. Dr. E., *Via della Vite 7, Rome, Italy.*

Buschor, Prof. E., *Universität, München, Germany.*

Byvanck, Prof. A. W., *Burgervandium 24, Leiden, Holland.*

Charbonneau, Prof. J., *Palais du Louvre, 31 Quai du Louvre, Paris, France.*

Daux, Prof. G., *6 Avenue Paul Appell, Paris XIV<sup>e</sup>, France.*

Dinwiddie, Prof. W. B., *School of Architecture, Columbia University, New York, U.S.A.*

Dow, Prof. S., 690, *Widener Library, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.*

Dugou, Prof. C., *Faculté des Lettres, 72 Rue Pasteur, Lyon, France.*

Dumard, R., *30 Rue Perronet, Neuilly-s-Seine, France.*

Ellerin, Prof. S., *3 Cinis Terrone, Oslo, Norway.*

Haapala, Prof. Dr. C. H. E., *Archaeologisch Instituut, 33 Westpoortje, Amsterdam, Holland.*

Hill, Dr. B. H., *Platarch Street 9, Athens, Greece.*

Jaeger, Prof. Dr. W., *Widener Library, 774, Cambridge 38, Mass., U.S.A.*

Johansen, Prof. K. F., *The University, Copenhagen, Denmark.*

Karo, Prof. Dr. G., *1144 Harvard Avenue, Claremont, Cal., U.S.A.*

Karandak, Dr. M. Ch., *Director, National Museum, Athens, Greece.*

Karandak, Mrs. S. P., *National Museum, Athens, Greece.*

Keramopoulos, Prof. A. D., *Evaristos St. 6, Ampelokipoi, Athens 5, Greece.*

Klaassenbach, Dr. G., *Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin.*

Manni, Prof. A., *R. Museo Nazionale, Naples, Italy.*

Mannaris, Prof. S., *Polytechnic 47, Athens, Greece.*

Meritt, Prof. B. D., *Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A.*

Merlin, Dr. A., *Musée du Louvre, Paris, France.*

Montesoro, Signora P. Zanussi, *Il Pizzo, S'Agostino Di Sorrento, Naples, Italy.*

Nilsson, Prof. M. P., *Bredgatan 25, Lund, Sweden.*

Orlandos, Dr. A. C., *4 Varnakton St., Athens, Greece.*

Picard, Prof. Ch., *16 Avenue de l'Observatoire, Paris VP, France.*

Richer, Dr. G. M. A., *81 Viale delle Mura Giustiniani, Rome, Italy.*

Robert, Prof. L., *31 Avenue Paul de Montsouris, Paris XIV<sup>e</sup>, France.*

Romilly, Prof. J. de, *5 Rue des Sablons, Paris XVI<sup>e</sup>, France.*

Rumpf, Prof. A., *Universität, Köln, Germany.*

Schaeffer, Dr. C. F. A., *Le Castel Bleu, 14 Rue Turgot, St. Germain-en-Laye, France.*

Schubert, Prof. W., *10 Marienstrasse, 19 B Halla/Saale Saebler, Germany.*

Snell, Prof. Bruno, *Universität, Hamburg, Germany.*

Thompson, Dr. Homer A., *Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.*

Zanotti-Bianco, Dr. U., *Palazzo Tanini, Monte Giardino 35, Rome, Italy.*

## The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies

60 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1

President: PROFESSOR A. W. Gomme, F.R.S.

The Society, founded in 1879 to promote the study of Greek literature, history and art, maintains its connection with the Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies.

1. A Library of Hellenic Studies, containing every newly issued work and paper of importance.
2. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
3. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
4. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
5. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
6. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
7. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
8. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
9. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.
10. A Series of Hellenic Studies, the most important of which are published by the Society.

## The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

59 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1

President: MISS M. V. TAYLOR, C.B.E., F.R.S.

The Society was formed to promote the study of the history, literature and art of Rome, Italy and the Roman Empire in central Europe to about A.D. 476. Its principal activities are the publication of the *Journal of Roman Studies*, the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, and the *Journal of Classical Studies*.

The Society also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*. It also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*.

The Society also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*. It also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*.

The Society also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*. It also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*.

The Society also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*. It also publishes the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, the *Journal of Classical Studies*, and the *Journal of Roman Studies*.

The following may be procured from the Secretary of the Society:

1. LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF J. D. BEAZLEY. Oxford, 1951. Price 15s.
2. Supplementary Papers:
  - No. I. EXCAVATIONS AT MEGALOPOLIS (1890-91). By E. A. Gell, W. Taylor, G. C. Richards, and W. J. Woodhouse with an architectural description by R. W. Smith. Folio. London, 1892.
  - No. II. ECCLESIASTICAL SITES IN ISAVRIA (Iolich Tracheni). By A. C. Headlam. Folio. London, 1893. Price 11s. for both volumes.
  - No. VI. CORINNA. By Denis L. Page. 44 pages. Demy 8vo. Price 12/6.
  - No. VII. PERSPECTIVE IN ANCIENT DRAWING AND PAINTING. By John White. 100 pages. Demy 8vo. Price 16/6.
  - No. VIII. THE GREEKS AND THEIR EASTERN NEIGHBOURS. By T. J. Dunne. 96 pages. Demy 8vo. Price 16/6.

## THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION

The objects of the Classical Association are to promote and maintain the well-being of classical studies, and in particular (a) to improve upon public education in the classics, (b) to secure a place in the national scheme of education, (c) to improve the position of classical teachers, (d) to encourage investigation and call attention to new discoveries, (e) to create opportunities for intercourse among lovers of classical learning.

Members of the Association are entitled to vote and to be elected. The annual subscription is 5s. (the composition of 1951). Members receive a copy of the annual Proceedings of the Association. They may also obtain the *Classical Review* and *Classical Quarterly* at reduced rates, though the reduction cannot be guaranteed. A subscription is paid before January 31st in each year. Grants and Bursaries may be obtained by an application to the Association.

Applications for membership should be addressed to the Hon. Secy, The Classical Association, Mrs. John M. Harker, M.A., The University, Edmund St., Birmingham, 21. Inquiries should be addressed to the Hon. Secretaries of the Association (T. W. Martin, M.A., The School, London, S.W.17, and Professor I. J. D. Richardson, M.A., University of London, 19, Bedford Square, London, W.C.1). The Hon. Secy, The Classical Association, Mrs. John M. Harker, M.A., The University, Edmund St., Birmingham, 21. Inquiries should be addressed to the Hon. Secretaries of the Association (T. W. Martin, M.A., The School, London, S.W.17, and Professor I. J. D. Richardson, M.A., University of London, 19, Bedford Square, London, W.C.1).

Contributions to the JOURNAL should be sent to Prof. A. W. Gomme, Long Cranford, Aylesbury, Bucks. Books intended for review should be addressed to The Librarian, Hellenic Society, 59 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.

# THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HELLENIC STUDIES

50 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1.

## HONORARY MEMBERS

H.M. the King of Sweden.

Blegen, Prof. C. W., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.

Bressia, Prof. Dr. K., Via delle Vite 7, Rome, Italy.

Buschor, Prof. E., Universität, München, Germany.

Byvanck, Prof. A. W., Burggravenlaan 24, Leiden, Holland.

Daux, Prof. G., b. Avenue Paul Appell, Paris 14<sup>e</sup>, France.

Dawson, Prof. W. B., School of Architecture, Columbia University, New York, U.S.A.

Dow, Prof. S., 690, Widener Library, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.

Dugas, Prof. C., Faculté des Lettres, 72 Rue Pasteur, Lyon, France.

Dussard, R., 30, Rue Fernand, Nantilly 2 Seine, France.

Eitrem, Prof. S., 3 Grande Tenstave, Oslo, Norway.

Hill, Dr. B. H., Phylarch Street, 9, Athens, Greece.

Jacger, Prof. Dr. W., Widener Library, 774, Cambridge 38, Mass., U.S.A.

Johansen, Prof. K. F., The University, Copenhagen, Denmark.

Karo, Prof. Dr. G., 1144 Harvard Avenue, Champaign, Ill., U.S.A.

Karouzou, Dr. M. Ch., Director, National Museum, Athens, Greece.

Karouzou, Mrs. S. P., National Museum, Athens, Greece.

Keramopoulos, Prof. A. D., Rue Eurycléus 8, Amphioklepoi, Athens 6, Greece.

Klaffenbach, Dr. G., Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin.

Maiuri, Prof. A., R. Museo Nazionale, Naples, Italy.

Marinatos, Prof. S., Polyta Street 47, Athens, Greece.

Meritt, Prof. B. D., Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A.

Merlin, Dr. A., Musée du Louvre, Paris, France.

Nilsen, Prof. M. P., Brødgaards 25, Lund, Sweden.

Orlandos, Dr. A. C., 4, Vasilevova St., Athens, Greece.

Picard, Prof. Ch., 16, Avenue de l'Observatoire, Paris 14<sup>e</sup>, France.

Rachner, Dr. G. M. A., 81 Viale delle Mura Romane, Rome, Italy.

Roberts, Prof. L., 31, Avenue Paul de Monmorant, Paris XII<sup>e</sup>, France.

Rumpf, Prof. A., Universität, Köln, Germany.

de Sanctis, Prof. G., Via Santa Chiara 61, Rome, Italy.

Schaefer, Dr. C. F. A., La Castel Blau, 14 Rue Turgot, St. Germain-en-Laye, France.

Schubart, Prof. W., 111 Minnastrasse, 119 B. Halle/Saale Saxony, Germany.

Thompson, Dr. Hinner A., Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.

Zanotti-Blanco, Dr. U., Palazzo Tiziana, Monte Giordano 38, Rome, Italy.



## The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies

50 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1

President: Professor A. W. Gomme, F.R.S.

The Society, founded in 1875, is devoted to the study of Greek language, literature, history and art, maintaining sympathy with the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies.

1. A Library of books, papers, documents, mostly early prints and rare pamphlets.

2. Some 12,000 ancient coins covering the whole range of ancient life and art.

3. The general collection, there are also of others with lecture notes.

Books and slides can be sent to Members by post.

Communications about books and slides should be addressed to the Librarian, at the above address.

By arrangement with the Society of Antiquaries the quarterly (General) Meetings are normally held in the Society's rooms at Burlington House, Piccadilly, W. 1.

The *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, recognized as one of the foremost periodicals in the field of classical scholarship, contains articles by leading authorities, numerous Digests, and reviews of recent books of importance to classical studies. It is normally published yearly as a single volume, which Members receive free of charge, the price to the public being £3.

The *Journal* is published by the Society at £2. The subscription for the Librarian is twenty pounds per annum over fifty years of age and thirty pounds for others. The subscription for Librarians and Student Assistants is £2 and £1 respectively. There is no entrance fee.

Applications for membership or inquiries about the Society should be addressed to the Secretary at the above address.

## The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

50 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1

President: Miss M. V. Taylor, C.B.E., F.S.A.

The Society was formed to promote the study of the history, archaeology and art of Rome, Italy and the Roman Empire in general down to about A.D. 500. In particular, so far as its members are able, and so far as it is possible without prejudice to its other objects, the Society endeavours to promote the study of British and Roman antiquities by providing space in its *Journal* to authors of Roman-British history and archaeology.

The Society maintains, in conjunction with the Hellenic Society, a joint library of works on classical antiquity and a collection of ancient coins. Members are entitled to borrow books and slides, which may be sent to them by post, and may also consult books in the library of the London University Institute of Classical Studies, which is located in the same building and is complementary to that of the Society. Communications about books and lecture slides should be addressed to the Librarian.

Meetings for the reading and discussion of papers are held in the rooms of the Society of Antiquaries in Burlington House, Piccadilly, about four times a year. Meetings are also held in various parts of the country. Notices of all meetings are sent to members.

The *Journal of Roman Studies*, which is open to the contributions of both British and foreign scholars, and includes an annual summary of Roman history discovered, is published annually and is sent post free to all members at the end of the year.

The annual subscription for membership of the Society is £2. The subscription for the Librarian is £2 (or three over fifty years of age and £1 for the others). Special conditions are obtained at the reduced subscription of £2.

All enquiries should be addressed to the Secretary.

### The following may be procured from the Secretary of the Society:

1. LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF J. D. BEAZLEY. Oxford. 1931. Price 15s.

#### 2. Supplementary Papers:

No. I EXCAVATIONS AT MEGALOPOLIS (1890-91)

By E. A. Gardner, W. Loring, G. C. Richards, and W. J. Woodhouse with an architectural description by R. W. Schultz. Folio. London. 1892.

No. II ECCLESIASTICAL SITES IN ISAURIA

(Cilicia Trachea). By A. C. Headlam. Folio. London. 1893. Price £1 1s. for both volumes.

No. VI CORINNA

By Denis L. Page. 88 pages. Demy 8vo. Price 12/6.

No. VII PERSPECTIVE IN ANCIENT DRAWING AND PAINTING

By John White. 100 pages. Demy 8vo. Price 16/6.

## THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION

The objects of the Classical Association are to promote the development and maintain the well-being of classical studies, and in particular (a) to keep open open public schools the claim of such studies to an eminent place in the national scheme of education; (b) to improve the practice of classical teaching; (c) to encourage investigation and call attention to new discoveries; (d) to create opportunities for intercourse among those of classical learning.

Membership of the Association is open to men and women alike. The annual subscription is 5s. (life composition £5 5s.). Members receive a copy of the annual Proceedings of the Association. They may also obtain the *Classical Review* and *Classical Quarterly* at reduced prices, though the reduction cannot be guaranteed unless the subscription is paid before January 31st in each year. Grace and dues may be obtained for an annual subscription of 5s.

Applications for membership should be addressed to the Hon. Treasurer of the Association (J. S. Shanks, M.A., Queen Mary's School, Basingstoke, Hants.). Inquiries should be addressed to either of the Hon. Secretaries of the Association (T. W. Malpas, M.A., Dec. School, London, S.W. 17, and Professor L. J. D. Richardson, M.A., University College, Cardiff), or to the Hon. Secretary of any one of the Local Branches, viz. Aberystwyth, Bedford, Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, East Anglia, Hull, Kent, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Llanelli, Manchester, Nottingham, North Staffordshire, Northumberland and Durham, North Wales, Nottingham, Oxford, Reading, Sheffield, Shrewsbury, Southampton, South Western (Winter), Sussex, Swansea, Tisbury, Worcester and Wrexham.

Contributions to the JOURNAL should be sent to Prof. A. W. Gomme, The University, Glasgow.

Books intended for review should be addressed to The Librarian, Hellenic Society, 50 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1

Printed in Great Britain by Fooks Brothers Limited, Reading and London







*"A book that is shut is but a block"*

**CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY**  
GOVT. OF INDIA  
Department of Archaeology  
**NEW DELHI.**

Please help us to keep the book  
clean and moving.

---

U. P. 148, P. 11101.